

**Escola de
Cultura de Pau**

2012 Yearbook of Peace Processes

VICENÇ FISAS

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This yearbook was written by Vicenç Fisas, Director of the UAB's Escola de Cultura de Pau, in conjunction with several members of the Escola's research team, including Patricia García, Josep María Royo, Jordi Urgell, Pamela Urrutia, Ana Vilellas and María Vilellas.

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Glossary

ACP: Alliance for the Consolidation of Peace	BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic
ADC: <i>Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement</i> (Mali)	BRA: Balochistan Republican Army (Pakistan)
ADF: Alliance of Democratic Forces (DR Congo)	BRN: <i>Barisan Revolusi Nasional</i> /National Revolutionary Front (Thailand)
ADLF: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo	CAIJP: Concise Agreement for an Immediate Just Peace
AI: Amnesty International	CAR: Central African Republic
AIAI: <i>Al-Itihaal Al-Islami</i>	CARHRIHL: Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
AKIN: American Kurdish Information Network	CAVR: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean	CCN: National Conciliation Commission
ALS: Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia	CCP: Colombians for Peace
AMIB: African Union Mission in Burundi	CCR: Consultative Commission for Regionalisation
AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission	CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
AMIS: African (Union) Mission in the Sudan	CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia	CERA: Coordination of the Former Armed Resistance
ANBP: Afghanistan New Beginning Programme	CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
ANC: African National Congress	CHMT: Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (Uganda)
ANCD: National Alliance for Democratic Change	CIS: Community of Independent States
ANDDH: Nigerian Association of Human Rights	CJMC: Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee
ANRAC: National Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance	CMI: Crisis Management Initiative
APCLS: <i>Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Démocratique</i> (DRC)	CNDD: <i>Conseil Nationale pour la Défense de la Démocratie</i> (National Council for the Defence of Democracy)
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Kashmir)	CNDP: <i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i> (National Congress for People's Defence) (DR Congo)
APRD: Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (Central African Republic)	CNF: Chin National Front (Myanmar)
AQIM: Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb	CNP: National Peace Council (Colombia)
AQMI: Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb	CNR: National Reconciliation Commission
ARLA: Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad	CNRR: National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation
ARLPI: Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (Uganda)	CNT: National Chadian Convention
ARMM: Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Philippines)	COBRA: Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (India)
ARPCT: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (Somalia)	COCE: ELN Central Command (Colombia)
ARS: Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia	CODESA: Conference for a Democratic South Africa
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations	CODHES: Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement
ASWJ: <i>Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a</i>	COPAZ: National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
ATNM: <i>Alliance Tuareg Niger-Mali</i>	CORCAS: Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs
ATNMC: Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change	CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
AU: African Union	CPI: Communist Party of India
AUC: United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia	CPJP: <i>Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix</i> (Central African Republic)
BERSATU: Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MRPMP) (Thailand)	CPLA: Cordillera People's Liberation Army
BGF: border guard force	CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines
BINUCA: United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic	
BLA: Baloch Liberation Army (Pakistan)	
BLF: Baluchistan Liberation Front (Pakistan)	
BLT: Bodoland Liberation Tiger (India)	
BNLF: Bru National Liberation Front	

CRAES: Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs (Senegal)

CRIC: Regional Council of the Cauca Indians (Colombia)

CUF: Unified Command of the Armed Forces of Cabinda

DAC: Democratic Alliance for Change

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DEHAP: Democratic People's Party

DH Centre: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

DHD: *Dima Halim Daoga* (India)

DIAG: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (Afghanistan)

DKBA: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Myanmar)

DTH: Democratic Society Movement

DTP: Democratic Society Party (Turkey)

DUP: Democratic Unionist Party

EA: Eastern Front

ECK: Electoral Commission of Kenya

ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EEBC: Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission

ELN: National Liberation Army

ELSAM: The Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (Indonesia)

ERG: Guevarist Revolutionary Army (Colombia)

ETA: *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*

EU: European Union

EUFOR Tchad/RCA: European Union mission in Chad and the Central African Republic

EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)

EUMM: European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia

EUPOL: European Union Police Mission

EUTCC: EU-Turkey Civic Commission

EZLN: Zapatista Army of National Liberation

FACU: Cabindan Unified Armed Forces

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FARDC: *Forces Armées de la RD Congo*

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)

FCD: Cabinda Forum for Dialogue

FDD: *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*

FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FDPC: *Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africain* (Democratic Front for the Central African People) (RCA)

FECAT: Forum for Exiled Chadians in Central Africa

FFR: *Front des Forces de Redressement* (Front of Forces for Rectification)

FIAA: Arab Islamic Front of Azawad

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front

FLEC-FAC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda*

FLV: Vavoua Liberation Front (Ivory Coast)

FNI: Nationalist and Integrationist Front (DR Congo)

FNL: National Forces of Liberation

FOMUC: Multinational Force in Central Africa

FORERI: Forum for the Reconciliation of the Irian Jaya Society

FPIR: *Forces Progressistes pour l'Indépendance et la Renaissance* (Chad)

FPJC: *Front Populaire pour la Justice au Congo*

FPLC: *Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo*

FRNF: Federal Republican National Front (Nepal)

FRPI: Patriotic Resistance Forces of Ituri (DR Congo)

FUC: *Union de Forces pour le Changement* (United Front for Democratic Change)

FURCA: Forces for the Unification of the Central African Republic

GAM: *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GIA: Armed Islamic Group

GMIP: *Mujahadeen Pattani* (Thailand)

GNP: Gross National Product

GPP: Patriotic Group for Peace

GPPAC: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (Philippines)

GSLM: Great Sudan Liberation Movement

GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

HAD: Hands Across the Divide

HCRP: High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace (Niger)

HDI: Human Development Index

HM: *Hizbul Mujahideen* (India)

HPG: People's Defence Forces

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IACHR: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICD: Inter-Congolese Dialog

ICG: International Contact Group on Somalia

ICG: International Crisis Group

ICR: International Centre for Reconciliation (Coventry Cathedral)

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP: Internally Displaced Persons

IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force

IEV: International Eco-Peace Village

IFMOT: Indigenous Freedom Movement of Tripura

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IMT: International Monitoring Team (Philippines)

INC: Ijaw National Congress

INFC: Iraqi National Founding Conference

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

IPD: Inclusive Political Dialogue (CAR)

IRA: Irish Republican Army

IREC: Independent Review Commission (Kenya)

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)

IWG: International Working Group (for Ivory Coast)

JASIG: Joint Agreement on Safety And Immunity Guarantees (Philippines)

JCC: Joint Control Commission

JDLF: Joint Democratic Liberation Front (Nepal)
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JRC: Joint Revolutionary Council
JTF: Joint Task Force (Nigeria)
JTMM: *Janatantril Tarai Mukti Morcha* (Terai Democratic Liberation Front) (Nepal)
JVMM: Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (Burundi)
JVP: *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna*
JWP: *Jamhoori Watab Party* (Pakistan)
KADEK: Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KCK: Kurdistan Democratic Confederation
KFOR: NATO Kosovo Force
KIO: Kachim Independence Organisation
KKK: Koma Komalen Kurdistan
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
KLNF: Karbi Longpi North Cachar Liberation Front (India)
KNC: Kurdish National Congress
KNU: Karen National Union / Karen Liberation Army
KPC: Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF: Kosovo Security Force
KVM: Kosovo Verification Mission
LJM: Liberation and Justice Movement
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Terai Eelam (Nepal)
LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy
MAPP: Mission to Support the Peace Process
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MDJT: Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad
MDR: Democratic Republican Movement
MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Nigeria)
MFDC: Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Senegal)
MFUA: Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MILIA: *Mouvement de Libération Indépendant et Aliés*
MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Ivory Coast
MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix*
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*
MLPA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MMT: Madhesh Mukti Tigers (Nepal)
MNDAA: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MNDS: National Movement for Developing Society (Niger)
MNJ: Niger Movement for Justice
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MNLF: Maoist Madheshi National Liberation Front (Nepal)
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (Nigeria)
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
MPA: Popular Movement of Azawad
MPC: Mindanao People's Caucus (Philippines)
MPCI: *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire*
MPIGO: *Mouvement Patriotique pour l'Indépendance du Grand Ouest*
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPRF: Madheshi People's Rights Forum (Nepal)
MRC: Revolutionary Movement of Congo
MRP: *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (Papuan People's Council) (Indonesia)
MSP: Melanesian Spearhead Group
MUP: Serbian police
MVK: Madheshi Virus Killers (Nepal)
NALU: *Armée Nationale de Libération de l'Ouganda*
NAP: New Alliance for Progress (CAR)
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCF: National Concord Front (Iraq)
NCP: National Congress Party
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDF: National Democratic Front (Philippines)
NDF: National Democratic Front (Myanmar)
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland (India)
NDFP: Niger Delta Patriotic Forces
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Defence Force (Nigeria)
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO: Nongovernmental organisation
NGRC: National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (Somalia)
NLD: National League for Democracy (Myanmar)
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPF: New Patriotic Front (Niger)
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: National Reconciliation Commission
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NRF: National Redemption Front
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak – Muivah (India)
NSMA: *Nagarik Shanti Mancha Asom* (Citizen Forum for Peace in Assam) (India)
OAS: Organization of American States
ODM: Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya)
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OIC: Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia)

ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUGBIS: UN Office in Guinea-Bissau
OPAPP: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (Philippines)
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Organisation)
AQIM: Al Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARECO: Congolese Resistance Patriots (DR Congo)
PCG: People's Consultative Group (India)
PCPIA: People's Committee for Peace Initiatives in Assam (India)
PDCI: Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire
PDF: Peace and Development Front (Myanmar)
PDF: Popular Defence Force
PDK: Democratic Party of Kosovo
PDP: Papuan Presidium Council
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PGPO: Perdana Global Peace Organisation (Thailand)
PIC: Peace Implementation Council
PJD: Justice and Development Party (Morocco)
PJPO: Perdana World Peace Organisation
PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PMCC: Pattani Malay Consultative Congress (Thailand)
PML: Pakistan Mulim League
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PP: *Partido Popular*
PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PSE: *Partido Socialista de Euskadi* (Basque Socialist Party)
PSOE: *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Socialist Workers' Party of Spain)
PTC: Peace and Tranquillity Committee (Myanmar)
PULA: Patan United Liberation Army (Thailand)
PULO: Patan United Liberation Organization (Thailand)
PWG: People's War Group (India)
RAFD: Rally of Democratic Forces
RCD-Goma: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma*
RCD-K-ML: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération*
RCD-N: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National*
RDL: *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté* (Democracy and Liberty Group)
RFD: Rally of Democratic Forces (Chad)
RPM-M: Revolutionary Workers' Party of Mindanao
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: South African Development Community
SBPAC: Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (Thailand)
SDF: Sudanese Defence Force
SDFA: Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
SG: Secretary General
SGSR: UN Secretary General Special Representative
SRSHR: Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
SICS: Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia
SIMEC: Socialist International Middle East Committee's Working Group on the Kurdish Question
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan's Liberation Army
SLMM: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council
SOMA: Suspension of Military Activities (Philippines)
SOMO: Suspension of Offensive Military Operations (Philippines)
SPDC: State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar)
SPLA: Sudan's People Liberation Army
SSA: Shan State Army
SSDF: South Sudan Defence Forces
TA: Tariq Ali (Nepal)
TAK: Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
TC: *Terai Cobra* (Nepal)
TDRA: Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TFP: Transitional Federal Parliament (Somalia)
TJLF: Terai Janatantrik Liberation Front (Nepal)
TKS: *Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha* (Tharu Welfare Society) (Nepal)
TMK: Kosovo Protection Corps
TMVP: *Tamileela Makkal Viduthalao Pulikal* (Sri Lanka)
TMSSA: Terai-Madhe Service Security Association (Nepal)
TNG: Transitional National Government
TNSM: Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law (Pakistan)
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Burundi)
TSJP: Terai Samyukta Janakranti Party (Nepal)
TTP: Tharik-i-Taliban Pakistan
TUSU: Thailand United Southern Underground
UAB: Autonomous University of Barcelona
UBP: National Unity Party (Cyprus)
UDMF: United Democratic Madhesi Front (Nepal)
UFDD: *Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (Union of Forces for Democracy and Development) (Chad)
UFDL: United Front for Development and Liberation (Sudan)
UFDR: *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (CAR)
UFR: Union of Resistance Forces (Chad)
UFR: Union of Rallied Forces (RCA)
UFVN: *Union des Forces Vives de la Nation* (Union of Active Forces of the Nation) (CAR)
UIC: Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia)
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam (India)
UM: Union for the Mediterranean
UN: United Nations

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

UNAMID: UN-AU Mission in Darfur (Sudan)

UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan

UNASUR: Union of South American Nations

UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

UNHCHR: United Nations High Commission for Human Rights

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission

UNICEF: United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNIFL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIPA: Indigenous People's Organization Unit Awá (Colombia)

UNITA: *União para a Independência Total de Angola* (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal

UNMIS: United Nations Mission in the Sudan

UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNMOT: United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast

UNOL: United Nations Office in Liberia

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOMSIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPO: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office in Somalia

UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace Building Mission

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process

UNSLF: United Western Somali Liberation Front

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

UPDF: Uganda People's Defence Force

UPF: Uganda People's Front

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

UTO: United Tajik Opposition

UWSA: United Wa State Army (Myanmar)

UWSLF: United Western Somali Liberation Front

USA: United States of America

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

WPCNL: West Papua Coalition for National Liberation (Indonesia)

Introduction

This seventh edition of the **Yearbook of Peace Processes**¹ analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

The organisation of the analysis of each conflict follows a similar pattern in most cases: 1) a brief synopsis of the context of the conflict, with a small description of the armed groups and the main actors intervening in each conflict, 2) the background to the peace process, 3) the events that happened in 2011, 4) a table with the most significant events in the year as a summary, 5) a selection of websites where you can monitor the conflict and 6) a table illustrating the relationships among the primary and secondary actors in each conflict, highlighting the spaces of intermediation in each case.² At the start of every country, there is a small box with basic statistics on it. The government armed forces are not included in the section of the box called “Armed actors”.

The author of this yearbook has tried to stay within the bounds of mentioning new deeds, events, successes, failures or proposals in an attempt to limit personal opinions on these events to the extent possible.

MODALITIES OR STAGES IN PEACE PROCESSES

Informal **indirect contacts**
Formal indirect contacts
Informal **direct contacts**
Formal direct contacts
Informal **explorations**
Formal explorations
Informal **dialogues**
Formal dialogues
Formal **negotiations**
Formal **peace process**

By **negotiation** we mean the process through which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal actors within the same country) agree to discuss their differences in an agreed-upon setting to find a solution that will meet their demands. This negotiation can be either direct or through third-party facilitation. Formal negotiations usually have a prior, exploratory, phase, which enables the framework (format, venue, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future negotiations to be defined. By **peace process** we mean the consolida-

¹ The yearbook expands on the information provided by the *Escola de Cultura de Pau* through its annual publication “Alerta 2012” (Icària Editorial, 2012), which is updated quarterly through the electronic publication “Barómetro” (<http://escolapau.uab.cat>).

² This “space of intermediation” includes not only the more formal “facilitators or mediators” (which are indicated by letter size or bold face), but also other institutions or individuals that have somehow intervened. Obviously, facilitation efforts that were not made public are not included, even if the author is aware of some of them.

tion of a negotiation scheme once the thematic agenda and the procedures to follow have been defined, along with the calendar and the facilitators. Therefore, negotiation is just one stage in a peace process.

By **ceasefire** we mean the military decision to halt any combat or use of weapons during a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** includes not only a ceasefire but also the commitment not to engage in kidnapping, harassment of the civilian population, threats, etc.

Depending on the ultimate goals sought and the dynamic of the different phases in the negotiation process, the majority of peace processes can be categorised into one of these five **categories or models**, although some cases may combine two categories:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Confidence-building measures
- e) Formulas for self-governance or “intermediate political architectures”

The model of peace process is usually related to the kinds of demands presented and the actors’ capacity to exert pressure or demand (level of symmetry between the military, political and social spheres), although mentors and facilitators, the weariness of the actors, support received and other less rational factors related to leaders’ pathologies, imagined events or historical inertia also come into play. In some cases, though not many, especially if the process has lasted a long time, it might begin in one of the above categories (demobilisation and reinsertion, for example) and then the demands expand to situate the process in another more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all processes or their previous phases of exploration, dialogue and negotiation are undertaken with true sincerity, as it is common for them to be part of the actor’s war strategy, either to win time, to internationalise and gain publicity, to rearm or for other reasons.

Finally, I wanted to note that what we commonly call a “peace process” is actually nothing other than a “process to put an end to violence and armed struggle”. The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement are nothing other than the start of the true “peace process”, which is linked to stage called “post-war rehabilitation”. This stage is always fraught with difficulties, but it is where decisions are truly taken and policies are truly enacted which, if successful, will manage to overcome the violence (both structural and cultural) that will ultimately enable us to talk about truly having “achieved peace”. This yearbook, however, with the exception of a few appendices, shall limit itself to analysing the efforts made in the early stages of this long pathway, without which the final goal would be impossible to reach.

The main stages in a peace process


All peace processes require a huge time investment, and this is proven by the many years that must usually be spent for one to begin and bear fruit. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, peace processes follow a pattern with more or less known phases in which the most time is spent on negotiations. They work with an initial exploratory or testing phase, also called pre-negotiation, in which the actors intervening in the process (explorers) calibrate the conviction of the parties, that is, whether they are truly convinced that they are going to launch a negotiation process in which they will have to give up something. This stage is decisive, since negotiations are often held without true conviction by one of the parties, either the government or the armed group. In this case, the negotiations are destined for failure. The exploratory phase is when the terms of complete and absolute security for the future negotiators are tested, since there is a history of murders or attacks against them and nobody dares to embark on talks without full guarantees of their safety. This safety must be established with very clearly defined rules. Likewise, certain guarantees are sought for compliance with the agreements reached in this early stage; in this case, timelines and methodologies to be followed are

recommended; the pre-agenda or initial agenda is set; the terms of a tentative roadmap are agreed upon; and the conflictive aspects of the basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the meta-conflict) are clarified. In short, in this stage, the goal is to generate trust in the process itself: the role played by potential third parties is agreed upon, the imposition of plans (the very cornerstone of the negotiations) is discarded, and the adversary is recognised, giving him the legitimacy needed to engage in dialogue. Once this exploratory work has been completed, an “agreement on what must be agreed upon” is reached in order to then proceed to determining “how to do it”. The sum of all these steps is what sometimes makes up the “roadmap” or initial framework of what must be done to ensure that the process fares well. The roadmap is nothing other than a working schema, often a diagram, in which the steps to follow, which will guide the process, are outlined.

Once the negotiations have started, the parties ascertain whether the interlocutors are valid, that is, whether they are the representatives of the primary actors with the capacity to take decisions. Third-ranked actors have no place at the negotiating table, so it is always necessary to start with an inclusive approach which gives a voice to the actors, even if they are unwanted, who are the keys to resolving the conflict. Although it is unquestionably more comfortable, it makes no sense to invite friendly actors to the negotiating table; rather the true adversaries must be invited. The reason for this negotiation is for the opposing parties to sit down to talk under the mindset of achieving mutual benefit through an “everyone wins, no one loses” or “I win, you win” scheme, thus discarding zero-sum approaches in which one party wins and the other loses.

If the negotiation proceeds satisfactorily, the issues on the substantive agenda can be discussed (the ones on the procedural agenda will have already been agreed upon). At that point, given the fact that trust will have been established, personal relationships will develop, which will make it easier to reach an agreement, or at least partial agreements, with their respective protocols, which in turn lead to the final agreement which outlines how it will be implemented and who will implement it. This finally leads us to implementation agreements, including the forms of verification and resolving any potential disagreements that might arise in the final stages.

Usual stages in negotiation processes



Main conclusions of the year

- By the end of 2011, 19.5% of the negotiations were going well and 43.6% faced difficulties.
- There are four prolonged or “intractable” conflicts (Kashmir, Cyprus, Palestine and Western Sahara) which have been in negotiations for more than 20 years, with underlying issues related to identity, security, land and self-governance.
- The former Maoist insurgency in Nepal turned in its weapons after remaining cantoned since 2006.
- In 40% of the armed conflicts there are open or exploratory dialogues.
- There are 20 situations of conflict with no negotiations underway.
- In 60% of the negotiations there is external mediation-facilitation.
- The main reasons for crises have been ruptures or violations of ceasefires, internal divisions within the armed groups, terrorist attacks, disagreements on the agenda and divergences on the status of a region.
- The measurement of the temperature of peace has been 1.2.
- Of the conflicts which came to an end in the past 20 years, 80.9% were through a peace agreement and the remaining 19.1% through a military victory of one of the parties.
- In the rounds of negotiations, the figure of an external observer who serves as a witness and guarantor of what occurs at the negotiating table can be very useful.
- There are at least 22 countries with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration processes, with more than 413,000 beneficiaries. In Southern Sudan, there are aims to demobilise 80,000 soldiers from the SPLA and 70,000 troops from other security forces.
- Colombia is the country with the highest number of individual demobilizations.
- Over the course of the year, the armed struggle ended or six armed groups were demobilised in: LJM (Sudan), FPR (Chad), CPJP (Central African Republic), FRF (DR Congo), UPDS (India) and ETA (Spain).
- The negotiations between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco over the future of Western Sahara were interrupted due to Morocco's refusal to hold a new round of talks.
- The negotiations with the Taliban were interrupted after the attack against the Afghan government mediator although the government later said they were interested in resuming negotiations. In January 2012, the Taliban decided to negotiate peace with the USA in Qatar, where an office was open.
- Contacts between the PKK guerrilla group and the Turkish government were interrupted.
- Several armed groups in India expressed their willingness to embark upon negotiations.
- The political transition in Myanmar may enable a peace agreement with the ethnic armed groups to be reached.
- In Spain, ETA permanently abandoned its armed activities.
- Serbia and Kosovo reached agreements in terms of trade, freedom of movement, land registry, and mutual recognition of university degrees.
- The first official meeting to undertake formal negotiations for conflict resolution in Transnistria was convened in a 5+2 format after almost six years of cancellations.
- Palestine requested to be recognized as a state in the United Nations. In January 2012 negotiations with Israel in Jordan were resumed.
- The conflict in Colombia is the longest-standing without negotiations.

Peace processes in 2011

This yearbook analyses the status of 41 conflicts, 39 of them in negotiations, and two countries without peace processes (Colombia and Spain). In 40% of the armed conflicts today there are open or exploratory dialogues. During the year, seven groups laid down their weapons after achieving a peace agreement with their respective governments of abandoning their armed struggle.

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF 2011

Going well (3)	In difficulty (17)	Going poorly 6)	In exploratory stages (8)	Resolved (5)
<i>India (NDFB-Progressive)</i> <i>India-Pakistan</i> <i>Myanmar (NLD)</i>	<i>Senegal (MFDC)</i> <i>Sudan (JEM)</i> <i>Sudan (SLA)</i> <i>Somalia</i> <i>Western Sahara</i> <i>India (ULFA)</i> <i>India (NDFB)</i> <i>India (NSCN-IM)</i> <i>India (NSCN-K)</i> <i>Philippines (MILF)</i> <i>Philippines (MNLF)</i> <i>Philippines (NDF-NPA)</i> <i>Cyprus</i> <i>Moldova (Transnistria)</i> <i>Serbia-Kosovo</i> <i>Palestine</i> <i>Yemen</i>	<i>China (Tibet)</i> <i>Armenia</i> <i>-Azerbaijan</i> <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> <i>Israel-Palestine</i>	<i>Chad (UFR)</i> <i>Afghanistan</i> <i>India (naxalites)</i> <i>India (DHD -Jewel)</i> <i>India (DHD -Nunisa)</i> <i>Myanmar (UNFC)</i> <i>Thailand (South)</i> <i>Turkey (PKK)</i>	<i>DR Congo (FRF faction)</i> <i>Sudan (LJM)</i> <i>Chad (FPR)</i> <i>CAR (CPJP)</i> <i>India (UPDS)</i>

(Italics signal the unresolved conflicts which are still in the phase of armed struggle or which cannot be categorised as "armed conflicts" at the close of the year.)

Generally speaking, in 2011 **19.5% of the negotiations went well or ended satisfactorily**. Another 43.6% of the negotiations came upon serious difficulties, and 15.4% truly went poorly. Of the 39 negotiations listed in the table below, 19 are armed conflicts and 20 are unarmed conflicts.

In **Southern Sudan**, which achieved independence on the 9th of July, the leading armed group in the country, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), led by General Peter Gadet, declared a ceasefire in August and accept President Salva Kiir's offer of amnesty as the foundation for dialogue with the government. The SSLA troops joined the armed forces. The group had been formed at the beginning of the year to protest the corruption and poor management of oil resources by the government of Southern Sudan.

Moreover, relations between **Sudan and South Sudan** deteriorated due to lack of agreement on the implementation of certain key points in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The final demarcation of

the border layout, agreement on tax payment for the use of Sudanese pipelines to exploit South Sudan's oil, or the dispute over Abyei played a leading role in the various rounds of negotiations that took place in Addis Ababa during the year under the guidance of the High Level Panel for the Implementation of the AU resolutions, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. The parties reached an agreement at the beginning of September for the withdrawal of troops from the Abyei oil enclave, which had been occupied after a serious clash between both armies in May. The agreement included the deployment of a UN mission (UNISFA) responsible for certifying the demilitarization of the area and for ensuring the protection of the population. However, by the end of the year, both governments were reluctant to comply with the agreement and to withdraw their troops, which led to the UN protest.

In August, **the former** Maoist insurgency in **Nepal** turned over its weapons to a multiparty committee charged with supervising the peace process after its leader, Baburam Bhattarai, was appointed Prime Minister. The Maoists had been in cantonments since the end of the armed conflict in 2006.

In October a special parliamentary committee was formed to address the violence in **Balochistan (Pakistan)** and to negotiate peace with the groups which were defending the region's autonomy. The establishment of a committee followed the offer by the Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, to the Balochi leaders to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

After six years of secret contacts outside **Thailand**, the Thai government negotiators and separatist groups in the south, expressed their satisfaction in April with the meetings held. The talks were conducted with an alliance of two rebel groups, the Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front (BRN) and the more moderate Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO). The Thai delegation was represented by the Prime Minister in his role as chief of the National Security Council, as well as by General Prayuth and representatives of the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. On the side of the insurgency, the seven-person team representing the Patani Malay Liberation Movement (PMLM) led by Kastori Mahkota, the vice president and head of PULO foreign affairs, based in Sweden, along with other PULO and BRN delegates. The participants took due note of the lessons learned in other contexts, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Southern Philippines and Indonesian region of Aceh.

In the case of **Yemen**, the country suffered severe internal destabilization, which forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign a pledge to relinquish power after more than three decades in control. Throughout the year, the president refused on various occasions to sign an agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). After several months, with the precedent of the death of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and under greater pressure from the U.S.A and Saudi Arabia, among other factors, the president signed the pact in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in late November. In mid October, the UN Security Council had unanimously approved a call urging Saleh to facilitate the political transition and to make use of the plan put forward by the GCC. The GCC agreement provides for the transfer of power to his vice president, Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi, and a transition programme that includes the holding of elections in late February, 2012. The agreement also provides for the vice president to lead a security council for coordinating the tasks of demilitarization and for supervising the holding of a national dialogue. The agreement sponsored by the GCC allows president Saleh to remain as 'honorary' president until the elections, and includes a controversial immunity clause for him and his family. The agreement was welcomed by some Yemeni sectors, but was criticized by others -among them the Yemeni journalist and 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate, Tawakul Karmann - who rejected immunity for the president and demanded the case to be investigated by the ICC. Despite the agreement, acts of violence and mass demonstrations against Saleh continued to be reported. The new government of national unity was set up in December.

CONFLICTS THAT HAVE ENDED IN RECENT YEARS

2000	Burundi, Sierra Leone	2
2001		0
2002	Angola	1
2003	DR Congo, India (BLTF-BLT, DHD)	3
2004		0
2005	Indonesia (Aceh), Northern Ireland, Sudan (South), India (NLFT), Iraq (Kurdistan)	5
2006	Sudan (east), Sudan (Darfur - SLA Minawi), Nepal (CPN), Israel-Lebanon	4
2007	Ivory Coast	1
2008	Mali (ADC), Benin-Burkina Faso, Burundi (FNL), CAR (various), Kenya, Colombia (ERG), Sri Lanka (TMVP), Georgia-Russia, Lebanon	9
2009	Mali (ATNM), Niger, Chad (National Movement), Central African Republic (FDPC, MNSP), DR Congo (CNDP), Somalia (ARS), India (DHD-J), Myanmar (KNU - KNLA Peace Council), Thailand- Cambodia	10
2010	Nigeria (MEND), Niger (MNJ), Chad (UFCD faction, UFR; UFDD, CDR, UFDD/F), Ethiopia (UWSLF, ONLF faction), Eritrea-Djibouti, Somalia (ASWJ), Sudan (JRM, SLA-FREES), India KNF, KNLF, KCP-MC Lallumba faction), Myanmar (SSA-N)	17
2011	Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Spain (ETA)	6

PROLONGED OR “INTRACTABLE” IDENTITY CONFLICTS³

Country or region	Start of the negotiations	Years elapsed	Underlying issue
Kashmir	1949	62	Identity, security, self-governance
Cyprus	1974	37	Identity, territory
Palestine	1990	21	Identity, security, territory
Western Sahara	1991	20	Identity, territory

³ Using Edward Azar's terminology.

CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES AT THE END OF 2011

Ended		Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Spain (ETA)	6
Armed conflicts underway	With a consolidated process	Philippines (MILF), India (ULFA-Pro negotiations), India-Pakistan (Kashmir), Yemen	4
	With interruptions	Somalia, Sudan (factions of the SLA), Sudan (JEM), Afghanistan (Taliban), India (DHD-Jewel, DHD-Nunisa), Philippines (NPA), India (Naxalites), Myanmar (UNFC), Thailand (South), Turkey (PKK), Israel-Palestine	12
	Without a specific process ⁴	Algeria (OAQMI), DR Congo (east) (FDLR and others), Somalia (Al Shabab), Sudan (southern), Uganda (LRA), Colombia (ELN, FARC), Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), India (Manipur), Pakistan (Balochistan), Pakistan (northwest), Thailand (south), Russia (Chechnya), Russia (Ingushetia), Iraq	15
	Subtotal		30
Violent conflicts that cannot be categorised as "armed conflicts"	With a consolidated process	India (UPDS, NDFB Progressive), Philippines (MNLF, NDF)	4
	With interruptions	Senegal (MFDC), Chad (UFR), India (NDFB) Palestine	4
	Without a specific process	Uganda (ADF)	1
	Subtotal		9
Former unresolved armed conflicts	With a consolidated process	India (NSCN-IM), India (NSCN-K), Myanmar (NLD, Cyprus, Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia-Azerbaijan, Kosovo	7
	With interruptions	Western Sahara, China-Tibet, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)	4
	Without a specific process	Angola (FLEC)	1
	Subtotal		12
Ended			6
With a consolidated process			15
With interruptions			20
Without a specific process			17
TOTAL			58

⁴ The fact that there is no specific process does not mean that there are no explorations or agreements with some of the armed groups operating in the country, but if so they are not important or far-reaching enough to place the country in the other category.

MAIN REASONS FOR CRISES IN THE YEAR'S NEGOTIATIONS

Rupture or violations of the ceasefire
Internal divisions in an armed group
Terrorist attacks
Disagreement over issues on the agenda
Divergences over the status of a region
Mistrust in the facilitator
Demands for the cessation of violence
Rise in military activities of the armed group
Disagreement over where to hold the meetings
Disagreement over the status of a region
Military attacks from a third country
Calls for a referendum
Divergences on the continuity of sanctions
Disagreement over commitments not to use force
Disagreement over the date to hold a referendum
Requests for international help
Ban on negotiators travelling
Demand for a ceasefire
Illegalisation of an armed group
Arrests of the leaders of an armed group
Demands for the release of the arrested leaders
Failure to recognise interlocution with a government in exile
Failure to accept a partnership among opposing groups that are pursuing a unity government
Overlap with a peace agreement signed with another group in the region
Refusal to release the collaborators of an armed group
Armed group's refusal to become a border guard
Disagreement on the format of the negotiations and the countries to participate
A third country's plans to place military installations in a territory in dispute
Leaks of secret negotiations
Calls for greater prominence for a neighbouring country
Murder of a mediator
Demands for the withdrawal of military troops from a region
Previous demand to clarify positions
Difficulties in achieving support that would enable the Constitution to be amended
Rejection by the armed groups in a country to hold separate negotiations
Disagreements on territorial waters
Demands for the freedom of movement for the negotiator of an armed group
Escalation in armed violence
Disagreement over the return of refugees
Rejection of an external mediator
Rejection of one of the parties to hold a new round of negotiations
Refusal to grant a general amnesty to the members of an armed group

The peace temperature in 2011

For years now, the Escola de Cultura de Pau has drawn up a monthly indicator on the status of the peace negotiations existing in the world with the goal of analysing the overall dynamics of these processes. In 2011, this index analyses a selection of 14 negotiations.⁵

The index is developed based on the average result after granting three points to the processes that have fared well during the month, one point to those that remained at a standstill or showed no new developments, and zero points to those that have experienced difficulties. The maximum score in a given month would be 3.0, and the average 1.5 points.

The peace temperature in 2011												
	J	F	M	A	M	J	JL	A	S	O	N	D
1.9												
1.8												
1.7												
1.6												
1.5												
1.4												
1.3												
1.2												
1.1												
1.0												
0.9												
0.8												
0.7												
0.6												

As can be seen in the graph above, the year ended with a monthly average of 1.2 points, compared to the average of 1.2 in 2010 and 2009, 1.0 in 2008, 1.1 in 2007, 1.2 in 2006, 1.3 in 2005 and 1.5 in 2004. The index sheds light on the obstacles keeping the majority of processes from remaining on a positive course in

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1.5								
1.4								
1.3								
1.2								
1.1								
1.0								
0.9								

⁵ Armenia-Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Philippines (MILF, NPA), Georgia, India (ULFA and NSCN-IM), India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, Moldavia (Transnistria), Nigeria (MEND), Western Sahara, Sudan (JEM) and Turkey (PKK).

Conflicts and peace processes in recent years

The majority of the armed conflicts analysed in this 2012 Yearbook got their start between the 1970s and 1990s. During these years, several armed conflicts have ended, either through a permanent peace agreement (regardless of its quality) or by reaching a provisional cessation of armed hostilities. In any event, the interpretation of most of the conflicts from the 1990s and the fact that many of them have lasted until today enables us to draw preliminary conclusion on what action has been taken in these conflicts from the perspective of 20 years of history. We should mention that some of these conflicts have evolved from an armed to an unarmed phase, although in this section we shall examine all of them.

Of the 97 conflicts listed on the table below, 30.9% ended by means of a peace agreement and another 8.2% with an “imperfect” peace agreement, either because it was imposed or because it had certain gaps. In any event, we can point out that somewhat more than **one-third of the conflicts from this period have come to an end by means of an agreement**. Another 10.3% are in the resolution phase or have not been permanently resolved. **Those that have not been resolved and remain active account for 41.2% of the total**, and what is even more significant is the fact that **only 9.3% of these conflicts have ended by means of a military victory by one of the sides**. In other words, the vast majority of the conflicts are only resolved by negotiations, not military victory, and by embarking on some kind of process that leads to the signing of a final agreement.

Regarding the conflicts that ended in the past 30 years (47 of them), 38 ended through a peace agreement (80.9%) and nine with a military victory (19.1%), which serves to reaffirm negotiations as an effective means of resolving conflicts.

CONFLICTS UNDERWAY SINCE THE 1980s AND THEIR RESOLUTION UNTIL 2011

Countries	Period	Resolution
Afghanistan	89-...	Unresolved
Angola – FLEC	75-...	Unresolved
Angola – UNITA	75-02	Peace agreement
Algeria	91-...	Unresolved
Armenia-Azerbaijan	91-...	Unresolved
Myanmar – CNF	88-	Unresolved
Myanmar – KNU	48-...	Unresolved
Myanmar (MNDAA)	09-...	Unresolved
Myanmar – Shan	59-...	Unresolved
Burundi	93-00	Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL)	79-08	Peace agreement
Colombia – ELN	64-...	Unresolved
Colombia – FARC	64-...	Unresolved
Congo (Ninjas)	98-07	Imperfect peace agreement
DR Congo (Intercongolese Dialogue)	97-03	Imperfect peace agreement
DR Congo (Kivus and Ituri)	96-...	Without a permanent resolution
Ivory Coast	02-07	Peace agreement
Ivory Coast	11	Military victory
Croatia	92-95	Peace agreement
Chad	99-...	Without a permanent resolution
Cyprus	74-...	In resolution phase

El Salvador	80-91	Peace agreement
Eritrea-Djibouti	08-10	Peace agreement
Spain (ETA)	68-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia (OLF)	74-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia (ONLF)	84-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia-Eritrea	98-...	Without a permanent resolution
Philippines (Abu Sayaf)	90's-...	Unresolved
Philippines – MILF	78-...	Unresolved
Philippines – MNLF	70-...	In resolution phase
Philippines – NPA	69-...	Unresolved
Georgia (Abkhazia)	93-...	Unresolved
Georgia)	90-...	Unresolved
Guatemala – URNG	82-94	Peace agreement
Guinea-Bissau	98-99	Peace agreement
India (Andra Pradesh) – CPI	80-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – BLTF-BLT	92-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) –DHD	95-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) – ULFA	89-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – NDFB	92-...	In resolution phase
India (Manipur)	03-...	Unresolved
India (Nagaland) – NSCN-IM	80-	In resolution phase
India (Punjab)	81-93	Military victory
India (Tripura) – NLFT	89-05	Peace agreement
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	90-...	Without a permanent resolution
Indonesia (Aceh)	76-05	Peace agreement
Indonesia (Western Papua)	65-	Unresolved
Indonesia (Timor Este)	75-99	Peace agreement
Iran (PJAIC)	05-...	Unresolved
Iraq	03-...	Unresolved
Iraq-Kuwait	91	Military victory of a coalition of forces
Iraq (Kurdistan)	91-05	Peace agreement with political power-sharing
Northern Ireland – IRA	69-05	Peace agreement
Israel-Palestine	64-...	Unresolved
Kosovo	98-10	Ended without a peace agreement
Lebanon	89-90	Peace agreement
Lebanon-Israel	06	Peace agreement
Lebanon – Fatah al-Islam	07	Military victory by the Lebanese armed forces
Liberia	89-96	Imposed and imperfect peace agreement
Libya	11	Military victory
Mali	90-09	Peace agreement
Mozambique- RENAMO	77-92	Peace agreement
Nepal – CPN	96-06	Peace agreement
Nepal - Terai	07-...	Unresolved
Niger - MNJ	07-...	Unresolved
Nigeria (Delta) - MEND	05-10	Imperfect peace agreement
Pakistan (Balochistan)	06-...	Unresolved
Pakistan (Northwestern Frontier)	01-...	Unresolved
Peru – Shining Path	70-99	Military victory of the armed forces
Central African Republic	03-08	Peace agreement

Rwanda – FPR	94	Military victory of the FPR
Rwanda (FDLR)	97-...	Unresolved
Russia (Chechnya)	94-...	Unresolved
Russia (Georgia)	08	Imperfect peace agreement
Russia (Ingushetia)	08-...	Unresolved
Western Sahara	75-...	Unresolved
Senegal (Casamance)	82-...	Unresolved
Sierra Leone	91-00	Peace agreement
Somalia	89-...	Unresolved
Sri Lanka – LTTE	72-09	Military victory of Sri Lanka
South Africa	61-93	Peace agreement
Sudan (SLA)	03-06	Peace agreement
Sudan – SPLA	83-05	Peace agreement
Sudan (JEM)	03-...	Unresolved
Sudan – Este	05-06	Peace agreement
Sudan (southern)	09-...	Unresolved
Thailand (south) – PULO	68-...	Unresolved
Tajikistan	92-97	Peace agreement
Turkey – PKK	74-...	Unresolved
Uganda – LRA	89-...	Unresolved
Yemen North-South	94	Military victory of Northern Yemen
Yemen (AQAP)	09-...	Unresolved
Yemen –Zeidi sect	04-...	Imperfect peace agreement

STATUS OF THE 97 CONFLICTS ANALYSED

	Number	%
Ended with peace agreement	30	30.9
Ended with imperfect peace agreement	8	8.2
In resolution phase	4	4.1
Without a permanent resolution	6	6.2
Military victory	9	9.3
Unresolved	40	41.2
TOTAL	97	100.0

CONFLICTS ENDED

	Number	%
With peace agreement	38	80.9
With military victory	9	19.1
TOTAL	47	100.0

Witnesses in peace negotiations

Many peace negotiations are interrupted or enter into crisis because of disagreements between the parties in the course of the process. This is quite common, and in the worst case scenario it can entail a rupture in negotiations. At times, a given issue is interpreted differently by the parties, which leads to misunderstandings. To undo these erroneous interpretations, it is recommended that there be the figure of the “**external observer**” in peace talks who acts as a “**witness**” or “**overseer**” of the process, and who has the ability to clarify to the parties the points on whose meaning they cannot reach an agreement. In 2002, for example, the government of Indonesia and the GAM guerrillas reached a dead-end over differences in how they interpreted the cessation of hostilities to which they had agreed.

The figure of the witness in negotiations helps the parties to clarify their proposals, and they thus avoid entering a “meta-conflict”, that is, a problem over meanings. At any given point in time, the witness can determine whether a certain thing has been said or not, clarifying different interpretations of what has been said at the negotiating table. He or she provides guarantees to ensure that the process proceeds as smoothly as possible.

Witnesses do not perform the role of mediator or facilitator; rather they simply clarify. Their purpose is to ensure transparency in the parties’ communication. Should there be a formal mediator or facilitator, they also play the role of witness through their presence at all the meetings.

The box below illustrates the types of witnesses in peace negotiations:

The witnesses in a negotiation

1. With mediation
 - 1.1. With a witness
 - 1.2. Without a witness
2. Without mediation
 - 2.1. Without witnesses
 - 2.2. With witnesses
 - 2.2.1. External observers
 - 2.2.1.1. Professionals
 - 2.2.1.2. Civil society
 - 2.2.1.3. Church
 - 2.2.1.4. Politicians
 - 2.2.2. Friendly countries
 - 2.2.3. International contact groups

The figure of the **mediator-facilitator** exists in approximately half of the negotiations underway in the world, and this figure in itself serves as a witness of what takes place. However, the parties may also decide to have “other eyes” witnessing the proceedings and enlist the aid of an external observer who can serve as a witness of what is said and agreed upon. The other half of the cases involves direct negotiations between the parties. In these negotiations with no mediation, there may be the figure of a witness, such as in the first six rounds of talks between the ELN and the Colombian government held in Havana, Cuba between 2005 and 2007.

When there are witnesses but no mediators, there may also be an external observer or the participation of friendly countries or an international contact group. Regarding the former, the parties may request the presence of a **professional**, such as Álvaro de Soto in the second face-to-face meeting between Christiani’s

government in El Salvador and the FMNL in October 1989 held in San José, Costa Rica. Álvaro de Soto later became the official mediator. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue also played this role in the talks between the Spanish government and ETA held in Geneva in 2005 and 2006. In Colombia's peace process, both the Caracas Agreement (1991) and the Tlaxcala Agreement (1992) between the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinator (made up of the FARC, the ELN and the EPL) and the Colombian government, had an "international word witness" (Emilio Figueredo Planchart).

Another variation is the participation of **civil society**, such as in the state of Assam in India, where the People's Consultative Group is acting as the facilitator and witness of the talks with the ULFA guerrillas. In the aforementioned talks in Caracas and Tlaxcala between the Colombian guerrillas and the country's government, observers from Colombian civil society were brought in, including Nelson Berrío, Álvaro Vasquez del Real, Rafael Serrano Prada and Miguel Mottoa Cure.

The **Church** often acts as a witness. The Bishop-Ulama Conference (BUC) has been requested as a witness several times in recent periods and in its capacity as the Advisor on Religious Issues in the peace process between the government of the Philippines and the MILF guerrillas. A professional **politician** can also serve as a witness, sometimes a head of state or president, like Bill Clinton in July 2000 at Camp David, when he served as witness in the negotiations being held between the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, and the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Yasser Arafat.

Some peace processes enlist the aid of **friendly countries**, which can simply accompany the process or participate more actively in the negotiations. For example, in the case of Colombia, both Mexico and Venezuela were the witnesses and overseers of the peace process and disarmament of the EPL and the indigenous movement Quintín Lame in 1991. Finally, another kind of participation is the kind offered by an **international contact group**, like the one operating in the Philippines in the talks between the government and the MILF guerrillas, in which a group of NGOs made up of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), The Asia Foundation (USA), Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) and Conciliation Resources (London) participate in all the meetings. This group also includes diplomats from Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

In short, in the negotiation rounds it can be very useful to have a witness as an overseer of what happens in the negotiations. Even though they do not have the right to participate in the talks, they do have the authority to express their opinion to the parties afterward, especially when they do not concur on what has been said.

DDRs in 2011

The peace processes in the world in the past ten years have not always led to a DDR process, although the majority have. In the processes underway since 2000, the exceptions include Northern Ireland (where there was disarmament without reintegration) and Nepal (the turnover of weapons without reintegration). We could include Afghanistan as well, which does not yet have a final peace agreement although there is a demobilisation programme.

Between 2008 and 2011, DDR programmes have been recorded in at least 22 countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Republic of the Congo, DR Congo, Comoros Islands, Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Colombia, Chad, Uganda, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Nepal and Eastern Sudan), with more than 413,000 former combatants benefitting from these processes between 2011 and 2012. The largest programmes are the ones in DR Congo and Southern Sudan.

In 2010, the UNDP provided assistance to 25,000 male and 7,000 female former combatants in Burundi, Colombia, Ivory Coast, DR Congo, Kosovo, Nepal, Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Uganda. Eight DDR programmes were expected to be operating in 2011, specifically in Afghanistan, Chad, Comoros Islands, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Sri Lanka. In the immediate previous years there had been contributions to DDRs in the Central African Republic, DR Congo, Haiti, Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal, Niger, the Republic of the Congo, Serbia and Sudan.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

Year	Country	DDR
2010	Chad	YES
2009	Nigeria (MEND)	YES
2009	DR Congo (CNDP)	YES
2008	Central African Republic	YES
2008	Burundi (FNL)	YES
2007	Ivory Coast	YES
2006	Nepal	disarmament
2006	Eastern Sudan	YES
2005	Southern Sudan	YES
2005	Northern Ireland	disarmament
2003	Indonesia (Aceh)	YES
2002	Angola	YES
2002	Sierra Leone	YES
2001	Afghanistan	YES
2000	Burundi	YES

As noted, the UNDP had planned to launch a new DDR programme in **Afghanistan**. Between 2005 and March 2011, the UNDP had also partnered in a programme called Dismantlement of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) costing 116 million dollars. Before that, between 2003 and 2006 the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme (ANBP) had been in operation with the support of UNAMA and the UNDP, as well as economic assistance from Japan, which enabled 63,380 former officers and soldiers to be disarmed, 53,145 former combatants to be reintegrated, and 94,262 light and medium weapons and 12,248 heavy weapons to be collected.

The DDR in **Burundi** took place between 2004 and 2008 to demobilise 78,000 combatants, 41,000 of whom belonged to the armed forces, 15,500 to different armed groups and 21,400 to two paramilitary militias. The

total cost of the programme was 84.4 million dollars. In 2009, a new DDR process got underway in the country for the 8,500 combatants from Agathon's Rwasas' FNL, the last group to sign the peace agreements. The DDR, which was managed to the Ministry for National Solidarity, was to be completed by 2011 and called for the integration of 2,100 combatants into the army, 1,400 into the police and 5,000 into reintegration programmes. All of this was supported by the World Bank, which contributed 22.5 million dollars, 1.2 million of which was for demobilisation, 5.1 for reinsertion, 8.4 for reintegration, 2.6 for vulnerable groups and 4.5 to manage the programme, which included assistance for 11,000 adults "associated" with the FNL, who were first cantoned and then had to return to their communities. A special programme was launched for the women (around 1,200 beneficiaries) to grant them micro-credits through 60 local institutions, especially for farming projects.

In **Colombia**, as the result of the demobilisation of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the individual demobilisations of people belonging to the guerrillas (with an average of 2,642 people per year from 2006 to 2010), a total of 31,803 people were assisted by DDR programmes by the High Council on Reintegration in the period from August 2010 to July 2011. A total of 25,720 received educational services and 9,271 received job training. The government budget for the Reintegration Programme in the past three years, not counting international cooperation aid, was 78.4 million dollars for 2011, 95.4 for 2010 and 94.3 for 2009.

On the **Comoros Islands**, in 2011 a small DDR programme was implemented targeted at 50 people, half of whom were in the Gendarme forces, with the support of the UNDP as part of the Peace Consolidation Fund financed by the UN. Micro-credits were granted and a reconciliation project was launched with the victims. In June 2010, the first DDR programme was started targeted at 350 people, including members of the armed forces and victims of the 2008 uprising, which was put down by the African Union. Although the goal was to collect 400 weapons, in the end very few were collected.

In mid-2010, the first phase in the demobilisation of 1,200 combatants from the Forces Nouvelles in the **Ivory Coast** began, a process being monitored by the United Nations through UNOCI which will entail the integration of these combatants into the country's armed forces. The elections at the end of the year and the president's refusal to accept the results, with the consequent civil war, paralysed the DDR plans. The new president, Alassane Ouattara, took possession of his post on the 12th of May 2011, and on the 1st of June he appointed his first government, with the leader of the Forces Nouvelles as the prime minister. At mid-year, UNOCI began a programme to collect weapons and return the former combatants to civilian life in conjunction with the National Programme for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation. In August 2011, the government announced a demobilisation plan for 17,000 combatants, which was supposed to be finished by the end of the year. In September, 5,000 of them had joined reinsertion programmes and another 5,000 had joined the armed forces.

In November 2010, 4,080 combatants from the UFR, UFDB, CDR and UFDD/F laid down their weapons in **Chad**. Since 2007, more than 1,000 minors have been removed from the armed groups in this country. The United Nations has devised educational plans for them in an effort to reintegrate them into their communities after an agreement signed in June 2011.

In **Guinea-Bissau** there is a programme to reform the security system targeted at lowering the number of troops in the armed forces through a DDR programme being managed by the UNDP and the Peace Consolidation Fund. The United Nations has an Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS).

In **Liberia**, the International Migration Organisation (IMO) launched a reintegration programme in 2010 for 400 former combatants with the support of the government of Germany. This programme is slated to last eight months and revolves around ecological agriculture. Between 2003 and 2008, Liberia implemented an extensive DDR programme which encompassed 103,000 combatants and cost 110 million dollars.

In **Nepal**, the 31,152 Maoists did not turn over their 2,475 weapons to a multipartite committee charged with supervising the peace process until August 2011, after its leader, Baburam Bhattarai, was appointed prime minister. The Maoists have been cantoned since the end of the armed conflict in 2006. There are 1,000 women among the 3,000 minor soldiers to be demobilised, who shall require special treatment due to the discrimination suffered by women because of the patriarchal nature of Nepalese society. The World Bank has supported this cantonment and paid the families affected by the violence of the conflict with 52 million dollars in aid.

DDRS IN 2011 AND 2012

Country	Beneficiaries
Afghanistan	unknown
Burundi	8,500
Chad	4,080
Colombia	31,803
Comoros	50
Ivory Coast	17,000
Guinea Bissau	unknown
Iraq	unknown
Liberia	400
Nepal	31,152
Nigeria	20,192
Central African Republic	8,500
Republic of the Congo	30,000
DR Congo	150,000
Rwanda	5,669
Somalia	60
Sri Lanka	unknown
Sudan (Darfur)	+ 1,000
Sudan (east)	2,254
Southern Sudan (2012)	90,000
Southern Sudan	12,525
Uganda	unknown
TOTAL	+ 413,185

In **Nigeria** there is a reinsertion programme for the 20,192 combatants from the MEND who were granted amnesty in 2009. The process did not get underway until mid-2010, and it ended in September 2011 with a budget of 30 million dollars provided by the oil and gas multinationals. Very few weapons were turned over (2,700), and the reintegration began late and suffered from many shortcomings, which generated protests. The UN services agency, UNOPS, developed reorientation programmes. The amnestied former combatants received a payment of 439 dollars prior to reintegration. By mid-2011, 5,000 former combatants had benefited from educational and occupational programmes, and micro-credits had also been granted. There were criticisms that it was more a weapons control programme than a reintegration programme. Furthermore, the amnesty criminalised the beneficiaries and weakened their claims to improve the situation in the Niger Delta region. The amnesty programme, which ended in September 2011, was part of the office of the Special Counsellor for the President for the Niger Delta region.

There has been a DDR programme in the **Central African Republic** for five groups (APRD, UFR, MLJC, UFDR and FDPC) which total 8,500 combatants. The programme has a budget of 27 million dollars and is

managed by the United Nations office to support peace-building in the CAR. It is a three-year programme which began one year after the peace agreement was signed in 2008 with the Inclusive Political Dialogue. It is being supervised by military observers from the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States). The Steering Committee is made up of the government (General Sylvestre Yangongo, the Minister-Delegate of the President of the Republic charged with the DDR), the five armed groups, the UNDP, MICOPAX, BINUCA, the World Bank, France and the European Commission, which meet biweekly. Fourteen local committees have also been created. The agreement reached in June 2011 between the government and the CPJP stipulated a DDR process that would include the minor soldiers in this group. However, a report written jointly by Watchlist International and the IDMC noted that minors were still highly active in the local self-defence militias. The report claimed that there were 2,000 minors in these militias, higher than the number of minors in the armed groups.

In the **Republic of the Congo**, there is a DDR programme for the Ninja militias which is slated to end in September 2011. It particularly affects the Pool region and has the support of the World Bank. In 2009, a programme began that benefitted 30,000 former combatants, including 19,000 demobilised troops from after the 1999 war who did not enter the reintegration phase, 5,000 ninjas and 6,000 members of the armed forces. The cost of this programme was 24.2 million dollars, and it was financed by the World Bank.

In the **DR Congo**, the World Bank supported the final phase of a demobilisation and reintegration programme for 150,000 combatants as well as a reduction in military spending, which ended in September 2011. A 31.3 million dollar loan was granted, and there are calculated to be 45,000 former combatants in the reinsertion phase. In late 2009, a second phase in the DDR programme that got underway in mid-2008 was completed. The first phase had started in 2004 and ended in 2006 with the demobilisation of 300,000 combatants. This second phase affected 12,820 combatants from the CNDP, 8,038 of whom joined the Congolese armed forces. The total budget was 75 million dollars.

In **Rwanda**, the World Bank has been supporting the demobilisation and reintegration of 5,660 former combatants since 2009 with 19.1 million dollars, with special attention to women, minors and injured persons. A total of 3,119 reinsertion kits have been given to the dependents of the former combatants.

In **Somalia**, the Transitional Federal Government is providing housing and food to around 60 former combatants with minor logistical support from the UNSOR.

In **Sri Lanka**, even though a peace agreement was not reached with the Tamils in the conflict in which the country was enmeshed between 1972 and 2009, in 2009 the UNDP launched a DDR programme with a budget of 120,000 dollars which ended in 2011. It was implemented by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms and was managed by the UNDP, the ILO and bilateral organisations, especially from the USA.

In April 2011, more than 1,000 former combatants from the armed forces and former combatants from the region of **Darfur (Sudan)** joined a DDR programme organised by the National Sudanese Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Coordination Unit. The Hybrid AU and UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has provided medical assistance and logistical support. Its mandate includes providing assistance to the establishment of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme stipulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement.

The UNDP has supported the demobilisation of 2,254 former combatants in the second phase of the DDR programme in **Eastern Sudan**, which reached a peace agreement in 2006.

In **Southern Sudan**, there are plans to demobilise 80,000 soldiers from the SPLA and 70,000 troops from other security forces, for a total of 150,000 people. Around 90,000 of them may be demobilised in 2012 according to William Deng Deng, the director of the DDR Commission. There had been plans for a small

programme in 2011 that would affect 2,600 former combatants from the new country. The programme is being managed by the DDR Unit of the United Nations, which includes the UNDP, UNICEF, the WFP and the UNFPA. It is also receiving support from UNMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan). In a previous phase resulting from the 2005 peace agreement, in 2011 a total of 12,525 former combatants completed a programme that was initially supposed to affect 90,000 combatants (plus another 90,000 from the Sudanese army) and cost 55 million dollars. The programme was not successful, partly because of the high salaries of the SPLA military forces (150 dollars per month) compared to the low income of civil society, which hindered the disarmament of an oversized army (194,000 troops) which absorbs half of the national budget. The DDR also got underway in 2009 after several years' delay.

In **Uganda**, the MDRP financed the Amnesty Commission, which closed in June 2007. A post-DDR programme got underway in July 2008, with 28,000 beneficiaries from the LRA and the ADF, and was to last until 2010. The budget was 8.2 million dollars. Today, the UNDP is financing the disarmament and development of the region of Karamoja in the north of the country, and the World Bank has financed a demobilisation and reintegration programme that ended in June 2011.

The history of DDRs reached its peak in the middle of last decade, especially due to the high number of programmes that were being implemented in Africa. According to the Escola de Cultura de Pau, in 2007 there were DDR programmes for 1.1 million former combatants, 688,390 of whom were from armed opposition groups and 421,380 members of the armed forces. A total of 757,000 people benefited at some stage in these processes.

BENEFICIARIES OF DDR PROGRAMMES IN 2007

	Combatants	Demobilised	Status
Afghanistan	63,380	63,380	Reintegration
Angola	138,000	97,114	Reintegration
Burundi	78,000	23,185	Demobilisation and reinsertion
Chad	9,000	9,000	Reintegration
Colombia	31,671	31,761	Reintegration
Ivory Coast	47,500	-	Demobilisation
Eritrea	200,000	200,000	Reintegration
Haiti	6,000	500	Prospection
Indonesia (Aceh)	5,000	6,145	Reintegration
Liberia	119,000	101,495	Reintegration
Nepal	15,000	19,602	Demobilisation
Niger	3,160	3,160	Reintegration
Central African Republic	7,565	7,556	Reintegration
DR Congo	150,000	124,059	Demobilisation
Rep. Congo	30,000	17,400	Reintegration
Rwanda	37,684	26,536	Demobilisation
Somalia	53,000	1,266	Pilot phase
Sudan	100,500	8,750	Demobilisation
Uganda	15,310	16,245	Reintegration
TOTAL	1,109,770	757,154	

Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau, "DDR 2008".
(<http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr005.pdf>)

The most important regional programme has been the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) which affected Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, DR Congo and Uganda between 2002 and 2009, with 360,000 combatants (54,000 of whom were minors) and with a cost of 500 million dollars. Forty donors participated in this programme. The extension of this programme was the Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (TDRP), which encompasses the period from 2009 to 2012 and focuses on the Great Lakes region. It has a budget of 30.6 million dollars supplied by the World Bank and revolves around the security and development of the region.

Analyses by countries

AFRICA

Western Africa

SENEGAL (Casamance)

Context of the conflict

Discovered in 1445, Casamance became the first Portuguese colony. It was transferred to French control in 1908 as part of what was then the Federation of Mali, and remained so until Senegal's independence in 1960. Since 1982, the **MFDC** (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) has been waging an armed rebellion through its military wing, **Atika**, to achieve independence for Casamance, a region in the south of the country which is virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia. Casamance is also the only place in Senegal where an area of tropical jungle remains, with large trees, rivers and wildlife. With 3.5 million inhabitants, Casamance is one of the most important tourist hubs in Senegal, and therefore, tourists have been the

target of MFDC actions on several occasions. Offshore the subsoil in this region is rich in **oil**, while the region is also relatively rich in rice and cashews. The rebellion is led chiefly by people from the Diola ethnic group, a minority compared to the majority Wolofs running the government. The Diola are also present in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, which explains the support that the independence movement receives from these two countries, depending on the situation and the makeup of the dissidences within the MFDC. The Diola, a farming people, founded a kingdom called Gabu in the early 18th century. They feel economically and politically marginalised by the central power, which looks down on the other minorities, and are unfavourable to the colonisation of people from the north of the country. The main languages in Casamance are Diola and Portuguese Creole. The USA and France support Dakar in its bid to defeat the MFDC. The conflict has become regionalised and is affecting Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, triggering the exodus of thousands of people. The historical leader of the MFDC was Abbot **August Diamacoune**, who died in 2007. Diamacoune offered ceasefire proposals several times (1992, 1995 and 1998), but the peace talks between the MFDC and the government were postponed repeatedly for various reasons (clashes, disagreement about the venue or facilitators, etc.). The Church has played an extremely important role in this region, which has very particular social and religious structures. The conflict has caused around 3,000 deaths. The MFDC has representatives in Switzerland, Portugal, France and Gambia. Both of the factions currently keeping the conflict alive, the Northern Front (led by Salif Sadio) and the Southern Front (led by Cesar Atoute Badiate), earn a living from the illegal trade in cashews and other natural products, giving a more economic than political dimension to the resolution of the conflict.

Population: Senegal (12.8 million),
Casamance (3.5 million)

Area: Senegal: 197,000 km²;
Casamance: 32,350 km²

HDI Senegal: 155 (of 187)

GDP Senegal: 13,100 million dollars

Per capita income: \$1,040

Deaths due to the conflict: 3,000

Displaced persons: between 10,000 and 40,000

Armed actors: factions of the MFDC

Facilitators: Presidential envoy, P. Goudiaby
Atepa, M. Jacques Diop, Church, Council of Elders,
Cardinal Sarr

Development of the peace process

In 1982 the MFDC began an armed rebellion. and the Senegalese authorities arrested Diamacoune, the group's leader. Almost one decade later, in 1991, the government launched a reconciliation initiative and released many prisoners. The first ceasefire went into effect. This was agreed to in Guinea-Bissau and signed by Sidi Bajdi, at that time Chief of Staff of the movement. On leaving prison Diamacoune stated that the agreement was null and void, but one year later he proposed another ceasefire. That same year, 1992, witnessed the first split within the MFDC between Sidi Badji's Northern Front and Diamacoune's Southern

Front. In 1995 Diamacoune proposed another ceasefire, and the government created the National Investigation Commission for Peace, led by the former Foreign Minister, Assane Seck. Seck attempted to conduct several dialogues, yet these failed due to Diamacoune's demand that they be held in Europe. Diamacoune was released in 1997, and the following year he suggested yet another ceasefire. **In 1999 a historic encounter was held in the capital of Gambia between the President of Senegal, A. Diouf, and Abbot Diamacoune, launching the so-called "Banjul Process", which culminated in a ceasefire.** In January 2000, elections were held and A. Wade won, whereupon he shifted the negotiation strategy, doing away with the Gambian mediation and giving the ministerial team all the responsibility. Elections were also held in Guinea-Bissau, and the new President expelled the MFDC combatants. Shortly thereafter, the tensions between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau escalated. In November, the government presented a text aimed at resuming the negotiations, yet this proved to no avail due to the tensions with Guinea-Bissau, the internal division within the MFDC, the massacres caused by this group and the rivalries among the government negotiators.

In January 2001 the army of Guinea-Bissau killed 30 members of the MFDC. Two months later the group finally reached a **first peace agreement** with the Senegalese government, although Diamacoune acknowledged that he had no control over certain dissident sectors. However, an agreement was reached on the release of prisoners, the return of refugees, demining, the freedom of movement of people and goods and the reintegration of combatants. In May however the clashes resumed, and Guinea-Bissau bombarded MFDC positions on the border. In August the MFDC agreed in Gambia to resume the peace talks with the government, but one sector of the group rejected the agreement. There were also changes in the leadership of the MFDC: Diamacoune came to be honorary President and Jean-Marie F. Biagui was elected Secretary General of the movement, although he was replaced by Sidi Badji in November. Shortly before that, in September of the same year, Diamacoune was granted an audience with the President of Senegal. In May 2003, after a period of renewed clashes, Diamacoune met with the President of Senegal and expressed his willingness to reduce his demands for independence in exchange for higher government investment in Casamance. A few days later, S. Badji, one of the MFDC leaders most mistrustful of negotiations, died. In September 2004, the MFDC underwent yet another change in leadership, revealing the heavy internal divisions in the group, and J.M. François Biagui (living in France) was elected President of the organisation. He represented the most moderate faction of the group and was in favour of transforming the MFDC into a political party capable of running in the 2007 elections. **In late December 2004, the government and MFDC finally signed a General Peace Agreement in the town of Ziguinchor.** The agreement was signed by the Minister of the Interior and the founder of the MFDC, A. Diamacoune, and it included a pledge to end to the use of violence, an amnesty for members of the group and their voluntary integration into the country's security forces, the start of a demining process, the return of thousands of displaced persons and refugees, and the reconstruction of the region of Casamance. There were plans to create a Mixed Committee to supervise the ceasefire and assist the ICRC to demobilise the combatants. In February 2005 a meeting was held in the Senegalese city of Fatick with most of the players in the conflict, including the members of the MFDC J.M.F. Biagui, A. Badji and the brother of the historical leader, Abbot Diamacoune. The President of the CRAES (Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs), Jacques Diop, secured a commitment from all the participants to take part in another meeting which would enable headway to be made towards consolidating a peace process. The second meeting, however, was never held, and despite the fact that the agreement was signed with the majority sector of the group, the dissident sectors of the MFDC, led by **Salif Sadio**, continued to conduct military operations, which are still occurring to this day. In an interview held in October 2005, S. Sadio called for independence for Casamance, the exit of the Senegalese from the region and negotiations to be held in Europe (preferably in France, Portugal or the UK, but not in Gambia or Guinea-Bissau).

It is worth noting that in the past few years several organisations have acted as facilitators in the different stages in the peace process. In addition to the Church, which played a very active role in supporting the process during the period 1992-2000, especially the diocese of Ziguinchor, which created a **Peace Committee for Casamance** (although later the state curtailed its scope of action), the **Collectif de Cadres Casamançais**, presided over by architect Pierre Goudiaby Atepa, advisor to President Wade, has also played a noteworthy role as an intermediary in the conflict. In December 2005, it participated in a meeting of the MFDC in San

Domingo (a town in Guinea-Bissau on the border with Casamance). Diamacoune attended the meeting, but S. Sadio did not. The purpose of the meeting was to unify the different strands within the group in order to engage in a negotiation process. This committee made very specific proposals for the socioeconomic recovery of the region. Also worth noting are the mediating activities conducted by **Mbaye Jacques Diop**, President of the Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs (CRAES), who acted as an interlocutor for the President of the Republic on this issue and is regarded as the official facilitator in the process.

In February 2006 several elements of the African media reported on a supposed decision by the military leader of the Southern Front of the MFDC, S. Sadio, to accept a negotiation with the government, contrary to the opinion of other leaders, like I. Magne Diéme and C. Atoute Badiate. However, the reality was that in March the skirmishes of S. Sadio's faction intensified on the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, in the area where A. Sadio had encampments. This made it necessary for the latter country's military forces to intervene. In view of the worsening situation, the President of Gambia, Y. Jammeh, reaffirmed his willingness to consolidate the peace process with the support of the President of CRAES, M. Jacques Diop. Achieving an agreement was however once again complicated by the constant divisions and clashes among the MFDC factions, especially between S. Sadio (who controlled the south) and I. Magne Diéme, leader of the Northern Front and ally of the military commander C. Atoute Badiate. Diéme ended up supporting the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau in its fight against S. Sadio, who some sources accused of receiving economic support from the government of the Ivory Coast. Also worth noting is that the Gambian authorities arrested I. Magne Diéme, which was interpreted as explicit support of S. Sadio's group in his struggle against members of the MFDC's Northern Front. Indeed, as proof of regional involvement in the conflict, every time there are skirmishes in northern Casamance, the people who take refuge in Gambia receive an offer of Gambian citizenship.

In late February 2007, President A. Wade, who was then 80 years old, won the presidential elections in the first round, garnering 57% of the votes. The faction of the secessionist armed group MFDC led by S. Sadio had waged several attacks in the northern region of Casamance since the beginning of the election campaign. During the first quarter, there were repeated clashes between the armed forces and dissident members of the MFDC, although it was surprising that one of the factions attacked by the armed forces was led by C. Badiate, who in March had cooperated with the army of Guinea-Bissau to expel S. Sadio's faction from its soil. In consequence, **Badiate's forces regarded their peace agreement with the government as over.** Worth noting is that early in the year the top leader of the MFDC, A. Diamacoune Senghor, died in Paris. Diamacoune had signed peace agreements with the government in 2004 after a 22 year struggle to achieve self-determination for the region of Casamance. Despite the fact that some skirmishes continued with the different factions of the MFDC that rejected the peace agreements, in the second quarter of the year the Secretary General of the movement, Jean-Marie Bangui, expressed his support for this group's representation in the National Assembly and Senate. He allowed one of his militants, Mariama Sané Guigoz, to join the Democratic Party of Senegal. This was the governing party, having won the legislative elections in June, despite the fact that the voter turnout rate was under 40%. In early October, President Abdoulaye Wade sent a delegation to Gambia to meet with his counterpart there, Yahya Jammeh, with the purpose of discussing the release of 21 members of the northern and inland factions of the armed secessionist group MFDC who were in Gambian prisons. In late December Samsidine Dino Némou Aïdara, the Presidential Envoy for the Peace Process, was assassinated. The President of the country announced that this would not affect the peace process under way. In October 2009, the President of neighbouring Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, asked the clashing parties to declare an immediate ceasefire, stressing that the conflict in Casamance would not be resolved by military means, but rather through dialogue.

In late April 2010, the Prime Minister Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye stated that the government was prepared to welcome the leaders of the armed group MFDC and resume the peace negotiations. The condition he set was that the meetings be held in Senegal. With these statements, Ndiaye was responding to the request by the leader of the MFDC's faction on the southern front, Cesar Atoute Badiate, which is at odds with Salif Sadio's faction on the northern front, although Sadio also expressed his willingness to find a solution to the conflict in Casamance. However, Badiate described the situation in the region as an international problem

and asked that the negotiations be held in a neutral country. Several analysts noted the need for Sadio and Badiate's factions to engage in an internal dialogue as a step needed for a peace process. Both expressed their willingness to hold peace talks. In June there was a split-off in the armed wing of the MFDC, Attika, led by Ousmane Gnantang Diatta, who presented himself as the new head of the group, replacing César Atoute Badiate. The latter expressed his support for unity in order to hold honest negotiations in a neutral country. In August, the Bishop of Ziguinchor, Msgr. Maixent Coly, died; Coly had served as a mediator in the conflict since 2001. The local media reported that in July there had been clashes among the different MFDC factions. The proclamations issued by Ousmane Gnantang Diatta as the military Chief of Staff and by Nkrumah Sané as the Secretary General of the movement, replacing Jean Marie François Biagui, were the source of a rise in tension between the two factions. In November, the political wing of the MFDC set two preconditions for resuming negotiations with the government: the suspension of the arrest warrant on its leaders, Nkrumah Sané and Salif Sadio, and a meeting venue outside the country. The MFDC underscored the fact that its openness to negotiations was not linked to the army's heavy pressure on its armed wing, also known as Attika.

The peace process in 2011

The National Conference submitted a peace plan for Casamance to the Senegalese President in February. The proposal included two phases: the creation of a national contact group and the launch of a national commission to supervise the negotiations. The contact group was to be made up of one representative of the President, two representatives of the government (one from the Ministry of the Interior and another from the Ministry of the Armed Forces), one representative from the Parliament, another from the President's party and another from the opposition. This group also had to include a representative of the Casamance Youth Platform, another representative of businesspeople and a representative of the base organisations in the region. The group's mandate would be to forge the contacts needed with the civilian and military wings of the MFDC and the notables of Casamance to establish a ceasefire. In this way, it would draw up a roadmap for future peace negotiations in conjunction with the interested parties. In this sense, its mission would include designating the negotiators, the issues to be examined and the guarantees for the agreement. The efforts of the contact group would conclude upon the start of direct negotiations between the parties. The national supervision commission would then begin its work by facilitating the dialogue, offering proposals to overcome any impasses and ensuring fulfilment of the agreements reached among the parties. The proposal was submitted by the President of the National Conference, Amadou Matar Mbow, and its Vice President, Mansour Kama, who presides over the special commission for Casamance within this organisation. The National Conference is a kind of debate forum in which representatives from the different political parties take part along with civil society in an attempt to respond to what they regard as questions of state and offer proposals to solve them. Likewise, the Regional Committee of Solidarity for Women in Peace in Casamance, USOFORAL, presented an action plan for peace at the Dakar Forum in which it called on the state and the MFDC to resume negotiations.

In August, the president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, met with his Gambian counterpart, Yahya Jammeh, in Banjul and asked him to put an end to the conflict in Casamance. Specifically, the leader asked Jammeh not to let dissidents in the southern province go into exile in his land. Jammeh ensured his collaboration by stating that resolving the Casamance crisis was in the interest of both countries. In November at least ten people died in an armed attack in Diagon, 30 km from the capital Casamance, Ziguinchor. The armed forces accused the MFDC of perpetrating the violence. However, the Secretary General of the movement, Jean-Marie François Biagui, condemned the attack, indicating that it had occurred just a day after the group had called for a new **peace process in Casamance**. Biagui announced in December, during a meeting held in Casamance, the intention of his movement to become a political party and propose the development of a federal system in Senegal, renouncing its calls for independence. The party would carry the name of the Movement for Federalism and Constitutional Democracy, thus maintaining its current abbreviation. MFDC. Biagui hoped to take part under this name in the presidential elections. The leader called on the authorities to reactivate the Banjul, which had managed to achieve the peace agreements of 1999 with the MFDC with the involvement of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. However, the military chief of the MFDC, César Atout Badi-

ate issued a message in which he opposed the meeting and Biagui's proposals, pointing out that Biagui had been relieved of his duties in 2004.


Most significant events in the year

The National Conference submitted a peace plan for Casamance to the Senegalese President in February.

Websites of interest

Africa Time (www.africatime.com/senegal)
 Afrol News (www.afrol.com)
 Assises (www.assises-senegal.info)
 World Bank (www-wds.worldbank.org/external)
 Government (www.gouv.sn)
 Le Soleil (www.lesoleil.sn)
 Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
 Seneweb (www.seneweb.com)
www.homeviewsenegal.sn

Main actors in the process



Horn of Africa

ETHIOPIA (Ogaden)

Context of the conflict

The region of Ogaden is part of what is called the Somali Region in Ethiopia. It covers an area of around 200,000 km², and is divided between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as part of Kenya and Djibouti. The region was annexed to Ethiopia in the late 19th century. In the late 1970s there were military clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of this region, and this culminated in 1978 with the Somali regime seriously debilitated. The Ogadeni/Somali population practices a tolerant form of Islam.

Population: Ethiopia (84.7 million);
Ogaden (4.3 million)

Area: Ethiopia (1,104,000 km²);
Ogaden (179,000 km²)

HDI Ethiopia: 174 (out of 187)

GDP Ethiopia: 27,200 million dollars

Per capita income Ethiopia \$330

Displaced persons: 650,000

Deaths due to the conflict: + than 1,000 in 2007

Armed actors: UWSLF, ONLF

Facilitators: —

Since 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has been fighting for the independence or autonomy of the region of Ogaden, a desert area bordering on Somalia. The ONLF was part of the transition government from 1991 to 1995, after the Communist regime, but thereafter it withdrew from government to fight for the independence of what it views as the Ogadeni people. It has a major diaspora in the United States (with numerous pro-peace civil organisations), Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands. It calls for the independence of the Ogadeni/Somali people, an ethnic group 27 million people strong. In 1994 the ONLF called for a referendum on self-rule in Ogaden, an initiative which met with a large-scale military attack by the Ethiopian government. Given this situation, the "elders" in the region called on the government to take up talks to resolve the conflict. In 2007 the ONLF launched attacks against Chinese oil and natural gas facilities (China Petroleum Chemical Corporation) operating in the region of Ogaden, an area where the Malaysian company Petronas also has facilities.

Development of the peace process

In early 1995, just a few months after having rejected the dialogue offered by the elders in the region, the Ethiopian government prepared for a meeting to negotiate with the ONLF, but to no avail. In late 1998 both parties held secret meetings to seek a solution, but the meetings ended when the ONLF demanded that an outside organisation participate in the negotiations as a witness. The government also murdered one of the negotiators, and captured another, who later died in prison. In 2005 several traditional and religious leaders launched a peace proposal that included direct negotiations between the ONLF and the government, and this was initially accepted. The ONLF also demanded that the negotiations be held in a neutral country, clearly hinting that the United States might adopt this role. April witnessed the release of one of the Chinese workers kidnapped by the ONLF, under the auspices of the ICRC, an organisation that was expelled from the region in August. After the release of the kidnapped workers, the ONLF made an appeal for international mediation that would help to open up negotiations with the Ethiopian government. In early September, the ONLF asked the United Nations mission that had travelled to the region to analyse the humanitarian situation in the zone of conflict and the civilian population's protection needs to investigate what the rebels regarded as genocide and war crimes by the Ethiopian army. However, the ONLF criticised the fact that the mission had only visited the areas in the region that the government had let them see. Nevertheless, the ONLF announced a temporary halt to all military operations against the army during the deployment of the United Nations mission. Weeks later, the United Nations expressed its concern at the constant deterioration in the humanitarian situation and human rights in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, which could affect 1.8 million people if the right

measures were not taken and if the Ethiopian government did not allow humanitarian organisations access to the region.

In the early months of 2008, the requests for negotiations submitted by the armed opposition group ONLF met with no success, despite the fact that the area was immersed in a serious humanitarian crisis, which even prompted a visit by a US delegation. Furthermore, in March the ONLF claimed to have caused the death of 43 armed forces soldiers during two weeks of clashes in the region. During the second quarter, not only did the clashes with the armed group ONLF continue, but in April the Ethiopian government announced that it was breaking off diplomatic ties with Qatar. Ethiopia claimed that Qatar was trying to destabilise Ethiopia and that it had close relations with its enemy, Eritrea. The ONLF criticised this decision, stressing that after Norway, Qatar had become the second victim of the paranoia of the Ethiopian regime in its relations with the international community. A new armed group called the Somali Islamic Guerrilla emerged, which took responsibility for some of the attacks. In late July, the ONLF held the fourth plenary session of the organisation's Central Committee. The session analysed the situation in the Horn of Africa and in particular in the region of Ogaden, which was suffering from a severe humanitarian crisis. At the session, an agreement was reached recognising that the movement had made significant headway towards achieving its goals during the review period, the operational and strategic capacity of the armed wing of the ONLF was praised and so was the support it lent to the diaspora. Ultimately, the most noteworthy part of the conclusions was the considerable emphasis placed on strengthening and promoting cooperation and the coordination of efforts of the peoples living in the Horn of Africa oppressed by the Ethiopian regime, in particular with their Somali brethren.

In late September, numerous United Nations agencies claimed that the region was suffering from a serious humanitarian crisis. The ONLF issued an appeal to the UN Security Council to set up an international humanitarian corridor that would allow humanitarian aid to be supplied to the people living in the region affected by the crisis. In 2009, after an attack by the Ethiopian armed forces which led to the deaths of dozens of civilians, the armed opposition group ONLF, which operates in the region of Ogaden, asked the United Nations to send an investigative mission to the region to ascertain the facts and tend to the victims. The group also asked the Malaysian oil firm Petronas to launch corporate responsibility measures and stay out of the region while the population was suffering from the consequences of the conflict, and it asked Petronas to try to play a constructive role in resolving the conflict in order to be able to defend its economic interests in a climate in which the company was welcome. In mid-October, the ONLF leader, Mohamed Omar Osman, claimed that the region was a forgotten Arab-Islamic cause, and that the region, which Ethiopia regarded as its province, was actually an occupied zone. In statements to the press, the leader denied that his group received funds from the Arab states to prevent Ethiopia from drilling in the Ogaden region in the quest for oil and gas resources.

In April 2010, the armed group United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), a wing of the former Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI) which operated in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, agreed to turn over its weapons to the Ethiopian government and return to legal status after decades of guerrilla warfare. The group had been operating out of Somali and had ties with Eritrea. In early August, the leader of the group, Sheik Abdurahim Mohammed Hussein, signed the peace agreement in Addis Ababa which led to an amnesty for the members of the group, a rival of the ONLF. **The UWSLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa on the 29th of July.** The agreement, signed by the leader of the group, Sheikh Abdurahim Mohammed Hussein, and by senior government officials in the presence of diplomats and officials from the AU and the United Nations, contained a prior granting of amnesty for the group members and the launch of development projects in the Ogaden zone. Sheikh issued a call to the other rebel groups to adhere to the peace initiatives. The UWSLF is the rival of the ONLF, the main insurgency in the region. The armed group ONLF described the agreement reached as rubbish and stated that it had no impact on the ground and represented an attempt by the regime and its representatives to promote the idea that a nonexistent peace process was underway in Ogaden. The ONLF stated that the UWSLF had no support base in Ogaden and reiterated the fact that any rapprochement between the people of Ogaden and the Ethiopian government needed to have international mediation and be held in a neutral venue.

In October, **part of the ONLF reached a peace agreement with the government** which put an end to the armed struggle which it had been waging for decades in the region of Ogaden. The agreement was signed by the Minister of Federal Affairs, Shirefaw Teklemariam, and the head of this faction, Salahdin Abdurrahman Maow. The Ethiopian Prime Minister later held a reception for the ONLF leaders. The agreement stipulated amnesty for the imprisoned members of the group and the ONLF's conversion into a political party. However, one part of the ONLF led by Mohamen Omar Osman carried on its armed struggle, and both factions regarded themselves as the core of the ONLF, accusing the other part of being insignificant. In November, the Ethiopian authorities released an indeterminate number of ONLF rebels pursuant to the peace agreement reached in October with the faction of this group.

The peace process in 2011

The fifth plenary session of the Central Committee of the **ONLF** was held between the 25th of December 2010 and the 1st of January 2011 after the group (the part of it that did not negotiate a peace agreement with the government in October 2010) reaffirmed its armed struggle against the Ethiopian government, encouraged relations with the countries and peoples that support the cause of the Ogadeni people to be strengthened yet nonetheless stated **its commitment to a negotiated solution to the conflict through an international mediation process**. However, this faction of the ONLF fears that in the current situation the government is using this posture for tactical reasons in order to avoid holding real negotiations. In the meantime, the government released 402 leaders and members of the ONLF in compliance with the agreement reached last October with the ONLF faction led by Salahdin Abdurrahman. In August, the ONLF condemned the agreement reached between China, Ethiopia and the region of Somaliland concerning the construction of an oil refinery in the port of Berbera, a gas pipeline and an oil pipeline from the region of Ogaden to Berbera, and a motorway that will cross the territory of Ogaden. In its opinion, the agreement was an act of war against the people of Ogaden, and the ONLF reserved the right to take action against the promoters of this agreement.


Most significant events in the year

The ONLF stated its commitment to a negotiated solution to the conflict through an international mediation process.

Websites of interest

AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
All Africa.com (allafrica.com)
Ethiopian News Agency (www.ena.gov.et)
Ogaden Human Rights Committee (www.ogadenrights.org)
Ogaden News (222.ogadennews.com)
Ogaden Online (www.ogaden.com)
Ogaden Voices for Peace (www.ogadenvoice.org)
ONLF (www.onlf.org)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)

Main actors in the process



SOMALIA

Context of the conflict

Somalia is a country that is homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. However, it is separated into five main clans, which are in turn divided into sub-clans. In 1969 General Siad Barre led a coup d'état and established a dictatorship. This lasted until he was overthrown in 1991 after three years of armed conflict in the country. The coalition of opposition groups that overthrew the general began an armed struggle for power resulting in the wholesale destruction of the country and the death of hundreds of thousands of people since 1991. This situation brought about US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the establishment of a United Nations mission (UNOSOM) in 1992. The mission failed and withdrew from the country three years later. Despite these precedents, the UN Secretary General recommended establishing a peacekeeping mission on the basis of the communities' proposals. This mission would be focussed on the tasks of disarmament and demobilisation. Some of the country's regions have declared their independence or have agreed to a certain level of autonomy (Somaliland and Puntland).

Population: 9.6 million inhabitants

Area: 638,000 km²

HDI:

GDP:

Per capita income: ...

Displaced persons: + 1 million

Refugees: 400,000

Deaths due to the conflict: hundreds of thousands; 21,000 since 2007.

Armed actors: Al Shabab, ARS dissidents

Facilitators: IGAD, Kenya, International Contact Group, Yemen, Libya, Arab League, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, UN (AMISOM)

Development of the peace process

In spring 2000, the new President of Djibouti, who is also president of IGAD - the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (a regional organisation made up of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda) organised a reconciliation conference in the city of Arta in Djibouti. A Transitional National Assembly was elected, despite the fact that many clan leaders were absent. In January 2001, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. However, the TNG was not supported by all of the groups and only controlled part of the country and the capital. At the end of this year, a round of talks between the TNG and opposing factions were held in Kenya and an initial agreement was reached. Finally, in late 2002, a round of peace talks was held in Eldoret (Kenya). They were organised under the auspices of IGAD, and led to an agreement to cease hostilities and to begin a negotiation process on different issues.

The Transitional Federal Parliament was formed in 2004. This parliament elected A. Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of the country (up until then he had been the leader of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Puntland). Ahmed, in turn, appointed a new prime minister whose task was to form a new government for the country in which Somalia's main warlords would participate. What appeared to be the slow recovery of Somalia first became noticeable in January 2006 when a group of political leaders representing the TFG faction based in Mogadishu accepted the reconciliation agreement between the two factions that had been signed in Aden in Yemen, and was facilitated by that country. Seven other countries also finally managed to deploy a peace force in Somalia under the responsibility of IGAD and the AU. In March 2006, the process suffered a serious setback because of the struggles being waged by several militias in the capital. It completely fell apart in May due to the clashes between these groups, which were clustered together into the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which received the support of the USA, and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which managed to wrest control of the main cities, including the capital. Later, delegations from the TFG and the UIC met in the capital of Sudan to initiate reconciliation dialogues under the auspices of the Arab League; they managed to reach a seven-point agreement. The agreement acknowledged the legality of the TFG and the presence of the alliance of Islamic courts, and in addition it called for a dialogue without preconditions within the framework of mutual recognition. Early in the year, the superior

military capabilities of the TFG, which was bolstered by Ethiopian air and land forces, brought about a swift defeat of the militias of the Islamic courts (SICS).

In July and August 2007 the thrice-postponed peace and reconciliation conference, dubbed the National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (NGRC), was held in the outskirts of the capital. The conference was boycotted by the Islamists from the UTI, who demanded that it be held in a neutral country, since otherwise it would appear to legitimise the Ethiopian occupation. Parallel to the conference, around 400 opposition figures met in Eritrea and agreed to create an alliance opposing the TFG, adopting the name of the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS). In mid-September, several Somali leaders who were members of the TFG met in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) under the facilitation of King Abdullah. There they reached a reconciliation agreement in which they pledged to replace the Ethiopian troops that were supporting the TFG with a mission made up of Arab and African troops operating under the auspices of the United Nations. The UN Secretary-General named Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as his new special envoy for Somalia.

In March 2008, the USA decided formally to include the group of militant Islamists Al-Shabaab on its list of terrorist organisations, in order to step up pressure on what Washington defined as al-Qaeda's main link in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is the militant wing of the UTI. Between the 31st and 9th of June the TFG and the ARS met in Djibouti with facilitation by the United Nations, and reached a cessation of hostilities and political cooperation agreement between both parties. In September the peace talks were resumed in Djibouti between the TFG and the moderate faction of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, which resulted in an agreement on 26th October mediated by the United Nations. This agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, the radical militia Al-Shabaab, headquartered in Eritrea, announced that it would not heed the agreement and would instead continue to fight against the moderate ARS militia headquartered in Djibouti. Representatives of the TFG and the ARS agreed to power-sharing and an expansion of the Parliament as a possible way of achieving peace. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in turn, appointed elder Kenyan minister Kipruto Kiowa as the chief mediator for the peace process in Somalia. He was charged with coordinating all the initiatives currently under way.

In parallel, at the beginning of 2009, peace talks were held between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the moderate faction of the ARS in Djibouti, with facilitation by the United Nations, in an attempt to form a government in which all the parties participated. At the end of January, the Transitional Federal Parliament, which was operating out of Djibouti, chose a new president of the TFG in a second round of voting, namely the leader of the ARS, the moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The Transitional Federal Parliament was extended to 420 parliamentarians; this reform was introduced while attempting to respect the "4.5" formula agreed to during the Nairobi peace process (which was held between 2002 and 2004 and gave rise to the TFG), i.e. proportional representation of the four major clans in the country and all the minor clans. According to some sources, the TFG had offered to start negotiations with the Islamist groups, a suggestion the latter refuted, since they still regarded the TFG as an illegitimate government. In early November the armed Islamist group Al-Shabab rejected the proposal for dialogue made by the prime minister of the TFG, Omar Abdirashid Ali Shamarke, arguing that it would not promote dialogue with those who did not want to implement Sharia or Islamic law. In the following days there was a continuation of serious clashes between the Al-Shabab militia and its former ally Hizbul Islam in the region of Lower Jubba in the south of the country. Both groups, formerly allies, had been clashing since October for a variety of reasons, including control and management of the lucrative port of Kismayo in the south.

In the second half of February 2010, **the TFG signed an agreement with the Islamic group Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ) with the goal of creating an alliance with the groups and factions which opposed the presence of extremist groups in the country** before launching a national offensive against these groups, primarily Al-Shabaab. The leaders of the TFG and the leader of the Islamic group, Sheikh Mahamoud Sheikh Ahmed, agreed to meet after a week of talks held in Addis Ababa. According to the agreement, the ASWJ troops would be under government control, the ASWJ would be assigned several ministerial posts and senior positions, a national panel of Ulemas would be set up to create a context to protect and preserve traditional Somali Islamic faith, and a body would be created to supervise the enforcement of the agreement on which UNPOS,

the African Union and IGAD would be represented. Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a is a Sufi group which has clashed with Al-Shabaab as a result of the pressures and threats its members have experienced by the latter and the destruction of holy graves and sites in Kismayo, the main port city in the south of the country. In late 2008, the group clashed with Al-Shabaab in the town of Guriel in the centre of the country with the goal of controlling the city, the economic heart of the central region. In March, the Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a movement joined the TFG through a new agreement that ratified the previous meetings, so the group was granted five ministerial posts and other diplomatic and prominent positions in the intelligence service and police corps.

On the 22nd of May, **an international conference was held in Istanbul with the aim of promoting the fragile peace process in Somalia.** The participants in the conference drew up the Istanbul Declaration, in which they reiterated their commitment to promote peace and stability in the country, the need to keep the Djibouti Peace Process alive, the formation of Somali security forces and their support of AMISOM. The conference was organised by the government of Turkey and the United Nations. In June, three ministers from the TFG stepped down and one of them, the Minister of Defence, Sheikh Yusuf Mohammad Siad, stated that he took this decision due to the fact that the TFG had failed in its goal of restoring order and security. Several analysts stated that these resignations revealed the weakness of the TFG and may exert even more pressure on the Prime Minister to resign or submit to a motion of censure by the Parliament. This situation was joined by the criticisms of impartiality levelled against the UN Secretary General Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, on the job since 2007, who was ultimately relieved of his post and replaced by Augustine Mahiga, Tanzania's ambassador to the United Nations since 2003.

The regional organisation of the Horn of Africa, IGAD, renewed its appeal to the United Nations to replace the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM, by a UN mission at its meeting in Addis Ababa in July. Uganda requested an extension of the mission's mandate so that it could deal with the insurgent organisation Al-Shabaab. The AU announced its decision to step up the military component of AMISOM at the closure of the organisation's conference held in Kampala between the 23rd and 27th of July. The AU decided to send 2,000 additional soldiers to join the 6,300 who were already in the country, who had been sent by Uganda and Burundi, reaching the maximum of 8,000 troops stipulated at the start. In September, the Somali Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, resigned after experiencing heavy pressure as a result of the loss in confidence from the President of the TFG, who had declared that his government was ineffectual. In October, the UN Security Council expressed its support for strengthening AMISOM. The AU, with the support of IGAD, aimed to boost the size of the mission to 20,000 troops, compared to the 7,200 soldiers on the ground at the time, but it needed United Nations financing and the authorisation of the Security Council. The AU also wanted an aerial exclusion zone and a naval blockade to be imposed on Somalia. The cost of AMISOM was 130 million dollars per year, paid by the United Nations. The Assistant Secretary of State of the USA, Johnnie Carson, announced that Washington supported the idea but did not state the number of soldiers the USA wanted on the ground. In November, the president of the TFG, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, appointed Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo the new Prime Minister.

The peace process in 2011

In January, the UN Security Council approved a new resolution in which it asked the AU to maintain the deployment of its peace-keeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to boost the number of troops deployed through its mandate from 8,000 to 12,000, thus strengthening its ability to carry out its mandate. In parallel, the AU extended the mandate of its mission by one year, challenging the insurgency's demands to withdraw. In February, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) approved the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by three more years; its mandate was to end in August, the date on which a new constitution was to be adopted and the first elections in the country were to be held. In March, Burundi decided to raise its contribution to AMISOM by another 1,000 soldiers, meaning that the Burundian contingent in AMISOM now totalled 4,400 soldiers. In April, a high-level consultative meeting was held in Kenya promoted by the United Nations. Participants included the President of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Puntland, Abdirrahman Mohamed Farole, representatives from the state of Galmudug and from the pro-government Islamist militia,

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, and the President of the Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in addition to representatives from the international community such as the AU, the EU, IGAD, the Arab League and the OIC. The president of the TFG and his prime minister boycotted this meeting. The parties at the meeting agreed to the following: the need to put an end to the transition in accordance with the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter, which called on elections for the presidency of the TFG and the presidency of the Parliament before the transitional phase ended, slated for August; regarding the extension of the Transitional Federal Institutions (FTI), a proposal to extend the Parliament's mandate for another two years so that it could complete critical tasks; the strengthening of security and the struggle against extremism, both politically and militarily, as well as the struggle against piracy; the reform of the Parliament and the intensification of the reconciliation process with the authorities from the states and regions of Somalia; an acceleration in the process of drawing up a federal constitution; implementation of the previous agreements between the TFG and Puntland and between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa; an extension of immediate assistance to the zones won back from the armed groups, especially in Mogadishu; and an increase in humanitarian aid. Previously, the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the country, Augustine Mahiga, had met with the leaders of the TFG to encourage them to participate in the consultative meeting in Nairobi promoted by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), albeit unsuccessfully. Around 100 parliamentarians signed a motion against Mahiga on his goal of holding this consultative meeting in Nairobi. The President of the TFG stated that his goal would be to accept presidential elections, but that at that time the country was not optimally poised to hold proper elections. The fact that the president of Parliament had agreed to participate in the consultative meeting led the President of the TFG to order an arrest warrant upon his return to Nairobi. Previously, the president of the Parliament had appointed three committees to work on developing the electoral process in August, which the president and prime minister of the TFG had opposed and instead decreed the extension of their mandate for three years. The mandates of both institutions were supposed to end in August.

In May, Mahiga stated that the political divisions within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were hindering opportunities to make headway in the peace process in the country, so he issued a call to boost the regional and international efforts to overcome the stalemate. The main problem was that neither the TFG nor the Transitional Federal Parliament wanted to update and change their members in the elections that were supposed to be held in August, thus leading to predictions of delays in the elections. **In June, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reached an agreement with the President of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in which they pledged to postpone the legislative and presidential elections for a one-year period starting on the date on which the transitional federal institutions were supposed to be renewed,** so the elections will take place by the 20th of August 2012 at the latest. According to the Kampala Agreement signed on the 9th of June, within a 30-day period the Prime Minister must resign and the President must appoint a new Prime Minister, who in turn must set up a new government charged with planning the execution of the main tasks pending regarding the issues of security, parliamentary reforms, the constituent process and preparations for the elections, for which he will have regional and international support. This agreement aimed to put an end to the disputes between both leaders in the TFG. The UN Security Council celebrated the peace agreement and reiterated that the framework of peace in the country is still the Djibouti Peace Agreement reached in 2008. Days before the agreement was reached, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had declared that the TFG needed one year to defeat Al-Shabab, and that holding Somali elections in 2011 could undermine the advances made on the battlefield against Al-Shabab. The Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned from his post to facilitate the launch of the Kampala Agreement. The President of the TFG appointed Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, the Vice Prime Minister of the government and professor from the American diaspora, as the new Prime Minister. This appointment was welcomed by the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the country.

In July, a new consultative meeting of the transitional institutions and the most important stakeholders in the peace process was called, in addition to the representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its president, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a militia and representatives of the regions of Puntland and Galmudug were also called to the meeting. August, the armed Islamist group Al-Shabab abandoned its bases and control points in the capital of Mogadishu. Also in August, a joint security meeting was

held in Mogadishu with the participation of the Prime Minister of the TFG, the UN Secretary General Special Representative and the AU Vice-Representative for the country. This meeting was the first of its kind to be held in the capital in many years. Representatives from the Arab League, IGAD, the EU and countries like Norway, the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and Sweden also participated in the meeting. In October, the United Nations Secretary General Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, stated that the country had a major opportunity to make inroads towards peace and to set up a government. Mahiga stated that the peace process had taken a step forward with the **adoption of the roadmap reached by the National Consultative conference held in Mogadishu in early September**, in which a series of tasks were established that should be completed before August of 2012. One of the tasks stipulated in the roadmap was an improvement in security, the drafting of a constitution, national reconciliation and good governance.

In December **the Prime Minister of the Federal Transition Government (TFG), Professor Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gas, announced during his visit to Kuwait that he was prepared to hold peace talks with the armed Islamic al Shabaab group.** The prime minister, who was visiting Kuwait in order to strengthen relations between the two countries, pointed out that war was not the solution and that the only solution was peace and dialogue. According to him, Al-Shabaab should give up its arms and meet with the TFG to discuss the problems and look for solutions. During the same month in Garowe, capital of the state of Puntland, there was a meeting of the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference in which the president of the TFG, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; the prime minister of the TFG, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gas; the president of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden; the president of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, together with Vice President Abdisamad Ali Shire; and the leader of the Galmudug region, Mohamed Ahmed Alin took part. There were also representatives of the pro-government Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama armed group, as signatories of the route map between TFG, the TFP, Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna. Among the representatives of the international community was the UN Special Envoy for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, and his aide, Christian Manahl, as well as the UA envoy for Somalia, Boubacar Diara, and the IGAD facilitator for Somalia, Kipruto Arap Kirwa. The objective of the meeting was to work on the launch of the route map for Somalia. Despite the dispute at the heart of the TFP about the motion of no confidence in the TFP president, he nevertheless attended the Garowe meeting and was prepared to attend the peace conference. The Secretary General of the UN visited Mogadishu for the first time, the highest level visit that has taken place in the country in recent years, as a show of support for the political process and the advances in the area of security that are taking place in the country.

Most significant events in the year

The President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reached an agreement with the President of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in which they pledged to postpone the legislative and presidential elections for a one-year period starting on the date on which the transitional federal institutions were supposed to be renewed.

The National Consultative conference held in Mogadishu in early September adopted a roadmap.

Websites of interest

- CEWARN (www.cewarn.org)
- Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk)
- IGAD (www.igad.org/somalipeace/index.htm)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
- www.somali-civilsociety.org

SUDAN (Darfur)

Context of the conflict

Several different conflicts have been superimposed in Sudan in recent years. The first of these, in the south of the country, began in 1982 and ended with the peace agreements signed in January 2005, despite some persisting tension. The second, located in the western region of Darfur, began in early 2003. This conflict has only intensified over the years and is the situation analysed in this chapter. In addition, there is a third, lesser conflict in the east of the country, which erupted in 2005 and ended in late 2006.

Population: 44.6 million (7.5 in Darfur)
Area: 2,506,000 km²; (Darfur, 503,180 km²)
GDP Sudan: 51,500 million dollars
Per capita income: \$1,220
HDI: 169 (out of 184)
Deaths due to the conflict: 300,000
Displaced population and refugees: 2,700,000
Armed actors: JEM, LJM
Facilitators: Qatar, UN-AU

In February 2003, while talks between the government and the SPLA were progressing in the south of the country, a new armed group arose in the Darfur region. Known as the **SLA**, it would subsequently split into many factions. After months of confrontation with the government, both parties agreed to a ceasefire in September. However, there were many violations of this agreement. The government of Chad offered to mediate in the conflict. In October, a new armed group called the **JEM** emerged in the region. This group initially refused to negotiate with the government and criticised the Chadian mediation.

Development of the peace process

In February 2004, the SLA and the JEM attended a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The aim of this meeting was to guarantee humanitarian access to the affected villages. Shortly afterwards, both the EU and the USA tried to mediate in the conflict. The JEM wanted the following preconditions to be fulfilled: the disarmament of the Janjaweed pro-government militia, a ceasefire, the end of air attacks, and an international investigation of the crimes committed in the region. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation worsened, to the point that the United Nations classified it as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Tens of thousands had died and hundreds of thousands had been displaced. In April 2004, a temporary ceasefire agreement was reached in Chad, and both armed groups demanded an end to the region's marginalisation and its inclusion in the peace process that the government was carrying out with the SPLA in the south of the country. This agreement led to the creation of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), initially consisting of 465 observers from ten countries, which in October was expanded to a total of 3,320 troops, 815 of which were police officers.

At that time the talks involved not only the SLA, which ultimately joined forces with the JEM, but also the NMRD, a group that appeared at a later date and expressed a desire to be present at the negotiating table in Abuja (Nigeria). In the first quarter of 2005 talks between the government and the armed opposition groups the SLA, the JEM and the NMRD remained stalled. The situation did not improve, despite the fact that another round of negotiations was held in Chad in February under the auspices of Chad and the AU, leading to an agreement to hold further negotiations in Nigeria with the explicit support of the US government. In mid-April the government of Chad suspended its participation as a mediator in the peace negotiations, as it believed that the Sudanese government was supporting members of armed opposition groups in Chad. In May 2005, under the auspices of Muammar al-Gaddafi, both parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Libya, which would facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Subsequently, in mid-June, the government and the two armed groups met in Abuja (Nigeria) to begin a new round of direct contacts (following a six month break), with mediation from the AU under the leadership of its special envoy, S. Ahmed Salim. Towards the end of July, the SLA and the JEM signed an agreement in Tripoli (Libya), pledging to end the confrontations between the two groups, to free prisoners and to re-establish trust and coordination. **On the 5th of May 2006, the**

Sudanese government and the majority faction of the SLA led by M.A. Minnawi signed a peace agreement in Abuja (Nigeria) under the auspices of the AU. However, the minority faction of the SLA (the main representative of the Fur ethnic group led by A. al-Nour) and the JEM initially refused to sanction this arrangement. In addition, in July the armed opposition groups that had refused to sign the Darfur peace agreement back in May held a meeting in Libya with president Muammar al-Gaddafi aimed at convincing the Libyan leader to intercede on their behalf with the government of Sudan. Meanwhile, the Sudanese government appointed M. Minawi, president and commander-in-chief of the SLA faction that signed the peace agreements, as Presidential Council. In mid-November, six factions from the SLA and two other armed opposition groups meeting in Juba (capital of South Sudan) and signed a unification agreement, with the purpose of presenting a joint position before the Sudanese government in the forthcoming peace negotiations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 of July 31st 2007 authorised the establishment of a joint operation run by the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur (**UNAMID**), authorised to take the measures needed to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its staff and civilians, without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent upon the government of Sudan. By the 30th of April 2010, UNAMID was made up of 21,993 uniformed personnel supported by 1,134 international civilians, 2,557 local civilians and 419 UN volunteers. UNAMID, which began to be deployed in early 2008, has been providing support to the joint AU-UN mediator, Djibril Bassolé.

In late June 2008, the UN Secretary-General and the President of the AU appointed the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, to be the joint mediator for Darfur. In early July, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo from the International Criminal Court called for the arrest of the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, whom he accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, alluding to his responsibility for the crimes perpetrated in the region over the past five years. The Sudanese government warned that this would undermine the peace process in Darfur. The situation arising from the ICC's request caused division in the UN Security Council. In another context, the JEM expressed its willingness to discuss the peace proposal for Darfur promoted by Qatar, and it stated that it would send a delegation to Doha to hold consultations with Qatari leaders. Likewise, in January 2009, the US embassy in Khartoum confirmed that a delegation from the armed group JEM would travel to Washington as part of the US government's initiative to support the peace process in Darfur. Representatives of this group also travelled to Norway, where the authorities stressed the importance of their participation in the peace process under Qatari mediation. In mid-February, the JEM reached an agreement in principle with the government after a week long meeting in Doha under the mediation of Qatar, although this did not put an end to the skirmishes. Both parties (JEM and the government) pledged to continue with the dialogue under Qatari mediation, with the United Nations and the AU mediator Djibril Bassolé also taking part. The JEM delegation was headed by its leader Khalil Ibrahim, while the government delegation was presided over by Nafie Ali Nafie.

In turn, the SLA faction led by Minni Minnawi that had signed the peace agreements in April 2009 announced its intention of forming a political party in order to take part in the general elections scheduled for February 2006. Shortly thereafter, Qatari newspapers announced that delegations from five armed groups from Darfur had arrived in this gulf state to discuss their joining the peace process launched in March by the armed group JEM. The groups that signed an agreement in March to participate in these talks in Libya were SLA-Unity, - the SLA faction led by Khamis Abdullah Abakr; the URF - the faction led by the JEM's Idriss Azrag; and SLA-Juba. However, the JEM threatened to withdraw from the peace talks with the Sudanese government if the other armed opposition groups joined the negotiations separately, as desired by the Sudanese, Libyan and Qatari governments (the latter two acting as facilitators in the process), the chief mediator, Djibril Bassolé, and the US special envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration. The JEM proposed that the armed groups who wanted to join the negotiating process should do so within the JEM or the government panel. To this end the government of Egypt hosted the "Cairo Consultative Forum", a meeting in which seven of the armed groups addressed two options for participating in the peace negotiations with Khartoum: by merging their organisations or by adopting a shared negotiating position. The armed opposition group SLA (known as SLA-Juba) led by Ahmed Abdel Shafi refused to participate in the Cairo meeting despite the fact that the other two factions (led

by Mohamed Saleh Harba and Mohamed Ali Nassir) did indeed attend. In mid-August, the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, informed the Libyan authorities of his political scheme for achieving a negotiated agreement that would put an end to the armed conflict. The JEM expressed its opposition to the inclusion of tribal leaders in the negotiations, due to the complexity of managing the more than 80 different ethnic groups living in the region. The JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, met in N'djamena (Chad) with the joint AU/UN mediator, Djibril Bassolé. At this meeting, Ibrahim reaffirmed his commitment to the Doha peace process and agreed to hold a consultative meeting in the Qatari capital of Doha on an overall strategy for the peace process. Abdel Wahed Al-Nur's SLA, which according to numerous sources enjoys widespread support in the camps for displaced persons in Darfur, refused to participate in the Doha peace talks, insisting that there needed to be greater security before the peace process could be initiated.

In the second half of February 2010, the Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement facilitated by the president of Chad, and they presented a framework for a future peace agreement. This tentative agreement stated that the JEM would join the armed forces and that the government would offer government posts to the leaders of the group. In March, the government and the JEM resumed their indirect talks in N'Djamena facilitated by the government of Chad. However, the armed group rejected the provision of government posts offered by Sudan, which included a post as presidential advisor, two national ministries and other posts within the regional government of Darfur. In June, the JEM accused the government of having violated the ceasefire agreement by bombarding its positions in northern Darfur. The rise in the number of skirmishes and military operations in Darfur during the month of May led the armed group to withdraw from the negotiations as it believed that the agreements reached with the government had been violated by the new wave of violence. Furthermore, the Chadian authorities opposed the entry of the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, into the country, who was once again headed to Darfur with a stop in N'Djamena on a flight from Libya. Chad denied him the refuge that it had granted him until then. The JEM believed that Qatar was no longer a neutral venue for the negotiations and refused to resume the talks as it deemed that any agreement reached by the government would be devoid of content. In October, the JEM was reconsidering rejoining the negotiations, so it sent a delegation to Doha to meet with the mediators in the process. The delegation presented the armed group's demands regarding how the negotiations should proceed. The JEM insisted on freedom of movement for its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, in order to be able to resume the talks. Ibrahim remained in Libya since he had been expelled from Chad in May as he was trying to return to Darfur. In November, a delegation from the JEM met in Qatar with the mediating team to which it delivered a document with ten points that had to be taken into account in order for the JEM to rejoin the negotiations. The group stated that they were not preconditions but legitimate requests, such as freedom of movement for its representatives between the negotiation site and Darfur. In December, the JEM confirmed that it was negotiating with the government in Doha (Qatar) to reach a cessation of hostilities agreement. In return, the group demanded the release of political prisoners.

In March, the government signed a **ceasefire agreement with the coalition of armed groups Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)**, an umbrella organisation of small factions led by El-Tijani El-Sissi (of the Fur ethnic group and former governor of the region) in Qatar. In April, four SLA factions joined the coalition. The group is made up of the SLM Revolutionary Forces and three movements from the Roadmap Group. In June, the LJM, which was present at the peace negotiations in Doha, approved the working plan presented by the mediators and devised by the United Nations and the AU envoy, Jibril Bassolé, to make headway in the peace process. The signing of the peace agreement announced between the government and the LJM was delayed by last-minute disagreements among the parties. The main rifts revolved around the political power-sharing agreements, despite the offer of a vice presidency and a regional authority for Darfur, in addition to security issues and the total amount earmarked to compensate the internally displaced persons.

In July, two rebel groups from Darfur, the **Sudan Liberation Army-FREES (SLA-FREES) and the Justice and Reform Movement (JRM)**, signed a peace agreement mediated by a reconciliation committee made of local leaders and native administrators, with UNAMID as the observer. The two groups are factions of the SLA-Abdul Wahid and the JEM, respectively. Likewise, **on the 5th of February, Chad and Sudan agreed**

to put an end to the wars by proxy which they were waging against each other through the armed groups in Chad and Darfur, and instead to work together to reconstruct the areas near their shared frontier. Both parties agreed to stop hosting the other side's rebel groups and to encourage these armed groups to run in the elections. Numerous analysts pointed out that the agreement signed between the governments of Chad and Sudan to re-establish diplomatic relations and expel the insurgents from the neighbouring country might have forced the JEM into a ceasefire under pressure from the government of Chad.

In June, the founding leader of the armed group SLA, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, met in Paris with the head of the joint AU and UN mediating team, Djibril Bassolé, and with the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmood. At this first meeting, al-Nur recognised the efforts made by the government of Qatar to achieve peace in Darfur and expressed his willingness to continue negotiating with the mediating team on the conditions for his participation in the peace table in Doha. Al-Nur persisted in his demand for security for the people of Darfur and for allowing humanitarian organisations free access to the zone to help the victims of the conflict. These two conditions were essential for him to participate in any negotiations. In turn, Al-Nur announced that he would meet with the leaders of his group in Paris to discuss a possible political solution to the Darfur conflict.

The peace process in 2011

In January the UN Security Council expressed its discontent with the current joint special representative of the UN and AU, Ibrahim Gambari, stating that he was responsible for the failure of UNAMID to apply its mandate in Darfur. The US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, stated that UNAMID was the most expensive mission and the one with the strongest mandate of all the missions created by the United Nations, and that it was expected to be active and, if necessary, aggressive in fulfilling its mandate of defending the life of the civilian population. In February, the armed groups JEM and LJM issued a joint communiqué in which they expressed their commitment to peace and justice in Darfur and asked the government to resume peace negotiations in Doha (Qatar) in order to reach a global political solution to the conflict. Both armed groups expressed their opposition to what they regarded as attempts by Khartoum to resume the process inside Sudan instead of holding negotiations in Doha.

The SLA-Minnawi faction resumed its armed struggle after being inactive since 2006, when it signed a peace agreement with the government. On the 3rd of January, its leader declared the group released from any agreement with the government. In March, the mediating team announced that the peace negotiations would resume on the 18th of April in Doha with the participation of the government, the armed groups, civil society organisations, representatives of displaced persons and refugees, tribal leaders, political parties and international representatives. Consensus was sought among the parties in order to reach a global agreement and secure the support of the international community in implementing its contents. The armed groups JEM and LJM announced that they had reached an agreement in which they pledged to fully coordinate their positions for the negotiations and invited the other armed group operating in the region to create a common front for dialogue. The JEM and the SLA-Minnawi faction issued a joint communiqué in which they expressed their support for the union of the resistance forces in Darfur. The JEM also reported that it was holding consultations with the faction of the SLA led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur. The mediators referred the parties to a document divided into four chapters in the hopes that it would be approved in order to start the negotiations around the four substantial topics: human rights and fundamental freedoms, justice and reconciliation, compensation and the return of displaced persons, and refugees and power-sharing. Likewise, they publicised a list of pending issues, including the administrative status of Darfur, the degree of power of the Regional Authority of Darfur and its links with other levels of government, participation by the insurgent groups in decision-making bodies, the permanent ceasefire and security agreements, and the mechanisms and guarantees for implementing the peace agreement. Also worth noting is the government's offer to put the administrative division of Darfur up to a referendum and its approval to create two new provinces in response to the insurgents' demands for unification.

On the 27th of April the mediators delivered to the armed groups LJM and JEM a six-point draft peace agreement for their consideration. While the LJM looked favourably upon the agreement, the JEM expressed reluctance and demanded that several aspects of it be debated with the government representatives. The main points of contention were regarding the section on human rights and freedoms, as well as the administration of Darfur and the vice presidential posts offered within the central government. The JEM expressed its desire to offer solutions that benefit Sudan as a whole and not just Darfur, referring thus to the national security and emergency law and other laws that curtail human rights. Another of the main divergences between both armed groups was the administrative organisation of Darfur: while the LJM accepted the proposal to hold a referendum on the division of the region one year after the agreement is signed, **the JEM submitted a proposal to divide the country into six regions**, each with its own legislative and executive branches that would coordinate with the central power in Khartoum. The government decided to create two new states in the province of Darfur, thus dividing the land into five states. The new states would be Eastern Darfur, with its capital in Ed Daein, and Central Darfur, with its capital in Zalingei. The rebel groups condemned this decision, which they claimed aimed to fragment the population and the resistance movements. **The government also announced its decision to hold a referendum in the province on the possibility of reunifying the states into a single state.** This was a specific request from the rebel movements, which asked that the consultation be held after a peace agreement that put an end to the conflict was signed. The chief mediator for the peace process in Darfur, Djibril Bassolé, submitted his resignation after having been appointed the Foreign Minister for the government of his country, Burkina Faso. Bassolé had served as the mediator since June 2008. The United Nations and the African Union appointed the former Foreign Minister of Niger, Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, as the Deputy Special Representative of UNAMID.

In June, the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (ADSC) approved the Doha Peace Document which aimed to serve as a framework agreement for resolving the conflict. The proposal was welcomed by the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), while the JEM harshly criticised Khartoum for trying to centre the agreement exclusively on security and participation in institutions. In turn, the government expressed its unwillingness to negotiate the content of the document and stressed that it would have to be respected in its entirety, as it was approved. The ADSC is made of 500 members representing political groups, armed groups, internally displaced persons and civil society.

The government and the alliance of armed groups LJM signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) in July aimed at putting an end to the armed conflict in Darfur. The document was based on the proposal put forth by the mediators, which received the backing of the conference of Darfur actors held in June. However, the leading armed groups described this agreement as futile. The SLA labelled it propaganda, condemning the fact that the violence still persisted in Darfur, while the armed group JEM stressed the need to revise some of its points, such as victim compensation and the agreements on security matters. The leader of JEM, Tijani el-Sisi, regarded the agreement as a solid basis for peace and stressed the need to extend it to the remaining groups operating in the region. In August, the UN Security Council extended UNAMID's mandate by one year and approved the UN Secretary General's intention to review the number of troops and to propose a roadmap for solving the conflict in the region. This news was not well received by the Sudanese government, which accused the USA of trying to change the force's mandate and threatened to cancel the mission. The resolution did not back the initiative of former South African President Thabo Mbeki known as the Darfur-based Political Process, although it did recognise the potential complementary role that it could play in peace-building in the region. It also celebrated the establishment of the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Committee achieved in Doha (Qatar) between the government and the armed group LJM. The leader of the LJM, Tijani el-Sisi, was appointed President of the Regional Authority of Darfur in fulfilment of the peace agreement reached with the government in Doha (Qatar). Among his priorities, El-Sisi stressed reconstruction of the region, for which the government had pledged two billion dollars per year, according to his statements.

In September, **a new faction of the armed group JEM, Democratic Change Forces** – headed by the Vice President of the group and the leader of the forces in Kurdufan, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdein – **announced its intention to reach a peace agreement with the government** as part of the Doha process. Mohamed

Bahr had been removed from his post as JEM representative in Qatar for the peace negotiations after the armed group accused him of wanting to sign an agreement without the consent of its leaders. Likewise, the SLA faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur declared that the head of UNAMID and the new mediator in the peace process, Ibrahim Gambari, was not viewed as a valid, neutral interlocutor by the group and asked that his appointment be reconsidered.

In October, the SLA faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur pledged to eliminate minor soldiers from its ranks. The group sent an action plan to the United Nations through the head of UNAMID, Ibrahim Gambari, in which it pledged to put an end to the recruitment of minors and their use within its forces. The United Nations received similar commitments from other groups and factions operating in the region. Between 2009 and February of this year, the DDR Commission for northern Sudan recorded a total of 1,041 former minor soldiers in Darfur.

Most significant events in the year


The government and the alliance of armed groups LJM signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) in July aimed at putting an end to the armed conflict in Darfur.

A new faction of the armed group JEM, Democratic Change Forces – headed by the Vice President of the group and the leader of the forces in Kurdufan, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdein – announced its intention to reach a peace agreement with the government as part of the Doha process.

Websites of interest

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Issues in Peacebuilding (www.cmi.no/sudan)
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UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Save Darfur Coalition (www.savedarfur.org)
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UEM (www.sudanjem.com)
UNAMID (www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unamid)
African Union (www.africa-union.org)
UNMIS (www.unmis.org)
Wikipedia (Conflict in Darfur)

Main actors in the process



Great Lakes and Central Africa

CHAD

Context of the conflict

Ever since its independence in 1960, Chad has suffered numerous conflicts, both internally and with neighbouring countries, with a sum total of 50,000 casualties. The experience of initiating its independence with a single political party and an authoritarian regime led to the creation of the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) in 1966, and subsequently numerous other armed groups. These groups are highly divided, with most of them lacking a political agenda and having the sole objective of seizing power. In 1982 Hissène Habré gained power as a result of international sup-

port provided by an expansionist Libya, ushering in several years of major political repression. Between 1975 and 1990 numerous conflicts took place between the north and south of the country, with the participation of several foreign countries. Libya occupied the northern part of the country, supporting one of the factions in the conflict, while the USA and France provided military support to the other side.

Population: 11,5 million inhabitants

Area: 1,284,000 km²

GDP: 6,700 million dollars

Income per inhabitant: \$600

HID: 183 (of 187)

Deaths due to the conflict: 7,000 since 1990

Displaced population: 173,000

Refugee population: 236,000

Armed actors: MDJT, FUC, SCUD, CAR, RFC, CNT, UFDD, UFR

Facilitators: Libya

In 1990 several military officers led a coup d'état, and Idriss Déby took power with the backing of Libya and Sudan. Despite making some progress, and despite retaining power in the 1996 and 2001 elections, Déby's regime entered a serious crisis in the late 1990s. In 1998, a former minister of defence, now deceased, created the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) with the backing of Libya, thus ushering in a period in which the presidency was contested. In 2003, the presidential party, the MPS, decided to amend the constitution, which only allowed for two consecutive presidential mandates, so that the president could be re-elected once again. Chad also became an oil-producing country in 2003.

The Popular Front for National Rebirth (**FPRN**) was created in 2004; it has around 5,000 troops. In the same year, there was an attempted coup, and in 2005 a referendum was held on constitutional reform, although this was boycotted by the majority of the population. The year 2005 also witnessed the creation of **FUC**. This was a federation of the leading insurgent groups, with over 3,000 troops. It included the **RDL**, led by Mohamat Nour, a young military officer who was highly contested by members of his own group. In late 2005, several Chadian military officers joined the RDL, bringing with them their vehicles and heavy weapons. Other important groups included **SCUD**, a splinter group of the FUC led by Yaya Dillo Djerou, and the Rally of Democratic Forces (**RAFD**). In the latter stage in this series of conflicts continuing throughout 2006, the rebel groups were poised to occupy the capital of the country.

The current crisis is spurred by the confluence of several factors. One element is the current war in Darfur (western Sudan) which began in 2003 and which has led to tensions with Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). Also featuring prominently in this conflict is the antagonism between the Arab tribes and the black ethnic groups, especially the Zaghawa, which is the tribe of the president of Chad. This tribe lives off political kickbacks and the perks of power despite being a minority tribe in this country, accounting for a mere 3% of Chad's population. Given that there is a large Zaghawa population in Darfur, the President of Chad is faced with the dilemma of either contributing to ending the conflict in Darfur by helping the Sudanese government, or maintaining his clan loyalty with the more than 200,000 Sudanese refugees who have moved to Chad, mainly Zaghawa. Chad's relations with Sudan deteriorated seriously at the outset of the Darfur crisis, since both countries accused each other of supporting the armed groups in their respective countries. The Sudanese rebels in

Darfur recruit Zaghawa combatants in the refugee camps located in Chad, a situation which has led to armed conflict between the two countries and the respective attempts at negotiation.

A second factor in the crisis is the internal division within the Zaghawa of Chad, who are enmeshed in internecine battles to gain the presidency, totally unwilling to share power with other ethnic groups, and thus not in favour of political openness. A third source of instability is the crisis in the country's tax and social system, with the consequent loss in the legitimacy of the state; a situation which is only aggravated by the lack of a democratic tradition. The final factor playing a key role in the current situation is the management of the oil resources which have begun to be exploited in recent years, and which led to a confrontation with the World Bank. Lastly, it is worth pointing out the key role that different countries have played at different times. This is especially true of Libya (which now wants to play the role of regional mediator), France (which has 1,200 troops deployed in the country and supports president Idriss Déby), Sudan (due to the Darfur conflict) and the USA (which has major oil interests in the country).

Development of the peace process

During the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000, President Idriss Déby attempted to neutralise several of the armed groups in the country either by military means or by encouraging negotiations. However, in October the government and the last MDJT group signed an agreement in which the 2006 members of the group would be able to rejoin the armed forces, while the government pledged to develop the region of Azouzou. In the middle of December 2006, Mahamat Nour, the leader of the armed group FUC, held a reconciliation meeting with President Idriss Déby, putting an end to the clashes in recent months and reaching a peace agreement. In the early days of January, the president of Chad, Idriss Déby, and the leader of the armed opposition group FUC, Mahamat Nour, elevated the Tripoli peace agreement to official status with facilitation by the president of Libya, Muammar al-Gaddafi. The agreement called for a ceasefire, amnesty for the rebels, representation in the government, the integration of its members into the Chadian armed forces and the release of prisoners on both sides. However, the climate of uncertainty continued after the agreement was signed, with this group breaking up into factions. Several sources estimate that before the group broke up it had between 3,000 and 4,000 combatants, of whom almost 1,000 had not joined the peace process. The two main factions emerging from the FUC were the coalition of groups called the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) led by the brothers Tom and Timane Edrimi, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), led by the former Minister of Defence Mahamat Nouri, and the National Chadian Convention (CNT), led by H. Saleh al-Jinedi. In early October, the government and the four main armed opposition groups in this country reached the beginnings of a peace agreement with the facilitation of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Tripoli. The four armed groups that signed the agreement were the UFDD, the UFDD-Fundamental (UFDDF, a schism of the former), the RFC and the CNT. The agreement called for an immediate ceasefire, the release of prisoners, amnesty for the members of the armed groups, the creation of a committee to integrate the members of the rebellion into Chad's state structures, the right to form political parties and the disarmament and integration of the members of the rebellion into the state security corps. One month later however, serious clashes broke out between the armed forces and the armed opposition groups present in the country after the breach of the peace agreement by two of the four armed groups that had signed it and the government's expulsion of the former leader of the armed opposition group FUC and the Minister of Defence, Mahamat Nour.

In early January 2008 the EU's military organisations approved the EU's peacekeeping mission on the border between both countries (EUFOR RCA/TCHAD) with a delay of more than three months. On April 15th however, contacts were initiated in Tripoli between the Chadian government and a delegation from the armed opposite group RFC led by Timane Erdimi, a nephew of the president and one of the three forces that had tried to bring down Déby's regime in February. In late November, the rebel movements in eastern Chad decided to join forces in a new structure called the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR). In a manifesto signed by the different leaders, they promised an 18-month transition period after the fall of the Déby regime. The groups that belong to the UFR include the UDC (led by Abderraman Koulamallah), the FSR (led by Ahmat Hassabal-

lah Soubiane), the RFC (Timane Erdimi), the UFDD (Mahamat Nouri), the UFCD (Adoum Hassabalah), the UFDD-F (Abdelwahid Aboud Makkaye), the CDR (Albadour Acyl Ahmat Achabach) and the FPRN (Adoum Yacoub Koukou). A new armed group was also formed in Cameroon with the goal of bringing down President Idris Déby; this group, called the Forces Progressistes pour l'Indépendance et la Renaissance (FPIR), was created by the Forum for Exiled Chadians in Central Africa, known by its acronym in French, FECAT.

On the 25th of September 2007 UN Security Council Resolution 1778 approved the establishment of a multi-dimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic, organised in conjunction with the European Union and aimed at creating the security conditions needed for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The Security Council decided that the multifunctional presence would include a United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (**MINURCAT**). In the meantime, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1861 in which it authorised the replacement and expansion of the EU mission (EUFOR RCA/TCHAD, made up of 3,200 soldiers) on the 15th of March with the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission, which included 2009 soldiers and 300 police officers. The goals of this mission were to take all the measures needed to protect the civilian population, to facilitate the arrival of humanitarian aid and to protect the United Nations staff and property. It will have an initial mandate of one year. Its area of action will be the frontier regions of the Central African Republic and Chad with the Darfur region. The head of the MINURCAT mission and Secretary General Special Representative is Victor Da Silva Angelo. By late 2009, MINURCAT had 2,777 staff members, made up of 2,489 soldiers, 24 military observers and 264 police officers. The budget from the 1st of July 2009 to the 30th of June 2010 was 690 million dollars.

In late July, the Chadian government and a cluster of three armed groups signed a peace agreement in Sirt (Libya) after mediation by the Libyan leader, who was also the serving president of the AU. The agreement called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the exchange and release of prisoners as part of a general amnesty, for the armed groups to engage in political activity and for their members to be integrated into the armed forces within three months. The government, the armed groups, Libya and the ACNUR were to set up a committee to work on returning and reintegrating the refugee population. The coalition of groups, called the National Movement, was made up of three armed groups, the UFDD-Renewal, led by Issa Moussa Tamboulet, the MNR, led by Mahamat Ahmat Hamid, and the FSR, led by Ahmat Hasaballah Soubiane, who was also the leader of the three-group coalition that had been formed in June. The UFR, the coalition of groups led by Timane Erdimi, which encompasses eight armed groups, rejected this agreement, stating that it had been reached separately, and issued a call to set up an all-inclusive negotiating panel.

In July 2010, the rebel chiefs of Chad and Sudan who had set up their bases on the borderland between the two countries suffered the consequences of the rapprochement between the countries and lost their support. While in May, the leader of the Sudanese Armed group JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, was declared a persona non grata by his Chadian hosts, later the same declaration was levelled at the leaders of the Chadian rebellion. The Sudanese authorities forced the Chadian rebel chiefs Timane Erdimi (RFC), Mahamat Nouri (UFDD) and Adouma Hassaballah (UFCD) to leave Khartoum. Around the same time, **approximately 500 combatants from the group UFCD led by Colone Hassabalah decided to turn in their weapons** and gain legal status. In September, a second group of 150 insurgents from the former Chadian armed group Movement for Justice and Social Change (MJSC) returned to N'Djamena from the capital of northern Darfur accompanied by the Chadian Minister of Security. These rebels had deserted the army in February 2006. This joint handover of weapons was part of both countries' efforts in the peace agreement which they had reached early in the year in order to put an end to the support that both were providing to the other country's insurgency.

In November, **more than 4,000 combatants laid down their weapons** in a ceremony held in Moussoro. The event was presided over by Mahamat Nimir Hamita, the mediation representative of the government. Specifically, the ceremony included 4,080 rebels and 83 all-terrain vehicles equipped with heavy weapons. The rebels belonged to different political and military movements, including Timane Erdimi's UFR coalition, Mahamat Nouri's UFDD, the CDR and Abdelwahid Aboud's UFDD/F. The rebels asked for the government's pardon. Analysts in the local press noted that around 90% of the rebels had already turned in their weapons and regained legal status, the whereabouts of around 5% were unknown, and another 5% were still in transit. One of the essential features of the government's "outstretched hand" policy was the absorption and integra-

tion of former rebels into the country's social and public life. The government had declared a general amnesty in the different agreements it had signed in recent years except for those rebels who were guilty of common crimes. Officially, the former soldiers and civil servants were readmitted to their former positions, and the rebel chiefs and combatants were allowed to join the Chadian army and the civil service.

The peace process in 2011

In May, the armed opposition coalition UFR questioned the results of the elections and issued a call to the international community, especially the AU and the EU, to review the election process and strengthen democracy, which entailed promoting national reconciliation with the goal of the country being able to live in peace.

The UFR renewed its call for dialogue with the government in the same conditions set earlier, such as defining a global framework with international assistance and defining a new transition guaranteed by the international community. In June, the old Chadian rebel leader Abderraman Koulamallah, arrested upon his return to N'Djamena from exile in France, was released after spending two weeks under arrest and having earned presidential pardon. Koulamallah, the spokesman of the coalition of armed groups UFR, issued a call to the authorities to find a formula so that people who were arrested would not have to stay in prison and to permanently close the issue of the armed conflict. Before his return, Koulamallah had declared to the AFP that he had decided to put an end to the armed struggle.


In mid-June, **the armed opposition group Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR), based in the Central African Republic and led by General Abdel Kader Baba Ladde, signed a peace agreement with the Chadian government** (Bangui Agreement). Baba Ladde had been living in exile in the Central African Republic since 2008.

Most significant events in the year

The armed opposition group Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR), based in the Central African Republic and led by General Abdel Kader Baba Ladde, signed a peace agreement with the Chadian government (Bangui Agreement).

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Context of the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR) won independence from France in 1960. For the first six years of its independence it was governed by the dictator D. Dacko. Dacko was later overthrown by his cousin J. B. Bokassa, who set up an eccentric military dictatorship. Later France backed a coup d'état that reinstated Dacko, until he was once again overthrown in 1981, this time by Ange Félix Patassé, who took over ownership of the companies exploiting the country's natural resources. The country suffered from several military

mutinies in the 1990s because it failed to pay the soldiers' salaries, and there was a coup in 2003, when the current president François Bozizé came to power. Despite the fact that the country is rich in diamonds, gold, uranium, wood and coffee, the CAR has been suffering from political instability, ineffective governance, insecurity, banditry and deterioration in its economic situation for twenty years, while half of its population remains illiterate. With the economic recession in Europe and the United States, the diamond industry entered into a deep-seated crisis and most companies closed. In the words of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to this country, the roots of the conflicts in the CAR lie in the collapse of its socioeconomic structures and the absence of political dialogue. Since 2003, the conflict between the government and several armed groups has been closely linked to the situation in Darfur (Sudan), which shares a border with the CAR, since the armed groups from both countries take refuge in refugee camps on both sides of the border, generating serious tensions between the two countries. The majority of the conflict is thus centred in the northern region of Vakaga, whose capital Birao has been controlled by the rebel groups on several occasions. 2005 saw the creation of the armed opposition groups the **Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy (APRD)**, and the **Union des Forces du Renouveau (UFR)**, headed by F. Njadder-Bedaya. Another armed group, the **UFDR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement)**, led by Michel Djotodia, is a coalition between three groups (GAPLC, MLCJ and FDC), and the **Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africain (FDPC)**, led by Abdoulaye Miskine, who was close to former president Patassé.

Population: 4.5 million inhabitants

Area: 623,000 km²

HID: 179 (out of 187)

GDP: 2,000 million dollars

Income per inhabitant: \$450

IDP: 280,000

Armed actors: FDPC, APRD, UFDR, UFR

Facilitators: Paulin Pomodimo, BONUCA, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Development of the peace process

After the country experienced three mutinies in its armed forces in 1996, in January 1997 the **Bangui Agreements** were signed between the forces loyal to the then president Patassé and the rebel groups. These agreements called for an inter-African force, called **MISAB**, whose 800 soldiers would be in charge of demobilising the combatants and ensuring compliance with the agreements. In 1998, after intervention by French troops, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping mission (**MINURCA**) to protect the capital of the country and replace MISAB. Since February 2000 there has been a United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (**BONUCA**) with the mission of helping the government consolidate peace and national reconciliation. In February 2004, the government approved the Ex Combatants and Community Support Project that started operating in December 2004. The government also created the National Council for Permanent Peaceful Mediation. Radio Ndeke Lula, a station devoted to peace and development in the country, has been operating for some years now, with the support of the Swiss-based Foundation Hirondelle and the UNDP. In 2005 troops were deployed in the area of conflict in the northeast of the country. The troops were from CEMAC (the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa), which was replaced by the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace (MICOPAX), which has around 500 troops from Gabon, Chad, Cameroon and DR Congo, as well as police officers from Equatorial Guinea.

In August 2006, President Bozizé announced the possibility of beginning conciliatory talks with the armed opposition groups, launching a series of dialogues that was partly funded by China, which has a keen inter-

est in the oil resources in the region. In February 2007, the government and the FDPC led by Abdoulaye Miskine signed a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) under the mediation of Muammar al-Gaddafi. In April an agreement was reached with Damane Zakaria's UFDR, with a joint call for a cessation of hostilities and the offer of amnesty for the members of the group. In May 2008 the government signed an agreement with the APDR, run by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who was in exile in France, in Libreville, with the mediation of the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo. Later, **in December 2008, the government and several armed opposition groups reached an Inclusive Political Agreement (IPA)** with the mediation of the archbishop of Bangui, Paulin Pomodimo, forming a joint government and holding free elections in 2010. The Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) was co-facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. Two former presidents also participated in this dialogue, namely André Koulingba and Ange-Félix Patassé, as well as Jean Jacques Demafouth's APRD, Damane Zakaria's UFDR, Florent N'Djadder's UFR and Abakar Sabone's MLCJ (a faction of the UFDR). Months later, in July 2009, with mediation by Libya, Abdoulaye Miskine's FDPC joined the dialogue (Miskine was in exile in Libya), and in October 2009 Hassan Ousman's MNSP (a faction of the MLCJ) also adhered to the IPD. The only rebel group that remains on the margins of the peace process is Charles Massi's CPJP. The Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) created a Monitoring Committee presided over by the United Nations and made up of 15 members. Three committees were also set up on the areas of governability and policy, security and armed groups, and socioeconomic issues. The IPD called for the disarmament of the groups, and it estimated a budget of 27 million for the demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of around 8,000 combatants. However, this DDR suffered from major delays despite the fact that the first phase of awareness-raising in the DDR was launched by the President in August 2009.

BONUCA, the United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic, started operating in 2000. It was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (**BINUCA**) in January 2010. The objective of BINUCA is to coordinate the UN's efforts to support the processes of national reconciliation and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) under the parameters established by the Inclusive Political Dialogue of Bangui (2008), in which the office will play a key facilitating role. BONUCA was created to support the government of the CAR's efforts to consolidate peace and international political resources for national reconstruction and the economic reconversion of the country. The head of BONUCA is the Senegalese Cheikh Tidiane Sy.


In January 2010, BONUCA and other agencies joined the United Nations Integrated Peacekeeping Office in the CAR (BINUCA). In late January of the same year, the president of the Central African Republic, François Bozizé, confirmed the death of the former Minister of Defence and the leader of the CPJP, Charles Massi, under police custody. By June, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 8,000 former combatants was completed.

The peace process in 2011

The government and a dissident faction of the armed group CPJP made up of 500 combatants signed a peace agreement in July in the town of Nzako, located in the east, after they reached a ceasefire agreement on the 12th of July. The CPJP is the last major rebel group active in the country which signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on the 12th of June of this year. However, the group did not disarm. The official government mediator, Monsignor Paulin Pomodimo, announced that the new agreement had been signed by the leader of a faction of the group, Mahamat Sallé, in the presence of other members of the government and the MICOPAX mission. The agreement led the dissident faction to disarm and recognise the governmental institutions, while it provided Sallé with security so he can freely travel around the country. This agreement came in the wake of a meeting between the Ministry of Security and the President of the Republic where they discussed the case of Sallé, who had expressed his desire to abandon the armed struggle and work in favour of peace. The agreement reached in June between the government and the CPJP stipulated a DDR process that included the minor soldiers in this group. However, a report drawn up jointly by Watchlist International and the IDMC stated that minors were still quite active in the local self-defence militias. The

report stated that there were around 2,000 minors in these militias, more than the number of minors in the armed groups. These militias were neither financed nor armed by the government, but they did receive munitions and other kinds of supplies. In August, Monsignor Pomodimo announced that he had gone to Kaga Bandoro (northern part of the country) to meet with General Abdel Kader Baba Laddé, head of the Chadian rebellion of the FPR.

The Inclusive Political Dialogue in the CAR



Most significant events in the year

The government and a dissident faction of the armed group CPJP made up of 500 combatants signed a peace agreement in July in the town of Nzako, located in the east, after they reached a ceasefire agreement on the 12th of July.

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (East)

Context of the conflict

During the 20th century, the DR Congo was immersed in a situation of despotism, with an absence and disintegration of the state. In addition, the country's natural resources were plundered. This situation began during the Belgian colonial period, and except for a brief interval after independence in 1960, it continued for over 30 years under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. This dictatorship was characterised by the repression of political dissidence, serious human rights violations and a situation where the Mobutu elite amassed wealth by plundering the natural resources for their own benefit. In 1996 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), led by Laurent Desiré Kabila and supported by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, began an uprising against Mobutu which culminated in Mobutu ceding power in 1997. In 1998 Kabila lost the support of his old allies, neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, who invaded the DR Congo under the excuse that they were guaranteeing the security of their borders. These countries supported different armed groups (Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda, the MRC) fighting against Kabila's government. The government was supported by different countries in the region (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad) in a war that has caused around three and a half million deaths through combat, hunger or illness. Plundering the natural resources (gold, diamonds, wood and coltan) has become the driving force behind both the war and the prolonged presence of foreign armed forces in the country. Several neighbouring countries and western multinationals have profited from this enterprise, according to the United Nations. In this chapter we shall limit ourselves to analysing the process under way in the most conflict-ridden provinces in the country: Orientale (especially the Ituri area) with the presence of the **MRC**, **FNI** and **FRPI**; North Kivu, with the presence of the **ADF** (now dismantled), **CNDP** and **Mai-Mai** militias; South Kivu, where the Rwandan group **FDLR** is active; and Katanga, another region where the Mai-Mai militias are currently active.

Population: 67,8 million inhabitants
Area: DRC (2,345,000 km²), **Kivus (124,600 km²), Orientale (503,200 km²), Katanga (497,000 km²), Ituri district (65,600 km²)**
GDP: 10,600 million dollars
Per capita income: \$160
HDI: 187 (out of 187)
Deaths due to the conflict: 3.5 million people
IDP: 1,400,000 people in 2007
Refugee population : 462,000 people
Armed actors: Factions of the armed groups included in the Transitional National Government, Mai-Mai militias, MRC, FNI, FRPI, CNDP, the Rwandan armed opposition group FDLR (former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militia)
Facilitators: Ketumile Masire (Botswana), Libya, South Africa, SADC, United Nations, AU, the Saint Egidio Community, Rwanda, MONUC

Development of the peace process

The first stage in the peace process was the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, which was signed in July 1999 by the different countries and armed groups involved in the conflict. This agreement was reached with the facilitation of the regional organisation SADC (the Southern Africa Development Community) and primarily South Africa. It enabled the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in November 1999 (UN Security Council Resolution 1291) to monitor the ceasefire and promote the disarmament of the militias. Its mandate is divided into four phases: enforcing the ceasefire agreements signed in Lusaka; monitoring any violation of the agreements; organising the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants; and facilitating the transition in order to organise credible elections. Its mandate is governed by Chapter VII of the charter, which authorises it to use force if necessary.

Nonetheless, the conflict continued in the east of the country. Laurent Desiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001, and his son Joseph Kabila took over power. It was only then that J. Kabila revitalised and promoted the Inter-Congolese Dialogues (ICD) held in South Africa. The ICD led to negotiations between the belligerent parties in Sun City, which led to the signing of an agreement at the end of these negotiations, known as the Global and In-

clusive Agreement. This was signed in Pretoria in December 2002. The Sun City Final Agreement was reached in April 2003, bringing together and summarising the previous agreements. The Sun City Final Agreement led to the integration of the government and the armed opposition groups into the Transitional National Government (TNG). Joseph Kabila kept his office as president of this government and four vice-presidents were appointed, representing the government, the MLC, the DRC/Goma and the unarmed opposition. The agreement called for a two-year transitional phase, after which general elections would be held and new Congolese armed forces would be formed, which would be made up of the different armed opposition groups.

In early 2005 6,000 troops from one of the six armed groups in the region, the FAPC, were demobilised. In late July 2006 some of the main militias operating in the eastern region of the DR Congo, within the armed opposition coalition MRC, decided to lay down their weapons, to facilitate the free movement of displaced people in the area in order to exercise their right to vote in the elections. They also agreed to join the country's armed forces gradually in exchange for amnesty for all their members. The agreement was reached through mediation by the UN peace team in the region. One of the demobilised members was a leader of the FNI militia, Peter Karim. In late November 2006 the last three armed groups operating in Ituri signed a Framework Agreement for Peace in Ituri with the government, meaning that they agreed to lay down their weapons and join the DDR process. All told, the groups had 6,000 troops: 3,500 from "Cobra" Matata's FRPI, 1,800 from Peter Karim's FNI (some of which, however, were opposed to demobilising and continued fighting) and 500 from Mathieu Ngudjolo's MRC. In early December the Congolese government accepted the demand to hold direct peace talks with Laurent Nkunda's CNDP militia under the auspices of the United Nations and its Special Envoy, Olesegun Obasanjo, in Kenya. Early January 2009 witnessed a major division within the Congolese Tutsi group CNDP, as the military leader (Chief of Staff) of the rebellion, Bosco Ntaganda, announced the expulsion of General Laurent Nkunda as the leader of the group for reasons of poor governability. Shortly thereafter, Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda in a joint military operation between the Rwandan and Congolese armed forces. Furthermore, the faction of the Tutsi armed opposition group CNDP led by General Bosco Ntaganda, alias "Terminator", and ten other senior leaders of the rebellion, who just days earlier had stated that they had deposed General Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the movement, issued a declaration on the 16th of January in which they announced that they were putting an end to the hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces. After the agreement this faction announced that it would join the Armed Forces, and was willing to help in the offensive against the Rwandan Hutu armed opposition group, FDLR.

THE ARMED ACTORS IN THE EAST OF DR CONGO

Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)	Made up of the Hutus from Rwanda involved in the 1994 genocide, the FDLR is made up of former members of the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militias. It has around 3,000 troops and an armed wing, FOCA, which is active in South Kivu. Mai Mai groups Most of them are members of self-defence militias assembled by local leaders who then arm the young men in the settlements. Some groups reached a peace agreement with the government and demobilised.
Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)	Directed by Bosco Ntaganda, who replaced Larent Nkunda, who agreed to orient the movement towards peace. In March 2009, the CNDP became a political party, and between 3,000 and 4,000 members joined the Congolese army. Another 1,500 refused to join.
Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC)	A group active in North Kivu, it is led by General Gad Ngabo and has several hundred combatants. It is in a dispute with the CNDP over control of certain zones.
Forces Démocratiques Alliées / Armée Nationale de Libération de l'Ouganda (ADF/NALU)	This is a group of 1,300 men founded early in the 1990s and directed by Jamil Mukulu, a Ugandan rebel chief associated with the former dictator Idi Amin Dada, which in the mid-1990s penetrated into Congolese territory and in 2009, with United Nations mediation, held peace talks with Uganda and DR Congo.

Armée de Résistance du Seigneur (LRA)	This is a Ugandan group founded in 1987 by Joseph Kony and opposed to the government of Yoweri Museveni. It is trying to create a Christian-inspired theocracy. Persecuted in Uganda, the group has dispersed into small units which have travelled through several countries in the region. They recruit minors as soldiers and use girls as sex slaves. They terrorise the population and horribly mutilate them.
Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri / Front Populaire pour la Justice au Congo (FRPI/FPJC)	The FPJC is a dissident group of the FRPI. They are active in the south of Ituri and are a residual group. Colonel "Cobra" Matata, head of the FRPI, which had agreed to join the Congolese armed forces, deserted in June to join his militia.
EnYele / Mouvement de Libération Indépendant et Alliés (MILIA)	Made up of members of the Lobala group. The insurrection began in the province of Ecuador.
Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC)	Human rights organisations accuse this group of being devoted to criminal activities and attacking the civilian population.

Source: IRIN, 18-6-2010

In late May, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1925 extending MONUC's mandate until the 30th of June. It also decided that in view of the new phase that the country had reached, the United Nations' mission in this country **would be called the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) starting on the 1st of July**. MONUSCO was to be deployed until the 30th of June 2011 and it would have at most 19,815 troops, 760 military observers and 1,441 police officers. It would also be supplied with the corresponding civilian, judicial and penitentiary members. The Security Council also authorised the withdrawal of at most 2,000 United Nations troops by the 30th of June 2010 at the latest in the zones where security conditions allowed it. It further authorised MONUSCO to not only concentrate its efforts on the eastern zone of the country but also to keep a reserve force with rapid deployment capacity in any other part of the country. Finally, the Security Council stressed that the Congolese government was the main body in charge of security and protection of the civilian population. In June, the UN Secretary General appointed Roger Meece, the US ambassador in the DR Congo between 2004 and 2007, as the new UN Secretary General Special Representative to replace Alan Doss.

In August, at least 400 former members of armed groups from North and South Kivu proceeded to be demobilised. From 2009 until August 2010, 4,178 former combatants had laid down their weapons. The event also included a call for the members of the groups Mai Mai Kifuafula, Pareco-FAP and APCLS to disarm and reintegrate into the Congolese armed forces. In late December, a government delegation and a MONUSCO delegation held talks with a delegation of the Mai-Mai militia regarding the possible demobilisation of this group.

The peace process in 2011

The Congolese armed forces and the armed group Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) reached an agreement in February after intense negotiations that led to the group's joining the army. The FRF is made up of people from the Banyamulenge community located in the Haute Plateau zone between Uvira and Fizi in the province of South Kivu. The group, led by self-proclaimed Generals Venant Bisogo and, Michel Rukunda, has never posed a military threat, and its membership currently fluctuates between 50 and 500 combatants. However, the army's operations against them led to numerous civilian deaths and had a heavy impact on the humanitarian situation in the region. One of the key issues in the negotiations, the status of the region of Minembwe, was postponed. The Banyamulenge people advocated on behalf of creating an autonomous Banyamulenge entity for the people with its own services and administration, as well as a separate election district. One of the prime leaders of the armed Hutu Rwandan group present in the east of DR Congo, the **FDLR**, namely Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Bisengimana, also known as Sam Mu-


tima-Kunda, abandoned the armed group and joined the DDR programme being conducted by MONUSCO. Mutima-Kunda had been an officer in the former Rwandan army, a company commandant, and his current responsibilities were to mobilise civilian support of the FDLR and facilitate recruitment. **In 2010, 1,681 members of the FDLR, including 64 officers, chose to surrender and embark on the DRR process.** The UN Secretary General Special Representative in the country, Roger Meece, stated that the FDLR, the main group in the east of DR Congo, was being weakened by military action and desertions, so it might actually disappear as a threat. Of its 15,000 members in 2001, only around 6,000-7,000 were left by late 2007, and today it is estimated to have around 3,500 combatants.

Most significant events in the year

The Congolese armed forces and the armed group Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) reached an agreement in February after intense negotiations that led to the group's joining the army.

Websites of interest

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Maghreb

WESTERN SAHARA

Context of the conflict

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when a referendum on self-rule was held. In the same year the territory was invaded by Morocco. As a result, almost half the population fled and settled in the Algerian area of Tinduf, close to the border with the Western Sahara. This incident led to the breaking off of relations between Algeria and Morocco. From then until 1991 there has been an open military confrontation between Morocco and the Saharan people led by the POLISARIO Front. In 1991 some of results of the negotiations begun by the United Nations back in 1988 were put into effect, leading to a ceasefire and the deployment of a United Nations mission (MINURSO). However, since 1991 Morocco has encouraged the colonisation of the Sahara by Moroccan settlers.

Population: 250,000 inhabitants
Area: 184,000 km²
HDI (Morocco): 130 of 182
Deaths due to the conflict: 10,000
Refugee population: 86,000-150,000
Actors: POLISARIO Front
Facilitators: United Nations

Development of the peace process

Since the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front came into effect in 1991, the United Nations has been working to achieve a satisfactory agreement between both parties. However, the desired results were not obtained in any stages of the process until 2007. The 1991 Settlement Plan, which called for a referendum to be held in the short term, was blocked shortly thereafter due to the allegations submitted by Morocco, and despite the fact that in 1997 it seemed that negotiations might prove fruitful, as a result of the Houston Agreements, which were signed by both parties. The new deadlock caused by Morocco prevented the implementing of the Houston agreements. In view of this, the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, James Baker, presented a new proposal, or Framework Agreement, in 2001. This agreement yielded to Morocco's main demands, since it proposed that a new autonomous regime be established in the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. This proposal was roundly rejected by the POLISARIO Front. However, starting in 2000, the UN Security Council resolutions stopped mentioning the word "referendum". In 2003 James Baker presented a new, more balanced proposal which was accepted by the POLISARIO Front as a starting point for negotiations. However, this time the proposal was rejected by Morocco. In 2004, James Baker was replaced by Álvaro de Soto.

The Baker Plan II had three stages. In the first stage, which lasted one year, prisoners of war would be released, all the armed forces would be scaled down and an election campaign would be held. In the second stage, the Western Sahara Authority (WSA) would be elected. Voters would include any anyone of age appearing on the MINURSO election list on the 30th of December 1999, as well as ACNUR's list of repatriates from the 31st of October 2000. This option was favourable to the POLISARIO Front. The Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly would be elected and would have far-reaching powers, with the exception of foreign relations, national security, defence of territorial integrity against potential secessionists, the flag, currency, customs, the postal service and telecommunications. The third stage included plans to hold a referendum to vote on the 1991 Settlement Plan (with the option of independence) and the Morocco Agreement with the **WSA**. The same electors would vote in this referendum as those who elected the **WSA**, plus those residing in Western Sahara on a continuous basis since the 30th of December 1999 (an option favourable to Morocco). More than half the votes would be needed to win, and the elections would be organised by the UN.

In April, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, released a statement in favour of direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front with participation by Algeria and Mauritania, aimed at seeking a political

solution to the conflict in Western Sahara. By doing so, the United Nations permanently shelved the Baker Plan, which had been unanimously approved by the Security Council in 2003, to be replaced by the ideas of the new Secretary-General's Representative for Western Sahara, the Dutchman Peter van Walsum. According to diplomatic sources, in an approach that differed radically from that of his predecessor, Peter van Walsum believed that the Baker Plan had been a mistake, that the option of independence would have been discarded and that Algeria should form a part of the negotiations, an option that this country has always rejected since it insists that Morocco does not represent the Saharan people. According to Kofi Annan, the new plan drafted by the UN would be doomed to failure because Morocco would reject it unless it did not include the option for a referendum on independence. The POLISARIO Front then rejected the UN's proposal to start direct negotiations with Morocco over Western Sahara. In addition, the King created the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), made up of the chiefs of several Saharan tribes, local elected officials and NGOs. This body expressed its approval of broad autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.

In 2007, the Secretary General of the UN named British diplomat J. Harston as the new Special Representative for the Western Sahara and as Head of the UN Mission charged with organising a referendum (MINURSO). In March, the Algerian president Bouteflika declared that the Western Sahara issue would not be a *causus belli* between Algeria and Morocco, and that it was more inclined to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict via a referendum on self-determination. **Despite this, two attacks committed on March 11th in Casablanca and on April 11th in Algiers, claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, triggered a change in Algeria's and Morocco's positions on Western Sahara, since they recognised the need to strengthen their relations in order to combat terrorism.** Morocco submitted its proposal for regional autonomy for Western Sahara to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. The proposal states that this region would have autonomy in terms of administration, economics, taxation, infrastructure, culture and environmental issues. The state of Morocco, in turn, would retain exclusive jurisdiction on matters of sovereignty (the flag or national currency), exploration and exploitation of natural resources, religious and constitutional matters and any matter related to the figure of the king, national security, defence, territorial integrity, foreign relations and judicial power in the kingdom. The POLISARIO Front also submitted its own proposal to the Secretary-General, which called for setting up economic and trade relations with Morocco as part of a possible independence achieved via the right to self-determination. In mid-April, the Secretary General of the UN submitted to the Security Council his report on the situation in the Western Sahara. In it he urged Morocco and the POLISARIO Front to enter into talks to seek a solution to the conflict. Both sides expressed their willingness to meet, thus paving the way for a first two-day meeting in a United Nations building near New York in June.

Morocco's proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara, 11th of April 2007

Areas of regional power:

- Administrative (local administration and local police)
- Economic (development, planning, investments, trade, industry, tourism, agriculture)
- Taxation
- Infrastructures
- Social (housing, education, healthcare, employment, social protection)
- Cultural
- Environmental

Exclusive jurisdiction of Morocco:

- The flag
- The national anthem
- Currency
- Exploitation of natural resources
- Religious issues
- Constitutional issues

National security

Defence

Foreign relations (Western Sahara would be consulted on issues that affect it)

Judicial power

Morocco's commitments

Autonomy would be subjected to a referendum

The Moroccan constitution would be revised to include Western Sahara's charter of self-government

The reinsertion of repatriates would be guaranteed

A general amnesty would be declared

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

In August 2007, in Manhasset, a town near New York city, the second two-day round of negotiations was held via separate consultations with Morocco and the POLISARIO Front to find a solution to Western Sahara. This round ended with an agreement to meet once again at the end of the year, probably in Geneva. Both parties listened to several different talks by experts on specific issues, such as natural resources and local administration. For his part, the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to Western Sahara, Peter Van Walsum, communicated after the meeting that *both parties acknowledged that the current status quo was unacceptable* and that they had pledged to continue with the negotiations in good faith, as well as to develop confidence-building measures (facilitate family visits, joint de-mining actions, respect for human rights, etc.). The opening and closing sessions were attended by Algeria and Mauritania.

The third round of negotiations held in Manhasset, near New York City, between the government of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front ended in early January 2008. Even though the UN communiqué stated that both parties had agreed to resume the talks from March 11th to 13th, the UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter Van Walsum, declared that the parties were still expressing serious differences on the fundamental issues at stake, as the fourth round of talks demonstrated. In addition, the parties had agreed on the need to elevate the process to a more intensive level of negotiations on the more substantial issues. The report by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that, despite the fact that Morocco and the POLISARIO Front had interacted dynamically in their last encounter, the exchanges could hardly be considered as negotiation. Ban Ki-moon stated that despite both sides' commitment to negotiation, their positions were still quite divergent. However, it should be pointed out that in March Morocco called for the opening of the border with Algeria, which had been closed for over a decade, as well as a normalisation of bilateral relations. The dispute made little progress during the second quarter of the year, although it was significant that in early April Algeria rejected Morocco's appeal to normalise relations and open the borders between both countries. Also noteworthy is the fact that the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Western Sahara declared that, due to the lack of pressure on Morocco to give up its bid for sovereignty over Western Sahara, the latter country's independence was not a realistic proposal. Van Walsum's statements were communicated via a letter addressed to the 15 members of the Security Council just a few days before meeting to discuss a variety of matters, including the renewal of the MINURSO mandate. Van Walsum's analysis triggered confusion in the Security Council, leading the then-rotating president of this institution, the South African ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, to claim that Van Walsum's comments seemed to contradict the UN Secretary-General's report. In response, Ban Ki-moon stated that it was unacceptable for the current negotiation process on Western Sahara to be used to consolidate the status quo, and that it was necessary to find a way out of the current political impasse by adopting realism and a spirit of compromise on both sides. Moreover, some days later the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1813, in which it appealed to both sides to enter into a more intensive, substantial phase of negotiations, while it also asked them to continue with the talks without any preconditions and in good faith, with the goal of reaching a fair, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution.

The exclusion of the referendum from the language of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Western Sahara

Resolution	Date	Text
S/RES/621	20-9-1988	"holding a referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara"
S/RES/809	2-3-1993	"holding a referendum on a free and fair basis"
S/RES/1033	22-12-1995	"the holding, without further delay, of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan, which has been accepted by the two parties"
S/RES/1108	22-5-1997	"the holding, without further delay, of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan, which has been accepted by the two parties"
S/RES/1198	18-9-1998	"the holding, without further delay, of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan, which has been accepted by the two parties"
S/RES/1301	35-5-2000	"to hold a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" ... "to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution to their dispute over Western Sahara"
S/RES/1324	30-10-2000	"to hold a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara: ... "agree upon a <i>mutually acceptable</i> political solution to their dispute over Western Sahara"
S/RES/1429	30-7-2002	"achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which <i>would be of benefit to the Maghreb region</i> ... which <i>will provide for</i> the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" ... " <i>readiness to consider any approach</i> which provides for self-determination that may be proposed by the Secretary General and the Personal Envoy, consulting, as appropriate, others with relevant experience"
S/RES/1541	29-4-2004	"to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara"
S/RES/1720	31-10-2006 until now	"to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara"

During the third quarter of 2008, the conflict continued to worsen due to the tensions between the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the POLISARIO Front. The negotiator for the POLISARIO Front in the talks held in Morocco and Manhasset (New York), Mohamed Haddad, claimed that it was impossible for a fifth round of negotiations to be held under the current circumstances. Haddad stated that the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, dealt the coup de grâce to the process, referring to his words in which, according to several interpretations, he asked the UN Security Council to choose the realistic option, rejecting independence for Western Sahara. A spokesman from the US State Department stated that an independent Saharan state was not a realistic option. In late July the POLISARIO Front challenged the UN Special Envoy and formally requested a new negotiator for the new round of negotiations. During the second half of August, in a letter published in the Spanish newspaper El País, the hitherto UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Peter Van Walsum, confirmed that he had not been re-elected for the post after the POLISARIO Front asked for his removal in a communiqué written to the Secretary General of the organisation, Ban Ki-moon. Van Walsum stated that with political will the conflict could be resolved, but that the deadlock in which it was enmeshed arose from Morocco's April 2004 decision not to accept a referendum that would consider the possible independence of Western Sahara, and from the Security Council's stance of requiring a consensual solution. In mid-October, the Fourth Commission of the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution backing the negotiation process begun the previous year between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco, and it asked both parties to cooperate with the ICRC and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law.

In November, as part of celebrations of the 2008th anniversary of the Green March, the spokesman for the Moroccan government stated that Rabat wished to embark on serious negotiations under UN auspices in order to resolve the conflict with the POLISARIO Front. However, it also declared that the negotiations must be based on autonomy, not on the UN's 33 plan that called for a referendum on independence. In a speech by King Mohammed VI on the same occasion, the monarch announced a reform aimed at transferring power to Western Sahara and other regions. The King also announced that he was setting up a consultative committee to propose an "overall concept of regionalisation", and he charged the government with drawing up a draft decentralisation project that would include the creation of new provinces. In parallel, the Moroccan government decided to double its military spending for 2009 to 3,206 million euros (4.6% of the GDP).

In early January 2009, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, named diplomat Christopher Ross as his Special Envoy for the Western Sahara. Ross is the former US ambassador to Syria and Algeria, and in February he visited the region for the first time and declared his support for a solution to the conflict that took into account the Saharan people's right to self-determination. In mid-March, a report from the European Parliament delegation that visited Western Sahara claimed that MINURSO's mandate must also include the supervision of human rights in this land, but in late April France voiced its opposition to including the monitoring of human rights in the MINURSO mandate after several NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, along with other organisations like the Maghreb Delegation of the European Parliament, requested this change. The UN Security Council unanimously approved a one-year extension of MINURSO's mandate, while it also asked Morocco and the POLISARIO Front to negotiate without preconditions and in good faith. Furthermore, given the fact that the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Sahara deemed that the conditions were not in place to resume the negotiation, the holding of previous "informal talks" between the parties was approved. The negotiations had been on hold since March 2008. During the Security Council talks, the French representative, Foreign Minister Jean-Maurice Ripert, expressed his support for the autonomy plan offered by Morocco, while his US counterpart, Susan Rice, simply stressed that the conflict had been going on for too long.

In late July 2009, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced that he was launching an autonomy policy in Western Sahara. In his speech from the throne, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of his coronation, the monarch announced that a consultative commission would be created within a few months that would present a plan to implement advanced regionalisation in the country, which until then had been characterised by a highly centralised organisation. He further stated that the process would begin with the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara), which were to become a model for the rest of Morocco. In mid-August, after two days of informal meetings in a hotel in Dürnstein (Austria), Morocco and the POLISARIO Front agreed to resume negotiations on Western Sahara, thus unblocking contacts that had been paralysed for the past 18 months. The UN Special Envoy for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, had promoted the encounter, and he claimed that these preliminary talks had taken place in an atmosphere of serious commitment, trust and mutual respect. The dates and venues for these negotiations are yet to be determined, but they will be the fifth round after the ones held in Manhasset (New York). Representatives from Mauritania and Algeria attended the opening and closing of these talks. As reported in press releases, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front maintained their postures: Rabat insisted on its proposal for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, while the POLISARIO Front demanded a referendum on self-determination that included the option of independence. However, they did make headway on a preliminary agreement for Saharan families living in the Western Sahara or in refugee camps in Tindouf to be able to travel by land to visit each other under UN supervision. Until then, in order to see each other only for a few days, the families had to sign up on a list and be flown in by the UN. This process involved a waiting period that could last as long as several years. Nonetheless, this progress was jeopardised in mid-September when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, stated that there were only half as many Saharan refugees in the camps in Tindouf in southwest Algeria compared to the figure provided by the POLISARIO Front). In October the Egyptian Hany Abdel-Aziz was appointed the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO.

THE DELAYS IN THE LAUNCH OF AUTONOMY FOR WESTERN SAHARA

March 2006	Creation of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS)
April 2007	Moroccan proposal of autonomy for Western Sahara
November 2008	The King of Morocco announces the establishment of a consultative commission to propose a “general concept of regionalisation”
July 2009	The King of Morocco announces the launch of a process of autonomy for Western Sahara
January 2010	The King of Morocco announces the creation of the Advisory Commission on Regionalisation
August 2010	The King of Morocco extends the efforts of the Advisory Commission on Regionalisation for another six months

The peace process in 2011

The first quarter was marked by two more rounds of talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO front, albeit with no major advances in the key issues in the dispute. The first was held on Greentree estate in Manhasset (New York) and the second in Mellieha (Malta), with the participation of Swiss mediator Julian Hottiger as an expert in negotiation techniques. However, after both meetings minor advances were noted such as the decision by the parties to adopt innovative perspectives. In early January 2010, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Regionalisation (ACR), which was to lay the groundwork for the country's regionalisation process, which would begin in the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara). The Commission is presided over by Morocco's former ambassador to Spain, Omar Azzi-man. In a speech in early January, the monarch claimed that the revamping of the Moroccan state would entail the transfer of powers and competences from Rabat to the regions, and he stressed that his country could not remain passive in view of the actions of enemies of Morocco's territorial integrity. The Commission was supposed to present its proposal in June. In March, the United Nations Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, started a nine-day tour around North Africa in an attempt to reactivate the talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front.

In April, the leader of the POLISARIO Front, Mohamed Abdelaziz, sent a harsh, critical letter to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in which he expressed his dismay at the lack of leadership and desire to fulfil the UN's mandate in Western Sahara, which was being disputed by Morocco and the Saharans. In the letter, the leader of the Saharans acknowledged his indignation with Ban Ki-Moon, especially because of the latest periodical report issued to the Security Council on the status of Western Sahara. Abdelaziz stated that he did not think the document was an objective reflection of the events in the past year and that the Secretary General had caved in to some of the theses being upheld by Morocco, such as by barely mentioning the possibility of holding a referendum, one of the Saharans' claims. Likewise, the leader criticised the scant attention paid to the denunciations of human rights violations perpetrated by Morocco and called for changes in the peacekeeping mission. In late May, the POLISARIO Front froze its contacts with MINURSO, the United Nations force in Western Sahara, claiming that “it was becoming a protective shield for a colonial deed, namely the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco”.

In early July, the UN asked the Group of Friends of the Sahara (USA, France, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia) to unblock the negotiations. Christopher Ross expressed his concern with Morocco's closed attitude, as the country refused to discuss the POLISARIO Front's proposal, while the Front was more flexible and willing to consider Morocco's proposal for autonomy. In August, the King of Morocco asked that a clear, precise roadmap be established in order to proceed gradually to the country's “advanced regionalisation”, which was to begin with Western Sahara. The King extended the mandate of the Advisory Committee on Regionalisa-

tion, which was originally supposed to finish its job by the end of the year, for another six months. In any event, the proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara suffered from a major delay, as more than three and a half years will have elapsed between the first proposals in 2011 and the date in which the Moroccan proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara was aired in April 2007. The United Nations Special Envoy for Western Sahara also expressed his concern with the human rights situation in Western Sahara. “Ever since I was appointed,” he stated, “I have suggested to my Moroccan interlocutors that if they want the POLISARIO to accept their vision of an autonomous Sahara they must demonstrate their good intentions and be indulgent with the pro-independence Saharan activists instead of constraining their freedom of movement and expression”. In other words, what Ross was trying to point out is that the autonomous future of Western Sahara will not become a reality until Morocco adopts a strategy of tolerance and persuasion, as opposed to one of repression towards the Saharan people in favour of self-determination.

In the third quarter of 2010, the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, negatively assessed the negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front and asked several countries for aid in overcoming the impasse in the peace process. In July, before visiting the so-called Group of Friends of Western Sahara, Ross sent a secret document to the respective governments in which he recognised that neither he nor Ban Ki-Moon could convince the parties to abandon their implacable attachment to their positions, so he enlisted the specific support of these countries and the Security Council. He also expressed his belief that the parties had no political will to begin real negotiations or confer priority on trust-building measures. In this sense, Ross claimed that Morocco was the party making the least effort and outlined how in the latest informal round of contacts in Westchester (New York), the POLISARIO Front had sketched out negotiations by trying to explore several aspects of Morocco’s autonomy proposal. However, according to Ross, Rabat refused to consider its counterpart’s ideas, and as a result, the POLISARIO Front refused to continue. In the message, which was leaked to the press in August, Ross stressed the need for the parties to examine the adversary’s proposals as a sign of respect since, if they did not, it made no sense to call for new rounds of negotiations. According to this civil servant, the status quo in the long term cast doubt on the UN’s credibility, yet it also entailed risks, such as the possibility that some Saharan sectors would choose extremist activities. Ross also claimed that the question of human rights in Western Sahara was a key issue and stated that he had discussed with Morocco the need to act indulgently with the Saharan activists instead of cutting back on their freedom of movement and expression.

In August, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, asked that a clear, precise roadmap be established in order to put the advanced regionalisation in the country into practice, a process that he planned to begin in Western Sahara. In late July, at a speech commemorating the eleventh anniversary of his ascent to the throne, Mohamed VI stressed that he would not cede even one inch of Western Sahara. The POLISARIO Front described the monarch’s words as proof of Rabat’s lack of desire to cooperate constructively in favour of a lasting, definitive peace in line with international law.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL PERSONAL ENVOYS

1997	James Baker (USA)
2004	Alvaro de Soto (Peru)
2005	Peter van Walsun (Netherlands)
2009	Christopher Ross (USA)

In October, a Saharan child died and several people were injured from Moroccan bullets in an incident which took place as part of the largest protest held by Saharans in the past 35 years. The Saharan mobilisation started when a group travelled to the desert and set up a cluster of Bedouin tents, which later became a makeshift camp. The camp, named Agdyam Izik, was located around 15 kilometres from El Aaiún and gathered together 20,000 people. Thousands of gendarmes and agents from the auxiliary forces depending on

Morocco's Ministry of the Interior surrounded the camp, controlled its entrances and sometimes hindered the entry of water and food. The mobilisation's main claims were socioeconomic, namely demands for housing and jobs. In November, the Moroccan authorities decided to put an end to the massive Saharan protest in an action that entailed the dismantlement of the camp in Agdyam Izik and subsequent clashes in El Aaiún. The attack on the Saharan camp took place the same day as the talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front resumed in New York. Even though the incidents led the Saharan delegation to have qualms about the process, ultimately its representatives participated in the meeting. However, the third round of informal consultations was yet again stalemated with no specific headway and instead only a commitment to hold a new informal encounter in December (in Greentree, New York) and a formal one in early 2011. In December, Wikileaks showed that Spain's position in recent years on Western Sahara had been support of Morocco's proposal for autonomy. This month, the fourth round of informal talks held between representatives of the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, sponsored by the UN in New York, once again closed with no headway. Both parties pledged exclusively to meet once again on the 21st and 22nd of January, in addition to a date in March yet to be determined.

In early January, the UN refugee agency, the UNHCR, re-launched its family visit programme in order to temporarily allow the refugees in the encampments in Tindouf to get together with their relatives in Western Sahara. The progress made during the meetings in Geneva in February had made it possible for the number of family visits to increase. Internationally, the United States clearly declared its support for Morocco's autonomy plan, which it described as "serious, realistic, credible and using an approach that might satisfy the aspirations of the Saharan people". Furthermore, in a meeting with Mohamed VI, the new Prime Minister of Tunisia, Bejj Caïd Sebsi, stressed the importance of resolving the issue of Western Sahara in accordance with international law as the only way to unblock the re-launch of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), created in 1989 by Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania. In February, too, it was announced that the fishing agreement between Morocco and the EU would be extended for another year. This agreement had aroused criticism in the EU as it meant implicit recognition of Morocco's legitimacy over Western Sahara.

In Morocco, **King Mohamed VI announced a constitutional reform plan in March which might entail a curtailment of the monarchy's powers.** The announcement, which was described as "historical" by the local press and hailed in the USA and the EU, came three weeks after protests by thousands of Moroccans asking for substantial changes in the country. Five people died and more than 100 were injured in this day of citizen unrest. The monarch's proposal aims to reinforce the power of the Prime Minister, who would be appointed by the king from the party that wins the elections – until now, the monarch could appoint whomever he wanted, in practice – and would have full responsibility over the government and the public administration. It could be deduced from the plan that the king would no longer appoint the so-called "sovereignty ministers" who handle four key portfolios (Interior, Exterior, Justice and Religious Affairs) and are directly accountable to the monarch. According to Mohamed VI, the proposal also aims to ensure free elections are held, to consolidate the role of the political parties, to promote the independence of the judicial branch, to extend the authority of the lower chamber, to deepen the protection of human rights and to recognise the importance of the Tamazight language. The king made the televised announcement after officially receiving the proposal for regionalisation that sought to decentralise the country's public administration and elect regional councils. The text of the proposed constitutional reform was entrusted to a commission, which had to present it in June in order to later submit it to a referendum.

In April, three days after the MINURSO mandate expired, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1979 which enabled its efforts to be extended by another year, until the 30th of April 2012. Even though the text recognised the need to improve the human rights situation in Western Sahara, ultimately **a mechanism for MINURSO to supervise human rights was not approved.** In his report, Ban Ki-Moon also stressed the **need to take into account the Saharan people's opinions in any decision** on the future of Western Sahara, especially in the context of the revolts in the Maghreb and Middle East. In June, King Mohamed VI called a constitutional referendum for the 1st of July in the midst of a political division in the country over the scope of the proposed changes. The king's initiative suggested that the Prime Minister be the President of the

government and that he would appoint both ministers and senior positions, recognise the Berber language as official along with Arabic, and extend the legislative capacity of the Parliament, among other measures. In the meantime, representatives from Morocco and the POLISARIO Front held a new meeting on Western Sahara without achieving any headway.

LATEST ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATION

1 st	Manhasset (New York)	June 2007
2 nd	Manhasset (New York)	August 2007
3 rd	Manhasset (New York)	January 2008
4 th	Manhasset (New York)	March 2008

1 st	Dürnstein (Austria)	August 2009
2 nd	Armonk (New York)	February 2010
3 rd	Manhasset (New York)	November 2010
4 th	Manhasset (New York)	December 2010
5 th	Manhasset (New York)	January 2011
6 th	Mellieha (Malta)	March 2011
7 th	Manhasset (New York)	June 2011
8 th	Manhasset (New York)	July 2011

In July, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front persisted in their differences over the future of **Western Sahara**. However, according to UN sources, in the July meeting held in Manhasset, the parties seemed to have listened to the recommendations of the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and may have begun to dialogue in order to **include representatives of the Saharan people in the negotiation process**. This would facilitate the debates on issues like education, the environment and healthcare. In the recent meetings, the POLISARIO Front had expressed its displeasure at Morocco's decision to include Western Sahara in the vote on constitutional reform. In August, in a speech commemorating his twelfth anniversary on the throne, **the King of Morocco called for a complete normalisation of bilateral relations with Algeria** and for the opening of the land border between the two countries. The border, which is 1,800 kilometres long, was closed by Algeria in 1994 after Morocco imposed a visa on Algerians who wished to enter the country. The bilateral relations have been marked by tension over the issue of Western Sahara. According to diverse economists, the closure of the land border with Algeria has cost Morocco 2% of its GDP. In October, the negotiations reached a stalemate without any new date scheduled for a new round of talks between the parties. According to press reports, Morocco reported that it could not attend the meetings on the issue of Western Sahara until after elections are held in the country, slated for the 25th of November. This situation would delay a new encounter until 2012, the year when Morocco will become one of the new non-permanent members of the Security Council. The POLISARIO representative to the UN accused Morocco of blocking the agenda of informal talks and warned that the lack of contacts until 2012 would create a "dangerous vacuum" in a context of increased tensions in Western Sahara. The AFP news agency indicated that the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, might propose **launching a "committee of wise men" from Africa** which could help to overcome the impasse in the talks between the parties.

In November, **the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, supported the opening of political talks with Morocco**. The Islamic Party for Justice and Development (PJD) won the first elections in Morocco following the approval of the new constitution. Islamic leader Abdelilah Benkirane became the new head of

government. In December European politicians decided to suspend the fishing agreements between Morocco and the EU arguing that it was illegal because there was no evidence that it would benefit the Saharawi people. The legislators blocked the renewal of the fishing agreement, which had been in force since 2006, by 326 to 296, which resulted in a strong reaction from the Moroccan government. The European Parliament insisted that an agreement should be negotiated with greater consideration of the Saharawi question.

Most significant events in the year

A mechanism for MINURSO to supervise human rights was not approved.

The parties began talk about including representatives of the Saharan people in the negotiation process.

The UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, might propose launching a “committee of wise men” from Africa.

Websites of interest

Afrol News (www.afrol.com/es/paises/Sahara_occidental)

ARSO (www.arso.org)

CORCAS (www.corcas.com)

Government of Morocco (www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/Sáhara)

ICG (www.crisisgroup.org)


MINURSO (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso)

United Nations (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)

RASD- Sahara Press Service (www.spsrasd.info)

Sahara Libre (www.saharalibre.es)

Main actors in the process



LATIN AMERICA

COLOMBIA

Context of the conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has very deep roots that go beyond the emergence of the present guerrillas in the 1960s. Violence characterised the relations between liberals and conservatives from the 19th century to the National Front regime (1958-1978). In addition, any alternative political option has been repressed. Therefore the emergence of various guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s can be explained by politics that serve the interests of

the elite, social exclusion and the lack of democratic opposition parties. Among the guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (**FARC**) and the National Liberation Army (**ELN**), both of which were formed in 1964. They currently have 15,000 and 3,000 fighters respectively. The violence increased when paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**) emerged in the early 1980s to fight against the insurgents. Within this environment of violence, the production and export of drugs and the recent emergence of new paramilitary structures linked to drug trafficking are other factors that make the conflict more complex. The civilian population is the main victim of the conflict.

Population: 46.9 million inhabitants

Area: 1,139,000 km²

GDP: 227,800 million dollars

Per capita income: \$4,980

HDI: 87 (out of 187)

Displaced population: 3.7 million

Refugees: 450,000

Armed actors: FARC, ELN

Facilitators: Piedad Córdoba (humanitarian affairs)

Development of the peace process

Since the 1980s, many efforts have been made to build peace by parties involved in the conflict and by Colombian society. In 198, President Betancur appealed to the guerrillas to reach a peace agreement. Two years later, the **FARC** ordered a ceasefire that formally lasted until 1990, when president Gaviria ordered an attack on FARC's command centre. In 1990, after lengthy negotiations, the third guerrilla group in the country, M-19, was demobilised, resulting in the approval of a new constitution in 1991 that formally consolidated the rule of law. In 1991 too, other groups (EPL, PRT, MAQL) were demobilised, followed by CER in 1992, CRS, MPM, MMM and FFG in 1994, and finally MIR-COAR in 1998. With regard to the guerrilla groups that were not demobilised then, in 1991 and 1992, meetings were held in Caracas and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between the government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator group. Members of this group include the FARC, the ELN and the EPL. However, the 1992 talks were suspended when the FARC assassinated a minister they had kidnapped. In 1995 the Colombian Episcopal Conference created the National Reconciliation Commission (CCN). In 1997 President Samper proposed forming a National Peace Council to include institutions and civil society. In January 1999 the United Nations' Secretary General appointed Jan Egeland as his special advisor for Colombia. Three years later J. Egeland was replaced by James Lemoyne.

FARC

International support for the peace process reached a high point during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana. This president believed that negotiations could take place in the midst of the conflict without a ceasefire agreement. In late 1998 President Pastrana allowed an extensive area of the country to be demilitarised in order to negotiate with the FARC, with whom he reached a 12-point agenda (the Common Agenda for Change towards a New Colombia, or the La Machaca Agenda, of May 1999). and later a National Dialogue

and Negotiation Panel, as well as a Thematic Committee. In March 2001 the Group of Friends of the Peace Process with the FARC was created. The following countries were involved in this group: Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela. However, in February 2002 there were several crises and the FARC hijacked an aeroplane, thereby bringing the talks with the FARC to an end. After negotiations with the FARC were broken off, the situation changed dramatically. A new president, Álvaro Uribe, was elected. He introduced a programme of “democratic security”, which was based on the militarisation of the civilian population and military combat against the guerrillas. This programme was supported by the USA via the Colombia Plan. Since then negotiations with the FARC have not resumed beyond attempts to reach a humanitarian agreement. In February 2005 the UN Secretary General suspended his mediation mission to seek rapprochement with the guerrilla group after six years of efforts, acknowledging the impossibility of continuing this mission and maintaining direct contact with the guerrilla leaders.

Since 2002 there have only been sporadic attempts at rapprochements, in addition to dialogues designed to facilitate humanitarian exchanges. In December 2005 the government accepted a proposal put forward by the Technical Exploratory Mission – made up of the governments of France, Spain and Switzerland – in which a security system was set up which would allow representatives of the government and the FARC to meet in an 180 square km. zone near the town of Pradera (Valle). However, the proposal was not accepted by the FARC. In September 2006 the Colombian government expressed its willingness to authorise an “encounter zone” in the Valle department, designed to begin talks with the FARC that would lead to a humanitarian agreement and the start of political negotiations with this group. In early October, with unusual speed, the FARC soldiers and the government exchanged communiqués containing proposals that paved the way for not only a possible humanitarian agreement but also subsequent peace negotiations. For the first time, the government expressed its support for a military withdrawal limited over time in two towns in the Valle department, and it even deemed feasible the possibility of calling a Constituent Assembly at the end of the peace process. In May 2007 President Álvaro Uribe announced the release of more than a hundred prisoners from the guerrilla group as an act of conciliation designed to achieve the release of the hostages in the hands of the group. At the request of French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, President Uribe also decided to release the leader, Rodrigo Granda, who later received permission to travel to Cuba. The FARC described the release of the prisoners as a trap, but they maintained that Rodrigo Granda could act as witness in the case of a possible humanitarian exchange. In December however, President Alvaro Uribe authorised the Colombian Catholic Church to carry out a facilitation exercise, authorising a 150 sq. km. meeting area with the FARC for one month in a rural, sparsely populated area of the country. In the course of 2008, all of these proposals were derailed by the death of the founding leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda, and the death of two members of his secretariat, Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríos. The former died in a bomb-raid in Ecuador and the latter was murdered. In early February 2009 Alfonso Cano, the top leader of this guerrilla organisation, stated that his movement wished to engage in talks with the current government, as long as the guarantees needed for its spokespeople were granted, and he reiterated the Bolivarian platform for a new government, contained in 11 points or demands.

OBJECTIVES IDENTIFIED BY THE FARC IN FEBRUARY 2009

Public strength based on the Bolivarian principles of never using arms against the people.
 Democratic participation at national, regional and municipal levels in the strategic decisions affecting each level.
 A single chamber parliament.
 Independence in the election of bodies of institutional control, and their integration into the high courts.
 Strategic production sectors should be owned by the state. Economic emphasis on production and self-sufficiency in food production.
 The richest should pay the highest taxes. 50% of the national budget should be destined to social projects and 10% to scientific research.
 Productive lands should be available to the rural population with large incentives and support.
 Strategies for maintaining an ecological balance.
 International relations should be based on non-intervention by foreign forces.
 Legalisation of the production and commercialisation of drugs using crop substitution strategies.
 Respect for the rights of ethnic and minority groups.

In June 2010, the vote counts for the presidency of the Republic were finished, yielding Juan Manuel Santos as the winner, who was elected with an agenda to carry on with the policy of President Uribe's government. In his first speech, the President-Elect claimed that he would deal with other countries on a strictly diplomatic, respectful basis while he also stated that he would work for Latin American integration as the cornerstone of development and progress. Just days before the new President took office, the FARC spread a video in which Alfonso Cano, Central Chief of Staff, expressed his willingness to talk with the new government, specifically on five points: the United States military bases, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, land, the political regime and the economic model. In his investiture speech on the 7th of August, the new President of Colombia stated that "the door to dialogue is not locked". He added: "During my government, I aspire to sow the seeds for a true reconciliation among Colombians. To the illegal armed groups that invoke political reasons and are today once again talking about dialogue and negotiation, I tell them that my government will be open to any conversation that seeks to eradicate violence and build a more prosperous, equitable and fair society. However," he stressed, "this will come grounded on inalterable premises: the renunciation of weapons, kidnapping, drug trafficking, extortion and intimidation. Yet as long as they do not release the kidnapping victims, as long as they keep committing terrorist acts, as long as they do not return the children they forcibly recruited, as long as they keep laying mines and polluting the Colombian countryside, we will keep combating all violence, without exception, with all the means at our disposal". President Santos also stated that for the time being, he would not activate the figure of High Commissioner for Peace.

UNASUR

The objective of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is to build a space of integration and union on the cultural, social, economic and political fronts among its members in a participatory, consensual way using political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among other means, to eliminate socioeconomic inequality, achieve social inclusion and citizen participation and to strengthen democracy. The UNASUR countries have a GDP of 973,613 million dollars and population of 361 million people. The organisation was founded in December 2004 and is made up of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay. The permanent headquarters of UNASUR's Secretary General is in Quito, Ecuador. The current Secretary General is the Colombian María Emma Mejía.

<http://www.pptunasur.com>

The day after taking office, the leader of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, stated that the Colombian guerrillas should come out in favour of peace with massive demonstrations of their intentions, such as releasing all its kidnapping victims. In Chávez's opinion, "the Colombian guerrillas have no future travelling along the pathway of weapons". He also expressed his satisfaction that Senator Piedad Córdoba had been appointed President of the Senate Peace Commission. Precisely the group that this senator leads, Colombians for Peace, had managed to get UNASUR to suggest an alternative that would lead to an eventual peace agreement with the guerrillas. In August, the FARC sent a communiqué to UNASUR expressing its willingness to set forth its vision of the Colombian conflict in a UNASUR assembly. Days earlier, in view of the initiatives that Senator Piedad Córdoba of Colombians for Peace was taking, the Colombian government unauthorised any parallel handling of peace issues, stating that "the government itself should be the one to make headway on the issue when it considers the circumstances, as until now there has been no signs of a true desire for peace". Furthermore, in late August, President Santos asked that the draft amending Law 418 from 1997 state explicitly that no safe havens would be allowed in view of potential talks with the guerrillas, leaving a clear message that the Caguán experience and the proposal to demilitarise towns like Pradera and Florida would not be repeated. Therefore, any eventual negotiations must take place under a different format, either abroad or by lifting the arrest warrants on the negotiators.

In September 2010, the FARC publicised a communiqué which expressed their willingness to talk to the current government and find a political solution to the social and armed conflict in the country, but without any kind of

preconditions. The guerrillas believed that what the president was demanding in order to hold talks should be the result of a peace agreement, not a condition prior to talks. President Santos responded to the guerrillas' communiqué by stating that "in order for there to be any dialogue with the guerrillas, they have to stop committing acts of terrorism". Shortly thereafter, the Colombian armed forces bombarded a FARC encampment, leading to the death of Jorge Briceño, alias "Mono Jojoy", the military chief of the guerrilla organisation.

In a new communiqué issued in October, the FARC expressed its rejection of the government's demobilisation and surrender proposals and stated that "they were not going to desist after more than 40 years of struggle, nor accept a false peace". However, the communiqué also noted that "Peace agreements yes, but the cardinal point is: with or without structural changes in politics and society?" They also reiterated their willingness to hold talks on substantive matters. Likewise, Senator Piedad Córdoba was sanctioned by the Attorney General of the Nation, Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado, by being removed from her post and banned from holding public posts for 18 years in retaliation for her supposed collaboration with the FARC guerrillas. In November, during his second presidential speech, President Juan Manuel Santos indicated that the government's primary goal was to achieve peace at all costs. "We shall not rest until we achieve the peace of Colombia, by either reason or force", claimed the president. Likewise, according to documents appearing in Wikileaks in January 2010, the former High Commissioner of Peace, Frank Pearl, mentioned to the US ambassador that both the FARC and the ELN were demanding four conditions for a peace agreement: 1) the government had to show its unanimous, unambiguous support for the agreement; 2) the military forces had to be onboard the process, since in both the 1980s and 1990s they opposed the negotiations; 3) the private sector had to participate since the guerrillas regard as the power behind the throne of Colombian politics; and 4) the FARC and the ELN wanted international monitoring from the start of the negotiations.

ELN

Regarding the ELN, the first negotiations between the government and this guerrilla group date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998 both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid in which they agreed to hold a National Convention. In the same year ELN negotiators met with members of civil society in Mainz (Germany). They signed the "Puerta del Cielo" agreement, which focused on humanitarian issues. In 1999 the government and the ELN met again in Cuba. The following year the government authorised the creation of an encounter area in the south of the Bolívar region. Representatives of the Friendly Countries were involved in this process (Cuba, Spain, France, Norway and Switzerland). In June 2000 President Pastrana declared that attempts to reach an agreement with this group were over. In 2002 the High Commissioner for Peace undertook new rounds of exploratory negotiations with the ELN in Cuba, and in mid-2004, new exploratory talks began, with Mexico acting as facilitator.

At the beginning of 2005 facilitation by the Mexican ambassador Andrés Valencia continued in an attempt to achieve rapprochement with the ELN guerrilla group. At the end of March, after a temporary crisis related to the facilitation process, this group and the Colombian government exchanged proposals aimed at holding direct negotiations outside the country (in either Mexico or Cuba). This stage of rapprochement was successful, and a peace process began which received strong international support. Despite these positive developments, the ELN suddenly dispensed with the facilitation services, claiming that Mexico had disqualified itself by voting against Cuba on the UN Human Rights Commission. However, the guerrillas stressed that the group of Friendly Countries (Spain, France, Switzerland, Norway and Cuba) could act as alternative facilitators. In the third quarter of 2005, exploratory talks continued between the ELN and the government on the government's proposal to set up an external rapprochement process (for a short and fixed period) and its suggestion of international involvement. In September President Álvaro Uribe authorised the ELN's spokesman, Francisco Galán, to be released from prison for three months in an attempt to advance discussions with all sectors of Colombian society, and in response to a citizens' initiative (the "Group of Guarantors") that was also approved by the ELN. This armed group had outlined what it considered to be the five obstacles blocking the beginning of a real peace process. These were: the government's denial of the existence of an

armed conflict; the humanitarian crisis; the social, political and economic causes of the conflict; the lack of opportunities for the civil society to participate; and the mock negotiations with the paramilitary groups. Days before the end of the three-month period, the government extended the release of the ELN spokesman for a further three months. The government reached an agreement with this spokesman to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba during December, with the involvement of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. These talks are known as the “external rapprochement process”.

After an initial meeting in Havana (Cuba) in December 2005, a second meeting was held in the same city in February 2006. After this meeting, the president of the Colombian government, Álvaro Uribe, officially recognised Antonio García, Ramiro Vargas and Francisco Galán as the interlocutors representing the ELN, and rescinded their arrest warrants, enabling them to travel around inside Colombia and abroad. Both parties also agreed to create an alternative committee where the ambassadors of the three facilitating countries (Spain, Norway and Switzerland) would participate, in order to discuss “interim affairs”. The ELN declared a unilateral end to offensive actions during the period when parliamentary elections were being held. In late March the ELN representative, A. García, moved from Cuba to Colombia to hold meetings with representatives of society and diplomats. In April the third exploratory round was held in Havana. According to the military chief of the guerrillas, A. García, countries such as Holland, Sweden, Canada and Japan were also willing to support the talks. In addition, the Colombian Catholic Church announced that it would ask the Vatican to join the international facilitators in the negotiation process. The ELN expressed its willingness to participate in a new round of negotiations in Cuba in early October, and it announced the beginning of a Political Campaign for Peace. In September the ELN announced that it had held its 4th Congress, its most important internal event. The commandants and delegates from all its guerrilla structures had taken part in this gathering. The conclusions stressed the desirability of a political solution to the conflict in order to obtain peace, which was understood as eradicating profound inequalities, overcoming the humanitarian crisis, and building a “new government of nation, peace and equity”. They also reiterated that political struggle was the main form of struggle, including the electoral struggle, in order to achieve new local and regional forms of government. The event confirmed the proposal of the National Convention as the inclusive democratic scenario for building a national consensus in order to overcome the country’s serious problems. To this end they invited all the revolutionary, patriotic and democratic political and social forces to join together to address the challenges entailed in building a new country in peace and with social justice, and they recognised the Alternative Democratic Pole as the only alternative opposition to the right wing in Colombia. They also invited the guerrillas from the FARC to work towards unity amongst the insurgent movement based on affinities, yet with respect for the uniqueness of each organisation. The ELN negotiator, Antonio García, announced that he would propose to the government that all political prisoners be granted amnesty, that a National Convention be held and that an agenda including economic and social issues be studied in order to tackle the country’s crisis and put an end to the war.

In October 2006 the government and the ELN held the fourth exploratory round of talks in Cuba. Upon its conclusion they highlighted the headway made in the design of the process by establishing the two fundamental aspects on which to build a Basic Agreement: Climate for Peace and Participation in Society. In mid-December the ELN Central Command (COCE) issued a communiqué in which it repeated its willingness to agree to a ceasefire and an end to bilateral hostilities with the government. It also called for the creation of a new coalition government, the formation of a Special Truth Commission to which the paramilitary troops could report about the deeds and secrets that the country should know about in order to begin the clean-up of institutions, an in-depth solution to drug trafficking without resorting to fumigation, and a refusal to allow Colombians to be extradited. The following morning, the Guarantee Committee of the process with the ELN held a press conference to present its “roadmap” for 2007. This was criticised by the High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo, for not having been discussed previously between the parties (the Government and the ELN) since it involved matters for negotiation that should be addressed in the next round of talks, scheduled for the beginning of 2007 in Havana.

Francisco Galán, the spokesperson for the guerrilla group for the last 16 years, received conditional release from prison in the first part of 2007, and the government granted a member of the Central Command of the

guerrilla group, Pablo Beltrán, the status of Representative Member, giving him freedom of movement in order to join the ELN negotiating team, which was extended to four members. At the beginning of March the fifth round of talks between the government and the ELN was concluded in Havana, with the support of the Nobel Prize winner for Literature, Gabriel García Márquez. The parties did not make the content of their discussions public. The guerrilla delegation was led by Pablo Beltrán, replacing the military chief, Antonio García. In mid-April the government and the ELN began a new round of talks in Havana, initially planned to last six weeks. Unlike the five previous rounds, both sides promised to reach a significant agreement (the so-called "Basic Agreement") to advance the peace process, beginning with reaching some kind of ceasefire agreement and a cessation of hostilities. The ELN proposed a bilateral, temporary, experimental ceasefire and an end to hostilities without localising the guerrilla forces and demanded that the government place a freeze on processes for the agreement of the Free Trade Treaty (TLC), among other social and economic measures. The government and the ELN began the eighth round of peace talks in August, in Havana, without achieving results or signing the so-called Basic Agreement, since they were unable to agree on how to concentrate and check the guerrillas. The government insisted on their demand that they be located at one or several places, including locations abroad, but at previously established coordinates, with the names of all the guerrillas concentrated there, and with an international verifier. This was however rejected by the ELN, which was not prepared to reveal the identity of its members or gather together in conditions which they perceived as giving them a military disadvantage. Members of the National Peace Council (CNP) took part in this round for the first time. The CNP is an organisation created years ago that had not been involved until that time. The CNP presented a proposal for verifying the corridors of mobility in ten areas of the country and the presence of the international observers in each region. Observers would have the communication mechanisms needed to maintain permanent contact with military commanders and the chiefs of the insurgents. In September delegations from the government and the ELN met in Caracas, accepting the invitation from the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, to help to unblock the process. ELN delegates began consultations with the Central Command of the organisation to decide its position in the future round of negotiations. The National Peace Council, in turn, created a commission responsible for articulating the efforts made by the government and the public sector for peace and development programmes in public policy. In addition, it decided to create another permanent commission to monitor the peace talks with the ELN. The government and the ELN decided to meet again at the end of December, but tensions with the Venezuelan government meant that the round was delayed until the beginning of 2008. At the end of the year it was not known whether a further meeting would be held in Havana.

Proposals from the government and the ELN in late 2007

The government proposed:

- Signing of the base agreement now
- Recognition of the existence of the armed conflict
- Recognition of the ELN as a party in the conflict
- Removal of the label of terrorist and removing the ELN from the EU's list of terrorist organisations
- Release of all kidnap victims and a commitment to abandon this practice
- Start of a two-month phase of discussion and agreement to start a cessation of hostilities and verification
- Localising all the ELN forces (urban and rural militants and combatants)
 - In a single place
 - In several places
 - Abroad
 - A combination of the two above options
- Depositing the identity of all the members of the ELN with a special commission from an international body trusted by both parties
- Beginning of "in situ" verification: a Verifying Commission to constantly accompany the localised forces
- Calling on the CNP to initiate a study and to propose how to deal with:
 - The phenomenon of displacement
 - The phenomenon of forced disappearance
 - The phenomenon of the persecution of social leaders and political leaders from the opposition
- Initiating a study on the legal status of ELN prisoners to result in prison releases
- Forming a preparatory commission for the National Convention

Defining guarantees for the political management of ELN spokespeople and how the Casas de Paz (Peace Houses) should operate
Holding a National Convention

The ELN proposed:

Signing of the base agreement.
Recognition of the existence of the armed conflict
Recognition of the ELN as a party in the conflict
Removal of the label of terrorist and removing the ELN from the EU's list of terrorist organisations
Calling on the CNP to initiate a study and to propose how to deal with:
The phenomenon of displacement
The phenomenon of forced disappearance
The phenomenon of the persecution of social leaders and political leaders from the opposition
Starting a cessation of hostilities for six months (which could be extended if the parties decided to do so):
A halt to all offensive actions against the active forces on both sides
A halt to all attacks against the infrastructure
Release of all economic prisoners and halting this practice as long as the agreement is in place
Release of ELN prisoners
Implementing verification mechanisms
Guaranteeing the mobility and political action of ELN spokespeople and the operation of the Casas de Paz (Peace Houses)
Conducting an international tour
Forming a preparatory commission for the National Convention
Holding a National Convention

DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ELN AND THE GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT	ELN
Cessation of hostilities	Ceasefire and cessation of hostilities
Temporary, but can be extended with a view towards demobilisation and disarmament	Temporary and experimental Demobilisation and disarmament are not under discussion.
Verification requires the location + identification of all ELN members	Verification without either the location or identification the of its members Verification based on trust and the political will to fulfil
Verification commission from the OAS + national component	Verification commission from the UN + national component
Release of all kidnap victims and permanent renunciation of this practice	Release of all economic kidnap victims at the start of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities and suspension of this practice as long as the agreement is in force
Government financing of economic sustenance of the ELN force and its political plan	Non-government financing of the ELN and its political plan as long as the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities last
The ELN is barred from recruiting new members and arranging for means of financing.	New members of the ELN are linked to political and peace-building activities.
The ELN has to redefine its political line internally in favour of rejecting "the combination of forms of fighting".	Sovereign definition of the elements of its political line

For their part, the ELN guerrillas expressed their satisfaction at the government of Venezuela's recognition of the political nature of the FARC and the ELN, and at the international community's request for these

organisations to be recognised as belligerent forces and withdrawn from the lists of terrorist organisations. They claimed that their recognition as a belligerent force would stress the need to sign an agreement with the government to regulate the war as the starting point for embarking on a peace process. Nonetheless, by the end of the quarter no new rounds of negotiations had been started, with the last of these being held in August 2007. In early April the political spokesman for the ELN, Francisco Galán, met with President Álvaro Uribe in the Casa de Nariño, with the purpose of discussing the stalemate in the peace talks that this guerrilla group had been holding with the government. Galán declared that he attended the meeting on his own behalf and that he was renouncing the war, although not his convictions, and that he had been authorised by the government to remain in permanent contact with the Central Command of this organisation with the purpose of working towards a return to the negotiating table. He also stated that he was going to spearhead an effort to build a national political consensus for peace with all the violent parties in the country. As a response, the ELN Central Command revoked Galán's status as spokesman and his membership in the ELN team negotiating with the government, insisting that his deeds and opinions did not represent the ELN's policies, and that he was left free to develop his political options as he saw fit.

In late April, the ELN Central Command suggested that the country adopt a national agreement among all the democratic and social forces in order to open up a peace process founded on the reconstruction of democracy, social justice and the welfare of the majority. It said that this effort must begin by removing the obstacles to a humanitarian agreement. It also suggested that a plan be promoted to address the serious humanitarian crisis of the displaced persons, and that a National Constituent Assembly be called with no exclusions, as well as a referendum to approve the new constitutional charter. In June the ELN stated that it viewed further rapprochement with the Colombian government as futile, and thus did not expect to hold a new round of talks. Despite this, in May 2009, in a letter addressed to Colombians for Peace, the ELN Central Command suggested that no topics should be vetoed as part of an eventual process of dialogue and negotiation, noting its willingness to deal with issues like kidnapping, forced disappearance and political prisoners at the negotiating table.

The Central Command of the ELN revealed in April 2010 that it had received proposals from the government to hold secret talks, which it rejected as it deemed that they came solely with the purpose of currying favour in the elections. The FARC guerrillas, in turn, shut off all possibilities of holding talks with the government abroad, as expressed by the Secretariat of this organisation in a communiqué targeted at the High Commissioner for Peace, Frank Pearl. In this communiqué, the FARC noted that they had always been willing to talk, but that they would not talk with the government of President Uribe when there were only four months left in his mandate, especially when the government's proposal stipulated secret talks abroad. The FARC reiterated the fact that they would keep the doors open to talks as long as they were held in Colombia before the entire nation. On the 4th of August, the ELN expressed its interest in working to find a solution to Colombia's internal conflict as part of a peace proposal for the entire continent, linking the efforts of the UNASUR member countries to other initiatives that might arise from the international community. The ELN also expressed its willingness to talk with the Venezuelan government and other South American governments to explore the pathways that might make peace possible in Colombia.

In late October, in turn, the ELN guerrillas asked UNASUR to "accompany" it in the quest for peace in the country by exhorting the government to "offer a pathway" that would put an end to the internal armed conflict. "Today peace is a demand", said Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias "Gabino", the top ELN leader, in a video posted on the insurgent group's website. To Santos' government, "we say that he is facing the challenge of offering the country a pathway to peace", stated "Gabino", who also asked the president to make the structural changes that Colombia needs "feasible". The extensive communiqué, which was read by the guerrilla leader on video, also stressed that the ELN "wants to resume the construction of a pathway of peace with the participation of all Colombians" through a process that "might conclude with a constituent assembly". To the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), he said that "we reaffirm the request for UNASUR to accompany us in our quest for peace in Colombia. We believe that the balance and political justice heard in the ELN's approach are necessary", added "Gabino". In early December, in response to a request from the vice president,

Angelino Garzón, the ELN proposed to the national government that they agree to a bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in order to give priority attention to the winter tragedy, among other emergencies that needed to be discussed and agreed upon.

In mid-December, the ELN proposed a solution to the national crisis on the basis of eight premises: 1) humanising in order to speed up and lay roots for a permanent, comprehensive solution to the internal conflict; 2) identifying the essential problems in order to resolve them; 3) undoing the problem by undoing the pathway along which it was created; 4) not starting by blaming the victims; 5) not applying double standards when resolving problems; 6) bringing society and the international community into the process; 7) exchanging the culture of exclusion and imposition for one of negotiation, agreement and compliance; and 8) signing with the intention of fulfilling.

GOVERNMENT MEETINGS WITH THE INSURGENCY

Years	Venues	Groups
1991	Cravo Norte (Colombia)	FARC, ELN, EPL
1991	Caracas (Venezuela)	FARC, ELN, EPL
1992	Tlaxcala (Mexico)	FARC, ELN, EPL
1998-2002	San Vicente del Caguán (Colombia)	FARC
1998	Madrid (Spain)	ELN
1998	Mainz (Germany)	ELN
1999	Havana (Cuba)	ELN
2002	Havana (Cuba)	ELN
2005-2007	Havana (Cuba)	ELN
2007	Caracas (Venezuela)	ELN

DEMOBILISED INDIVIDUALS, 2002-2010

AUC	FARC	ERG	ELN	Dissidence	TOTAL
Collective demobilisations					
31,671	101	38	N/A	N/A	31,810
Individual demobilisations					
3,682	14,626	N/A	3,047	494	21,849
TOTAL					
35,353	14,727	38	3,047	494	53,659

Source: Office of the Higher Commissioner for Peace, July 2010.

The peace process in 2011

In late January, the President of Uruguay, José Múgica, expressed his willingness to serve as the mediator in order to achieve peace in Colombia. In February, the FARC guerrilla fulfilled the unilateral offer it had made the previous December with the release of two civilians and four soldiers. The released persons were welcomed by peace activists and former senator Piedad Córdoba, with the cooperation and logistical support of the government of Brazil and the ICRC. In May, the President of the Republic, Juan Manuel Santos, recognised that there had been an internal armed conflict in Colombia for some years. This declaration contrasted with the version imposed by Álvaro Uribe Vélez during his eight years at the head of the government. Counter to all the evidence, Uribe had firmly denied that there was an armed conflict in Colombia and immediately thereafter claimed that there was, however, a terrorist threat. Santos clarified that recognition of the conflict did not mean that he recognised the belligerence of the guerrillas. The “Law on Care, Assistance and Comprehensive Reparations of the Victims of the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia” was also approved, which is aimed at ensuring the rights of truth, justice and reparation and to provide guarantees that this would not happen again to the more than four million Colombians whose fundamental rights had been breached, as long as these breaches were the consequence of the international human rights infractions or serious violations of international human rights norms.

On the occasion of its 47th anniversary, in late May the FARC published a communiqué which contained novel language in which it stated that it had never renounced the political solution to the social and armed conflict, that violence had never been its *raison d'être* and that peace was possible, stressing the mobilisation of its people. As an agenda, the FARC insisted on fair land distribution and wholesale agrarian reform, the establishment of effective preventative health policies, full democracy, the full and comprehensive exercise of human rights, a drop in military spending, the redirection of the defence policy, a humanitarian agreement, decent housing, balanced human development, tax laws that protect the most disadvantaged, a law on victims and land restitution that would benefit the landless, a reform of the pension scheme, free education at all levels, fair salaries and guaranteed employment, wholesale environmental protection, the political guarantee of debate and participation in the political power organisation, full recognition of gender rights, recognition of abortion and the right to protest and social mobilisation. To the FARC, “peace is a right that must become a reality, and barbarism cannot continue to be part of our destiny, especially now that a certain, civilised future can be imposed through the mobilisation.”

In June, the President of Colombia signed the Law on Victims and Land Restitution through which there are plans to compensate more than four million victims of the armed conflict and return more than two million hectares to Colombians whose land was usurped by the armed groups. The estimated cost of the compensation is around 20 billion dollars. The law protects the people affected by cases of violence related to the conflict which happened after the 1st of January 1985, while the land restitution will be applied to deeds which occurred after the 1st of January 1991. In parallel, on the occasion of its anniversary the ELN publicised a communiqué in which it stated that the motivations that originally led the group to assemble remained in place and that the armed struggle was more urgent than ever, contradicting its previous messages in favour of seeking a negotiated political solution.

In early August, the ELN sent a letter to Piedad Córdoba in which it stated that “the ELN has publicly and repeatedly expressed **its willingness to engage in a bilateral dialogue without conditions**, the agenda and rules to be set by the parties in these dialogues... A government and insurgency committee is the most advisable course today and in this sense we are making every effort to achieve it.” The letter also expressed its abidance by international humanitarian law. In early November, **after an air attack, the top leader of the FARC, “Alfonso Cano”, died**, which opened up a period of uncertainty as to the future of the organisation and potential peace dialogues.

EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIQUÉS PUBLISHED IN 2011 BY THE ELN AND THE FARC REFERRING TO THE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT

ELN	
8 th of February	We reiterate to all the political and social sectors who love democracy and national sovereignty to outline the national dialogue which shall lead us to the political solution to the social and armed conflict.
14 th of February	(letter to the Episcopal Conference) The ELN has repeated told the country and government about its willingness to seek pathways of political solutions because we remain convinced that only in this way can we discuss the reasons which led us to take up weapons and establish lasting agreements on substantive changes in the political, economic and social reality in Colombia.
7 th of March	The ELN repeats its full willingness to seek a political solution to the conflict which requires a dialogue with no conditions among the conflicting parties. For this purpose, the contributions of the political and social organisations in the country are needed, as is the effective participation of the international community.
April	Among the ranks of the ELN and the Colombian insurgency there is an unwavering decisiveness to achieve peace. The second option for seeking peace is the political solution in which the people and the nation play a crucial role, with the participation of the international community. This option is the one chosen by the ELN, and it has been defending this option since the 1980s, when we suggested a political solution to the conflict.
16 th of May	The ELN reiterates yet again, in regards to the government's recognition, that it is time for all the people's organisations and Colombian society to channel the struggles for social justice, for democracy, into a huge effort among all of us to find a political solution to the grave social and armed conflict which is destroying Colombia.
1 st of August	The ELN has publicly and repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in a bilateral dialogue without conditions , the agenda and rules to be set by the parties in these dialogues... A government and insurgency committee is the most advisable course today and in this sense we are making every effort to achieve it
26 th of September	The roots of the Colombian conflict lie in the social inequalities and violent responses by the regime to citizen protests, and this has led weapons to be taken up. For this reason, what is required is a political solution to the conflict which resolves these causes and confers upon the country new rules written by all the people and not only by those of us who have taken up weapons for political and social reasons.
FARC	
8 th of January	We will not stop for even a moment in our struggle for a political solution to the conflict out of principles.
27 th of May	Compatriots, peace is a right that we must make a reality in this fatherland flooded with offenses.... We call all the people to action and mobilisation to set the country on the pathway of a political, dialogued solution . In these 47 years of battles for the peace of Colombia from the armed resistance, we ratify our efforts in the effort to reconstruct and reconcile the Bolivarian Colombia, the great fatherland and socialism, illuminated by the unitary thinking of the liberator Simón Bolívar, because unity and peace are indeed possible.
12 th of August	The FARC-EP reiterates its unwavering pledge to devote all our energy and efforts to welcoming ideas and helping along the quest for formulas that lead to the route of dialogue ... Gathering the calls to seek a solution other than war, to resolve the social and armed conflict that our nation is experiencing and in view of the willingness expressed by Mr President to explore this pathway, we hereby declare before you our political will to take steps aimed at creating the scenario to foster the start of dialogues in the country as soon as possible.

Most significant events in the year

The military shot down the FARC top leader, "Alfonso Cano".
Both the FARC and the ELN sent messages to be willing to dialogue with the Government.

Websites of interest

Anncol (www.anncol.info) (information on the FARC)
El Colombiano (www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/pd.asp)
El Espectador (www.elespectador.com)
El Tiempo (eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/index.htm)
ELN (www.eln-voces.com)
FARC (resistenciafariana.blogspot.com)
Fundación Ideas para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org)
Indepaz (www.indepaz.org.co)
UNDP (www.undp.org.co)
Revista Semana (www.semana.com)
Wikipedia (armed conflict in Colombia)

ASIA

Southern Asia

AFGHANISTAN

Context of the conflict

A mountainous, extremely poverty-stricken, ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim country that cultivates opium and gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1919, Afghanistan's pre-existing monarchy came to an end with the coup d'état in 1973, when the country became a republic. A few years later, a Communist government came to power. This government became embroiled in fighting with an Islamic guerrilla group, a situation which led to the intervention of Soviet troops in 1979. The Soviets remained in the country with a total of 100,000 troops until 1989, and they only withdrew after negotiations with the United Nations and constant pressure from a coalition of militias (the Northern Alliance) that was supported by the United States. The civil war resumed, and in 1996 the Taliban forces ended up wresting control of the country. They remained in power until 2001, when an international coalition led by NATO occupied the country ('Operation Enduring Freedom') with a contingent mainly made up of US soldiers. Hamid Karzai became the president of the country. Between 1992 and 1996, the various Afghan militias that were engaged in internecine fighting caused the death of around 50,000 people, most of them civilians. The country lived under constant instability, and the government only controlled the capital. Much of the population are still living as refugees in other countries.

Population: 32.4 million inhabitants
Area: 652,000 km²
GDP: 10,044 million dollars
Per capita income: \$310
HDI: 172 (out of 187)
Refugees: + 6 million
Armed actors: Taliban, Al Qaeda, occupation forces
Facilitators: Qatar

Development of the peace process

The Bonn Agreement, signed in December 2001, led to the creation of the Interim Authority. The process began in Bonn in 2001, and culminated in September with elections for the National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga) and the provincial councils. Since then NATO has kept a military force in Afghanistan called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has a United Nations mandate. In March 2002, as a result of a Security Council resolution, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created with the purpose of implementing the commitments to reconstruct the country agreed to a few months earlier in Bonn. In April 2003 the UNDP set up a programme to disarm and demobilise the combatants, called the ANBP, which came to an end in 2006 with the demobilisation of 63,000 militia members and with 53,000 weapons collected. This programme now focuses on dismantling the remaining illegal armed groups and destroying mines. In early 2006 the Afghan government approved an Action Plan for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation.

In early February, the Wolesi Jirga, as Afghanistan's lower chamber is called, approved **a draft amnesty law** for all the combatants who had participated in the 25 years of conflict, including Mullah Omar, the highest Taliban authority. This amnesty also extended to people accused of war crimes, such as the former Mujahideens (Afghan resistance) who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, some of whom now hold government posts. **In September**, the Taliban claimed that they were willing to begin negotiations with the Afghan government after president Hamid Karzai made a proposal to negotiate. Nevertheless, a Taliban spokesman stated that before formal negotiations could get under way, the government had to agree to withdraw the international troops present on Afghan soil; adding that the imposition of Islamic law was a requirement. **In early October 2008**, President Hamid Karzai revealed that he had asked Saudi Arabia to facilitate peace negotiations with the Taliban leaders, and he revealed that his envoys had travelled to that country and to Pakistan to initiate

those talks. Representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan met in late October in a mini-jirga (traditional assembly) and agreed to hold talks with the insurgencies from their respective countries if they agreed to abide by the constitutions of each country. Additionally, the initial condition was set that the Taliban would renounce violence. In 2009 the President of the US, Barack Obama, stated that reconciliation with the Taliban could be an important initiative in an armed conflict in which a US military victory was unlikely. In mid-October, the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, claimed that the government was examining the possibility of approaching the Taliban as part of a new strategy for the country. In the second half of November, the US special representative for Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, confirmed that Saudi Arabia had started a dialogue process with the Taliban, and stated that the US would support any Saudi initiative. According to the Saudi press, the US ambassador to Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry, had held talks with the former Taliban Foreign Minister, Mulla Mutawakil, in Kabul. Eikenberry had offered to recognise the Taliban government in several provinces – Helmand, Kandahar, Arakzan, Kunar and Nuristan – in exchange for a cessation of the Taliban's attacks on the US armed forces in the country.

Loya jirgas were held in June 2002, December 2003, 2006 and December 2009. These were large assemblies for discussing important issues, in which all the political, cultural and religious tribal leaders took part. In the first of these, the new Afghan administration was formed; in the second, the draft constitution was examined; in the 2006 meeting, the border dispute with Pakistan was discussed; and in the 2009 meeting, the Taliban insurgency, which was invited, was discussed.

In the second half of January 2010, the London summit began with the participation of 70 Foreign Ministers. At this summit, a fund was created by the donor countries to promote the demobilisation and reintegration of the Taliban insurgents. In turn, the President, Hamid Karzai, pointed to a political process with the Taliban insurgency which would include its leaders. However, Karzai stated that the offer of talks was only open to those who gave up violence. Several countries in the region (Pakistan, Turkey, China, Iran and Russia) expressed their support for a national reconciliation and reintegration process directed and executed by Afghanistan. In parallel, the UN Security Council lifted its sanctions against five Taliban and withdrew them from the list of individuals sanctioned because of their ties to Al-Qaeda after the President of Afghanistan had requested this measure. Some Taliban had stated that their inclusion on terrorist lists was preventing them from participating in peace negotiations. Likewise, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, appointed Staffan de Mistura the new Special Representative in Afghanistan to replace Kai Eide. In March, it was reported that the government might have been holding secret negotiations with the second in command of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, when he was arrested by the USA in Pakistan, which may have caused serious problems for the President, Hamid Karzai, according to sources close to the Afghan leader. The arrest was regarded by the Afghan government as Pakistan's boycott of the negotiating efforts or an attempt to capture the limelight in the negotiations. In April, a peace conference was held in which an action plan was drawn up for the reintegration of the low- and mid-level Taliban insurgents. The plan included job offers, training and other economic incentives. Some analysts stated that the insurgents were motivated by three kinds of reasons: a predatory political system that has excluded some ethnic groups, the abuse of power by government officials and the perception that the international forces were overly aggressive. Apparently the Taliban were also receiving support from the Pakistani intelligence services. In mid-April, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar stated that his group might be willing to hold negotiations with Western politicians. This information was revealed by two of his closest collaborators in an interview with *The Sunday Times*. The Taliban leader had stated that he was no longer interested in governing the country and that the goals of the Taliban were to expel foreigners from the country, to return to Sharia law and to establish security. The Taliban had set no preconditions for dialogue, simply stating that it must be honest. In June, the peace jirga – traditional assembly – called by President Hamid Karzai ended with the tribal leaders adhering to the plan submitted by Karzai. The assembly, which had been criticised for being mainly made up of followers of the President and not including the Taliban, was attacked by Taliban missiles on the first day. The government's plan called for the creation of a "High Peace Council" which would undertake an effort to get the low-profile insurgents to adhere to the reintegration process all over the country. In July, the international conference held in Kabul came to an end with an agreement to begin to define the transfer of control of the country's security from the

international NATO forces to the Afghan government in 2014. However, the NATO Secretary General stated that the troops would remain in the country until the Afghan forces were capable of guaranteeing security. Plus, it was agreed that the Afghan executive would control 50% of the funds supplied by the international community within the space of two years. To date they only controlled 20% of these funds. The conference also accepted the plan to reintegrate 36,000 Taliban insurgents, which would cost around 600 million euros. In September, 40% of the Afghans voted in the legislative elections, and the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, announced the launch of a peace plan for the country. This new strategy, which was to be directed by the High Peace Council, had a twofold objective: first, to establish a dialogue with the Taliban leaders, and secondly to distance the combatants from the base of the insurgency.

In October, the government explained that it had held unofficial talks with the Taliban. Hamid Karzai made this claim on CNN, where he stated that so far the meetings had not been official and regular; rather they had taken the guise of personal contacts which had been happening for some time. The official body charged with fostering the dialogue process with the Taliban is the Supreme Peace Council led by former Afghan president Buhanuddin Rabbani, which had almost 70 members. Despite the fact that the official Taliban version remained that they would not negotiate until all the foreign armed forces had left the country, numerous Afghan and Arab sources claimed that the leaders of the insurgency were showing their willingness to dialogue for the first time. According to several media sources, the secret talks that had been going on until then had included representatives of Quetta Shura, the Taliban core of leaders located in Balochistan (Pakistan) and led by Mullah Omar, and representatives of the Haqqani clan, two of the main hubs of power within the Taliban insurgency. The Supreme Peace Council called on the other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to support the process. In November, the USA's Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, claimed that there were no formal peace talks with the insurgency and dampened the initial optimism that this process, launched by the president himself, Hamid Karzai, with the creation of the High Peace Council.

The peace process in 2011

A delegation from the Afghan High Commission for Peace met in January with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani with the purpose of fostering mutual trust and cooperating in the peace process. At the end of the visit, Pakistan declared that both countries had agreed to hold a peace *jirga* (traditional assembly) in the forthcoming months, although this was denied by the Afghan delegation. **Both countries created a joint commission to develop a means of direct negotiations for the eventual start of peace talks with the Taliban** as part of the peace plan for the country launched by President Hamid Karzai in late 2010. The commission would be headed by the foreign ministers of both countries, senior military officials and members of the Afghan and Pakistani intelligence services. In February, around 900 Taliban lay down their weapons and joined the government's reintegration programme for insurgents, according to NATO sources. However, **Pakistan withdrew from the dialogue process on the war in Afghanistan as a sign of protest over the latest attacks by the US government** on Pakistani soil, which according to the government in Islamabad led to the death of 40 civilians. Pakistan described these attacks as "a flagrant violation of humanitarian norms and laws" and claimed that it would not attend the meeting with US and Afghan representatives scheduled for the 26th of March in Brussels in order to discuss the war in Afghanistan.

In April the government of Turkey expressed its willingness to host a political office for the Taliban in order to promote peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, a proposal which was backed by Pakistan. The former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, a member of the Afghan Peace Commission, met with Turkish authorities to discuss this matter. The Taliban had expressed their willingness to have a contact office in a place that was safe for them. However, it was first necessary to resolve the issue of the ban on travel imposed by a United Nations resolution, although NATO was willing to establish a security corridor for the Taliban leaders willing to participate in a peace process. Likewise, a member of the peace commission and advisor to President Hamid Karzai, Mohammad Massoom Stanekzai, confirmed that **the government was holding negotiations with the Taliban** and stated that major headway had been made.

To the question of whether they were negotiations on the negotiations, Stanekzai stated that they went a step further. These declarations took place in the presence of the US Ambassador during a press conference to announce a 50 million dollar donation to the National Solidarity Programme that promotes the reintegration of Taliban combatants. Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed that Pakistan would participate in the commission charged with promoting peace and negotiation with the Taliban; its inclusion gave Pakistan a crucial role in negotiations with the Taliban insurgency. This decision should be interpreted in the context of the start of the US's gradual withdrawal from the zone, as different local analysts stated, and they also noted that Pakistan might try to foster the formation of a coalition government similar to that of Iraq, in which the Taliban may participate but not hold all the power.

In June, **the US President Barack Obama announced his plan to withdraw from the country**, which entailed the exit of around 33,000 soldiers by September 2012, around 10,000 of whom would be repatriated in 2011. The US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, in turn, acknowledged the existence of preliminary contacts with Taliban representatives; specifically, US representatives had met with Taliban officials in Germany, among other venues, and Pakistan had also participated in these meetings. One example was the promotion of Maulvi Qalamuddin, former Vice Minister of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in the Taliban regime, who had been rehabilitated and was now a member of the High Peace Council set up to negotiate with the insurgency.

The UN Security Council removed 14 former Taliban from the list of sanctions in July as part of the measures aimed at promoting peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Among the people withdrawn from the list are the four members of the High Peace Council set up by the Afghan government. The Afghan government had requested that several former Taliban be excluded from the sanctions, explaining that they had abandoned the insurgency. In August, an Afghan government leak to the Associated Press revealed that **the US government had held three meetings with a personal emissary of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar Tayyab Aga**. The Afghan government leak had been the cause of the interruption in negotiations, and it may have been motivated by the fear of the executive, with Karzai at the helm, of being left aside in the process, in addition to the fact that an agreement reached by Washington would weaken Karzai's leadership. The Taliban also asked that Pakistan not be informed of these meetings. The first meeting was held in 2010, and the others in the spring of 2011. They were held in Germany – the country where Aga might be located – and in Qatar. Even though the meetings were preliminary, they were beginning to yield results. The US government had to treat the Taliban differently than Al-Qaeda in terms of international sanctions, in addition to guaranteeing that it would not oppose their opening an office in a third country and ensure Aga's presence in Germany. The leak seriously damaged trust in Karzai's government and revealed the high level of mistrust that marred the relations between the two executives. Likewise, Senator John Kerry held a meeting in a Gulf country with the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani army at which the latter requested a greater role for Pakistan in the Afghan peace process. As a result of the activation of peace negotiations, the commanders and warlords belonging to the Northern Alliance may be rearming in order to strengthen their position in view of a possible peace agreement with the Taliban. The leader of the insurgent group Hizb-e-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, rejected the peace negotiations and stated that jihad was the only way to put an end to the foreign presence in the country.

In September, **a suicide attack perpetrated by a supposed envoy of the Taliban caused the death of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former President of Afghanistan between 1992 and 1996, the leader of the Northern Alliance and the Head of the High Peace Council, which is charged with promoting a reconciliation process in the country**. The attack took place at the start of a meeting between Rabbani and Taliban envoys. In response, the USA noted that the Haqqani network had to be behind the murder. Haqqani had conditioned its participation in peace negotiations with the government and the USA upon participation by the Taliban. Even though the Haqqani network is under the command structure of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, in practice it acts independently. After the attack, however, President Karzai declared that the negotiations with the Taliban were finished. In December US government sources confirmed that talks with the Taliban were at a critical stage and that the USA considered the possibility of transferring a non-specified

number of Taliban prisoners currently jailed in Guantanamo to Afghanistan. The prisoners would move under the control of the Afghan government. In exchange the Taliban was asked to put in place some confidence measures, such as condemning violence or publicly expressing their willingness to begin formal talks with the Afghan government. The USA held several meetings with the Taliban in Germany and Doha, specifically with representatives of Mullah Omar.

Most significant events in the year


The US President Barack Obama announced his plan to withdraw from the country.

A suicide attack perpetrated by a supposed envoy of the Taliban caused the death of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who is charged with promoting a reconciliation process in the country.

Websites of interest

Human Security Report Project (www.hsrgroup.org)
ISAF (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.html)
UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
UNPD (www.undp.org/afghanistan)
Presidency of the Republic (www.president.gov.af)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
UNAMA (www.unama-afg.org)
UNGOMAP (www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/index.html)
Wikipedia (War in Afghanistan)

Main actors in the process



INDIA

With 1.198 billion inhabitants, a land area of 3.2 million square kilometres and a GDP of 1,186,700 million dollars, India is a true mosaic of cultures and political traditions. This can be seen in the numerous regions inhabited by peoples with aspirations of reunification and self-government, the reason behind armed conflicts in some of them. In this section, we shall comment on the processes which have emerged in the regions of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, as well as those stemming from the group CPI-M, which operates in several regions. The conflict with Pakistan over the region of Kashmir is examined separately.

In July, the Maoist insurgency responded positively to the proposal by the Chief Minister of **West Bengal (India)**, Mamata Banerjee, to hold negotiations with the Naxalite insurgency. The Maoists stated that they wanted to start talks, but they demanded the withdrawal of the security forces in the zones affected by the armed conflict and the release of the arrested leaders, particularly Patipaban Halder, Himadri Sen and Sudip Chongdar. In August, the government of West Bengal appointed the interlocutors that would meet with the Naxalite leaders to negotiate the end of violence in the zones of the state affected by the armed conflict. Furthermore, it agreed to ensure them a safe corridor so they could participate in the negotiations, and they were sent a formal letter inviting them to the negotiations. Sujato Bhadra was appointed to head a committee of civil society that would participate in the negotiations. In September, however, Banerjee did not authorise the start of negotiations with the Naxalite insurgency, stating instead that it was divided and that it needed to clarify its positions in order for the negotiations to take place. In turn, the Indian Minister of the Interior, P. Chidambaram, offered to negotiate with the Maoists in exchange for their simply suspending violence, without the need for them to disarm, surrender or dismantle themselves as an armed group.

Assam

Context of the conflict

Assam is a region in northeast India. Many immigrants from Bangladesh have arrived in this region, and as a result several nationalist groups have emerged calling for the region to be liberated. The main nationalist group is the United Liberation Front of Assam (**ULFA**), which was created in 1979 and has Maoist leanings. The ULFA chose to engage in an armed struggle from 1989 onwards. In 1994, 4,000 of its combatants abandoned the group. However, they did not lay down their arms and instead went on to attack ULFA bases in Bhutan. As conditions for talks with the Government, the ULFA requested negotiations abroad in the presence of UN observers. It has carried out attacks against oil company interests and has training bases in Bangladesh.

The other important group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (**NDFB**), created in 1988, which took up arms in 1992. They also fight against the Bangladesh immigrants, who are Muslims, and strive to create "Bodoland", an independent state separate from Assam. It has bases in Bhutan and around 3,500 combatants, many of whom are Christians. There are other groups in the region (BLT, UPDS and DHD) that have reached ceasefire agreements with the government.

Population: 32 million inhabitants

Area: 78,400 km²

HDI (India): 134 (out of 182)

GDP (India): 1,405,700 million dollars

Per capita income (India): \$1,220

Armed actors: ULFA, NDFB,

India Mujahideen

Facilitators:

ULFA: R. Goswami, People's Consultative Group, PCPIA

NDFB: All Bodo Peace Forum

Development of the peace process

In 1993, attempts were made to find a solution to the demands of the Bodo people. An agreement was signed with moderate Bodo groups to create a Bodoland Autonomous Council. However, this agreement was not supported by the NDFB, which did not begin further exploratory talks with the government until 2002. In any event, **in 2003, an agreement was signed that brought an end to eleven years of confrontations between the BLTF-BLT group (Bodo Liberation Tigers) and the government. In addition, in 2003 the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the DHD group**, which had been founded in 1995 to fight for the independence of the Dimasas people. The government and the DHD formed a Joint Monitoring Group to ensure that the agreement was upheld.

The **ULFA** opposed the 2003 agreement between the BLT and the government. However, in mid-2004, they established relations with the government, to open up the way for future negotiations. In 2005 several attempts were made to establish formal talks with the ULFA, though fighting between the group and government armed forces continued. In February the facilitator of this process, the writer R. Goswami, asked the government to withdraw the precondition established by the ULFA to give up violence in order to start talks. Days later, the government made a new offer of talks. This time the ULFA accepted, on the condition that the issue of sovereignty be discussed. The government refused. In September the ULFA announced the appointment of a delegation of eleven trusted citizens, called the **People's Consultative Group (PCG)**, to maintain contacts with the Indian government. The writer R. Goswami and the former footballer R. Phukan were to act as facilitators. This Consultative Group promised to consult the civil society and submit its conclusions to the government. Through the PCG, the ULFA presented the government with six demands for negotiations. Most of them were accepted, with the exception of the request for independence for Assam.

The first round of negotiations through the PCG was held on the 25th of October 2005. In December a meeting was held at the residence of the Prime Minister, M. Singh. The second round of negotiations was held on the 7th of February 2006. The ULFA however expressed its willingness to negotiate under the auspices of the United Nations, while the PCG conditioned its presence in the forthcoming rounds of negotiations to the suspension of military activities in the region. It is also worth pointing out that the existing truce was the first to encompass the entire armed opposition group ULFA in its 27 years of existence. In June 2007 the government agreed to restart the peace talks with the ULFA under several conditions. The government would not release the five leaders of the armed group who were imprisoned, but it would facilitate encounters with them if this was deemed necessary for the negotiations in order to guarantee a safe corridor. In early January 2008 the executive stated that it would not accept any precondition for starting negotiations with the armed opposition group ULFA. Despite this, the government indicated that the doors were open to a new peace process, but that it would have to be the ULFA themselves who approached the government, thus setting aside the formula of negotiations via a third party (in the past, the Popular Consultative Group, made up of representatives of the civil society appointed by the ULFA, had served this purpose).

In early January 2009 the Alpha and Charlie companies of the 28th battalion of the ULFA, which had announced a unilateral ceasefire in June, created a new organisation called ULFA Pro-Talks, and which was headed by Mrinal Hazarika. They also announced that they were giving up their demands for sovereignty and independence and would work instead to achieve greater autonomy for the state of Assam. The government also stated that the ULFA faction in favour of negotiations had resubmitted its request to hold talks with the government and was in favour of accepting an agreement within the framework of the constitution. Likewise, a manifesto suggested that a dual citizenship mechanism be established for everyone living inside Assam prior to the British "indigenous" colonisation and for those who had emigrated to different regions of India and held the status of "ethnic" citizens. The term "Assamese" would be used to classify both collectives. The group stressed the need to create an upper chamber in the state parliament where all the permanently settled groups could be represented, including the Bengalis, Biharis, Marwaris, Punjabis and Nepalese. The ULFA gave the green light to peace negotiations in the second half of November. Likewise, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that if the ULFA leaders wanted to hold peace talks without any preconditions, they had to guarantee the safety of Arvind Rajkhowa.

With regard to the other process the government is involved in with the armed opposition group DHD, in 2008 the government extended the ceasefire agreement for another six months, even though it also accused the DHD of violating it. The agreement was announced after a tripartite encounter between the central Indian government, the government of the state of Assam and the armed group, and it included the suspension of military operations. During the third quarter, the government and the DHD (N) agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement for another six months, as well as to hold a subsequent meeting in July in order to address political issues. In addition, the armed opposition group DHD (J) or Black Widow (a splinter group from the DHD) unilaterally declared a ceasefire and forwarded the government a list of requests, expressing its willingness to hold peace negotiations. However, the government refused to dialogue with this group as long as it continued to rearm, as in November it had resumed its armed activities, which were only interrupted by the unilateral ceasefire declaration. Therefore, this group was expected to be outlawed soon. In 2009, the ceasefire agreement with the armed opposition group DHD (N) was also extended for another year, following negotiations held by representatives of the central and state government and the insurgent group. The DHD (N) expressed its satisfaction with the results of this meeting. In mid-September, the armed opposition group DHD-J, also known as Black Widow, started a surrender process and turned in its weapons in the wake of the latest ultimatum issued by the government, which stated that it must turn in its weapons by the 15th of September under the threat of a large-scale military operation. The 350 members of the armed group were to be transferred to cantonment areas. In the first nine months of the year, around 100 people died as a result of violence waged by this armed group, which had split off from the DHD in 2003. The negotiations got under way in August after the government rejected a ceasefire proposal from the armed group and demanded that it turn over its weapons. In late October the Interior Minister, P. Chidambaram, stated that talks would be held with the armed opposition group DHD-J as a result of their handover of weapons. The central government appointed the former director of the Intelligence Bureau, P.C. Haldar, as the interlocutor for the talks with the DHD-J, as well as with the armed groups UPDS and the pro-negotiation faction NDFB. During the second half of November, the government set a one-year deadline to reach agreements with the armed groups with which it had agreed to ceasefires, namely the DHD (J), UPDS and NDFB (the pro-talks faction). The interlocutor appointed by the government, P.C. Haldar, will hold negotiations with all three groups. The government stated that it did not want to see a repetition of previous situations in which the negotiations extended over several years. All three organisations submitted their documents with their respective demands.

Regarding the negotiations with the **NDFB**, talks began in May 2005 and resulted in an agreement to a ceasefire. This agreement put an end to the violence of the preceding 18 years and was valid for one year. In October 2008, the group gave the government a document stating its demands. In January 2009, the ceasefire was extended by six months. This announcement came after the group removed its leader, Ranjan Daimary, and expelled him from the organisation. In May, the NDFB asked the Supreme Court of Guwahati to withdraw the illegalisation that weighed heavily on the organisation, given that it had accepted the Indian constitution.

In May 2010, the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, stated that after the Bangladeshi police's handover of the head of the armed opposition group NDFB, Ranjan Daimary, who had been under arrest in that country, he expected there to be peace talks with different armed opposition groups. Daimary was at the helm of the NDFB faction that had been opposed to a ceasefire agreement and was instead calling for independence for the territory of Bodoland. Daimary is accused of being the mastermind behind the attacks that caused 100 deaths in October 2008. However, one of Daimary's family members stated that he was not opposed to negotiations and that sovereignty was not a precondition for him. The faction in favour of negotiation was called the NDFB-Progressive; its Secretary General is Govinda Nasumatary, alias B. Swmkhwr, who reached a ceasefire with the government in 2005.

In early 2010, **419 members and leaders of the armed opposition group Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF), including 22 women, turned over their weapons** to the security forces in the city of Diphu in the district of Karbi Anglong, one of the areas the most heavily affected by the violence in Assam.

The leader of the armed group stated that despite the handover of weapons, they would not give up their claims for self-governance for the Karbi nation, which they would set forth at the negotiating table. The KLNLF emerged in 2004 as a faction of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS).

In August 2010, the government extended its ceasefire with the **United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)** for another six months, until the end of the year, which enabled the peace talks to continue. This group was created in 1999 and represents Karbi nation. In November, the Prime Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, claimed that everything was in place for the signing of a peace agreement with the UPDS. This armed opposition group had signed a ceasefire in 2002, after which it split off into two groups: the UPDS, which was in favour of the peace talks, and the KLNLF, which wanted to continue with the insurgent activity.

In June 2010, the Indian government gave the go-ahead to the government of the state of Assam to launch a negotiation process with the ULFA and named the former head of the intelligence office, P.C. Haldar, as the interlocutor with the armed group. In turn, the armed group, whose imprisoned leaders must have met in the central prison of Guwahati to discuss this affair, issued a public declaration asking the government to release the six arrested leaders as a way of fostering the negotiations. The government mediator met in prison with the ULFA leaders, including Arabinda Rajkhova, to discuss the modalities of the peace talks. In turn, the president of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhova, expressed the group's willingness to participate in the peace talks, although he stressed the release of armed opposition group's leaders as a prerequisite. He also asked that the armed opposition group's secretary general, Anup Chetia, accompany him in the talks; the secretary general was in prison in Bangladesh. According to journalistic sources, the Indian authorities might be willing to take over custody of Chetia for the peace talks. In parallel, the Tada tribunal, which specialises in insurgent activities, declared that the deputy commandant of the organisation, Raju Barua, was free on bail under the condition that he could not leave the state of Assam without notifying the authorities in advance, and he was asked to turn over his passport. However, Barua was still waiting for release on bail for other crimes which fell under the jurisdiction of the court of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which expected to take a decision in late November. This tribunal had already released other prominent members on bail, including the vice president Pradip Gogoi, the Secretary of Information Mithinga Daimari, the Secretary of Culture Pranati Deka, and the ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain, also known as Mama. All of this took place after several meetings between the interlocutor appointed by the central government, PC Haldar, and Rajkhova and other imprisoned ULFA leaders over the course of several months, the last in October. Regarding the leader of the insurgent group, Paresh Barua, who was in exile, presumably in Myanmar, Gogoi claimed that they had received no signal that he was interested in participating in the process and stressed that even though the Indian and Assamese authorities preferred Barua to be involved, the peace process would move forward with or without him. Haldar was charged with setting up the modalities of the tripartite peace talks, which were scheduled to begin in December, in which representatives of the central government, the government of Assam, which would act as the facilitator, and Haldar himself was to participate. Haldar was to act as the interlocutor along with the ULFA representatives. Haldar once again met with the president of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhova, who was locked up in the central prison of Guwahati, to discuss the modalities of the talks, and he claimed that at that point there were no obstacles to starting the dialogue process. In the same vein, Rajkhova stated that he believed that the process was proceeding well. Rajkhova claimed that when the leaders who were still imprisoned were released, the peace talks could commence. The Indian government chose not to oppose the requests for release under bail for the two ULFA leaders as a way of levelling the playing field for the start of the peace talks.

The peace process in 2011

In February **the Indian government and the faction of the ULFA in favour of peace talks**, led by Arabinda Rajkhova, **started the first round of formal talks**. A four-member ULFA delegation went on a five-day tour during which they met with the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in the presence of the National Security Councillor, Shiv Shankar Menon, and the interlocutor P.C. Haldar. Rajkhova described the talks

with the Prime Minister as satisfactory, and he recalled that they are seeking a fair, honourable solution that is acceptable to their demands. Even though the team has not yet submitted its list of demands, Rajkhowa underscored the need to amend the constitution in order to safeguard the identity of the indigenous peoples. Prior to this, the ULFA leaders had met with the Interior Minister, P. Chidambaram, and with the Secretary of the Interior, G.K. Pillai, as part of the first round of formal talks, which the parties described as introductory talks. The outcome of this first phase of negotiations was the formation of a seven-member coordination group with representatives from ULFA and the governments of India and Assam charged with moving the process forward. Likewise, throughout the first quarter the ULFA leaders Antu Chaudang and Pradeep Chetia were released from prison and transferred to Guwahati, the capital of the state of Assam, along with another member of the group, Dipjyoti Mahanta, who was brought back from Myanmar. The president of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa, had often called for the extradition of Chetia as a condition for starting formal peace talks with the government. The ULFA Foreign Secretary, Sasha Choudhury, and the group's Finance Secretary, Chitraban Hazarika, were also released under bail. They are the last members of the ULFA leadership imprisoned in Assam. According to journalistic sources, Baruah once again rejected the peace process with the government by sending the local media several videos in which he appeared expressing his opposition to dialogue and called for independence for Assam. This only served to **reinforce the internal division of the ULFA between those who are in favour and those who are against the peace process**. In March, the ULFA faction opposed to the negotiations waged an attack against the Congress Party (CP) headquarters in Guwahati, which injured five people, including several local political leaders.

In April, the armed group ULFA announced a complete restructuring, with the dismantlement of all its battalions. From then on, the insurgents would be under the direct control of the recently-created "General Mobile Military Headquarters". Many of the ULFA battalions had been left leaderless after many of their commanders had been arrested or had abandoned the armed group. The pro-negotiations faction of ULFA, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, denied having received money from the government to maintain their members and establish a cantonment centre. In parallel, several leaders of this ULFA faction held a meeting to discuss the future of the peace process and their position against the anti-negotiation faction of the armed group. In May, the Minister of the Interior P. Chidambaram stated that **the ULFA leaders had expressed their willingness to resume the peace negotiations** after having met with the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi. The armed group might prepare a document which would serve as the basis of the talks. Chidambaram stated that the negotiations would be conducted by Rajkhowa, given that Paresh Baruah was not in India. In June, the government of Assam affirmed that the peace process with ULFA was heading in the right direction, but it stated that before formal talks could begin, an agreement to suspend operations would have to be reached.

The President of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa, declared a unilateral, indefinite ceasefire in July despite the opposition of Paresh Baruah, the Chief Commander of the armed group. The government celebrated this declaration and stated that it would adopt measures to start peace talks as quickly as possible. It also issued a call for Baruah to participate in the talks. Rajkhowa stated that political talks had gotten underway with the Minister of the Interior, the Chief Minister of Assam and the Prime Minister of India, in which all parties had expressed their desire to further the conversations. Rajkhowa was released on bail in early 2011. Paresh Baruah stated that according to its bylaws no ULFA member could adopt decisions on the group unilaterally, and he stated that Paresh Baruah was under state control even though he was free on bail. **For the first time, in August, ULFA declared that it did not want to secede from India and that it agreed to reach some kind of sovereignty within the framework of the Indian Constitution.** The Secretary General of the armed group, Anup Chetia, was going to participate in the formal negotiations with the government. This announcement came shortly after a seven-member delegation headed by the President of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa, met with the Minister of the Interior, P. Chidambaram, and turned over a document with twelve claims related to protecting the identity and material resources of the indigenous population and the resolution of illegal migration and border disputes, among other issues. This declaration may have been aimed at weakening the position of Paresh Baruah, the head of the armed group who had opposed these negotiations. In September, the Indian government signed a pact to suspend operations with the pro-negotiation faction of ULFA, in which it pledged to put an end to the violence in Assam in order to start negotiations. The armed

group pledged not to carry out any subversive activities until a political solution was found to the conflict, and the government pledged not to carry out any actions against ULFA members. The pro-negotiation faction of ULFA stated that it was not planning to change the group's bylaws to remove the Chief Commander, Paresh Baruah, from his post in view of his opposition to holding negotiations with the government.

Regarding the **NDFB**, the faction headed by Ranjan Daimary, which has traditionally opposed the peace process, offered the Indian government a unilateral ceasefire in January with the goal of being able to start a dialogue with the government. This gesture came after Daimary expressed his desire to embark on a peace process and even give up the demands for sovereignty in late 2010. The leader of the NDFB faction that was opposed to the peace process was arrested in May 2010 in Bangladesh and has been imprisoned in Assam since then. Numerous local media sources mentioned the possibility that the government would not object to releasing Daimary and the leaders of the armed group DHD on bail with the goal of facilitating the peace talks. In April, the government of the state asked the courts to extend the illegal status of the armed opposition group NDFB, given that it had not put an end to the violence. The central Indian government had already requested this extension. The government accused the armed group of extortion and attacks on the security forces and the civilian population. However, in June, the Prime Minister of the state, Tarun Gogoi, reported that **the NDFB faction against peace talks, led by Ranjan Daimary, had expressed interest in holding talks with the government.** This interest had been conveyed through emissaries from the Bodoland People's Convention. Gogoi stated that the government was also interested in meeting with representatives of this NDFB faction. In relation to the NDFB faction led by Govinda Nasumatary, alias B. Swmkhwr (NDFB-Progressive), the suspension of operations was underway, and the members of the group were already cantoned in encampments.

In October, the central government refused to grant a general amnesty to the leaders of the DHD, and further asked **DHD-Jewel** and **DHD-Nunisa** to resolve their differences. **Both factions were holding negotiations with the government for the first time.** At the end of October **the government signed a peace agreement with the Karbi UPDS armed opposition group after two years of negotiations.** The tripartite agreement was signed by Indian Minister for the Interior, P Chidambaram and Head of Assam Minister, Tarun Gogoi. The agreement contemplated the creation of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council in the district as well as regional reorganisation. The armed group indicated that it would continue its movement by political means and promote the development of the district. The armed group must hand over its weapons and disband within a period of one month. The agreement also contemplated the rehabilitation of members of the armed group and an individual review of the charges against those accused of having committed serious crimes will be carried out. The Assam government agreed to sign the agreement after the armed group accepted the postponement of their demand to turn the Karbi Anglong district into a separate state of Assam. In December the 568 members of the UPDS handed over their weapons and promised to abandon the use of violence after signing a peace agreement with the Indian government. The insurgents handed over 177 weapons.

Nagaland

Context of the conflict

The conflict in Nagaland is one of the oldest in India. It involves Christian Tibetan-Burmese tribes who have been fighting for their independence since the 1950s. The main group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (**NSCN**), which was founded in 1980. There was a schism in the group in 1988, and it divided into the **NSCN (K)**, which operates in the north of the state, and the **NSCN (IM)**, which is better established in the south. The NSCN (IM) has 4,500 combatants and a strong component of Christian fundamentalists. Its leaders are exiled in Thailand. Many other members live in the Netherlands and Ireland. The region is rich in natural gas resources.

Population: 2.2 million inhabitants
Area: 16,600 km²
HDI (India): 134 (out of 187)
GDP (India): 1,405,700 million dollars
Per capita income (India): \$1,220
Deaths due to the conflict: 20,000
Armed actors: NSCN-IM
Facilitators: Kreddha (Netherlands),
Prime Minister of Mizoram, Thailand

Development of the peace process

Since the first ceasefire in 1997, the NSCN-IM has held more than 60 rounds of negotiations with the government, many of them in Thailand and others in Amsterdam. In these talks, they agreed to extend the ceasefire. In 2005 the NSCN-IM suggested setting up federal relations with India, in addition to establishing joint defence forces, integrating the areas with Naga people and having its own flag. Were the negotiations to fail, the leaders of this group announced that they would call a referendum of the Naga people, as they had not given up on the idea of creating a territorial entity that would group together the regions inhabited by the Naga. The government stated that it would consider formulas for an asymmetrical federalism capable of resolving the conflict, since in the last round both parties had argued over the limits to the constitution's flexibility, as well as over how a sub-national constitution could fit in with the federal one. The government reiterated to the armed group that the issue of sovereignty was totally outside the realm of discussion, and that any solution to the conflict must abide by the country's constitution. The armed group may have been willing to agree to remaining part of India via a federal link to the union with special status, although this discussion has not yet been closed. In addition, the government asked the NSCN (IM) to point to the elements in the constitution that might be reformed in order to find a solution to the conflict.

In early June, **the armed opposition group NSCN-K stated that it was prepared to start formal peace negotiations with the government of India**, eight years after a ceasefire agreement had been reached with Delhi. The NSCN-K expressed its willingness to place no preconditions on the dialogue, and stated that issues such as sovereignty could be discussed at the negotiating table without their posing an obstacle to the start of negotiations.

In the second half of February 2010, the central government appointed the former Chief Secretary of Nagaland, R.S. Pandey, as the interlocutor for the negotiations with the NSCN-IM. The government hailed the decision by the leaders of the armed group to visit India and hold negotiations with the government. The Secretary General of the NSCN-IM, Thuingaleng Muivah, met in Delhi with the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the Interior Minister, P. Chidambaram, and the government-appointed interlocutor for the talks with the armed group, R.S. Pandey. Muivah, who travelled to Delhi for the negotiations from his exile in Amsterdam, headed a five-person delegation, and after the meeting he stressed the Indian government's good intentions to reach a definitive agreement. However, he also stated that he would accept no imposition from the constitution. In turn, the executive stated that it was willing to grant the maximum autonomy possible to Nagaland, even if this entailed a constitutional reform. In April, the government interlocutor, R.S. Pandey, took a six-day trip to the region with the goal of speeding up the peace process. This visit took place after the one taken

by the leader of the armed group, Thuingaleng Muivah, with his wife one month earlier, during which he met with representatives of several NGOs. After the trip, the government and the armed group met once again in Delhi. The armed group was represented by a five-member delegation headed by Muivah. The negotiations centred around the 31-point proposal put forth by the armed group which included the unification of all the districts inhabited by Naga people, as well as a constitution, flag, currency and army of their own. Likewise, Muivah might meet with government representatives alone. In June, the Indian government and the NSCN-IM held a round of negotiations in Kohima, the capital of the Naga state. This was the first time that a meeting had been held on Naga soil since the negotiations got underway thirteen years ago. In late September, one of the leaders of the NSCN-IM was arrested as he was heading to New Delhi to participate in peace talks. According to several sources, Antony Shing was travelling from Thailand to Kathmandu; he had stopped in New Delhi to participate in peace talks, scheduled for the end of that month, when he was arrested by members of the National Investigating Agency (NIA). The Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) accused the Indian intelligence agency and the government of Nepal of illegally arresting Shing.

The peace process in 2011

The leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, accepted Indian passports in February as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to talk with the government. During their visit to the capital of the country on the occasion of a meeting with representatives of the government, Swu invited the leader of the main opposition faction, the NSCN-K, S.S. Khaplang, to take part in the peace negotiations as part of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR), which is yet another important gesture of good will towards the peace process in the state. However, this invitation was rejected by Khaplang. In early March, a five-person delegation led by Muivah met with the President of India, Manmohan Singh, and the Minister of the Interior, P. Chidambaram. The parties positively viewed these encounters and hinted that there would soon be more meetings, despite the fact that their positions on the independence of Nagaaland differed.

In April, the leaders of the armed opposition groups NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu, and NSCN-K, N. Kitovi Zimoni, met in a gathering described as positive by the latter, stating that it was a major advance in the Naga reconciliation process. In the meantime, the Forum for Naga Reconciliation met with the leader of the NSCN-K in Khehoyi camp. The Forum stressed the importance of there being a meeting at the highest level as soon as possible, while the leader of the armed opposition group stressed the desire of the group's leader, S.S. Khaplang, to have participated in the gathering, although ultimately it was impossible for him to attend. Khaplang also reiterated the armed group's commitment to the reconciliation process. In May, the NSCN-IM accused the Indian security forces of violating the stipulations of the ceasefire agreements after five leaders of the armed group were arrested in Assam and later released after pressure from numerous women's groups. The insurgents had already been arrested in the district of Senapati, which is inhabited by a majority Naga population. On the other hand, the ceasefire agreement between the government and the NSCN-K was extended for another year. After the tensions in early May, in June, the NSCN-K faced an internal division between the sectors of the group based in India and the sectors operating out of Myanmar. Specifically, the chief commander based in India, Khole Konyak, expelled the founding chief S.S. Khaplang, regarded as the hard line, whom Khole accused of acting unilaterally and in a dictatorial fashion. Khaplang is credited with having removed Khole from his post after Khole had promoted the expulsion of Khaplang from the group in its national assembly. Some analysts stated that these tensions could lead to rapprochement and reconciliation between the NSCN-K sector based in India and the NSCN-IM, which is involved in talks with the government. Until then, Khaplang had supposedly banned his group leaders in India from participating in Naga reconciliation meetings and had opposed a rapprochement with the NSCN-IM.

In December the **secretary general of the NSCN-IM, T. Muivah, confirmed that he was about to declare an honourable agreement between the parties in talks with the Indian government.** However, he pointed out that at that time it was the government that had to take the initiative and offer a response to the demands of the insurgents. Leaders of the NSCN-IM met with the Minister for the Interior, P Chidambaram

and the government spokesperson RS Pandey in Delhi. Following this meeting, Muivah confirmed that matters had been clarified. However, in July he had already made similar declarations without them resulting in any progress being made. Muivah denied any proposals for the creation of a suprastate body. The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, also confirmed that there were no plans for the creation of such an entity and that he would protect regional integrity. On the other hand, the Naga People's Organization (NPO) made a call to the different Naga insurgent organisations for an immediate ceasefire and an end to provocative action by those groups.

Most significant events in the year

The Indian government and the faction of the ULFA in favour of peace talks, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, started the first round of formal talks. For the first time, in August, ULFA declared that it did not want to secede from India and that it agreed to reach some kind of sovereignty within the framework of the Indian Constitution.


The NDFB faction against peace talks, led by Ranjan Daimary, had expressed interest in holding talks with the government.

The leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, accepted Indian passports in February as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to talk with the government.

Websites of interest on the processes in India

AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
Andhra News Net (www.andhanews.net)
Assam Tribune (www.assamtribune.com)
Government of India (india.gov.in)
IDSA (www.idsa.in)
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (www.ipcs.org)
Nagaland International Support Centre (www.nagalim.nl)
Nagaland Post (www.Nagalandiapost.com)
Nagalim (www.nagalim.nl/naga/index-2.html)
North East News Agency (www.nenanews.com)
SATP (www.satp.org)
South Asia Analysis Group (www.saag.org)
Wikipedia (Naxalite) (Naxalite-Maoist insurgency)

Main actors in the process



INDIA – PAKISTAN (Kashmir)

Context of the conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir dates back to the partition in 1947, when both countries won independence from the United Kingdom and Kashmir was divided between India (the state of Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan and China. According to the 1947 Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to join either India or Pakistan. Its decision to join India was a source of conflict between the two countries, and the

Population: 13 million (Kashmir)
Area: 222,200 km² (Kashmir)
HDI: India 134; Pakistan 145 (out of 187)
GDP: India, 1,405,700 million dollars; Pakistan, 169,800 million dollars
Per capita income: India, \$1,220; Pakistan, \$1,000
Deaths due to the conflict: 47,000-70,000 people since 1989.
Actors: APHC, Hizbul Mujahideen
Facilitators: —

clashes began the same year. India laid claim to the territories controlled by the other countries, arguing that those lands had been administrated by the Maharajah of Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan laid claim to part of an area under Indian control for reasons of Muslim identity. Since then, there have been three armed confrontations (1947, 1948 and 1965), and hostilities resumed in 1971. **In July 1949, both countries signed the Karachi Agreement, which set a ceasefire line that was to be controlled by observers.** As a result, the UN created an observation mission called **UNMOGIP**. This mission is still active and has international observers on the Line of Control. At the end of the 1980s tension mounted, with the added risk of the nuclear weapons that both countries possess.

The conflict therefore has two dimensions. The first is an inter-state conflict, involving a border dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. This conflict is evident in the continuous infiltrations of Pakistani groups across the border. The other dimension is intra-state, involving the fighting waged by armed Muslim opposition groups within the Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir against India's central government. Some of these groups are fighting for the independence of a unified Kashmir, while others are fighting for this Indian state's integration into Pakistan. In 1992 the coalition All Parties Hurriyat Conference (**APHC**) was formed. The APHC demanded an internationally monitored referendum, as mentioned in the Security Council's first resolutions. Another conflict involves the dispute over control of the Punjab river basins.

Another important armed group is the **Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)**, created in 1989 and led by Sayeed Salahu-deen. This group has been on the EU's list of terrorist groups since 2005 for having perpetrated numerous attacks against India's civilian population.

Development of the peace process

India has always refused any type of international mediation; it prefers direct bilateral dialogue, is opposed to changing the territorial demarcations, and has the backing of China. In contrast, Pakistan is in favour of internationalising any peace process. Furthermore, based on the right of self-determination, it has called for a referendum to be held under the auspices of the UN, although lately it has declared that it would be willing to withdraw this demand. Likewise, the USA has performed some mediation aimed at resolving the dispute, so that the armed forces of its ally in the region – Pakistan – can focus on fighting against Al-Qaeda. The most noteworthy aspect of this conflict is the dynamic of **creating bilateral trust-building measures** and the type of process known as a **composite dialogue**. This consists of addressing all the disputes in a single process so that headway can be made on several different fronts at the same time. Even though reaching agreements is a slow process, there is usually no going back.

In 2005 the President of Pakistan stated that the conflict over control of Kashmir might be resolved through greater autonomy for the region, while the Prime Minister of India declared that creating a Kashmir without

defined borders and giving greater autonomy to the zones administered by India are measures that might help to resolve the conflict; the idea being to weaken the border demarcation in order to detract from its importance. In August 2006 the armed opposition group Hizbul Mujahideen pledged to take all the measures needed to reach a solution to the dispute in Kashmir that reflected the desires of the Kashmiri people. In December of that year, the President of Pakistan, P. Musharraf, stated that Pakistan might abandon its demands on Kashmir if India would accept its peace proposals: a gradual withdrawal of troops in the zone, self-government for Kashmiris and a joint supervision mechanism which would involve Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. India's response to this proposal was that the maps could not be redrawn; however, it claimed that it was possible to make the borders irrelevant. The coalition of independent parties of Jammu and Kashmir, APHC, asked for the armed struggle to be abandoned in order to pave the way for peace negotiations that would lead to a sustainable peace agreement. In early November 2009 the central government finally announced that it was preparing a series of political measures for the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir which were to be implemented within the next two years. These measures were the result of the efforts of the working groups set up in 2006, and they encompassed relations between the state and the central government, trust-building measures, the strengthening of relations across the Control Line (the boundary between India and Pakistan), economic development and the governability of the state.

In the second half of February 2010, both countries resumed the peace negotiations that had been formally interrupted since the attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. In late April, the Prime Ministers of both countries, Monmohan Singh of India and Yusuf Raza Gilani of Pakistan, met in Timphu, Bhutan, for the first time in nine months during a summit of south Asian countries. The agenda of the meeting was not revealed, although it was described as positive by both leaders. Likewise, an opinion survey administered by the British think tank Chatham House revealed that 44% of the people living in the part of Kashmir administered by Pakistan and 43% living in the part administered by India were in favour of independence for Kashmir. In the Kashmir valley, the heart of the armed conflict, between 74% and 95% of the people were in favour of this option. However, only 27% of the people in the Pakistani zone and 57% in the Indian zone expressed confidence that a peace process will actually solve the armed conflict. In October, Pakistan once again asked the USA to intervene in the dispute. The Foreign Minister issued this request at a three-day meeting in Washington with secretary of State, Hillary Clinton; he requested that she ask the President of the USA, Barack Obama, to exert pressure on India so that both countries could reach an agreement, taking advantage of the US President's trip to its neighbouring country scheduled for November. Several times Pakistan had called for the intervention of third countries in the conflict in order to reach an agreement, an option that India had always rejected. To date, the USA had remained on the sidelines of the affair. Likewise, the Indian government appointed a three-person team – a journalist, a civil servant and a professor – as the mediators in the crisis in which Indian Kashmir had been enmeshed since June; during this period more than 100 demonstrators had died at the hands of the security forces. The mediators were the journalist Dilip Padgaonkar, the information commissioner M. M. Ansari and the scholar Radha Kumar, and they were charged with launching peace talks with the pro-independence leaders of this Indian region. The group visited prisons and interacted with the Kashmiri people. Padgaonkar noted the need to get Pakistan involved in order to achieve a lasting solution in line with the demands of the Kashmiri separatist leaders. The Indian government decided to appoint these mediators at a meeting of the Security Council held in late September, shortly after the visit by a delegation made up of representatives of the main parties to the Kashmir Valley.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Mutual visits by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Encounters between the prime ministers

Resumption of a coach line joining the two Kashmirs and a subsequent rise in the frequency of journeys

Release of prisoners, most of them fishermen

Boost in commercial exchanges and encounters between the Secretaries of Trade

Cricket matches attended by political leaders

- Joint march of pacifists from both countries from Delhi (India) to Lahore (Pakistan)
- Meeting between the leaders of both countries at the United Nations General Assembly
- Expansion of the coach service between the two Kashmirs
- Withdrawal of troops
- Broadcast of Indian programmes on Pakistani TV
- Agreement regarding anti-terrorist cooperation
- Agreement to lower the nuclear risk
- Boost in the number of weekly flights between the two countries, the number of destinations connected to each other and the number of airlines operating
- Simplification of the paperwork needed to travel to the other country

The peace process in 2011

The team of interlocutors appointed by New Delhi made their fifth visit to the region in February. In an effort to reach the pro-independence groups, the interlocutors sent a formal invitation to the presidents of the factions of the Hurriyat Conference, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, and to the leader of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Yasin Malik, and of the People's Conference, Sajjad Lone, to join the peace talks. Until then, the interlocutors had not managed to get the pro-independence groups involved, as they labelled the meetings with the interlocutors useless. In turn, the leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Shabbir Ahmed Shah, called for a referendum to be held in the state to determine the people's aspirations. He also said that India should withdraw its troops from the occupied territory, abolish the "draconian" laws imposed by the central government, release all residents of Kashmir imprisoned illegally and bring human rights violators to justice as the prior steps to create a favourable atmosphere for resolving the conflict through negotiations. Likewise, the Indian Minister of the Interior, P. Chidambaram, visited the frontier state with Pakistan and called for an "innovative" solution when designing a roadmap that can put an end to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, **India and Pakistan resumed formal peace talks after the process was broken off in 2008** as a result of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Throughout 2010, there were encounters among senior representatives from both countries, but the announcement of the formal resumption of talks on the issues on the agenda signalled a significant step forward in the peace process. The encounter between the Pakistani Minister of the Interior, Chaudhary Zaman, and his Indian counterpart, G.K. Pillai, took place on the 28th of March in New Delhi. During the meeting, both ministers agreed to establish a direct line of contact in order to keep each other abreast of possible terrorist threats, and they laid the groundwork for a new ministerial meeting scheduled for July, at which critical issues between both countries could be addressed, such as the dispute over the region of Jammu and Kashmir and terrorism. After the meeting between the Ministers of the Interior, which lasted two days, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, invited his Pakistani counterpart, Yousuf Raza Gilani, to watch a cricket game between the two rival countries in India. In turn, Pakistan pledged to release an Indian prisoner accused of espionage who had been imprisoned for 27 years.

In April the prime ministers of the two countries attended a cricket match in which both teams played in the world cricket championship. This was the first match played by both teams on Indian soil since the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, attended on invitation from his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh. Both leaders pledged to improve relations between the two countries. The Pakistani Prime Minister invited Singh to travel to Pakistan and expressed his desire for a similar match to be held on Pakistani soil. The Pakistani government stated that the Kashmir issue was not on the agenda of this meeting. Likewise, the secretaries of trade of both governments met in a two-day meeting with the goal of extending bilateral trade. The Indian government expressed its interest in progress on trade, even if it was not accompanied by advances in other affairs, such as the Kashmir issue. The trade talks were part of the composite dialogue process between both countries that had been suspended after the attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai. Furthermore, the Indian government released 39 Pakistani prisoners and the Pakistani government released 89 Indian prisoners after the meeting held in March by the secretaries of the interior of both countries.

In June, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) announced its intention to boycott the Kashmir Committee headed by lawyer Ram Jethmalani, who early in the month had travelled to the region to talk with various groups in the zone on the Kashmir issue. The JKLF alleged that the group aspired to a political solution to the conflict and that it had always been open to dialogue, but that the decision not to meet with the committee was based on a variety of factors, including the disintegration of the Hurriyat Conference, which the JKLF attributed to the Kashmir Committee. In the meantime, India and Pakistan agreed to continue the talks on Jammu and Kashmir in a constructive way by lowering their discrepancies and using new means of trust-building. The parties agreed to call a meeting of the working group on trust-building measures across the Control Line with the purpose of recommending measures to strengthen the trade agreements and movement across the Control Line. The JKLF welcomed the dialogue between India and Pakistan, but stated that Kashmiris must be included in the dialogue process. According to its leader, Muhammad Yasin Malik, the JKLF had always been willing to talk, but he added that thus far the bilateral talks had yielded no dividends for the region of Kashmir.


Most significant events in the year

India and Pakistan resumed formal peace talks after the process was broken off in 2008.

Websites of interest

Asian Centre for Human Rights (www.achrweb.org)
Government of India (india.gov.in)
Government of Pakistan (www.pakistan.gov.pk)
Human Security Report Project (www.hsrgroup.org)
ICG (www.crisisweb.org)
Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
Kashmir Global (www.kashmirglobal.com)
Kashmir Watch (www.kashmirwatch.com)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
SATP (www.satp.org)
Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
UNMOGIP (www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unmogip/index.html)
United States Institute of Peace (www.usip.org)
Wikipedia (Kashmir conflicts) (conflicto.de/Kashmir)

Main actors in the process



Eastern Asia

CHINA (Tibet)

Context of the conflict

China has governed Tibet directly since 1920. In 1950, one year after winning the Chinese civil war, the Communist government of Mao Tse Tung invaded Tibet, and throughout the following decade it stepped up its military, cultural and demographic pressure on the region, putting down several attempted uprisings, with thousands of people dying in the process. In view of the brutality of the occupation, the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of people fled Tibet and went into exile in other countries, particularly Nepal and northern India, where the Tibetan government has its headquarters in exile. In recent decades, both the Dalai Lama and numerous human rights organisations have condemned the repression, demographic colonisation and attempts at acculturation inflicted on the Tibetan population, part of whose territory has the status of autonomous region.

Population: China: 1,347.6 million inhabitants;
Tibet: 2.7 million inhabitants
Area China: 9,635,000 km²;
Tibet: 1,228,000 km²
HDI China: 101 (out of 187)
GDP China: 4,856,200 million dollars;
Per capita income China: \$3,650;

Development of the peace process

In early May 2008 envoys from the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama, in this case represented by Lodi Gyari, met in Beijing to address management of the crisis. The Dalai Lama declared that he had noticed a degree of openness in the Chinese government and that he was optimistic about the future after hearing of the invitation to dialogue issued by the Chinese President, Hu Jintao. On a visit to the United Kingdom, the Dalai Lama declared that the government in exile was not demanding Tibet's independence, but rather a type of autonomy in which the central Chinese government could keep certain powers such as foreign affairs and defence, while the Tibetan people could take charge of issues like education, religious policy and the environment. The top Tibetan authority admitted that some sectors of Tibetan society were openly advocating independence. The Dalai Lama even expressed his willingness to attend the Beijing Olympics if a long-term solution to the Tibet issue could be reached beforehand.

In late June the Chinese government confirmed the holding of a new round of talks in Beijing with two of the Dalai Lama's special envoys (Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen). The Chinese government placed a series of conditions in order for a dialogue to be held with the Dalai Lama's special envoys this year. The conditions were that both the Dalai Lama and his followers would explicitly pledge to not boycott the Olympics, that they would adopt measures to put an end to the violent activities of the Tibetan Youth Congress and would oppose any argument or activity in favour of Tibet's independence. For its part, the Tibetan government in exile bemoaned China's lack of impetus in embarking on a substantive dialogue process. In October a new round of negotiations got under way between the Chinese government and two of the Dalai Lama's envoys, who were also the Tibetan representatives to the governments of the USA and Switzerland. This was the eighth round of negotiations since 2002, and the first after the Olympics. In parallel, for the first time the British government recognised the Chinese government's sovereignty over Tibet, although it clearly supported the Dalai Lama's calls for autonomy and the current negotiations between both parties.

In November 2008 a meeting of the Tibetan exiles was held in the northern Indian city of Dharamsala, where the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, lives. The aim of this meeting, which brought together around 500 Tibetan leaders in exile, was to review all the aspects of the current situation in Tibet with respect to China. Some of the delegates attending the meeting stated that negotiations should continue in order to achieve autonomy for the region, while others believed that this avenue had been exhausted and that they should now strive for independence. The Prime Minister in exile, Samdhong Rinpoche, stressed that if the groups meeting

in Dharamsala decided that independence was the only option, the Tibetan people could pressure China for independence. In response, the Chinese government declared that it would never consent to independence for Tibet, although it would be willing to consider allowing the Dalai Lama to return. Beijing kept accusing the Dalai Lama of having a hidden secessionist agenda and of instigating the violence in Tibet. Furthermore, it believed that the so-called “middle way” propounded by the top Tibetan leader (which consists of recognising China’s sovereignty over Tibet but advocating greater autonomy in politics, religion and culture) was ultimately a strategy to win independence in the long term. At the end of that month, the Chinese government called off the 11th EU-China summit as a sign of protest over the intention of the French President and rotating President of the EU, Nicolas Sarkozy, to meet with the Dalai Lama in Poland. In view of all of this, the Dalai Lama declared that the negotiating process was suspended until Beijing showed signs of political will.

In late February 2008, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the occupation of the region, the Chinese government published a report declaring its refusal to grant Tibet independence or high levels of autonomy, and accusing the Dalai Lama of sowing instability in the region. In late May a representative of the Dalai Lama, Kelsang Gyaltsen, declared that the Tibetan government in exile was prepared to resume talks with the Chinese government; these talks had been blocked since the previous October. Kelsang Gyaltsen once again recalled that the main demand, autonomy not secession, was in full agreement with the Chinese constitution. He also declared that encounters between groups of Chinese and Tibetan people were being held in order to improve communication and understanding between both sides. In mid-August the Dalai Lama stated that he would await signals from Beijing. Between 2002 and 2008, nine rounds of negotiations had been held between Chinese civil servants and representatives of the Dalai Lama. In mid-September a delegation from the US government met in Dharamsala (India) with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile to exchange impressions on the present and future status of Tibet. According to several sources, the Dalai Lama had made clear his intention to gain greater autonomy (but not independence) for Tibet, and expressed his desire to meet with the President of the United States, Barack Obama, on his trip to the USA in October.

In the second half of January 2010, after 15 months of mutual accusations, the government of China and the Tibetan government in exile resumed their talks. Five representatives of the Dalai Lama, led by Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, travelled to China to start the ninth round of talks. Just a few days earlier, senior officials in the Chinese government had held a specific meeting on Tibet for the first time in nine years. After this meeting, Beijing declared that it would carry on with the policies it had implemented until then. On a trip to Hungary in September, the Dalai Lama asked the Chinese government to promote some degree of political liberalisation in Tibet and warned Beijing that it could lose the trust of the international community if it did not resume talks on the future of Tibet with the Tibetan government in exile. In October, the prime minister of the Tibetan government in exile, Samdhong Rinpoche, declared that a new round of negotiations with the Chinese government might be held late in the year, the tenth since 2002. Rinpoche announced that they had not yet agreed on the date and venue of the talks and hinted that the negotiating agenda might be based on a 13-point document that the Tibetan delegation had given the Chinese authorities at the eighth round of talks. The dialogue had been on hold since January. This announcement came days before the Dalai Lama met with the senior US government official on Tibetan affairs, Maria Otero. Otero stated that her government did not support independence for Tibet, but it did encourage a consensual, peaceful solution to the conflict. Likewise, thousands of people demonstrated in the provinces of Tibet, Qinghai and Sichuan to protest the government’s attempt to implement Mandarin Chinese as the only language at schools. According to several media sources, dozens of people had been arrested.

The peace process in 2011

Lobsang Sangay was elected the new Prime Minister of the Tibetan government in exile in April after winning 55% of the votes in the elections held among the Tibetan community in exile. These elections were held after the Dalai Lama’s decision to abandon his political responsibilities. Lobsang Sangay, who was promoted

by other candidates in these elections, was born in a refugee camp in India and presided over the Tibetan Youth Congress which advocated Tibet's independence. He has lived in the USA for years, where he earned a doctorate in Law. Some voices claimed that Lobsang Sangay was in favour of going even further than the so-called "middle way" supported by the Dalai Lama (which consists of calling for genuine autonomy and giving up any claims to independence for Tibet). The figure of the Prime Minister was expected to take on more political responsibilities than what the Dalai Lama had been assigned until then. Some observers noted that the withdrawal of the Dalai Lama and the election of the new Prime Minister might lead to greater democratisation of the Tibetan government in exile. In May, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of what the Chinese government considered the peaceful liberation of Tibet (23rd of May 1951), **the central government and the government of the Autonomous Region of Tibet rejected any negotiations with the Tibetan government in exile**, yet they also declared that the Dalai Lama could return home. To commemorate the date, Beijing stated that since 1951 Tibet's economy and wellbeing had improved, that the religious beliefs and cultural practices of Tibet's minorities had been respected, and that the environment had been properly protected. Beijing also recalled that its intervention in 1951 put an end to a theocratic, feudal regime. In September, the Tibetan Parliament in exile unanimously approved the composition of the new government in exile proposed by the new Prime Minister, Lobsang Sangay. Sangay accused Beijing of a lack of headway in the negotiations, which had been interrupted in January after the ninth round of talks was held. **The new Tibetan Prime Minister declared his willingness to resume the negotiations at any time and in any place**, and he reiterated that his government's official position, known as the "middle way", consisted of claiming real and genuine autonomy for Tibet, although not independence.


Most significant events in the year

The central government and the government of the Autonomous Region of Tibet rejected any negotiations with the Tibetan government in exile.

Websites of interest

China Today (www.chinatoday.com/gov/a.htm)
 Government of the People's Republic of China (english.gov.cn) (spanish.china.org.cn)
 Government of Taiwan (www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website)
 Tibet Office in New York (www.tibetoffice.org)
 Wikipedia (Tibetan sovereignty debate)

Main actors in the process



Southeast Asia

MYANMAR /BURMA

Context of the conflict

There are two types of conflict in Myanmar: one is related to the fight for the democratisation of the country; the other is linked to the rights claimed by the different ethnic minorities. Having gained its independence in 1947, the country had a democratic government from 1948 to 1962, when General Ne Win led a coup d'état. Ne Win was in turn brought down by yet another military coup in 1988.

Myanmar has a population of 50 million people, divided into 135 ethnic groups and subgroups who practise different religions. The military regime is Buddhist. Many of the ethnic groups have their own military apparatus. The main minorities are the Shan (9%) and the Karen (7%). These ethnic groups still fight against the military junta, although less intensely than in previous decades.

Population: 48,3 million inhabitants

Area: 677,000 km²

HID: 149 of 187)

GDP:

Income per inhabitant:

Deaths due to the conflict: 15,000

Displaced population: 500,000

Armed actors: KNU, CNF

Non-armed actors: NLD (Aung San Suu Kyi)

Facilitators:

NLD: Malaysia, UN, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

KNU: Thailand

CNF: Reverend Chawn Kio, Peace and Tranquillity Committee

The **Karen** people are political organised under the **KNU** (Karen National Union) and are not involved in drug trafficking, unlike many other ethnic groups. Their military activity is via the **KNLA** (Karen National Liberation Army), created in 1947. The group has around 7,000 combatants. In 1995 the Karen reformed en masse in Thailand, with most of these being unarmed. They have stated that they are willing to completely lay down their arms if they obtain political guarantees of a future institutional framework and if they can earn revenues from gas production. The state of Karen covers 28,725 km² and has 1.1 million inhabitants. Even though the majority of Karen are Buddhists, the state also has a high number of Christians (30%) as a result of its past relationship with the British Empire. The Karen have had a ceasefire with the government in place since 2004, and it is currently the oldest conflict in the world (since 1949). The Karen are led by Naw Zipporrah Sein.

The **Shan State Army (SSA)**, created in 1964, reached a peace agreement with the government, but one of its dissidents, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), remained active in pursuing an autonomous Shan state within a federal Burma. In May 2007 the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement were suspended after an agreement could not be reached on the venue where the meeting should be held. The leader of this armed group had agreed to negotiate with the armed forces with mediation by members of the Thai military. In 2009 the government invited them to become border guards, which they accepted in April 2010. However, half of their troops (5,000), led by General Parngha, were opposed to this agreement. There is also the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which was declared a terrorist group in 2006. The SSA-S also experienced dissidence this year, and it reached a peace agreement with the government.

The **Chin** are an ethnic group consisting of more than one million people with their own language and culture divided between Myanmar and India. In India they are known as the Mizo people. The Burmese side is the home to almost half a million people, and they account for the majority of the population in the Chin state of Myanmar, which borders on India and Bangladesh and was created in 1974. The Chin were Christianised in the early 20th century, just a few years after the independent Chinland was annexed by British colonialism, and therefore the majority of the population is Baptist. They have a widespread diaspora in India, Malaysia, Canada and the United States. The military junta has persecuted the Chins, regarding them as pro-Western. Since the 1930s, the Chins have been claiming their rights to self-determination, as a continuation of their

claims to independence from Myanmar (formerly Burma) in 1948. Forty years later, in 1998, the **Chin National Front (CNF)** was created following the military junta's brutal repression of demonstrations by students calling for democracy in the country. This group, which demanded self-rule for the Chin people and the creation of a territory called Gran Mizoram, organised on the border of the Burmese region of Shin with the Indian state of Mizoram (from which they receive support) and with Bangladesh, and has around 200 military troops. The Secretary-General of the CNF is Thang Lian. Since 1989 the CBF has been part of the National Democratic Front of Burma (NDF), and since 2001 it has been a member of the United Nations' Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The Chin National Council was founded in 2006, and includes the CNF and other Chin organisations.

The production of opium in much of the country has made many of these groups turn to drug trafficking. Such groups fight among themselves and against the government. In parallel to these conflicts, the country is under an autocratic military dictatorship. In 1990, this regime adopted the name SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council). In 1997, it changed its name to the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). Since 1985 the junta has signed agreements with many armed groups. In exchange for renouncing their political and separatist demands, the junta has allowed these groups to control their lucrative activities with total impunity. In 1990 the military junta permitted elections, which were won with a majority by Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the **NLD** (National League for Democracy) and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was later arrested.

Development of the peace process

The process of democratisation and reconciliation was conducted via talks with the Nobel Prize Winner Aung San Suu Kyi and the **NLD**. The first meetings were held at the end of 2000 and were mediated by Malaysia and the United Nations. Between 2001 and 2004, a series of gestures were made by the military junta which could be called a "**diplomacy of visits**". Several political prisoners were released either before or after the periodic visits to the country by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the leaders of several countries. However, there were several periods during which the military junta did not permit such visits. In 2004 the government promoted a **National Convention** to democratise the country. However, the NLD made its participation conditional upon the release of its imprisoned members. Much of the diplomatic activity aimed at seeking a solution to the conflict has been undertaken through the **Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue**, which has its headquarters in Geneva. This organisation had had an office in the Burmese capital since 2000. However, the office was closed down by the military junta in March 2006. Worth noting is that in 2009 the Obama administration showed signs that it was in favour of engaging in direct relations with the military junta. The Assistant Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of creating a format analogous to the one used in the negotiations with North Korea, through a six-sided dialogue in which ASEAN, Japan, China and India would also take part. US representatives from the delegation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with representatives of the military junta. At the end of the year the US government stated that it was hoping for a dialogue process to get under way between the military junta and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, after the party she leads, the NLD, had published a letter from Suu Kyi to the leader of the junta, General Than Shwe, expressing her willingness to work with the government in order to put an end to the sanctions affecting the country.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is an independent organisation with its headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland) aimed at improving the responses to armed conflicts. To reach this objective, mediation takes place between the conflicting sides, and support is offered to the affected communities. The Centre is guided by humanitarian values, and its ultimate purpose is to reduce the consequences of violent conflicts, improve security and contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is led by Martin Griffiths, and has acted in countries such as Sudan, the Philippines, Myanmar, Central African Republic, Timor-Leste, Kenya, Somalia, Nepal, Burundi and Indonesia, among others.
www.hdcentre.org

As for the **KNU**, the government's first meeting with this Karen group was held in 1996, with no results. The second meeting was held in late 2003, and it ended with a verbal agreement for the cessation of hostilities. In 2007 a faction called the KNU/KNLPAC split off from the group and signed a peace agreement with the military junta. Another faction, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, reached an agreement with the military junta in 2009 in which members of the group would act as border guards on the frontier with Thailand. In April 2009 the armed opposition group KNU agreed to hold a meeting with government representatives to discuss the possibility of reaching a ceasefire agreement after representatives of the armed organisation met with the Foreign Minister of Thailand. Meanwhile, the Karen faction KNPH stated that it would become a border guard unit after reaching an agreement with the Burmese government.

In 2010, the government Myanmar sought to convert all the armed groups operating in the country into border guards so that there could be a single army when the November elections were held. In April, half of the 5,000 troops from the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) became border guards. Likewise, in March the military junta officially announced the results of the 1990 elections, and in parallel it authorised the reopening of some offices of the main democratic opposition party, the NLD. The opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, met in May with the US Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, and the head of the US's diplomatic mission in the country. In September, the Election Commission of Myanmar announced the dissolution of ten political parties for the general elections in November, including the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

In November, the party supported by the military junta won the general elections in Myanmar with 80% of the votes, while the international community labelled the process a farce. Several parties, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD, chose not to run in the elections since they deemed them a sham. Regarding the ethnic minorities in the country, which account for approximately one-third of the total population, broad swaths of the Wa, Shan and Karen minorities decided not to turn out for the election and the Election Commission took away the vote of hundreds of thousands of members of these ethnic groups by cancelling the elections in several districts in the states of Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Shan. After the elections, the Military Junta released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after seven and a half years of house arrest. The Nobel Peace Prize winner (1991), appearing before more than 5,000 followers who congregated at the headquarters of her party, the NLD, in Rangoon, was conciliatory towards the military regime, and she claimed that she held no rancour against it and instead offered the junta direct talks in order to achieve a peaceful, felicitous and quick transition. After her release, Aung San Suu Kyi asked Myanmar's Supreme Court to restore her party, the National League for Democracy, which had been abolished by the Military Junta in May of that year under the pretext that it had not registered in the elections. However, the Supreme Court rejected her demand. In December, a United Nations representative travelled to Myanmar to re-launch the multilateral body's talks with the military regime, the opposition and the ethnic minorities. The UN representative met with the Nobel Peace Prize winner at the head of the opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, at her residence in Rangoon.

The peace processes in 2011

In January the United Wa State Party (UWSP), the political wing of the armed group United Wa State Army (UWSA), decided to continue its talks with the government once it was set up. At a conference organised by the party, which the leader of the UWSA did not attend, the UWSP also announced that it would not lay down its weapons and that it would carry on with its demands for autonomy. The UWSA is the largest armed group currently in a ceasefire which has refused to join the Border Guard Force (BGF). Several armed ethnic groups that are opposed to joining the BGF, including the KIA, the SSA-N and the NMSP, formed an alliance in November to resist the pressure from the regime to join the BGF plan. Even though the UWSA is not part of this alliance, known as the National Democratic Alliance Army, it did express its willingness to cooperate with it. In February, the Burmese military junta threatened opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her party with "a tragic end" if they kept supporting the West's sanctions against the regime. Suu Kyi distanced herself from the calls in favour of suspending the sanctions issued by several opposition parties and Asian countries neighbouring Myanmar.

Suu Kyi believed that the release of all political prisoners is a sine qua non condition for abolishing the sanctions and stated, citing a report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that the sanctions had few consequences on the economy of the country and the daily lives of the Burmese. In a communiqué disseminated in the state-run press, the junta demanded that the LND retract its position and publicly apologise. The government of the USA expressed its concern over the security of the opposition leader after the junta's threats.

In April, General Than Shwe official dissolved the military junta which had been set up in 1988 through a coup d'état, after taking possession of the new "Union Government" which replaced the junta. The military junta was officially renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). However, the leaders of the military junta remained the de facto leaders of the country through the Supreme Council. In June, there was a clash in Kachin state between the armed forces and the armed opposition group KIA. This group, which is estimated to have around 7,000 members, signed a cessation of hostilities agreement with the military junta in 1994, but in recent months tensions had risen between the government and the group in the wake of the KIA's refusal to join the border security guards. The main opposition party, the LND, also asked the government to start negotiations with the KIA. This group, in turn, declared that it would not embark upon talks with the government unless the Chinese executive facilitated the talks.

In July, the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi offered to facilitate ceasefire agreements and peace processes between the government and the ethnic insurgency. Aung San Suu Kyi addressed both the government and the leaders of the armed groups KIO, KNU, NMSP and SSA and issued a call for a ceasefire. In parallel, **the coalition of ethnic groups UNFC submitted a ceasefire proposal to EU representatives** at a meeting held in Bangkok and **called upon the European organisation to facilitate a dialogue between the Burmese government and the ethnic groups.** In August, **Suu Kyi met with the President, Thein Sein, for the first time.** The opposition leader travelled to the capital, Naypidaw, to participate in a national encounter on economic development, at which she also met with other ministers. Suu Kyi, who expressed satisfaction with this first encounter, asked to meet with General Than Shwe. The official press published news and pictures on this encounter. In August, **the leaders of the UNFC formed a team to hold peace negotiations with the government with the idea that these negotiations would take place in the near future.** The UNFC stated that its claims would revolve around equal treatment for the people belonging to the different ethnic minorities, the reform of the constitution to create a genuine federal state, the end of the military offensive in the ethnic zones and a national ceasefire. The leaders of the armed groups rejected partial negotiations with each group. In mid-August, the official press reported that the government had extended an "olive branch" to the armed groups, instructing them to get in touch with the local authorities to start contacts. A delegation of religious leaders had conveyed to the armed group KNU the government's desire to hold negotiations, but the KNU rejected this offer, stating that they would only negotiate under the umbrella of the UNFC. In the meantime, the clashes between the armed forces and the Kachin armed opposition group KIA continued. The clashes were taking place in parallel to the talks that the armed group had held with the government to try to reach a ceasefire, albeit with no success. In September, the Chief Minister of the state of Mon, Ohn Myint, formed a six-person peace mission and was waiting for the Burmese government to give it permission to start peace talks with the armed opposition group NMSP. In turn, **the Parliament approved the creation of a peace committee charged with mediating with the insurgent groups.**

In October, activist opposition sectors called upon the government to release all the political prisoners just days after 200 dissidents had been released. **The military junta issued an amnesty for 6,359 prisoners,** although 2,000 opponents of the regime still remain imprisoned. In November **the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Myanmar to meet President Thein Sein.** Clinton announced some small concessions to the Burmese regime in response to advances in the democratisation process that had taken place, but demanded further advances. On the other hand, **five armed ethnic groups met government representatives and three of them reached informal ceasefire agreements** with the government. The groups taking part in the negotiations were the KIO, KNP, CNF, SSA-S and KNU. The last three reached ceasefire agreements informally with the government. At the beginning of the month Brigade 5 of the armed DKBA group reached a ceasefire agreement with the government. The brigade had split from the DKBA group when the latter agreed to become a

Border Guard body. Leaders of the Kachin armed opposition group KIO met government representatives at the Chinese border and asked the Burmese authorities to start negotiations to find a political solution to the armed conflict. Five civilian leaders met representatives of the Mon armed opposition group, the NMSP. The leaders were sent by the Mon minister head of state to discuss possible peace negotiations.

In December the government reached agreements with two armed groups. **The armed Shan group SSA-S and the government signed a ceasefire agreement**, which also contemplated guarantees for economic development, the creation of a joint working group to combat illegal drugs in the Shan state and the opening of contact offices. It was expected that the negotiations would continue in the future. Ministers Aung Min and Khin Maung Soe, acted as witnesses. Also, **the Karen Kaloph Htoo Baw armed group – previously known as Brigade 5 of the DKBA and split from that group when the latter decided to become a Border Guard entity, signed a six-point peace agreement with the government**. The agreement contemplated cooperation by the group with the government in regional development projects, and that its members and their families could undergo a rehabilitation process and both parties would work to improve the economic situation of the population of the city of Sukali. They also promised not to support the separation of the Karen state and to respect the Constitution which refers to the indivisibility of Myanmar. This group was made up of around 1,500 members. Following the signing of the peace agreement with the SSA-S, Burmese president Thein Sein formed a new negotiating team called the “union-level peace discussion group” led by the Minister Aung Min, and made up of different ministers and other high level government representatives: Soe Thein, Ohn Myint, Khin Yi, Win Tun, Maung Soe, Than Htay, Zaw Win, Soe Win and Aung Min. However, it was not clear whether this group could substitute the one led by Aung Thaung, responsible for the agreement with Kaloh Htoo Baw. On the other hand, **the peace commission headed by Minister Aung Thaung offered to start peace talks with the Kachin armed opposition group KIO** on the armed conflict and the refugees, and to discuss political questions. Previously, the government had shown willingness to discuss only the ceasefire, while the armed group had wanted to discuss political matters. The commission led by Aung Thaung had committed to finding a permanent solution to the conflict in a period of three or four years. Since June 2011, when the conflict flared up again intensely, several meetings had taken place between the government and the KIO, all of which had failed. The last of those meetings took place in December in China when the government refused to recognise the political nature of the conflict.


Most significant events in the year

The opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi offered to facilitate ceasefire agreements and peace processes between the government and the ethnic insurgency.
The leaders of the UNFC formed a team to hold peace negotiations with the government.
The Parliament approved the creation of a peace committee charged with mediating with the insurgent groups.
The military junta issued an amnesty for 6,359 prisoners.

Websites of interest

Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (www.altsean.org)
Burma Issues (www.burmaissues.org)
Burmanet News (www.burmanet.org/news)
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.dhcentre.org)
CNF (www.chinland.org)
Government (www.myanmar.com) (www.myanmar.gov.mm)
Karen National Union (www.karennationalunion.net)
PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
The Burma Project (www.soros.org/initiatives/bpsai)
The Kachim Post (www.kachimpost.com)
UNPO (www.unpo.org)

Main actors in the process



PHILIPPINES

Context of the conflict

Even though the Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, 8% of the population is Muslim. However, in recent decades, armed Muslim groups have emerged, as have communist guerrillas. Despite the two popular revolts in the last twenty years (in 1986 to bring down President F. Marcos, and in 2001, to depose President Estrada), the country is still in the hands of a landowning oligarchy with no intention of resolving the serious structural problems in the country: corruption, a lack of infrastructure, rural underdevelopment, a lack of basic services, serious human rights violations with impunity, etc. The expansion of the communist guerrillas, led by the **NPA** (the New People's Army) is linked to the system of land exploitation. The Muslim rebellion, led by the **MILF** (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front), is related to the socioeconomic discrimination against the southern population, and particularly against the people who live on the island of Mindanao and on the Sulu archipelago. This discrimination has led to regional nationalism, since two-thirds of the country's Muslims live in this region. The 1990s saw the emergence of a new radical terrorist group, **Abu Sayaf**, operating primarily in the Sulu archipelago. The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic state in the south of the country. It is accused of being in contact with Al-Qaeda and has not begun any negotiation process with the government.

Population: 94.9 million inhabitants

Area: 300,000 km²

HDI: 112 (out of 187)

GDP: 164,600 million dollars

Per capita income: \$1,790

Deaths due to the conflict: 120,000

Displaced persons: 2 million

Armed actors: NPA, MILF, MNLF, Abu Sayyaf

Facilitators: Norway, Malaysia, Libya, Church, OCI, FCD, UNPO, CDH, Arabia, Qatar

The **NPA** was formed in 1969 and is the military arm of the **Communist Party of the Philippines (the CPP)**. It is also part of the **NDF** (the National Democratic Front), which is the umbrella organisation for several groups and acts as the NPA's political arm and negotiator. The NPA has around 6,000 combatants and is led by J. M. Sison "Joma", who is exiled in the Netherlands. The NPA distanced itself from the popular revolution of 1986, which led to considerable divisions within the group. As a result, many leaders and combatants abandoned the armed struggle. The **MILF** was founded in 1978 as a result of a division in the **Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)**, which had been formed in 1969. After several years of negotiations, it reached a peace agreement with the government (the Manila Agreement). Libya initially mediated in this agreement, but it was subsequently replaced by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The agreement obtained autonomy for the southern provinces. The MILF were opposed to this 1996 agreement and demanded Mindanao's independence. The MILF has around 10,000 combatants. In October 2005 the government announced the signing of a **cessation of hostilities agreement with the armed opposition group RPM-M**, a faction that had broken away from the NPA a few years earlier and has been holding talks with the government over the last two years.

Development of the peace process

MILF

Two years after rejecting the 1996 Manila Agreements, the MILF secured Libya's support to begin negotiations with the Philippine government. However, this attempt was not successful. In 2001 the President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, offered to hold negotiations outside the country. She also suspended military operations and began talks in Malaysia under the auspices of Libya. These talks led to a ceasefire. Despite several major clashes with the armed forces, talks were resumed in Malaysia in 2003. Throughout 2004, the government of the Philippines and the MILF held exploratory meetings in Malaysia, in which a three-point initial agenda was drawn up which involved security, the rehabilitation of the conflictive areas and protection of the ancestral lands on Mindanao Island. It seemed that the MILF had given up its claims for independence, while

at the same time it demanded self-governance formulas that would provide a greater degree of autonomy in the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 2005 the MILF held a large assembly in the south of the country which was attended by more than half a million people. The assembly served as a forum for its members and sympathisers to discuss the principle challenges facing the Bangsamoro people and the strategies to be adopted in the quest for solutions. New observers from the International Monitoring Team also arrived, including military observers from Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan and Libya. One of the points of disagreement among the parties was the validation mechanism of the new political group, given that the MILF was against holding a referendum to include this community in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), as the government demanded and the constitution required.

In 2007 the MILF gave a positive response to the latest government proposal, since **Manila would have offered the Bangsamoro people the right to self-rule for the first time, although it ruled out in advance any possibility of independence**. The government would be prepared to grant them a self-government formula, except in the areas of defence, foreign affairs, currency and postage. In late July the government and the MILF declared that they would sign the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Ancestral Domain on the 5th of August in Malaysia. This had been the most controversial aspect of the negotiations in recent years. Both parties also pledged to reach a global peace agreement within the next 15 months that would include the three main points on the negotiation agenda: security, rehabilitation and development and ancient domains. Lastly, the MILF and the government also agreed that one year after the MOA was signed (August 2009) a referendum would be held in 735 communities with Muslim majorities adjacent to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and in six cities in the province of North Lanao, to decide which ones would join the future Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The same referendum would be held in another 1,459 communities, albeit at least 25 years after the signing of the definitive peace agreement. However, in early August **the Supreme Court temporarily suspended the Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral Domain just hours before the Philippine government and the MILF were ready to sign the agreement in Malaysia**. Given the outbreak of violence resulting from this decision by the Supreme Court, **at the beginning of September the government dissolved its negotiating panel, put an end to negotiations with the MILF** (after 11 years of peace process) and declared that **the new government strategy would be one of direct dialogue with the local communities**. In spite of this negative atmosphere, at the end of September both parties publicly declared that they had not abandoned the peace process either formally or definitively.

In mid-October, **the Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral Territories to be unconstitutional by eight votes to seven**, although it did state that an agreement may be renegotiated. Subsequently, the MILF announced that it did not consider the Supreme Court's ruling to be binding, and that the Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral Domain was the key document for resolving the conflict in Mindanao. At the end of that month the government of Malaysia withdrew its troops from the International Monitoring Team (IMT), the international team that had been supervising the ceasefire agreement between the government and the MILF since 2004 and whose mandate ended on 30th November. In mid-January, the former police chief and until then Deputy Director General of the National Security Council, **Avelino Razon**, was appointed as the new Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, replacing Hermogenes Esperon, who had been named chief of the Presidential Management Staff. Razon continued in the post until the end of the year, when **he was replaced by Annabelle T. Abaya**. In mid-September **the government and the MILF signed a framework agreement on forming an international group to support the negotiation process in Kuala Lumpur**. The group would be made up of governments, mainly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the EU, as well as international NGOs and eminent personalities. The main purpose of this group would be to observe the negotiations, hold visits, exchange impressions and advise the parties, seek people and organisations knowledgeable about specific aspects of the negotiating process and help the parties address substantial aspects of the negotiating agenda. In late October, **the Philippine government and the MILF signed an agreement to protect the civilian population**, which had been reached under the auspices of the Malaysian government and signed in Kuala Lumpur. The pact commits both parties to take all the measures needed to avoid the death of civilians and any negative impact on them and on civilian infrastructures or assets, as well as to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the government and the MILF agreed to extend the mandate of the International Monitoring Team, which from now on would include supervising, verifying and reporting on both parties' compliance with civilian protection. In the second half of November, the government and MILF negotiating panels, as well as representative of the NGOs and governments that were members of the International Contact Group, met in Malaysia under the facilitation of Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak. The governments that accepted the MILF's invitation included Japan, the United Kingdom and Turkey. With regard to the NGOs, The Asia Foundation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Mohammadia and Conciliation Resources had accepted the invitation.

In early February 2010, both the government and the armed opposition group MILF positively assessed the meeting between both parties in Kuala Lumpur, the first formal meeting since the Supreme Court nullified the agreement on the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro people in August 2008. The encounter was facilitated by the government of Malaysia and was aided by the International Contact Group. The government and the MILF agreed to the imminent deployment of the International Monitoring Team, including the Civilian Protection Component. Despite these agreements, several sources stated that there were still substantial differences in terms of the kind of scope of autonomy that Manila would be willing to grant. While the government was discussing a "reinforced autonomy" which would expand the Moro people's competences over the zone that currently falls within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the MILF was advocating the creation of a "Bangsamoro sub-state" which would expand the powers and scope of the ARMM. The MILF proposes that a Moro state be created (within a federal state) with high levels of self-governance. It believes that power-sharing between a Moro authority and the central government on issues like tax collecting and the control and exploitation of natural resources is insufficient. In turn, the government recognises that its proposed agreement is conditioned by the constitutional limitations and the failure of the Supreme Court, which in August 2008 called off the signing of the agreement on the ancestral lands of the Moro people at the last minute. In February, too, the government announced the start of the "Mindanaw Dialogue" programme, a series of consultations with different political, social and professional sectors in Mindanao about the current peace process between the MILF and the government. According to Manila, the goal of this programme is to take the people's opinions into consideration while also informing them about the current status of the negotiations in order to make the peace process more participatory and to avoid a repetition of what happened in August 2008, when major swaths of the population of Mindanao protested against the peace agreement between the parties. In March, a new round of negotiations between the government and the MILF ended in Kuala Lumpur without an agreement; this round was once again facilitated by the government of Malaysia.

International support for the process with the MILF

Facilitator	Malaysia
International Contact Group (ICG)	States: Japan, United Kingdom, Turkey Numerous NGOs: Muhammadiyah, Conciliation Resources, The Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
International Monitoring Team (IMT)	Coordination: Malaysia Security: Malaysia, Libya, Brunei, Norway (Qatar and Indonesia are invited) Socioeconomic assistance: Japan Civil protection: MPC, MOGOP, NPF, MinHRAC Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development: EU

In May, Senator Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino was officially proclaimed the winner of the Philippine presidential elections. In June, representatives of the Philippine government and the MILF signed an agreement to hold peace negotiations during the political transition. The meeting, which lasted two days, was held

in the capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, where the parties agreed to seek new formulas for reaching an agreement based on a fair peace and the equitable treatment of identities and rights of the Moro people, as claimed by the MILF spokesperson in the negotiation process, Mohagher Iqbal. During the talks, the parties also agreed to get Europe more involved in the peace process. In turn, the new President of the Philippines deemed achieving a peace agreement in Mindanao a top priority. Aquino met in early June with a diplomatic delegation from the EU made up of representatives from the United Kingdom, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Belgium, France and Holland. In May, the EU agreed to get actively involved in the peace process by supervising the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development tasks as part of the International Monitoring Team (IMT). Aquino also announced the appointment of Teresita Deles as the Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process. Deles had already occupied this post between 2003 and 2005, during the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The return of Deles, who is particularly active in defending women's rights in the Philippines, was hailed by several civil and social organisations in Mindanao. Likewise, the MILF and the MNLF signed a cooperation pact in which they pledged to work together on behalf of the self-determination, peace, justice and the economic development of the Moro people. The agreement, which was sponsored by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was signed in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

In September, the chief MILF negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, declared that his group had formally abandoned its request for independence for certain regions of Mindanao and had given the government a proposal to create a sub-state or autonomous republic which would hold all the competences except for foreign affairs, national defence, currency and postal service. This entity would not have an army of its own, but it would have internal security forces. Mohagher Iqbal also declared that a global peace agreement might be signed in at most two years and that should this sub-state be established, the MILF would play a prominent role in the transitional phase. In contrast, the MNLF opposed signing such an agreement as it believed that the government had to wholly comply with the 1996 peace agreement before signing a peace agreement with the MILF. The MILF rejected the government's proposals that representatives from the private sector and civil society attend the forthcoming rounds of negotiation as observers because it believed that a dialogue of this sort should be held with discretion. In October, the Norwegian government officially announced its participation in the International Monitoring Team, the body that is supervising the ceasefire agreement with the MILF and includes members from Malaysia, Libya, Brunei, Japan and the EU. The Norwegian government's participation will mainly be channelled through the Norwegian Refugee Council.

In November, both the government and the MILF aired their willingness to resume the peace talks, which had been stalled since the disagreement between the parties on allowing Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak, the facilitator of the talks since 2003, remain in place. Several times the government of the Philippines had asked for him to be replaced since it believed that he was partial to the MILF and that a facilitator should have the trust of both sides. In turn, the MILF steadfastly opposed replacing Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak as it believed that it would be counterproductive for the process and might cast doubt on the agreements that had been reached so far. Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak himself had declared that the decision on whether or not he continued serving as the facilitator was the sole responsibility of the Malaysian government. Despite the fact that both the chief of the government negotiating panel, Marvic Leonen, and the Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process, Teresita Quintos Deles, had declared that they were working to resume the talks any day, the MILF had stepped up its criticism of the government for stalling. The leader of the group declared that a peace agreement might be signed in approximately one year. Likewise, the MILF asked the international community to step up its diplomatic efforts to ensure that the peace process resumed. In this vein, the governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand publicly declared their support for the peace process after speaking with Teresita Quintos Deles. The MILF expressed its fear that new episodes of violence against the parties would occur if the International Monitoring Team (IMT), charged with supervising the ceasefire agreement, ended its mandate and withdrew in early December. The MILF believed that the on-the-ground presence of the IMT was necessary for the peace process to move forward. Between January and October 2010, only three clashes had been recorded, while during the same period in 2009 there had been 110 episodes of violence.

NPA

For its part, the NPA has been negotiating with the government through the National Democratic Front (NDF) since 1986, the year that its negotiators moved to the Netherlands. It began a ceasefire in 1987, at which time it had 25,000 combatants. In 1992 new talks with the Philippine government were held in the Netherlands, and a four-point agenda was drawn up (human rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms and disarmament). However, the illegalisation of the Communist Party of the Philippines led to divisions within the NPA. In 1993 talks took place in Hanoi, and in 1994 talks were held in the Netherlands. In 1995 the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was reached, which granted immunity to around a hundred people linked to the negotiation process. In 1997 an agenda of topics for negotiation was established. This enabled an agreement between the negotiating teams to be reached in 1998 on a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). However, this agreement was not validated by the country's President. In 2004 the government held a meeting in Oslo with NPA delegates. Both parties agreed to establish a joint committee to monitor the implementation of the human rights agreements. Since 2002, the main obstacle to the negotiations has been the fact that the NPA and the leader of the NDF are on both the US and the EU terrorist lists.

The Hague Declaration (1st of September 1992)

Formal peace negotiations should take place between the government of the Philippines and the NDF to resolve the armed conflict.

The shared objective of these negotiations should be to achieve a fair and lasting peace.

These negotiations should take place after the parties have reached tentative agreements on the substantial issues on the agenda agreed to by the reciprocal working committee which has been organised separately by the Philippine government and the NDF.

The peace negotiations should be in harmony with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice, and no preconditions should deny the inherent character and purposes of the peace negotiations.

In order to prepare for the formal peace negotiations, we agree to recommend the following:

Specific goodwill and trust-building measures should be promoted to create a climate favourable for the peace negotiations; and

The substantial agenda of the formal peace negotiations should include human rights and international humanitarian law, socioeconomic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, cessation of hostilities and disposal of forces.

A crisis arose during the exploratory process in July 2005 when the leader of the NDF (in exile in the Netherlands) announced that the group felt there was no point in continuing negotiations with a government that was in crisis and lacking in legitimacy. The NDF called for a transition government, which would not include members of the NDF, the NPA or the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). This government was to resolve five main issues: the removal of the NPA from terrorist lists, the release of political prisoners, reparations for the 10,000 victims of human rights violations committed under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, the adoption of measures to end the assassinations of political and social leaders and the negotiation of social and economic reforms. At the beginning of August, the Philippine government announced that it would suspend the immunity that had been agreed for the NDF's negotiators (on the basis of a prior agreement on security guarantees) within 30 days unless negotiations were resumed immediately. The NDF responded by postponing formal talks with the government, though it added that this did not mean it was ending the peace negotiations, as the negotiating panels and their advisers and teams would continue their work.

In mid-October 2007, the President of the Peace, Unification and Reconciliation Committee in the Philippine Senate, María Ana "Jamby" Madrigal, signed a joint declaration in the Netherlands with the NDF's negotiat-

ing panel, presided over by Luis G. Jalandoni. In the declaration, both parties pledged to make efforts to resume the negotiations that had been stalled since 2004. In May the Norwegian government sponsored and arranged a meeting in Oslo between the Philippine government and the NDF. The meeting was informational and was the first in the last three years. It was rated very positively by both sides. The government and the NDF agreed to return to talks and reactivate a joint supervisory committee for human rights and international humanitarian law after four years of inactivity. In late November the negotiating panels of the government and the NDF, led respectively by Nieves Confesor and Luis Jalandoni, met informally in Oslo under the facilitation of the Norwegian government. According to the NDF, the talks failed because the government's attempt to resume the official negotiations, which had been called off in 2004, had to be preceded by a prolonged ceasefire declaration. The NDF also accused the government of sabotaging the meeting, the third informal one since peace negotiations had been suspended, by including some points on the agenda such as the exploration of new ceasefire modes, the assumed recruitment of minors or the charging of the so-called "revolutionary tax" by the NPA, as well as the end of attacks by the armed group on mining companies and its presumed use of landmines. In early July 2009 the government and the NDF announced their intention to resume the official peace negotiations in Oslo (Norway) during the month of August. This announcement took place after the NDF pledged not to demand its withdrawal from the EU and USA terrorist lists as a precondition for dialogue at an informal meeting between both parties facilitated by Norway. In turn, the government had pledged not to link the peace talks with the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement and to remove the suspension of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), which offered immunity guarantees to 97 negotiators from the NDF, the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA.

In October 2010, the president, Benigno S. Aquino, appointed the lawyer and then-Vice Minister for Health Alexander Padilla as the new chief of the negotiating panel with the NDF. The Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process, Teresita Quintos Deles, declared that both the appointment of Padilla, a human rights activist during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, and the reshuffling of the negotiating panel revealed the government's willingness to resume talks with the NDF, the political branch of the armed opposition group NPA. Deles also expressed her gratitude to the government of Norway for accepting the role of facilitator of the talks. Padilla, in turn, expressed his hope that a peace agreement could be reached before the end of Aquino's mandate. The negotiating panel was then made up of Pablito Sanidad, Ednar Gempasaw Dayanghirang, Jurgette Honduada and Maria Lourdes Tison. On the other hand, the government of New Zealand announced the inclusion of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA on its list of international terrorist organisations. In November, the government declared that the president preferred to meet with the NDF once a peace agreement had been signed. After these declarations, the NDF stated that it was reconsidering its decision to send the head of the negotiating panel, Luis Jalandoni, and another panel member, Maria Consuelo Ledesma, to travel to Manila to meet with the government and address the resumption of the talks announced by Aquino's executive. However, the NDF had invited the new head of the negotiating panel, Alexander Padilla, to hold a meeting in Hong Kong to discuss the security guarantees that the NDF members would have in Manila. The NDF itself had stated that both leaders' visit to the Philippines was a gesture to show its support of resuming the peace talks and to express its satisfaction with the recent reshuffling of the government negotiating panel. Nonetheless, after the Philippine government's recent declarations, the vice president of the NDF's negotiating panel, Fidel Agcaoili, condemned the executive's lack of political will to move the peace process forward and criticised Manila's refusal to release more than 300 political prisoners sent to prison by the previous government. In view of the NDF's insistence on security guarantees, the Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process, Teresita Quintos Deles, declared that several of the group's leaders, including Jalandoni, Ledesma and Agcaoili, had visited the Philippines previously without having any security problems. In turn, Luis Jalandoni travelled to Australia to ask the government to support the peace process.

The heads of the government's negotiating panel, Alexander Padilla, and the NDF's panel, Luis Jalandoni, met in Hong Kong on the 1st and 2nd of December and agreed to resume exploratory talks in Oslo between the 14th and 18th of January and formal talks in Oslo as well between the 19th and 25th of February. Both parties also agreed to a ceasefire between the 16th of December and the 3rd of January, the longest in the past ten years. At this meeting, which was also attended by Pablo Sanidad (member of the government

panel) and Coni Ledesma (Jalandoni's wife and member of the NDF panel), the government offered Jalandoni and Ledesma safe conduct so they could take a private trip to the Philippines, and it recalled that the agreement on security and immunity guarantees for the NDF's negotiators had once again been in effect since July 2009. A few days after this meeting, 38 of the 43 people known as the "Morong 43" were released; the Morong 43 is group of healthcare workers accused of being NPA members. They had spent more than ten months in prison, during which numerous protests had been staged by journalistic and human rights organisations. Despite the rapprochement between the government and the NDF, the president, Benigno Aquino, declared that he would not meet with Jalandoni or other NDF representatives until a peace agreement had been signed. In this vein, Alexander Padilla declared that he hoped that a peace agreement with the NPA would be reached within the next three years.

As for the **MNLF** (which had reached a peace agreement with the government in 1996), in 2007 it reached significant agreements on the implementation of all the provisions in the 1996 agreement, which included five working groups: Sharia law and the judicial system, security forces, natural resources and economic development, the political system and representation, and education. In 2008 the government and the MNLF negotiating teams met in Istanbul (Turkey), where they declared their intention to reform the law that was supposed to have included the most important features of the 1996 peace agreement. In March 2009 the MNLF declared that it had started talks with the MILF to bring their positions into closer alignment and offer a shared solution to the conflict in Mindanao. In the previous months, the OIC, in which the MNLF has observing member status, had arranged several working meetings between representatives of the MNLF and the government in order to develop fully the contents of the 1996 agreement.

In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya, to resolve the issues that had been hindering full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996. The agreement called for the creation of a mechanism to finance development projects in the zones affected by the conflict, as well as the establishment of a structure for a tripartite process with the participation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which will supervise implementation of the 1996 peace agreement in the areas of security, governability, economic activities and the provision of social services in the zones of conflict. The agreement was signed by Camilo Miguel Montesa, Presidential Assistant for the Peace Process, and the leader of the MNLF, Nur Misuari. In August, both the MNLF and numerous organisations from civil society bemoaned the government's lack of political will to fulfil the promises made in 1996 and denounced the fact that the standard of living among the population in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was worse than it had been in 1996. In November, the government and MNLF negotiating panels met to discuss full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. The aspects dealt with at the meeting included the creation of a Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund and the supervision of the implementation of the agreement by the government, the MNLF and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which was facilitating the talks

The peace process in 2011

MILF

The government and the armed opposition group **MILF** met informally in January in Kuala Lumpur and decided to resume the peace talks in Malaysia on the 9th and 10th of February, as well as to renew the mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT, which is charged with supervising the ceasefire agreement) and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG); their mandate was to isolate criminal organisations or dissident factions of the different armed groups operating in Mindanao. In the same vein, the IMT was joined by two EU representatives that were carrying out humanitarian actions. Likewise, the government of Saudi Arabia officially announced its membership in the International Contact Group, a group of countries and NGOs that are mentoring and supervising the peace negotiations between the parties. Furthermore, both the MILF and the Presidential Office for the Peace Process were holding a series of **consultations with personalities and organisations from civil society in Mindanao in an effort to resume the**

negotiations. The government declared that it would guarantee the security of the individuals from the MILF who participated in these negotiations. At the meeting in February, the parties pledged to address the future of around 25 political prisoners from the MILF (albeit without revealing either their names or their possible release date), and they also agreed to the approximate dates of the next round of negotiations. In turn, the MILF presented a new draft proposal to resolve the conflict in Mindanao and asked the government to set up the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute, which would be charged with training the Moro youth. The MILF also stated that the government panel had expressed its intention and desire to reach a global agreement in less than one year. However, one of the developments that caused the greatest concern in the Philippine government was the **creation of a new armed group that split off from the MILF, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)**, led by the former commandant of the MILF, Ameril Umbra Kato. Kato had already played a prominent role in the spiral of violence that had taken place during the second half of 2008. According to some sources, this splinter group might have around 400 combatants. In this vein, the MILF acknowledged the seriousness of the problem, which could affect the stability and security of Mindanao and the future of the peace process, yet it also stated that it would try to get Ameril Umbra Kato to rejoin the discipline of the group. In March, both parties agreed to resume the peace negotiations in Kuala Lumpur in mid-April. The MILF announced that it had sent the government a draft global peace agreement in which it proposed the creation of a Bangsamoro state without cutting off relations with the Philippine state.

In April, the negotiating panels of the government and the armed opposition group MILF met in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) under the facilitation of the Malaysian government. After the last round of talks in February, both parties were holding consultations with different sectors in order to share the content of the negotiations and gather impressions and ideas on the future of the peace process. One of the main questions to be dealt with during this round in the talks was the split-off of a dissident faction (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, BIFF) led by the man who until then had been the commandant of the MILF, Ameril Umbra Kato. Even though the MILF reported his expulsion from the group to the government, the government expressed its concern with the consequences that the creation of this new group might have on stability in Mindanao. In this sense, the head of the government negotiating panel, Marvic Leonen, wondered who had the coercive force in the group and openly questioned the leadership of the MILF whether after signing an eventual peace agreement with the MILF new negotiations would need to be launched with the BIFF. In turn, the MILF spokesman declared that this issue (the MILF's relationship with Ameril Umbra Kato and the BIFF) would not focus the debate in the peace talks. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Presidential Office for the Peace Process celebrated the **government of Indonesia's intention to join the International Monitoring Team (IMT)** to supervise the cessation of hostilities in Mindanao, among other issues. According to the ARMM, Indonesia's participation in this body will strengthen the peace process. In the past, the government of the Philippines had participated in the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which supervised the peace agreement signed in the Indonesian region of Aceh in August 2005. This last round was already being facilitated by Tengku Dato Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, who replaced Datuk Othman bin Abdul Razak. Both parties rated the encounter as positive and expressed their optimism regarding the peace process.

The government requested clarification of some concepts on the draft global agreement proposed by the MILF, pledged to present its own draft in the upcoming weeks and expressed its willingness to modify some specific aspects of the Constitution which would facilitate a peace agreement with the MILF, although it was unwilling to countenance a wholesale or structural reform of the constitution. **One of the main concerns of the government, as expressed by the head of the government negotiating panel, Marvic Leonen, was the possible overlaps and contradictions between the peace agreement with the MILF and the peace agreement signed in 1996 between the government and the armed opposition group MNLF.** Both agreements referred to the same territory and the same people, the Moro, so he asked both groups to coordinate their requests and facilitate the interlocution with the government. The MILF also declared that the BIFF's armed capacity was quite modest and that Ameril Umbra Kato had not expressed his opposition to the peace process, and that therefore he would respect the ceasefire in place in the region. However, the

MILF believed that the role that the IMT could play in neutralising the risks entailed in Umbra Kato's armed activity was quite important. In turn, one of the members of the government negotiating panel, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, declared that the press was magnifying the importance of the split-off within the MILF and that this was leading to a loss in perspective on the importance of the peace process as a whole. In June, the government and the MILF met in Kuala Lumpur and agreed to hold another round of negotiations in early August. According to both sides, the encounter was productive. The head of the government negotiating panel, Marvic Leonen, declared that despite the difficulties inherent in any negotiation process, he hoped to reach a definitive peace agreement within one year. The government also declared that it had held more than 30 meetings with civil society organisations to report on the developments in the peace negotiations and to listen to the people's requests.

Likewise, the MILF, MNLF and several civil society groups asked the Congress to delay the elections in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which had originally been scheduled for the 8th of August, until May 2013. The groups that made this request believed that holding these elections next August would frustrate the MILF's aspirations and jeopardise the possibilities of the peace process. Overcoming the current geographic scope and authority of the ARMM was one of the MILF's main claims. Several times both the government and the MILF declared that the ARMM had been a failed formula. The Philippine government also expressed its support for delaying the elections, but the decision ultimately falls to the Congress.

In July, the MILF appointed two women as the new advisors on its negotiating panel. The first was Raissa Jajurie, a lawyer and defender of the rights of the Moro people and the indigenous peoples (the Lumads). The second was Bai Cabaybay Abubakar, a scholar who until then had presided over the Shariff Kabunsuan College in the city of Cotabato. The MILF also named Von Al Haq the new spokesperson of the group, replacing de Eid Kabalu, who was removed from the post. Al Haq had previously been at the helm of the MILF's Cessation of Hostilities Committee. In August, **the 22nd round of exploratory negotiations between the government and the MILF were held in Malaysia but ended with no agreement; at this round, the MILF rejected the government's proposed peace agreement as it deemed the agreement insufficient.** Previously, the government had rejected an MILF proposal in which it proposed creating a Moro sub-state as part of the federal Philippine state. The government's new proposal had three components: major government investments for the economic development of Mindanao; a political agreement with the MILF which included the creation of a commission (made up of the government, the MILF and different sectors from civil society) charged with supervising implementation of the agreement; and finally, recognition of the historical and cultural roots of the conflict. The MILF panel believed that this proposal contained practically nothing in common with the draft agreement presented by the MILF and warned that nor did it contain any of the agreements that had been reached at the previous rounds of negotiations. The MILF panel believed that the government's proposal could not resolve the problem of the Moro people and the armed conflict; rather it was more likely to prolong it. However, the MILF negotiating panel simply recommended to the MILF central committee, the body that determines the group's official stance, that the government's proposal be rejected. In late August, the central committee had begun to discuss the affair, but no information was provided. In turn, the government declared that given the difficulties in achieving widespread parliamentary and societal support for a constitutional reform, its proposed peace agreement was more realistic for putting an end to the violence in Mindanao. The government negotiating panel declared that its proposal contained some of the suggestions put forth during the consultations with the different political and social sectors. As an example to prove the government's sincere desire to resolve the conflict, Manila cited the meeting that the Philippine President, Benigno Aquino, and the leader of the MILF, Murad Ebrahim, held in early August in Japan. In September, both the government and the MILF expressed their desire that the arrival of the official facilitator of the peace process, the Malaysian Tengku Dato AB Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, in the Philippines would enable them to overcome the impasse in the peace talks since the last round of negotiations in late August.

On another front, the Philippine government refused to acknowledge information leaked by Wikileaks that several senior MILF members asked the government of the USA to formally become involved in the peace process in February 2010. This request, which also included the start of a parallel dialogue with the American

government, had been made in the presence of members of the US embassy, the Asian Foundation and the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies. The Wikileaks leak also noted that the US government's dialogue with the MILF dates back to 2005, that the USA was willing to give development aid to the MILF if it signed a peace agreement, and that Washington was vehemently demanding the end to any ties between the MILF and organisations regarded as terrorists by the US. The government of the Philippines stated that the USA was playing no formal role in the current negotiations and that in no way did it influence the decision-making in Manila. In October, despite the violent deeds mid-month, the government and the MILF resumed informal peace talks in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). The parties decided to wait on recommendations on the review of ceasefire mechanisms after the investigations conducted by the International Monitoring Team and other organisations in Basilan and Zamboanga Sibugay. In December formal talks resumed following a series of confrontations between the two parties which led to the death of more than 40 people and the forced displacement of thousands of others. During the round of negotiations, number 23, the head of the government panel, Marvic Leonen, urged the MILF to sign a peace agreement during the first quarter of 2012, considering the proposal of a government agreement an adequate, flexible and pragmatic framework for resolving the conflicts in Mindanao and showed his satisfaction for the security situation in Mindanao, although he demanded that the MILF identify and hand over their member operating outside the law and an agreement with an end to the hostilities between the two parties. Taking part in this round of negotiations were Yasmin Busran-Lao, founder of a women's organisation in Marawi and former consultant at the Presidential Office for the Peace Process, who formed part of the government panel, and Raissa Jajurie, a leading lawyer in Mindanao and vice-president of the Bangasmoro Women's Rights, who attended as a consultant, but not a panel member, of the MILF. This was the first time since the start of the negotiations in 1997 that the MILF had included a woman on its negotiating team.

In December the leaders of the MILF and the MNLF met in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) on the invitation and under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to try to resolve the differences between the two organisations that had emerged in recent months. According to the OIC, both parties agreed to continue and strengthen the coordination between the groups in terms of satisfying the aspirations of the Moorish population. In a communication the MILF indicated that the meeting meant a great step forward in the relationship between the two groups and in the unity of the Moorish people and stressed that the objective of the IOC was not to create a homogeneous organisation, but to establish mechanisms for consultation in aspects related to the peace process and other aspects of shared interest. The meeting was organised by the secretary general of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, and facilitated by the ambassador Sayed Kassem El-Masry, special envoy of the OIC to the Philippines.

MNLF

In February, the fourth round of tripartite negotiations between the Philippine government, the former armed opposition group **MNLF** and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) got underway in the city of Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) with the goal of addressing full implementation of the peace agreement signed in 1996. The OIC worked as a facilitator in both the signing of the agreement and the meetings held in recent years. The Secretary General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, asked the parties to negotiate with a constructive spirit based on what brings them together, not what separates them. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu also declared that in order for peace to take root in Mindanao, the government has to drive economic development, improve the distribution of wealth and solve the problem of internal displacement suffered in the region. The government negotiating panels and those from the former armed group met in April in Manila under the facilitation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to make headway in the negotiations on the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. The last three-part meeting took place in late February in Saudi Arabia. In this new round of negotiations, which was held simultaneously in the embassies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in Manila, economic issues were particularly addressed, including the division of revenues between the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and the central government. The MNLF publically aired its willingness to reach agreements that benefit the Moro people. In August, a senior com-

mander of the former armed opposition group MNLF, Habib Mujahab Hashim, warned about the dangers and problems entailed in excluding the MNLF from a peace agreement between the government and the MILF. Habib Mujahab Hashim also noted that despite the fact that he was in favour of eliminating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and eventually replacing it with another formula of autonomy, the 1996 peace agreement between the government and the MNLF could not be ignored. In recent months, there had been a growing groundswell suggesting that the MNLF participate more actively in the peace process in Mindanao.

NDF

Regarding the negotiations with the **NDF**, the political wing of the NPA, the government and NPA/NDF negotiating panels were quite positive in their assessment of the informal meeting held in Oslo in January with the mediation of the Norwegian government. At this informal meeting, both the government and the NDF had reaffirmed their commitment to end the negotiations as quickly as possible, preferably within 18 months, or if not by 2014. **The government and the NDF expressed their satisfaction with the agreements reached during the first round of formal negotiations held in Oslo between the 15th and 21st of February with facilitation by the Norwegian government.** The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the agreements signed between 1992 and 2004, they set a calendar of meetings for working groups and to sign agreements (the one on social and economic reforms for September 2011, the one on political and constitutional reforms for February 2012 and the one on the cessation of hostilities for June 2012), and they restored the joint committee on the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). As a trust-building measure, the NDF released some prisoners under the care of the armed opposition group NPA. Likewise, the government pledged to work to release, before the second round of negotiations, some or all of the 14 NDF consultants that, according to the group, were covered by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG). Both parties expressed their gratitude to the government of Norway and publicised their determination to fulfil the pledges made and to keep making headway in the next round of negotiations. In March, the head of the government negotiating panel, Alexander Padilla, declared that the government was willing to work jointly with the NDF to achieve the political and economic reforms that would improve the welfare of the people and the development of the country. Padilla also declared that the government no longer considered the NPA or the NDF as terrorist organisations, and that regardless of the correlation of forces on the battlefield, the executive's goal was to resolve the conflict through political negotiations.

In April the NDF publicised a document that listed the ten conditions that it was demanding from the government in order for it to sign a ceasefire agreement. This document had been submitted to the former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo back in 2005, but she had rejected it. In view of the unlikelihood that the government would sign this document, a difficulty acknowledged by the NDF, both parties recognised the importance of **signing a document on socioeconomic reforms for the peace process. According to what had been agreed in February, this agreement was to be signed in September 2011, while the pact on political and constitutional reforms was to be signed in February 2012, and the end of hostilities in June 2012.** In May, the government expressed its optimism regarding the peace negotiations that were being held with the NDF, the political wing of the NPA. Manila stated its intention to address the underlying causes of the conflict (which it believed to be poverty, unemployment, the instability of public services, the marginalisation of the indigenous peoples, uneven distribution of wealth and resources and environmental degradation), reported that the working groups on socioeconomic reforms would continue to seek mutually acceptable positions, and called on the people to participate and to get involved in the peace process. These working groups met in the second week of June, and they also planned to meet in the second and fourth weeks of August, before the plenary in September. In turn, the NDF asked the government to sign a document that contained the ten basic requirements for the communist movement to sign a cessation of hostilities and make headway on the peace negotiations. In June, the NDF negotiating panel suggested postponing the round of peace talks scheduled for June until the government released 17 NDF consultants who, according to the organisation, should be protected by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG). According to the NDF, the government had already pledged previously to release these people. The govern-

ment expressed its dismay with the NDF's communiqué, although it declared that it was hoping to continue to make progress in the substantive issues in the peace process. At the postponed meeting, which was going to be held in Oslo, social and economic reforms were supposed to be addressed, as well as political and constitutional reforms.

Ten-point agenda proposed by the NDF on socioeconomic reforms

Agrarian reform and rural development
National industrialisation and economic development
Bases, scope and applicability
Economic sovereignty, national heritage
People's right to work, sustenance and social services
Environmental protection, rehabilitation and compensation
Economic planning
Monetary and fiscal planning
Foreign economics and trade relations
Joint draft

In July, Senator Francis Pangilinan, President of the Agricultural, Food and Rural Development Commissions, met in Utrecht (Netherlands) with the founder of the NPA, Jose María Sison, and the head of the NDF's negotiating panel, Luis Jalandoni, to express his support for the resumption of peace talks. The talks were blocked by the government's refusal to release 17 NDF advisors whom the group believed to be protected by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees. The NDF believed that these individuals were in jail either because of their political opinion or because they had been falsely accused of crimes. The NDF and Pangilinan issued a joint communiqué in which they stated the need for formal talks and the resumption of the activities of the working groups on socioeconomic, political and constitutional reforms. In August, the government celebrated the NDF's offer of a truce and suggested that the peace talks be resumed in Oslo in September. However, by late August neither party had confirmed that a new round of talks would be held. Along these lines, several civil society organisations called upon both parties to resume the peace process. In turn, the government expressed its displeasure at the rise in the number of attacks perpetrated by the NPA, and it accused the NDF of using the negotiating table tactically to achieve the release of several of its members. To date, Manila had released three of the 17 consultants demanded by the NDF. However, the government stated that the release of these individuals was not an obligation but a trust-building measure. What is more, Manila accused the NPA of responding to the release of these three individuals with the kidnapping of four prison workers. During August, the President himself, Benigno Aquino, asked the NDF to make a gesture of sincerity and good will. The government announced the possible resumption of the peace talks in October shortly after the head of the negotiating panel, Alex Padilla, the head of the NDF's negotiating panel, Luis Jalandoni, and the Norwegian facilitator, Ture Lundh, met informally in the Philippines. In September, the government declared that it was suspending military operations with the NPA for one day to honour International Peace Day. In October, the Philippine government asked the NDF not to condition the resumption of the peace process on the release of advisors with ties to the group.

The government announced the declaration of an end to the hostilities by the NPA from 24 to 26 December and between 31 December and 2 January, although it stated that it would have preferred a longer truce. It also gave a warning about the violations of ceasefire agreements by the NPA in the past and regretted that the NPA had attacked government soldiers working in humanitarian tasks. For its part, the government declared a suspension of attacks from 16 December to the 2 January.

Most significant events in the year


One of the developments that caused the greatest concern in the Philippine government was the creation of a new armed group that split off from the MILF, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), led by the former commandant of the MILF, Ameril Umbra Kato.

According to what had been agreed in February, the agreement on socioeconomic factors was to be signed in September 2011, while the pact on political and constitutional reforms was to be signed in February 2012, and the end of hostilities was to be signed in June 2012.

Websites of interest

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org)
MILF (www.luwaran.com)
NDF (home.wanadoo.nk/ndf) (www.ndf.net/joomla) (home.casema.nl/ndf)
NPA (www.philippinerevolution.org)
OIC (www.oic-oci.org)
Presidential Office for the Peace Process (www.opapp.gov.ph)
www.mindanao.news
www.philnews.com
www.theworldpress.com/press/philippinespress.htm

Main actors in the process



EUROPE

Western Europe

SPAIN (Basque Country)

The Basques are an ancient, millennia-old people with a unique language and very specific cultural traits. The Basques lost their independence in 1200, and in the 19th century they lost certain secular rights (the *Fueros*) that gave rise to a strong national consciousness among some of their people. This sentiment in turn sparked

nationalism as the political expression of a culture that these sectors viewed as endangered, and as a reaction to the centralising nationalism of Spain. During the Franco regime, the Basque Country suffered severe political and cultural repression. This gave a further impetus to the sectors resisting the dictatorship that were in favour of self-determination, which materialised in the demands for what has been called “the right to decide”. For decades, one sector of this nationalism has also been calling for the unification of Euskal Herria, a geographic area that encompasses the three provinces in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country in Spain (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya), the Community of Navarra and three regions located inside France (Lapurdi, Bae Navarra and Zuberoa).

Population: Basque Country: 2,1 million inhabitants

Area: Basque Country: 7,059 km²

HDI Spain: 23 (out of 187)

GDP Basque Country: 68,591 million euros

Per capita income 2008: Basque Country, 31,712 euros

Deaths due to the conflict: 1,200

Armed actors: ETA

Facilitators: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Switzerland)

ETA was founded in 1959 as a dissident group of members of the Basque nationalist parties, and it committed its first deadly attack in June of 1968. In the years from then up until the March 2010 attack, it has claimed 839 lives, 527 of them civilians, and it has kidnapped 84 people. ETA or groups or individuals suspected of collaborating with it have claimed 300 victims, and it is calculated that another 2,000 have taken refuge abroad. In early 2010 there were 750 prisoners accused of belonging to ETA. ETA's demands have varied over the years, varying from calling for a wide spectrum of political, social, cultural and economic rights in the early decades to simply demanding the Basque people's “right to decide” in recent years, along with the right for their opinion to be respected by France and Spain. Part of its programme has been supported and politically expressed by a party that has had to change its name several times (Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herriarrok, AUB, Batasuna), which has traditionally garnered support in the elections from 15% of the Basque population (what is called the Abertzale Left or pro-independence left). The evolution of this political party, which was temporarily outlawed and placed on lists of terrorist groups, has been one of the fundamental factors in the process, along with the shift in position of the Socialist Party of Euskadi (the name of the country in the Basque language), the attitude of President Zapatero, the widespread social mobilisations in recent years¹ and political pressure on ETA, among other factors.

All the governments since the restoration of democracy have attempted to hold talks with the armed group. Between 1981 and 1982, negotiations were led by the Interior Minister of the government of the UCD, which allowed the 7th ETA Political Military Assembly to dissolve in September 1982 and agreed to a Social Reinsertion Plan for ETA members who laid down their weapons.

¹ Several groups and movements in favour of peace emerged in the Basque Country in the 1990s (Elkarri, Gesto por la Paz, etc.), which have played a very important role in creating an atmosphere of mobilisation and of developing proposals.

In view of the constant attacks waged by the remaining ETA members, between 1986 and 1987 the Socialist government launched a series of contacts in Algiers with the ETA leaders “Txomin” and “Antxon” via the Secretary of State of Security and a government delegate, among others. Around 30 ETA members had taken refuge in this country, fleeing from political persecution in Spain and France. However, the so-called “Algeria Talks” did not officially begin until January 1989, after ETA declared a three-month truce. These talks ended without results in early April, after the government refused to honour ETA’s demands to move several of its members imprisoned in France to Algeria and to start talks between the government and the Abertzale Left. Apparently a huge demonstration against violence and terrorism in Bilbao also had a negative influence. Despite the rupture, in 1990 the government continued to explore the possibility of resuming the negotiations with “Antxon”, to no avail, until in April 1991 the government announced that it would negotiate with ETA in Sweden if it could hold a two-month truce.

Stages in the peace process

In recent years, and particular since 1997, several events have taken place both inside and outside the Basque Country which have had a considerable influence on creating the conditions favouring the start of a negotiation process. These events can be grouped into the following seven stages :

STAGES IN THE LATEST PROCESS

July 1997 to August 1998	The Irish influence
September 1998 to November 1999	Frustrated truce
December 1999 to December 2001	Return to violence and contradictions
January 2002 to May 2003	First encounters and quest for new scenarios
June 2003 to March 2006	Change of government and pre-negotiation phase
March to December 2006	Permanent ETA ceasefire, negotiation and quest for sweeping consensus
Since January 2007	Rupture of the ceasefire by ETA. Period of reflection and overall reconsideration

The first stage was marked by ETA’s murder of Councillor Miguel Ángel Blanco in 1997, which caused a huge uproar in the entire country and a profound rejection of the Basque pro-independence left, which was then further isolated. Between this date and ETA’s ceasefire in September 1998, other events also characterised the political juncture, such as the **Peace Plan put forth by the Lehendakari (the President of the Basque Country) Ardanza**, and particularly the Good Friday Agreement in Ireland reached in April 1998, which became a major benchmark for a broad swathe of Basque nationalists. Shortly thereafter, the Basque nationalists grouped together, along with other social sectors and trade unions, under the banner of the “Lizarra Declaration”. However, the non-nationalist political groups (the Socialist Party of Euskadi and the People’s Party) did not participate in this initiative . This declaration was the prelude to the second stage in the process, which started in September with ETA’s announcement of a truce.

The truce, which lasted 14 months, created a highly favourable climate for the Abertzale Left (Herri Batasuna) to win more votes in the regional elections held during that period. This was the result of the climate of hope and expectation at the time. In December of the same year, the government of the People’s Party started its first rapprochements with ETA, which culminated in a meeting held in Zurich in May 1999 with the intermediation of Bishop Juan M. Uriarte. At this meeting, Ricardo Martí Fluxá, Francisco Javier Zarzalejos and Pedro Arriola participated on behalf of the government, while Mikel Albizu “Antza”, Vicente Goikoetxea and Belén

González “Carmen” participated on behalf of ETA. During this period, the government transferred several ETA prisoners imprisoned far from the Basque Country to jails closer to home.

The end of the truce meant a return to the attacks. Some of these had major repercussions (such as the murders of Socialist politicians Fernando Buesa and Ernest Lluch), and led to the signing of the Anti-Terrorist Pact in December 2000 between the two most important political parties (the Socialists and the People’s Party), with a clear anti-nationalist undertone. The attacks in New York on the 11th of September 2001 also reinforced the struggle against any kind of terrorist group, which obviously included ETA. At this stage, not only was there frustration at the failed truce, but some of the first movements in the Abertzale Left were also forged. Thus after the 9/11 attacks, Batasuna started using a new discourse (new only in nuances) in its communiqués. Its leader, O. Otegi, wrote a public letter to President J.M. Aznar (September 2000) and the first secret contacts were held between leaders of the PSE (Jesús Eguiguren) and Batasuna (Arnaldo Otegi). In May 2001 Euskal Herriarrok suffered a serious setback in the elections, clearly showing the pro-independence supporters’ exhaustion with ETA’s violence and the limits that this placed on conducting political activities. The contradictions were serious enough to make palpable the boundaries of the violent strategy, the impossibility of its coexisting alongside the new global terrorism, and the gradual conviction that a dialogue with the other side had to be started.²

From 2002 until May 2003 a new stage emerged in the encounters, proposals and quest for more realistic scenarios. In January 2002 Batasuna published a document entitled “A Scenario of Peace”, in which for the first time they aired concepts such as earning the support of the entire population. The contents of this document included an invitation to all the political parties to renounce expressly any political project of their own, and recognised the existence of different feelings of national belonging. Shortly thereafter, the Socialist leader Gemma Zabaleta published a book with Denis Itxaso entitled “With the Left Hand”, in which they advocated opening a dialogue with Batasuna. This was therefore a decisive stage in constructing the process, with the acceptance of the concepts of inclusion, the quest for sweeping consensus and diversity, and constant calls for dialogue with the other party. This was the situation when **Lehendakari Ibarretxe launched his ill-fated proposal for a “free association” with Spain, a proposal that failed** because it was not inclusive enough. However, in March 2003 Batasuna was outlawed, and this group’s parliamentarian, Josu Urrutiakoetxea “Ternera”, who had been the leader of ETA back when ETA was conducting numerous deadly attacks, fled several weeks later for fear of being arrested. Despite all these setbacks, in April 2003 the Abertzale Left (which was then identified by a new abbreviation AUB), published a document containing “ten points for reflection”. Among these suggestions were: no longer excluding anybody, opening up a plural process and eliminating all expressions of violence. At that time, nobody knew that ETA’s deadly attack in May of the same year would be the last one the organisation would commit until December 2006. Thus a new tacit truce got under way, accompanied by a long period of almost three years (from June 2003 until March 2006) characterised by the quest for convergences, the acceptance of a popular consultation and the search for external points of reference that could serve as a model for achieving peace. This was also a period when the Socialist Party of Euskadi (PSE) took sweeping initiatives, such as the “Más Estatuto” (calling for a reform of the Charter of Self-Government which would mention cross-border cooperation and the possibilities of exploring all the potential of the Basque Charter of Self-Government in the absence of violence), and the declarations by Socialist leader J. Eguiguren in late 2003,³ in which he did not discard the possibility of holding a referendum, of taking inspiration from the models of Ireland or Quebec, or

² The Escola de Cultura de Pau was able to witness directly the need to break the lack of communication with the Basque political groups after the end of the 1998 truce. Between 2000 and 2003, the Escola conducted a confidential exercise that entailed ascertaining the opinions of all the Basque parliamentary groups, showing that despite ETA’s violence and the lack of political communication, there were enough points in common to start a process of convergence, such as the one that got under way in 2005. On pages 76 and 77 of the book “Peace Processes and Negotiation of Armed Conflicts” by Vicenç Fisas (Paidós, 2004), there is a table entitled “The Basque Basket”, which is actually a summary of the agreements reached in this exercise.

³ The book by Socialist Jesús Eguiguren entitled “Una vía vasca para la paz” (A Basque Way for Peace) was apparently influential in the informal contacts between people from the PSE and Batasuna; this book suggested creating two committees to resolve the conflict.

of talking about new political frameworks. Apparently the ETA leaders decided to give up violence in late 2003, six months after the group's last murder.

Around that time, a delegation from Batasuna travelled to South Africa to hold the first of several meetings with a centre specialised in training people to negotiate in a peace process.⁴ It was as these avenues were being explored that an attack was perpetrated in Madrid by Islamists with close ties to Al-Qaeda (11th of March 2004), which led to a conviction that no more deaths could be accepted nor justified. This was shared not only by Batasuna's voters but also most likely by ETA itself. Days after this attack, general elections were held and the government changed. With the PSOE's arrival to power, **the government of J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero pledged from the start to resolve the Basque conflict during its legislature**, which encouraged ETA to send a letter in August asking for dialogue. A few months later, in April, as a result of the arrangements of Bishop J.M. Uriarte,⁵ Pope Benedict XVI issued words of support for the process in Saint Peter's Square, stressing the important role that the Church has always played in attempting a peace process.⁶ In late 2004 the contacts held in recent years between PSE leaders and Batasuna in the quest for a "roadmap" that they could agree upon took shape in the so-called "Anoeta Declaration", in which the Batasuna leader, A. Otegi, publicly issued the proposal to create two separate committees: one with the government and ETA and another with all the political forces.

The methodology of the two committees proposed by Batasuna in November 2004

- 1 One committee in which the government and ETA would meet to talk exclusively about the status and future of ETA prisoners and the laying down of weapons.
- 2 Another committee in which all the political groups interested could sit down and talk in order to lay the groundwork for the political solution to the conflict.

The process in recent years

In May 2005, **the President of the government, J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero, set forth his peace proposal in a plenary session of the Spanish Parliament, thus formalising the process that had been exploratory until then.** Later, representatives of the Spanish government met over the summer and in November with the former ETA leader Josu Urrutikoetxea "Ternera"⁷ in Oslo and Switzerland, launching an exploratory pathway that **allowed ETA to declare a permanent ceasefire on the 24th of March 2006. Nevertheless,** it was subsequently seen that in the months prior to this declaration ETA had seriously rearmed and had the logistical conditions in place needed to commit an attack. At the exploratory meetings, it was agreed that the negotiating scheme would be as follows: previous contacts, pre-dialogue – truce – agreements – implementation of the agreements, and normalisation in the Basque Country.⁸

⁴ According to the El País newspaper, on the 11th of December 2005 (P.13), the South African advisor to Batasuna was Brian Currin, a lawyer specialising in conflict resolution who participated in the processes in South Africa, Northern Ireland and other countries. In an interview conducted by El País, he stated the need to encourage the legalisation of Batasuna, to deal with the issue of prisoners, to protect the Batasuna negotiators from lawsuits, to allow this group to express itself and to reach the point where Batasuna and the government could take steps together.

⁵ Bishop Uriarte had already participated in the encounter between the government of J.M. Aznar and ETA held in Vevey (Switzerland) in May 1999, accompanied by a social pastoral delegate from the Bishopric of Bilbao, J. Segura, who was later able to maintain the contacts with ETA and Batasuna, in the company of the Irish priest Alec Reid, who moved to the Basque Country in 2000 (El País, 22nd of October 2006, pp. 18-19).

⁶ It has been pointed out several times that Cardinal Etchegaray, a French Basque, might serve as the notary between the Spanish government and ETA, should both parties reach a definitive agreement.

⁷ According to some media sources (El Diario Vasco, 15th of January 2007), "Josu Ternera" attended the earliest negotiations as the "interlocutor" but not as the "ETA leader"; at these talks leading up to the ceasefire it was agreed to create a commission which would meet every time a crisis arose - something that apparently never materialised.

⁸ Fernando Jáuregui and Manuel Ángel Menéndez, "El Zapatero", Península, 2010, p. 109.

Encounters between government and ETA representatives

Date	Venue	Subjects
June 2005	Geneva	Exploratory meeting
November 2005	Oslo	Exploratory meeting
December 2005	Geneva	Exploratory meeting
February 2006	(Geneva)	Possible agreement on pledges and guarantees
March 2006	—	ETA declaration of a “permanent ceasefire”
June 2006	Switzerland	Focused on setting up the Committee of Parties; facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
September 2006	Switzerland	Sense of crisis, with international observers
October 2006	Geneva	Mutual recriminations about non-compliance with what had been previously agreed
December 2006	Oslo	This was supposed to be the first official meeting, but the process was already blocked. ETA made an overall political proposal (inclusion of Navarre, the right to self-determination, a process lasting several years, etc.). ⁹

Another significant development came in July 2005, when the IRA permanently gave up its armed struggle. After the IRA's disarmament, the British prime minister Tony Blair, who had always supported the process launched by J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero, sent a report to the Spanish prime minister at the latter's request in which he advised keeping a channel of communication set aside for ETA, achieving a public commitment from ETA regarding its cessation and not unduly accelerating the release of prisoners from this group¹⁰

In June 2006 Zapatero announced that the government would begin direct talks with ETA in order to put an end to the violence, and later in the month he held a press conference in the Spanish parliament to inform the media about this decision, stating that he would pay no political price for peace. He admitted that the process would be “long, tough and difficult”, and that the state security forces had verified ETA's inactivity. The dialogue would be held with the technical support of the Henry Dunant Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. In his address, the prime minister mentioned that the government would respect the decisions taken freely by Basque citizens abiding by legal procedures, and he advocated achieving the maximum consensus possible. According to some sources,¹¹ the government and ETA had come to an agreement in February 2006, with commitments and guarantees of the process to be pursued. In this sense, the Swiss facilitators from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue held the minutes of contacts between the government and ETA in late 2005 and early 2006, without providing a copy to the parties, in order to prevent the agreements from becoming a form of pressure.¹² Also worth noting is that during the entire process started by the government in 2005, it was constantly criticised by the main opposition party, the People's Party, which was against any dialogue with ETA, despite the fact that when it was governing it had maintained contacts with ETA between 1998 and 1999. One of the issues that the People's Party (PP) took advantage of in its obstructionist attitude towards any movement by the government was precisely the possibility that ETA and the government had agreed to some kind of commitment prior to the ceasefire declaration by ETA.

⁹ Gara, 21st of January 2007.

¹⁰ El País, 1st of October 2006, p. 23.

¹¹ Gara, 10th of July 2006.

¹² El Diario Vasco, 7th of November 2006.

What is called the “exploratory phase” in any peace process, in which the parties try to reach mutual commitments on security and feasibility regarding what they should do to give rise to formal negotiations later, was interpreted by the PP as a “betrayal” and as “paying a political price”. The information that circulated later about these prior agreements included the government’s pledge to reduce police pressure and arrests of the pro-independence left (something that the judicial power refused to agree to, with the result that the arrests and trials continued). ETA, in turn, kept rearming. As a result, both parties were later able to make a long list of instances of non-compliance, enough to place the entire process in jeopardy.

Speech by the Prime Minister of the Spanish government, 29-6-2006

In his speech, the Prime Minister of the government made the following statements, among others:

The government will initiate a dialogue with ETA while upholding the non-negotiable principle that **political issues can only be resolved with the legitimate representatives** of the people’s will.

The government will respect the decisions that Basque citizens take freely, as long as they respect the legal norms and procedures, democratic methods and citizens’ rights and freedoms, and in the absence of any kind of violence or coercion.

The agreements between the different political groups in Euskadi must be reached with the **maximum consensus possible**, respecting the political plurality of Euskadi and with equal opportunities for all groups.

I understand that the political parties and the social, economic and trade union bodies must **adopt agreements for this peaceful pact of coexistence by whatever methods of dialogue they deem appropriate**, and of course by employing democratic means to transfer these agreements to the different institutional spheres.

Roadmap suggested by the government in mid- 2006¹³

June	Informing Parliament about the start of direct talks
July	First official meeting between the PSE and Batasuna Invitation for Batasuna to adhere to the Law on Parties
August-October	Batasuna asks to be legalised (probably under another name) Prisoners are brought closer to home, and other penitentiary measures
No date	Setup of the Committee of Parties, once the Abertzale Left is legalised

As might be expected, the formation of the Committee of Parties resulted in difficulties, since it was a mechanism designed to advance the political discussion of the process. Between September and November 2006, 12 meetings were held in the Loyola sanctuary between the PNV, the PSE and Batasuna in what was called the “Loyola process”, which ended when Batasuna demanded that Navarre be included as part of Euskadi. A few months after ETA’s permanent ceasefire, and once the government had verified that ETA had not made any suspicious moves over this period, the government surprisingly took no initiatives to build trust, such as gradually moving the ETA prisoners closer to home,¹⁴ releasing ETA prisoners suffering from serious illness or reforming the Law on Parties, among other possibilities. This inactivity, excessive caution or different way of viewing the timeline gradually created an overall feeling of mistrust, which was further aggravated by the extreme opposition of the People’s Party, the main opposition group, to any movement on the part of the government, as well as the rising demands for Batasuna to only be allowed to participate in the committee once it was legalised.

¹³ El País, 18th of June 2006, p. 20.

¹⁴ According to some media sources, by mid-2006 the government was planning to move the first prisoners closer to home in February 2007.

On another front, once the first direct dialogue committee between ETA and the government had got under way, on the 6th of July 2006 a first meeting was held between a delegation from the Socialist Party of Euskadi (PSE) and Batasuna, with the approval of the High Court. In the middle of the same month, the PSE set forth its proposal to launch the “dialogue committee”, the multi-party forum where the Basque political parties could debate the process of political normalisation. The key points in this PSE “roadmap” were Batasuna’s participation once it was legalised, the imposition of no preconditions, the quest for sweeping consensus and the postponement of any political agreement until ETA had been dissolved.

“Roadmap” suggested by the PSE for the Dialogue Committee or Forum¹⁵

The multi-party platform is an instrument for initiating dialogue, and **is being set up because not all the political forces needed are represented in the parliamentary institutions.**

The requirements for launching the forum are: cessation of any kind of coercion or violence or support for them, and a **focus on exclusively peaceful, democratic methods.**

One of the indispensable conditions for participating in the forum is for the **parties to be legal.** Batasuna will have to comply with the Law on Parties.

Nobody will be allowed to put forth partisan claims as a prior condition for the dialogue.

In time, **the forum of parties will join the parliamentary institutions**, which is where the agreements will be implemented.

The forum aims to achieve consensus on all agreements. Should consensus not be reached, the decisions will be taken by weighted voting, but **no agreement will be possible without the support of the two major political currents.**

The forum will not be conditioned by the course of the talks between ETA and the government. **Political agreements will not be reached inside the forum until ETA announces its dissolution.**

Batasuna, in turn, stepped up its demands¹⁶ and insisted on its aim for Navarre to participate in the Committee of Parties. It also expressed the need for an international mediator which could act as an outside witness of any agreements that might be reached within the committee.¹⁷ However, the disagreements on the conditions for starting the dialogue in this committee kept delaying its launch, unleashing a crisis that only served to heighten the tension among the political parties. These developments also contaminated the initial idea that the government-ETA talks should not be conditioned by how the second committee, the Committee of Parties, was faring, since ETA decided to delay dialogue with the government in order to force the Committee of Parties to be formed. Moreover, in a communiqué in August 2006 ETA warned the parties that they were immersed in a clear crisis, blaming the PSOE and the PNV for constructing a process tailored to their own interests and needs. In view of this impasse, several bridge-building initiatives were proffered, such as that by the women belonging to **Ahotsak**, a collective made up of women from all the parties except the PP, whose founding manifesto was later revived by Lehendakari Ibarretxe on the 22nd of September in the debate on the overall policy held in the plenary session of the Basque Parliament. In this debate, Lehendakari Ibarretxe proposed six measures aimed at making headway in setting up the committee:

1. Shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral dialogue.
2. Reaching a prior agreement on shared ethical and democratic minimums.

¹⁵ El País, 17th of July 2006, p. 19.

¹⁶ According to El Diario Vasco on the 15th of January 2007, Batasuna proposed that an eventual permanent cooperation organisation between the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the Chartered Community of Navarre should have legislative powers, and that within two years of its creation a new draft National Charter of Autonomy should be drawn up for both autonomous communities.

¹⁷ In October 2006, several international political luminaries signed the “Declaration of Six” supporting the process. The signatories were M. Soares, F. Cossiga, G. Adams, K. Motlanthe, C. Cárdenas and A. Pérez Esquivel. Meanwhile, the government received the backing of Javier Solana, the Council of Europe, the White House, the UN and the Vatican.

3. Establishing the principles contained in the Ahotsak manifesto as a point of departure for the prior agreement.
4. Creating a working group made up of members of all the parties which should agree to the committee's methodology.
5. Legalising Batasuna, with the government providing legal guarantees to this group.
6. Applying the principles of non-exclusion.

The Lehendakari also encouraged the creation of municipal forums for public participation, and the opening of an interactive and direct communication channel using the new technologies, and he encouraged the economic and social stakeholders to submit proposals to the Committee of Parties. Several days later, on the 8th of October 2006, a Norwegian television station reported that ETA and the government were meeting in a city near Oslo. This was neither confirmed nor denied by the Norwegian government, while the Spanish Interior Minister, A. Pérez Rubalcaba, limited himself to saying that the information was not "truthful". Prior to this, ETA and the government had met in September with international observers in an exploratory fashion to prepare the rules of play and the future dialogue. They agreed to aspects of the procedure such as the number of representatives from each party (three) and the number of observers (four). The interlocutors agreed to meet again in Switzerland in October to prepare for a formal meeting in November, which however was not held until December. This meeting was not exploratory but official,¹⁸ although it apparently made no headway. The October meeting focused on ETA's recent theft of pistols, and the repercussions of this deed on the process.

On another front, and with the near future in mind, in the last few months of the year several initiatives emerged aimed at preparing for the difficult stage of reconciliation. The Basque Church created several working groups to design a "roadmap" for the "pre-reconciliation" stage, with projects to "disarm memory". The Basque Franciscans, meanwhile, supported the creation of the Baketik Peace Centre, an initiative aimed at training 1,000 people in reconciliation.

The crisis experienced in the second half of 2006 was largely due not only to the failure to create the Committee of Parties formally (despite the fact that in the autumn there were frequent informal contacts between Batasuna, the PSE and the PNV with the intention of holding a political conference which would start the activities of the Committee of Parties), but also the renewed outbreak of street violence, several ETA actions and stagings (theft of weapons, appearance of two armed men wearing hoods at a commemorative event) and the lack of understanding on the sequential order of the measures that each party was supposed to take (the government, Batasuna, political parties and ETA), the repressive attitude of the courts towards Batasuna and the possible conditions that the parties might want to place on each other. The PSE therefore demanded that Batasuna first earn legal status before being able to participate in the Committee, a condition that was rejected by Batasuna, since it believed that its members would not be guaranteed freedom should it be legalised under another name. As a result, it asked for the Law on Parties to be abolished.¹⁹ The PSE also demanded the dissolution of ETA as a condition for bringing prisoners closer to the Basque Country. Batasuna also demanded that before the Committee of Parties could be set up, a "pre-agreement" or "basic agreement" should be reached which would state the political nature of the negotiations and would address self-determination and territorial issues. The parties did not consider conducting the simultaneous actions agreed to in advance, at least not in public - something which might have helped unblock the situation.

Another reason for delay was the debate on how to take decisions on reviewing the legal framework by means of a cross-party consensus. To this end the parties studied several formulas aimed at overcom-

¹⁸ El País, 24th of December 2006, pp. 17-18.

¹⁹ Regarding these fears about Batasuna, on the 12th of October President Zapatero stated that "the legal system cannot bear an irreconcilable contradiction" and that "there are mechanisms in the justice system to ensure that this contradiction does not exist". However, the current Law on Parties contains several paragraphs in Articles 2 (1), 5 (6), 9 (3c), 12 (1b) and 13 (DA 2nd 4) that prevent people who have represented Batasuna and other illegal organisations from running as candidates or forming new political groups. This meant that Batasuna had no chance of becoming legalised unless the government amended this law.

ing the stalemate, including the studies performed in the past by the Egino Committee and promoted by Elkarri.²⁰ Finally, several of ETA's actions or declarations gave rise to the feeling that their ceasefire was associated with achieving certain political goals, something which should actually be the sole and exclusive responsibility of the Committee of Parties. This was interpreted by several sectors as a warning that the process pursued until then was not yielding results and that it did not dovetail with ETA's predictions about how the process was faring. Despite all this, in mid-December, yet another two-day meeting was held between representatives of the government and ETA, which focused more than anything on non-compliance with previous agreements and on the crisis in which the process was enmeshed. In November 2006, via its spokesperson A. Otegi, Batasuna stated that there were major difficulties in defining, outlining and guaranteeing the mechanisms that would ensure that the process would resolve the points of conflict, namely territorial issues and self-determination,²¹ two concepts that the rest of the parties did not want to discuss, or at least they were not the initial points to be addressed in the discussion in the Committee of Parties.

The sensation that the problems were only intensifying was confirmed on the 30th of December, precisely one day after the Prime Minister had stated his conviction in the Spanish Parliament that the process would fare better in 2007 than it had in 2006. That day however, without any prior notification or warning about the end of the "permanent ceasefire", **ETA exploded a powerful bomb in the car park of an airport in Madrid, killing two people and destroying the car park. This placed the process in a terminal phase and put an end to any credibility that any future pledges from ETA might have.**²² The government officially announced the rupture in the negotiations, and the political parties began a debate on whether or not communication should be maintained with Batasuna, which at first limited itself to expressing regret for the deeds and announced forthcoming initiatives on its part to resume the process. Many of the political forces stated that all dialogue with ETA should be cut off until the organisation gave up violence and announced its dissolution.

Ten days after the Madrid attack, **ETA issued a communiqué stating that the ceasefire declared in March remained valid for them**, but adding that "its decisions and responses will depend on the attitudes of the Spanish government", and that "as long as the situation of aggression against Euskal Herria continues, ETA is also steadfastly determined to respond in kind". These clarifications made the notion of reaching a "permanent ceasefire" meaningless inasmuch as this meant not perpetrating attacks or acts of intimidation through violence. After the attack, several personalities, including the President of the Basque Nationalist Party, J. Jon Imaz, stated that the ambiguity of the term "permanent ceasefire" should be replaced by a commitment from ETA to an "irreversible ceasefire". One day before the communiqué, Batasuna held a press conference in which its leader, A. Otegi, asked ETA to "keep the commitments of its permanent ceasefire declaration from the 22nd of March intact". This was the first time Batasuna has made a clear request of this kind to ETA. However, the majority of the political players stated that the step taken by Batasuna was not enough. A. Otegi also pledged to continue to ensure that the political dialogue would take place in the absence of any kind of violence, and he asked the government to reiterate its willingness to talk and its commitment to multilateral dialogue publicly. In parallel, the Collective of Basque Political Prisoners stated that starting in January they would launch a process to fight in favour of self determination and amnesty.

It is however worth noting that in mid-January 2007, Prime Minister J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero promised firm policing without ultimately giving up a dialogued outcome if ETA abandoned its weapons. He also stated that the recently made declarations by A. Otegi and Rafa Diez (Secretary General of the LAB union and one of the most influential members of the Abertzale Left) in a more positive tone than in the past should not go un-

²⁰ Elkarri was a social movement that promoted dialogue initiatives in the Basque Country for many years. In 2006, it transferred this responsibility to the new initiative called Lokarri.

²¹ Gara, 19th of November 2006.

²² Analysts like John Carlin (El País, 21st of January 2007), recalled that the IRA committed large-scale attacks (like the one in London in February 1996, after it had complied with 17 months of truce) with the goal of earning more respect from London, not putting an end to the process. We cannot discard the possibility that ETA perpetrated the attack in Madrid acting on these same premises.

noticed. Otegi, for example, stated that “the process should take place in a very specific climate in which all violence must disappear”,²³ although a few days earlier he had also clarified that “the Abertzale Left still aims for a model of political talks with political contents in order to resolve the conflict effectively by getting at its roots, defining whether or not we are a nation, what its territory is, how this territory is articulated and whether or not we have the right to decide.”²⁴ In turn, R. Díez stated that “now is the time for all the leaders of all the those concerned, ETA, the government and parties, to eliminate all the factors of ambiguity when spearheading a new peace process and a political solution to the conflict”, adding that “there can be no process with bombs, nor can there be one with laws on exceptions”.²⁵ In February 2007, ETA sent a letter to President Zapatero stressing the need to resume contacts. The government had a negotiator who met alone with ETA three times, in March, April and May 2007, in which Sinn Féin – which co-participated in the Northern Irish government – joined the group of referees accepted by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.²⁶ Two meetings were held in May near Geneva: a meeting of the “political committee” between Batasuna and the PSE, and another meeting of the “technical committee” between ETA and the government.

In the days following the Madrid attack, both the press and political circles **speculated on the possibility of serious divergences within ETA**, and even conjectured whether, around August 2006, the leadership of this organisation had cut back the authority of José Urrutikoetxea “Ternera” to negotiate, while reinforcing the more militaristic sector, which the press stated had been led by Garikoitz Aspiazu “Txeroki” since late 2003.²⁷ This would mean that for months there had been upheaval within the organisation between groups that advocated dialogue and proponents of keeping up the offensive actions. This contest was finally won by the latter faction.

The path of the pro-independence left to nonviolence

Elections were held for the Basque Parliament in 2008 and in these the Basque Socialists (PSE-EE) won the most votes for the first time, with 38.09%. This enabled a new government to be ushered in, led by Patxi López with the support of the People’s Party (PP). This new government set out to normalise Basque political life, a strategy in which the Abertzale Left had no place and was subjected to a policy of “zero tolerance” regarding any expression or justification of violence.

With the need to conduct politics in the institutions, and with an eye on the municipal elections in 2011, the Abertzale Left followed a maturing process towards the disavowal of violence, with initiatives that harked back to the methodology used by Northern Ireland in the past. Thus, in November 2009 (one month after the leader of Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi, was imprisoned for trying to rebuild this political group), the Alsasua Proposal was approved, an initiative sub-titled “A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left”. This proposal contained seven points: a) the popular will expressed via peaceful, democratic means is the sole reference in the democratic solution process; 2) the resulting legal-political system must be the consequence of the popular will at all times; 3) the agreements must respect and regulate the recognised rights; 4) inclusive political dialogue and equal conditions are the main tools; 5) the dialogue among political forces must be aimed at reaching a resolute political agreement which must be endorsed by citizens; 6) the democratic process must take place in the total absence of violence and without interference (South Africa and Ireland as examples); and 7) a dialogue process and multiparty process must be initiated which should be governed by Senator Mitchell’s principles; and a negotiation process between ETA and Spain must begin that discusses the country’s demilitarisation, the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles and fair, equitable treatment of all the victims of the conflict.

²³ El Diario Vasco, 17th of January 2007.

²⁴ Gara, 14th of January 2007.

²⁵ Gara, 17th of January 2007.

²⁶ Fernando Jáuregui and Miguel Ángel Menéndez, op.cit, pp. 201 and 208.

²⁷ El País, 21st of January 2007.

A month and a half later, ETA published a communiqué in which it stated that “the pro-independence left has spoken and its words are ETA’s”, which could be interpreted as a tacit declaration of a truce in that any possible attack might lead to a condemnation of the Abertzale Left. In fact, as a result of an unplanned incident in France in which a police officer died, ETA placed the pro-independence left in an awkward position, forcing it to react any way it could when faced with the risk of losing its credibility at a time when it was discussing a document of extreme importance for its future. This document, which put an end to a months-long debate, was published in February 2010. Six of its essential points are: 1) there is a critical mass needed to guide the democratic process properly by political means; 2) a democratic process must be articulated based on negotiation, political agreement and grassroots participation; 3) the conditions for carrying out this process properly must be constructed, without interference, injustice or violence; 4) the mass struggle, institutional struggle and ideological struggle, the modification in the correlation of forces and the quest for international support will be the only instruments in the democratic process; 5) the democratic process must take place in the total absence of violence and without interference, and the dialogue and negotiation among the political forces must be governed by Senator Mitchell’s principles; no one may use force or threaten to use it in an effort to influence the course or outcome of the multiparty negotiations, or try to modify the agreement that arises from these negotiations; and 6) in the future, the Abertzale Left should have its own legal political party for political-institutional intervention, as well as for participating in the committee of political parties where the final political agreement is reached.

Shortly thereafter, in late March, the so-called “Brussels Declaration” was made public. It was signed by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, Desmond Tutu, Frederick W. De Klerk, Mary Robinson, John Hume, Albert Reynolds, Jonathan Powell, Betty Williams and other personalities, and welcomed and praised the steps proposed and the Abertzale Left’s new public commitment to exclusively political and democratic means and the total absence of violence to achieve its political objectives. The declaration included an appeal to ETA “to support this commitment by declaring a permanent, totally verifiable ceasefire”. This appeal to ETA was endorsed on the 24th of April in a new document, the “Pamplona Declaration”, in which the Abertzale Left not only insisted that the activity had to be exclusively political and that its reference was the Anoeta model (direct ETA-government dialogue and committee of parties), it also stated that “experience shows that the scheme of disagreements which has revolved around repressive action by the state and the resumption of armed actions by ETA has done anything but unblock the talks; rather all it has done is block them even further, leading the parties to adopt positions that are further from a solution and closer to a scenario of break-down. This situation must be overcome, and to this end Senator Mitchell’s principles become the framework of reference enabling all the obstacles to be effectively overcome.”

Therefore, in mid-2010, when the Abertzale Left reached a historic agreement with Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) with the strategic goal of struggling to create a Basque state through peaceful means, and with the benchmark scheme of “peace by political participation”, ETA was left in the awkward position of either having to lay the groundwork for its own dissolution in the short term, or to declare a long-term truce, although the former is the only scenario which would make full inclusion of the Abertzale Left into political life possible with the approval of the Spanish government.

On the 5th of September 2010 ETA finally published a communiqué in which it stated that “several months ago we took the decision to conduct no armed offensive actions” and appealed to the international community “to take part in constructing a lasting, fair and democratic solution”. The communiqué, which was somewhat ambiguous, frustrated the expectations sparked days earlier that the truce might be permanent. However, it also opened up a new period of hope in which the Abertzale Left would take centre stage.

Two weeks after its declaration confirming the cessation of offensive operations, ETA issued a new communiqué, this time addressed to the international community in general and to the signatories of the Brussels Declaration in particular, in which it stated its willingness to analyse the steps needed for a democratic solution to the Basque conflict together, “including the commitments that ETA must make”. The armed organisation expressed its respect and gratitude for the signatories of the text presented in March requesting that ETA em-

bark on a permanent, verifiable ceasefire, and asked the Spanish government to provide a proper response to it. In the same vein, ETA then stated that in order for the conflict to be “permanently” resolved, “the solution must inevitably be firm, be built around multilateral commitments and take place through dialogue and negotiation”. ETA considered international contributions “very important”. Along the same lines, it issued an appeal to international agents and institutions “to promote and participate in the organisation of a democratic process that provides a permanent, fair and democratic solution to a centuries-old political conflict”.

In late September, international mediators once again demanded that the terrorist organisation declare “a unilateral, verifiable and permanent ceasefire”, thus reiterating what it had already expressed in the Brussels Declaration issued in late March: the need for ETA to somehow certify its unequivocal desire to abandon violence. This request was also put forth in Gernika by around 30 Basque political and union organisations led by Batasuna, Aralar and EA. Through a note signed by the South African attorney Brian Currin, the mediators warned ETA that the conditions expressed six months ago remained in place and that the communiqués and interview of the terrorist leaders published in Gara were not enough. Two representatives of ETA upheld the organisation’s desire to “go further” than the cessation of offensive activities “if the right conditions were in place”, although they first asked for the legalisation of Batasuna. The international collective expressed its intention to continue to work in favour of peace in Euskadi, the name of the Basque Country in the Basque language. In this sense, they announced that “in consultation with several interested parties”, they decided to set up a “five-person” commission to take decisions “rapidly and efficiently”. It would be called the International Contact Group. The mediators were thus trying to overcome “the logistical difficulties” posed by working with such a large number of individuals and associations, including four Nobel Peace Prize winners.

In October, in an interview published in the newspaper El País, the leader of the left “abertzale”, Arnaldo Otegi stated that they did not view resorting to armed violence as compatible with the pro-independence strategy, and that ETA’s decision to suspend its armed struggle neither should nor could be subjected to political agreements. Days later, the left “abertzale” appealed to ETA for a unilateral, unconditional cessation of violence, asking the terrorist group to take this step without demanding pre-conditions from the government, either political or penitentiary, unlike in previous truces. It grounded this appeal on the development of the Mitchell Principles – which include unilateral disarmament – as contained in its 2009 Alsasua Declaration and approved by its bases in the subsequent assembly process. The left “abertzale” conveyed to ETA that the future of its struggle lay exclusively in strengthening its pro-sovereignty political movement which, in its opinion, might gain a majority in Basque society in the long term. It trusted that ETA would take this step, which would initially translate into a permanent, verifiable ceasefire with the intention of becoming permanent, as called for in the Gernika agreement signed in September with Eusko Alkartasuna and Aralar.

In early December, a civil platform to support the peace process was founded, called the Movement for Civil Rights in Euskal Herria. Its goal was to get all of Basque society involved in the momentum of a peace process that would lead to a permanent end to the violence and to political normalisation. In its founding manifesto, it requested that ETA announce a unilateral, permanent and verifiable ceasefire as a sign of its intention to permanently lay down its weapons. In the meantime, ETA consulted with its bases and prisoners to sound out an end to the violence before issuing a new communiqué. In early January 2011, Batasuna demanded ETA to proclaim a unilateral ceasefire as an expression of goodwill for a definitive abandonment of violence instead of confining to a declaration of a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, as the mediator Brian Currin and four South African Irish Nobel Peace prizes had previously asked ETA in March. On Mar. 8, ETA issued a statement in which he declared a “permanent and overall ceasefire, which can be verified by the international community.” For ETA, this was their commitment to a final settlement and the end of the armed conflict, a solution that would, in their opinion, be reached through a “democratic process with the Basque people’s will as a main point of reference and dialogue and negotiation as tools”. With this statement, thus, ETA did not yet announce its self-dissolution but silenced the arms on a permanent basis to let Basque political and social agents be in charge of making agreements to reach a consensus on the formulation of the

recognition of the Basque Country and their right to decide. Throughout 2011 we will see if the pro-independence left has the opportunity to play a political role in the institutions and, thereby, advance on a process that may lead to lasting peace.

2011: The end of ETA's armed struggle

ETA's abandonment of its armed struggle is mainly due to two reasons: the effective police harassment which had decimated the organisation, with almost all its members in prison, and the conversion to non-violence of the leaders of what had been considered the organisation's political wing, Batasuna, which was illegalised several years ago. Even though the transition has been the outcome of a gradual maturation which lasted an entire decade, in recent years a series of events has precipitated things, until ETA itself realised the folly of its armed actions, which at some point became an obstacle to the pro-independence left (or Abertzale Left). Instead, it needed to be represented in the political institutions in order to make headway on its project of sovereignty. What follows below is an account of the events of 2011, the year when peace was finally achieved in a PEACE FOR POLITICS process.

In early January, Batasuna called on ETA to declare a unilateral ceasefire as an expression of its desire to permanently abandon violence instead of limiting itself to declaring a permanent, verifiable ceasefire as the South African mediator Brian Currin and four Irish and South African Nobel Peace Prize winners had asked it to in March. On the 8th of the same month, ETA released a communiqué in which it declared a "permanent, general ceasefire which can be verified by the international community". To ETA, this was its commitment to the process of finding a definitive solution and to the end of the armed conflict, a solution which in its opinion would come through a "democratic process which reflects the will of the Basque people as the utmost referent, and dialogue and negotiation as instruments". Therefore, with this communiqué, ETA was not yet announcing its dissolution, but it did want to silence its weapons permanently in order to let the Basque political and social agents be the ones in charge of reaching agreements on how to formulate the recognition of Euskal Herria and its right to decide.

In early February, the Abertzale Left presented a new party, called "Sortu" (which means 'to be born' or 'to emerge'). Its promoters stated that the cycle of armed struggle had come to an end. Its bylaws stipulated that "the new party will operate based on a rejection of violence as an instrument of political action or as a method to achieve political objectives, regardless of their origin and nature, a rejection which openly and directly includes the organisation ETA as the active perpetrator of behaviours that violate people's fundamental rights and liberties." According to its promoters, the party pledges to "overcome the consequences of all violence and terrorism on behalf of peace, justice and reconciliation of Basque society", as well as "recognition and reparation of all the victims stemming from the multiple violence that has taken place among our people in recent decades". Just a few days later, the names of the five members of the International Contact Group charged with verifying ETA's ceasefire were released: Silvia Casale, a British criminologist; Pierre Hazan, a Swiss jurist born in Egypt; Raymond Kendall, a British former secretary general of Interpol; Baroness Nuala O'Loan, the former ombudsman of the police of Northern Ireland; and Alberto Spektorowski, an Israeli political scientist. Its goals included encouraging trust-building measures such as overcoming the special measures that restricted political activity and adapting the penitentiary police to the new political situation. In March, ETA suggested an informal verification of the truce in view of the state's refusal to accept formal verification. The ETA communiqué was publicised on the days when the Supreme Court decided not to allow Sortu to become legal. Later, the Abertzale Left decided to run in the municipal elections with the election brand of "Bildu", which was contested by the public prosecutor's office and rejected by the Supreme Court, although it was finally approved by the Constitutional Court. Before that, ETA had told Basque business leaders that it would no longer engage in economic extortion.

In May the International Contact Group asked President Zapatero to help in the verification of the ETA ceasefire in order to "facilitate the dismantlement of weapons" and to show some flexibility with the strict security


measures, in allusion to the approach of ETA prisoners. In its opinion, Euskadi was facing the historical chance to put an end to the last political conflict in Europe. In the meantime, Bildu became the second most important political force in the municipal elections in the Basque Country, showing the impetus of the pro-independence opposition. In July, ETA issued a communiqué in which it stated that “having total conviction that a scenario of peace and freedom can be constructed in Euskal Herria, ETA wants to reaffirm its willingness to further pursue this pathway”. In this vein, ETA issued a call to all the stakeholders “to get involved in favour of the resolution and to open up areas for dialogue and negotiation”, which could be interpreted as an offer to negotiate with the government.

In September, the National Court condemned the pro-independence leaders Arnaldo Otegi and Rafa Díez to ten years of prison after they had been accused of recomposing Batasuna, when they themselves had been the main instigators of the Abertzale Left’s conversion into a peaceful movement. Days later, the ETA prisoners signed the Gernika Pact which asked for an end to the violence. They also demanded amnesty. In October, ETA issued a communiqué expressing its agreement to work with the International Verification Commission. In the middle of the month, an international peace conference was held in Donostia, organised by the pacifist movement Lokarri, with the presence of the former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan. At this conference, a five-point document was approved, with the first point being a call to ETA to make a public declaration of its definitive cessation of armed activity and a request for dialogue with the governments of Spain and France in order to exclusively discuss the consequences of the conflict, that is, the issue of prisoners and the handover of weapons. Neither the PSOE nor the PP attended the conference. The following morning, top representatives of the Abertzale Left, including the leaders of Batasuna, adhered to the conclusions of the conference, meaning that for the first time the pro-independence left was asking ETA to cease its armed activities permanently.

On the 20th of October, **ETA finally published a communiqué in which it announced the definitive cessation of its armed activities** and issued a call to the governments of France and Spain to open up a direct dialogue process with the goal of resolving the consequences of the conflict, namely the status of prisoners and the handover of weapons. ETA took the decision to lay down its weapons immediately after seeing the excellent electoral results of Bildu, the latest political expression of the Abertzale Left. In the absence of violence, it has always been successful in elections, while the electorate punished it if there had been attacks by ETA. The lesson is clear: the pro-independence aspirations could only win through a boost in the number of voters who followed Abertzale principles, and this could only take place in the absence of violence. In this way, ETA had no choice but to reconsider its existence. Political realism and the abandonment of the armed struggle won out after 46 years of life and 829 deaths.

The unique Basque process has left a lesson for other peace processes. A group’s armed struggle can cease to exist if there is a political group that shares its aspirations and has enough societal backing to earn institutional representation. To attain this, the state must allow this political expression to exist and provide security for its members. In short, political activity wins out over the logic of armed violence.

Main actors in the process



South Eastern Europe

CYPRUS

Context of the conflict

Colonised by many different cultures throughout its history, the island of Cyprus (9,250 sq. km - not much larger than the Spanish Basque Country) came under British administrative authority in 1878. The first revolts in favour of union with Greece took place in 1931, and in the 1950s they were led by archbishop Makarios. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 with Makarios as president (a post he held until 1973, three years before his death) and a constitution that strove to balance the interests of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island. Enforcement of the constitution however encountered several setbacks, leading to a series of institutional crises, especially at the end of 1963, which culminated in a meeting of the UN Security Council in the wake of Greece's complaints about Turkey's aggression. As a result, in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up, with 2,400 troops at first and 930 currently. This force is entrusted with performing the functions of good offices and creating trust-building measures. From the start, these forces laid down 180 km long ceasefire lines spanning the island, as well as a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the clashing forces. This zone has been the site for meetings between the two communities as well as monthly meetings by representatives of political parties organised by the Slovakian embassy.

Population: 1,1 million inhabitants
Area: 9,250 km²
HID: 31 of 187
GDP: 23,603 million dollars
Income per inhabitant: \$29,619
Facilitators: UN

In July 1974 a coup d'état was staged by Greek-Cypriots and Greeks in favour of union with Greece, which was followed by occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. Since then the island has remained divided into two homogeneous communities. In August 1974 a ceasefire came into effect. Throughout almost all these years, Turkey has kept a contingent of 30,000 soldiers in the occupied zone on the island. In addition, the United Kingdom keeps two military bases under British sovereignty on the island. In 2004 Cyprus (as an island) became a member of the European Union, although enforcement of the bulk of EU laws was suspended for the northern part of the island.

Development of the peace process

The Cypriots have spent the last 30 years negotiating an agreement that would end the division of the island, often through initiatives promoted by different UN Secretary Generals. Between 1977 and 1979, both communities discussed bicomunal, bizonal and federal formulas, none of them successfully. The first attempt came from Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who in 1997 managed to get both leaders of the communities at that time, Makarios and Denktash, to sign the High Level Agreement of 1977, which stated that a future resolution to the conflict would have to be based on a federation of two states and two communities, that is, a bizonal and bicomunal formula. Makarios died just a few months later. This agreement was revised two years later in a direct meeting between leaders of both communities, but they could not reach agreement on several points and the negotiations came to a deadlock.

In the 1990s, possibilities of a federation and confederation were once again discussed, although an agreement was never reached on the proportion in which each community should participate in the institutions. In light of the stalemate, in 1992 the new UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, presented another plan, once again based on the principles of creating a bizonal and bicomunal territory, which irritated the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash yet again. As a result, Boutros-Ghali decided to change tack, and he shifted to proposing a milder strategy based on trust-building measures which would include a reduction in troops and fewer restrictions on people's interactions. In November and December

2001 new direct talks were held under the auspices of the UN after a four-year hiatus. In November the UN Secretary General suggested that a confederate state with two cantons and a joint government be created. This was to become the definitive UN Peace Plan, and has been revised on three occasions. The latest version was released in February 2003, with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as the guarantors. The plan was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leader, but it was backed by the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdogan.

Nevertheless, in July 2006, after holding a meeting sponsored by the UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders agreed to begin a process of technical negotiations on issues that affect the everyday lives of citizens of both communities, and simultaneously tackle substantial issues with the purpose of reaching a comprehensive agreement on the future of the island. They also agreed to a list of principles, including the commitment to achieving unification of Cyprus based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation, as well as political equality, as recommended in the UN Security Council's resolutions. In mid-October, the Greek-Cypriot president, Tassos Papadopoulos, presented the UN with a new eight-point proposal aimed at accelerating implementation of the July 2006 agreements, which would include substantial participation by civil society with the purpose of ensuring that the process was closer to the people and monitored democratically. It also included both military and non-military measures to build trust between the two communities. In late June, the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat respectively, expressed their agreement in principle with a single sovereignty, common citizenship and the international character of the future federation which would resolve the prolonged division of the island and be made up of two constituent states, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot. At the beginning of July, after another meeting of both leaders, it was agreed that the solution chosen in the negotiation process would later be subjected to a separate, simultaneous referendum among both communities. On a visit to Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot President, Demetris Christofias, stated that the proposed solution to the conflict, based on a bizonal and bicomunal federation, would lead to a single federal state with a single sovereignty as well as a single international identity and nationality.

"The Elders"

The Elders is an independent group of renowned world leaders who work along with Nelson Mandela individually and exert their collective influence and experience to support peace processes, help in humanitarian causes and promote essential considerations for humanity. The initiative was launched in 2007 after a conversation between entrepreneur Richard Branson and musician Peter Gabriel. The group, whose members currently include Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi Annan, Ela Braht, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando H. Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson and Desmond Tutu, along with Aung San Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela as honorary members, has facilitated in Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan on women's equality and other human rights issues. The working team is coordinated by Mabel van Oranje.

Web: www.theelders.org

In mid-August 2009, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader concluded the first phase of the direct negotiations to resolve the conflict on the island. This first phase included 40 encounters, which were positively rated by both parties as well as by the United Nations, the facilitator of the process. The direct talks, which began on the 3rd of September 2008, included discussions on six chapters: governability and power-sharing, EU-related issues, security and guarantees, territory, property and economic affairs, and the drafting of the issues agreed to and in dispute. In mid-September, the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot leader embarked on the second phase of direct talks to resolve the conflict on the island with a new meeting under UN mediation. According to the UN Secretary-General Special Adviser for Cyprus, the parties discussed issues related to the election of a President and Vice President of the future unified republic.

In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya, to resolve the issues that had been hindering full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996. The agreement called for the creation of a mechanism to finance development projects in the zones affected by the conflict, as well as the establishment of a structure for a tripartite process with the participation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which will supervise implementation of the 1996 peace agreement in the areas of security, governability, economic activities and the provision of social services in the zones of conflict. The agreement was signed by Camilo Miguel Montesa, Presidential Assistant for the Peace Process, and the leader of the MNLF, Nur Misuari. In August, both the MNLF and numerous organisations from civil society bemoaned the government's lack of political will to fulfil the promises made in 1996 and denounced the fact that the standard of living among the population in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was worse than it had been in 1996. In November, the government and MNLF negotiating panels met to discuss full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. The aspects dealt with at the meeting included the creation of a Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund and the supervision of the implementation of the agreement by the government, the MNLF and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which was facilitating the talks

The peace process in 2011

The leaders of both communities met in late January for the first time since the trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. At the meeting, which was held in mid-February, the leaders addressed matters regarding the EU and economic issues. The next meeting was scheduled to discuss governability and power-sharing, as well as the EU and property. Regarding property, UN property experts travelled to the island to hold separate meetings with both parties. In early February, the Turkish-Cypriot leader announced that the meetings at the level of both leaders would be held every week, while their envoys would meet twice a week. In July, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that **the leaders of both communities on the island had accepted his proposal to strengthen the role of the UN in the peace talks**, and he stressed that both parties were expected to achieve convergence on the key matters still dividing them by October. According to Ban Ki-moon, since the trilateral meeting held in January, the headway had been slow and no rapprochement had been achieved on key issues. The parties acknowledged the importance of stepping up the negotiations and making inroads on these issues. Ban Ki-moon hoped to be able to present a positive report to the Security Council after the next trilateral meeting scheduled for October, which would ease the way towards an international conference and the signing of a final agreement to reunify the island. Likewise, the Turkish-Cypriot entity on the island began to provide electricity to the Greek-Cypriot side as a humanitarian measure after the explosion of a Greek-Cypriot military base in early July. According to the top Turkish-Cypriot Chief of Energy, Sunat Akin, they also expected that sharing electricity and water would help to strengthen the headway towards peace. In relation to water, Akin stated that his government was willing to share water with the Greek-Cypriot side once a project to transport water from Turkey to the Turkish-Cypriot territory was completed in 2014. In August, the leaders of both communities decided to hold an intensive round of meetings until the 21st of October, which would be followed by a new trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. This intensive round would include 19 meetings and was supposed to lead the parties to achieve convergence on key issues in order to reverse the loss in momentum and disagreements in recent months. However, in September tensions rose between the Greek-Cypriot government and Turkey on the drilling for gas in the Mediterranean Sea. This drilling had initially been started by the Greek-Cypriots, upon which Turkey answered by starting its own explorations.

In October, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, favourably assessed the trilateral meetings held over the course of two days with the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, and the Greek-Cypriot leader, Dmitris Christofias. According to Ban Ki-moon, the talks were positive, productive and vigorous, which gave him confidence that a final agreement could be reached. **The Secretary General called for a new summit in January, which would be followed by an international multilateral conference** at which the guarantor countries, including Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey should be present. Ban Ki-moon asked the parties to step up their efforts in the intervening months.

Most significant events in the year


The leaders of both communities on the island had accepted his proposal to strengthen the role of the UN in the peace talks.

The Secretary General called for a new summit in January, which would be followed by an international multilateral conference.

Websites of interest

UN Security Council (www.un.org)
Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
UN Peace Plan (www.cyprus-un-plan.org)
UNFICYP (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficy)
www.cyprus-conflict.net
Wikipedia (Cyprus dispute)

Main actors in the process



KOSOVO / KOSOVA

Context of the conflict

A former Ottoman possession, from the 14th to early 20th century, Kosovo was re-conquered by the Serbs in 1913 as it regarded this land as the cradle of the Serbian nation. The Serbs colonised the region for several years, while the Kosovar elite emigrated to Turkey. In 1945, Tito founded the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which was made up of six republics, one of them Serbia, which in turn had two autonomous provinces, one of which was Kosovo (or Kosove in Albanian). Kosovo was mainly populated by

Population: 2 million
Area: 10,900 km²
HDI: +/- 70
GDP Serbia: 43,900 million dollars;
Per capita income Serbia: \$6,000
Deaths due to the conflict: 13,400
Armed actors: none currently
Facilitators: UN (UNMIK, SGSE), OSCE, NATO (KFOR), Troika (USA, Russia, EU), EULEX

Albanian Muslims. Two-thirds of the Albanian people living in the former Yugoslavia reside in Kosovo, a small territory measuring 10,900 km² that has higher unemployment rates and is considerably more economically backward than the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1966 the local population withstood systematic political repression, until in 1968 Tito allowed an autonomous university in the Albanian language to be created in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. This measure was followed by other decisions that expanded the rights of the Albanian population. In 1981 there were serious clashes between the Albanian and Serbian communities, which were the harbingers of the harsh conflict that was to emerge years later. In 1990, as a reaction to the surge of nationalism in several Yugoslav republics, Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomous status, dissolved the parliament and the Albanian government, and undertook a process of repression in the region. This only served to further spur several republics to distance themselves from Serbia, which in turn gave rise to a series of armed conflicts starting in 1991, first with Slovenia, and later with Croatia and Bosnia. These conflicts came to an end with the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, after numerous resolutions by the UN Security Council and military intervention by NATO.

In 1991 the clandestine authorities of Kosovo organised a referendum, and virtually the entire population voted in favour of sovereignty. The following year, clandestine elections were held in which Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was proclaimed President of Kosovo. Thus began a non-violent strategy of confrontation with Serbia and the creation of parallel structures. Serbia's reaction was to militarise the region by sending 20,000 soldiers and police officers there, in addition to the ultra-nationalistic paramilitary forces that inspired terror among the Albanian populace. In 1997, shortly after the 1995 Dayton Agreements, which did not mention Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) emerged, with broad support from the Albanian Diaspora (around 400,000 people) living in Switzerland, Germany and the United States, and with rearguard bases in northern Albania. The goal of the UCK was to achieve independence for Kosovo. In 1998, when the UCK controlled around 40% of Kosovar territory, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic launched a major military operation in Kosovo in which over 1,500 people died and many people were forced to become refugees (around 800,000) and were displaced from their homes (500,000). This Serbian operation was followed by a NATO military action that led to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops, Albanian attacks on Serb civilians, and the deployment of NATO troops.

Development of the peace process

Several rounds of negotiations were begun in 2006 between the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo to debate the status of the latter province. The Serbian president, Boris Tadic, proposed autonomous status for the province and a 20-year period to determine its ultimate status, and he upheld the right of Serbians living in Kosovo to form mono-ethnic towns. July witnessed the first meeting in which the heads of Serbia and Kosovo held the first direct talks since June 1999. In late September, the Serbian parliament unanimously

approved a new constitution that claimed sovereignty over Kosovo, thus reinforcing Serbia's rejection of the option of independence as a solution to the status of Kosovo. During the first few days of January 2007, the United Nations Special Envoy for the process of the future status of Kosovo presented his proposal for the final status of the countries to the Contact Group, before this was passed to the Security Council for discussion in April. The plan, regarded as a type of independence under international supervision, provides for Kosovo having its own constitutions and state symbols (flag, anthem) as well as its own army, albeit only with light weapons, and the authority to sign international agreements. The proposal also calls for a decentralised regime with sweeping powers for the local administration and the creation of new municipalities, as well as the possibility for special relations between Serbia and the municipalities with a Serbian majority in Kosovo and special protection for the sites of Serbian cultural and religious heritage. One of the main aspects is the emphasis on the guarantee of minority rights and human rights in general, with the goal of constructing a multiethnic, democratic Kosovo. Martti Ahtisaari's proposal was initially rejected by Serbia and supported by Kosovo and the EU.

In November 2007 the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), won the parliamentary elections held in the region, during which votes were also cast for local authorities and mayors. The PDK, led by the former commander of the armed group UCK, Hashim Thaci, won 34% of the votes, compared to the 28% it had earned in 2004. Thaci stated that Kosovo would declare its independence immediately. In mid-February 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved the proclamation of independence of what until then had been a province of Serbia. In early April the Kosovar Parliament approved the new constitution which stated that Kosovo was a secular, democratic, parliamentary republic, and that it regarded Kosovo as a sovereign, indivisible state. In June the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, publicised his plan to reconfigure UNMIK, so that the EU's EULEX mission would remain under the auspices of the UN and its Special Representative. The plan also adopted a neutral position with regard to Kosovo's status, and it outlined the UN's intention to open dialogue with Serbia in six areas: police, justice, border controls, Serbia's heritage, transport and infrastructures, and customs. The EU would gradually take over the operational responsibilities in the areas of police, justice and customs throughout all of Kosovo. The UN's functions would be cut back and might include (along with others that have yet to be defined) supervising and drawing up reports, facilitating agreements for Kosovo to gradually align itself with international agreements, and facilitating talks between Belgrade and Pristina. In early October the UN General Assembly approved the Serbian government's proposal to ask the International Criminal Court for its opinion on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. In April 2009 the President of Kosovo, Fatmir Sedjii, stated that he had asked the UN to end its mission in the country, as he believed that its presence was no longer necessary more than one year after the declaration of independence. In mid-September, the EU mission EULEX and the Serbian Police (MUP) signed a cooperation protocol which would include the exchange of information on organised crime and better control of the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia.

The International Court of Justice, the UN's legal body, declared in a non-binding statement in August 2010 that Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 did not violate either international law or the UN Security Council's Resolution 1244. The Court responded with this ruling, approved with ten votes in favour and four against, to the question asked by the General Assembly at the request of Serbia. According to the ruling, general international law did not stipulate prohibitions on declarations of independence, nor did Resolution 1244. The Court also denied that the declaration of independence violated the provisional constitutional framework of Kosovo, since according to the judges it was not binding for the authors of the independence. However, the ruling did not judge whether or not the right to succession had been violated. In September, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution that asked for dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and that recognised the International Court of Justice's non-binding decision. The UN also offered to participate in the organisation of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo. In November, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, celebrated the forthcoming opening of talks between Serbia and Kosovo and expressed his approval of the UE's willingness to facilitate the process. The Secretary General believed that the degree of agreement and understanding between Serbia and the EU was positive, which made possible approval of the

latest UN General Assembly resolution on Kosovo, in which the International Court of Justice's non-binding ruling was recognised.

The peace process in 2011

The government of Serbia stated in January that it was ready to start talks with Kosovo without any prerequisites or prepared solutions. The Serbian government stated that its posture was constructive and that it had no taboos. Furthermore, it stated that the partition of Kosovo was not part of their negotiating position, but that they were awaiting Kosovo's position. The head of the Serbian negotiating team, Borko Stefanovic, confirmed that the talks would focus primarily on daily issues which are important for the people, but that the issue of Kosovo's status would also be addressed. In February, the Parliament of Kosovo approved the new government led once again by the re-elected Prime Minister Hashim Thaci. The executive would be a coalition headed by the PDK and Thaci along with the AKR, the party of the new President of Kosovo, Behgjet Pacolli, and other minority parties, including the Serbian-Kosovar Liberal Serbian Party. In March, **EU-sponsored negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia got underway to address at least the issues affecting the people's daily lives in the first stage.** The first round was held on the 8th of March, and a second round was scheduled to be held in Brussels on the 28th of March. The government of Kosovo stated that the talks were technical in nature and that the independence and territorial integrity of Kosovo was not up for discussion. According to the EU portal EurActiv, the dialogue was planned to focus on three areas: the rule of law, freedom of movement and regional cooperation.

The head of the Serbian negotiating delegation in the talks with Kosovo, Borko Stefanovic, stated in April that they were open to **discussing the possibility of the partition of Kosovo** and that they would not refuse to discuss any option. In turn, the leader of the Kosovo delegation, Edita Tahiri, called Stefanovic's declaration regarding the possibility of discussing a partition of the territory provocative, and she stated that the talks with Serbia were focused on technical, not political, issues. In the first three rounds, the parties agreed on issues like identity cards, land registry, driving licenses, vehicle registration, telecommunications and electrical energy. According to Stefanovic, while Serbia was offering concrete solutions to regulate the current situation, Kosovo was trying to erase Serbia from it. In May, the situation in Kosovo advanced to a period of greater political stability, according to the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Kosovo, Lamberto Zannier, which should facilitate greater dialogue among the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo. In the presentation of the latest report from the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) before the UN Security Council, Zannier stressed that the dialogue process had begun positively, with three trilateral meetings until mid-May in which important issues for the everyday lives of the people of Kosovo had been addressed, such as the civil registry, freedom of movement and telephony. Nonetheless, Zannier stated that there were still many problems, especially in the north of Kosovo, where the inter-community relations were unstable. The main negotiator on the Serbian delegation in the dialogue process with Kosovo, Borislav Stefanovic, visited the capital of Kosovo, Pristina, and met with several institutional officials, as well as representatives of NGOs and experts. According to Stefanovic, given the number of problems that affected Kosovo and Serbia, it was positive to hold meetings more often but not only in Brussels, where the official meetings in the dialogue process were being held. The Serbian negotiator explained that he had proposed that the head of the Kosovo negotiating delegation, Edita Tahiri, visit Belgrade, but that in view of the slowness of the procedures he finally decided to travel to Pristina. This was the **first institutional official from Serbia who met with representatives of the government of Kosovo since 1999.** Stefanovic was expected to meet with Tahiri, as well as with the Vice Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hajredin Kuci.

In August the NATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR) and the governments of Kosovo and Serbia supported an agreement to put an end to the violent crisis which started in late June over the control posts in northern Kosovo, where the majority of the population is Serbian. According to the Kosovo government, the agreement reached with KFOR enabled the Kosovo executive's blockade of the entry of goods from Serbia to be temporarily maintained, a measure that Kosovo described as reciprocal with respect to Serbia's closure to the entry of products from Kosovo. In September, new violent incidents took place in northern Kosovo, which led

to the postponement of the round of talks scheduled as part of the process facilitated by the EU. In December tension was reduced in the mainly Serbian north of Kosovo, which had been the scene of protests and roadblocks since July, while Serbia and Kosovo made progress in the negotiating process in terms of border control. Since the negotiations began in March, **Serbia and Kosovo have reached agreements in the areas of trade, freedom of movement, land registry and the mutual recognition of university degrees.**


Most significant events in the year

EU-sponsored negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia got underway to address at least the issues affecting the people's daily lives in the first stage.

Websites of interest

Courier des Balkans (www.balkans.eu.org)
 EULEX (www.eulaex-kosovo.eu)
 Government of Kosovo (www.ks-gov.net)
 Government of Serbia (www.serbia.sr.gov.yu)
 KFOR (www.nato.int/kfor)
 UN (www.un.org)
 OSCE (www.osce.org/kosovo)
 PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
 UNMIK (www.unmikonline.org)
 UNOSEK (www.unosek.org)
 Wikipedia (Kosovo)

Main actors in the process



MOLDOVA (Transnistria²⁸)

Context of the conflict

Although internationally the region of Transdniestria is considered to be part of the Republic of Moldova (an independent country since the beginning of 1992), most of its inhabitants (predominantly Slavs) have considered themselves to be independent from the Republic since September 1990, when the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of Transdniestria declared its independence and established its capital in Tiraspol, with its own currency, constitution, parliament, flag and media. Most of the population is declared Christian. Several studies indicate that there are high levels of corruption, censorship and organised crime in the region.

Population: 537,000-700,000 inhabitants,
over 3.5 million in Moldova
Area: 4,163 km²
GDP Moldova: 5,600 million dollars
Per capita income Moldova: \$1,560
Deaths due to the conflict: 1,000-1,500
Facilitators: OSCE

Situated between the Dniester and Nistre rivers, this region was under the control of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, when it was handed over to Imperial Russia. After the Russian Revolution at the beginning of the 20th century, the region became autonomous under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although during World War II it was annexed by Romania. Later its inhabitants were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan for having collaborated with the German army and its Russian allies. Later, as a result of the Paris Peace Treaties, it was made part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. Since 1956, the 14th Soviet army has remained in the area to control the enormous military arsenals deployed there, this being one of the reasons for the conflict in Moldova.

The conflict broke out as a result of the August 1989 proclamation declaring Moldovan (written in the Roman alphabet) to be the official language of the country (compared with the Cyrillic alphabet used by a large part of the population in Transdniestria), and negotiations began for reunification with Romania (before the fall of Ceaucescu in December). This move was rejected by the people of Transdniestria, who proclaimed independence the following year, creating paramilitary corps for its defence (the “workers’ detachments” which would later become the Republican Guard). The war, which did not last long, began in early 1992 and resulted in some 1,500 dead and 100,000 refugees. Shortly afterwards, in July, a ceasefire agreement was signed, the presence of the Soviet army in the area was made official and a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up to supervise the ceasefire in the Security Zone, as well as the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF), made up of delegations from Russia, Moldova and Transdniestria. Since 1994, the OSCE Mission in Moldova has formed part of the JCC as an observer. In December 2006, there was a referendum which overwhelmingly ratified the independence of Transdniestria, which aspired to join Russia (the majority of the population speaks Russian) and which had been blocked by the Republic of Moldova since the beginning of the armed conflict. The region, which represents only between 12% and 15% of Moldova, nevertheless produces 35% of the GDP, holds the greatest industrial wealth of Moldova (40%) and produces 90% of the electricity. This has caused significant economic tensions, among other reasons because of the region’s capacity to cut off the electricity supply to Moldova. Since 1991, the president of the region of Transdniestria has been Igor Smirnov, who renewed his mandate in the 2006 elections with 82% of the vote.

Development of the peace process

In March 1992 the foreign ministers of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine met in Helsinki and agreed the principles for a peaceful solution to the conflict, creating consultation mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. A few months later several discussions took place at the headquarters of the CIS regarding the deploy-

²⁸ The region is also called Transdniéster, Transdnistria or Pridnestrovia (in Russian).

ment of a peacekeeping force in Moldova. In July of that year an accord was also signed in Moscow between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, agreeing on a peaceful solution to the conflict, which apart from a ceasefire also agreed to create a **military free security zones for ten kilometres on either side of the Dniester River.**

Since February 1993 **the OSCE has been the organisation responsible for negotiations to find a solution to the conflict**, by means of a Mission in Moldova, based in the capital, Chisianu. The objective of the mission is to define the status of Transdniestria through dialogue between the conflicting parties. Since February 1995 it also has an office in Transdniestria. **According to the OSCE, the key areas of the conflict are language, the Moldavans' pretensions to unite with Romania, the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria and the definition of the region's status.** Since autumn 2005 the EU and the USA have joined forces with the OSCE as observers. In April 2008 the presidents of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria met for the first time in seven years and agreed to promote trust-building measures which would enable talks, which had been stalled for two years, to resume in a 2+5 format (Moldova and Transdniestria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as guarantors, and representatives of the EU and the USA as observers). It was agreed to establish working groups to draw up concrete proposals for trust-building measures in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, infrastructure development, the rail networks, health and social protection of the residents of Transdniestria, education and youth, disarmament and demilitarisation and humanitarian aid. **Moldova has usually been in favour of talks in the 5+2 format (Moldova, Transdniestria, OSCE, Russia and Ukraine; and the USA and the EU as observers), while Transdniestria preferred a 2+1 format (Moldova, Transdniestria and Russia).** In early November, delegations from the parties to the conflict as well as international mediators and observers in the 5+2 format held a consultative meeting in Vienna. At this meeting, which was not actually a resumption of the substantive negotiations under the 5+2 format, suspended since 2006, the parties expressed their agreement with the need to intensify the dialogue and studied possibilities for eliminating the obstacles to the resumption of the 2006+5 negotiation process.

In May 2010, the Presidents of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, and Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, signed a joint communiqué in which they reaffirmed their position that the conflict in Transnistria can only be resolved by political and peaceful means, and in which they asked the parties to refrain from unilateral actions. Both leaders stated that what was needed was to resolve the conflict through equitable dialogue with the purpose of determining a status with very reliable guarantees that ensures the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Moldova, constitutional neutrality and the establishment of a shared defence, legal and economic system. Russia and Ukraine pledged to continue their coordinated efforts to make headway in the mutual understanding between Moldova and Transnistria. The government of Moldova presented to the EU its new strategy on resolving the conflict of Transnistria, which aimed to make Moldova more attractive to the people of Transnistria. According to the Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, Moldova and Transnistria might draw closer to each other as a result of a regime of visa liberalisation and free trade between Moldova and the EU.

In July 2010, the Moldovan government ordered that all the Russian peacekeeping troops in the region of Transnistria be withdrawn. The interim Moldovan president, Mihai Ghimpu, requested this in a decree in which he called upon Russia to withdraw its 1,500 troops unconditionally, urgently and transparently. Russia had pledged to withdraw these troops as part of the 1999 agreement promoted by the OSCE, which set the withdrawal date for 2002, although compliance with this date did not materialise. Likewise, Vienna hosted informal consultations in the 5+2 format, a meeting aimed at promoting the formal resumption of the negotiation process, which had been suspended since February 2006. The Moldovan Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, and the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, held an informal meeting as part of a football match in the capital of Transnistria, Tiraspol, in late August. In September, the Moldovan government warned that the authorities of Transnistria were clinging to their demand for independence and that they were thus endangering the efforts to resolve the conflict. In turn, the authorities of Transnistria looked favourably upon Moldova's decision to allow direct exports of goods manufactured in this region. In October, Russia stated that it could not withdraw its peacekeeping troops or armaments from Moldova because they were a guarantee that the conflict would not break out once again. Furthermore, the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, stated that as soon as

Moldova had an effective government, the negotiation process on Transnistria could resume, in reference to the institutional fragility in Moldova since the election crisis in 2009. In November, the delegation from the pro-independence region turned in a list of seven problems that required an urgent solution, topped by the freedom of movement for people and goods. According to Yastrebchak, none of Transnistria's priorities had been resolved, and he warned that the resumption of formal 5+2 talks should not be an end in itself, rather a way to help the parties to reach agreements on equal footing.

The peace process in 2011

In March, **the government of Moldova created a new structure dedicated to the conflict in Transnistria**, the Reintegration Commission, whose mission is to promote and coordinate the implementation of a policy shared by all Moldovan institutions in the realm of reintegration. The new commission will consider proposals for creating conditions that foster the reintegration of the region of Transnistria into Moldova. It will also coordinate actions to resolve problems and ensure implementation of the actions, among other duties. The body will have 29 members and will be presided over by the Prime Minister, Vladimir Filat. It will also include the Vice Prime Ministers, Ministers and heads of a variety of power structures. The commission will replace the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, created in 2003, and joins the already existing Office for Reintegration and the job of the Vice Prime Minister for Reintegration Affairs, currently occupied by Eugen Carpov, who is also the political representative of Moldova in the negotiations.

The Prime Minister of Moldova, Vlad Filat, stated in April that he might meet in mid-April with the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, as part of an ice hockey match that will take place in the pro-independence region. According to Filat, if he travelled to the region he would probably discuss practical issues with Smirnov, including the resumption of railway cargo traffic and the modernisation of telephone connections between Moldova and Transnistria. Both leaders had met on previous occasions to attend sporting events. In early April, Smirnov invited Filat to make an official visit to Transnistria, although the latter rejected the invitation stating that he did not need an official invitation to visit his own country. Likewise, an informal meeting was held of the participants in the 5+2 negotiating format (Moldova and Transnistria as the contentious parties; Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as the mediators; and the USA and EU as observers) in early April. At the meeting, the participants focused on the **possibilities of resuming the formal process**, as well as on issues like the freedom of movement between both territories, the guarantees in the negotiation process and a draft statute for the activities of the working groups on trust-building measures. The delegations also brought their positions closer together on the need to resume the Permanent Council on Political Affairs as part of the Negotiation Process for an Agreement on Transnistria.

In late June, the informal meeting in the 5+2 format (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, USA and EU) in Moscow did not manage to revive the formal negotiations (the 5+2 format has been cancelled since 2006) and ended without headway and without a joint communiqué in view of the discrepancies among the parties. It was decided to hold another meeting, also in Moscow, at a date yet to be determined. Several analysts noted that **Russia might be trying to displace the 5+2 format in favour of other approaches with greater Russian domination**. The draft presented by Russia at the meeting stressed the equality between Moldova and Transnistria in the negotiation process and asked for Transnistria to have special status, omitting any references to the borders with Moldova. **Germany, a country with no status in the process, might be aligning with Russia**, according to some analyses, as part of the special relations between both countries, which are rooted in energy issues. In this sense, at the meeting Germany also presented a draft which would omit several basic points from the negotiating agenda: the withdrawal of Russian troops and their transformation into a peace-keeping operation, support of democratic reforms and the demilitarisation of Transnistria as part of the process of resolving the conflict, and the offer of the prospect of European membership for Moldova, among others. Russia and Germany asked Moldova to repeal its 2005 law on the principles of conflict resolution in Transnistria, as well as the unitary character of the Moldovan state, and

to make headway in the federalisation of Moldova. Likewise, the OSCE draft circulated prior to the meeting referred to the 5+2 format and other earlier formats, such as the 3+2, in which neither the EU nor the USA were included.

In July, the Prime Minister of Moldova, Vladimir Filat, and the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, met in the capital of the pro-independence region, Tiraspol, as part of a football match, in what was described as a new case of “football diplomacy”. After the meeting, Filat announced that both leaders had agreed that officials in the area of customs from both administrations would meet in mid-July. Both leaders positively assessed the meeting, although Smirnov noted that he was not particularly optimistic about the efficacy of “football diplomacy” since the matters agreed upon at similar meetings in the past had never come to fruition. Nonetheless, according to Smirnov, it is worthwhile for the Moldovan leaders to begin to realise that restrictions and pressures did not help to bring both peoples closer together. In August, **the governments of Moldova and Russia expressed their support for the resumption of official negotiations to resolve the conflict**, since these negotiations had been paralysed and had no date on which they were to resume. Moldova insisted on the immediate resumption of negotiations in the 5+2 format and expressed its openness to discussing solutions to the social and humanitarian problems afflicting the people of Moldova and Transnistria immediately. The measures suggested by Moldova included the total resumption of railway traffic, the establishment of clear rules for exports and imports, the resumption of telephone connections and improvements in educational facilities. The resumption of formal talks in the 5+2 format may be delayed until 2012 instead of taking place in 2011, as stated in October by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Audronius Azubalis, whose country occupied the presidency of the OSCE. In any event, the end of his presidency would not hinder the talks from taking place in his country, Azubalis added.

In December **the first official meeting took place for formal negotiations for the resolution of conflict in Transnistria. The meeting took the 5+2 format after having been cancelled for almost 6 years.** The former Lithuanian minister for the exterior, Audronius Azubalis, whose country held the presidency of the OSCE, stressed that the meeting, which took place over two days in the Lithuanian capital, Vilna, established a solid base for future work on the resolution of conflict. Azubalis declared that the discussion about principles and procedures for the negotiations, which took place in a constructive atmosphere, would allow tangible advances to be made in the future. The next meeting will take place in Ireland in February, and will include the two sides of the conflict, mediators (OSCE, Russia, Ukraine) and observers (USA, EU). The meeting was chaired by the special representative of the Lithuanian presidency of the OSCE for unresolved conflicts, ambassador Giedrius Cekuolis

Most significant events in the year


Russia might be trying to displace the 5+2 format in favour of other approaches with greater Russian domination, with the support of Germany.

The resumption of formal talks in the 5+2 format may be delayed until 2012.

Websites of interest

ICG (www.crisisgroup.org)
Moldova Azi (www.azi.md/en)
OSCE (www.osce.org/moldova)
Parliament of Transnistria (www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng)
Pridnestrovie (www.pridnestrovie.net)
Wikipedia (Transnistria)

Main actors in the process



TURKEY (PKK)

Context of the conflict

Kurdistan, with a population of 33 million, most of whom are Muslims, and a total area measuring 550,000 sq. km, is divided amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. It is regarded as the most populous stateless nation in the world. Over 20 million Kurds inhabit Turkish territory. Their origins go back to the 18th century. In the Middle Ages the Kurds lived in relative freedom, and during the Ottoman Empire they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. With the fall of this empire, and as a result of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, their land was divided amongst several different states. Shortly thereafter, Kurdistan's immense oil wealth was discovered, especially in the part inside Iraq. In 1924 Atatürk proclaimed Turkey's independence. From that year until 1938 there were fourteen uprisings by the Kurdish people.

Population: Turkey (73.6 million);
Turkish Kurdistan (20 million)
Area: Turkey (784,000 km²);
Turkish Kurdistan (220,000 km²)
HDI Turkey: 92 (out of 187)
GDP (Turkey): 652,400 million dollars
Per capita income (Turkey) \$8,720
Deaths due to the conflict: 40,000
Armed actors: PKK
Facilitators: —

There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) since 1984, with a total of 37,000 deaths, most of them Kurds. The PKK was created in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan ("Apo"). In subsequent years the PKK abandoned its goal of winning independence for Kurdistan and agreed to seek formulas for autonomy for each territory. It is largely financed by donations from the vast Kurdish diaspora around the world, especially in Europe and the United States. It has also received aid from the Greek-Cypriot community. The Kurds have support organisations in several different countries, such as the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) with headquarters in London and offices in the United States. The USA is also home to the KNCA, the Washington Kurdish Institute and the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN). In the past, the PKK also received periodic support from Iran and Syria. It has around 6,000 combatants. In 1995 the PKK created the exiled Kurdish parliament, with headquarters in Europe.

In 1987 the Turkish government decreed an exceptional status for eleven Kurdish provinces. President Turgut Özal (1989-1993) began peace efforts by creating a Ministry for Human Rights and promising the Kurdish people a certain degree of autonomy and the freedom to speak their own language. However, Özal's death and the renewed outbreak of PKK offensives put an end to the prospects of a negotiated solution. Since 1995, despite several unilateral ceasefires by the PKK, the government has continued its brutal fight against this group, destroying thousands of towns, displacing around two million Kurds and creating Kurdish militias charged with putting down the PKK and its support bases. In the 1995 offensive, the Turkish government deployed 35,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region. After a serious political crisis between Turkey and Syria in October 1998, the latter country withdrew its support of the PKK and forced Öcalan to leave Damascus, where he had lived for years. In February 1999 Öcalan was captured in Kenya by the Turkish secret services and was later sentenced to death, although this ruling was commuted in 2002. With the wane in the PKK's activities in 2000, the Turkish government began tentative reforms to ease the restrictions on the Kurdish culture.

The Kurdish conflict, just like the one in Cyprus, has been conditioned or influenced by Turkey's negotiations to join the EU. In 1998 the European Commission approved a document stating that a civilian, not military, solution must be found to the situation in southeast Turkey. Both the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (since 1995) have issued declarations to the same effect. In addition, the International Socialist has a Working Group on the Kurdish Question (SIMEC), headed by the Swede Conny Frederiksson, who is also the advisor to a civilian platform that studies the Kurdish question as part of the relations between Turkey and the EU. In November 2002 the moderate, pro-European Islamists in the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) won the elections with an absolute majority, and their leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, succeeded in being appointed Prime Minister in March 2003 after the sentence preventing him from holding this post was lifted. In view of the invasion and later conflict in Iraq, where much of the Kurdish community lives, the

new Turkish government sealed an alliance with Iran and Syria to prevent the Kurdish autonomy already existing in northern Iraq from becoming the start of independence for all Kurdish territories. This move has unquestionably hindered partial agreements with the Kurds from being reached, in this case with those living on Turkish soil.

In 2004 a new armed group appeared, called the Taybazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, abbreviated TAK), apparently with no ties to the PKK or perhaps made up of dissidents from the PKK. This group is pursuing independence for Turkish Kurdistan, and it was added to the EU's terrorist lists in late 2006. In 2005 the Democratic Society Movement (DTP) was founded, a pro-Kurdish party regarded as the successor of the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), which was founded in 1997 and was the continuation of a party that was banned because of its ties to the PKK. The DTH has mayors in 55 towns in southeast Turkey, mainly inhabited by Kurds. Its leaders include Leyla Zana, who was imprisoned for three years for having spoken Kurdish in the Turkish parliament. The party is jointly led by Nurettin Demirtas. The Turkish government has never engaged in any formal, open negotiations with the PKK.

Development of the peace process

The PKK has decreed a unilateral ceasefire several times (1993, 1995 and 1998); however, this was not matched by a similar decree by the Turkish armed forces, nor did the decrees serve to initiate a negotiation process. The year after A. Öcalan was arrested, in February 2000, the PKK announced the end of its armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy, but the Turkish army rejected its unilateral ceasefire. In April 2002 the PKK once again renounced its call for independence for Turkish Kurdistan and the armed struggle at its 8th Congress, where the party changed its name to KADEK (Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan) or Kongra-Gel. A. Öcalan remained at the helm, although at that time he was still imprisoned and facing a death sentence. The Turkish Ministry of Defence claimed that it would continue to regard KADEK as a terrorist organisation and that it would ignore any unilateral ceasefires. In May 2002 the EU included the PKK on its list of terrorist organisations. In August 2002 the Turkish parliament passed several measures aimed at minimally complying with the requirements for joining the EU, including abolishing the death penalty and granting the Kurds cultural concessions (recognition of the freedom of education and expression in the Kurdish tongue). However, the PKK always criticised the limitations of these measures. With the PJD in power and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister, in July 2003 the Turkish parliament approved a partial amnesty for members of the Kurdish armed groups that had not committed serious human rights violations. Additionally, a new law permitted education in the Kurdish tongue in certain private academies, though not in public schools. In 2005 the PPP created the Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK) as a platform for promoting a federal process in Kurdistan.

In August 2006 the Executive Council of the KKK decided to initiate a new stage in achieving peace and democracy by issuing a Declaration for a Democratic Resolution of the Kurdish Question, in which it put forth a two-step process: the first to achieve a ceasefire, and the second to discuss an agenda, which in its opinion had to contain the following steps:

Roadmap proposed by the KKK in August 2006

1. Recognition of the Kurdish identity under the identity of Turkish citizens as their main identity.
2. Development of the Kurdish language and culture, and recognition of Kurdish as a second official language within the region of Kurdistan.
3. Recognition of the right to freedom of thought, belief and expression.
4. Undertaking a social reconciliation project based on releasing political prisoners, including the PKK leader.
5. Withdrawal of military forces from Kurdistan and abolition of the system of keeping watch over Kurdish cities.
6. Gradual disarmament of both parties and legal participation in the democratic social life.

In late September 2006 the leader of the PKK, A. Öcalan, sent a message from prison asking for a unilateral ceasefire starting on the 1st of October. In his communiqué, Öcalan pointed out that it was impossible to reach a solution to the Kurdish problem through violence; rather it could only be achieved through democratic methods that would also serve as an example for other countries in the region. In Öcalan's opinion, this step should serve as the start of a process that would achieve the democratic unity of both Kurds and Turks, and he asked both the EU and the USA for support. He also asked the countries bordering Kurdistan to the south to contribute. In response to Öcalan's request, the KKK's executive council declared a unilateral ceasefire with the goals of establishing a platform for dialogue and peace, finding a political and democratic solution to the conflict and reaching a permanent bilateral ceasefire. The Turkish Prime Minister initially responded negatively to the possibility of taking a similar measure, stating that ceasefires are between states, not with terrorist groups. However, in mid-October he tempered his position and declared that the PKK's decision was positive and signalled an opportunity.

The official Party of Justice and Development (PJD) won 46% of the votes and 341 of the 550 seats in parliament in the general elections held on 22nd of July. The Kurdish party, the DTP, won parliamentary representation (24 seats) for the first time in the past decade, 13 years after several Kurdish deputies were expelled from the parliament (and later tried legally) due to their purported links with the armed opposition group, the PKK. During the election campaign, the DTP candidates advocated a political and dialogued solution to the Kurdish conflict, and demanded that Ankara put an end to the military operations against the PKK, as well as greater recognition of the unique features and rights of the Kurdish minority.

In April 2009, the PKK announced a ceasefire until the 1st of June through the Executive Council of the KCK in order to facilitate the quest for a negotiated solution to the Kurdish conflict. The leaders of the PKK reiterated their offer to the Turkish government to find a solution to the armed conflict within the framework of Turkey's territorial integrity, respecting Turkish borders. In mid-July, the PKK decided to extend its unilateral ceasefire declaration for the third time, in what they described as an action aimed at fostering a peaceful solution to the conflict with the government of Turkey. In early August, in an unprecedented political encounter, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met with Ahmed Ahmed Türk, leader of the Democratic Society Party (DPT), a Kurdish nationalist group, for more than one hour, in an attempt to make headway in finding a solution to the Kurdish conflict. The gesture was interpreted by the media as a move by Erdogan to open up the dialogue with the Kurds in Turkey. In the meantime, the government continued to develop its package of reforms to encourage a resolution of the Kurdish question. The executive referred to this initiative as a "democratisation package" which would not solely affect the Kurdish people. According to sources from the Turkish newspaper Today's Zaman, the government rejected any change to the unitary governing system in Turkey, as well as an amnesty that would include Abdullah Öcalan, two factors that it would not accept.

In the second half of November 2009 the government presented in Parliament the first specific measures in its democratisation initiative to resolve the Kurdish question, as a continuation of the parliamentary discussion begun in November. They include several short-term advances in culture, politics and society. The decisions announced by the Minister of the Interior, Besir Atalay, included the possibility of restoring the original names of municipalities and localities which had been forced to adopt Turkish names. This measure would take the form of a binding referenda that would previously be approved by the Minister of the Interior. According to government estimates, around 100 towns might change their names in 2010. In addition, an independent commission would be created to investigate human rights violations, especially in the southeast of the country. In parallel, Turkey planned to ratify the United Nations Convention against Torture. Furthermore, although Turkish would remain the official language of Turkey, obstacles would be lifted on the use of Kurdish. These include the elimination of time restrictions on Kurdish broadcasts and on private radio and television broadcasters in Kurdish, and encouragement for the native languages to be learnt, even though they may not be taught at public schools. Furthermore, the political parties would be allowed to use different languages in their campaigns. The Koran would also be translated into Kurdish. In turn, the people who fled from Turkey after the military coup in 1980 and gave up their Turkish citizenship might then get it back, including people of Kurdish extraction, with the exception of those involved in terrorism and armed acts. For the time being, there would be no general amnesty for the members of the armed groups; however, prison sentences would

be reduced. In mid-December, the Constitutional Court outlawed the pro-Kurdish party DTP because of its purported ties to the PKK, which cast doubt on the feasibility of the government's plan to undertake reforms. The PKK interpreted this as a declaration of war.

In early January 2010, the government claimed that it would step up its efforts to launch the reforms that were part of the democratisation initiative with which it aimed to resolve the Kurdish question, as claimed by the Interior Minister, Besir Atalay. However, several Kurdish sectors criticised the government's position given the massive arrests in Kurdish political circles. The Turkish President Abdullah Gül gave the green light to the draft constitutional reform approved by the Turkish Parliament in early May, albeit without a sufficient majority, meaning that the reform would be subjected to a referendum in order for it to be definitively approved. In the meantime, the clashes between the army and the PKK intensified.

In July, the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, proposed the disarmament of the PKK in exchange for political and cultural rights for the Kurdish people. Karayilan claimed that he was willing to disarm under United Nations supervision if Turkey accepted a ceasefire and fulfilled certain conditions. The PKK demanded that an end be put on the attacks against Kurdish civilians and arrests against Kurdish politicians. According to the Fırat news agency, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire between the 13th of August and the 20th of September, dovetailing with Ramadan, in response to an appeal by its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and as the result of the start of a dialogue process between Öcalan and the authorised bodies acting on behalf of the state with the government's knowledge. According to the main opposition party, the CHP, the Under-Secretary of Intelligence Services, Hakan Fidan, who had been appointed in May, accompanied by two other people met with Öcalan on the 20th of July in İmarali prison, which they reached by sea. In September, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, promised that his party would draw up a new constitution after the 2011 elections. He announced this prior to the referendum on constitutional reforms held on the 12th of December. Likewise, the government and the pro-Kurdish BDP party met in a gathering that had been delayed by violence but was described as positive by both parties. Furthermore, a 23-person committee known as the Elders Committee for Peace issued an appeal for dialogue to resolve the Kurdish conflict. In the meantime, the former president of Finland and Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari met with several Kurdish representatives in Diyarbakır as part of the visit to the country by the Independent Commission on Turkey to evaluate and promote the prospects on Turkish membership in the EU. This commission was made up of a number of European political personalities. He noted that Turkey must negotiate with Öcalan and the PKK to achieve a solution. The journey to Turkey also included meetings with the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, and with the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan. On the 1st of November, the PKK announced the extension of the ceasefire until the Turkish general elections were held in June 2011. In an unusual gesture, the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, celebrated the extension of the PKK's truce. The PKK leader, Murat Karayilan, stated that the extension of the ceasefire had been decided upon after receiving a letter from the group's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, asking it to be extended and stating that there was a positive attitude on the part of the state and the negotiating team to achieve a solution to the Kurdish question. Karayilan also stated that the Turkish state had to fulfil the five conditions posed by the PKK: the end of military operations, the release of all Kurdish politicians who had been arrested and of the police operations against Kurds, Öcalan's active participation in the process, the elimination of the election threshold of 10% and a constitutional reform. After visiting Öcalan as his lawyer, the co-president of the DTK, Aysel Tugluk, stated that in the leader's words, the dialogue process had turned into negotiations. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that the military operations may be cut back since if the PKK was laying down its weapons there would no longer be any reason for the security forces to conduct the operations. Late in the year, tensions increased between the government and the Kurdish movement over the Kurds' defence of their proposal for democratic autonomy.

The peace process in 2011

The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, stated that the Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, could play the role of mediator between the Kurdish movement and Turkey. In late February, **the PKK ended the ceasefire it had**

upheld since the 13th of August 2010, according to an announcement from the KCK. The KCK declared that it would not wage attacks but that it would defend itself more effectively. In the communiqué, it blamed the government of the AKP for the end of the truce since it had not responded to the KCK's demands and was carrying out a policy that was destructive for the Kurds. In their announcement, the KCK listed the following demands: ending all the military and political operations against the Kurds; releasing the Kurdish politicians held under arrest; authorising the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, to participate actively in the peace process and get involved as a negotiator; establishing a constitutional commission and an investigative commission to help the process move forward; and removing the election threshold of 10%. In March, the so-called **road-map of the PKK leader** was made public. The document proposed three phases for making headway towards resolving the conflict. In the first phase, the PKK would announce a permanent ceasefire and a period would get underway in which the parties would avoid provocations and the public opinion would be prepared for peace. In the second phase, according to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, the roadmap proposed setting up a parliamentary verification and negotiation committee which would be created with the maximum agreement between both parties, and which would lead to an amnesty project. According to Kurdish Info, in the second phase a truth and reconciliation commission would be created at the initiative of the government and the parliament following the principles of equal rights. This would give way to an amnesty process to foster a climate of problem-solving, and once the legal impediments were removed, the PKK would withdraw from the Turkish borders under the monitoring of the USA, the UN, the EU, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan and the government of Turkey. During this withdrawal process, the document regarded the parallel release of political prisoners as crucial. In the third phase, a process of judicial and constitutional reform would get underway, according to Hürriyet, which would lead to numerous consequences, including the legalisation of the KCK. According to Kurdish Info, the third phase would be a real process of democratisation, and it would also witness the return of the exiled or refugee population to Turkey as well as the legalisation of the KCK's activities. Öcalan's position in this process would have to be considered. In this vein, the document stated that Öcalan would play a clear role in implementing the project. Likewise, the so-called roadmap also developed the idea of ten principles on which the proposed solution would be based. It listed the principles of a democratic nation (based on multilingualism and free, equal individuals); shared land (no individual or group can exert pressure on others); a democratic republic (the opening of the state to society and individuals); a democratic constitution (the outcome of social consensus and one that defends citizens, in contrast to the constitutions of the nation state); a democratic solution (a bastion of civil society, not an extension of the state); shared collective and individual rights and freedom (the indivisibility of collective and individual rights); ideological freedom and independence (the need to overcome the hegemony of modern positivistic capitalism); history and the present (the importance of historical memory); moral and conscience (the need for empathy cultivated on morality and conscience); and democratic self-defence (self-defence mechanisms).

In April, the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK, its abbreviation in Turkish) initially banned and later rectified the participation of twelve independent candidates in the general elections in June, based on their having been arrested in the past and on technical legal issues. The twelve candidates included seven supported by the pro-Kurdish party BDP, including the current parliamentarians Gultan Kisanak and Sebahat Tuncel, as well as the politician and activist Leyla Zana. The decision to veto them triggered a wave of protests in several cities in the country, some of which led to clashes between demonstrators and the police, as well as a political crisis in the country which led the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, to ask for a solution. Later, the YSK revoked its initial decision after receiving the additional documents requested on the candidates, and it gave the green light to the seven candidates supported by the BDP, which was followed by an easing of the political and social tensions. During the course of the crisis, the Turkish President invited the former co-President of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, to meet with him. Demirtaş declined the invitation since he had to travel to the places of maximum tension, but he did express his satisfaction with the invitation and stated that he was willing to meet with the president at any time. The leader of the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, stated that a holistic approach was needed to resolve the Kurdish question, one that included political, cultural and economic measures. According to Kılıçdaroğlu, the economic, democratic and security problems in the southeast region were connected, so none of them could be left unresolved. In May, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet stated that Turkey had been holding talks with Kandil since 2005 in

reference to the PKK ranks based in the mountains of Kandil, Iraq. Milliyet cited comments from the co-President of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, in which he claimed that **Turkey had been in touch not only with the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in prison in Imrali, but also with Kandil.** The intelligence services (MIT) had held the talks with Kandil on behalf of the state. The talks had taken place several times since 2005 with a number of purposes, including the quest for a possible ceasefire and a permanent solution to the Kurdish question. The talks in 2006 and 2007 were followed by the talks in 2008 with the three parts of the PKK (Öcalan in Imrali; the leaders in Kandil and representatives in Europe) with the support of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, according to Milliyet. The state also coordinated Turkey's entry into the peace groups made up of PKK combatants and Kurdish refugees in 2009. According to the newspaper, the dialogues with the PKK in Kandil and with Öcalan were instrumental in the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire before the 2009 elections and before the constitutional referendum in 2010. According to Milliyet, after the appointment of Hakan Fidan as the new head of intelligence, replacing Emre Taner, the MIT continued to negotiate with Öcalan, even though the contacts with Europe and with Kandil had tapered off.

In June, the new legislature began with upheaval, with the boycott of the Parliament by the independent bloc led by the pro-Kurdish BDP after the invalidation of one of its elected candidates, Hatip Dicle. The KCK put forth two demands to be implemented without delay so that the ceasefire process and the development of a democratic constitutional solution could take place. First of all, they demanded that at the start of a new legislation the Parliament should create the climate needed, and they called on Abdullah Öcalan to play a role in the process of a democratic constitutional solution to resolve the Kurdish question. Secondly, they asked the Turkish state and the Prime Minister or some authorised state representative to declare and initiate the dialogue and the peaceful methods needed to resolve the Kurdish question, instead of resorting to what they considered annihilation, in reference to the military operations. They expressed these points in a communiqué issued on the 20th of June. Previously, on the 17th of June, **Öcalan had announced an extension of the ceasefire for several months** and had asked the Parliament to immediately start to prepare a new constitution and a solution to the Kurdish question, stating that if the Parliament took steps in this direction he would send the guerrillas outside the Turkish borders. Öcalan also asked for direct ties to be established with the guerrilla commanders. Likewise, he criticised the use of Molotov cocktails during the Kurdish demonstrations, asking the Kurdish youth to avoid damaging civilians and their property, and he also asked the guerrillas to avoid any clashes with the military. According to Hürriyet, reflecting other media, the announcement of the ceasefire was until the 1st of September. The top leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, turned in three protocols for resolving the conflict to the state representatives with whom he was in contact from his prison in Imrali, according to the statements by the PKK commandant Murat Karayilan in an interview published in the Turkish newspaper Milliyet. According to Karayilan, the three protocols included **proposals for constitutional reforms in order to agree to regional autonomy and education in the Kurdish language, and conditions for the complete end to violence and disarmament based on mutual forgiveness.** Öcalan also asked for his isolation to come to an end so that the process could work properly. According to Karayilan, the state delegation did not reject the protocols; rather it stated that it would convey them to the state and the government. For this reason, Karayilan stated that he was expecting a response and that after the June elections a window of opportunity had been opened.

In July, the tensions rose after the death of 13 soldiers and two PKK members during an army operation near Silvan (Diyarbakir province). The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, lamented the death of the soldiers and guerrillas in this incident and reaffirmed the Kurds' willingness to solve the conflict and lay down their weapons. Öcalan further stressed that the Kurds were not seeking separation from Turkey. According to Öcalan, he is the only person capable of putting an end to the conflict. Öcalan stated that a few days after the clashes on the 14th of July he held yet another meeting with state representatives. Likewise, on the same day as the incidents in Silvan, the Democratic Congress of Kurdistan platform (DTK), which is made up of an amalgam of mainly pro-Kurdish organisations, announced the formal launch of "democratic autonomy", in reference to the self-management of local affairs through assemblies in the Kurdish region of Turkey. According to the DTK, democratic autonomy had been operating in several zones in the region through 50 town communes,

21 neighbourhood assemblies, four canton-wide assemblies and a provincial council which had been in operation for four years. These structures also include cultural, judicial, women's and youth branches, among others. According to the DTK spokesperson, democratic autonomy is a process that begins on the local and community level and rises to the provincial level. Through this system, local conflicts are brought to an end, including problems such as drug use, violence against women and theft. Furthermore, the regional assembly had been granted popular authority to regulate issues related to traffic, health and education. The system also included self-protection forces, although this was not yet regarded as a top priority issue according to the spokesperson, Cemal Co'kun. The purpose of the new call was to expand the system. Also in July, the **leader of the PKK stated that an agreement had been reached with the state delegation with which talks had been held on establishing a Peace Council that would work to achieve a solution to the Kurdish conflict.** According to Öcalan, the state delegation agreed that this civilian initiative should be up and running within one month. The Council would not be totally official, nor would it be totally grounded in civil society. Regarding the three protocols that Öcalan had delivered the state delegation and the PKK in June, Öcalan stated that they had been misinterpreted. According to the leader of the PKK, the protocols were not something to be signed, nor were they binding; rather they were guiding documents agreed upon with the state that form the basis upon which to act. The three protocols presented were "Resolution of Principles on a Democratic Solution to the Basic Social Problems in Turkey", "Resolution of Principles for a Just Peace in Relations between the State and Society in Turkey" and "Resolution of an Action Plan for Just Peace and a Democratic Solution to the Kurdish Question". Likewise, according to Öcalan, another important issue was establishing a constitutional council to supervise the drafting of a new constitution. This council would not operate as a separate constitutional assembly; rather it would work within the Parliament, and the BDP would be allowed to participate in it.

In July, a meeting was held in Scotland to examine the Kurdish conflict sponsored by mediator Mark Muller, a researcher at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva and the spearhead behind the Beyond Borders initiative, which brought together 16 Turkish parliamentarians (including pro-Kurdish MPs), scholars and political journalists. The death of the 13 soldiers just a few days after Öcalan's declarations on reaching an agreement to create a Peace Council was interpreted by some media as an act of sabotage against the conflict resolution process. Some columnists also stated that the attack on the 14th of July may have had a twofold objective: to weaken Öcalan's position in the negotiations and to step up the violence. Öcalan announced in late July that he was withdrawing from the talks with the state to resolve the conflict. The leader of the PKK stated that his role had come to an end and that he would not take further steps unless measures were taken to ensure his health, security and freedom of movement. According to Öcalan, neither the state delegation nor the KCK had done their part. In August, the conflict was seriously aggravated with an escalation in armed violence, including cross-border violence, which followed the rise in clashes already recorded in July. In September, the armed conflict was once again aggravated as the PKK's violence had a greater impact on the civilian population in terms of deaths, injuries and kidnappings.

A recording leaked to the press in September revealed talks between the Turkish intelligence service (MIT) and senior PKK officials in Oslo. The government admitted to these talks and noted that the Turkish state was acting just as other countries do. The sound recording included talks between the number two of the MIT, Under Secretary Hakan Fidan, Deputy Under Secretary Afet Günes, the KCK member Mustafa Karasu and the PKK members Sabri Ok and Zübeyir Aydar, as well as representatives of the coordinating countries. The identities of the representatives who were speaking English were not revealed, nor was it clear when the talks had taken place. In them, Fidan claimed to be speaking on behalf of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Fidan proposed a period of inactivity. He also claimed that the state wanted to continue the conversations as a more systematic process, with more frequent negotiations and talks. The news of the supposed talks spurred criticism from the Turkish opposition. The independent Parliamentarian Serafettin Elçi, a member of the allied bloc in which the BDP ran, stated that the leaked talks had taken place in 2010, that the talks had been taken to the level of negotiations and that they must have continued until mid-2011. According to Elçi, at the end of these negotiations a protocol was drawn up that he himself and other BDP parliamentarians were able to see. The protocol was approved by Öcalan and taken to the troops based in the Kandil

Mountains, who also gave the document the green light. The document was then taken to the Turkish Prime Minister, who declined to sign it. The escalation in PKK violence might have been one of the factors in his decision not to sign the document, according to some interpretations. Judging from what could be gleaned from Elçi's declarations, the PKK's demands may have been accepted but not signed by the government. They included factors like education in the mother tongue, constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish identity, self-government, "democratic autonomy" (a term that is often used by the Kurdish movement) and house arrest for Öcalan. According to Elçi, a document like this could not be signed by the government, although the government could implement certain aspects of it. In late September, within a context of tension in Turkey due to the surge in PKK violence, the Turkish Prime Minister himself, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that the negotiations had been tabled and that the struggle against the PKK would continue until they laid down their weapons. On another front, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül met in September with BDP leaders Gultan Kisanak and Selahattin Demirtas one day after the party's announcement that it was returning to the Parliament. The BDP decided to put an end to the boycott measure which it was using to protest the Justice Department's veto of some of its parliamentarians.

In October, Öcalan's lawyers were once again denied their request for permission to visit him in Imrali jail. His layers' last visit had been on the 27th of July. Likewise, the PKK commandant Murat Karayilan stated that there was no armed conflict between the PKK and the Peshmerga security forces in the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (Iraq), stating that there was no longer a motive for a confrontation. According to Karayilan, the president of the Iraqi Kurdish region, Mesud Barzani, was working to support a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Karayilan stated that after the Turkish Prime Minister's refusal to sign the protocols defended by the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, Barzani and others were focusing on restarting the political process after five years of negotiations. According to Barzani, **the negotiations took place with Turkey via "friendly" parties in the first two years and directly in the ensuing three years.** Likewise, Karayilan described ETA's announcement of the permanent cessation of armed activities as the "proper, positive decision".

Most significant events in the year


The PKK ended the ceasefire it had upheld since the 13th of August 2010.

The leader of the PKK stated that an agreement had been reached with the state delegation with which talks had been held on establishing a Peace Council that would work to achieve a solution to the Kurdish conflict.

Websites of interest

EUTCC (www.eutcc.org)
Firat: en.firatnews.com
Info-Türk (www.info-turk.be)
Kurdish Human Rights Project (www.khrp.org)
Kurdish Info (www.kurdish-info.eu)
Kurdish Media (www.kurdmedia.com)
Kurdistan National Congress (www.kongrakurdistan.org)
Todays Zaman (www.todayszaman.com)
Turkish Daily News (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr)
Washington Kurdish Institute (www.kurd.org)
www.freedom-for-ocalan.com

Main actors in the process



Caucasus

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabakh)

Context of the conflict

In 1988, after a long period under the Soviet regime, a conflict arose in Nagorno-Karabakh (an enclave with an Armenian majority in the southwest of the country), when the local assembly voted to be administered by Armenia, and the Azerbaijan authorities rejected this decision. The tension over this conflict escalated, with open warfare war eventually breaking out between 1991 and 1994. More than 30,000 people died in this war, and one million people were displaced. **A ceasefire was signed in 1994**, and peace negotiations have been under way since then. The negotiations address two main points: the enclave's status and the return of territories occupied by the Armenian army. Currently, the construction of an oil pipeline running between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, at a cost of 2.9 billion dollars, is playing an important role in the peace process. The company British Petroleum has enormous influence over Azerbaijan, an oil-rich country.

Population: Nagorno-Karabakh (145,000); Armenia (13 million) and Azerbaijan (9,3 million)
Area: Armenia (30,000 km²); Azerbaijan (87,000 km²); Nagorno-Karabakh (4,400 km²)
HID: 86 (Armenia), 91 (Azerbaijan), out of 187
GDP: Armenia: 9,500 million dollars; Azerbaijan: 42,500 million dollars
Income per inhabitant: Armenia: \$3,100; Azerbaijan: \$4,840
Deaths due to the conflict: 30,000
Displaced persons: 720,000
Armed actors: Armed forces in the two countries
Facilitators: Minsk Group of the OSCE (France, Russia and USA), Turkey

Development of the peace process

Attempts to reach a peace agreement in the last decade had been blocked by Azerbaijan's failure to accept mediation by the **OSCE's Minsk Group**, created in 1992, and by the continuous proliferation of proposals and plans from different countries. The Minsk Group is co-led by France, Russia and the USA, and it includes the following participants: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its strategy consists of reinforcing economic cooperation among the two latter countries. In August 1995 the director of the OSCE appointed a Personal Representative for this area. In October 2000 Armenia, along with Russia and four other republics of the CIS, signed the revitalisation agreement of the Tashkent Treaty of 1992 (Collective Security Treaty) which includes legal procedures for the deployment of troops in case of aggression.

In July 1999, the OSCE approved the establishment of an office in Erevan (Armenia), which has been in operation since February 2000 carrying out political, economic, environmental and human activities. It functions independently of the Minsk Group, co-presided over by France, Russia and USA, which promotes peaceful agreement in the conflict. This is the result of an agreement adopted by the CSCE (the former name of the OSCE) in 1992, with the intention of holding a conference to reach a peace solution. Even though the conference was not held, the so-called "Minsk Process" carries on, and as a result the number of encounters between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan has multiplied, as has the number of diplomats. Presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan, who handed over power to his son Ilham Aliyev, met 20 times from the first meeting in 1999 until April 2001, when an agreement was reached on the so-called "Paris Principles", with mediation by President Chirac. However, in the end these principles were not signed. Both parties joined the Council of Europe the same year. A year and a half then passed with no direct meetings. The presidents finally met again in August 2002. The two leaders are both focussed on keeping power, do not trust each other and do not involve their people in the quest for peace. The President of Azerbaijan was critical of the OSCE's mediation and the role played by the UN. In addition, he had always

been opposed to any representatives from the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh taking part in the negotiations.

In December 2006, the self-proclaimed independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum which approved a constitution that described the region as a sovereign, democratic and social state with powers over the territory currently controlled by the separatist government. However, this referendum did not broach issues such as citizenship, or the thorny question of the return of Azeri refugees in a region with an Armenian ethnic majority. In November 2008 both presidents signed an agreement in Moscow in which they pledged to reach an agreement based on the principles and norms of international law. In May 2009 the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, declared that the resolution of the dispute must be based on the principle of territorial integrity and that there was no mechanism by which this region could gain independence from Azerbaijan. In mid-September the Azeri Foreign Minister stated that the country might consider opening up the border with Armenia in exchange for the handover of five districts around Nagorno-Karabakh which have been under the control of the Armenian forces since the end of the armed conflict. According to the spokesperson from the Foreign Ministry, this possibility had already been expressed on previous occasions and was part of the first phase in resolving the dispute. This stage would also include the return of internally displaced people.

In the second half of January 2010, the Presidents of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, met with the President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in Sochi (Russia) and reached a verbal agreement on the preamble to the final version of the basic principles for resolving the conflict being discussed. In March, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, claimed that his country accepted the revised proposal on the basic principles to resolve the conflict, although with a few exceptions, which were not made public. The Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, stated that the talks had entered a crucial phase. According to Aliyev, the mediators' proposal fit in with Azeri interests regarding territorial integrity and the return of the occupied districts. The Azeri leader stated that if Armenia accepted the proposal, headway could be made in the process. In turn, Armenia officially responded to the same revised document by presenting proposals to the mediating body, the OSCE's Minsk Group. According to the Azeri representative, this document entailed a phase-by-phase process instead of a "package solution". According to Mammadyarov, the steps to be followed included the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azeri districts of Agdam, Fizuli, Djebrail, Zangelan and Gubadli, which bordered on Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as from 13 towns in the occupied district of Lachin; the re-establishment of communications; and the holding of a conference to raise funds for rehabilitation, as well as the deployment of peace observers to ensure the security of the returning population. In a second phase, according to Mammadyarov, the Armenian forces would withdraw from Lachin and Kelbajar, which would be followed by the Azeri people's return to Nagorno-Karabakh. Thereupon, a decision would be taken on the status of the territory inside Azerbaijan, without affecting its territorial integrity. In this context, Mammadyarov proposed what he defined as a high degree of autonomy, similar to the autonomy in the regions of Tartarstan and Bashkortostan in the Russian Federation.

The proposal contained in the "Madrid Principles" includes a referendum with the participation of the people who lived in Nagorno-Karabakh prior to the war, the guarantee of a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, the return of refugees to their native lands and the help of international forces. In June, Aliyev warned that if Armenia continued to try to gain time or if it officially rejected the principles, Azerbaijan would re-evaluate the prospects of participating in the process and might change its position. On another front, the Armenian Foreign Minister stated that two years ago Armenia had already recognised that the Madrid Principles were the groundwork upon which negotiations would be held. In turn, it criticised Azerbaijan for not wanting to sign a document on the withdrawal of snipers around the separation line. Likewise, the Armenian President, Serzh Sarkisian, stated that the exercise of the right of self-determination was crucial for the peace process. In November, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, met with the president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, in the Russian city of Astrakhan (south) to address the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The parties reached a formal agreement on the exchange of war prisoners and the return of the bodies of the victims of the most recent incidents. They also agreed on the need to establish trust-building measures in the military security dimension, although without mentioning specific measures.


The peace process in 2011

In March, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, held a tripartite meeting with the President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in the Russian city of Sochi. After the gathering, they issued a communiqué in which they stated their intention to resolve all the controversies peacefully. In June, the presidents of both countries did not achieve an agreement on the Basic Principles at the meeting held in Russia despite external pressure to do so. In the joint document issued by the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as by the Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, they stated that they had reached mutual understanding on a series of issues whose resolution would facilitate the creation of the conditions for the Basic Principles to be approved. The conflicting parties noted a rise in internal pressure against what was perceived as concessions. In the months prior to the meeting, there had also been a rise in bellicose rhetoric, while some governmental representatives from both sides noted that a framework agreement might be reached soon, in reference to the Basic Principles. In any event, Armenia stated that any agreement would require the support of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to proceed to the next phase. Subsequently, both presidents blamed each other for the impossibility of reaching an agreement.

Websites of interest

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Eurasia Net (www.eurasianet.org)
Government of Armenia (www.gov.am/en)
Government of Azerbaijan (www.azerbaijan.az/portal.index_e.html?lang=en)
Government of Nagorno-Karabakh (www.karabakh.net/engl/gov?id=1)
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.ipwpr.net)
OSCE (www.osce.org/yereban) (www.osce.org/baku)
Peace Building & Conflict Resolution (www.peacebuilding.am/eng)
PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
President of Nagorno-Karabakh (www.presidentt.nkr.am)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org)
Wikipedia (war in Upper Karabakh) (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic)

Main actors in the process



GEORGIA (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)

Context of the conflict

There has been a conflict in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, in the northeast of the country, since the summer 1992. The conflict began after the local government made several attempts to separate from the Republic of Georgia, and confrontations were caused by the deployment of 2,000 Georgian soldiers, which led to 6,000 deaths. **In September 1992, a ceasefire was signed.** The Russian Federation was involved in this agreement. The following year, the United Nations peace mission **UNOMIG** was created to monitor this agreement, and **in May 1994, the Moscow ceasefire and separation of forces agreements were signed.** In 1999 there was a referendum in Abkhazia, after which it declared itself independent. The former President of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze, promised on several occasions "to broaden Abkhazia's powers" of self-government, as long as it formed an integral part of Georgia. In recent years, Russia has kept 3,000 soldiers on the border as a CIS peace force. In November 1999 Russia and Georgia agreed that Russia would close two of its four military bases in Georgia.

Population: Georgia: 4,3 million inhabitants;
Abkhazia, 0.5 million inhabitants.
South Ossetia; 70,000
Area: Georgia: 70,000 km²; Abkhazia: 8,400 km²;
South Ossetia: 3,900 km²
HDI Georgia: 75 (of 187)
GDP Georgia: 11,100 million dollars
Per capita income Georgia: \$2,530
Deaths due to the conflict: 6,000 in Abkhazia; 1,000
in South Ossetia
Displaced population: 240,000 in Abkhazia; 12,000
in South Ossetia
Facilitators: OSCE, UN, EU

In 1992 the autonomous region of **South Ossetia** was created in Georgia, two years before the former USSR created the autonomous Republic of North Ossetia. In 1990 South Ossetia declared itself a sovereign republic. This led the Georgian parliament to declare a state of emergency in the territory and withdraw the status of autonomous region. All of these factors led to confrontations, until a Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace force brought about a ceasefire in 1992. The conflict resumed in May 2004, when the President of South Ossetia threatened to use force against any threat from Georgia. Days later, South Ossetia withdrew from the international commission which was monitoring the peace agreement. This measure was followed by clashes between the Georgian armed forces and South Ossetia's armed groups. South Ossetia's authorities intended to join North Ossetia and thus become a part of the Russian Federation. In 2008, after military clashes between Georgia and Russia, this region cut off all links with Georgia and proclaimed its independence.

Development of the peace process

The OSCE has had a mission in Georgia since December 1992. Its headquarters are in Tbilisi and its aim is to promote peace negotiations for the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission also supports the UN's peace efforts. It has a staff member in the UN Human Rights Office in Sukhumi. The mission's mandate is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to assist in the development of democratic institutions. Since December 1999 the mandate has also included monitoring the border between Russia and Georgia. In 1992 the Agreement on Principles between Georgia and Russia for Resolving the Georgia-Ossetia Problem was signed, with a ceasefire and the creation of a Joint Control Commission (JCC) made up of representatives from Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. Russia has never looked favourably upon this arrangement, as it views itself as a minority on the commission.

Days after the conflicts in July 2004, the representatives of Georgia and South Ossetia signed a protocol aimed at resolving the conflict peacefully. The Georgian prime minister presented a plan to end tensions, and he pledged to demilitarise the area and expand the OSCE's mandate on the ground. Georgia also asked the EU and the OSCE to get more deeply involved in resolving the conflict. In early 2005 however, the leader of this region rejected the Georgian president's proposal for autonomy. Yet in March an agreement for the

demilitarisation of the region was nonetheless reached. The first stage involved dismantling trenches and fortifications, followed by steps towards economic cooperation. During the first half of November 2006, the province supported a referendum for independence of the territory which was not internationally recognised, with over 90% of the 50,000 voters in favour of secession and the re-election of E. Kokoity as president of the region. Kokoity indicated that independence from South Ossetia and integration with Russia were his political priorities.

The deadlocked situation in the Abkhazia process can be described as a “dynamic non-peace process” since there has been no progress in key matters: the return of the 200,000 Georgian refugees, the final status of Abkhazia and the future economy of the republic. Georgia’s current proposals call for updating and changing the negotiation mechanisms stipulated in the early 1990s. They also state that a new phase should be entered with direct dialogue between the parties, without preconditions, addressing at least the issue of re-establishing trust. However, the authorities from Abkhazia rejected the offer, arguing that the appropriate conditions for starting negotiations did not yet exist. In April 2008 the President of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, announced a new peace plan to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, offering the region what the Georgian government labelled “unlimited autonomy” within Georgia, and which included the creation of the post of Vice President to be filled by a representative from Abkhazia. The new peace initiative remained along the same lines as the proposals launched by the government in June 2006, although there was greater emphasis on the economic dimension. Predictably the peace proposal was rejected by the Abkhaz leaders, who labelled it as propaganda and repeated their refusal to resume the negotiating process until Georgia withdrew from the Upper Kodori area and a mutual agreement not to use force was signed. During the second half of August 2008, after serious clashes in South Ossetia in the wake of the Georgian armed forces’ attacks on several towns in South Ossetia with a death toll of 300 and a harsh military response by Russia that encroached on South Ossetian land, with Russia formally recognising South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence. With regard to its military presence, Russia kept similar posts in Georgia outside the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, including some in the towns of Senaki (west) and Poti (port city), as well as in zones north of the city of Gori. In early September, at a meeting held in Moscow, the Russian and French presidents agreed to implement the agreement reached in August, by which the Russian troops would withdraw from the zones in Georgia outside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within one month following the deployment of international mechanisms involving no fewer than 200 EU observers, which were to be in place by the 1st of October. This withdrawal was also considered conditional upon a legally binding and documented guarantee not to use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In late May 2009 the Geneva security talks in the southern Caucasus between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia, which were being mediated by the UN, the EU and the OSCE with participation by the USA, were suspended for several days. The Abkhazian delegation withdrew, as it said that the UN Secretary General had not handed in the report on the UN mission in the region on time, and because it deemed it unacceptable that an earlier report considered Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Later the delegations from South Ossetia and Russia also refused to take part in the fifth round of these negotiations after claiming that they were pointless without the presence of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian delegation warned that it would not continue the dialogue if the United Nations and the EU were biased in favour of Georgia. In the midst of constant tensions triggered by a series of maritime incidents, in mid-August the third meeting of the parties to the conflict was held in Gali as part of the mechanism to prevent and manage incidents for the region of Abkhazia. In mid-September, representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia met once again under the auspices of the UN and the EU observation mission (EUMM) as part of the mechanisms to prevent and respond to the incidents agreed to in the Geneva process. At the trilateral meeting, the parties also discussed access to education by the Georgian people living in the district of Gali (Abkhazia). With regard to the region of South Ossetia, which has a de facto independence, in mid-August representatives from Georgia, Ossetia and Russia met in the Georgian town of Dvani as part of the third meeting in the system to prevent and manage incidents. The meeting was facilitated by the EU supervisory mission. Another meeting was held in September. In late October, the EU Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia, Pierre Morel, stated that the talks in Geneva (a dialogue process between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, mediated by the UN, the OSCE

and the EU, with participation by the USA) was entering a second phase whose goal was to achieve a more highly developed security regime and a framework for humanitarian protection with the purpose of boosting regional security. According to Morel, the basic elements for a framework agreement on the non-use of force were slated to be addressed at the next round of talks.

On the 3rd of July 2010 the Georgian government approved an action plan to implement the objectives contained in the “Strategy on the Occupied Territories: Commitment through Cooperation”, which set the government’s guidelines in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The action plan was developed and would be supervised by the Office of the Georgian Minister of State for Reintegration, and it revolved around seven instruments that the government aimed to launch, including neutral contact mechanisms regarding the status, which would consist of officials appointed with the consent of both parties and a small number of individuals based in Sokhumi, Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. Secondly, ID cards and neutral travel documents were being considered for the residents of both pro-independence regions which would enable them to travel abroad as well as access social and educational services in Georgia. Likewise, an economic fund would be created which would be managed by an international organisation and would grant subsidies to organisations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Furthermore, an investment fund would be set up with funds from donor organisations and companies; it would be privately managed and would be earmarked for projects on both sides of the administrative border. In turn, they were considering creating a public cooperation agency as part of the Georgian Ministry for Reintegration which would promote programmes financed with public funds. The other two instruments included the establishment of a financial institution in the two pro-independence regions to facilitate money transfers and other transactions, as well as the creation of an integrated economic and social zone in the areas adjacent to the two administrative borders in to facilitate the development of economic and social services. The Georgian government’s strategy was rejected several times by the authorities from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In November, the president of Georgia, Dmitry Saakashvili, in a speech before the European Parliament, announced Georgia’s unilateral commitment not to use force to restore control over its territory. According to Saakashvili, Georgia would only resort to peaceful means and would retain the right to defend itself only in the case of new attacks or invasion of Georgian soil which remained under Georgia’s control. In recent years, Russia had demanded that Georgia sign agreements not to use force with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia defended a non-aggression pact with Russia, which it regarded as the main actor in the conflict. In the most recent stage, Russian had started to defend unilateral declarations against Georgia using force, although it had refused to adopt a measure of this kind itself, as it was demanding that Georgia do. The decision announced by Saakashvili before the European Parliament was therefore similar to the Russian proposal, although Georgia had asked the international community to label Russia’s military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an occupation. However, he stated that Georgia remained committed to the Geneva negotiating process and that at the same time it believed that it was necessary to embark upon a political dialogue with Russia in order to reverse the consequences of war and set the conditions for peace. According to Saakashvili, Georgia wanted Russia not as an enemy but as a partner, and he stated that Moscow could play a positive role in the transformation of the Caucasus. The Abkhaz regime stated that it mistrusted Georgia’s declaration on the non-use of force, which it described as demagogic. In December, the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced their willingness to pledge not to use force, stating that they would not use force against Georgia, its people, its territory or its armed forces.

The peace process in 2011

In March, Georgia asked Russia to adopt reciprocal measures to Georgia’s commitment not to use force, a measure that had been announced in November by the Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, and reiterated later in formal letters to the EU, OSCE, UN, NATO and the USA. It stated this request in the fifteenth round of talks in the peace process held in Geneva. According to Georgia, the other priority issue

in the new round was the establishment of international security arrangements in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the presence of international police and peacekeeping forces. Until then, Russia had blocked this possibility. Likewise, Russia insisted that it was not a party to the conflict and therefore saw no arguments for signing a pledge not to use force. Meantime, it asked Georgia to sign agreements regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In June, **Georgia threatened a possible withdrawal from the Geneva negotiating process**, alleging Russian plans to plant bombs on Georgian soil. In turn, the co-negotiators from the EU and the UN alerted that several incidents that had taken place in the past few months in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including shots and explosions (three dead in April and two wounded in May) spotlighted the risk of an escalation in the situation. Security issues were at the core of the last round of negotiations in Geneva held on the 7th of June. Alexander Ankvab, Vice President of Abkhazia, was elected to be the new President of the entity with 55% of the votes in the late August elections, which were not recognised by the international community. Ankvab succeeded Sergey Bagapsh, who had died three months earlier. The spokesman for the Georgian Parliament, Davit Bakradze, declared the elections invalid as he viewed them as a struggle between clans controlled by Russia. A new report from the International Crisis Group entitled *Georgia-Russia: Learn to Live like Neighbours*, warned that the tensions between Georgia and Russia were on the rise in a context in which diplomatic relations had been suspended since they were characterised by personal disputes, and in which there were only very limited negotiations with Swiss mediation on Russia's aspirations to enter the World Trade Organisation. The Geneva Process on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained active, although the parties had been unable to reach agreements on substantive issues, such as the return of refugees. Furthermore, there was a risk that the process could collapse given the climate of fragility and tension. Nevertheless, the report stated that since the Geneva Process had begun modest results had indeed been achieved, such as the creation of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM).

In October, the seventeenth round of talks was held in Geneva without any significant headway. The Georgian government denounced the fact that Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were blocking the discussion on any minor issue in order to condition talks on the issue of status. It expressed its disappointment with Russia and its position, which they labelled inflexible. In the meantime, the EU special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Philippe Lefort, stated that the talks were being held in a productive working atmosphere. The OSCE representative, Giedrius Cekuolis, stated that the question on the non-use of force remained a bone of contention between the parties. In December **Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia requested that the discussions about international security arrangements, one of the key aspects, linked until then to the non-use of force, be removed from the Geneva negotiations calendar**. This is a controversial element subject to frequent discussion in the process. According to Russia and the independent *de facto* bodies, the proposals by the co-presidents of the process had not obtained the support of some of the participants, with reference to its own position, and it also alleged that this was a matter that did not form part of the six-point ceasefire agreement mediated by the EU in 2008. Russia suggested that there was no alternative but an agreement that legally linked Georgia and Abkhazia and another similar one between Georgia and South Ossetia, while Georgia always defended joint solutions that included Russia, which it considered to form part of the conflict, something which Russia denied. Georgia, on the other hand, continued to call for an international police presence and peacekeeping forces in both regions, or as an alternative if this were to be a short term measure, the possibility that observers from the EU monitoring mission, the EUMM, should carry out regular fact-finding missions in the regions, to which entry had been vetoed.


Most significant events in the year

Modest results were achieved, such as the creation of the incident prevention and response mechanism.

Websites of interest

AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
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Caucasian Knot (eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru)
Caucaz Euroopenews (www.caucaz.com)
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org)
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Georgia Today (www.georgiatoday.ge)
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Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.iwpr.net)
International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (www.iccn.ge)
International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
Media News (www.medianews.ge)
OSCE Mission to Georgia (www.osce.org/georgia)
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UNAG online Magazine (www.civil.ge)
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UNOMIG (www.unomig.org)

Main actors in the process



MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL – PALESTINE

Context of the conflict

The roots of the conflict date back to the end of World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This led the Palestinian territory to be put under UK administration under the Mandate System adopted by the League of Nations. This mandate lasted from 1922 to 1947. During this time, many Jews immigrated to Palestine, particularly at the time of the Nazi persecution in the 1930s. In 1947 the UK passed the problem on to the United Nations. In the same year, the UN's Resolution 181

Population: Israel (7.6 million inhabitants); Palestine (4.3 million)

Area: Israel (22,000 km²); Palestine (6,240 km²)

HDI: Israel (17 out of 187)

GDP Israel: 192,000 million dollars;

Palestine: 4,500 million dollars

Per capita income Israel: \$25,790; Palestine: \$4,500

Deaths due to the conflict: 7,500 (since 2000)

Refugees: 4.2 million Palestinians

Armed actors: Israeli armed forces, Hamas, Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

Facilitators: Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU, UN), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Arab League (Follow-up Committee), Switzerland.

declared that the territory under British mandate would be divided into two states with no territorial continuity. This division was never wholly implemented. The partition of the Holy Land by the United Nations and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 were the main factors that sparked the current conflict. Shortly after the British left the area, Israel occupied 77% of Palestinian territory and a large part of Jerusalem. Zionist paramilitary groups massacred many Palestinians and drove some 800,000 Palestinians into exile. There were five wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982) before the present conflict. The PLO was founded in 1959, and soon afterwards Yasser Arafat became its leader. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, establishing a security ring around Israel, intensifying the Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and triggering a second exodus of Palestinians (half a million). In 1974 the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the PLO. In 1982 Israel invaded the Lebanon, leading to a large-scale massacre in the Palestine refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, and leading to the expulsion of Arafat in 1983, who went into exile in Tunis. In 1987 the desperation of the occupied Palestinian population led to the first "Intifada" (1987-1992), at the same time that Arafat began gestures aimed at bridging the gap with the United States, convinced that it was the only country capable of putting pressure on Israel. The second Intifada began in September 2000. Since then, more than 5,500 people have died, 80% of them Palestinians. In 2002, Israel began to build a wall to separate the two communities, thus spurring increasing criticism from the international community.

Development of the peace process

In 1990 the first secret negotiations began in Oslo, leading to the signing of an initial agreement between Israel and Palestine in 1993. The talks to reach an agreement were initiated by the Norwegian government, which was reasonably neutral in the conflict. The main architects of the agreements were Johan Jørgen Holst (the Norwegian Foreign Minister), Terje Rød-Larsen and Mona Juul. The negotiations were held in total secrecy in Oslo and its environs, with meetings being held at the home of Minister Holst until the resulting text was signed on the 20th of August and the consequent public ceremony was held on the 13th of September. In essence, the principles contained in the Oslo Agreements include the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the Palestinians' right to self-governance in these zones via the Palestinian Authority. The interim Palestinian government would last five years, during which time the status would be renegotiated (starting in May 1996). The issues of Jerusalem, refugees,

Israeli settlements, security and the exact borders were excluded. The interim self-government would be carried out in phases.

In the Madrid Conference, held two years earlier in 1991, the main topic had been the principle of exchanging "land for peace". In addition, the foundations were laid for a future bilateral negotiation. In 1995 the "Barcelona Process" got under way. The aim of this process was to encourage cooperation among all the Mediterranean countries, including Israel. In 1995 the Oslo II process also started. This addressed the creation of an area under Palestinian control, another area with a mixed administration and an area controlled by Israel, with roadways that would join the areas under Israeli administration. In 1998 this process became completely stalled. Since then, the number of suicide attacks by Palestinians has increased.

The peace negotiations between the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat which the US President, Bill Clinton, attempted to launch at the end of 2000 in Camp David, and which called for the broadening of the zone under Palestinian control and an exchange of territories, came to nothing, as did the negotiations held in January 2001 in Taba (Egypt), which even further broadened the area under Palestinian control and gave access to the Jordan River. After that, the second Intifada began, and the spiral of violence and action-reaction dynamic has justified the halt of numerous plans and proposals put forth by different players, organisations and countries.

By 2002 the conflict had severely worsened. The number of peace initiatives multiplied, such as the creation of an International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, the activities of the Diplomatic Quartet (the USA, Russia, EU and the UN), and their peace plan or "Road Map" of December 2002 in particular. The Road Map was a three-stage plan that would be completed in 2005 with the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In 2005 the conflict between Israel and Palestine worsened considerably following the death of Yasser Arafat, the victory of M. Abbas in the Palestine presidential elections and the subsequent opening up of direct contacts with the Israeli government. Throughout 2006 the difficult peace process between Israel and Palestine was initially marked by the victory of Hamas in the January elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, and by the subsequent international blockade of the new Islamist government, which was conditioned upon recognition of Israel, an end to the violence and acceptance of the agreements signed by the PNA. In April the new prime minister and Hamas leader, I. Haniya, defended the Palestinians' right to carry on their struggle for independence, although he also expressed his desire to embark on talks with international players in order to put an end to the conflict with Israel. He simultaneously expressed his support for ongoing international involvement in the peace process, referring to the Quartet and especially to Europe.

Around the same time, the Egyptian and Jordanian Foreign Ministers visited Israel to present a peace plan that was backed by the Arab League and would include recognition of Israel if it withdrew from the occupied territories. The peace conference held in Annapolis (Maryland, USA) finally ended on the 27th of November. It was the first peace talks between Israel and the PNA in seven years. The conference declared the launch of negotiations based on the Road Map; they were to begin on the 12th of December with the fortnightly meeting of the negotiating teams under the leadership of a joint management committee. The communiqué also stated that they agreed to deal with each of the fundamental issues without exception in an attempt to create an independent Palestinian state. The fundamental issues agreed to, known as the "final status", were the future of Jerusalem, borders, water, refugees and settlements. In August 2008, the Israeli government unveiled a plan in which it offered to grant Palestinians 93% of the West Bank, including a corridor between the West Bank and Gaza which would remain under Israeli sovereignty but where Palestinians could pass freely without Israeli checkpoints. As revealed by the newspaper Haaretz, the plan refused Palestinian refugees' right to return, although it did admit exceptions for the sake of family reunification. The plan made no mention of Jerusalem. After the offer was announced on the 10th of August, the spokesman for the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, declared that the offer was not serious and that they rejected it because it did not include a Palestinian state with territorial continuity and Jerusalem as its capital. In November 2006, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Minister, Tzipi Livni, reaffirmed their commitment to the representatives of the Middle East Quartet meeting in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh to continue

with the peace negotiations. Both representatives reached a series of agreements on the principles to guide the negotiating process. They included: the need to engage in bilateral, direct, uninterrupted and continuous negotiations; the principle that nothing would be considered agreed upon until everything was agreed; and the need to reach a complete agreement that addressed all the issues at stake, as called for in Annapolis, as opposed to an agreement on certain isolated issues.

The beginning of 2009 was profoundly marked by the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip on the 27th of December, the most violent operation since the 1967 war. Before the start of this operation, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, had declared that Israel had to bring down Hamas. The attack was waged at the end of the six-month truce between Hamas and Israel, which ended on the 19th of December. After several attempts, on the 8th of January the UN Security Council approved a resolution submitted by the United Kingdom, Resolution 1860, with 14 votes in favour and the US abstaining, which called for an immediate, lasting and fully respected ceasefire. This ceasefire would entail a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the distribution of provisional food, fuel and medical treatment in the region, and an intensification of international efforts to prevent the illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition in the Gaza Strip. In late May, the Israeli Prime Minister met with the President of the United States in Washington to discuss peace in the Middle East. Obama stated that his administration supported a solution to create two states, one Israeli and one Palestinian. Netanyahu expressed his agreement with greater autonomy, but not with the creation of a second state, alleging that if the government of the new state fell into the hands of Hamas, Israel's security would be seriously compromised. However, Netanyahu also expressed his support for a resumption of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians once they recognised the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. In turn, the Palestinian President stated that his two conditions for the dialogue were the halting of the construction and expansion of the Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory and the allowing of the creation of a Palestinian state. In mid-June, the Israeli Prime Minister delivered a speech at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv in which he stated his willingness to create a Palestinian state as long as it was demilitarised and the Palestinians recognised Israel as a Jewish state.

During the first week of May 2010, it was announced that the indirect talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians would resume in an attempt to make headway in the peace process. The round of talks ended without either signs of progress or a date on which they would continue. The talks were supposed to continue over the next four months and address key issues like Jerusalem and the status of refugees. In June, the death of nine activists after Israel's interception of a seafaring convoy bearing humanitarian aid to Gaza spurred international outcry and required the government of Benjamin Netanyahu to soften the conditions of its blockade on the Palestinian territory. The victims, all of them Turkish citizens, were travelling in the vessel *Mavi Marmara*, which was part of a fleet of six boats transporting 750 activists and 10,000 tonnes of aid to the Gaza Strip. The military action was conducted in international waters and caused dozens of injuries. It sparked widespread international condemnation as it was regarded as a disproportionate use of force against the aid workers. Israel justified its attitude by arguing that the convoy's intentions were illegal and that they ignored the army's warnings to abandon their attempt to reach the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met in Washington on the 2nd of September in a new round of direct talks between the parties, the first in twenty months. Abbas had demanded the total cessation of colony building, including in Jerusalem, as a step prior to dialogue, but he ended up giving in to the intense international pressure, and at least officially, Washington announced that the resumption of contacts was taking place "with no conditions". According to his press declarations, the Israeli prime minister accepted a Palestinian state, but he would not agree to negotiate on the borders prior to the 1967 war; he stated that Jerusalem was the eternal, indivisible capital of Israel and demanded control over the airspace of a future Palestinian state, which from his standpoint should be demilitarised and accept the installation of Israeli bases in the Jordan Valley. Nor could a future Palestinian state sign defensive pacts with countries regarded as the enemies of Israel. In this context, Netanyahu's priorities would be security, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (refugees could only be returned to a Palestinian state) and the end of the conflict, without the possibility of accepting new claims in the future. After the resumption of direct talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis in early September,

uncertainty remained as to the future of the dialogues after Israel's decision not to renew the moratorium on settlement-building in the West Bank. In October, the negotiations were at a stalemate after Israel decided not to extend the moratorium. Mid-month, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered a partial renewal of the moratorium in exchange for the Palestinians' recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Palestinian authorities rejected this proposal by stating that this recognition had nothing to do with the building of colonies in the Occupied Territories. Days earlier, the Arab League had supported the PLO's refusal to negotiate with Israel as long as it did not stop building settlements, although it avoided breaking off the peace process completely.

In late November, the Israeli Parliament approved a law that required a referendum to be held within 180 days before signing any international agreement that would alter the situation in the territories annexed by Israel. Several analysts agreed that the measure would make it more difficult for any Israeli government to agree to withdraw from the territories which Israel formally considered under its sovereignty but which the international community viewed as occupied territories. The Palestinian authorities rejected the Israeli Parliament's decision and stressed that the end of the occupation of Palestinian territories could not depend on a referendum in Israel. In December, **the USA refused to demand that Israel paralyse the construction of settlements** as a condition in the peace negotiations. The US Special Envoy for the Middle East, George Mitchell, met with the President of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, and with the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, as part of an attempt to save the peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis. Mitchell pledged to achieve real progress towards a peace agreement in the forthcoming months.

Regarding the dialogue between the Palestinian groups, in March 2010 the president of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, blamed Iran for blocking the negotiations with the Islamist group Hamas. The leader claimed that Teheran did not want Hamas to sign the reconciliation document being spearheaded by Egypt and recalled that first the Islamist leaders had expressed their willingness to sign the agreement and then later refused to. In early April, the tensions between the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, became clear after Abbas' declarations in which he discarded the Palestinian state's unilateral declaration, one of the key projects being promoted by Fayyad. Longstanding political rivals, both leaders had long taken care not to air their differences in public. However, Fatah sources claimed that Fayyad's rising initiative regarding the Palestinian state and his greater prominence in public had led Abbas to contradict the prime minister in a television interview. In June, several new proposals and ideas for reconciliation between the Palestinian factions were put on the negotiating table. According to the newspaper, which cited Palestinian sources, after the meeting between the head of the Arab league, Amr Moussa, and the head of Hamas in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, new options were being considered to overcome the impasse, one of which entailed that both parties would accept the commitment to take the other's observations regarding the reconciliation document being promoted by Egypt into account. Fatah had signed the initiative in October, but Hamas was demanding that some of its modifications be heeded, an issue that Cairo had categorically rejected. However, Egyptian diplomatic sources cited by the local press recognised that the Egypt agreement "was not the Koran" and admitted the possibilities of modifications that might lead to an agreement. In parallel, Egypt expressed its opposition to any intervention by Turkey in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation efforts. Cairo had rejected an unofficial Turkish proposal to have Turkish, Egyptian and Arab League representatives meet with delegates from Hamas and Fatah. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called on the parties involved in the negotiations to reach an agreement soon or open the door to an intervention by Ankara. Representatives from Hamas and Fatah met in Damascus in late September in an attempt to overcome the obstacles to reconciliation between these Palestinian groups. The points of agreement were regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the Election Committee and the Election Tribunal. In November, **the Palestinian President and the leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Khaled Meshal, announced in Cairo an agreement to end the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process.** In their first meeting after the official rapprochement between both groups the previous May, both leaders agreed to hold elections in May 2012 and to release prisoners.

The peace process in 2011

In January, the Qatari television station Al-Jazeera and the British newspaper *The Guardian* started to leak out more than 1,600 internal documents on the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis during the past decade. These documents revealed that **the Palestinian negotiators offered Israel sovereignty over most of Jerusalem**. According to the documentation, Israel rejected the Palestinians' offer in 2008, even though the Palestinians were ready to let all the Jewish settlements built illegally in Jerusalem to be annexed. The only exception was the colony of Har Homa because it blocked access to Jerusalem from Bethlehem. The texts confirmed what was already known about the meetings in Annapolis sponsored by the previous US administration, in which the **Palestinian representatives renounced refugees' right to return by accepting the return of a symbolic figure of between 5,000 and 10,000**. The documents' main interest lay in the details, which gave a servile image of the Palestinians, who had nothing left to offer, while they spotlighted the intransigent position of both the Israeli and American negotiators. The revelations left Mahmoud Abbas in an uncomfortable position because of the major concessions that his government had offered Israel. These revelations led to the resignation of the chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, who conceded that the leaks originated in the office where his team works.

The Israeli government suspended the transfer of funds to the Palestinian Authority in May in response to the signing of a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah early in the month. The block on the transfer of more than 100 million dollars gathered by Israel on behalf of the PA prevented thousands of Palestinian civil servants from receiving their salaries. The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, asked the Israeli government to release the funds and provide an opportunity for the unity agreement among the Palestinians. Israel justified its decision by the fact that part of the funds to be transferred might reach the hands of Hamas. However, after the violence incidents during the commemoration of Palestine's Nakba Day, Israel decided to release the money, arguing its conviction that the pact between Fatah and Hamas would have no effect. Shortly thereafter, in an anxiously awaited speech on the situation in the Middle East, **the President of the US, Barack Obama, suggested the 1967 borders as the basis of a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis**. Obama demanded that the Palestinians provide guarantees for the security of Israel, and in the climate of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas he warned that the Islamist group must accept the right for a Jewish state to exist. In his speech, Obama also presented an economic aid plan for North Africa and the Middle East, expressed his support of the democratic transition processes taking place in the region and criticised the repression of the popular demonstrations in Libya, Syria and Iran.

The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, met with Obama in Washington the day after the speech and then, in an act of the US Congress, rejected the American leader's plan. Netanyahu claimed that Israel was willing to make "painful" concessions and grant some land, but he stressed that it could not go back to the 1967 borders. Furthermore, he insisted that Jerusalem would not be divided, that the issue of Palestinian refugees could only be resolved outside Israeli borders and that a future Palestinian state must be completely demilitarised. The Israeli Prime Minister also rejected any possibility of negotiating with Hamas. In this context, **the Palestinians maintained their position of proceeding with diplomatic steps towards the UN's recognition of the Palestinian state in September**, a strategy that Obama had objected to. Regarding the US's role in this conflict, it should be noted that the US Special Envoy for the Middle East, George Mitchell, resigned from his post after two years at the helm of a mission that did not achieve rapprochement between Palestinians and Israelis. Likewise, the Egyptian authorities decided to reopen the border crossing at Rafah which connects to the Gaza Strip as part of the efforts to consolidate the reconciliation among Palestinians. This crossing had been blocked for four years, ever since Hamas had taken control of Gaza, and it was only opened sporadically to allow ill people to be transferred or humanitarian aid to enter.

In June, Mahmoud Abbas insisted that the route Palestine was pursuing was still negotiation, but that Netanyahu's position left no alternative other than moving forward in the quest for UN recognition of the Palestinian State unless Israel would agree to negotiate on substantial issues. The Palestinian president claimed that if Israel, the US or the EU did not want this action in the UN, they should present an alternative, but he stressed

that he would not return to the negotiating table without guarantees and without a cessation in Israeli settlement-building. The measure spearheaded by Abbas, which is unlikely to garner unanimous support among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, was taken as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate Israel's isolation. According to reports in the Israeli press, Netanyahu was trying to gather what was called a "moral majority" of 30 countries which would oppose the declaration of the Palestinian state in the General Assembly.

In July, the Quartet for the Middle East, made up of the United States, the EU, Russia and the UN, noted the profound impasse in which the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis had fallen and the prospects for greater confrontation between the parties after September. The senior diplomatic representatives of the Quartet refused to publish a joint communiqué on the issue after their meeting in Washington. According to the US source cited by the press, the Quartet backed Barack Obama's proposal that the pre-1967 borders should serve as the basis for negotiations on two states. However, this issue prompted rifts in Europe, and analysts warned that international divisions on this issue could be particularly delicate in the context of the uprisings and instability in the Middle East. In August, a new outbreak of violence between Palestinians and Israelis left around 30 people dead in the last month and triggered a crisis in relations between Israel and Egypt. Towards the end of the month, Hamas and Israel reached an informal ceasefire thanks to the intermediation of Egypt and the UN.

In September, **the President of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, submitted a request to the United Nations that it recognise and accept Palestine as state number 194 in the international organisation.** Despite pressure from the USA that Abbas desist in this proposal or only submit it to the General Assembly, the Palestinian leader decided to formally submit the request on the 23rd of September, asking for recognition of a Palestinian state at the borders that existed prior to the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. In the months leading up to this event, Palestinian diplomats had managed to secure support for a Palestinian state from 127 countries. Palestine's request to the UN was submitted with the context of a total halt in talks with the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. In his speech before the UN, Abbas stressed that the PLO was willing to resume negotiations based on the 1967 borders after a total cessation in settlement-building in the Occupied Territories. In his speech before the UN, Abbas dismissed the criticisms of Netanyahu's government which stated that Palestine's demand sought to isolate and delegitimize Israel. The US warned that it would veto Palestine's motion, which required the support of nine of the fifteen countries in the UN Security Council and no vote against it among the permanent Security Council members in order to be accepted. The use of the veto would be complicated for the US at a time when it was trying to rebuild its ties with the Middle East and within the context of the Arab Spring uprisings, since it entailed open opposition to one of the most emblematic issues for the region. After the message by the Palestinian leader and Netanyahu before the General Assembly, the Quartet for the Middle East – the USA, Russia, the EU and the UN – suggested a new timeline for the negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, which were to be resumed within at most one month, in order to address the key issues within a period of three to six months and to reach a peace agreement in at most one year. In parallel, the Security Council started the process to consider Palestine's initiative, which could be delayed weeks or even months before being analysed. In October, the Israeli government and Hamas reached an agreement on the exchange of prisoners: the release of soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for the release from prison of more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. Likewise, UNESCO admitted Palestine as a full member of the organisation despite open opposition from the USA and Israel. After UNESCO's decision, the USA announced that it would suspend its economic support for the organisation, which is equivalent to 70 million dollars per year or 22% of UNESCO's total budget.

In November the US special envoy for the Middle East, Dennis Ross, resigned. He was the second US to leave the post in six months, following the resignation of Senator George Mitchell. In December Israel completed the second stage of exchanging Palestinian prisoners following the freeing of Gilad Shalit, a soldier who had been held by Hamas since 2006. The second list contained the names of 550 prisoners and was drawn up exclusively by Israel, excluding those with Islamic pasts. At the beginning of January 2012, Israel and the National Palestine Authority resumed peace talks in Jordan, on the request of that country, in re-

sponse to a call by the Diplomatic Quartet for the Middle East. The negotiations had been broken off since September 2010, when Israel refused to extend a partial moratorium of ten months that it had declared in the construction of settlements.

Regarding the unity of the Palestinian groups, in April Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement that put an end to a deep-seated rift between the two Palestinian factions since 2007. The pact came about after several secret meetings in Cairo and stipulated the formation of a coalition government in the Palestinian Authority and presidential and legislative elections to be held within one year. The agreement would also include pacts on security, the reorganisation of the PLO to allow Hamas to join it and the release of political prisoners. Israel claimed that this agreement would hinder any peace negotiations. The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, warned that Fatah has to choose between peace with Israel or peace with Hamas, because peace with both was not possible. However, the spokesman for the Palestinian Authority responded that this was an internal Palestinian agreement and that Israel should not interfere with it. In late May, delegations from Fatah and Hamas signed a joint declaration in Moscow. According to press reports, it was an agreement to execute the commitments taken on in Cairo. Russia was part of the Quartet for the Middle East, which also included the USA, the EU and the UN. Unlike the EU and the USA, which kept Hamas on their terrorist lists, Moscow maintained relations with this Islamist group. In November the Palestine president and leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, announced an agreement in Cairo to finalise the process of intra-Palestine reconciliation. In its first meeting following the official rapprochement of the two groups last May, both leaders agreed to hold elections in May 2012 and on the freeing of prisoners.

Most significant events in the year

President Obama suggested the 1967 borders as the basis of a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected the US leader's plan.


Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement that put an end to a deep-seated rift between the two Palestinian factions since 2007.

The President of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, submitted a request to the United Nations that it recognise and accept Palestine as state number 194 in the international organisation.

Websites of interest

Alternative Information Center (www.alternativenews.org)
BBC (news.bbc.co./2/hi/middle-east/default.stm)
Haaretz (www.haaretz.com)
Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
IPCRI (www.ipcri.org)
Middle East Research and Information Project (www.merip.org)
Mideast Web (www.mideastweb.org)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa)
Mundo Árabe (www.mundoarabe.org)
United Nations (www.un.org/spanish/peace/palestine) (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
PLO Negotiation Affairs Department (www.nad-plo.org/index.php)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Wikipedia (peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict)

Main actors in the process



Appendix

Appendix 1. THE ACTORS IN THE ARMED CONFLICTS ANALYSED

Nigeria (Delta)	Government and armed opposition group MEND
Senegal (Casamance)	Government and armed opposition group MFDC
Ethiopia	Government and armed opposition group ONLF
Somalia	Government and armed opposition group al-Shabab
Sudan (Darfur)	Government and armed opposition groups JEM, SLA and LJM
Chad	Government and armed opposition groups UFR and FPR
CAR	Government and armed opposition group CPJP faction
DR Congo	Government and armed opposition group FRF faction
Sahara	Government of Morocco and Polisario Front
Colombia	Government and guerrillas del ELN and las FARC
Afghanistan	Government and Taliban
India	Government and Naxalite armed opposition groups ULFA, NDFB, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and UPDS
India-Pakistan	Governments of India and Pakistan
China-Tibet	Governments of China and Tibet in exile
Philippines	Government and guerrillas MILF, MNLF and NPA
Myanmar	Government, political opposition group NLD and Karen guerrilla
Moldova	Governments of Moldova and de la region of Transnistria
Cyprus	Governments of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities
Kosovo	Governments of Serbia and de la self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo
Turkey	Government and guerrilla del PKK
Armenia-Azerb.	Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Georgia	Government and authorities of the self-proclaimed autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Iraq	Government, Al Qaeda and various Islamist militias
Israel-Palestine	Government of Israel and Palestinian National Authority
Palestine	Palestinian groups
Yemen	Government and armed opposition group Al-Houthi

Appendix 2. CONFLICTS WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS IN 2011

Start of conflict	Kind	Main actors	Intensity
Africa			
Algeria (AQMI) -1992-	Internal internationalised	Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), Governments of Mauritania, Mali and Niger	2
	System		
Libya -2011-	Internal internationalised	Government; pro-government militias; political, social and armed opposition; international coalition	3
	Government		
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Internal internationalised	Government, Islamist group Boko Haram	1
	System		
	Government		
DR Congo (east) -1998-	Internal internationalised	Government, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FDLR-RUD, CNDP, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian armed opposition group FNL, Ugandan armed opposition groups ADF-NALU and LRA, Rwanda, MONUC	3
	Identity, Government, Resources		
Somalia -1988-	Internal internationalised	New Transitional Federal Government (TFG) –which has been joined by the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and is supported by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, warlords, Ethiopia, USA, AMISOM–, radical faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS)– made up of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabab– and supported by Eritrea.	3
	Government		
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Internal	Government, armed group SPLM-N, Murle militias	2
	Self-government, Identity		
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		
Southern Sudan -2009-	Internal	Revolting soldiers, community militias, government, army (SPLA), political parties in the south	3
	Government, Resources		
Uganda (north) -1986-	Internal internationalised	Ugandan, Central African, Congolese and government armed forces from the semi-autonomous government of Southern Sudan, (SPLA), pro-government militias from DR Congo and Southern Sudan, LRA	2
	Self-government, Identity		
Americas			
Colombia -1964-	Internal internationalised	Government, FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups	3
	System		
Asia			
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Internal internationalised	Government, Abu Sayyaf	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internal internationalised	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul-Mujahideen	2
	Self-government, Identity		

India (Manipur) -1982-	Internal	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA, KYKL, RPF	1
	Self-government, Identity		
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	3
	System		
Pakistan -2001-	Internal internationalised	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, USA	3
	System		
Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, BLA, BRA, BLF and BLT	2
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		
Thailand (south) -2004-	Internal	Government, secessionist armed opposition groups	2
	Self-government, Identity		
Europe			
Russia (Chechnya) -1999-	Internal	Russian federal government, government of the Republic of Chechnya, armed opposition groups	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		
Russia (Dagestan) -2010-	Internal	Russian federal government, government of the Republic of Dagestan, armed opposition groups	2
	System, Self-government, Identity		
Russia (Ingushetia) -2008-	Internal	Russian federal government, government of the Republic of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Jamaat Ingush)	1
	System, Self-government, Identity		
Turkey (southeast) -1984-	Internal internationalised	Government, PKK, TAK	2
	Self-government, Identity		
Middle East			
Iraq -2003-	Internal internationalised	Government, international coalition led by the USA/UK, internal and external armed opposition groups	3
	System, Government, Resources		
Yemen -2011-	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, pro-government militias, deserted soldiers, armed tribal groups	2
	Government		
Yemen (AQPA) -2011-	Internal internationalised	Government, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, USA, Saudi Arabia	2
	System		
1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity			

Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Alerta 2012! Informe sobre conflictos y construcción de paz, Icaria, 2012.

Appendix 3. AGE OF THE CONFLICTS WITH NO NEGOTIATIONS

	Year of the conflict	Age	Notes
Colombia	1964	47	
Myanmar	1967	44	Proposals from the Military Junta to the majority of armed ethnic groups, 1967 is the date that the group ALP was created.
India (CPI-M)	1967	44	The government has made proposals for negotiations.
India (Manipur)	1982	29	
India (Assam)	1983	28	The government and the ULFA have plans for formal negotiations in 2011.
Uganda	1986	25	
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	1991	20	
Algeria	1992	19	
DR Congo (east)	1998	13	
Russia (Chechnya)	1999	12	
Others	after 2000	-10	

Appendix 4. THE FACILITATORS IN THE CONFLICTS ANALYSED

Nigeria (Delta)	Wole Soyinka
Senegal (Casamance)	-
Ethiopia (ONLF)	-
Somalia	-
Sudan (Darfur)	Qatar (Ahmed Abdullah al-Mahmud), UN-AU (Djibril Bassolé)
Chad	Libya
CAR	Paulin Pomodimo, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
DR Congo	-
Western Sahara	UN (Christopher Ross)
Colombia	-
Afghanistan	Jirga, Saudi Arabia
India (Assam)	Mamoni Raisom Goswami
India-Pakistan	-
China-Tibet	-
Philippines (MILF)	Malaysia (Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak)
Philippines (MNLF)	Indonesia
Philippines (NPA)	Norway (Ture Lundh)
Myanmar	-
Cyprus	UN (Alexander Downer)
Kosovo	-
Moldova	OSCE (Philip Remler)
Turkey	-
Armenia-Azerbaijan	Minsk Group of the OSCE: France (Bernard Fassier), Russia (Igor Popov) and USA (Robert Bradtke)
Georgia	UN, OSCE, EU
Israel-Palestine	Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU, UN)
Palestine	Egypt, Qatar
Yemen	Qatar

Appendix 5. NEGOTIATION TIMES IN CERTAIN CONFLICTS (STATUS AT THE END OF 2011)

	Start of the conflict	Start of the negotiations	Years the conflict lasted	Years until the first negotiation
India-Pakistan	1947	1949	64	2
Guatemala	1960	1989	36	29
Colombia – ELN	1964	1991	47	27
Colombia – FARC	1964	1983	47	19
Palestine	1967	1990	44	23
Philippines – NPA	1969	1986	43	17
Northern Ireland	1970	1985	35	15
Philippines - MNLF	1972	1993	24	21
Cyprus	1974	1974	37	0
Angola	1975	1991	27	16
Cabinda	1975	2002	30	27
Western Sahara	1975	1991	36	16
Timor-Leste	1975	1998	24	23
Indonesia – GAM	1976	2000	29	24
Philippines – MILF	1978	1998	33	20
India – CPI	1980	2002	31	22
India – NSCN	1980	2003	31	23
Senegal – MFDC	1982	1991	24	9
Sri Lanka	1983	1983	26	0
Sudan – SPLA	1983	1999	22	16
Ethiopia – ONLF	1984	1998	27	4
Turkey – PKK	1986	1994	25	8
Uganda – LRA	1984	2009	27	25
Armenia-Azerb.	1991	1994	20	3
Sierra Leone	1991	1996	10	5
Somalia	1991	2000	20	9
Algeria	1992	1999	19	7
Bosnia-H.	1992	1992	3	0
Georgia-Abkhazia	1992	1992	19	0
Tajikistan	1992	1994	5	2
Burundi –FNL	1993	2002	13	9
Nigeria-MEND	1994	2008	17	14
DR Congo – FDLR	1994	2004	17	10
Nepal – CPN	1996	2003	10	7
Congo- Ninjas	1998	1999	5	1
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998	1998	2	0
DR Congo	1998	1998	3	0
Liberia-Lurd	2000	2002	3	2
Ivory Coast	2002	2002	4	0
Sudan – Darfur	2003	2003	8	0
Yemen	2004	2006	7	2
Sudan - east	2005	2006	1	1
Kenya	2008	2008	1	0
Georgia - Russia	2008	2008	1	0

(Bold type indicates the conflicts that are finished).

Appendix 6. DEMANDS FOR SELF-GOVERNANCE IN PEACE PROCESSES

Angola (Cabinda)	The armed opposition group FLEC demands advanced autonomy for the region. It used to demand independence.
Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Both countries are negotiating a status for the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, a self-proclaimed independent republic with an Armenian majority located in Azerbaijani territory. Azerbaijan proposes a system of autonomy within its territory.
China (Tibet)	The region of Tibet is calling for autonomous status within China. It is holding negotiations with this country.
Cyprus	The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities are negotiating to create a bizonal and bicomunal state with UN facilitation. In the latest rounds, they have addressed issues of power-sharing and governance.
Philippines (MILF)	The armed opposition group MILF gave up its demands for independence, but it is demanding formulas for self-government that express a higher degree of autonomy for the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The current negotiations are focused on recognition of the ancestral lands claimed by the MILF.
Georgia (Abkhazia)	An autonomous region of Georgia, in 1992 Abkhazia proclaimed itself independent "de facto". After clashes with Georgia in 2008, it severed all its ties with this country and proclaimed its independence, which has been recognised by Russia. Since then, there have been negotiations between Georgia, Russia and Abkhazia with mediation by the UN, the OSCE and the EU, to find a solution.
Georgia (South Ossetia)	An autonomous region of Georgia, in 1990 South Ossetia proclaimed itself a sovereign republic, and after clashes with Georgia in 2008 it severed all its ties with Georgia and proclaimed its independence, which has been recognised by Russia. All the UN members except Nauru, Nicaragua and Venezuela consider this territory part of Georgia. Since then, there have been negotiations between Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia mediation by the UN, the OSCE and the EU, to find a solution.
India (Assam)	The armed opposition group ULFA is demanding a referendum on independence, but the government will not grant this request until the group gives up violence. The negotiations may focus on federal models. The ULFA is asking for the release of its leaders as a condition for negotiating.
India (Nagaland)	The armed opposition group NSCM-IM upholds its claims to integrate all the lands inhabited by the Naga people into a single territorial entity, while the government states that it is willing to grant Nagaland the maximum autonomy, even if this means reforming the constitution if necessary.
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	Both countries have been conducting trust-building measures for years in an effort to reach a solution for the disputed region of Kashmir, with proposals of autonomy for Kashmir without defined borders in order to detract importance from the frontier demarcation and a withdrawal of the troops deployed in the region.
Indonesia (Aceh)	The 2005 peace agreement signed between the armed opposition group GAM and the government stipulates broad autonomy for the region of Aceh after the GAM abandoned its claims for independence. The region has been governed by the leader of the GAM since the December 2006 elections.
Northern Ireland	This is an autonomous administrative subdivision of the United Kingdom. According to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement approved by the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland through a referendum held in each place, a Legislative Assembly was set up in Northern Ireland and a British-Irish Council was established with representatives from all the parts of the British Isles.
Moldova (Transnistria)	Even though the region of Transnistria is regarded internationally as an integral part of the Republic of Moldova, most of its inhabitants consider it autonomous since September 1990, when it declared its independence with the name of the <i>Trans-Dniester Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</i> within <i>Moldova</i> . <i>The OSCE is the body charged with the negotiations to find a solution to the conflict and to define the region's status.</i>
Western Sahara	The Polisario Front is calling for a referendum on self-determination in which it can choose the option of independence. However, the government of Morocco rejects this option and is only offering the choice of voting for an autonomy plan for Western Sahara.
Senegal (Casamance)	The government of Senegal has offered negotiations with the two factions of the armed opposition group MFDC, which is calling for self-government for the region of Casamance.
Serbia (Kosovo)	The government of Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 and is recognised by countries like Albania, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia and the United States, while others such as Serbia, Russia, Romania and Spain oppose it and refuse to recognise it. The government of Serbia asked the International Court of Justice to hand down a ruling on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. This ruling came in July 2010, endorsing the validity of the declaration of independence.
Southern Sudan	After the 2005 peace agreement between the government and the SPLA, it was agreed to hold a referendum on self-determination in 2011 so that the population of southern Sudan could choose between autonomy or independence for the region. The result of the referendum was clearly in favour of independence.


**Appendix 7. RANK OCCUPIED BY THE COUNTRIES ANALYSED BASED
ON THEIR GLOBAL PEACE INDEX¹
(over a total of 153 countries)**

Rank	Country	Score
28	Spain	1.641
58	Morocco	1.887
59	Moldavia	1.892
71	Cyprus	2.013
77	Senegal	2.047
80	China	2.054
84	Serbia	2.071
109	Armenia	2.260
119	Niger	2.356
122	Azerbaijan	2.379
127	Turkey	2.411
133	Myanmar	2.538
134	Georgia	2.558
135	India	2.570
136	Philippines	2.574
138	Yemen	2.670
139	Colombia	2.700
142	Nigeria	2.743
144	Central African Republic	2.869
145	Israel	2.901
146	Pakistan	2.905
148	DR Congo	3.015
150	Afghanistan	3.212

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, "Global Peace Index 2011". <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/>

¹ This index is made up of 22 indicators which analyse countries' internal and external peace.

Appendix 8. TELL ME WHAT IT WAS LIKE... THE MIRRORS OF PEACE



Even though all the conflicts and their respective peace processes or negotiations are different, there tend to be certain aspects in each of them that explain why they attract attention, such as their methodology, objectives or other reasons. This table illustrates the processes in which the actors, either governmental or armed, have studied, observed or travelled to other regions to find out firsthand how their process unfolded, creating interesting mirrors where inspiration can be found for dealing with their own difficulties.

Appendix 9. CONFLICTS, PEACE PROCESSES AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN 2011

Angola	
Nigeria	
Senegal	
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Libya	1973 – 2008 - 2016 -2017 -2022
Somalia	1972 – 1976 – 2002 – 2010 – 2015 - 2020
Sudan	1978 – 1982 – 1990 – 1996 – 1997 – 2003 -2024 -2032
Chad	
CAR	2031
DR Congo	1991 -2021
Uganda	
Algeria	
Western Sahara	1979
Colombia	
Afghanistan	1974 -2011
India	
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	
Pakistan	
China (Tibet)	
Philippines	
Myanmar	
Thailand (south)	
Cyprus	1986 - 2020
Kosovo	
Turkey (PKK)	
Armenia-Azerbaijan	
Georgia	
Moldova (Transnistria)	
Russia (Chechnya)	
Russia (Ingushetia)	
Iraq	2001
Israel-Palestine	1994 – 2004
Yemen	

Appendix 10. MANAGING THE PAST IN RECENT PEACE AGREEMENTS

Country	Year of peace agreement	Initiatives	Year	Delay
El Salvador	1992	Creating a Truth Commission and subsequent general amnesty	1992	0 years
South Africa	1994	Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	1994	0 years
Guatemala	1996	Creating a Historical Clarification Commission	1997	1 year
		Creating an International Commission against Impunity	2007	11 years
Tajikistan	1997	Creating a National Reconciliation Commission which approved a law on mutual pardon and a draft amnesty law	—	—
Northern Ireland	1998	Creating a Consultative Group on the Past , which has not found the support to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2007	9 years
Angola	2002	—	—	—
Sierra Leone	2002	Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the existence of a Special Court for Sierra Leone	2002	0 years
Liberia	2003	Amnesty after the peace agreement and later creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2005	2 years
Indonesia (Aceh)	2005	The peace agreement granted amnesty to the members of the GAM and called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be set up, which has not yet been done	—	—
Southern Sudan	2005	—	—	—
Nepal	2006	In 2009, there was a verbal commitment to create a Commission on Disappeared Persons and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	—	—
Burundi	2008	The peace agreement contained provisional immunity for the FNL members and its transformation into a political party. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be created	—	—

Appendix 11. PEACE PROCESSES COMPARED

This appendix summarises the peace processes that have taken place in 12 countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Angola, South Africa, Liberia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Burundi, Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal. It encompasses processes begun between 1984 (El Salvador) and 2002 (Nepal), which lasted between four years in Nepal and 21 years in Northern Ireland. The majority had mediators (four by the United Nations), and as for the underlying causes, four were the democratisation of the country, five were political power-sharing and three were self-governance. In two of the processes (Guatemala and South Africa), there was widespread participation by society, while the remaining processes were conducted in a more pyramidal fashion. Once the agreements were reached, an amnesty for combatants was called in all the countries, although Truth Commissions were created in only some of them. All the opposition groups that fought in the conflict ended up holding positions of responsibility in the new governments that emerged after the peace agreements.

	Negotiation period	Years	Mediation	Underlying cause
El Salvador	1984-1994	10	UN	Democratisation of the country
Guatemala	1985-1996	11	UN	Democratisation of the country
Northern Ireland	1987-2008	21	-	Self-governance
Angola	1988-2002	14	Portugal, Russia, USA	Political power-sharing
South Africa	1989-1994	5	-	Democratisation of the country
Liberia	1990-2003	13	ECOWAS	Political power-sharing
Tajikistan	1992-1997	5	UN	Political power-sharing
Sierra Leone	1994-2002	8	UN	Political power-sharing
Southern Sudan	1998-2005	7	IGAD	Self-governance
Burundi	1998-2008	10	Tanzania, South Africa	Political power-sharing
Indonesia (Aceh)	2000-2005	5	CDH Finland	Self-governance
Nepal	2002-2006	4	-	Democratisation of the country

The reasons for engaging in negotiations and starting the peace processes were diverse, but in all cases the people's weariness with war and desire for peace were crucial. In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the regional context favourable to talks (Contadora Group) played a key role, as it did in Tajikistan. In Guatemala, the presidential elections that fostered a change in the political scene were influential, while in Northern Ireland and South Africa the economic need to achieve peace was an important factor. In Tajikistan and South Africa, the fact that the guerrillas no longer had a safe rearguard was a determining factor. External pressure exerted an influence in South Africa, Angola, southern Sudan and Burundi. The humanitarian crisis was the trigger in southern Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh); in the latter country, a natural catastrophe, the tsunami, catalysed the process. Finally, in Nepal, popular demonstrations against the monarchy paved the way for the negotiations that led to the definitive peace agreement.

The process in El Salvador

A civil war broke out in 1980 which led to the death of 75,000 people, as the FMLN guerrillas clashed with the country's repressive militaristic government. In 1983, the Security Council approved a resolution in which it stated its support for the peace-building activities of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), which had embarked on a series of consultations in five Central American countries. Between 1984 and 1987, the first four exploratory dialogue encounters were held, to no avail, between the government and FMLN representatives. These talks were mediated by the archbishop of El Salvador, Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas. At the last meeting, the Nunciature Round in October 1987, a communiqué was issued that expressed the desire to reach a ceasefire and to back the decisions taken by the Contadora Group. This was a stage in which both parties' positions matured and became more flexible. The Esquipulas Process gained prominence in 1986, which used the efforts of the Contadora Group and was joined by the Support Group (Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) with the backing of the OAS and the UN. Between 1987 and 1990, the Central American presidents called for a negotiated political solution.

In September 1989, the Secretary General of the United Nations conducted his first good offices spurred by a request by President Cristiani and the FMLN made in Mexico. The Secretary General appointed Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto

his special representative. The agreement signed in Mexico between the government and the FMLN included a decision to embark on a dialogue process with the purpose of putting an end to the armed conflict. However, in November, the FMLN launched a general offensive to demonstrate its strength. The offensive was contained by the armed forces, leading both parties to reach the conclusion that they were militarily tied.

In April 1990, a dialogue meeting was held in Geneva sponsored by the United Nations and in the presence of the Secretary General. At this meeting, an agreement was signed that laid down a series of rules to be followed in the negotiation process and stated both parties' desire to reach a negotiated, political solution. The goals were to end the armed conflict via political means, to promote the country's democratisation, to ensure unlimited respect for human rights and to reunify Salvadoran society. In May of the same year, a meeting was held in Caracas where a general negotiating agenda and calendar were drawn up. The process was divided into two phases: in the first, political agreements would be reached in areas that enabled the armed conflict to come to an end; and in the second, the guarantees and conditions needed for the FMLN to rejoin the country's civil, institutional and political life would be set forth. In July, the San José Agreement (Costa Rica) was reached, which outlined both parties' commitment to respect human rights and called for a UN verification mission (the future ONUSAL) before reaching a ceasefire.

In April 1991, an agreement was reached in Mexico City in which the negotiations on land tenancy were considered closed and constitutional reforms on judicial, military, electoral and human rights matters were included. The Truth Commission was created to investigate the serious violent deeds that had taken place since 1980; the commission received more than 22,000 grievances. In May, UN Security Council Resolution 693 was approved, which stipulated the formation of a United Nations Observers' Mission for El Salvador, whose initial mandate was to verify compliance with the San José Human Rights Agreements. Later, its mandate would be expanded. The mission had a three-fold organisation: a human rights division, a military division and police observers. In September, the UN Secretary General intervened directly by seating the parties in New York (New York Agreement) at a summit at which they agreed to the minimum security guarantees for a ceasefire. These guarantees were later verified by the nascent National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), made up of all the political forces in the country. In December, final negotiations were held at the UN headquarters in New York, and on the 31st of this same month an agreement was reached.

In January 1992, a general amnesty was declared and the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed, which led to a change in the armed forces (elimination of officers involved in the dirty war and reduction in troops), the creation of the National Civil Police force, the dissolution of the military intelligence services, the elimination of the paramilitary corps, a change in the judicial system, the defence of human rights, the creation of a Truth Commission, changes in the electoral system, the transformation of the FMLN into a political party, the adoption of economic and social measures and the expansion of the ONUSAL mandate (Military and Police Division). February witnessed a cessation of the armed clash and the start of demobilisation. In December, the FMLN was legalised as a political party, and the next day, the definitive end to the conflict was officially celebrated.

There were several determining factors in reaching the agreements: the Salvadoran people's desire for peace, changes in civil law, the de-legitimisation of the armed forces, the murder of six Jesuit priests, the military standoff between the armed forces and the FMLN, more flexible positions, United Nations mediation, the efforts of friendly countries (Spain, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), the positive role played by the Catholic Church and the National Reconciliation Commission, the new geopolitical scene (end of the Soviet empire, defeat of the Sandinistas), pressure from the United States late in the game and the influence of the Contadora Group. The process lasted ten years.

The process in Guatemala

Just like many peace processes, the one in Guatemala needed many years, more than one decade, to transform the earliest contacts into the agreement signed in 1996. The origins date back to 1983, when Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formed the Contadora Group with the purpose of stimulating democratic changes in Central America and generating, in little time, regional pressure in favour of peace in the region. The Contadora Group is an example of how an external factor can become a driving force in creating an atmosphere that is friendly to dialogue and negotiation, to such an extent that these processes would not have existed in Guatemala, nor in El Salvador and Nicaragua, without this initiative.

Furthermore, the regional pressure dovetailed with the first steps towards civility taken inside the country shortly thereafter. Guatemala had been enmeshed in years of conflict and militarisation, and it was not until 1984 that Guatemalan

military officers gave the first signs of agreeing to transfer power to civilian hands. These signs materialised in the 1985 presidential elections, which Vinicio Cerezo won. He became the president who launched the much-awaited transition to democracy after years of military dictatorship. Cerezo was also the first to make overtures to the guerrillas, specifically in Spain at the headquarters of the Guatemalan embassy, in an initial exploration of the URNG guerrilla's willingness to embark on a negotiation process. Even though the right conditions were not in place at that time, the encounter was decisive for starting a maturation process which would bear fruit years later. In any event, without the courage to take this first step and in the absence of Cerezo's vision of the future, peace would never have been achieved in Guatemala.

In 1986 and 1987, there was yet another regional push with the Esquipulas I and II Agreements, with the slogan "peace for democracy". The upshot of these meetings was the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala, which in the ensuing years would play a prominent role in achieving peace. In parallel, pro-peace social and religious groups also blossomed. They would end up being the hallmark of Guatemala's experience: the decisive contribution of its civil society in a scope of involvement rarely seen in peace processes. At that time, the contribution by a single person, the U.S. Lutheran pastor Paul Wee, was also crucial. Wee was the former Secretary General of the Lutheran World Federation whose good offices fostered the earliest encounters between the URNG and the military. While in South Africa the human factor is discussed in reference to the decisive contribution by Nelson Mandela, the history of Guatemala must pay tribute to the crucial figure of Paul Wee, as without his efforts the process would have taken another pace and a different course. Paul Wee fostered the creation of a favourable atmosphere, which paved the way for the Grand National Dialogue called in 1989.

In 1990, an extremely important process got underway that was dubbed the "Oslo Consultations", as the first meeting between the URNG and the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was held in that city, which enshrined Norway as one of the most active countries in peace diplomacy. That encounter ushered in a series of meetings between CNR delegates and the URNG in different countries: in El Escorial, Spain, with the presence of the political parties; in Ottawa, Canada, with the business sector; in Quito, Ecuador, with the religious groups; in Metepec, Mexico, with representation of the people and trade unions; and finally in Atlixco, Mexico, with the representatives of educational organisations, small business owners and university colleges. These meetings laid the groundwork for the start of direct negotiations between the URNG and the government in 1991. These negotiations lasted five years. President Serrano, who replaced Cerezo, launched the Total Peace initiative, which made it possible to sign an agreement in Mexico in April with an eleven-point negotiation agenda. The main items included strengthening civil society and the role of the army, indigenous peoples, constitutional reform and the election system, resettling the displaced population, socioeconomic conditions and agricultural reform. A second round of negotiations was held in Querétaro, Mexico, in July, at which the principles for the democratisation of the country were discussed. As can be seen, much of Guatemala's process was conducted outside the country.

In 1993, under the presidency of Ramiro de León, institutional reforms were undertaken in Guatemala and the National Reconciliation Commission was disbanded. However, a permanent peace fund was created to give the people a voice, and at the end of the year, more formal negotiations were launched with the URNG after several "ecumenical encounters" organised by pastor Paul Wee. The following year, negotiation rounds were held in Mexico, and UN mediation got underway with the Framework Agreement for Resumption of the Negotiation Process; this entailed a series of rounds that lasted until the final agreement, signed in 1996. The figure of "friendly countries" was launched, which included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States and Venezuela. These countries provided diplomatic and economic support to the project. The United Nations created MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala), whose mandate lasted until 2004. In March, the important Global Agreement on Human Rights was signed by the government and the URNG. It is worth noting that this agreement was signed without a ceasefire, that is, in the midst of the hostilities, but with the purpose of "humanising" the war. It was agreed to ask that a Standing Civil Society Assembly be created, which started in April of that year and lasted until 1996. Its mandate was to debate the underlying issues addressed in the bilateral negotiations. With the ASC, Guatemala's process provided a hugely enriching model of citizen participation, as it is one of the processes in which civil society had the most chances to influence the negotiating table under an operating scheme in which ten delegates were appointed for each social sector represented. These delegates were charged with adopting "least common denominator" proposals to be brought to the negotiating table.

Finally, a peace agreement was signed in 1996 that put an end to 36 years of armed conflict. It consisted of 13 agreements and 300 commitments, not all of which were fulfilled, partly because they were overly ambitious and partly because a referendum which was supposed to ratify some of them failed to pass in 1999. Thus, the process in Guatemala is criticised for having overly high aspirations, which sheds light on the dilemma of which is better: a less ambitious but more realistic agreement, or the opposite. In any event, the agreement put an end to the armed violence and enabled an International Commission against Impunity to be created years later in 2007.

The process in Northern Ireland

The peace process in Northern Ireland lasted a little over a decade. Its immediate origins date back to the mid-1980s, when the atmosphere was conducive to peace, either because of weariness with war, contagion from other processes, the economic need to achieve peace, support from the new US administration or the people's fervent desire for peace. In 1987, the first secret talks were launched between John Hume, leader of Northern Ireland's Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the British government. Eleven years later, Hume was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to peace in Northern Ireland. In 1990, the channel of communication was opened with the leaders of Sinn Féin, and in December 1993 the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, which accepted Northern Ireland's right to self-determination and pledged to facilitate an agreement with the Irish people, as well as allowing Sinn Féin to join the political dialogue. This led the IRA to declare a ceasefire in 1994, which lasted until February 2006. In January 2005, the loyalist paramilitary groups declared a ceasefire, and in November of the same year, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, travelled to Northern Ireland, which amounted to an enormous boost to the peace process.

In June 1996, inclusive multi-party negotiations were held, initially without Sinn Féin, with the mediation of former US Senator George Mitchell. These negotiations operated under the principle of "sufficient consensus", that is, the decisions were taken by simple majority, as long as the main parties participated. Decision-making also included what was called "parallel consent", in which a majority of both nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants was needed. The negotiations were conducted under the principle that "nothing was agreed until everything was agreed"; that is, the partial agreements would not be valid until everything had been agreed to. Under former Senator Mitchell's mediation, it was stipulated that only peaceful and political means would be used in the process. This was called the "Mitchell principles". At this time, the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, demonstrated her courage by visiting prisons to meet with prisoners from the IRA and protestant paramilitary groups with the purpose of convincing them to take part in the peace process. In 1997, the IRA declared a second truce, which allowed Sinn Féin to rejoin the multi-party talks. Finally, a peace agreement called the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed in April 1998. This agreement called for police reform, reform of the institutions of Northern Ireland, the formation of a British-Irish Ministerial Council, a North South Ministerial Council and a Human Rights Commission. Seven years later, in 2005, the IRA gave up its armed struggle. In 2007, a government shared between Catholics and Protestants was started, and the IRA was officially, permanently disbanded in 2008. Reconciliation will take many years and the wounds will probably not be fully healed for another generation, but at least headway can be made in the absence of attacks.

The process in Angola

The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and lasted 26 years, causing half a million deaths. It pitted the government forces of the MPLA, who received support from the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc countries, against the rebel forces of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi and initially supported by the United States, South Africa, Zaire and other African governments. The first attempt at negotiations came in December 1988, when an agreement was forcibly signed in New York; however, it did not address the causes of the conflict or entail an interruption in foreign interference. The first important official agreements (the Bicesse Agreement in May 1991 and the Lusaka Agreement in November 1994), both reached under the auspices of the international community, did not manage to put a halt to the military clashes, while the third one, the Luena Memorandum from 2002, in which the international community hardly played a role, enabled a cessation of hostilities to be reached and put an end to the war.

The official negotiations began in Portugal in 1990 under the auspices of the Troika made up of Portugal, the USSR and the United States. This led the MPLA to agree to turn Angola into a multi-party state. In May 1991, the Bicesse Agreement was signed in Portugal with mediation by the government of that country in the presence of President Dos Santos and Savimbi. This agreement stipulated that elections had to be held with UNITA's participation and United Nations supervision, although neither of the sides had given up its aspirations to achieve a military victory. A second UN mission was set up in Angola (UNAVEM II) with the mission of observing and verifying the disarmament process and backing the creation of a single new national army. In the meantime, the non-military social and political forces were left on the sidelines of the process. The MPLA won the elections, which were called too hastily in September 1992, and UNITA declared them fraudulent; as a result, the hostilities resumed without UNAVEM II unable to do anything. The United States stopped supporting UNITA and recognised the government of Angola, leading the UN to open sanctions against UNITA, which in October 1993 was forced to recognise the Bicesse Agreement and resume the talks. For one year, in the midst of combats that substantially curtailed UNITA's capacities, both parties held a dialogue mediated by the United Nations

Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the troika. This led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, which stipulated that UNITA had to disarm in exchange for participating in the National Unity and Reconciliation Government. UNITA, however, did not disarm and continued to exploit the diamond resources in an effort to continue the war, which led the Security Council to step up its sanctions against UNITA in June 1998. Under the Lusaka Protocol, both parties had to conclude the electoral process under UN supervision, in addition to a cessation of hostilities, the cantonment of UNITA troops and disarmament. In February 1995, the United Nations Mission UNAVEM III was created with the mission of helping the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements. Savimbi met with President Mandela in May 1995, and shortly thereafter the MPLA offered Savimbi the Vice Presidency of the country. In March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos reached an agreement to form a coalition government. When the UNAVEM III mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created with a contingent of 1,500 troops, but in 1999 the Angolan government, which felt militarily strong enough to defeat UNITA, asked for it to be closed, so it moved from Luanda to New York. The permanent truce between the MPLA and UNITA was only reached in 2002 when the leader of the latter, Jonas Savimbi, was murdered from several gunshots on the 22nd of February, which allowed a ceasefire to be reached with the new leader, the Secretary General of UNITA, Paulo Lukamba, and a National Unity Government to be formed. UNITA abandoned its armed struggle and became a political party. It officially demobilised in August 2002. The peace agreement became official in the Luena Memorandum dating from April 2002. The negotiation process had lasted 14 years.

The process in South Africa

The process in South Africa, which lasted less time, also emerged as the result of a nurturing atmosphere. In the late 1980s, South Africa was experiencing governability problems. There was a great deal of outside pressure regarding the policy of apartheid, the country was suffering from a major economic crisis and Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was losing outside support as the result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire. In 1989, all of these factors conspired in favour of negotiations, which the recently appointed President De Klerk would transform into major reforms. De Klerk opened up secret negotiations with Mandela, who was now the mastermind of a process that would shake the world and become a benchmark for other countries seeking a model of transition to democracy and reconciliation. Mandela used his extraordinary powers of persuasion to earn the trust and respect of his opponents and turn the secret talks into formal negotiations. He was released in 1990, at the same time that all the political groups were legalised and the transitional period got underway. In March of the following year, the churches called a peace conference, which was warmly welcomed by the business community. Indeed the business sector became one of the most fervent in its support of change, to such an extent that a consultative business movement was created. In April, President De Klerk announced a peace summit, and shortly thereafter a Civil Facilitating Commission and a National Peace Convention were created. From then on, a parallel process unfolded: first, the National Peace Accord was launched from 1991 to 1994 as the instrument of citizen participation, and secondly the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was orchestrated, made up of five working groups, along with the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) as a formal negotiation mechanism between the government and the political parties, including the ANC.

The instrument for citizen participation, the National Peace Accord, worked with two kinds of structures: a National Peace Commission (made up of 60 people) and a National Peace Secretariat (made up of seven people), as well as regional and local structures. The latter were made up of 11 regional peace commissions (with representatives from political parties, business, trade unions, local authorities, police, local commissions and other sectors), 260 local peace commissions (which reflected the composition of each community and reported to the regional commissions) and 15,000 peace monitors. This civic structure, which bears deep-down similarities to the Civil Society Assembly in Guatemala, debated the issues on the negotiation agenda for three years until general elections were held in 1994. Nelson Mandela won, and a transition government was sworn in, which gave rise to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated until 1999. In December 1996, the new constitution was approved, ushering in the new South Africa of the 21st century, full of challenges yet free of apartheid. All of this was thanks to the courage and mass appeal of President Mandela, the miraculous "human factor" in South Africa, a process which, along with its charismatic leader, has given the world a participatory model with a unique experience of reconciliation, in which forgiveness was conditioned upon revelation of the truth. The peace process lasted five years.

The process in Liberia

In 1980, Samuel Doe took power after the popular uprising. The civil war got underway in 1989, when Charles Taylor left Doe's government and met with a group of rebels from the NPFL in the Ivory Coast and attacked the capital. The UN responded to this in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook several initiatives to resolve the conflict, including the intervention of a regional ceasefire observer force (ECOMOG), which became an opposition faction in the conflict. Taylor was supported by Libya. Another dissident, Johnson, captured and killed Doe in 1990. ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as the President and with Johnson's support. In 1992, ULIMO, made up of Doe sympathisers, started a guerrilla war. The Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to facilitate talks between ECOWAS and the conflicting parties. A coalition government was formed in 1993. With mediation by ECOWAS, a peace agreement was reached in Cotonu (Benin), after which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established with the goal of consolidating the ceasefire. The next year, it was impossible for elections to be held due to skirmishes, but several complementary peace agreements were negotiated to join the Cotonu Agreements. In August 1995, after numerous negotiations and a dozen failed peace agreements, the Abuja (Nigeria) Agreement was signed, which included the leaders of the clashing factions in a transitional government and required the disarmament of the guerrillas for the elections.

In 1997, Taylor formed the National Patriotic Party and won the elections. He was elected President and promoted a policy of reconciliation and national unity. Even though the main militias had been dissolved in order to become political organisations, rebel groups continued operating from Sierra Leone and Guinea, giving rise to a second civil war. UNOMIL ended its mandate, and the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL), which managed to reach an agreement with the rebel groups to share power in the country. In 1999, ECOMOG withdrew from the country. In 2000, groups opposed to Taylor were formed, such as LURD (with support from Guinea), which began a war financed by diamond resources. In February 2000, a meeting sponsored by the King of Morocco was held in Rabat, in which the heads of state of the Mano River Union countries participated. At this meeting, the leaders pledged to resolve their differences and agreed to set up a Joint Security Committee on a sub-regional level. However, the dialogue process was suspended when President Taylor decided not to attend the September meeting, alleging concerns over his personal safety. Days later, a ten-member International Contact Group on Liberia was set up in New York under the joint presidency of ECOWAS and the EU with the purpose of securing greater participation by the international community in the efforts to resolve the crisis.

In early 2003 MODEL was formed with the support of the Ivory Coast; this group opposed Taylor and fought alongside LURD. By May, both rebel groups had seized control of two-thirds of the country and were threatening to take the capital, so the government and the rebels were forced to negotiate an agreement to put an end to the civil war. In June, negotiations were held among all the parties participated in Accra under the sponsorship of Ghana and ECOWAS facilitation. Taylor said that he was willing to resign if this would contribute to achieving peace. Days later, a ceasefire agreement was signed, which was violated by LURD several times. In July, spurred by intensified combats and in view of the threat of a humanitarian crisis, the Secretary General decided to appoint Jacques Paul from the USA his Special Representative for Liberia with the mandate to support the incipient transition agreements. He also proposed that international troops be deployed and that the UNOL be closed. In early August, the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force, and due to pressure from the USA, UN and EU, Taylor resigned because of his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone and harassment from LURD. On the 18th of August, the Accra Agreement was signed by the government, LURD, MODEL and the political parties as part of the ECOWAS peace process. The militias disarmed and a National Transitional Government was instated until the 2005 elections. The peace agreement also stipulated an amnesty and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Through this agreement, the parties asked the United Nations to deploy a 15,000-member force in Liberia (UNMIL) to support the National Transitional Government and ensure implementation of the agreement. The war ended in October when the United Nations and the US military intervened and banished Taylor to Nigeria. He was later transferred to The Hague to be tried by the International Criminal Court. The conflict, which lasted 14 years, had taken 250,000 lives and left one million displaced persons. The negotiations lasted 13 years.

The process in Tajikistan

In 1992, one year after Tajikistan proclaimed its independence from the USSR, a civil war broke out which led to 50,000 deaths. In May, the Tajik opposition, an informal coalition of Islamic groups and other forces, took power after two months

of demonstrations. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), led by Abdullo Nuri, took refuge in Afghanistan after being defeated in December.

In September of that same year, the first United Nations exploratory mission was conducted based on an appeal from President Rakhmonov to the UN Secretary General. A second United Nations exploratory mission was held in November, with the active participation of four countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. In April, Ismat Kittani was appointed the Secretary General's special envoy. In January 1993, Kittani was replaced by Ramiro Piriz-Ballón. In March 1993, the "non-official inter-Tajik dialogue" got underway when seven individuals from different factions in the war gathered round the same table in Moscow. The talks continued after a peace agreement was signed in 1997, and they exerted some influence on the outcome of events. In September 1993, the CIS Council of Ministers deployed collective peace forces, made up of contingents from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The hostilities had waned considerably.

In April 1994, the first round of negotiations was held in Moscow with an inclusive agenda (political agreement, the problem of refugees and consolidation of the state). In June, a second round of negotiations was held in Teheran with participation by the OECD as an observer. In September, a consultative meeting took place in Teheran, where a provisional ceasefire agreement was signed, prepared by the United Nations teams. At that meeting, the Russian and Iranian chancellors played a prominent role in convincing the UTO. In October, the third round of talks was held in Islamabad with participation by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as an observer. This round concluded with a protocol that set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire. In December, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was created with the mission of supervising the situation and backing regional peace initiatives.

In May 1995, the fourth round of talks was held in Almaty with an agreement to exchange prisoners and repatriate refugees. The UTO submitted a proposal for a transition government, which was rejected by the government. In July and August, the United Nations team flew between Dushanbe and Kabul five times to hold "consultative negotiations" between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the UTO, Nuri. In August, President Rakhmonov and Nuri signed a *Protocol on the Fundamental Principles* for establishing *Peace and National Accord* in Tajikistan, which became the roadmap and stipulated that a "continuous round" of negotiations be held. In November, the first phase in the continuous round was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, where the discussion topics included how to integrate representatives from the opposition into the government and representatives from the opposite military units into the armed forces. In July 1996, the third phase in the continuous rounds was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, and Ramiro Piriz-Ballón was replaced by the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Gerd Merrem. In December, Rakhmonov and Nuri met in Afghanistan and agreed to a cessation of hostilities.

In January 1997, the Protocol on Refugees was signed in Teheran with key participation by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati. From January to May, rounds of talks were held in Teheran, Moscow, Meshed (Iran) and Bishkeh, in which both parties agreed to the modalities of the DDR, the integration of the armed forces, the legalisation of the Islamic Renaissance Party and a 30% share in the power structure for UTO representatives. The Protocol on Political Affairs was signed in the Bishkeh round with the good offices of the President of Kyrgyzstan. In March, the Protocol on Military Affairs was signed, which enabled the CIS armed forces to accompany the units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) from Afghanistan to the gathering zones supervised by UNMOT. The Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, played a key role in this process. Finally, on the 27th of June, the General Peace Agreement was signed at the Kremlin. In July, the first meeting of the National Reconciliation Commission was held in Moscow, which approved a mutual forgiveness law and a draft amnesty law that was approved days later by the Parliament. In November, a donor conference was held in Vienna, where 96 million dollars were pledged. The Security Council extended UNMOT's mandate and changed its mission so it could cooperate with the National Reconciliation Commission, supervise the DDR and coordinate the United Nations' assistance during the transitional period. In 1999, peaceful elections were held and Rakhmonov was re-elected president. The peace process lasted five years.

There were several key factors in the negotiations: weariness of war; Russia's and Iran's interest in peace (the last few rounds were held in the capitals of both countries); the moderating influence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the Tajik opposition; the advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the loss of the rearguard for the Tajik opposition); the fundamental role played by the United Nations and its Department of Political Affairs; the skilful handling of the process by the friendly countries; the Security Council's clear mandate; the adept coordination of the four CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia); the participation of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan as observers; the role of the OSCE and the OIC, who were allies in the process and guarantors of the peace agreement; the negotiations, which were not interrupted despite the surrounding conflict and noncompliance with the ceasefire (the negotiations

were part of the war strategy); the personal relations between the Tajik President Rakhmonov, and the Tajik opposition leader, Nuri, who took the helm of their respective delegations seven times; the confidentiality of the process; the usual format of consultations between the leaders of the delegations and the United Nations mediators, who always wrote the first drafts, which were accepted 95% of the time; and the existence of the “non-official inter-Tajik dialogue”, which bore a positive influence on the course of the negotiations.

The process in Sierra Leone

A civil war broke out in 1991 in which 75,000 people died. It was triggered by a rebellion against President Momoh led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with Foday Sankoh at the helm. Momoh was defeated the next year in a military coup. Captain Strasser became the President, and the RUF issued new demands, leading the conflict to continue. In October, the RUF took control of the diamond mines, which also prolonged the conflict.

In 1994, President Strasser asked for the good offices of the UN Secretary General to encourage the RUF to negotiate with the government. The Secretary General sent a civil servant to try to forge contacts with the RUF, but to no avail. In view of this development, the Secretary General appointed Berhanu Dinka his Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, with the mission of engaging in contacts with the RUF. In 1995, the UN, ECOSAP and the OAU tried to negotiate a solution, and in December of the same year the international British organisation Alert helped to set up a meeting between the UN and the RUF in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). In March 1996, presidential elections were held and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected. The RUF did not participate and forged ahead with the conflict, but on the 25th of March the outgoing government and the RUF signed a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed to hold negotiations with a view to solving the conflict. These negotiations were held with mediation by Ivory Coast, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth. In April, Kabbah and Sankoh met face-to-face in the Ivory Coast; they agreed to a ceasefire and to set up working groups. The OAU decided to get more actively involved and appointed a special envoy. The negotiations ended with the signing of the Abidjan Agreement in November, which initially put an end to the conflict. The agreement called for amnesty, the conversion of the RUF into a political party and a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. The agreement also called for electoral, judicial and police reform. Between December 1996 and January 1997, an evaluation group sent by the UN Secretary General visited Sierra Leone, and on the 3rd of January this group managed to meet with the leader of the RUF.

In March 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, and in May of the same year, Paul Koroma led a military coup with the support of the RUF. He created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, with which he fought the ECOMOG (Military Observer Group) troops in the country. In October, talks were held in Conakry and a peace plan was signed that called for a cessation of hostilities, an ECOMOG verification mechanism, the DDR, immunity for participants in the coup, the return of Sankoh and the reinstatement of President Kabbah's constitutional government. In February 1998, in response to a joint attack by the RUF and the army of the junta, ECOMOG launched a military attack that led to the dissolution of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. President Kabbah once again occupied his post and appointed a new government. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was also created. Foday Sankoh, who had been arrested, issued a call for surrender, but the skirmishes continued, partly due to Liberia's support of RUF members.

In 1999, new negotiations were held between the government and the rebels. In May, the Lomé Convention was signed and a dialogue got underway between the government and the RUF. The government transported Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé with a promise of amnesty. The government of Togo facilitated the negotiations. A ceasefire was declared and the prisoners of war were released. The main provisions in the agreement were the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the establishment of a national unity government, the granting of the vice presidency to Sankoh, the establishment of a Council of Notables and Religious Leaders to act as mediators, an amnesty, the scheduling of elections, the start of a DDR and a restructuring of the armed forces, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the gradual withdrawal of ECOMOG forces. It was agreed that Togo, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth would serve as the guarantors of the agreement. In October, Sankoh and Koroma returned to Freetown and UNAMISIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) was created to fulfil the Lomé Convention. In November, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja, which called for UNAMISIL to perform a supervisory function and for the DDR to immediately resume. This agreement triggered divisions within the RUF.

In May 2000, 500 UN troops were kidnapped by the RUF, which prompted a British military intervention, the disbandment of the RUF and the arrest of Sankoh. However, in November the Abuja I Accord was signed, which declared a ceasefire

supervised by UNAMSIL and the handover of weapons by the RUF, as well as DDR programme and the restructuring of the armed forces. Given the fact that the fighting continued, in 2001 the Guinean troops conducted an offensive against the RUF. However, in May the Abuja II Accords setting out a DDR programme were signed between the RUF and the government. The war finally came to an end in January 2002. Sankoh died in prison. The peace process, with all its ups and downs and incidents of non-compliance, lasted eight years.

The process in southern Sudan

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA from the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese armed forces, which were opposed to independence for the south of the country, which the SPLA was advocating. The conflict led to the death of more than one million people. The first explorations were conducted in 1988, and the following year the government and the SPLA signed a tentative Declaration of Principles of IGAD, the mediator, to hold a referendum on self-determination in the south of the country.

In July 2002, a theoretical agreement was reached under the auspices of IGAD, which established autonomy in the south before a referendum was held in 2011. The first direct meeting between the President of Sudan and the SPLA leader also took place. Between 2002 and 2004, several rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya, in which headway was made on an extensive agenda of issues. These rounds made it possible for a definitive peace agreement to be reached on the 5th of January 2005, in which the north and south would keep separate armed forces, a joint force would be created for the more disputed areas, autonomy would be set for six years, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, the oil profits would be equitably split and a National Unity Government would be formed, with one vice presidency set aside for the SPLA. Likewise, it was agreed not to apply Islamic law in the south of the country and that each territory would have its own flag. The process lasted a total of 13 years, and seven went by before a peace agreement was signed.

The process in Burundi

The start of the conflict in Burundi dates back to 1983, when the country's Hutu prime minister was assassinated, triggering a cycle of violence that led to the death of 300,000 people. The first peace talks did not start until five years later, in 1998, in Tanzania. They were initially facilitated by the president of that country, Nyerere, and later by Nelson Mandela. In August 2000, the Arusha Agreement was signed with the participation of 17 political parties and the majority of Hutu organisations in the country, which led to the formation of the first transition government. Between 2002 and 2003, agreements were signed with two other major groups, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which left pending the agreement with just a single group, the FNL, whose leader, Agathon Rwasa, did not sign a peace agreement until six years later.

The first negotiations with Rwasa's FNL were held between 2002 and 2004 in Gabon, Tanzania, Switzerland, Kenya, the Netherlands and South Africa, although they were fruitless. In 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created with the mandate to help to implement the efforts to restore peace and reconciliation. Its mandate lasted until 2006, when a General Ceasefire Agreement was signed with the FNL in September in Tanzania, which along with South Africa was a mediator in the conflict. This agreement stipulated the following: a) rectification of the ethnic question, already identified as one of the causes of the conflict; b) provisional immunity for FNL members and its transformation into a political party; c) the repatriation of refugees and the return of the displaced population; and d) a revision of the composition of the security and defence forces. In October of the same year, a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was created, which took over the baton from the ONUB with the mandate of supporting the government in its efforts on behalf of peace and stability.

Finally, in December 2008 a peace agreement was signed with the FNL, with the presence of the South African mediator, Charles Nqakula. The next step was political power-sharing, with 33 posts set aside for the FNL and the launch of the group's disarmament. The process had lasted ten years.

The process in Indonesia (Aceh)

The conflict in Indonesia (Aceh) started in 1976, when the armed opposition group GAM claimed independence for Aceh. The conflict led to the death of 15,000 people. The earliest talks were held in 2000 with the facilitation of the Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue, headquartered in Geneva. These talks led to the signing of a Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. However, both parties were still clashing because they were unwilling to give up armed activity. Another influential factor was that Timor-Leste had just won independence and the Indonesian army was unwilling to lose another region. The second round of negotiations was held in May 2002, also in Geneva, and the third in May 2003 in Tokyo. However, the GAM was insisting on independence for Aceh, an option that was rejected outright by the government. As a result, martial law was instated and the hostilities resumed. Yet during this same period, a 46-year-old Finnish financial consultant, Juha Christensen, managed to keep up discreet contacts with the clashing parties, which would come to be of vital importance to the future of the negotiations.

A tsunami hit in December 2004, leading to the death of 170,000 people in the region, which was devastated. This natural catastrophe, which required the government to open up Aceh to the international community, totally altered the situation and triggered reactions that helped spur the resumption of the negotiations. The first contacts occurred in January 2005 with the mediation of the Crisis Management Initiative, driven by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Several noteworthy events took place within the space of a few months: a bilateral truce, a meeting in Sweden with GAM exiles, the withdrawal of the arrest warrant against GAM leaders and a change in GAM criteria, as it ceased to demand independence and instead agreed to advanced autonomy. Thus, a special autonomy was negotiated, and the facilitator set a deadline for reaching an agreement (summer). Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding between the GAM and the government was signed in August 2006, which put an end to 30 years of conflict. The agreement was based on the end of hostilities and the disarmament of the GAM, the withdrawal of the military and police forces, amnesty for GAM members and their participation in politics, as well as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In December of the same year, the GAM candidate was proclaimed governor of the region of Aceh. The peace process, in all its stages, lasted five years.

The process in Nepal

The conflict got underway in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), a Maoist guerrilla force, opposed the forces of the Nepalese monarchy. The conflict led to 10,000 deaths. In 2002, the first secret talks were held and a tentative and temporary bilateral ceasefire was reached. The next year, formal talks were held, but to no avail. In November 2005, the CPN reached an alliance with seven Nepalese parties, pledging to establish a democracy, respect human rights, call UN-supervised elections and embark on a UN-supervised disarmament. One year later, in June 2006, an agreement was reached between the government and the CPN, and in November the peace agreement was signed that put an end to ten years of conflict. This agreement was comprised of the following points: 1) to implement the 12-point agreement reached on the 22nd of November 2005 between the CPN and the seven political parties, as well as the ceasefire code of conduct signed by the government and the CPN on the 22nd of May 2006; 2) to conduct their respective activities peacefully and mindful of the commitments of a multi-party government system, civil liberties, the fundamental rights, human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law and the democratic norms and values.; 3) to ask the United Nations to assist in managing the armed forces and weapons of both parties, as well as to observe the impartial elections for the Constituent Assembly; 4) to guarantee the democratic rights established by the grassroots movement in 1990 and 2006, based on the commitments expressed in the 12-point agreement, in the preamble of the ceasefire code of conduct and in the draft of an interim constitution, and consequently to set up an interim government, set a date for the election of a Constituent Assembly and dissolve the congress and the Maoist government through an alternative agreement based on consensus; 5) to deem that these issues are of national importance and must be fulfilled based on understanding; 6) to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the Nepalese people are part of the process of creating a new constitution, without their being influenced by fear, threats or violence. International observation and monitoring will be needed for the elections; and 7) to restructure the state gradually in order to resolve the problems associated with class, race, region and gender, through elections for a Constituent Assembly. This includes a commitment to transform the ceasefire into lasting peace and to resolve problems through dialogue, with special attention to democracy, peace, prosperity, progress, independence, the sovereignty of the country and self-esteem. In 2008, Nepal ceased to be a monarchy and became a democratic federal republic. In accordance with the peace agreement, the United Nations will supervise the cantonment and reintegration of the Maoist forces, while the government will restructure its armed forces. The peace process lasted four years.

GOOD LESSONS FROM THE PROCESSES

El Salvador	<p>Delegitimisation of the armed forces</p> <p>Positive role of the United Nations and the countries in the region</p> <p>Human rights agreement in the midst of the conflict</p> <p>Role of the National Reconciliation Commission</p>
Guatemala	<p>Participation of civil society</p> <p>Regional pressure</p> <p>Role of the National Reconciliation Commission</p> <p>Good offices of Paul Wee</p> <p>The guerrilla's consultations with civil society</p>
Northern Ireland	<p>Role of prisoners</p> <p>Methodology of the negotiation (sufficient consensus, parallel consent, Mitchell principles)</p>
Angola	<p>Security Council sanctions on diamonds</p>
South Africa	<p>Participation of civil society (National Peace Agreement)</p> <p>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</p> <p>Persuasive, conciliatory role of Nelson Mandela</p>
Tajikistan	<p>Good mediation by the United Nations</p> <p>Good help from the countries in the region</p> <p>Continuous rounds of negotiations in the midst of the conflict</p>
Southern Sudan	<p>Direct encounter between the guerrilla leader and the President of the country</p> <p>Continuous rounds of negotiations</p>
Indonesia (Aceh)	<p>Speed of the process</p> <p>Flexibility of the parties</p> <p>Taking advantage of a natural and humanitarian catastrophe (tsunami)</p>
Nepal	<p>United Nations verification</p>

Appendix 12. WEBSITES OF INTEREST

Alertnet (www.alertnet.org)
Armed Conflict Database (acd.iiss.org)
Berghof Research Center (www.berghof-center.org)
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org)
CICDM (www.cidcm.umd.es)
Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (www.clingendael.nl)
Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org)
Conflictbarometer (hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer)
Crisis Management Initiative (www.cmi.fi)
Crisis Watch (www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch)
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace)
Escola de Cultura de Pau (www.escolapau.org)
European Centre for Conflict Prevention (www.conflict-prevention.net)
FEWER (www.fewer.org)
FriEnt (www.frient.de)
German Working Group on Development and Peace (www.frient.de)
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (www.gppac.org)
Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
International Peace Academy (www.ipacademy.org)
Kreddha (www.kreddha.org)
United Nations (www.un.org)
Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
Peace Accords Matrix (peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/topic)
Peace and Justice Update (peace.sandiego.edu/reports/updates.html#bottom)
Peace Negotiations Watch (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
People Building Peace (www.peoplebuildingpeace.org)
PRIO (www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current)
Project Ploughshares (www.ploughshares.ca)
Public International Law & Policy Group (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Responding to Conflict (www.respond.org)
SIPRI (www.sipri.se)
Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
The Conflict Resolution Information Source (www.crinfo.org)
The Joan B. Kroc Institute (kroc.nd.edu)
Today's Mediation News (www.crinfo.org/news_feeds/v2_negotiation.cfm)
United States Institute of Peace (www.usip.org/library/pa.html)
UN Peacemaker (peacemaker.unlb.org)
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University (www.ucdp.uu.se)
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (www.wilsoncenter.org)

Escola de Cultura de Pau

The Escola de Cultura de Pau was created in 1999 with the purpose of organising a variety of academic and research activities related to the culture of peace, conflict prevention and transformation, disarmament and promoting human rights.

The Escola is principally financed by the government of Catalonia through the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency and the Governmental Department. The Escola is run by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The main activities held by the Escola de Cultura de Pau include the following:

- The **post-graduate diploma in the Culture of Peace** (post-degree programme consisting of 230 classroom hours).
- **Elective subjects:** "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
- **Peace Processes Programme**, which monitors and analyses the different countries with peace processes or formalised negotiations underway, as well as those countries with negotiations still in the exploratory phase. It includes awareness-raising initiatives and intervention in conflicts to facilitate dialogue amongst the actors in a conflict.
- **The Education for Peace Programme**. The team in this programme strives to promote and develop the knowledge, values and skills for Education for Peace.
- **Programme on Conflicts and Peace-building**, a programme that monitors international events related to armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises and the gender dimension in peace-building on a daily basis in order to draw up the annual report Alert!, bimonthly reports and quarterly publications.

Escola de Cultura de Pau
Edificio MRA
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
08193 Bellaterra (Spain)
Tel: 93 586 88 48 - Fax: 93 581 32 94.
Email: escolapau@uab.cat
<http://escolapau.uab.cat>