

Yearbook on
Peace Processes

Vicenç Fisas

2013

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Glossary

- ACP:** Alliance for the Consolidation of Peace
ADC: Democratic Alliance for Change (Mali)
ADF: Alliance of Democratic Forces (DR Congo)
ADLF: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
ADSC: All Darfur Stakeholders Conference
AI: Amnesty International
AIAI: *Al-Ittihad Al-Islami*
AIG: Armed Islamic Group
AKIN: American Kurdish Information Network
ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean
ALS: Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia
AMIB: African Union Mission in Burundi
AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMIS: African (Union) Mission in the Sudan
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
ANBP: Afghanistan New Beginning Programme
ANC: African National Congress
ANCD: National Alliance for Democratic Change
ANDDH: Nigerian Association of Human Rights
ANRAC: National Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance
APCLS: *Alliance des Patriots pour un Congo Libre et Démocratique* (DRC)
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Kashmir)
APRD: Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (Central African Republic)
AQIM: Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb
ARLA: Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad
ARLPI: Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (Uganda)
ARMM: Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Philippines)
ARPCT: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (Somalia)
ARS: Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASWJ: *Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a*
ATNM: *Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali*
ATNMC: Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change
AU: African Union
AUC: United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia
BERSATU: Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MRPMP) (Thailand)
BGF: Border Guard Forces
BIFF: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA: United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic
BLA: Baloch Liberation Army (Pakistan)
BLF: Baluchistan Liberation Front (Pakistan)
BLT: Bodoland Liberation Tiger (India)
BNLF: Bru National Liberation Front
BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic
BRA: Balochistan Republican Army (Pakistan)
BRN: *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (Thailand)
CAIJP: Concise Agreement for an Immediate Just Peace
CAR: Central African Republic
CARHRIHL: Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
CAVR: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CCP: Colombians for Peace
CCR: Consultative Commission for Regionalisation
CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CERA: Coordination of the Former Armed Resistance
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHD: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CHMT: Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (Uganda)
CIS: Community of Independent States
CJMC: Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee
CMI: Crisis Management Initiative
CNDD: *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie*
CNDP: *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (DR Congo)
CNF: Chin National Front (Myanmar)
CNP: National Peace Council (Colombia)
CNR: National Reconciliation Commission
CNRR: National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation
CNT: *Convention Nationale du Tchad*
COBRA: Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (India)
COCE: ELN Central Command (Colombia)
CODESA: Conference for a Democratic South Africa
CODHES: Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement
COPAZ: National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CORCAS: Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Communist Party of India
CPJP: *Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix* (RCA)
CPLA: Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines
CRAES: Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs (Senegal)
CRIC: Regional Council of the Cauca Indians (Colombia)
CUF: Unified Command of the Armed Forces of Cabinda
DAC: Democratic Alliance for Change
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEHAP: Democratic People's Party
DHD: *Dima Halim Daoga* (India)
DIAG: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (Afghanistan)
DKBA: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Myanmar)
DTH: Democratic Society Movement
DTP: Democratic Society Party (Turkey)
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party
EA: Eastern Front
ECK: Electoral Commission of Kenya
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EEBC: Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission
ELN: National Liberation Army
ELSAM: The Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (Indonesia)
ERG: Guevarist Revolutionary Army (Colombia)
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
ETA: *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*
EU: European Union
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: European Union mission in Chad and the Central African Republic
EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)

EUMM: European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUPOL: European Union Police Mission
EUTCC: EU-Turkey Civic Commission
EZLN: Zapatista Army of National Liberation
FACU: Cabindan Unified Armed Forces
FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FARDC: *Forces Armées de la DR Congo*
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FCD: Cabinda Forum for Dialogue
FDD: *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FDPC: *Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africain* (CAR)
FECAT: Forum for Exiled Chadians in Central Africa
FFR: *Front des Forces de Redressement*
FIAA: Arab Islamic Front of Azawad
UNFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
FLEC-FAC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda*
FLV: Vavoua Liberation Front (Ivory Coast)
FNI: Nationalist and Integrationist Front (DR Congo)
FNL: *Forces Nationales de Libération*
FOMUC: Multinational Force in Central Africa
FORERI: Forum for the Reconciliation of the Irian Jaya Society
FPIR: *Forces Progressistes pour l'Indépendance et la Renaissance* (Chad)
FPJC: *Front Populaire pour la Justice au Congo*
FPLC: *Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo*
FRF: *Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes*
FRNF: *Federal Republican National Front* (Nepal)
FRPI: Patriotic Resistance Forces of Ituri (DR Congo)
FUC: *Union de Forces pour le Changement*
FURCA: Forces for the Unification of the Central African Republic
GAM: *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GMIP: *Mujahadeen Pattani* (Thailand)
GNP: Gross National Product
GPPAC: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (Philippines)
GSLM: Great Sudan Liberation Movement
GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
HAD: Hands Across the Divide
HCRP: High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace (Niger)
HDI: Human Development Index
HM: *Hizbul Mujahideen* (India)
HPG: People's Defence Forces
HRW: Human Rights Watch
IACHR: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICD: Inter-Congolese Dialog
ICG: International Contact Group
ICG: International Contact Group on Somalia
ICG: International Crisis Group
ICR: International Centre for Reconciliation (*Coventry Cathedral*)
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IEV: International Eco-Peace Village
IFMOT: Indigenous Freedom Movement of Tripura
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IMT: International Monitoring Team (Philippines)
INFC: Iraqi National Founding Conference
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IPD: Inclusive Political Dialogue (CAR)
IRA: Irish Republican Army
IREC: Independent Review Commission (Kenya)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISF: Islamic Salvation Front
IWG: International Working Group (for Ivory Coast)
JASIG: Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (Philippines)
JCC: Joint Control Commission
JDLF: Joint Democratic Liberation Front (Nepal)
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JRC: Joint Revolutionary Council
JTF: Joint Task Force (Nigeria) (Nigeria)
JTMM: *Janatantril Tarai Mukti Morcha* (Nepal)
JVMM: Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (Burundi)
JVP: *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna*
JWP: *Jamhoori Watab Party* (Pakistan)
KADEK: Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KCK: Kurdistan Democratic Confederation
KFOR: NATO Kosovo Force
KIO: Kachin Independence Organization
KKK: *Koma Komalen Kurdistan*
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
KLNF: Karbi Longpi North Cachar Liberation Front (India)
KNC: Kurdish National Congress
KNU: Karen National Union / Karen Liberation Army
KPC: Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF: Kosovo Security Force
KVM: Kosovo Verification Mission
LJM: Liberation and Justice Movement
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Terai Eelam (*Nepal*)
LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy
MDC: Movement for the Democratic Change
MDJT: *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad*
MDR: Democratic Republican Movement
MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Nigeria)
MFDC: *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Senegal)
MFUA: Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MILIA: *Mouvement de Libération Indépendant et Alliés*
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast
MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix*
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*
MLPA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MMT: Madhesh Mukti Tigers (Nepal)
MNDAA: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MNDS: National Movement for Developing Society (Niger)
MNJ: Niger Movement for Justice

MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MNLF: Maoist Madheshi National Liberation Front (Nepal)
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (Nigeria)
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
MPA: Popular Movement of Azawad
MPC: Mindanao People's Caucus (Philippines)
MPCI: *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire*
MPIGO: *Mouvement Patriotique pour l'Indépendance du Grand Ouest*
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPRF: Madheshi People's Rights Forum (Nepal)
MRC: Revolutionary Movement of Congo
MRP: *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (Indonesia)
MSP: Melanesian Spearhead Group
MSPP: Mission to Support the Peace Process
MUP: Serbian police
MVK: Madeshi Virus Killers (Nepal)
NALU: *Armée Nationale de Libération de l'Ouganda*
NAP: New Alliance for Progress (CAR)
NCC: National Conciliation Commission
NCF: National Concord Front (Iraq)
NCP: National Congress Party
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDF: National Democratic Front (Philippines)
NDF: National Democratic Front (Myanmar)
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland (India)
NDFP: Niger Delta Patriotic Forces
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Defence Force (Nigeria)
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO: Non-governmental organisation
NGRC: National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (Somalia)
NIC: National Ijaw Congress
NLD: National League for Democracy (Myanmar)
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPF: New Patriotic Front (Niger)
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: National Reconciliation Commission
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NRF: National Redemption Front
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak – Muivah (India)
NSMA: Citizen Forum for Peace in Assam (India)
OAS: Organisation of American States
ODA: Official Development Assistance
ODM: Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya)
OIC: Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
OLP: Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUGBIS: UN Office in Guinea-Bissau
OPAPP: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (Philippines)
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Organisation)
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PARECO: Congolese Resistance Patriots (DR Congo)
PCG: People's Consultative Group (India)
PCPIA: People's Committee for Peace Initiatives in Assam (India)
PDCI: *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*
PDF: Peace and Development Front (Myanmar)
PDF: Popular Defense Force
PDK: Democratic Party of Kosovo
PDP: Papuan Presidium Council
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PGP: Patriotic Group for Peace
PGPO: Perdana Global Peace Organisation (Thailand)
PIC: Peace Implementation Council
PJD: Justice and Development Party (Morocco)
PJPO: Perdana World Peace Organisation
PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council
PMCC: Pattani Malay Consultative Congress (Thailand)
PML: Pakistan Muslim League
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PP: *Partido Popular* (People's Party)
PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PSE: *Partido Socialista de Euskadi* (Basque Socialist Party)
PSOE: *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Socialist Workers' Party of Spain)
PTC: Peace and Tranquillity Committee (Myanmar)
PULA: Patan United Liberation Army (Thailand)
PULO: Patan United Liberation Organization (Thailand)
PWG: People's War Group (India)
RAFD: Rally of Democratic Forces
RCD-Goma: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma*
RCD-K-ML: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération*
RCD-N: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National*
RDL: *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté* (Group for Democracy and Freedom)
SGSR: UN Secretary General Special Representative
RFD: Rally of Democratic Forces (Chad)
RPM-IM: Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SBPAC: Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (Thailand)
SDF: Sudan Defence Force
SDFA: Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
SG: Secretary General
SICS: Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia
SIMEC: Socialist International Middle East Committee's Working Group on the Kurdish Question
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SLMM: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council
SOMA: Suspension of Military Activities (Philippines)
SOMO: Suspension of Offensive Military Operations (Philippines)
SPDC: State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar)

SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army
SRSHR: Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
SSA: Shan State Army
SSDF: South Sudan Defence Forces
TA: *Tariq Ali* (Nepal)
TAK: Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
TC: Terai Cobra (Nepal)
TDRA: Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TFP: Transitional Federal Parliament (Somalia)
TJLF: Terai Janatantrik Liberation Front (Nepal)
TKS: *Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha* (Nepal)
TMK: Kosovo Protection Corps
TMVP: *Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal* (Sri Lanka)
TMSSA: Terai-Madhe Service Security Association (Nepal)
TNG: Transitional National Government
TNSM: Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law (Pakistan)
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Burundi)
TSJP: Terai Samyukta Janakranti Party (Nepal)
TTP: Therik-i- Taliban Pakistan
TUSU: Thailand United Southern Underground
UAB: Autonomous University of Barcelona
UBP: National Unity Party (Cyprus)
UDMF: United Democratic Madhesi Front (Nepal)
UFDD: *Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (Chad)
UFDL: United Front for Development and Liberation (Sudan)
UFDR: *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (RCA)
UFR: Union of Resistance Forces (Chad)
UFR: Union of Rallied Forces (CAR)
UFVN: *Union des Forces Vives de la Nation* (RCA)
UIC: Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia)
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam (India)
UM: Union for the Mediterranean
UM: Union for the Mediterranean
UN: United Nations
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMID: UN-AU Mission in Darfur (Sudan)
UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan
UNASUR: Union of South American Nations
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIPA: Indigenous People's Organization Unit Awá (Colombia)
UNITA: *União para a Independência Total de Angola*
UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola
UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast
UNOL: United Nations Office in Liberia
UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNMOT: United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOMSIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPO: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
UNPOS: United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace Building Mission
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
UNSLF: United Western Somali Liberation Front
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UPDF: Uganda People's Defence Force
UPF: Uganda People's Front
USA: United States of America
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
UTO: United Tajik Opposition
UWSA: United Wa State Army (Myanmar)
UWSLF: United Western Somali Liberation Front
WB: World Bank
WFP: World Food Programme
WHO: World Health Organisation
WPCNL: West Papua Coalition for National Liberation (Indonesia)

Introduction

This eighth edition of the **Yearbook on Peace Processes**¹ analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

The organisation of the analysis of each conflict follows a similar pattern in most cases: 1) a brief synopsis of the context of the conflict, with a small description of the armed groups and the main actors intervening in each conflict, 2) the background to the peace process, 3) the events that happened in 2012, 4) a table with the most significant events in the year as a summary, 5) a selection of websites where you can monitor the conflict and 6) a table illustrating the relationships among the primary and secondary actors in each conflict, highlighting the spaces of intermediation in each case.² At the start of every country, there is a small box with basic statistics on it. The government armed forces are not included in the section of the box called “Armed actors”.

The author of this yearbook has tried to stay within the bounds of mentioning new deeds, events, successes, failures or proposals in an attempt to limit personal opinions on these events to the extent possible.

By **negotiation** we mean the process through which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal actors within the same country) agree to discuss their differences in an agreed-upon setting to find a solution that will meet their demands. This negotiation can be either direct or through third-party facilitation. Formal negotiations usually have a prior, exploratory, phase, which enables the framework (format, venue, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future negotiations to be defined. By **peace process** we mean the consolidation of a negotiation scheme once the thematic agenda and the procedures to follow have been defined, along with the calendar and the facilitators. Therefore, negotiation is just one stage in a peace process.

MODALITIES OR STAGES IN PEACE PROCESSES

Informal **indirect contacts**
Formal indirect contacts
Informal **direct contacts**
Formal direct contacts
Informal **explorations**
Formal explorations
Informal **dialogues**
Formal dialogues
Formal **negotiations**
Formal **peace process**

By **ceasefire** we mean the military decision to halt any combat or use of weapons during a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** includes not only a ceasefire but also the commitment not to engage in kidnapping, harassment of the civilian population, threats, etc.

Depending on the ultimate goals sought and the dynamic of the different phases in the negotiation process, the majority of peace processes can be categorised into one of these five **categories or models**, although some cases may combine two categories:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Trust-building measures
- e) Formulas for self-governance or “intermediate political architectures”

The model of peace process is usually related to the kinds of demands presented and the actors’ capacity to exert pressure or demand (level of symmetry between the military, political and social spheres), although mentors and facilitators, the weariness of the actors, support received and other less rational factors related to leaders’ pathologies, imagined events or historical inertia also come into play. In some cases, though not many, especially if the process has lasted a long time, it might begin in one of the above categories (demobilisation and reinsertion, for example) and then the demands expand to situate the process in another more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all processes or their previous phases of exploration, dialogue and negotiation

1 The yearbook expands on the information provided by the Escola de Cultura de Pau through its annual publication “Alerta 2013” (Icària Editorial, 2013), which is updated quarterly through the electronic publication “Barómetro” (<http://escolapau.uab.cat>).

2 This “space of intermediation” includes not only the more formal “facilitators or mediators” (which are indicated by letter size or bold face), but also other institutions or individuals that have somehow intervened. Obviously, facilitation efforts that were not made public are not included, even if the author is aware of some of them.

are undertaken with true sincerity, as it is common for them to be part of the actor's war strategy, either to win time, to internationalise and gain publicity, to rearm or for other reasons.

Finally, I wanted to note that what we commonly call a "peace process" is actually nothing other than a "process to put an end to violence and armed struggle". The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement are nothing other than the start of the true "peace process", which is linked to stage called "post-war rehabilitation". This stage is always fraught with difficulties, but it is where decisions are truly taken and policies are truly enacted which, if successful, will manage to overcome the violence (both structural and cultural) that will ultimately enable us to talk about truly having "achieved peace". This yearbook, however, with the exception of a few appendices, shall limit itself to analysing the efforts made in the early stages of this long pathway, without which the final goal would be impossible to reach.

The main stages in a peace process


All peace processes require a huge time investment, and this is proven by the many years that must usually be spent for one to begin and bear fruit. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, peace processes follow a pattern with more or less known phases in which the most time is spent on negotiations. They work with an initial exploratory or testing phase, also called pre-negotiation, in which the actors intervening in the process (explorers) calibrate the conviction of the parties, that is, whether they are truly convinced that they are going to launch a negotiation process in which they will have to give up something. This stage is decisive, since negotiations are often held without true conviction by one of the parties, either the government or the armed group. In this case, the negotiations are destined for failure. The exploratory phase is when the terms of complete and absolute security for the future negotiators are tested, since there is a history of murders or attacks against them and nobody dares to embark on talks without full guarantees of their safety. This safety must be established with very clearly defined rules. Likewise, certain guarantees are sought for compliance with the agreements reached in this early stage; in this case, timelines and methodologies

to be followed are recommended; the pre-agenda or initial agenda is set; the terms of a tentative roadmap are agreed upon; and the conflictive aspects of the basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the meta-conflict) are clarified. In short, in this stage, the goal is to generate trust in the process itself: the role played by potential third parties is agreed upon, the imposition of plans (the very cornerstone of the negotiations) is discarded, and the adversary is recognised, giving him the legitimacy needed to engage in dialogue. Once this exploratory work has been completed, an "agreement on what must be agreed upon" is reached in order to then proceed to determining "how to do it". The sum of all these steps is what sometimes makes up the "roadmap" or initial framework of what must be done to ensure that the process fares well. The roadmap is nothing other than a working schema, often a diagram, in which the steps to follow, which will guide the process, are outlined.

Once the negotiations have started, the parties ascertain whether the interlocutors are valid, that is, whether they are the representatives of the primary actors with the capacity to take decisions. Third-ranked actors have no place at the negotiating table, so it is always necessary to start with an inclusive approach which gives a voice to the actors, even if they are unwanted, who are the keys to resolving the conflict. Although it is unquestionably more comfortable, it makes no sense to invite friendly actors to the negotiating table; rather the true adversaries must be invited. The reason for this negotiation is for the opposing parties to sit down to talk under the mindset of achieving mutual benefit through an "everyone wins, no one loses" or "I win, you win" scheme, thus discarding zero-sum approaches in which one party wins and the other loses.

If the negotiation proceeds satisfactorily, the issues on the substantive agenda can be discussed (the ones on the procedural agenda will have already been agreed upon). At that point, given the fact that trust will have been established, personal relationships will develop, which will make it easier to reach an agreement, or at least partial agreements, with their respective protocols, which in turn lead to the final agreement which outlines how it will be implemented and who will implement it. This finally leads us to implementation agreements, including the forms of verification and resolving any potential disagreements that might arise in the final stages.

Usual stages in negotiation processes



Main conclusions of the year

The year 2012 proves to have been the most successful in recent times as far as the opening of negotiations and peace processes is concerned. 46.3% of the 54 analyzed negotiations worked out well or were satisfactorily completed. There were seven explorations phases in Sudan, Central African Republic, Colombia, India, Burma and Turkey, which might bear fruit throughout 2013. The following events are noteworthy:

During the year 13 groups laid down their weapons and reached a peace agreement with their respective governments (Central African Republic, India, the Philippines, Burma and Nepal)

The “peace temperature” which measures the development of some negotiations, reached the highest level since 2004.

82% of the conflicts ended in the last thirty years, did so by means of a peace agreement, while only the remaining 18% ended with a military victory. Negotiations are imposed as the most common method to put an end to a conflict.

Most cases have not had the mediation of a third party, but if so, negotiations usually work better. Intervention of a third party in the exploratory phase has been important in terms of approaches (i.e. Cuba and Norway in Colombia). However, UN (few) mediations have been less significant.

Later in the year, and before the French military intervention in Mali, Tuareg MNLA rebels and leaders of the Islamist group Ansar Dine in Burkina Faso held conversations with representatives of Mali which, unfortunately, were not successful.

In Senegal (Casamance), negotiations between the government and the MFDC armed group, were facilitated by the Community of Sant Egidio in order to ensure decentralization which would include devolution of powers and improve life conditions in the area.

Contacts were held between the Government of Ethiopia and the ONLF, Ogaden's armed group, although dialogue was stalled when the government demanded the ONLF to recognise the Ethiopian Constitution. A faction of the ONLF agreed to negotiate within the framework of the Constitution.

In Sudan (Darfur), representatives of the government and the dissident faction of the JEM signed a ceasefire and announced that they would hold peace talks.

Sudan and South Sudan reached a partial agreement on security and economic relations under the auspices of the Panel of High-Level Implementation of the African Union. The two presidents held a meeting in early January 2013, and Egypt offered to mediate.

The Government of South Sudan announced its willingness to promote mediation for Eritrea - Ethiopia territorial disputes after which Egypt also offered to mediate.

In Somalia, the country's leaders reached an agreement on the road map peace process earlier last year. Months later, the National Constituent Assembly approved the Interim Constitution.

In the Central African Republic a peace agreement between the armed group CPJP and the government was signed. The CPJP was the last armed group active in the country.

In DR Congo, the government and the M23 in Kampala (Uganda), reached an agreement to hold peace talks under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

The UN special envoy for Western Sahara was not in favour of holding new rounds of negotiations, after the failure of previous rounds, in which the parties did not yield their position, that is, an autonomy proposal put forward by Morocco, and a referendum on self-determination requested by the Polisario Front.

Peace talks were initiated between the Colombian government and the FARC. The talks were held in La Havana (Cuba), with Norway and Cuba, as guarantors and Chile and Venezuela to escort the process. Agricultural policy is the first item on the agenda. On the other hand, the ELN guerrilla appointed a delegation to start talks with the government, but in January 2013 President Santos ruled out the possibility of such an approach.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban opened a political office in Qatar for talks with the United States, although these talks were suspended. Instead, there was a meeting between Taliban leaders and the Afghan government in France. Pakistan could replace the U.S. in the approach.

In Assam (India), 700 insurgents from nine armed groups from the Kuki and the Adivasi communities surrendered their weapons.

The Indian government and the Assam state government signed a peace agreement with the two factions of the armed group DHD.

The Indian government could start negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary, of the armed group National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).

In Nagaland (India), the armed group NSCM-IM and the Government were working on a memorandum of understanding for peace, and the NSCN-K said they were prepared to start negotiations.

Pakistani Foreign Secretary invited Kashmiri separatist leaders to hold negotiations.

Several ethnic armed groups called a ceasefire in Myanmar. The ABSDF held negotiations with the government for the first time, and the SSA-S signed a peace agreement. Other groups were scheduled to meet with the government.

In Nepal (Terai), the government and the armed opposition group SKTMMM reached an agreement by which the group decided to give up violence and handed over the weapons to participate in political life.

In the Philippines, the government and the MILF signed a peace agreement and created a new political entity called Bangsamoro, which will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and increase both their powers and economic resources as well as their territorial scope. The four annexes are expected to be agreed in two months.

Later this year, members of the Philippine Government in the NPA met in The Hague (Netherlands), and suggested the possibility of resuming negotiations NDF 2013. The NDF had proposed the Government a “special or parallel track”, called Proposal for Alliance and Peace, which aims to streamline and complement the negotiation process. Direct peace talks were stalled in Cyprus pending Greek Cypriot elections, in 2013, although the dialogue between the parties was kept alive through meetings between the technical committees.

In Kosovo, the government of Pristina stated its willingness to deal with the past and reconcile with Serbia. Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on Kosovo’s representation in regional forums. The prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo met in Brussels for the first time, with the facilitation of the EU, and soon afterwards reached an agreement for the start of the implementation of the agreement on integrated border management.

The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said at the end of the hunger strike of 700 Kurdish prisoners, he was not opposed to the resumption of formal negotiations with the PKK. Later in the year, the Turkish government announced conversations between the State and the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan were underway, which opened the door for a new negotiation process. The PKK would allegedly be willing to lay down their arms.

Progress was made in the preparation of a draft on the non-use of force between Russia and Georgia.

The UN General Assembly elevated the status of Palestine in the international organization and recognized it as a non-Estate-member.

The two mediators sent by the UN Secretary General to Syria, Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi, failed to impose a peace plan or a ceasefire between government forces and insurgents. Given the inflexibility of the Syrian president, it seems unlikely that an agreement with the insurgency can be reached, while the latter is gradually gaining ground in the military confrontation.

It is therefore worth celebrating the agreement reached between The Philippines government and a historical guerrilla which has put an end to 34 years of confrontation. The negotiation lasted several years and was facilitated by Malaysia with the accompaniment of an International Support Group, formed by four organizations: the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Asia Foundation, Muhammadiyah, and Conciliation Resources, as well as Japan, United Kingdom and Turkey. Demobilization of the MILF will take place in 2013 through a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) process.

The second event to be pointed out is the opportunity that a final agreement can be reached with the Colombian FARC guerrilla. The Colombian Government and the guerrilla have been discussing the agrarian issue, which is a fundamental historical claim for the FARC, for several months. An agreement may be reached in the spring, which would allow for the following agenda items to be dealt with: political participation, drug trafficking, as well as victims and the end of conflict. They are all complex matters, which will need to be negotiated quite rapidly for the agreement to be finalized before the end of the year.

The third issue to be followed closely in 2013 is the beginning of a dialogue with the Turkish government PKK guerrilla, which could put an end to 22 years of armed conflict. The emergence of “spoilers”, is to be anticipated given the number of attacks perpetrated just at the time when the PKK announced a ceasefire to facilitate initial talks with the Turkish government. Thus, parties should ensure that current approaches are aimed at reaching an agreement for greater autonomy to the Kurdish people in exchange for the guerrilla’s disarmament. In these negotiations, it will be important to have the flexibility that both the MILF and the FARC have shown with their own governments.

Peace processes in 2012

This yearbook analyses the status of 54 conflicts. During the year, 13 armed groups laid down their weapons after achieving a peace agreement with their respective governments.

Generally speaking, in 2012 **46.3% of the negotiations went well or ended satisfactorily**. Another 27.8% of the negotiations had to deal with serious difficulties, while negotiations went poorly in 13%.

In the first quarter, in **Nigeria**, the government's first attempt to establish a dialogue with the Islamist group **Boko Haram** ended in the abandonment of the chief mediator. Datti Ahmed, the president of the Supreme Council of Sharia and close to the founder of the sect, Mohamed Yusuf, showed his dismay because news regarding the first contacts with Boko Haram had been leaked to the press, calling his neutrality into question along with the needed development of trust-building measures. The Boko Haram spokesman, who goes by the pseudonym of Abu Qaqa, announced to the media that the avenues of negotiation with the government were closed and that the Islamist group mistrusted the executive's desire to fulfil its promises. According to information reported in the press, Boko Haram had shown its willingness to start a reconciliation process with the government and demanded the release of its imprisoned members in exchange for declaring a ceasefire.

In **Pakistan** during the first quarter, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the second in command in **Therik e Taliban**

(TTP), who had recently been divested of his position, showed his position **in favour of holding negotiations with the government**, and may have held encounters with the executive with the group's authorisation. Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the armed group, was against an agreement with the government. TTP was founded in 2007 and brings together around 30 groups originally founded in the south of the Pakistani region of Waziristan, which borders on Afghanistan. In 2008 it was estimated to have around 30,000 to 35,000 members, in alliance with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

In **Nepal (Terai)** in April, **the government and the armed opposition group SKTMMM reached an agreement which stated that the group would give up violence and turn in its weapons in order to participate in political life**. In exchange for being considered a political group as opposed to a terrorist organisation, to guarantee the security of its leaders during negotiations and to remove criminal charges against its members, the SKTMMM pledge to work towards achieving peace. The Minister for Peace and Reconstruction, Satya Pahadi, led the negotiations.

With regard to the crisis in **Syria**, the violence persisted in the country parallel to the regional and international peace initiatives. An observer mission from the Arab League reached the country in late December but did not manage to stop the escalation of the conflict. The working mission was hindered by denouncements from some of its members regarding a purported proximity

Going well (12)	In difficulty (15)	Going poorly (7)	In exploratory stages (7)	Resolved (13)
STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF 2012				
Senegal (MFDC)	Somalia	Etiopia (ONLF)	Sudan (SPLM- N)	CAR (CPJP)
Sudan (JEM)	Sudan (JEM- MC)	Mali	RCA (faction CPJP)	India (APA, AALA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA, KRA, DHD)
India (NSCM- IM)	Sudan- Southern Sudan	Western Sahara	Colombia (ELN)	Myanmar (SSAS)
India (NDFB(P))	Colombia (FARC)	Afghanistan	India (NDFB)	Nepal (SKTMMM)
Myanmar (KNU)	India (ULFA)	Armenia -Azerbaijan	India (faction NDFB(R))	
Myanmar (ABSDF)	India (NSCN-K)	Israel- Palestine	Myanmar (ABSDF)	
Myanmar (NMSP)	India-Pakistan	Syria	Turkey (PKK)	
Myanmar (ALP)	Philippines (MNLF)			
Myanmar (CNF)	Philippines (NPA)			
Myanmar (RCSS - SSA)	Cyprus			
Myanmar (KNPP)	Serbia-Kosovo			
Philippines(MILF)	Moldova(Transdnistria)			
	Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)			

between the observers and the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the inoperativity when avoiding abuses against the civilian population. What is more, the mission was led by the Sudanese General Mohamed al-Dabi, the target of controversy via accusations of human rights violations in his country. In this context, several Arab countries withdrew their contingents from the mission. Even though Damascus had authorised the extension of its presence in the country, the mission ended up withdrawing from Syria in late January. The Arab League then devised a new peace plan – the proposal included Bashar al-Assad stepping down, a transfer of power to the vice president, the formation of a national unity government and talks with the opposition within two weeks – which was rejected by the Syrian government.

In mid-February, the Arab League and the United Nations appointed the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as the UN Special Envoy for **Syria**. This international political leader appealed to the parties to work together to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and worked tirelessly with Chinese and Russian representatives to guarantee their support for a peace proposal. The plan promoted by Annan included six points: the opening of an inclusive political process which would listen to the aspirations of the Syrian people, a cessation of violence by all parties under UN supervision, guarantees of access to humanitarian aid, the release of political prisoners, guarantees of the freedom of expression and movement of journalists, and respect for the right of association and peaceful demonstration. In view of the failure of his peace plan and his attempts to bring the parties to a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League decided to give up his post in early August. On the 1st of September, the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi took over the post vacated by Annan. During that month, Brahimi engaged in contacts with numerous actors in the conflict, including Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, but his machinations also failed to achieve success.

In October, the government of Southern Sudan announced its desire to promote mediation between **Eritrea and Ethiopia** with the goal of resolving the border dispute that had the two countries at odds with each other. The South Sudanese Minister for Cabinet Affairs, Deng Alor, stated that Addis Ababa and Asmara had given the green light to start talks with the goal of solving the conflict. Alor stated that President Salva Kiir and other top South Sudanese politicians were discussing the composition of the mediation team that would soon travel to both capitals. Southern Sudan has good relations with both countries.

In November, Tuareg rebels from the MNLA and leaders of the Islamist group Ansar Dine held talks in Burkina Faso with representatives of the government of **Mali** in order to make headway towards a solution to the crisis in the north of the country. The Islamists – who control the area of Timbuktu, where they have waged attacks against locations considered human heritage sites and have been broadly condemned internationally – expressed their willingness to put an end to months of instability in the region. Mid-month, representatives of the MNLA and Ansar Dine publicised a joint declaration in which they stated that they were willing to commit to a political dialogue process. The mediation, which was spearheaded by ECOWAS, was led by the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. In early November, an Ansar Dine delegation led by travelled to the capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou, to meet with Compaoré and the Malinese Foreign Minister, Tieman Coulibaly. After the meeting, Ansar Dine announced its willingness to allow humanitarian aid to enter the territories under its control, to observe a ceasefire and to hold peace talks with the Malinese government. In a declaration, Ansar Dine stated that it was ready to respect the fundamental rights, the return of displaced persons and refugees and the creation of an atmosphere favourable to a peace agreement that would address the causes of the crisis.

CONFLICTS THAT HAVE ENDED IN RECENT YEARS		
2000	Burundi, Sierra Leone	2
2001		0
2002	Angola	1
2003	DR Congo, India (BLTF-BLT, DHD)	3
2004		0
2005	Indonesia (Aceh), Northern Ireland, Sudan (South), India (NLFT), Iraq (Kurdistan)	5
2006	Sudan (East), Sudan (Darfur - SLA Minawi), Nepal (CPN), Israel-Lebanon	4
2007	Ivory Coast	1
2008	Mali (ADC), Benin-Burkina Faso, Burundi (FNL), CAR (various), Kenya, Colombia (ERG), Sri Lanka (TMVP), Georgia-Russia, Lebanon	9
2009	Mali (ATNM), Niger, Chad (National Movement), Central African Republic (FDPC, MNSP), DR Congo (CNDP), Somalia (ARS), India (DHD-J), Myanmar (KNU - KNLA Peace Council), Thailand- Cambodia	10
2010	Nigeria (MEND), Niger (MNJ), Chad (UFCD faction, UFR; UFDD, CDR, UFDD/F), Ethiopia (UWSLF, ONLF faction), Eritrea-Djibouti, Somalia (ASWJ), Sudan (JRM, SLA-FREES), India (KNF, KNLF, KCP-MC Lallumba faction), Myanmar (SSA-N)	17
2011	Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Myanmar (NDAA, KHB), Spain (ETA)	8
2012	CAR (CPJP), India (DHD, APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, IKDA, KRA), Nepal (SKTMMM), Myanmar (KNPP)	13

PROLONGED OR "UNTREATABLE" IDENTITY CONFLICTS ³			
Country or region	Start of the negotiations	Years elapsed	Underlying issue
Kashmir	1949	62	Identity, security, self-government
Cyprus	1974	37	Identity, territory
Palestine	1990	21	Identity, security, territory
Western Sahara	1991	20	Identity, territory

Reasons for crises in the year negotiations

- | | |
|--|---|
| Abandonment by the mediator | Demands for a cessation of hostilities |
| Criticism of the mediator | Failure to agree to withdraw heavy artillery from a separation zone |
| Rejection of the mediator | Disagreement on the agenda points |
| Discomfort with third-country mediation | Divisions within the armed group |
| Decrease in the frequency of negotiation rounds | Accusations of a third country supporting the dissident faction within an armed group |
| Criticism of a negotiation model | Failure to accept a ceasefire at the start of negotiations |
| Absence of political dialogue | Lack of agreement on the exchange of prisoners |
| Mistrust of the government's will | Imprisonment of members of the negotiating team |
| Demands to release imprisoned members | Attacks |
| Status of the prisoners from an armed group | Failure to recognise the other side's interlocutors |
| Lack of agreement on the fee to pay for an oil pipeline | Isolation in prison of the head of the armed group |
| Reactivation of hostilities | Demand for recognition of the constitution |
| Holding military exercises | Weapons purchases |
| Failure to withdraw governmental armed troops from a zone controlled by an armed group | Human rights violations in the occupied territories |
| Ceasefire violations | |

³ Using Edward Azar's terminology.


CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES AT THE END OF 2012			
Ended		CAR (CPJP), India (DHD, APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, IKDA, KRA), Nepal (SKTMMM, JTMM), Myanmar (SSA-S)	13
Armed conflicts underway	With a consolidated process	Somalia, Colombia (FARC), India-Pakistan (Kashmir), Myanmar (KNU, ABSDF, NMSP, ALP, CNF, RCSS-SSA, KNPP), Philippines (MILF)	11
	With interruptions	Sudan (JEM), Ethiopia (ONLF), Afghanistan (Taliban), Philippines (NPA), Israel-Palestine	5
	Without a specific process	Algeria (OAQMI), Burundi, Mali (North), Nigeria, DR Congo (East), Somalia (Al Shabab), Sudan Kordofan and Blue Nile), Southern Sudan, Uganda (LRA), Colombia (ELN), Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (Manipur), India (CPIM), Pakistan (Balochistan), Pakistan (Northwest), Thailand (South), Russia (Chechnya), Russia (Dagestan), Russia (Ingushetia), Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria), Turkey (Southeast), Iran (Northwest), Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Yemen (Al-Houthists), Yemen (AQPA).	28
	Subtotal		43
Violent conflicts that cannot be categorised as "armed conflicts"	With a consolidated process	CAR (CPJP), Sudan-Southern Sudan, Philippines (MNLF), India (NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, ULFA-Pro-negotiations)	6
	With interruptions	Senegal (MFDC)	1
	Without a specific process	India (NDFB)	1
	Subtotal		8
Former unresolved armed conflicts	With a consolidated process	Cyprus, Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia-Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)	6
	With interruptions	Sáhara Occidental	1
	Without a specific process	Angola (FLEC)	1
	Without a specific process	Angola (FLEC)	8
TOTAL 2011	Ended		13
	With a consolidated process		23
	With interruptions		7
	Without a specific process		30
	TOTAL		73

The peace temperature in 2012


For years now, the *School of Peace Culture* has drawn up a monthly indicator on the status of the peace negotiations around the world with the goal of analysing the overall dynamics of these processes. In 2012, this index analyses a selection of 16 negotiations.⁴

The index is developed based on the average result after granting three points to the processes that have fared well during the month, one point to those that remained at a standstill or showed no new developments, and zero points to those that have experienced difficulties. The maximum score in a given month would be 3.0, and the average 1.5 points.

THE TEMPERATURE OF PEACE IN 2012



As can be seen in the figure above, **the year ended with a monthly average of 1.5 points.** The index sheds light on the obstacles keeping the majority of processes from remaining on a positive course in a sustained way.



Conflicts and peace processes in recent years

The majority of the armed conflicts analysed in this 2013 Yearbook got their start between the 1970s and 1990s. During these years, several armed conflicts have ended, either through a permanent peace agreement (regardless of its quality) or by reaching a provisional cessation of armed hostilities. In any event, the interpretation of most of the conflicts from the 1990s and the fact that many of them have lasted until today enables us to draw preliminary conclusion on what action has been taken in these conflicts from the perspective of 30 years of history. We should mention that some of these conflicts have evolved from an armed to an unarmed phase, although in this section we shall examine all of them.

Of the 104 conflicts listed on the table below, **39.4% ended by means of a peace agreement. Those that have not been resolved and remain active account for 48.1% of the total,** and what is even more significant is the fact that **only 8.7% of these conflicts have ended by means of a military victory by one of the sides.** In other words, the vast majority of the conflicts are only resolved by negotiations, not military victory, and by embarking on some kind of process that leads to the signing of a final agreement.

Regarding the conflicts that ended in the past 30 years (50 of them), 41 ended through a peace agreement (82%) and nine with a military victory (18%). This serves to reaffirm negotiations as an effective means of resolving conflicts.

CONFLICTS UNDERWAY SINCE THE 1990S AND THEIR RESOLUTION UNTIL 2012

Countries	Period	Resolution
Afghanistan	89-...	Unresolved
Angola – FLEC	75-...	Unresolved
Angola – UNITA	75-02	Peace agreement
Algeria	91-...	Unresolved
Armenia-Azerbaijan	91-...	Unresolved
Burma – CNF	88-	Unresolved
Burma – KNU	48-...	Unresolved

⁴ Afghanistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Myanmar (KNU and KIO), Cyprus, Philippines (MILF, NPA), Georgia, India (ULFA and NSCN-IM), India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, Kosovo, Moldova (Transnistria), Western Sahara and Somalia.

Countries	Period	Resolution
Burma (MNDA)	09...	Unresolved
Burma – Shan	59...	Unresolved
Burundi	93-00	Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL)	79-08	Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL)	11-...	Unresolved
Colombia (M-19)	74-90	Peace agreement
Colombia (EPL)	67-91	Peace agreement
Colombia (MAQL)	84-91	Peace agreement
Colombia (CRS)	91-94	Peace agreement
Colombia – ELN	64-...	Unresolved
Colombia – FARC	64-...	Unresolved
Congo (Ninjas)	98-07	Peace agreement
Congo, DR (Inter-Congolese dialogue)	97-03	Peace agreement
Congo, DR (Kivus and Ituri)	96-...	Unresolved
Ivory Coast	02-07	Peace agreement
Ivory Coast	11	Military victory
Croatia	92-95	Peace agreement
Chad	99-...	Unresolved
Cyprus	74-...	In resolution phase
El Salvador	80-91	Peace agreement
Eritrea-Djibouti	08-10	Peace agreement
Spain (ETA)	68-11	Ended without negotiations
Ethiopia (OLF)	74-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia (ONLF)	84-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia-Eritrea	98-00	Peace agreement
Philippines (Abu Sayaf)	90's-...	Unresolved
Philippines – MILF	78-12	Peace agreement
Philippines – MNLF	70-...	In resolution phase
Philippines – NPA	69-...	Unresolved
Georgia (Abkhazia)	93-...	Unresolved
Georgia (South Ossetia)	90-...	Unresolved
Guatemala – URNG	82-94	Peace agreement
Guinea-Bissau	98-99	Peace agreement
India (CPHM)	80-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – BLTF-BLT	92-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) –DHD	95-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) – ULFA	89-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – NDFB	92-...	In resolution phase
India (Jammu and Kashmir)	89-...	Unresolved
India (Manipur)	03-...	Unresolved
India (Nagaland) – NSCNIM	80-	In resolution phase
India (Punjab)	81-93	Military victory

Countries	Period	Resolution
India (Tripura) – NLFT	89-05	Peace agreement
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	90-...	Unresolved
Indonesia (Aceh)	76-05	Peace agreement
Indonesia (Western Papua)	65-...	Unresolved
Indonesia (Timor Este)	75-99	Peace agreement
Iraq (PJAIC)	05-...	Unresolved
Iraq	03-...	Unresolved
Iraq-Kuwait	91	Military victory
Iraq (Kurdistan)	91-05	Peace agreement
Northern Ireland – IRA	69-05	Peace agreement
Israel-Palestine	64-...	Unresolved
Kosovo	98-10	Ended without peace agreement
Lebanon	89-90	Peace agreement
Lebanon-Israel	06	Peace agreement
Lebanon – Fatah al-Islam	07	Military victory
Liberia	89-96	Peace agreement
Libya	11	Military victory
Mali	90-09	Peace agreement
Mali (North)	11-...	Unresolved
Mozambique- RENAMO	77-92	Peace agreement
Nepal – CPN	96-06	Peace agreement
Nepal - Terai	07-...	Unresolved
Niger - MNJ	07-...	Unresolved
Nigeria (Delta) - MEND	05-10	Peace agreement
Pakistan (Balochistan)	06-...	Unresolved
Pakistan (Northwest Frontier)	01-...	Unresolved
Peru – Shining Path	70-99	Military victory
Central African Republic	03-08	Peace agreement
DR Congo	98-...	Unresolved
Rwanda – FPR	94	Military victory
Rwanda (FDLR)	97-...	Unresolved
Russia (Chechnya)	94-...	Unresolved
Russia (Dagestan)	10-...	Unresolved
Russia-Georgia	08	Peace agreement
Russia (Ingushetia)	08-...	Unresolved
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	11-...	Unresolved
Western Sahara	75-...	Unresolved
Senegal (Casamance)	82-...	Unresolved
Sierra Leone	91-00	Peace agreement
Syria	11-...	Unresolved
Somalia	89-...	Unresolved

Countries	Period	Resolution
Sri Lanka – LTTE	72-09	Military victory
South Africa	61-93	Peace agreement
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)	11-..	Unresolved
Sudan (SLA)	03-06	Peace agreement
Sudan – SPLA	83-05	Peace agreement
Sudan (JEM)	03-...	Unresolved
Sudan – Este	05-06	Peace agreement
Sudan –Southern Sudan	09-12	Peace agreement
Thailand (South) – PULO	68-...	Unresolved
Tajikistan	92-97	Peace agreement
Turkey – PKK	74-...	Unresolved
Uganda – LRA	89-...	Unresolved
Yemen North-South	94	Military victory
Yemen (AQPA)	09-...	Unresolved
Yemen (Al-Houthists)	04-	Unresolved

STATUS OF THE CONFLICTS ANALYSED		
	Number	%
Ended with peace agreement	41	39,4
In resolution phase	4	3,8
Military victory	9	8,7
Unresolved	50	48,1
TOTAL	104	100,0

CONFLICTS ENDED		
	Number	%
With peace agreement	41	82
With military victory	9	18
TOTAL	50	100

LENGTH OF THE CONFLICTS THAT ENDED WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT	
Years	Number
1- 4	9
5 - 9	11
10 - 14	5
15 - 19	3
20 - 24	2
25 - 29	3
30 - 34	2
35 - 39	1
40 - 44	1

Fifty-four percent of the conflicts lasted fewer than ten years, while 18.9% lasted more than 25 years

Special topic: The roles in a peace process

We are indebted to Chris Mitchell for an initial proposal on how to systematise the roles of mediators, which I shall elaborate upon in this essay by adapting them to a peace process. The point of departure is to clarify a common misunderstanding, which is thinking that mediation is an act performed by just a single person (Bill Clinton in Israel-Palestine, Nelson Mandela in Burundi, Kofi Annan in Syria or Christopher Ross in Western Sahara, just to cite a few examples). What I shall explain here, following Mitchell's proposal, is that mediation is a process in which multiple actors take part, all playing different yet complementary roles, and that the more the map of roles is filled, the better the process develops. What is commonly called a "mediator" is actually just one figure in the process, the central one which we know as a "facilitator"; however, this person cannot act alone and instead needs the aid of other people who will perform other equally necessary jobs within a peace process.

Mediation is the intervention by third parties in a conflict in which two or more actors have an initial incompatibility, and in which this third party attempts to help the actors in dispute to find a satisfactory solution to the problem by themselves. The facilitator does not provide them with a solution but helps them to seek one using the right techniques and procedures. It should also be noted that mediation is not needed in all conflicts, since the clashing parties may talk and negotiate directly without the need for third parties. However, the aid of third parties is enlisted in more than half of the conflicts.

When we talk about mediation in a peace process, we are therefore referring to the actions of numerous people in all three basic stages in a peace process: pre-negotiation, negotiation and implementation of the agreements. In each of these stages, certain figures may intervene who fulfil a specific function. These participants are usually individuals, but sometimes they may be centres, organisations or bodies.

Creating the atmosphere

Starting a negotiation when public opinion is contrary or indifferent is more difficult than if there is the right atmosphere, that is, public opinion in favour of a negotiation or a peace process. This favourable attitude helps the government to agree to negotiate. However, this atmosphere does not arise on its own, spontaneously; rather it must be created using patience and strategy. The people or organisations in favour of a negotiation must create the right public opinion through op-ed articles, declarations and public events. These interventions by civil society not only create the right atmosphere but also help to shape the agenda and the negotiation times, making it possible for certain issues to be considered. Individuals who generate opinion through the media are

the first ones charged with creating this atmosphere that is sensitive and favourable to rapprochement, countering the voices of the sectors opposed to negotiations, which will always exist and sometimes are quite influential. The goal is to generate an opinion of "yes, we can", "now's the time", "it's necessary" or "we have to try it". To accomplish this, many actors are needed, including artists. "Peace concerts" have been held numerous times not only to encourage the average person to support a peace process but also to stimulate the government and armed groups to engage in talks.

The exploration

A negotiation can begin directly when the parties take the decision to do it because they believe that the time has come. However, oftentimes the prior intervention of a third party is needed, the explorer, who discreetly tests and weighs each party's willingness to enter pre-negotiations. The explorer fulfils a vital function in the process, because he or she has the ability to approach one or all the parties involved and to determine whether the time has come to begin the process. This is a confidential, thankless job because the person acting as the explorer does not tend to appear in the official history of peace processes.

The person who performs this job has to have the ability to get in touch with one of the parties, and if possible with all of them, because in this way they will be able to act as a messenger; that is, they will be able to tell one of the parties that the other is ready and willing to begin a negotiation or a pre-negotiation. To do this, they must know how to get in touch with the parties, either directly via their leaders or with people close to the leaders with access to them. In some cases, the person who acts as an explorer may also actually influence the opinion and decision-making of the actors with whom he or she is engaged in talks. Based on probing, he or she can play a role in generating a more favourable position to entering into talks, or convince one of the parties that the other is now ready and willing. To do this, good information is needed, and this information can only be attained via direct contact. An explorer can also serve as an intermediary; that is, he or she may carry message from one party to the other, always with great discretion. In this case, the explorer is not acting on his or her own initiative but on the request of one of the parties.

The preparation, the training

The members of the armed groups have spent many years of their lives in the mountains, field or jungle, far from real life. They are skilled in the use of weapons, but they are lacking training in more day-to-day things that people living a normal life do have. When negotiating, the armed groups tend to lack the knowledge needed

to properly discuss the items on the agenda. To fix this, the country in question often authorises members of the armed group to travel abroad in order to receive training in a series of issues (economics, parliamentary life, armed forces, democratic institutions, public management, municipalism, etc.). The Salvadoran guerrillas travelled to Spain to take courses organised by the Spanish government. The guerrillas from Mozambique took courses in Italy. In both cases, this was done with discretion. With more publicity, the Colombian guerrillas from the FARC travelled around Europe in the early 1990s to learn about the democratic institutions in several different countries. In 2012, delegations from the Philippine guerrillas MILF visited Catalonia to learn about the experience of autonomous communities. From this trip, new ideas emerged for the negotiation, such as included the demand for a public defender. Sometimes these so-called “Friendly Countries” are charged with delivering this training.

The call for participation

When the parties have reached the conviction that they want to engage in talks, sometimes the figure of the “caller” is needed, who formally and publicly requests the start of dialogues. This may be a prestigious individual or an organisation (the Church, a regional or international body). The caller must also offer a physical place where the talks can be held, although this is not a requirement. Calling for talks always adds a sense of formality to the negotiation. The actors in conflict often meet with the caller, who also can play yet another essential role as the facilitator.

The facilitation

What we commonly call the “mediator” is actually a “facilitator”. This is the most crucial figure in the mediation process, since they are the person who is present during all the phases in the mediation, attend all the meetings and help the parties to find a solution. They are often a prestigious public figure in which case they will surround themselves with a team of experts, professionals who will help them as they mediate. The facilitator is limited to presiding at meetings, but the real work is done by the assistance team. The facilitator is the most prominent person in the process, the most public figure and the one will get the most credit if the process is successful. They are the ones to appear in the final photography. Yet as noted above, their job would not be possible without the assistance and participation of the other actors who shape the mediation process.

Many peace processes enter into crisis because they did not choose the right facilitator or because one of the parties falls out with the facilitator. There are also crises over the facilitation model, that is, over the technical aspects of the process. Therefore, it is important to choose the right person and the right procedure to follow.

A series of conditions is needed to be a facilitator: knowledge of the problem, perseverance, neutrality, impartiality, patience, empathy and imagination. The facilitator must create the ability to keep the parties seated at the table, even at the most difficult times, and they must have the ability to suggest proposals that help to unblock impasses. The facilitator never imposes solutions but limits themselves to helping the party to find solutions. It is related to seeing the glass as half-full; that is, knowing when headway has been made, and making sure the parties know this. When needed, the facilitator should suggest a break so that the ideas are updated or to get out of a dead-end.

It is important for the facilitator to have precise knowledge of the conflict in which they must mediate. Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat who took on the role of UN secretary General Special Envoy for Somalia in the early 1990s, met with the top experts on Somalia around the world so they could give him a crash course on Somali culture, economics, politics and society. In this way, he was able to design an action plan based on the unique features of the Somali people. Unfortunately, his honesty and hard work cost him the job.

The witnesses

Many negotiation processes break down or enter into crisis due to tensions among the parties in the course of the process. This is quite common, and in the worst case scenario it can signal a rupture in the negotiations. Sometimes, one issue is interpreted differently by the parties, which leads to misunderstandings. In order to clarify these misunderstandings, it is recommended that an external observer be present at the talks, who acts as a witness or overseer of the process and who has the ability to clarify to the parties the meaning of the points where agreement cannot be reached. In 2002, for example, the government of Indonesia and the GAM guerrillas reached a dead-end over differences in their interpretations of the cessation of hostilities to which they had agreed.

The figure of a witness in the negotiations helps the parties to clarify their proposals and avoids meta-conflicts, that is, a problem of meanings. At any given point, the witness may say whether a certain thing had been said or not, and can thus clarify different interpretations of what was said at the negotiating table. Therefore, the witness provides guarantees that the process can take place with the utmost normality.

The witness does not mediate or facilitate; rather they simply clarify. Their goal is transparency in the communication between the parties. Should there be a formal mediator, or facilitator, this person can also serve as a witness as they are present at all the meetings.

In more than half the negotiations underway around the world, there is a mediator-facilitator, who is taken for granted as also being a witness. However, it could

arise that the parties decide to also have other eyes, and to enlist the aid of an external observer, who would be the authenticator of what is said and agreed. The other half of negotiations are direct negotiations between the parties. In this case, where there is no mediation, there may not be a witness, such as in the first six rounds in the talks between the ELN and the Colombian government in Havana between 2005 and 2007. When there are witnesses but no mediators, there can be an external observer, the participation of friendly countries or an international contact group. With regard to the first, the presence of a professional can be sought, such as Álvaro de Soto in the second face-to-face meeting between Christiani's government in El Salvador and the FMNL in October 1989, held in San José, Costa Rica. Later, Álvaro de Soto became the mediator. This kind of negotiation is the kind held by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in the talks between the Spanish government and ETA in Geneva in 2005 and 2006. The peace process in Colombia, in the Caracas Agreements (1991) and Tlaxcala Agreements (1992) between the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (made up of the FARC, ELN and EPL) and the government of Colombia had an international witness (Emilio Figueredo Planchart).

Another variation is the participation civil society, as happened in the state of Assam, in India, where the People's consultative Group has acted as a facilitator and witness in the talks held with the ULFA guerrillas. The aforementioned talks in Caracas and Tlaxcala between the Colombian guerrillas and the government of the country were attended by observers from Colombian civil society, including Nelson Berrío, Álvaro Vasquez del Real, Rafael Serrano Prada and Miguel Mottoa Cure.

The Church often acts as a witness. The Bishop-Ulama Conference (BUC) has been requested to serve as a witness several times, and in recent periods it has been asked to serve as a Councillor on Religious Matters in the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF guerrillas. A professional politician, sometimes a head of state or president, can be asked to serve as a witness, such as Bill Clinton in July 2000 at Camp David, where he acted as an authenticator in the negotiations being held between the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, and the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Yasser Arafat.

In some peace processes, the figure of friendly countries is used. These countries may simply accompany the process or they may participate more actively in the negotiation process. For example, in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela were the witnesses and overseers of the peace process and the disarmament of the EPL and the indigenous movement Quintín Lame in 1991. Finally, another kind of participation is an international contact group, such as the one operating in the Philippines in the government's talks with the MILF guerrillas where a group of several NGOs, made up of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), The Asia Foundation (USA), Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) and Conciliation Resources (London) participated in all the

meetings. This group is made up of diplomats from Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

In short, it may be very helpful to have a witness to serve as the overseer or authenticator in the rounds of negotiations of what happens at the negotiation table. Even though this figure has no right to weigh in in the discussions, he or she does have to authority to later express his or her opinion to the parties, especially when they do not agree about what was said.

Incentives

When a negotiation is held at a difficult time, it may be wise to enlist the participation of an organisation or country that can offer political or economic incentives to ease the process. The European Union has played this role several times, and numerous countries have offered economic resources in exchange for a continuation of the negotiations or the promise to provide these resources once a peace agreement is reached. For example, in 2012 the Norwegian government offered more than 60 million euros for the development of the Karen people (Myanmar), which stimulated the negotiations that were being held at that time by the Karen guerrillas and the Burmese government. Another incentive is promising an armed group removal from terrorist lists if it signs a cessation of hostilities. In 2012, an incentive in Myanmar was to allow the different ethnic armed groups to open representation offices. A visit by the United Nations Secretary General to the negotiating parties can also be a sound incentive measure. In India, one incentive for moving the negotiations with the armed group ULFA forward in 2011 was the release of its imprisoned leaders.

Generating ideas

All negotiations experience difficult times in which the facilitator must calibrate whether it is the right time to take a break and proceed later under a different approach. To do this, they may resort to third persons, usually scholars, or to specialised centres, to develop new ideas. An academic centre like the School for Peace Culture, for example, met with the negotiator of the Polisario Front, delegates from the King of Morocco, the representative of the United Nations facilitator, the African Union and European chancelleries, experts in the Arab world and formulas of self-government in an attempt to generate new ideas during an impasse in the negotiations over Western Sahara. Later, these ideas were forwarded to the United Nations facilitator in this conflict. A witness of peace talks may have no right to participate, but they can make suggestions in a written document that they make available to the parties. This is what, Kristian Herbolzheimer, a representative of Conciliation Resources of the International Contact Group did as he accompanied the negotiations between the MILF guerrillas and the Philippine government. The

representatives of this guerrilla group visited several countries to gather the experiences of other negotiations. This is quite common in peace process.

The unifier

When preparing for peace negotiations, an armed group will often experience one or several splinters, becoming divided into those in favour of and those opposed to the negotiation. This can be the source of even further divisions, as happened in Darfur (Sudan), which had two armed groups at first and one year later had 13, rendering the negotiations impossible. In this case, the figure of the unifier is needed, a person who tries to unify if not the groups at least the groups' agendas so that there are as few as possible and it is feasible to carry out successful negotiations.

The guarantor

It is common for the lengthiness of the conflict to have caused severe mistrust among the parties. For this reason, the entire peace process should be accompanied by a figure, the guarantor, who guarantees that the parties comply with what has been agreed to. Obviously, compliance with any agreements reached is the responsibility of the conflicting parties, but it is positive for a third actor to accompany them and monitor the agreements. The guarantor should have some kind of power, so this cannot be just anyone. It can be a regional or international organisation which lends the process security. At times, such as the negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government, the guarantors (Norway and Cuba) also act as observers.

The verification

In the course of the negotiation, measures are taken, such as a ceasefire or a cessation of hostilities, which must be verified. To do this, the participation of experts, both civilian and military, from several countries is needed, who can witness that the agreements are fulfilled. This is a technical job, so some training is required. Sometimes United Nations staff fulfils this role. Compliance with the peace agreements must also be verified, so people in verification teams are also needed on political, economic, police and military matters. These groups are often mixed, that is, made up of people from the armed group, from the government and from third countries. The verification teams must check the denunciations of violations of the agreements, and they must develop mechanisms to resolve these deeds. Therefore, they can have the ability to level sanctions.

Conclusion

All of the aforementioned roles must participate in a peace process. They are usually different figures, and working on one aspect renders a person incompatible for taking on another role. Only on a handful of occasions can one person do two things at once. In the pre-negotiation phase, in the exploratory phase, is it wise to define which people or individuals will take on these roles, and how the decisions on appointing these actors must be clarified. The success of the negotiation depends on doing this well and choosing the right people.

Analyses by countries

AFRICA

Western Africa

SENEGAL (Casamance)	
Population Senegal:	Senegal (12.8 million), Casamance (3.5 million)
Area Senegal:	197.000 Km ² ; Casamance: 32.350 Km ²
HDI Senegal:	155 (of 187)
GDP Senegal:	13,100 million dollars
Per capita income Senegal:	\$1.040
Deaths due to the conflict:	3,000
Armed actors:	factions of the MFDC
Facilitators:	Presidential envoy, P. Goudiaby Atepa, M. Jacques Diop, Church, Council of Elders, Cardinal Sarr

Context of the conflict

Discovered in 1445, Casamance became the first Portuguese colony. It was transferred to French control in 1908 as part of what was then the Federation of Mali, and remained so until Senegal's independence in 1960. Since 1982, the **MFDC** (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) has been waging an armed rebellion through its military wing, **Atika**, to achieve independence for Casamance, a region in the south of the country which is virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia. Casamance is also the only place in Senegal where an area of tropical jungle remains, with large trees, rivers and wildlife. With 3.5 million inhabitants, Casamance is one of the most important tourist hubs in Senegal, and therefore, tourists have been the target of MFDC actions on several occasions. Offshore the subsoil in this region is rich in **oil**, while the region is also relatively rich in rice and cashews. The rebellion is led chiefly by people from the Diola ethnic group, a minority compared to the majority Wolofs running the government. The Diola are also present in Guinea Bissau and Gambia, which explains the support that the independence movement receives from these two countries, depending on the situation and the makeup of the dissidences within the MFDC. The Diola, a farming people, founded a kingdom called Gabu in the early 18th century. They feel economically and politically marginalised by the central power, which looks down on the other minorities, and are unfavourable to the colonisation of people from the north of the country. The main languages in Casamance are Diola and Portuguese Creole. The USA and France support Dakar in its bid to defeat the MFDC. The conflict has become regionalised and is affecting Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, triggering the exodus of thousands of people. The historical leader of the MFDC was Abbot **August Diamacaoune**, who died in 2007. Diamacaoune offered ceasefire proposals several times (1992, 1995 and 1998), but the peace

talks between the MFDC and the government were postponed repeatedly for various reasons (clashes, disagreement about the venue or facilitators, etc.). The Church has played an extremely important role in this region, which has very particular social and religious structures. The conflict has caused around 3,000 deaths. The MFDC has representatives in Switzerland, Portugal, France and Gambia. Both of the factions currently keeping the conflict alive, the Northern Front (led by Salif Sadio) and the Southern Front (led by Cesar Atoute Badiate), earn a living from the illegal trade in cashews and other natural products, giving a more economic than political dimension to the resolution of the conflict.

Background to the peace process

The earliest peace initiatives date back to 1991, when the government first undertook a reconciliation measure and released many prisoners. Likewise, a first ceasefire was declared at that time. The first splinter within the MFDC between Sidi Badji's Northern Front and Diamacoune's Southern Front came in 1992. In 1999, there was a historical encounter in the capital of Gambia between the president of Senegal, A. Diouf, and Abbot Diamacoune, the leader of the MFDC, launching what was called the "Banjul process", which culminated in a ceasefire. Elections were held in January 2000 with A. Wade declared the winner. He changed the negotiation strategy by eliminating Gambia's mediation and assigning the entire responsibility to a ministerial team. In 2001, the MFDC reached an initial peace agreement with the government of Senegal, although Diamacoune recognised that he did not have control over several dissident sectors. In late December 2004, the government and the MFDC finally signed a general peace agreement in the town of Ziguinchor, which theoretically put an end to 22 years of conflict. The MFDC gave up its claims for independence and focused more on developing Casamance. The agreement was signed by the Minister of the Interior and the founder of the MFDC, A. Diamacoune, and it stipulated an end to the use of violence, amnesty for members of the group and their voluntary integration into the country's security forces, the start of a demining process, the return of thousands of displaced persons and refugees, and the reconstruction of the region of Casamance. However, the agreement was only partial, since both factions of the group remained active.

In February 2011, the National Conference presented the president of Senegal with a peace plan for Casamance. The proposal included two phases: the creation of a national contact group and the launch of a national commission to supervise the negotiations. The National Conference is a forum for debate in which representatives

from the different political parties and civil society took part in an attempt to respond to what are considered questions of state and offering proposals to resolve them. In December, the secretary-general of the MFDC, Jean-Marie François Biagui, announced that during the meeting held in Casamance, his movement's intention was to become a political party and proposed that a federal system be developed in Senegal, thus giving up his pretensions for independence.

The peace process in 2012

Early in the year, the resolution of the conflict in Casamance was the major focus of the presidential campaign in Senegal. President Abdoulaye Wade reported that he had requested mediation from the San Egidio community to forge a dialogue with the MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio, which is regarded as the most belligerent. **Sadio, in turn, expressed his willingness to engage in negotiations, but he kept up his demand for them to take place in a neutral country outside Africa.** The leading opposition leader, Macky Sall, also visited Casamance during the election campaign and promised to hold an inclusive dialogue that would put an end to the violence. He also pledged to improve the transport infrastructures between Casamance and the rest of Senegal. Along similar lines, the secretary-general of the MFDC, Jean Marie François Biagui, asked that Sall be voted on during the second round of presidential elections with the hopes that changes in the country's leadership would make it possible to solve the conflict in Casamance. On the other hand, the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance took advantage of the candidates' visits to the region to ask them to sign a memorandum in which the winner of the presidential election pledged to quickly and permanently resolve the conflict through dialogue and to enlist the participation of the women of Casamance in the process. The opposition leader, Macky Sall, won the second round of elections in March with 66% of the vote, thus defeating Wade as the incumbent president.

In April, the MFDC welcomed the **decision by the new president, Macky Sall, to get Gambia and Guinea-Bissau involved in the quest for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Casamance.** The president underscored the fact that peace in Casamance was one of his priorities at the helm of the government. Sall visited Banjul (Gambia), where he made these statements. However, the armed wing of the movement, known as Atika, made no declaration on the president's statements. The secretary general of the political wing of the MFDC, Jean Marie François Biagui, hoped to be able to participate in the forthcoming legislative elections in July in the pro-ecology party Rassemblement des Écologistes du Sénégal (Res-Les Verts), according to news reports in the national press. In May, **the leader of one of the MFDC factions, César Atoute Badiate, expressed his willingness to meet with the leader of the other faction of the group, Salif Sadio,** after the Casamance-based architect Pierre Goudiaby Atepa invited the forces

to engage in dialogue as part of the national tribute to Jules François Bocandé, a football player from the region of Casamance who died on the 7th of May. In June, **Salif Sadio proposed a negotiated solution to the crisis in Casamance through mediation from the San Egidio community.** In a communiqué, Sadio expressed his willingness to negotiate with the new government of Senegal to achieve permanent peace in the region. As a condition, Sadio insisted on the mediation of the San Egidio community and announced that the MFDC was willing to release the soldiers they held prisoner if the new regime promised to engage in honest dialogue. The new president of Senegal claimed that he and his government were willing to participate in an open, frank dialogue with the MFDC commanders, including Sadio (head of the northern section), César Atoute Badiate and Ousmane Nianthan Diatta (leaders of the southern factions). Sall stressed the importance of also having other prominent actors in Casamance participate, including the Christian and Muslim religious authorities, civil society organisations and the women's platform, among others, in order to embark upon a dialogue that would put an end to a conflict that has lasted more than three decades.

The positive signals regarding the possible establishment of a dialogue between the government and the armed group MFDC in Casamance were confirmed by the **official announcement on the establishment of negotiations among the parties** during the third quarter. After the victory of the coalition headed by president Macky Sall in the legislative elections held on the 1st of July, there was headway in the steps towards dialogue. The leaders of the MFDC, Salif Sadio and César Badiate Atoute, expressed their willingness to negotiate with the government with the mediation of the San Egidio community. In this context, meetings were held among the parties in Guinea Bissau during the month of July. A month and a half later, the prime minister of Senegal, Abdoul Mbaye, confirmed the establishment of *discreet negotiations* with the MFDC, which in the future would be expanded to include other stakeholders with interests in the crisis. Mbaye underscored the fact that the dialogue sought to return peace to Casamance, that the region is a priority for Sall's government and that efforts will be made to ensure a decentralisation process that ensures the transfer of competences and improvements in the living conditions of the residents of Casamance.

Analysts and observers stressed that the government seemed to want to create the conditions necessary for restoring peace in the region after 30 years of armed rebellion, and they determined that the president was responding to the offers of dialogue from the MFDC. Likewise, **several analysts stressed that there are efforts underway to enlist the participation of several local and international actors in the process,** beyond the mediation of the San Egidio community. In this sense, it was noted that in his investiture speech in April, Sall emphasised the need to enlist the aid of neighbouring countries like Gambia and Guinea Bissau in order to address the crisis in Casamance. Sall chose Gambia

as the destination for his first international trip after taking on the presidency. Other observers stressed the challenge posed by the divisions within the MFDC, which has a political wing made up of local representatives as well as many more who live abroad, and another military wing made up of different factions. One of them is in the southern zone of Casamance on the border with Guinea Bissau, another is in the north on the frontier with Gambia, while a third faction is located in the eastern region of Kolda. The different factions all claim hegemony over the MFDC, so the merger of the different groups or the definition of a single interlocutor were identified by some analysts as one of the major challenges. In this context, it should be noted that in September two rival MFDC factions led by Ousmane Niantang and César Atoute Badiate reached a reunification agreement.

In mid-October, a government delegation went to Rome with an MFDC delegation to discuss a peace agreement. The meeting was held at the San Egidio community. In December, the MFDC faction that had kidnapped eight soldiers released them after almost one year of captivity. The Senegalese authorities praised the measure and, in this context, it was announced that the peace talks between the government and the insurgent group would resume in Rome in January. At these talks, government representatives and envoys from one of the MFDC leaders, Salif Sadio, would try to find a middle way for Casamance between autonomy and advanced regionalisation, according to press reports. There were also reports that the government may consider lifting

its arrest warrants for the rebels. Parallel to the talks in Rome, the Archbishop of Dakar, upon the request of the president Macky Sall, was holding talks with César Atoute Badiate, the military chief of another of the MFDC factions. The president of Gambia also joined the process, and along with the former mayor of Ziguinchor he was promoting an encounter between representatives of the Sadio and Badiate factions in order to define a shared platform. In mid-December, Sall stressed that the region of Casamance would be the best venue for developing an advanced decentralisation policy.

Most significant events of the year

- The new president, Macky Sall, decided to get Gambia and Guinea-Bissau involved in the quest for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Casamance.
- Negotiations got underway among the parties with the mediation of the San Egidio community.

Websites of interest

- Africa Time (www.africatime.com/senegal)
- Afrol News (www.afrol.com)
- Government (www.gouv.sn)
- Le Soleil (www.lesoleil.sn)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Rewni (www.rewni.com)
- www.homeviewsenegal.sn

Horn of Africa

ETHIOPIA (Ogaden)	
Population Ethiopia:	(84.7 million); Ogaden (4.3 million)
Area Ethiopia:	(1,104,000 km ²); Ogaden (179,000 km ²)
HDI Ethiopia:	174 (out of 187)
GDP Ethiopia:	27,200 million dollars
Per capita income Ethiopia:	\$330
Deaths due to the conflict:	+ than 1,000 in 2007
Armed actors:	UWSLF, ONLF
Facilitators:	-

Context of the conflict

The region of Ogaden is part of what is called the Somali Region in Ethiopia. It covers an area of around 200,000 km², and is divided between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as part of Kenya and Djibouti. The region was annexed to Ethiopia in the late 19th century. In the late 1970s there were military clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of this region, and this culminated in 1978 with the Somali regime seriously debilitated. The Ogadeni/Somali population practices a tolerant form of Islam.

Since 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has been fighting for the independence or autonomy of the region of Ogaden, a desert area bordering on Somalia. The ONLF was part of the transition government from 1991 to 1995, after the Communist regime, but thereafter it withdrew from government to fight for the independence of what it views as the Ogadeni people. It has a major diaspora in the United States (with numerous pro-peace civil organisations), Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands. It calls for the independence of the Ogadeni/Somali people, an ethnic group 27 million people strong. In 1994 the ONLF called for a referendum on self-rule in Ogaden, an initiative which met with a large-scale military attack by the Ethiopian government. Given this situation, the “elders” in the region called on the government to take up talks to resolve the conflict. In 2007 the ONLF launched attacks against Chinese oil and natural gas facilities (China Petroleum Chemical Corporation) operating in the region of Ogaden, an area where the Malaysian company Petronas also has facilities.

Background to the peace process

In late 1998, the government and the ONLF held secret meetings to find a solution, but the meetings ended when the ONLF asked that another organisation participate in the negotiations as a witness. The government also killed one of the negotiators and captured another, who died in prison. In 2007, the ONLF issued a call for international mediation which would help to open up negotiations with the Ethiopian government. In October 2010, part of the

ONLF reached a peace agreement with the government which put an end to the armed struggle that it had been waging in the region of Ogaden for decades. The agreement stipulated an amnesty for the imprisoned members of the group and the conversion of the group into a political party. However, a part of the ONLF led by Mohamen Omar Osman kept up the armed struggle, and both factions considered themselves to be the main core of the ONLF, accusing the other part of being insignificant.

In April 2010, the armed group United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), a wing of the former AItihaad A-Islaami (AIAI) which operated in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, agreed to turn its weapons in to the Ethiopian government and return to legal status after decades of guerrilla warfare. The WSLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa on the 29th of July. Amnesty had previously been granted to the members of the group, and the agreement signalled the launch of development projects in the Ogaden region.

The peace process in 2012

During the third quarter of the year, contacts were held between the **government of Ethiopia and the armed opposition group from the region of Ogaden, the ONLF**. According to several analysts, the death of the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, on the 20th of August may have brought a new impetus and chance to make headway in the process. These negotiations were made public in early September, although the ONLF stated that contacts had been underway between the parties for months. Both parties met in Nairobi, Kenya in early September to hold preliminary talks in which they agreed to a framework of negotiations to put an end to 28 years of insurgency. A communiqué issued by the ONLF stated that a new date had been set for the next meeting, and that both sides agreed to conduct specific trust-building measures for the formal negotiations. The Ethiopian Minister of Communication, Bereket Simon, described the talks as a “very positive step” and stated that the government wished to pursue the talks to the end.

In October, the peace talks stalled. According to the ONLF Exterior Secretary, Abdirahman Mahdi, **the talks stalled when the government demanded that the ONLF recognised the Ethiopian constitution**. The delegation led by the Ethiopian Minister of Defence, Siraj Fegessa, stressed that the ONLF refused to recognise the Ethiopian constitution. Mahdi remarked that during the initial round both parties had agreed not to set preconditions in order to facilitate a propitious atmosphere for the talks, so establishing recognition of the constitution became the government’s prerequisite for continuing the talks, which triggered this situation. Mahdi stressed that they had been fighting against Ethiopia since 1984 and that the current constitution dates from 1994, so the government could not force the group to recognise the Ethiopian constitution. In December, the Sudan Tribune agency reported on the arrival of Abdinur Abdullahi Farah, the purported leader of

an ONLF faction, in Addis Ababa with the goal of resuming the peace talks with the government. The peace talks mediated by Kenya had been interrupted in October when the government set as a precondition the ONLF's respect for the constitution and its acceptance of the constitutional framework for reaching an agreement. This faction of the ONLF had to respect the constitution and agree to negotiation within the constitutional framework. The ONLF issued a communiqué in which it stated that there were currently no peace talks between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government, even though the latter was striving to create a different image. The Ethiopian regime announced that it was reaching a new peace agreement with a self-determined faction of the ONLF. The ONLF communiqué stated that in the current peace talks the government was speaking with a low-ranking deserter from the ONLF's Office of External Affairs named Abdinur Abdullahi Farah, which it elevated to the rank of member of the ONLF's Executive Committee. It had done the same two years earlier with Salahdin Maow, who had been expelled from the organisation, but Ethiopia took advantage of the situation to conduct a farce before the international media, which later led it to seek Kenya's help to try to reach a real peace agreement with the ONLF, which was not possible. After two rounds of negotiations in Nairobi (Kenya), the Ethiopian government abandoned the talks and declared that they had failed upon seeing that the ONLF did not accept unilateral preconditions,

since it wanted a formal peace process. Finally, the ONLF stressed that Ethiopia had not yet learned that trickery and denial of the seriousness of the Ogaden conflict were getting them nowhere, as well as the need to participate in a genuine peace process in order to find a fair solution that would accept the exercise of the people of Ogaden's right to self-determination. In consequence, according to the group, this manipulative attitude would never put an end to the legitimate resistance of the people of Ogaden.

Most significant events of the year

- Contacts were held between the government of Ethiopia and the armed opposition group in the region of Ogaden, the ONLF.
 - The Ethiopian regime announced that it was reaching a new peace agreement with a self-determined faction of the ONLF.
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Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
 - All Africa.com (allafrica.com)
 - Ethiopian News Agency (www.ena.gov.et)
 - Ogaden Human Rights Committee (www.ogadenrights.org)
 - Ogaden News (222.ogadennews.com)
 - Ogaden Online (www.ogaden.com)
 - Ogaden Voices for Peace (www.ogadenvoice.org)
 - ONLF (www.onlf.org)
 - Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
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SOMALIA	
Population:	9.6 million inhabitants
Area:	638,000 Km ²
HDI:	...
GDP:	...
Per capita income:	...
Deaths due to the conflict:	hundreds of thousands; 21,000 since 2007.
Armed actors:	Al Shabab, ARS dissidents
Facilitators:	IGAD, Kenya, International Contact Group, Yemen, Libya, Arab League, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, UN (AMISOM)

Context of the conflict

Somalia is a country that is homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. However, it is separated into five main clans, which are in turn divided into sub-clans. In 1969 General Siad Barre led a coup d'état and established a dictatorship. This lasted until he was overthrown in 1991 after three years of armed conflict in the country. The coalition of opposition groups that overthrew the general began an armed struggle for power resulting in the wholesale destruction of the country and the death of hundreds of thousands of people since 1991. This situation brought about US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the establishment of a United Nations mission (UNOSOM) in 1992. The mission failed and withdrew from the country three years later. Despite these precedents, the UN Secretary General recommended establishing a peacekeeping mission on the basis of the communities' proposals. This mission would be focussed on the tasks of disarmament and demobilisation. Some of the country's regions have declared their independence or have agreed to a certain level of autonomy (Somaliland and Puntland).

Background to the peace process

In spring 2000, the new President of Djibouti, who is also president of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD (a regional organisation made up of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda), organised a reconciliation conference in the city of Arta in his country. A Transitional National Assembly was elected, despite the fact that many clan leaders were absent. In January 2001, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. However, the TNG was not supported by all of the groups and only controlled part of the country and the capital. At the end of this year, a round of talks between the TNG and opposing factions was held in Kenya and an initial agreement was reached. Finally, in late 2002, a round of peace talks was held in Eldoret (Kenya). They were organised under the auspices of IGAD and led to an agreement to cease hostilities and begin a negotiation process on a range of issues.

The Transitional Federal Parliament was formed in 2004. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in January 2007. That same year, the peace and reconciliation conference called the National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (NGRC) was held in the outskirts of the capital. The conference was boycotted by the Islamists from the UTI, who demanded that it be held in a neutral country. Parallel to the conference, around 400 opposition figures who gathered in Eritrea agreed to create an alliance opposing the TFG, adopting the name Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS), which later came to be called the ARS. In 2008, the peace talks were resumed in Djibouti between the TFG and the moderate faction of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, under United Nations mediation, which resulted in an agreement on the 26th of October. This agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, the radical militia Al-Shabaab, headquartered in Eritrea, announced that it would not heed the agreement and would instead continue to fight against the moderate ARS militia headquartered in Djibouti. In the second half of February 2010, the TFG signed an agreement with the Islamic group Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ) with the goal of creating an alliance with the groups and factions that opposed the presence of extremist groups in the country.

In February 2011, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) approved the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for another three years. This mandate was about to conclude in August, when a new constitution was to be adopted and the first elections in the country held. In June, the president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reached an agreement with the president of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in which they pledged to postpone the legislative and presidential elections for a one-year period after the date on which the transitional federal institutions were to be renewed, so the elections had to take place before the 20th of August 2012 at the latest. Worth noting is the roadmap reached by the National Consultative Conference held in Mogadishu in early September which stipulated a series of tasks that would have to be completed before August 2012, including improvements in security, the writing of a draft constitution, national reconciliation and good governance.

The peace process in 2012

In January, the leaders who met in Puntland reached an **agreement on the roadmap for the peace process**. The representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) from the regions of Puntland and Galmudug and the group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa signed the Garowe Principles at the constitutional conference held in that town. According to the new agreement, Somalia would have a two-chamber parliament with an upper chamber with representatives from the federal states. This federal bicameral parliament would enter into force in June 2016. Between June 2012 and June 2016, the federal parliament

will also have a chamber of representatives made up of 225 parliamentarians elected under the clan-based 4.5 formula. Twenty percent of the seats in the new parliament will be set aside for women, according to the Garowe Principles. In parallel, a National Constituent Assembly will be set up, 30% of whose delegates will be women; this assembly will ratify the new federal constitution in May 2012. In turn, the UN Secretary General Special Envoy, Augustine Mahiga, set up his office in Mogadishu after the institution's 17-year absence from the country. The new UN presence aims to show international support for the TFG in its struggle against Al-Shabaab and its active participation in the preparations for the elections which are to be held this year.

On the 23rd of February, an **international conference was held in London** with the goal of addressing the multiple challenges affecting the country. Around 40 representatives from different countries, including the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, participated in the summit, in addition to the Foreign Ministers of France, Spain and Saudi Arabia. One of the main challenges highlighted by the diplomatic representatives present at the conference was ensuring widespread support of the talks about the constituent process that should ultimately lead to the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) on the 20th of August. The main sources of concern mentioned were the possibility that Somalia would become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and the rising cost of Somali piracy, which is estimated at around 7 billion dollars per year. In February, too, on the eve of a summit in London, the UN Security Council approved an expansion of the AU mission in the country, AMISOM, by 12,000 soldiers to reach a total of 17, 731, which was interpreted as a show of support for the initiative. The Security Council also agreed to expand and reinforce the mission's mandate until the 31st of October. In March, the signatories of the Roadmap and the Garowe Principles met in Galkayo to agree to the amendments of the Roadmap. The signatories of the previous agreements participated in the Galkayo meeting, including Farole, the president of the region of Puntland; Sharif, the president of the TFG; Sharif Hassan, the president of the Parliament; Gaas, the prime minister of the TFG; Abdisamad Nuur Guled, the president of the region of Galmudug; Sheikh Mohamed Yusuf, the representative of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama; Augustine Mahiga, the UN Secretary General Special Representative; and Ali Shire, the vice president of Puntland. The meeting sought to step up the formation of the Constituent National Assembly (CNA) based on the 4.5 formula of dividing the places among the clans. The CNA will be made up of 825 members, and the signatories of the Roadmap agreed to choose the members of the CNA so that it could hold its preliminary meeting on the 25th of April in Mogadishu. The president of the TFG, Sharif Ahmed, announced the appointment of a committee with the mandate of guiding the talks between the TFG and other organisations, including most importantly Somaliland, as well as the self-proclaimed state of Khatumo (the disputed region comprised of the

provinces of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn in northern Somalia). At the peace conference in London, contacts were secured between Somaliland and the TFG, but the representatives of Khatumo were not invited.

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, stated in April that he had not given up on promoting peace talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the armed Islamist group Al-Shabaab. In this vein, he noted that Turkey could play the role of mediator between the clashing parties in Somalia due to his country's good relations with all the Somali actors. To date, Turkey has played an important role in supporting and assisting Somalia in the political sphere and in development matters. In 2011, Turkey provided 201 million dollars in emergency aid to the country, and in June it organised an international conference on Somalia. In other affairs, the prime minister of the TFG, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, stated that there had been a delay in the receipt of the funds from the international community earmarked to implementing the Roadmap. Thus, despite the fact that Somalia had recently made headway on the Roadmap (signing of the Garowe, Galkayo and Mogadishu agreements) and completed the Somali constitution, the international community was delaying payment of the funds in order to ensure compliance with the agreement before the deadline. Gaas met with the UN Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, to discuss the headway on the Roadmap and the Garowe Principles, which established a calendar of actions that would put an end to the transition in August. In May, the signatories of the Mogadishu Roadmap met in Addis Ababa at the behest of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and agreed to introduce several amendments to the draft constitution, clarifications on the mandates of the different committees, and they discussed the evolution and general progress on the Roadmap, as well as on its calendar.

On the 22nd of June, a meeting was held in Nairobi among the key stakeholders in the peace process in Somalia (president of the TFG, president of the parliament, president of Puntland, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa) in which **a draft constitution was approved after the initial draft written by the Independent Federal Constitution Commission (IFCC) was revised and amended.** This agreement had been mentioned by the UN Secretary General Special Representative in the Country, Augustine Mahiga, as a decisive step in the Roadmap in recent months. The next decisive steps were choosing the members of the Constituent Assembly (NCA) which was to approve the draft constitution and choosing the members of the federal parliament by a committee of 135 traditional elder leaders. Likewise, Conference II on Somalia was held between the 31st of May and the 1st of June in Istanbul, facilitated by the government of Turkey, which concluded with support of the Roadmap and the agreements signed to date – the Garowe Principles I and II, and the Galkayo Principles – and the Addis Ababa communiqué dated the 23rd of May. Representatives from all the key actors participated in the conference, including presidents of the TFG, the federal parliament,

Puntland, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa and Galmudug, as well as traditional leaders, religious leaders, civil society, women, youth, the diaspora and representatives of the private sector, in addition to representatives from 57 countries and 11 regional organisations. This conference was just as multidimensional as Conference I on Somalia held in Istanbul in 2010. However, it should be noted that the committee of elders took upon themselves the prerogative to revise the draft constitution, an issue which did not appear in the Roadmap, and to upgrade the number of members of the future parliament.

During the third quarter, major headway was made in the peace process in Somalia which may contribute to resolving the conflict, most notably the approval of the new federal constitution, the parliament and the new president, as set forth in the Roadmap for Somalia.

The signatories of the Roadmap (president of the Transitional Federal government, prime minister, president of the Parliament, presidents of the regions of Puntland and Galmudug and representatives of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a) approved a draft constitution and made it public for its approval. In accordance with the Roadmap, on the 1st of August **the provisional constitution was approved by the Constituent National Assembly (CNA)**, which is made up of 825 members elected by a group of 135 elders (the old Somali leaders who serve as the traditional authorities in the country). This draft federal constitution must be approved via a national referendum which will be held as soon as the security situation improves. This group of elders also debated the selection of the members of the new federal Parliament. These members were chosen in August, and later Mohamed Osman Jawari was appointed the new president of the Parliament on the 28th of August. On the 10th of September, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was appointed as the new president of the country, which signalled the end of the transition process. Mohamud, a scholar who had already worked for the local peace research organisation, the Centre for Research and Dialogue, and who was regarded as a moderate, defeated the three outgoing TFG leaders: the president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the prime minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and the president of the Parliament Sharif Sheikh Aden. In turn, the outgoing prime minister withdrew his candidacy after being defeated in the first round and instead offered his support to Mohamud with the goal of preventing the outgoing president of the TFG from winning. As noted the report by the UN Secretary General for Somalia, the process experienced serious delays, and cases of undue intimidation and influence with regard to the elders and the members of the technical selection committee were noted. What is more, the fact that many parliamentarians had been bribed to buy their votes, as claimed by

diplomatic sources, led to fears as to the credibility of the entire process. The citizens celebrated the defeat of the TFG candidates, whom they labelled as corrupt, and their replacement with a new leader from civil society. The UN Security Council approved Resolution 2067, which celebrated the completion of the process, encouraged the new authorities to choose an inclusive and responsible government, noted the importance of developing a programme to define the priorities of the post-transition period and stated that the referendum and general elections should be held during the mandate of the current Parliament. In parallel, as the pro-government militias supported by AMISOM, Kenya and Ethiopia expelled the insurgents from several different regions in the centre and south of the country, the TFG stepped up its efforts to foster the participation of local leaders from the recently won-back zones in the dialogue process and the shaping of the new government.

Also worth highlighting are the talks held between the TFG and the authorities of the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland in Chevening (United Kingdom) on the 20th and 21st of June. The goal of these talks was to outline the future relations between both entities, in accordance with the talks held at the Conference on Somalia held in London on the 20th and 21st of February, and the Conference II on Somalia held in Istanbul on the 31st of May and 1st of June. Later, the presidents of both entities met in Dubai on the 27th of June to make further progress in the process, taking advantage of a summit on piracy.

In October, the federal Parliament approved the appointment of Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saaid) as the new prime minister of the country. In December, a delegation from the federal government met with the authorities of Kismayo, the site of the government of Jubaland, to discuss the process of creating a new state of Jubaland and its integration into Somalia's state structure.

Most significant events of the year

- A draft constitution was approved after the initial draft drawn up by the Independent Federal Constitution Commission (IFCC) was revised and amended.

Websites of interest

- IGAD (www.igad.org/somalipeace/index.htm)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)

SUDAN (Darfur)	
Population:	44.6 million (7.5 in Darfur)
Area:	2,506,000 Km ² ; (Darfur, 503,180 Km ²)
HDI:	169 (out of 184)
GDP:	51,500 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$1,220
Deaths due to the conflict:	300,000
Armed actors:	JEM, LJM
Facilitators:	Qatar, UN-AU

Context of the conflict

Several different conflicts have been superimposed in Sudan in recent years. The first of these, in the south of the country, began in 1982 and ended with the peace agreements signed in January 2005, despite some persisting tension. The second, located in the western region of Darfur, began in early 2003. This conflict has only intensified over the years and is the situation analysed in this chapter. In addition, there is a third, lesser conflict in the east of the country, which erupted in 2005 and ended in late 2006.

In February 2003, while talks between the government and the SPLA were progressing in the south of the country, a new armed group arose in the Darfur region. Known as the **SLA**, it would subsequently split into many factions. After months of confrontation with the government, both parties agreed to a ceasefire in September. However, there were many violations of this agreement. The government of Chad offered to mediate in the conflict. In October, a new armed group called the **JEM** emerged in the region. This group initially refused to negotiate with the government and criticised the Chadian mediation.

Background to the peace process

In February 2004, the SLA and the JEM attended a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The aim of this meeting was to guarantee humanitarian access to the affected people. In April 2004, a temporary ceasefire agreement was reached in Chad, and both armed groups demanded an end to the region's marginalisation and its inclusion in the peace process that the government was carrying out with the SPLA in the south of the country. This agreement led to the creation of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). In May 2005, under the auspices of Muammar al-Gaddafi, both parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Libya, which would facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Subsequently, in mid-June, the government and the two armed groups met in Abuja (Nigeria) to begin a new round of direct contacts (after a six month break), with mediation from the AU under the leadership of its special envoy, S.

Ahmed Salim. Towards the end of July, the SLA and the JEM signed an agreement in Tripoli (Libya) pledging to end the confrontations between the two groups, to release prisoners and to restore trust and coordination. On the 5th of May 2006, the Sudanese government and the majority faction of the SLA led by M.A. Minnawi signed a peace agreement in Abuja (Nigeria) under the auspices of the AU.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 dated the 31st of July 2007 authorised the establishment of a hybrid operation run jointly by the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur (UNAMID) which was authorised to take any measures needed to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its staff and civilians, without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent upon the government of Sudan. In 2008, the JEM expressed its willingness to discuss the peace proposal for Darfur promoted by Qatar, and it stated that it would send a delegation to Doha to hold consultations with Qatari leaders. In the second half of February 2010, the Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement facilitated by the president of Chad, and they presented a framework for a future peace agreement. In June, the JEM accused the government of having violated the ceasefire agreement by bombarding its positions in northern Darfur. The surge in skirmishes and military operations in Darfur during the month of May led the armed group to withdraw from the negotiations, as it deemed that the agreements reached with the government had been violated by the renewed outbreaks of violence. In March, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the coalition of armed groups Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella organisation for small factions led by El-Tijani El-Sissi (a member of the Fur ethnic group and former governor of the region) in Qatar. In July, two rebel groups from Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army-FREES (SLA-FREES) and the Justice and Reform Movement (JRM), signed a peace agreement mediated by a reconciliation committee of local leaders and native administrators, with UNAMID as the observer. On the 27th of April, the mediators gave to the armed groups LJM and JEM a draft peace agreement with six points for their consideration. While the LJM stated that it was in favour of the agreement, the JEM expressed reluctance and asked to discuss several aspects with government representatives. The main points of contention referred to the section on human rights and freedoms, as well as to the administration of Darfur and the vice presidential posts offered within the central government. The government and the alliance of armed groups LJM signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) in July with the goal of putting an end to the armed conflict in Darfur. In September, a new JEM faction, Democratic Change Forces, headed by the vice president of the group and the leader of the forces in Kordofan, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdein, announced its intention to reach a peace agreement with the government as part of the Doha process. At the end of the year, the top JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, died during an attack by the Sudanese army.

The peace process in 2012

During the first quarter, there were no new rounds in the **Darfur (Sudan)** negotiating process, which are usually held in the capital of Qatar, Doha. However, several provisions agreed to in the Doha Peace Document signed by the government and the armed coalition LJM in July 2011 began to be implemented in the region. They included president Omar al-Bashir's signing of several decrees in January to divide the region into five states (until now there had been three) and the appointment of their respective governors. The new states of East Darfur, whose capital is Ed Daein, and Central Darfur, whose capital is Zalingei, are traditionally associated with the Arab Rizeigat and Fur communities, respectively. In January, too, the Deputy Secretary General for Peace Operations, Hervé Ladsous, reported to the UN Security Council on the progress made in implementing the peace agreement and stated that its implementation would lead to tangible improvements for the people of Darfur. However, the head of the United Nations mediation panel in the Doha negotiations, Ibrahim Gambari, was once again criticised and received a warning from the New York headquarters after he attended the wedding of the president of Chad, Idriss Deby, with the daughter of one of the leaders of the Janjaweed militias. In this sense, **the armed group JEM stated that Gambari was an obstacle for peace in Darfur** in a note sent to the UN Secretary General. In February, Jibril Ibrahim, the brother of the JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, who died in December, the victim of a military ambush, succeeded his brother at the helm of the armed group.

In the third quarter, there was a **splinter within the armed group JEM** in the region of Darfur. This faction, led by commander Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim (Dabajo), expressed its **willingness to negotiate with the Sudanese government** and appointed Mohamed Bashr as the new leader of the armed group. Dabajo had been relieved of his post on the 9th of August due to rumours claiming that he was trying to take down the leader of the armed group. Mohamed Bashr stated that he wanted a solid international commitment to support the peace process and that he had received a letter from the president of Chad, Idriss Déby, stating that the Sudanese government was willing to negotiate a dialogued solution to the Darfur conflict. In view of these events, the JEM leader, Jibril Ibrahim, accused the Chadian government of supporting the JEM dissidents and collaborating with Sudan in its goal of dismantling the leading armed group, JEM, which refused to join the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) despite the fact that it had participated in the Doha peace process.

In October, **representatives of the government and the dissident JEM faction signed a cessation of hostilities and announced that they would hold peace talks** on the 22nd of November. Both parties engaged in secret contacts in Doha between the 17th and 22nd of October, after which they agreed to negotiate within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, the dissident JEM faction stated that it had to hold a general conference in November before the scheduled peace talks, since at a meeting held in early September they agreed to choose the group's leadership before the peace talks. The vice commander of the dissident group, Arko Dahiah, stressed that they had expelled the JEM leader, Jibril Ibrahim, because of his dictatorial practices and because he was engaged in contacts with the opposing Sudanese Islamist leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Therefore, the faction purportedly expelled from the JEM was known as the "al-Turabi Group". On the other hand, Amin Hassan Omer, the government representative, the former chief of the government's negotiating team and the current head of the DDPD Monitoring Office, stated that the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement and a framework agreement with the group would improve the security situation in the state of North Darfur, where the group is based. The Doha talks between the government and a dissident JEM faction called JEM-MC resumed in January after a break for Christmas because the group was still preparing for the talks. The United Nations was involved in these talks.

Most significant events of the year

- There was a splinter group within the JEM which expressed its willingness to negotiate with the government. Representatives of the government and the dissident JEM faction signed a cessation of hostilities and announced that they would hold peace talks.

Websites of interest

- IGAD (www.igad.org)
- Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Issues in Peacebuilding (www.cmi.no/sudan)
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- Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurveysudan.org)
- Sudan Tribune (www.sudantribune.com)
- UNAMID (www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unamid)
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- UNMIS (www.unmis.org)
- Wikipedia (Darfur Conflict)

SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN

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Per capita income:	\$1,220
Deaths due to the conflict:	300,000
Armed actors:	JEM, LJM
Facilitators:	Qatar, UN-AU

Context of the conflict

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA from the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese armed forces, which were opposed to independence for the south, as advocated by the SPLA. The conflict led to the death of more than one million people.

Background to the peace process

The first explorations were held in 1988, and the following year the government and the SPLA signed the first Declaration of Principles of IGAD, the mediating organisation, to hold a referendum on self-determination for the south of the country.

In July 2002, the start of an agreement was reached under the auspices of IGAD, which stipulated autonomy in the south, before a referendum was held in 2011. The year also witnessed the first direct encounter between the president of Sudan and the leader of the SPLA. Between 2002 and 2004, several rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya in which headway was made on a broad agenda of topics. These rounds made it possible for a definitive peace agreement to be reached on the 5th of January 2005, which stated that the north and south would have separate armed forces, a joint force would be assembled for the more controversial zones, a six-year period of autonomy would be established, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, the oil profits would be shared equitably, and a National Unity Government would be formed with one vice presidency for the SPLA. Likewise, it was agreed that Islamic law would not be applied in the south of the country and that each territory would have its own flag. The referendum was held in 2011 with the result that South Sudan became an independent state. The process lasted a total of 13 years, with a total of seven years until the peace agreement was signed.

The tensions in 2011

The end to the war with the north and the subsequent attainment of independent for South Sudan in 2011 did

not manage to bring stability to this region. The disputes over control of the land, livestock and political power were only heightened among the multiple communities that live in South Sudan, which increased the number, seriousness and intensity of the clashes among them. The situation became even direr after the general elections held in April 2010, when numerous soldiers who had submitted their candidacy or supported political opponents of the party of the presidency, the SPLA, did not win. These soldiers refused to recognise the election results and decided to take up weapons to demand their access to the institutions, denounce the predominance of the Dinka and the underrepresentation of other communities within these institutions and label the government of South Sudan corrupt. The Jubas' offers of amnesty have not managed to put an end to the insurgency, which is accused of receiving financing and logistical support from Sudan.

During the year, two major armed fronts coalesced in the greater Upper Nile region: the South Sudan Liberation Army under the command of Peter Gadet in the state of Unity, and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army headed by General George Athor in the state of Jonglei. Both groups share the goal of bringing down the government of South Sudan led by president Salva Kiir, who they label as corrupt and accuse of poor governing, while they also accuse the main party, the SPLM, of monopolising political power within the institutions and marginalising the other parties and communities other than the Dinka (the majority within the SPLM). They also noted that even though the army (SPLA) and the police receive a great deal of resources from the state, they are poorly equipped and incapable of ensuring the people's safety.

Over the course of the year, the attacks by the SSLA and the SSDM/A, along with the militias led by Gabriel Tang-Ginye (Upper Nile), Gatluak Gai (Unity) and David Yau-Yau (Jonglei), left thousands of victims in their wake in the greater Upper Nile region. One of the most serious attacks in terms of the number of victims was the one perpetrated by the SSDM/A in the county of Fangak (Jonglei), in which more than 300 people died between the months of February and March according to government sources. The government's response to the insurgency was twofold: it renewed its offer of amnesty for their leaders – which included the integration of their troops into the army – and it engaged in direct combat via the armed forces. The military operatives contributed to aggravating the situation several times after the soldiers were accused of harming, attacking and killing civilians, whom they, in turn, accused of connivance with the insurgency. The army's burning of at least 7,000 homes in the country of Mayom (Unity state) in May was a clear example of this kind of action.

In September and October, the SSLA warned the NGOs and UN agencies to leave the state of Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap, against which they intended to wage a heavy attack. With regard to the amnesty, George Athor (SSDM/A) took advantage of it in January, even though he continued and even expanded his attacks in the ensuing months. Athor died in December in a

military ambush on the Sudanese border. Likewise, the rebel soldier Gatluak Gai reached an amnesty agreement with the government in July, although he died under strange circumstances that same month in the county of Koch (Unity). Yau-Yau and Peter Gadet took advantage of the amnesty in June and August, respectively, but Gadet's group (SSLA) refused to give up its armed struggle. Likewise, the rebel Gabriel Tang-Ginye remained under arrest in Juba from April onwards. Repeatedly over the course of the year, the South Sudanese government accused Khartoum of providing aid and weapons to the rebellious soldiers. In this sense, several reports published during the year by the Small Arms Survey, in which the material confiscated by the army from Athor and Gadet's forces was identified, corroborated the suspicions that both might have been receiving external support.

The peace process in 2012

In February, Khartoum and Juba signed a **non-aggression agreement** in Addis Ababa under the mediation of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. The agreement included the creation of an observation mechanism that would investigate the infractions of this agreement. However, just a few weeks after signing the agreement, the first clashes between the armies of both countries came in Jau, a disputed border town stemming from the lack of a final delimitation of the border between the two countries. The lack of agreement on the fee to be paid for using the Sudanese oil pipeline aimed at exporting crude oil produced in South Sudan had led Juba to declare the cessation of production, which contributed to once again raising the tensions between both countries. In March, both governments reached an agreement on principles to create a mixed commission, co-presided over by the Interior Ministers of both countries, to give their citizens freedom of residence, freedom of movement and the freedom to perform economic activities and to use the land in both states. However, the signing of this agreement was ultimately suspended after the reactivation of the military conflict along the shared border. Sudan and South Sudan resumed negotiations on the 29th of May after the escalation of declarations by their leaders and clashes between both armies in the borderlands once again brought them to the brink of an armed conflict.

Another positive step forward in the last days of May was the United Nations' confirmation that the Sudanese troops were withdrawing from the oil enclave of Abyei after it had been occupied by both armies in May 2011. However, Juba continued to denounce the bombardment of its territory by Sudanese airplanes despite the ultimatum issued by both the AU and the United Nations. These were the first direct negotiations between both countries since the border skirmishes had gotten underway in April, and they were being held in Addis Ababa after heavy mediation efforts by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, with the backing of the AU.

During the third quarter, several encounters and rounds of negotiations were held between Sudan and South Sudan, but a partial agreement on security and economic relations was not reached until the 27th of September under the auspices of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. In addition to the official AU mediator, Thabo Mbeki, the USA and China also exerted considerable influence on the peace talks. The first encounter since April took place in July during the AU summit in Addis Ababa. The UN Security Council had announced that the deadline for reaching an agreement was the 22nd of September; if no agreement were reached by that date it would put into place sanctions for both parties. The peace talks in September were also held in Addis Ababa. An agreement of principles had been reached by August regarding oil, as announced by Thabo Mbeki. The agreement signalled a resumption of oil exports and an agreement to demilitarise the shared border and thus avoid a larger and more serious conflict. However, many of the key points were still unresolved, including the status of the disputed region of Abyei and numerous border areas that were still being disputed by both countries. In this sense, this agreement may lay the groundwork for the other remaining questions to be negotiated in the near future, as noted by several analysts. Previously, in early September, South Sudan had appointed its ambassador for Sudan with the goal of contributing to improving the relations between both countries.

In October, **the AU Peace and Security Council unanimously agreed to prepare mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict in Abyei**, which pits Sudan and South Sudan against each other. The AU proposal issued a call to hold a referendum on the region in dispute in October 2013, and only members of the Misseriya community living in Abyei could participate in the vote. This proposal came one day after the African mediators circulated a new proposal to extend the negotiations for another six months with the goal of getting both parties to reach a consensus on the issues under dispute, including the ultimate status of Abyei. The AU's text regarding the referendum matched South Sudan's proposal but not Sudan's, since Khartoum suggested dividing the area under dispute. The USA, France, the United Kingdom and the EU expressed their support for the proposed referendum, while Russia stated that it was in favour of partitioning Abyei, reflecting Khartoum's posture.

Both presidents were scheduled to hold a meeting on the 5th of January in Addis Ababa to try to make a renewed effort to overcome the mutual hostilities and implement the agreements reached to date, after insistence and pressure from the international community and the mediation from the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. In parallel, **Egypt offered to mediate in the dispute between both countries**. This meeting was to be held in mid-December, but it was ultimately postponed for the Christmas vacations. Since November, Sudan had been demanding that the demilitarised zone between both countries be expanded by 50 km with the goal of ensuring that this zone covered the shared border

with South Kordofan, where the SPLM-N was clashing with the Sudanese armed forces. However, Juba rejected this demand because it claimed that this issue was not part of the agreement reached previously in September, since the agreement in which the UNISFA was to participate only stipulated five disputed areas along the border and a separation of 10 km on either side of the border but did not stipulate the deployment of troops along the entire 1,800 km of border between both states. In early December, both countries asked the AU for its support in demilitarising the border. They both signed an agreement in Addis Ababa in September under the auspices of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and the threat of sanctions from the UN Security Council; the agreement stated that they would resume oil exports and guarantee the security of the border zone by having both armies create a security zone on the border, but neither of the two had begun implementing the agreements due to mutual mistrust. Both need the benefits derived from oil exports, leading Juba to pay Khartoum millions of dollars, but numerous analysts noted that both countries also need the mutual conflict to gain legitimacy at home and distract attention from the serious problems in their

economies, not to mention the rampant corruption. The AU, supported by the leading Western powers, asked both countries to compromise in the dispute. In December, South Sudan accused Sudan of launching air attacks on the other side of the border, of executing five people in Bahr el-Ghazal and of launching a coordinated attack between the SAF and the Popular Defence Forces militias in the county of Raja, which led to the death of 32 soldiers and civilians and dozens of injuries just days before the summit. It requested the intervention of the UN Security Council, while Sudan once again accused South Sudan of supporting the SPLM-N in the two border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Most significant events of the year

- A partial agreement was reached on security and economic relations under the auspices of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel.
- The AU Peace and Security Council unanimously agreed to prepare mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict in Abyei.
- Egypt offered to mediate in the dispute.

Great Lakes and Central Africa

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	
Population:	4,5 million inhabitants
Area:	623,000 Km ²
HDI:	179 (out of 187)
GDP:	2,000 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$450
Armed actors:	FDPC, APRD, UFDR, UFR
Facilitators:	Paulin Pomodimo, BONUCA, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Context of the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR) won independence from France in 1960. For the first six years of its independence it was governed by the dictator D. Dacko. Dacko was later overthrown by his cousin J. B. Bokassa, who set up an eccentric military dictatorship. Later France backed a coup d'état that reinstated Dacko, until he was once again overthrown in 1981, this time by Ange Félix Patassé, who took over ownership of the companies exploiting the country's natural resources. The country suffered from several military mutinies in the 1990s because it failed to pay the soldiers' salaries, and there was a coup in 2003, when the current president François Bozizé came to power. Despite the fact that the country is rich in diamonds, gold, uranium, wood and coffee, the CAR has been suffering from political instability, ineffective governance, insecurity, banditry and deterioration in its economic situation for twenty years, while half of its population remains illiterate. With the economic recession in Europe and the United States, the diamond industry entered into a deep-seated crisis and most companies closed. In the words of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to this country, the roots of the conflicts in the CAR lie in the collapse of its socioeconomic structures and the absence of political dialogue. Since 2003, the conflict between the government and several armed groups has been closely linked to the situation in Darfur (Sudan), which shares a border with the CAR, since the armed groups from both countries take refuge in refugee camps on both sides of the border, generating serious tensions between the two countries. The majority of the conflict is thus centred in the northern region of Vakaga, whose capital Birao has been controlled by the rebel groups on several occasions. 2005 saw the creation of the armed opposition groups the **Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy** (APRD), and the Union des Forces du Renouveau (UFR), headed by F. Njadder-Bedaya. Another armed group, the **UFDR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement)**, led by Michel Djotodia, is a coalition between three groups (GAPLC, MLCJ and FDC), and the Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africaines (FDPC), led by Abdoulaye Miskine, who was close to former president Patassé.

Background to the peace process

After the country experienced three mutinies in its armed forces in 1996, in January 1997 the Bangui Agreements were signed between the forces loyal to then-president Patassé and the rebel groups. These agreements called for an inter-African force, called MISAB, whose 800 soldiers would be in charge of demobilising the combatants and ensuring compliance with the agreements. In 1998, after intervention by French troops, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping mission (MINURCA) to protect the capital of the country and replace MISAB. Since 2007, the government has been signing peace agreements with the different armed groups. In February 2007, the government and the FDPC led by Abdoulaye Miskine signed a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) under the mediation of Muammar al-Gaddafi. In April, an agreement was reached with Damane Zakaria's UFDR, with a joint call for a cessation of hostilities and the offer of amnesty for the members of the group. In May 2008, the government signed an agreement with the APDR, run by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who was in exile in France, in Libreville with the mediation of the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo. Later, in December 2008, the government and several armed opposition groups reached an Inclusive Political Agreement (IPA) with the mediation of the archbishop of Bangui, Paulin Pomodimo, forming a joint government and calling free elections in 2010, which were postponed until 2011. The dialogue was co-facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. Two former presidents also participated in it, André Koulingba and Ange-Félix Patassé, as well as Jean Jacques Demafouth's APRD, Damane Zakaria's UFDR, Florent N'Djadder's UFR and Abakar Sabone's MLCJ (a faction of the UFDR). Months later, in July 2009, Abdoulaye Miskine's FDPC joined (Miskine was in exile in Libya) with mediation by Libya, and in October 2009 Hassan Ousman's MNSP (a faction of the MLCJ) also adhered to the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD). The only rebel group that remained on the margins of the peace process was Charles Massi's Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP). In July 2011, the government and a dissident faction of this armed group, which is made up of around 500 combatants, signed a peace agreement in the town of Nzako in the east, after they had reached a ceasefire agreement in June.

The peace process in 2012

The most noteworthy event was the signing of the **peace agreement between the armed group CPJP and the government** on the 25th of August. The CPJP was the last armed group in the Central African Republic that was still active, since the four most important armed groups had signed several peace agreements in 2008. However, in some cases the armed groups have continued having a major presence on the ground and have served as the guarantors of safety in places where the Central African armed forces are barely present. The CPJP reached a temporary cessation of hostilities in the middle of the past year, although acts of violence persisted sporadically.

One faction of the group did not recognise the agreement reached on the 25th of August by their leader and waged several armed actions in mid-September.

An alliance of different armed groups called Seleka incited a rebellion on the 10th of December, took control of several towns in the country and threatened to bring down president François Bozizé if he did not implement the peace agreement reached in 2007. This alliance, the outcome of the merger of different factions and splinter groups from the armed groups CPJP, UFDR and CPSK, which are active in the north of the country and had reached several peace agreements with the government in recent years, at first demanded the payment of the stipend provided for in the peace agreement along with the release of political prisoners. However, they later stepped up their demands and by the end of the year were calling for Bozizé to resign as the starting point for negotiations. Bozizé stated his desire to study the formation of a national unity government (which would mean the acceptance of government posts for the rebel leaders) with himself at the helm. The rebellion's advance was unstoppable, and within a few days it had taken numerous towns with barely any resistance from the Central African armed forces, supported by regional military contingents. Finally the rebellion was showing signs of internal divisions between those who supported bringing down Bozizé and those who favoured embarking on peace talks with him, including the CPSK. Bozizé refused to step down, as the rebels demanded, which led to fears of a resumption of hostilities, and he declared the resignation of the Minister of Defence,

his son Jean Francis Bozizé, and the Military Chief of Staff. The former prime minister and opposition leader in the country, Martin Ziguélé, stated that all options should be on the negotiating table, including Bozizé stepping down from power. The international community expressed its concern and pressured the government to agree to **peace talks to be held in Libreville, Gabon, on the 10th of January 2013.**

Most significant events of the year

- A peace agreement was signed between the armed group CPJP and the government, even though a CPJP splinter group started a rebellion.
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Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
 - All Africa (allafrica.com)
 - Alwihda (www.alwihdainfo.com)
 - BINUCA (www.operationspaix.net/BINUCA)
 - Centrafrique Presse (www.centrafrique-presse.com)
 - Foundation Hironnelle (www.hiroidelle.org)
 - Government (www.centrafricaine.info/fr.html)
 - ICG (www.crisisgroup.org)
 - Le Confident (www.leconfident.net)
 - MINURCAT (www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/minurcat) (minurcat.unmisssions.org)
 - United Nations (www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc)
 - UNDP (www.cf.undp.org/p_ala_une.htm)
 - Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
 - Sangonet (www.sangonet.com)
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Maghreb

WESTERN SAHARA	
Population:	250,000 inhabitants
Area:	184,000 Km ²
HDI (Marruecos):	130 of 182
Deaths due to the conflict:	10,000
Population refugiada:	86,000-150,000
Armed actors:	POLISARIO Front
Facilitators:	United Nations

Context of the conflict

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when a referendum on self-rule was held. In the same year the territory was invaded by Morocco. As a result, almost half the population fled and settled in the Algerian area of Tinduf, close to the border with the Western Sahara. This incident led to the breaking off of relations between Algeria and Morocco. From then until 1991 there has been an open military confrontation between Morocco and the Saharan people led by the POLISARIO Front. In 1991 some of results of the negotiations begun by the United Nations back in 1988 were put into effect, leading to a ceasefire and the deployment of a United Nations mission (MINURSO). However, since 1991 Morocco has encouraged the colonisation of the Sahara by Moroccan settlers.

Background to the peace process

Since the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front was reached in 1991, the United Nations has been working through diplomatic channels to reach a satisfactory agreement between both parties. However, to date the desired results were not obtained in any stages of the process. The government of Morocco has limited itself to offering autonomy, while the POLISARIO Front is demanding that a referendum be held with the option of independence. The so-called Settlement Plan from 1991, which called for a referendum to be held in the short term, was blocked shortly thereafter due to the allegations levelled by Morocco and despite the fact that in 1997, through the Houston Agreements, which were signed by both parties, it seemed that negotiations could be fruitful. The fact is that the new roadblocks put up by Morocco distorted what had been signed in Houston, which required the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, James Baker, to submit a new balanced proposal, or framework agreement, which gave Morocco's demands a considerable advantage, given that it suggested an autonomous regime for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The POLISARIO Front roundly rejected this plan. Furthermore, starting in 2000 the UN Security Council resolutions stopped mentioning the word "referendum". In 2003, James Baker presented

a new, more balanced proposal known as the Baker Plan II, which was accepted by the POLISARIO Front as a starting point for negotiations. However, this time the proposal was rejected by Morocco.

In 2007, Morocco submitted its proposal for regional autonomy for Western Sahara to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. The proposal states that this region would be autonomous in its administration, economics, taxation, infrastructure, culture and environmental issues. The state of Morocco, in turn, would keep exclusive jurisdiction over matters of national sovereignty (the flag or national currency), the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, religious and constitutional matters and any matter related to the figure of the king, national security, defence, territorial integrity, foreign relations and judicial power in the kingdom. In early January 2009, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, named diplomat Christopher Ross as his Special Envoy for Western Sahara. Ross is the former US ambassador to Syria and Algeria, and in February he visited the region for the first time and declared his support for finding a solution to the conflict that takes into account the Saharan people's right to self-determination. In early January 2010, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Regionalisation (ACR), which was to lay the groundwork for the country's process of regionalisation, which would begin in the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara).

In 2011, it should be noted that the USA stated its support for Morocco's autonomy plan, which it described as "serious, realistic, credible and using an approaching that may satisfy the aspirations of the Saharan people". In July, Morocco and the POLIARIO Front persisted in their differences over the future of Western Sahara. However, according to UN sources, at the meeting held in July in Manhasset, the parties seemed to have listened to the recommendations of the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and begun talks to include representatives of the Saharan people in the negotiation process. This would facilitate the debates on issues like education, the environment and healthcare.

The peace process in 2012

In the first quarter, a new round of negotiations was held, with participants including the delegates from Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Mauritania. The meeting was held from the 11th to 13th of March in the outskirts of New York, but no significant headway was made. According to the UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, the parties made headway in their deliberations on issues like trust-building measures, natural resources, demining and the environment, without committing to the ultimate status of the territory at stake. Moroccan delegates claimed that the stress in these talks was on humanitarian issues, and that little progress was made on political issues. The Saharan representatives had insisted on human

rights issues and on demanding guarantees of access to Western Sahara for NGOs, the press and international observers. The delegates agreed to hold a new round of negotiations scheduled for June or July in Europe at a place yet to be determined. Ross also confirmed that a new visit to the zone was scheduled for mid-May.

In April, **the Un Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, accused Morocco of spying on the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO)**. In a report sent to the Security Council, Ban warned that there was evidence that the confidential communication between the mission in El Aaiun and the UN headquarters in New York had been compromised. Even though he did not explicitly mention Morocco, diplomatic sources claimed that Ban was referring to Rabat. Ban Ki-moon also complained in the report that MINURSO's access to the people was controlled by Morocco and that the presence of the Moroccan security forces at the entrance to the mission discouraged people from going to it. The Secretary General claimed that the international contingent was unable to fully perform its monitoring, observation and information tasks aimed at bringing peace to Western Sahara and asked for full access to the territory for diplomats, journalists and NGOs. He also asked that the mission – which has 230 observers – be reinforced with another 15 members. According to press reports, despite his criticism of Rabat, the Secretary General had toned down his report compared to the original draft in response to the machinations of France and Morocco, which was a temporary member of the Security Council. The draft had included a reference to the launch of a referendum on self-determination that the POLISARIO Front was calling for, but the definitive text published in mid-April only mentioned the need to apply the successive UN resolutions. Despite this, leaders of the POLISARIO Front believed that the report was positive.

In May, **Morocco withdrew its confidence in the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Western Sahara, the US diplomat Christopher Ross**. Morocco's Vice Minister shared this decision with Ban Ki-moon, and in parallel Rabat issued a communiqué accusing Ross of acting in a partial, imbalanced manner. The spokesman of the Moroccan government claimed that the mediator had made absolutely no substantial headway in the negotiations with the POLISARIO Front. Previously, the Foreign Minister had declared to the local press that Ross had tried to introduce into the negotiations topics which were beyond his scope. Even though Ban Ki-moon responded to this situation with a declaration expressing his complete confidence in Ross, Morocco's veto signalled the end of this diplomat's job as mediator, since even if only one party rejected him as the interlocutor for his mission he was obliged to step down. Press reports stressed that Morocco's decision mainly stemmed from three reasons. The first was annoyance with Ross for his latest report on Western Sahara in which he issued veiled attacks on Rabat for spying on the UN Mission (MINURSO) and stated that Saharans' access to the headquarters of the international mission was limited by the presence

of the Moroccan police. Likewise, the report also asked Morocco to improve the human rights conditions in the zone. Despite the irritation of the report, Morocco added its approval to the unanimous vote in the UN Security Council on the 24th of April. The second reason, from Rabat's perspective, was that Ross had not centred the negotiations on Morocco's proposal for autonomy, which meant that he had allowed all the options to remain on the negotiating table. Finally, Morocco mistrusted the position that the new French government with François Hollande at the helm might take on the issue of Western Sahara. Back in 2004, Morocco had forced the then-Special Envoy, the American James Baker, to resign, while the POLISARIO Front had rejected Dutchman Peter van Walsum.

In the third quarter, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, reiterated his confidence in his Special Envoy, Christopher Ross. The US diplomat, who was in charge of the mediation between the parties under the auspices of the UN in recent years, was questioned by Morocco in May. Rabat had asked that Ross be replaced after deeming that his methods for addressing the conflict were imbalanced and partial. However, in a telephone conversation with King Mohammed VI in late August, **Ban Ki-Moon repeated that the United Nations had no intention of changing the terms of its mediation in Western Sahara, which focused on achieving an acceptable solution for both parties**. The Secretary General of this international organisation underscored his desire to reach an understanding with Morocco as they address this issue and to make headway towards restoring diplomatic relations with Algeria. In mid-September, **representatives from MINURSO, the POLISARIO Front and Morocco met in Geneva (Switzerland) to jointly evaluate the implementation of a series of trust-building measures**. In late September, in his report to the General Assembly on the situation in Western Sahara, Ban Ki-Moon stressed that no headway had been made on the key issues during the contacts among the parties, and he emphasised the importance of international actors – including MINURSO, diplomats and journalists – having access to Western Sahara and the Saharan refugee camps.

In December, the Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, warned that accepting the status quo in the conflict would be a serious miscalculation. The American diplomat claimed that finding a resolution to the dispute had taken too long and that the situation was still quite worrisome, so it should take a prominent place on the international agenda. Ross stressed that the question of Western Sahara was particularly important given the context of instability in the Sahel region, and he underscored his frustration at the persistence of the conflict, which could trigger new cycles of violence. Ross submitted to the UN Security Council the main conclusions from his visit to North Africa between the 25th of October and the 11th of November. During his trip, the diplomat met with representatives from Morocco, the POLISARIO Front and Algeria and made his first visit to Western Sahara, where he met with local leaders and representatives

from civil society. Ross also held consultations with the governments of Spain and France. **The diplomat expressed his support for calling for new rounds of informal talks between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco after deeming that the new meetings held since August 2009 had yielded no results.** Ross believed that the strategy should be focused on consultations with key international actors, although he stressed that the main responsibility for resolving the conflict lay among the disputing parties. In late December, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution to support peace negotiations to resolve the conflict.

Most significant events of the year

- Morocco withdrew its confidence in the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Western Sahara, the US diplomat Christopher Ross.
- Ross expressed his support for calling for new rounds of informal talks between the POLISARIO Front and Morocco.

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- ARSO (www.arso.org)
- Government of Morocco (www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/Sáhara)
- ICG (www.crisisgroup.org)
- MINURSO (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso)
- United Nations (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
- Sahara Libre (www.saharalibre.es)

Latest rounds of negotiation

1 st	Manhasset (New York)	June 2007
2 nd	Manhasset (New York)	August 2007
3 rd	Manhasset (New York)	January 2008
4 th	Manhasset (New York)	March 2008
1 st	Dürnstein (Austria)	August 2009
2 nd	Armonk (New York)	February 2010
3 rd	Manhasset (New York)	November 2010
4 th	Manhasset (New York)	December 2010
5 th	Manhasset (New York)	January 2011
6 th	Mellieha (Malta)	March 2011
7 th	Manhasset (New York)	June 2011
8 th	Manhasset (New York)	July 2011
9 th	Manhasset (Nueva York)	March 2012
10 th	Geneva	September 2012

LATIN AMERICA

COLOMBIA	
Population:	46.9 million inhabitants
Area:	1,139,000 km ²
HDI:	87 (out of 187)
GDP:	3.7 million
Per capita income:	\$ 4,980
Armed actors:	FARC, ELN
Facilitators:	Noruega, Cuba (garantes); Venezuela, Chile (acompañantes)

Context of the conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has very deep roots that go beyond the emergence of the present guerrillas in the 1960s. Violence characterised the relations between liberals and conservatives from the 19th century to the National Front regime (1958-1978). In addition, any alternative political option has been repressed. Therefore the emergence of various guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s can be explained by politics that serve the interests of the elite, social exclusion and the lack of democratic opposition parties. Among the guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (**FARC**) and the National Liberation Army (**ELN**), both of which were formed in 1964. They currently have 10,000 and 3,000 fighters respectively. The violence increased when paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**) emerged in the early 1980s to fight against the insurgents. Within this environment of violence, the production and export of drugs and the recent emergence of new paramilitary structures linked to drug trafficking are other factors that make the conflict more complex. The civilian population is the main victim of the conflict.

Background to the peace process

Since the 1980s, many efforts have been made to build peace by both actors involved in the conflict and by Colombian society. The FARC's position is to achieve structural changes, especially in agricultural matters, while the ELN has shown its desire to develop a participative mechanism in society to achieve the democratisation of the country. In 1982, President Betancur appealed to the guerrillas to reach a peace agreement. Two years later, the FARC ordered a ceasefire that formally lasted until 1990, when president Gaviria ordered an attack on FARC's command centre. In 1990, after lengthy negotiations, the third guerrilla group in the country, M-19, was demobilised, resulting in the approval of a new constitution in 1991 that formally consolidated the rule of law. In 1991, too, other groups (EPL, PRT, MAQL) were demobilised, followed by CER in 1992, CRS, MPM, MMM and FFG in 1994, and finally

MIR-COAR in 1998. With regard to the guerrilla groups that were not demobilised then, in 1991 and 1992, meetings were held in Caracas and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between the government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator group, whose members include the FARC, the ELN and the EPL. However, the 1992 talks were suspended when the FARC assassinated a minister they had kidnapped. In January 1999, the United Nations' Secretary General appointed Jan Egeland as his special advisor for Colombia. Three years later, J. Egeland was replaced by James Lemoynne.

International support for the peace process with the FARC reached a high point during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana. This president believed that negotiations could take place in the middle of the conflict without a ceasefire agreement. In late 1998, President Pastrana allowed an extensive swath of the country to be demilitarised in order to negotiate with the FARC, with whom he reached a 12-point agenda (Common Agenda for Change towards a New Colombia, or the La Machaca Agenda from May 1999). However, in February 2002 there were several crises and the FARC hijacked an aeroplane, bringing the talks with the FARC to an end. After negotiations with the FARC were broken off, the situation changed dramatically. A new president, Álvaro Uribe, was elected. He introduced a programme of "democratic security", which was based on the militarisation of the civilian population and military combat against the guerrillas. This programme was supported by the USA through the Colombia Plan. Since then, negotiations with the FARC have not resumed beyond attempts to reach a humanitarian agreement. In February 2005, the UN Secretary General suspended his mediation mission to seek rapprochement with the FARC after six years of efforts, acknowledging the impossibility of continuing this mission and maintaining direct contact with the guerrilla leaders. In his investiture speech on the 7th of August 2010, the new president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, stated that "the doorway to dialogue is not locked", and he added: "During my government, I aspire to sow the seeds for a true reconciliation among Colombians. To the illegal armed groups that cite political reasons and today are speaking once again about dialogue and negotiation, I say that my government will be open to any talk that seeks to eradicate violence and build a more prosperous, equitable and fair society." In early November 2011, after an air attack, the top leader of the FARC, Alonso Cano, died, which opened up a period of uncertainty as to the future of the organisation and a stage of temporary peace talks. He was replaced by Rodrigo Lodoño Echeverri, alias 'Timochenko'. In the second half of November, the president Juan Manuel Santos claimed that he was ready to open the door to dialogue with the FARC guerrillas when he stated that he was convinced that the end to the conflict in Colombia had to come via a political solution. "The key is in my pocket and I am willing to open the doors because I believe that the end should be via a political solution, but I need clear signs that these people are not going to betray the trust of the Colombia people," Santos stated.

Regarding the ELN, the first negotiations between the government and this guerrilla group date from 1991

(Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid, in which they agreed to hold a National Convention. That same year, ELN negotiators met with members of civil society in Mainz (Germany) and signed the “Puerta del Cielo” agreement, which was focused on humanitarian issues. In 1999, the government and the ELN met again in Cuba. The following year, the government authorised the creation of an encounter area in the south of the Bolívar region. Representatives of the Friendly Countries were involved in this process (Cuba, Spain, France, Norway and Switzerland). In June 2000, president Pastrana deemed that attempts to reach an agreement with this group were over. In 2005, the government reached an agreement with this guerrilla group to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba during December with the involvement of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. These talks are known as the “external rapprochement process”. In August 2007, the government and the ELN began the eighth round of peace talks in August in Havana without achieving results or signing the so-called Base Agreement, since they were unable to agree on how to concentrate and verify the guerrilla troops. The government insisted on demanding that they be located in one or several points, including abroad, but at previously determined locations and with the names of all the guerrillas concentrated there; these names would then be given to an international verification commission. However, this was rejected by the ELN, which was not prepared to reveal the identity of its members or gather together in conditions which they perceived as putting them at a military disadvantage. In June 2008, the ELN stated that it did not consider rapprochement with the Colombian government useful, so it did not envisage holding a new round of talks. In early August 2011, the ELN sent a letter to Piedad Córdoba in which it stated that “the ELN has publicly and repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in bilateral talks without conditions; the agenda and rules should be determined by the parties to these talks [...] A government and insurgency committee is the best pathway today, and we are making every effort to achieve it.” In the letter, they also expressed their compliance with international humanitarian law.

The peace process in 2012

The most noteworthy development in the year was the information coming from different sources noting the existence of **exploratory talks abroad between the government and the FARC**, which was confirmed in August by the president, who said that the rapprochement was happening under the following guiding principles: 1) we are going to learn from our past mistakes in order to avoid repeating them; 2) any process has to lead to the end of the conflict, not to the extension of it; 3) the military operations and presence will remain on every inch of national soil. In fact, the first contacts via letter came in 2010 with Pablo Catatumbo, while the direct contacts began in March 2011 in Venezuela with the presence of Rodrigo Granda and Andrés París on behalf of the FARC and Jaime F. Avendaño and Alejandro Eder (director of

the Colombian Reintegration Agency) on behalf of the Colombian government. The second preparatory meeting was held in July of that same year, and an exploratory meeting was held in Havana, the city that had hosted ten exploratory rounds up to August 2012. The FARC was represented by El Médico, Andrés París, Rodrigo Granda and Marcos Calarcá, while the representatives of the Colombian government included Frank Pearl, former High Commissioner of Peace; Sergio Jaramillo, Security Minister; and Enrique Santos, journalist and brother of the president. Prior to that, the head of the FARC, Timochenko, had welcomed an emissary from Fidel Castro in northeast Colombia, near the border with Venezuela. The president of Venezuela exercised his good offices in all of these early contacts, in which it was decided that Norway would act as the observer. Later, it was decided that Chile and Venezuela would act as monitors, and that Cuba would work with Norway as a guarantor of the process.

In early January, the FARC issued a communiqué in which they stated that they were interested in examining all the country's social problems, including privatisations, deregulation, total freedom of trade and investment, environmental depredation, market democracy and military doctrine in hypothetical talks. The head of the FARC, Timochenko, encouraged the agenda from the failed Caguán Process to be revisited, which sparked widespread controversy in the country and the refusal of president Santos, who repeated his demand for peaceful deeds. Timochenko also wrote to a university professor who had written him an open letter a few months earlier, in a respectful and didactic tone, which was well received by opinion leaders, who noted a change in the FARC's language. On the other hand, the group Colombians for Peace asked the government, the FARC and the ELN for a cessation of hostilities for 90 days in the event that the peace negotiations moved forward.

In February, the ELN's magazine published an editorial entitled “Peace, An Imperative for Colombia”, in which it noted that “now is the time to reflect, to make immobile postures more flexible and to understand that peace is an imperative for Colombia and that this peace does not entail one party's subjugation to the other but confluence based on listening to each other, understanding life in society as peaceful coexistence, as rights and responsibilities for everyone, in order to build a future of prosperity, democracy, justice and equality [...]. The national government and the insurgency must humbly heed the calls from the international community to foster a dialogue with no conditions and to profit from their wisdom and experience as a sincere contribution to peace in Colombia. At this critical time for Colombian society, the ELN reiterates its willingness to seek a political solution to the conflict and expresses its recognition of all the voices from both inside and outside the country that support an open dialogue with no preconditions, and for this purpose it draws the national government's attention to acting consequently.” On the 26th of February, the FARC issued a communiqué in which they announced the release of six soldiers they

had been holding, and they added four more soldiers to the list. They also stated that they would suspend what they called 'retentions' as a means of financing. On the 2nd of April the soldiers were released by the FARC, as announced, which gave rise to **speculations regarding the existence of exploratory talks, via Cuba**. In late May, the FARC also released a French journalist who had been captured the month before.

In late May, too, the ELN addressed an open letter to the local authorities in which it noted that "we are convinced that the pathway for Colombia is peace and not war", in addition to publicly noting the urgency of humanising the conflict and expressing "our total willingness to discuss all the issues in the Colombian armed social conflict and seek solutions, within the bilateral relations of both parties, with the participation of Colombian society, with no exclusions". In the letter, they proposed creating a national organisation with the goal of achieving peace. Days later, in early June, the ELN stated that "we are convinced that the pathway and future of Colombia is peace and not war, and we are willing to dialogue with those who declared war against us and motivated our rise to arms, but without conditions, for the country and as long as every single Colombian can take on the role of active participant in the quest for the future of the country and the nation. We agree with those who state that an isolated dialogue committee solitarily between the government and the insurgency will not achieve peace. Therefore, these dialogues must be accompanied and backed by society, spurred through grassroots social organisations in which society can express itself and define the future that is ours."

In July, the ELN published a communiqué in which it appealed to Latin America's involvement in the political solution to the conflict in Colombia, stating that "the ELN will continue to stress that peace in Colombia must become a core, strategic backbone of the project to unify and integrate Latin America. For this reason, the countries in the region should close ranks around a huge campaign in favour of our Latin America on behalf of a political and negotiated solution to the war in Colombia, to counterbalance the campaign being waged by the Santos government. UNASUR's call in November 2011 to transform Latin America into a zone of peace will only materialise through a unified struggle by all the governments and peoples of our America." In August, the ELN noted that "Our commanders have clearly expressed that the ELN is willing to engage in dialogue with the current government in a serious, responsible, respectful process with no traps or hostilities, which will facilitate the restoration of trust and create a favourable atmosphere for addressing the causes of the armed and social conflict, where the goal is to lay the groundwork on which real, stable and lasting peace can be built. The government and the class it represents now have the ball in their court regarding whether they are willing to seek and allow half a century of internal conflicts to be overcome, ignoring the voices of the guerrillas who want to prolong the war, which brings them enormous economic benefits and power."

In late August, president Santos officially announced the existence of exploratory talks with the FARC in Cuba, and he reported that the formal negotiations would begin in the first half of October in Oslo (Norway), a country that had acted as an observer in the exploratory rounds, and would later continue in Havana. In early September, at an official ceremony president Santos (in Bogotá) and the FARC (in Cuba) announced the start of a serious, worthy, realistic and effective peace process, and they presented a five-point roadmap: 1) a comprehensive agrarian development policy; 2) political participation; 3) an end to the conflict; 4) a solution to the problem of illicit drugs; and 5) victims. **"This is a real chance to end the conflict," said president Santos. "The solution is not war but civilised dialogue," concurred Timochenko.** The chief negotiators for the government will be Luis Carlos Villegas, president of the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI); Óscar Naranjo, former director of the National Police; Jorge Enrique Mora, former commander of the armed forces; Frank Pearl, former Minister of the Environment; and Sergio Jaramillo, who will become the High Commissioner for Peace. The chief of the negotiating team will be Humberto de La Calle. The negotiating team for the FARC is made up of five plenipotentiary members (Iván Márquez, Rodrigo Granda, Andrés París, Mar León Calandá and Simón Trinidad) along with another five members: José Santrich, Hermes Aguilar, Bernardo Salcedo, Sargento Pascuas and Rubén Zamora. The negotiations are being planned under the principle that nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon. The rules established for the negotiations are the following:

- Each negotiating team can have up to 30 members.
- At each negotiating session, up to ten people can participate per delegation, and at most five shall be plenipotentiary, that is, only five shall have a decision-making capacity.
- The negotiating teams will invite experts on the different points on the agenda; these thematic advisors will not be a permanent part of the negotiations.
- The agreement stipulates that periodical reports be published.
- The agreement includes a mechanism to receive proposals on points on the agenda from citizens and organisations.
- The negotiating teams are autonomous; nothing that happens outside the talks, including events in the war, shall affect their discussions.

The FARC suggested discussing the issue of the ceasefire at the beginning of the talks, but president Santos rejected this possibility, stating that it will only be discussed at the end of the process. In order to channel the suggestions from civil society, president Santos decided to activate the National Peace Council, after restructuring it. This council has not met in eight years.

The very realistic agenda agreed upon with the FARC and signed on the 26th of August, which will be discussed in Cuba, is the following:

GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE

“The delegates of the Government of the Republic of Colombia (National Government) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP):

As a result of the Exploratory Meeting that had as headquarters Havana, Cuba, between February 23, 2012 and XXX, and that counted on the participation of the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of Norway as guarantors, and with the support of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as facilitator of logistics and companion:

With the mutual decision of putting an end to the conflict as an essential condition for the constitution of stable and lasting peace; attending the cry of the population for peace, and recognizing that:

The construction of peace is a point of the society in conjunction that requires the participation of all, without distinction; The respect of the human rights in all of the confines of the national territory is an end of the State that should be promoted; The economic development with social justice and in harmony with the environment, is a guarantee of peace and progress.

Social development with equality and well-being, including the great majorities, allow to grow as a country; A Colombia in peace will play an active and sovereign role in regional and global peace and development. It is important to amplify democracy as a condition to achieve solid bases for peace. With the full disposition of the National Government and the FARC-EP to reach an agreement, and the invitation to the entire Colombian society, as well as organisms of regional integration and the international community, to accompany this process.

We have agreed:

I. To initiate direct and uninterrupted conversations about the points of the agenda established here, with the end of reaching a Final Agreement for the termination of the conflict that will contribute to stable and lasting peace.

II. To establish a table of conversation that will be installed publicly (a month after the public announcement) in Oslo, Norway, and whose principal headquarters will be Havana, Cuba. The table could have meetings in other countries.

III. To guarantee the effectiveness of the process and conclude the work about the points of the agenda expeditiously and in the least amount of time possible, to fulfill the expectations of society concerning the agreement. In any case, the duration will be subject to periodic evaluations of progress.

IV. To develop the conversations with the support of the governments of Cuba and Norway as guarantors and the governments of Venezuela and Chile as accompaniment. In accordance with the necessities of the process, they may by agreement invite others.

V. The following agenda:

1. Integral agricultural development policy:

The integral agricultural development is crucial to boost the integration of the regions and the equitable social and economic development of the country.

1. Access and use of land. Wastelands. Formalization of property. Agricultural border and protection of reserve zones.

2. Programs of development with a territorial focus.

3. Infrastructure and land improvement.

3. Social development: health, education, housing, eradication of **poverty**.

5. Stimulus to agricultural production and the economy of solidarity and cooperation. Technical assistance. Subsidies. Credit. Generation of income. Marketing. Labor formalization.

6. Food security system.

2. Political participation

1. Rights and guarantees for the exercise of the political opposition in general and in particular for the new movements that arise after the signing of the Final Agreement. Access to the media.

2. Democratic mechanisms of citizen participation, including those of direct participation, on different levels and diverse themes.

3. Effective measures to promote greater participation in the national, regional and local policy of all sectors, including the most vulnerable population, equality of conditions and with guarantees of security.

3. End of the conflict

Integral and simultaneous process which implies:

1. Bilateral and definitive cease of fire and hostilities.

2. Abandonment of arms. Reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civil life - economically, socially and politically -, in accordance with their interests.

3. The National Government, will coordinate the revision of the situation of individuals, charged or convicted, for belonging to or collaborating with the FARC-EP.

4. In parallel form the national government will intensify the fight to end the criminal organizations and their support networks, including the fight against corruption and impunity, in particular against any organization responsible for homicides and massacres or undermines defenders of human rights, social movements or political movements.

5. The National Government will revise and make the reforms and institutional adjustments necessary to address the challenges of the construction of peace.

6. Guarantees of security.

7. Under the provisions of Point 5 (Victims) of this agreement they will clarify, among others, the phenomenon of paramilitarism.

The signing of the Final Agreement initiates this process, which must develop in a reasonable time agreed by the parties.

4. Solution to the problem of illicit drugs

1. Illicit crop substitution programs. Integral development plans with participation of the communities in the design, execution and evaluation of the programs of substitution and environmental recovery of the areas affected by illicit crops.

2. Prevention programs of consumption and public health.

3. Solution to the phenomenon of production, consumption and public health.

5. Victims

To compensate the victims is in the centre of the agreement National Government - FARC-EP. In this sense they will treat:

1. Human rights of the victims.

2. Truth.

6. Implementation, verification and countersignature.

The signing of the Final Agreement begins the implementation of all of the agreed points.

1. Mechanisms of implementation and verification:

a. System of implementation, giving special importance to the regions.

b. Commissions of tracking and verification.

c. Mechanisms of resolution of differences.

These mechanisms will have the capacity and power of execution, and will be confirmed by representatives of the parts of society, following the case.

2. International accompaniment:

3. Schedule.

4. Budget.

5. Tool of dissemination and communication.

6. Mechanism of countersignature of the agreements.

The following operating rules:

1. In the sessions of the Table up to 10 people will participate per delegation, of which up to 5 will be plenipotentiaries who will carry the respective voice. Every delegation will be made up of up to 30 representatives.

2. With the end of contributing to the development of the process they can realize consultations of experts about the themes of the Agenda, once the corresponding procedure is sorted.

3. To guarantee the transparency of the process, the Table will elaborate periodic reports.

4. It will establish a mechanism to raise awareness to the advances of the Table. The discussions of the Table will not be made public.

5. It will implement a strategy of effective dissemination.

6. To guarantee the most open participation possible, it will establish a mechanism of reception of proposals about the points of the agenda of citizens and organizations, by physical or electronic means.

By mutual agreement and a determined time, the Table can make direct consultations and receive proposals about said points, or delegate a third the organization of spaces of participation.

7. The National Government guarantees the necessary resources for the operation of the Table, that will be administered in an efficient and transparent manner.

8. The Table will have the necessary technology to advance the process.

9. The conversations will initiate with the point of integral agricultural development policy and will continue with the order that the Table agrees.

10. The conversations will be given under the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

In October, the government stated that the cessation of hostilities would only occur in the third phase of the negotiations, and not before. On the other hand, Congress will issue a call to civil society organisations in the regions with the goal of promoting a venue of encounter for the different sectors in society and get specific proposals that will contribute to the debate in the negotiating team, according to a document presented by the government

On the 18th of October, the ceremony presenting the negotiations between the government and the FARC was held in the outskirts of Oslo (Norway), with both delegations attending. A surprising turn of events was the orthodox speech of the FARC representative Iván Márquez, who noted the structural causes of the conflict and sketched a negotiation scenario which extended beyond the five points already agreed upon. The government delegate, Humberto de la Calle, stated that the dialogues would be limited to the five-point agenda and nothing more. Around the same time, the FARC leader, Timochenko, stated that if peace were not achieved through the negotiations, the war should at least be regulated via a treaty that should include the issue of the bilateral use of explosives and indiscriminate bombardments in densely populated zones. He also pointed to the monitoring of the denunciations by the victims and the dignified treatment of prisoners in jail. Days later, the FARC peace delegation in Havana publicised a communiqué which stated that the insurgency had no parallel or hidden agendas and that in the future discretion could not be synonymous with secretiveness. It also stated its support for citizen participation in the process. The communiqué further asked the government to explain without delay the procedures, mechanisms, methodologies and dynamics that would make it possible for the different expressions in society to develop the process of peace talks in Colombia, with all the resources and guarantees that this requires. In late October, the FARC delegation in Havana stressed that what would get underway in mid-November was not negotiations but peace talks. At the same time, regarding the first point on the agenda, it stated that to the FARC, the “land” factor is an essential component of “territory”, and that aspects like food sovereignty and social welfare are the basis of this territory. The definition of “territory” bears in mind social-historical and social-environmental relations. To date, two mechanisms had been agreed upon for the participation of civil society in the peace negotiations: Adpostal would receive the proposals that citizens send through the municipal mayors’ offices all over the country free of charge, and it would also start a website where citizens could express themselves. What is more, the negotiating team would receive the initiatives that the Congress of the Republic gathered at the forums that it is holding in the different regions in the country. The FARC had requested that a representation office be opened in Bogotá where it could receive proposals from citizens; however, the government opposed this initiative. For the time being, citizen participation is being channelled through the regional working committees,

which are seeking to promote the different social actors that are participating on them to submit their proposals on the thematic strands of the General Agreement on the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace. The proposals will be systematised and delivered to the government and FARC-EP peace talk committee in documents that will compile the proposals from several committees, along with one consolidated final document. The regional working committees are an initiative spearheaded by the Peace Commissions in the Senate and Chamber of Representatives which are aided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace along with the technical support of the United Nations.

On the 19th of November, the talks on the agreed-upon agenda got underway in Havana. The FARC surprisingly announced a unilateral two-month ceasefire to provide an atmosphere propitious to the talks. The methodology to be used was joint meetings in the morning and separate meetings in the afternoons for at least two weeks. The government and FARC delegations also agreed to launch an initial venue for participation on the Peace Talk Committee by calling a forum on Comprehensive Agrarian Development Policy (Territorial Approach) in the city of Bogotá for three days in December, which came up with 400 proposals. The Peace Talk Committee asked the United Nations in Colombia and the National University (Centre for Thought and Peace Talk Monitoring) to call, organise and serve as rapporteurs for the debates. The Regional Working Committees will begin their second cycle in February 2013, and their first working topic will be the victims of the armed conflict. A website of the Peace Talk Committee will also be launched. In parallel, the FARC sent a letter to the ICRC stating that the special agreements, because of their regulatory level, are part of the “Constitutionality Block”, such that unilaterally, as allowed for this kind of situation, the FARC-EP asked the ICRC to formally request recognition of this pact between the government and the insurgency as a Special Agreement, according to the meaning given to this kind of international humanitarian law agreement. In consequence, it must automatically become part of the Constitutionality Block, generating the obligation among the parties to maintain the dialogue scenario as an unshakeable commitment over which no threats of suspension or rupture can be levels, even more so considering that the government and the FARC have agreed to start direct, uninterrupted talks until reaching a final agreement to end of the conflict and contribute to establishing a stable, lasting peace.

In early December, president Juan Manuel Santos set the month of November 2013 as the deadline for successfully concluding the peace negotiations with the FARC. Likewise, the FARC recognised that it still held prisoners of war, which could be exchanged. The government and the FARC concluded the second cycle of peace negotiations in Havana on the 21st of December and announced that on the 14th of January they would resume the talks on the problem of land, the first point on

the agenda, in order to study the specific proposals that would enable them to draft agreements.

With regard to the ELN, both the government and the guerrillas expressed their willingness to start peace talks. The top commander of this guerrilla group, Gabino, spoke in August about the option of negotiating for peace jointly with the FARC, without conditions and discussing the country's most pressing problems. The **ELN** suggested that all the grassroots and social organisations be part of the peace process because "in this proposal no one will replace them and only with their active participation will it be possible to make peace a real, stable, lasting and profound process which overcomes the causes that sparked and fed the conflict and which meets the dreams and aspirations of the Colombia that we all deserve". In September, the ELN expressed its willingness to engage in a bilateral ceasefire, stating that "it is necessary to recognise that neither the government nor the insurgency can abrogate society's right to be at the table and define it. Therefore, we express the urgency that grassroots and social organisations organise their agendas with their representatives. This is a job in which no one can replace them, and without them the pathway towards peace will begin on the wrong foot [...] We agree that the pathway towards peace implies working to end the conflict and not prolong it. This conflict is social and armed, and only by addressing both of these components will peace be real and possible [...] We are obligated, President Santos, to act with common sense and to listen to the calls of the Colombians who are requesting a bilateral ceasefire or a bilateral truce, because they are in the middle of the conflict and are the victims of it." The ELN suggested setting up a dialogue committee in which the different social and political expressions in the country could participate. It also criticised the Legal Framework for Peace because "the opinion of the insurgency was not consulted, [...] nor was there a real public discussion". Likewise, it declared that it is in favour of humanising the conflict while it lasts. Finally, it encouraged "diplomatic, political and communication efforts to be developed that lead to international accompaniment and true guarantees of safety and respect for everyone who should participate in the development of a peace process for a Colombia with welfare and a future of freedom".

In early November, the ELN proposed a bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Several days later, in its magazine it announced that the ELN delegation for exploratory talks with the government had been assembled and was ready to meet in Colombia. In an editorial in its magazine, it noted that the dialogue committee with the insurgency was just the first step, and it stressed that peace could only be achieved by going to the roots of the conflict and with the participation of society as a whole. In an interview, commander Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista proposed that the international community, through its grassroots and social organisations, set up an international entity which would support the peace talks committee in Colombia and request that the parties not leave the table until the peace process was advanced enough that the committee were no longer necessary. In late November, there were speculations that the ELN and the government might start exploratory talks in Cuba and that the representative of the guerrilla group would be Pablo Beltrán. In January 2013, however, president Santos declared the talks over and withdrew the safe-conduct for the ELN delegates.

Most significant events of the year

- The FARC and the government agreed to start peace talks after several months of exploratory talks in Cuba.
- The ELN set up a delegation for talks with the government. Exploratory talks were begun, although they yielded no results.

Websites of interest

- Anncol (www.anncol.info) (information on the FARC)
- El Colombiano (www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/pd.asp)
- El Espectador (www.elespectador.com)
- El Tiempo (eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/index.htm)
- ELN (www.eln-voces.com)
- FARC (resistenciafariana.blogspot.com)
- Fundación Ideas para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org)
- Indepaz (www.indepaz.org.co)
- UNPD (www.undp.org.co)
- Semana magazine (www.semana.com)
- Wikipedia (armed conflict in Colombia)

ASIA

Southern Asia

AFGHANISTAN	
Population:	32.4 million inhabitants
Area:	652,000 km ²
HDI:	172 (out of 187)
GDP:	10,044 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$ 310
Refugees:	+ 6 million
Armed actors:	Taliban, Al Qaeda, occupation forces
Facilitators:	Qatar

Context of the conflict

A mountainous, extremely poverty-stricken, ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim country that cultivates opium and gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1919, Afghanistan's pre-existing monarchy came to an end with the coup d'état in 1973, when the country became a republic. A few years later, a Communist government came to power. This government became embroiled in fighting with an Islamic guerrilla group, a situation which led to the intervention of Soviet troops in 1979. The Soviets remained in the country with a total of 100,000 troops until 1989, and they only withdrew after negotiations with the United Nations and constant pressure from a coalition of militias (the Northern Alliance) that was supported by the United States. The civil war resumed, and in 1996 the Taliban forces ended up wresting control of the country. They remained in power until 2001, when an international coalition led by NATO occupied the country ('Operation Enduring Freedom') with a contingent mainly made up of US soldiers. Hamid Karzai became the president of the country. Between 1992 and 1996, the various Afghan militias that were engaged in internecine fighting caused the death of around 50,000 people, most of them civilians. The country lived under constant instability, and the government only controlled the capital. Much of the population are still living as refugees in other countries.

Background to the peace process

As a result of the Bonn Agreement, which was signed in December 2001, the Interim Authority was created, and the process culminated in September with elections for the National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga) and the provincial councils. Since then, NATO has kept a military contingent in Afghanistan called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate from the United Nations. In March 2001, as the outcome of a Security Council resolution, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created with the purpose of implementing the commitments to reconstruct the

country agreed to a few months earlier in Bonn. In early February 2007, the Wolesi Jirga or lower chamber of Afghanistan approved a draft law on amnesty for all the combatants who had participated in the 25 years of conflict, including Mullah Omar, the top Taliban authority, as well as individuals accused of war crimes, like the former Mujahedin (Afghan resistance fighters) who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, some of whom now occupy government posts. In September 2007, the Taliban stated that it was willing to start negotiations with the Afghan government, after President Hamid Karzai made a proposal that negotiations get underway. In early October 2008, President Hamid Karzai revealed that he had asked Saudi Arabia to facilitate peace negotiations with the Taliban leaders, and he stated that his envoys had travelled to Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan to start these talks. In 2009, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, stated that reconciliation with the Taliban might be an important initiative in an armed conflict where a US military victory could not be foreseen. In April 2010, a peace conference was held in which an action plan was drawn up for the reintegration of the low- and middle-ranking Taliban insurgents. The plan included job offers, training and other economic incentives. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, stated that the Taliban were willing to hold negotiations with Western politicians. The Taliban leader had stated that he was no longer interested in governing the country and that the Taliban's objectives were to expel foreigners from the country and restore Sharia law and security. The Taliban had set no preconditions for the talks; instead they had simply stated that they must be honest. In September, 40% of Afghans went to the polls for the legislative elections, and the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, announced the launch of a peace plan for the country. This new strategy, which would be led by a High Peace Council, had a twofold objective: first, to begin a dialogue with the Taliban leaders, and secondly, to remove the combatants from the base of the insurgency.

In January 2011, Afghanistan and Pakistan created a joint commission to draw up kinds of direct negotiations for the possible beginning of peace talks with the Taliban as part of the peace plan for the country launched by President Hamid Karzai in late 2010. In June, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, announced his plan to withdraw from the country, which stipulated the withdrawal of around 33,000 soldiers by September 2012, 10,000 of whom would be repatriated during 2011. In December, US government sources stated that the talks with the Taliban were at a key juncture and that the US was considering the possibility of moving an unspecified number of Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo back to Afghanistan. The prisoners would then be under the control of the Afghan government. In exchange, it asked the Taliban to implement some kind of trust-building measures, such as denouncing international terrorism or making a public expression of its intention to embark on formal talks with the Afghan government. The US held several meetings with the Taliban in Germany and Doha, specifically with representatives of Mullah Omar.

The peace process in 2012

After an agreement of principles collapsed in December due to opposition from the Afghan executive, in January **the Taliban insurgency announced that it was opening a political office in Qatar**, a measure that was ultimately accepted by Karzai's government, which had been extremely reluctant to carry on with the process. However, the Taliban continued to prefer direct negotiation with the US instead of with the Afghan executive. Afghanistan, in turn, had imposed the condition that no foreign power would be involved in the process without its consent. The US Secretary of State sent a diplomatic team to the region to hold consultations with the governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in addition to the Afghan government itself. However, the Taliban refused to recognise the Afghan constitution and described Karzai's government as a puppet regime, stating that their wish was to negotiate the release of prisoners in Guantanamo and that they were persisting in their attempt to instate an Islamic state in Afghanistan. According to reports in *The Wall Street Journal*, the Taliban commanders on the ground supported the decision to negotiate with the US, but without giving up their demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the instatement of an Islamic state. In turn, the Afghan executive insisted that the talks be led by Afghans, and that the role of the US should be as a facilitator and mediator, but not referee, thus expressing its dismay at how the negotiations were being carried out. In February, the government of the US and Taliban representatives held several meetings in Qatar at which they discussed preliminary trust-building measures, such as a possible transfer of prisoners, as revealed by Taliban sources. However, the Taliban also stated that these talks were not peace negotiations. In turn, the Afghan government was planning to meet with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia, even though the latter, who had repeatedly stated that it would only negotiate directly with the US, as it regarded the Afghan government as a puppet regime, made no statement on these plans. In turn, the press leaked that the US president received a message from the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, in which he expressed his interest in holding negotiations to put an end to the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government, in turn, made its first public call to the Taliban to participate in peace negotiations. Despite all this, **in March, the Taliban announced that they were temporarily suspending the negotiations with the US government** in a communiqué which made no reference to the burning of Qurans at a NATO military base or of the murder of 16 Afghans by an American soldier. The Taliban alluded to the US's erratic activity and stated that it was still refusing to entertain any negotiations with the Afghan executive. US military sources stated that they viewed this announcement more as a tactical move than as a permanent withdrawal from the peace negotiations, and that it could be a reflection of the internal tensions within the insurgency. The main point of contention between the Taliban and the US is the issue of prisoners at Guantanamo.

In April, the government of Afghanistan and the US concluded the draft partnership strategy which pledged the US's support for Afghanistan for ten years after the withdrawal of combat troops in 2014. The agreement covers issues such as social and economic development, the construction of institutions, regional cooperation and security, and should be approved by the leaders of both countries and by the Afghan parliament. However, it did not specify the monetary amounts to be earmarked or the specific projects that would be supported. Nor did it clarify the US military presence in the country or the role it would play, although it did stipulate that the US would provide 2.7 billion dollars per year for the maintenance of the Afghan security forces. On the other hand, **the High Council for Peace appointed Salahuddin Rabbani as the new president**. Rabbani is the son of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president of this council and the former president of Afghanistan who was murdered by the Taliban in September 2011. Salahuddin Rabbani used to be the ambassador in Turkey. Days earlier, the leader of the head of the High Peace Council in the province of Kunar and his son died as the result of a suicide bomber attack. **The insurgent organisation Hezb-i-Islami announced that it was suspending negotiations with the US and Afghanistan**, and it replicated the Taliban decision. This suspension took place in view of the lack of practical results from the talks. The leader of this organisation, which operates in the northeast of the country, is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former US ally, and it has thousands of members, so its participation in any agreement with the Taliban is essential.

In May, **NATO approved in Chicago the Afghanistan exit plan**, which called for the transfer of the command of all the combat missions to the Afghan security forces in mid-2013 and the withdrawal of the majority of international troops (130,000 soldiers) in late 2014. Likewise, Arsalah Rahmani, the former Taliban minister and government peace negotiator, died from gunfire in Kabul in the second of the assassinations of leaders of the Afghan High Peace Council. The Taliban denied involvement in this assassination, although it kept up its threats against the members of this institution. Rahmani had been removed from the UN sanctions list in 2011. According to *The Washington Post*, the US government had secretly released high-level detainees in Parwan Prison in Afghanistan as part of the negotiations with the Taliban insurgency. The number of released prisoners is unknown. The releases had taken place in exchange for a drop in violence in certain districts, and the negotiations for these prison releases had been held between the US and local leaders.

In the third quarter, the American press published several news reports that pointed to an ostensible cool-off in the Afghan peace process. Military sources stated that progress in the negotiations with the Taliban would be difficult before the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country, which is scheduled for 2014. The Obama administration's failure to achieve an

agreement on the exchange of prisoners – the release of the Taliban commanders imprisoned in Guantanamo in exchange for the release of an American soldier, the only prisoner of war in the hands of the Taliban – may have been behind the thwarting of any new advances in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban insurgency. Even though the US government undertook several initiatives during the summer with the goal of reviving the process, the current perspective is that the results will only come in the long term. One initiative included creating a joint committee with Pakistan to look into possible candidates for political rehabilitation among the Taliban insurgents. What is more, the possibility of resuming negotiations for the exchange of prisoners could only come after the presidential elections scheduled for November. In September, the British think tank Royal United Services Institute published a report in which it revealed that Taliban leaders were willing to permanently break off ties with Al Qaeda and accept the continuation of US counterinsurgency operations against this organisation as long as the US does not interfere in Afghan politics or use Afghan territory to wage attacks against other countries, in addition to other trust-building measures like accepting education for girls. However, the Taliban refused to allow any of its leaders to participate in negotiations that include a US presence in its territory.

With regard to the Afghan government, worth noting is the fact that during the month of August official representatives met with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the former number two of the Shura of Qetta and a person with close ties to Mullah Omar who is currently in prison in Pakistan. The meeting, which according to Pangin Spanta – Hamid Karzai's national security advisor and one of the masterminds of the peace negotiations – aimed to check on Baradar's opinion on the negotiations, was authorised by Pakistan, who also collaborated in making it come to fruition. The relations between the two neighbouring countries on the peace negotiations in Afghanistan improved considerably in July, when both agreed to resume the work of the Peace Commission, which had been suspended after the murder of the Afghan peace envoy Burhanuddin Rabbani.

In November, **Pakistan released a group of Afghan Taliban prisoners** which included the son of a prominent Mujahedin leader, as well as other Taliban leaders. This gesture was interpreted by Afghanistan as a signal of its neighbour's willingness to facilitate the Afghan government's negotiations with the Taliban insurgency and support for the efforts underway by the Afghan High Peace Council. The Afghan government stated that Pakistan could release more prisoners in the future, and the Taliban insurgency celebrated these releases. The leader of the High Peace Council, Salahuddin Rabbani, who travelled to Islamabad at the head of a high-level delegation that met with representatives of the Pakistani government, noted that this gesture signalled a change in its neighbour's policy regarding the peace process in Afghanistan.

In December, **there was a meeting between leaders of the Taliban insurgency and representatives of the Afghan government in France** organised by the French think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. The Taliban delegation included Shahabuddin Delawar, the head of the political office in Qatar, and members of the Afghan government and the Northern Alliance also attended. The Northern Alliance had been at military odds with the Taliban for years. This meeting may have opened the door to a formal start of peace negotiations between the government and the Taliban during 2013, while the contacts between the USA and the Taliban were still suspended, even though the Obama administration may have been trying to reactivate them. At the meeting, the Taliban expressed their support for an inclusive government, as well as for respect for women's rights, although they described the current constitution as fraudulent since it was drawn up under the aegis of the US government. Likewise, they stated that the Taliban is the legitimate government of the country and that the 2014 elections will have to take place under the occupation of the country, since not all of the foreign troops will have withdrawn by then. Other participants in the meeting were the members of the group Hezb-e-Islami, an ally of the Taliban. Before the meeting, the **High Peace Council of Afghanistan had released a plan that included the transformation of the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami and other armed groups into political organisations and their participation in all the political and constitutional processes in the country by 2015**. The plan sketched out a scenario of a full NATO withdrawal and the complete transfer of security to the Afghan forces, as well as the possible inclusion of insurgent leaders in the central and provincial governments. What is more, according to this plan, **Pakistan would replace the US in leading the peace negotiations**. Likewise, Western diplomatic and military sources stated that reconciliation in Afghanistan had become a priority for the head of the Pakistani armed forces, General Ashfaq Kayani, who might be providing support for the negotiations with the Taliban insurgency in view of the forthcoming withdrawal of foreign combat troops from the neighbouring country. Even though the Afghan government questioned the genuine motives behind this impetus, the relations between the Pakistani government and the Taliban insurgency had gradually deteriorated. On the other hand, Afghan government sources stress the genuine desire of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to transform the Afghan Taliban insurgency into a political movement that could attain power through peaceful means. In parallel, the Pakistani government released the former Taliban Minister of Justice, Mullah Turabi. His release from prison took place in the wake of the negotiations that were held in November between representatives of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it came hand in hand with the release of three other Taliban prisoners. During the month of November, 13 Afghan Taliban were released. However, dozens of Taliban remained under arrest in Pakistan, including the former number two of the organisation, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

Most significant events of the year

- The Taliban insurgency announced that it was opening a political office in Qatar.
- Pakistan released a group of Afghan Taliban prisoners.
- There was a meeting between leaders of the Taliban insurgency and representatives of the Afghan government in France organised by the French think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

Websites of interest

- Human Security Report Project (www.hsrgroup.org)
- ISAF (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.html)
- UN (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
- Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
- UNDP (www.undp.org/afghanistan)
- Presidency of the Republic (www.president.gov.af)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- UNAMA (www.unama-afg.org)
- Wikipedia (War in Afghanistan)

INDIA

With 1.198 billion inhabitants, a land area of 3.2 million square kilometres and a GDP of 1,186,700 million dollars, India is a true mosaic of cultures and political traditions. This can be seen in the numerous regions inhabited by peoples with aspirations of reunification and self-government, the reason behind armed conflicts in some of them. In this section, we shall comment on the processes which have emerged in the regions of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, as well as those stemming from the group CPI-M, which operates in several regions. The conflict with Pakistan over the region of Kashmir is examined separately.

Assam

Population:	32 million inhabitants
Area:	78,400 Km ²
HDI (India):	134 (out of 182)
GDP (India):	1,405,700 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$ 1,220
Armed actors:	ULFA, NDFB, India Mujahideen
Facilitators:	ULFA: R. Goswami, People's Consultative Group, PCPIA NDFB: All Bodo Peace Forum

Context of the conflict

Assam is a region in northeast India. Many immigrants from Bangladesh have arrived in this region, and as a result several nationalist groups have emerged calling for the region to be liberated. The main nationalist group is the United Liberation Front of Assam (**ULFA**), which was created in 1979 and has Maoist leanings. The ULFA chose to engage in an armed struggle from 1989 onwards. In 1994, 4,000 of its combatants abandoned the group. However, they did not lay down their arms and instead went on to attack ULFA bases in Bhutan. As conditions for talks with the Government, the ULFA requested negotiations abroad in the presence of UN observers. It has carried out attacks against oil company interests and has training bases in Bangladesh.

The other important group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (**NDFB**), created in 1988, which took up arms in 1992. They also fight against the Bangladesh immigrants, who are Muslims, and strive to create "Bodoland", an independent state separate from Assam. It has bases in Bhutan and around 3,500 combatants, many of whom are Christians. There are other groups in the region (BLT, UPDS and DHD) that have reached ceasefire agreements with the government.

Background to the peace process

In 2004, the ULFA approached the government regarding possible negotiations. During 2005, a delegation of eleven trustworthy citizens, the People's Consultative Group (PCG), was appointed to hold contacts with the Indian government. The contacts were facilitated by writer R. Goswami (who died in 2011) and the former footballer R. Phukan. This consultative group pledged to hold consultations with civil society and to forward the conclusions to the government. The first round of negotiations via the PCG was held on the 25th of October 2005. In 2007, the government noted that the doorway was open to a new peace process, but that the leaders of the ULFA had to be the ones to get in touch with the government, thus leaving behind the formula of negotiating via a third party (namely the PCG). In early January 2009, the Alpha and Charlie companies of the 28th battalion of the ULFA, which had unilaterally declared a ceasefire in June, created a new organisation which they called ULFA Pro-Negotiations, led by Mrinal Hazarika. They also announced that they were giving up on their demand for sovereignty and independence and would work to achieve greater autonomy for the state of Assam. In June 2010, the Indian government gave the green light for the state of Assam to begin a negotiation process with the ULFA and appointed the former head of the intelligence office, PC Haldar, as the interlocutor with the armed group. The Indian government chose not to oppose the requests for release upon bail of the ULFA leaders in order to lay the groundwork for the start of peace talks. In February 2011, the Indian government and the pro-negotiation faction of the ULFA, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, began the first round of formal talks. In August, the ULFA declared for the first time that it did not want to secede from India and that it would accept reaching some kind of sovereignty within the framework of the Indian constitution.

In 2003, an agreement was signed that put an end to 11 years of clashes between the government and the group BLTF-BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers). In 2003, as well, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the group DHD, which had been founded in 1995 and upheld the independence of the Dimasa people. In mid-September 2009, the DHD-J, also known as Black Widow, started a process of surrendering and turning in its weapons after the ultimatum issued by the government in this vein. With regard to the negotiations with the NDFB, in May 2005 talks began which led to a ceasefire agreement. The faction in favour of negotiations is called NDFB-Progressive, and its secretary general is Govinda Nasumatary, alias B. Swmkhwr, who reached a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2005. With regard to the faction of the NDFB led by Ranjan Daimary, which was traditionally against the peace process, in January 2011 it offered the Indian government a unilateral ceasefire with the goal of being able to start talks with the government.

In early 2010, 419 members and leaders of the armed opposition group Karbi Longri National Liberation Front

(KLNLF), which included 22 women, turned in their weapons. The KLNLF emerged in 2004 as a faction of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS).

In late October 2011, the government signed a peace agreement with the armed opposition group UPDS after two years of negotiations. The agreement called for the creation of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council in that district, as well as its territorial reorganisation.

The peace process in 2012

In January, almost **700 insurgents from nine armed opposition groups turned in their weapons** to the Indian Minister of the Interior, P. Chidambaram. The insurgents belonged to the armed groups APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA and KRA. The nine groups were part of the Kuki community, which inhabits the east of the state, and the Adivasi community, which lives in northern and western Assam. Even though all the groups already had ceasefire agreements with the government, they had not yet begun formal peace negotiations. The insurgents who turned in their weapons would be moved to cantonment centres until the peace negotiations got underway.

The Indian government held **talks with the ULFA Pro-Negotiations faction** after the approval of the budgets in March. This is the first round of formal negotiations since the group submitted its proposal in October. However, several informal talks were held with the government interlocutor, PC Haldar. Likewise, the Ministry of the Interior revealed that the leader of the anti-negotiations faction, Paresh Baruah, was trying to convince the group to reunify. The faction in favour of reaching an agreement with the government had accepted constitutional reforms to protect the state's identity and natural resources, which was different to the initial demand for sovereignty, according to Baruah. This faction was demanding a separate constitution similar to the one existing for Jammu and Kashmir, which would provide complete autonomy to manage economic and forest resources as well as land, water and mining. Furthermore, it demanded that a clause be included that stated that any change in the territorial demarcation of the state necessarily had to have the consent of the Parliament of Assam. At the October meeting, at which the agreement was reached, the participants included the Secretary of the Interior of India, RK Singh and several representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, including UK Bansal and Shambhu Singh, in addition to the official interlocutor. The government of Assam was represented by the chief secretary, NK Das; the director general of police, Khagen Sharma; and the State Interior Commissioner, Jishnu Barua. The ULFA delegation was led by Arabinda Rajkhowa.

In March, the government stated that there were five armed groups active in the state of Assam: ULFA Pro-Negotiations, with between 225 and 250 members; the

NDFB (R), with between 325 and 350 members; the KPLT with 50 or 70 insurgents; the MULTA with 60 members; and the HUM with 40 members.

The government stated that significant progress was made at the meeting held with the armed opposition group ULFA (PTF) in April. The ULFA delegation, headed by leader Arabinda Rajkhowa, met with the Secretary of the Interior of India, RK Singh, and other government representatives. Even though little of the content of the encounter was revealed, both parties stated that tangible headway had been made which they hoped to further in future meetings. Some of the issues discussed included safeguarding the indigenous population of Assam, respect for the ceasefire, the handover of ULFA's weapons and munitions and the total suspension of security force operations. The ULFA mentioned the need for changes in the legislation since its demands could not be met under the current constitution. Other claims included getting information on vanished ULFA members and socioeconomic issues. In June, the Indian government and the ULFA Pro-Negotiations faction met in Delhi at a meeting described by the government as fruitful. Even though no specific details of what the parties had agreed to were revealed, the government had pledged to launch several of the armed group's proposals related to control of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, as well as safeguarding the political rights of the people of Assam. What is more, other issues were also discussed at the meeting, like infrastructures and measures to control flooding in the state. The armed group stated that **the final resolution to the conflict might come this year**. The meeting was presided over by the Secretary of State of India, RK Singh, and by the leader of the armed group, Arabinda Rajkhowa. A group of leaders of the ULFA Pro-Negotiations faction requested passports to travel to Bangladesh and meet with the secretary general of the armed group, Anup Chetia. Different media sources reported that the government was highly likely to grant them the passports requested.

In October, the Indian government and the government of Assam signed a **peace agreement with both factions of the armed opposition group DHD**. The agreement, which was reached after several rounds of negotiations, stipulated the dissolution of the armed group within six months and greater decentralisation in the district of Dima Hasao. It was also signed by two factions of the group D(N) and DHD(J). Thus, the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council would change its name to the Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council, and it would undergo an administrative reorganisation and embark upon socioeconomic development projects.

The Indian government may start negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary from the armed opposition group NDFB, and it is waiting for a formal letter from the government of Assam to ratify the agreement between both executives in order to start the talks. The interlocutor on behalf of the central government, PC Haldar, held several contacts with Ranjan Daimary in prison in Guwahati, and the armed group formally expressed its desire to begin negotiations. The contacts

between the government and the armed group have taken place in the past two years. Government sources state that the peace agreement may be reached late in the year, although the differences between the president of the armed group, Ranjan Daimary, and the commander in chief, IK Songbijit - who operates out of Myanmar – may hinder the process. However, there was still no decision on Daimary’s possible release from prison in order to participate in these negotiations. The government had already refused to create a new state, as the armed group was demanding. In December, the central government and the government of Assam stepped up their efforts so that the splinter group within the armed opposition group NDFB(R) led by commander in chief IK Songbijit would join the peace negotiations planned with this group. Even though the government was not calling off the talks – seven rounds had already been held between the government interlocutor PC Halder and the leader of the armed group Ranjan Daimary – it was sceptical about the possibilities of success if the internal division within the insurgency persisted. For this reason, it had facilitated the communication between Daimary and other leaders of the armed group. Daimary is currently in prison, but headway in the peace process may help him be released on bail.

The armed opposition group NDFB(P), which is engaged in peace talks with the Indian government, celebrated the decision taken by the Indian Minister of the Interior, Sushil Kumar Shinde, to hold a multipartite meeting on the issue of creating a new state for the Bodo people.

Nagaland	
Population:	2.2 million inhabitants
Area:	16,600 Km ²
HDI (India):	134 (out of 187)
GDP (India):	1,405,700 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$1,220
Deaths due to the conflict:	20,000
Armed actors:	NSCN-IM
Facilitators:	Kredtha (Netherlands), Prime Minister of Mizoram, Thailand

Context of the conflict

The conflict in Nagaland is one of the oldest in India. It involves Christian Tibetan-Burmese tribes who have been fighting for their independence since the 1950s. The main group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (**NSCN**), which was founded in 1980. There was a schism in the group in 1988, and it divided into the **NSCN (K)**, which operates in the north of the state, and the **NSCN (IM)**, which is better established in the south. The NSCN (IM) has 4,500 combatants and a strong component of Christian fundamentalists. Its leaders are exiled in Thailand. Many other members live in the Netherlands and Ireland. The region is rich in natural gas resources.

Background to the peace process

Since the first ceasefire in 1997, the NSCN-IM has held more than 60 rounds of negotiations with the government, many of them in Thailand and others in Amsterdam, in which the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire. The government reiterated to the armed group that the issue of sovereignty was totally off-limits for discussion and that any solution to the conflict had to fall within the country’s constitution. The armed group may agree to remain part of India via a special federal relationship with the union. During the second half of February 2010, the central government appointed the former chief secretary of Nagaland, R. S. Pandey, as its interlocutor for the negotiations with the group. The executive noted that it was willing to grant Nagaland the maximum autonomy possible, even if that entailed a constitutional reform. The government and the armed group met once again in Delhi. The armed group was represented by a five-member delegation led by Muivah. The negotiations focused on the 31-point proposal submitted by the armed group, which included the unification of all the districts inhabited by the Naga people, and their own constitution, flag, currency and army. The leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, accepted an Indian passport in February 2011 as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to engage in talks with the government.

In early June 2009, the armed opposition group NSCN-K stated that it was prepared to start formal peace negotiations with the government of India, eight years after having reached a ceasefire agreement with Delhi. The NSCN-K stated that it was willing to set no preconditions for the dialogue and that issues like sovereignty could be discussed at the negotiating table, but without that being an obstacle to starting negotiations. In June 2011, the NSCN-K was grappling with an internal division after the tensions in early May between India-based sectors of the group and sectors operating from Myanmar. Some analysts stated that these tensions might lead to a rapprochement and reconciliation between the India-based sector of the NSCN-K and the NSCN-IM, which is currently involved in talks with the government.

The peace process in 2012

The Forum for Naga Reconciliation held a meeting in February with the participation of 20,000 people from the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, as well as from Myanmar. Leaders from the main Naga insurgent organisations also attended it, including the NSCN (IM), the GPRN/NSCN (Khole Konyak), the NNC/FGN (Singnya), the NSCN (K) and the NNC/FGN (Kiumakam). This was the first time that the leaders of these organisations were participating jointly in a public event. Representatives of different civil society organisations also participated in the meeting. In April, the armed opposition group NSCN (IM) reaffirmed its commitment to the ceasefire agreement despite the recent incidents with the Indian security forces, which it described as flagrant violations of this

agreement. Several members of the security forces were taken prisoner by the armed group near one of its camps and later released after the intervention of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, even though their weapons were not returned. The Naga government denied any intention to attack the insurgent group's facilities. In May, there was speculation that **several diplomats from EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Germany, Poland and Slovakia) may play the role of facilitator in the peace negotiations in the state.** The ambassadors travelled to Nagaland in May and met with the Naga authorities as well as with representatives of the different civil society organisations. The visit aroused some controversy in the Indian government, and the Ministry of the Interior protested to the Ministry of the Exterior for not having informed it about certain meetings that were held on the trip. The diplomats made no comments about their visit and alluded to the controversy, although they did note that possible avenues of cooperation were opened between India and the EU in different spheres related to the northeast region.

The peace process experienced major headway during the third quarter, after **all the parliamentarians from the Assembly of Nagaland travelled to Delhi to meet with the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.** The parliamentarians, who in 2009 formed the Joint Legislators Forum (JLF) of Nagaland Legislative Assembly on the Naga political issue to facilitate the peace process, conveyed to the prime minister their willingness to give up their seats in order to pave the way for a new political agreement that could stem from a possible peace agreement between the government and the insurgents, before the next state elections scheduled for February 2013. The Chief Minister of Nagaland, Neiphiu Rio, was at the helm of the delegation, which was made up of the 34 parliamentarians from the governing party NPF, 19 from the opposition Congress party and 7 independent parliamentarians. The delegation also met with the members of the armed opposition group NSCN-IM which was camping in Delhi while holding informal negotiations with the government. After the meeting with the government, the Naga legislators met separately with the four most important insurgent Naga groups, the NSCN-IM, the NSCN-K, the NSCN (Khole-Kitovi) and the NNC (FGN). All four armed groups expressed their support for reconciliation. However, the NSCN-K noted that it would only accept an agreement that includes Naga sovereignty.

In October, **the Indian government and the armed opposition group NSCN-IM may have been close to signing a peace agreement.** Both parties were working on a memorandum of understanding that would include different proposals. The first would be to transform

the legislative assembly of Nagaland into a bicameral institution. The NSCN-IM also called for an increase in the number of seats, and the Indian state wished to ban it from being called a "parliament". What is more, the agreement considers establishing autonomous development councils, a separate flag for the state, more autonomy and a special status, in addition to formal recognition of the unique history of the Naga people. With regard to the integration of the Naga people who live in different states in India, one of the insurgency's historical claims, the government may be preparing a proposal that includes creating an autonomous institution financed by the central government that would safeguard the Naga identity and culture in the states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The Minister of the Interior, Sushil Kumar Sinde, was carrying out a consultation process with the chief ministers of these states, and he had begun to meet with the chief minister of Manipur, the one with the most intransigent posture on maintaining the state's territorial integrity. On the other hand, some sources noted that the government, through its interlocutor, RS Pandey, had offered the armed group to integrate their combatants into some security force and even into the armed forces themselves, but there was no agreement on this issue given that the NSCN-IM was calling for the creation of Naga armed forces. Both the government and the armed group denied that the NSCN-IM had signed any commitment in writing, as some media sources had reported. The armed group started a consultation process with civil society and stated that it would sign nothing until these consultations were over. On another front, the chief minister of Nagaland, Neiphiu Rio, headed a delegation that met with the Minister of the Interior at which it asked the government to conclude the peace negotiations before the Naga legislative period came to an end on the 26th of March 2013, although the armed group rejected any timeframe for concluding the process. In December, the leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chishi Swu and Th Muivah, expressed their optimism regarding the possibility of a forthcoming solution to the Naga conflict, although they did not specify a calendar, stating that this would be impossible. What is more, the armed group also expressed its willingness to meet with any organisation from civil society wishing to meet with it.

In November, **the armed opposition group NSCN-K and the government may have started peace negotiations,** although there was no official confirmation of this. An insurgent delegation held an informal meeting with the executive, although the armed group was waiting for a formal invitation from the government to start the process after having received a verbal invitation. Since a ceasefire agreement had been reached in 2001, no peace negotiations had taken place.

Most significant events of the year

- Almost 700 insurgents from nine armed opposition groups from Assam turned in their weapons.
- The Indian government may start negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary from the armed opposition group NDFB.
- The Indian government and the government of Assam signed a peace agreement with both factions of the armed opposition group DHD.
- All the parliamentarians from the Assembly of Nagaland travelled to Delhi to meet with the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.
- The Indian government and the armed opposition group NSCN-IM may be close to signing a peace agreement.
- The armed opposition group NSCN-IM and the government may have started peace negotiations.

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INDIA – PAKISTAN (Kashmir)	
Population:	13 million (Kashmir)
Area:	222,200 km ² (Kashmir)
HDI:	India 134; Pakistan 145 (out of 187)
GDP:	India, 1,405,700 million dollars; Pakistan, 169,800 million dollars
Per capita income:	India, \$1,220; Pakistan, \$1,000
Deaths due to the conflict:	47,000-70,000 people since 1989.
Armed actors:	APHC, Hizbul Mujahideen
Facilitators:	

Context of the conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir dates back to the partition in 1947, when both countries won independence from the United Kingdom and Kashmir was divided between India (the state of Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan and China. According to the 1947 Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to join either India or Pakistan. Its decision to join India was a source of conflict between the two countries, and the clashes began the same year. India laid claim to the territories controlled by the other countries, arguing that those lands had been administrated by the Maharajah of Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan laid claim to part of an area under Indian control for reasons of Muslim identity. Since then, there have been three armed confrontations (1947, 1948 and 1965), and hostilities resumed in 1971. **In July 1949, both countries signed the Karachi Agreement, which set a ceasefire line that was to be controlled by observers.** As a result, the UN created an observation mission called **UNMOGIP**. This mission is still active and has international observers on the Line of Control. At the end of the 1980s tension mounted, with the added risk of the nuclear weapons that both countries possess.

The conflict therefore has two dimensions. The first is an inter-state conflict, involving a border dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. This conflict is evident in the continuous infiltrations of Pakistani groups across the border. The other dimension is intra-state, involving the fighting waged by armed Muslim opposition groups within the Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir against India's central government. Some of these groups are fighting for the independence of a unified Kashmir, while others are fighting for this Indian state's integration into Pakistan. In 1992 the coalition All Parties Hurriyat Conference (**APHC**) was formed. The APHC demanded an internationally monitored referendum, as mentioned in the Security Council's first resolutions. Another conflict involves the dispute over control of the Punjab river basins.

Another important armed group is the **Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)**, created in 1989 and led by Sayeed Salahudeen.

This group has been on the EU's list of terrorist groups since 2005 for having perpetrated numerous attacks against India's civilian population.

Background to the peace process

India has always refused any international mediation; rather it prefers direct bilateral dialogue. It is not in favour of changing the territorial boundaries and is supported by China. In contrast, Pakistan is in favour of internationalising any peace process, and based on the right of self-determination, it is calling for a referendum to be held under UN control, although lately it has declared that it may give up on this demand. The most noteworthy feature of this conflict is the dynamic of creating trust-building measures on both sides and the model of the process, which has become known as the composite dialogue, which consists of addressing all the disputes in a single process so that headway is made on several matters at the same time. In this process, even though it is difficult to reach agreements, once they are reached it is difficult to renege on them.

In 2005, the Pakistani president stated that the dispute over control of Kashmir may be resolved by greater autonomy for the region, while the Indian prime minister declared that a Kashmir without clearly defined borders and with greater autonomy for the zones administered by India would be measures that might help to resolve the conflict and to weaken the border demarcation in order to detract importance from it. In turn, the coalition of pro-independence parties, APHC, asked that the armed struggle be abandoned in order to pave the way for peace negotiations which would lead to a sustainable peace agreement. In early November 2009, the central government of India announced that it had prepared a set of political measures for the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. During the second half of February 2010, both countries resumed peace negotiations, which had been formally interrupted since the attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. In February 2011, the leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Shabbir Ahmed Shah, called for a referendum in the state to determine the people's aspirations.

The peace process in 2012

Representatives of both governments agreed in January to extend the agreements to lower the nuclear risk and to pre-notify on ballistic missile testing for another five years. However, India did not accept Pakistan's proposal to withdraw the heavy artillery measuring more than 130 millimetres to 30 kilometres from the Line of Control (the de facto border between both countries). **The Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, visited India in April** in a private trip and met with the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. This was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state to the neighbouring country in seven years and the first meeting between both leaders

since 2009. Singh agreed to visit Pakistan, although the date has not yet been announced. The Indian government authorised foreign direct investment from Pakistan, and 600 Pakistani businessmen participated in a trade fair in India. In November, the Pakistani government pledged to grant India most-favoured nation status. In June, the **Pakistani Foreign Secretary invited pro-independence Kashmiri leaders to hold negotiations during the course of a trip to Delhi.** Pakistan invited the leaders from the organisations JKLF and APHC. The Foreign Secretary met with the Kashmiri leaders prior to the meeting scheduled with his Indian counterpart. The Kashmiri leaders noted that they were not against negotiations between India and Pakistan, but they also stated that progress had been made on the dispute over Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people should be included in the dialogue.

In the third quarter, India and Pakistan reached an agreement to loosen what until then had been restrictive criteria for granting visas to the other country's citizens. The agreement came during the

three days of talks held in Islamabad between the Indian Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna, and his Pakistani counterpart, Hina Rabbani Khar. This was the second meeting between the two ever since peace talks were officially resumed in 2011. Days before this high-level meeting, a delegation of Pakistani parliamentarians and merchants also travelled to India to participate in the fourth round of the India-Pakistan Parliamentarians Dialogue. The headway achieved in the bilateral relations that quarter included the release of 55 Indian fishermen detained for having crossed into Pakistan's territorial waters; they were released on the occasion of India's Independence Day. Today there are 100 fishermen in Pakistani prisons and 250 in Indian prisons.

In October, the Pakistan Minister of Oil stated that the country was willing to buy Indian fuel as long as the price was reasonable. These statements came as part of the country's participation in a conference in Delhi on the petrochemical sector. In recent months, India and Pakistan had been channelling their relations through **"trade diplomacy"**.

Southeast Asia

MYANMAR/BURMA	
Population:	48,3 million inhabitants
Area:	677,000 Km ²
HDI:	149 of 187)
GDP:	—
Per capita income:	\$ 824
Deaths due to the conflict:	15,000
Armed actors:	KNU, CNF
Actores no armados:	NLD (Aung San Suu Kyi)
Facilitators:	NLD: Malaysia, UN, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. KNU: Thailand CNF: Reverend Chawn Kio, Peace and Tranquility Committee

Context of the conflict

There are two types of conflict in Myanmar: one is related to the fight for the democratisation of the country; the other is linked to the rights claimed by the different ethnic minorities. Having gained its independence in 1947, the country had a democratic government from 1948 to 1962, when General Ne Win led a coup d'état. Ne Win was in turn brought down by yet another military coup in 1988.

Myanmar has a population of 50 million people, divided into 135 ethnic groups and subgroups who practise different religions. The military regime is Buddhist. Many of the ethnic groups have their own military apparatus. The main minorities are the Shan (9%) and the Karen (7%). These ethnic groups still fight against the military junta, although less intensely than in previous decades.

The **Karen** people are political organised under the **KNU** (Karen National Union) and are not involved in drug trafficking, unlike many other ethnic groups. Their military activity is via the **KNLA** (Karen National Liberation Army), created in 1947. The group has around 7,000 combatants. In 1995 the Karen reformed en masse in Thailand, with most of these being unarmed. They have stated that they are willing to completely lay down their arms if they obtain political guarantees of a future institutional framework and if they can earn revenues from gas production. The state of Karen covers 28,725 km² and has 1.1 million inhabitants. Even though the majority of Karen are Buddhists, the state also has a high number of Christians (30%) as a result of its past relationship with the British Empire. The Karen have had a ceasefire with the government in place since 2004, and it is currently the oldest conflict in the world (since 1949). The Karen are led by Naw Zipporrah Sein.

The **Shan State Army (SSA)**, created in 1964, reached a peace agreement with the government, but one of its dissidents, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N),

remained active in pursuing an autonomous Shan state within a federal Burma. In May 2007 the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement were suspended after an agreement could not be reached on the venue where the meeting should be held. The leader of this armed group had agreed to negotiate with the armed forces with mediation by members of the Thai military. In 2009 the government invited them to become border guards, which they accepted in April 2010. However, half of their troops (5,000), led by General Parngha, were opposed to this agreement. There is also the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which was declared a terrorist group in 2006. The SSA-S also experienced dissidence this year, and it reached a peace agreement with the government.

The **Chin** are an ethnic group consisting of more than one million people with their own language and culture divided between Myanmar and India. In India they are known as the Mizo people. The Burmese side is the home to almost half a million people, and they account for the majority of the population in the Chin state of Myanmar, which borders on India and Bangladesh and was created in 1974. The Chin were Christianised in the early 20th century, just a few years after the independent Chinland was annexed by British colonialism, and therefore the majority of the population is Baptist. They have a widespread diaspora in India, Malaysia, Canada and the United States. The military junta has persecuted the Chins, regarding them as pro-Western. Since the 1930s, the Chins have been claiming their rights to self-determination, as a continuation of their claims to independence from Myanmar (formerly Burma) in 1948. Forty years later, in 1998, the **Chin National Front (CNF)** was created following the military junta's brutal repression of demonstrations by students calling for democracy in the country. This group, which demanded self-rule for the Chin people and the creation of a territory called Gran Mizoram, organised on the border of the Burmese region of Shin with the Indian state of Mizoram (from which they receive support) and with Bangladesh, and has around 200 military troops. The Secretary-General of the CNF is Thang Lian. Since 1989 the CBF has been part of the National Democratic Front of Burma (NDF), and since 2001 it has been a member of the United Nations' Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The Chin National Council was founded in 2006, and includes the CNF and other Chin organisations.

The production of opium in much of the country has made many of these groups turn to drug trafficking. Such groups fight among themselves and against the government. In parallel to these conflicts, the country is under an autocratic military dictatorship. In 1990, this regime adopted the name SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council). In 1997, it changed its name to the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). Since 1985 the junta has signed agreements with many armed groups. In exchange for renouncing their political and separatist demands, the junta has allowed these groups to control their lucrative activities with total impunity. In 1990 the military junta permitted elections, which were

won with a majority by Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the **NLD** (National League for Democracy) and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was later arrested.

Background to the peace process

With regard to the process of democratisation and reconciliation channelled through the dialogue with the Nobel Peace Prize winner and the NLD, the first meetings took place in late 2000 with the mediation of Malaysia and the United Nations. During the period 2001-2004, the Military Junta made a series of gestures in what could be called “visit diplomacy”, which translated into the release of political prisoners before and/or after the periodical visits to the country by the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy to the country, a special Rapporteur on human rights and political leaders from several countries, although there were also periods when the Military Junta did not allow these visits. In 2004, the government promoted a national convention to democratise the country, but the NLD conditioned its participation upon the release of its imprisoned members. Many of these diplomatic manoeuvres to resolve the conflict came via the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is headquartered in Geneva but has had an office in the Burmese capital since 2000, which was closed by the Military Junta in March 2006. In 2009, the most noteworthy event was that the new Obama administration gave signs of being in favour of engaging in direct relations with the Military Junta. The Deputy Secretary of State noted the possibility of creating a format similar to the one used in the negotiations with North Korea, via a six-part dialogue in which ASEAN, Japan, China and India would also participate. US representatives from the delegation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with representatives of the Military Junta. Late in the year, the US government stated that it was hoping to start a dialogue process between the Military Junta and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after the party she leads, the NLD, had publicised a letter that Suu Kyi had sent to the leader of the Junta, General Than Shwe, in which she expressed her willingness to work with the government to put an end to the sanctions that were harming the country. In 2010, the Military Junta had authorised the reopening of some offices of the main democratic opposition party, the NLD. The opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, met in May with the US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, and the head of the US diplomatic mission in the country. After the elections, the Military Junta released the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after seven and a half years of house arrest.

With regard to the KNU, the government’s first meeting with this Karen group was held in 1996, albeit with no results. The second meeting was in late 2003, and it ended with a verbal cessation of hostilities agreement. In 2007, a splinter of the group and the KNU/KNLPAC was formed, which signed a peace agreement with the Military Junta. Another faction, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, reached an agreement with the Military Junta in

2009 which stated that the members of the group could serve as border guards on the border with Thailand.

In April 2011, General Than Shwe officially dissolved the Military Junta, which had been established in 1988 via a coup d’état, after taking possession of the new government of the union, which replaced the Junta. In July, the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi offered to facilitate ceasefire agreements and peace processes between the government and the ethnic insurgency. In parallel, the coalition of ethnic groups United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), established in February, submitted a ceasefire proposal to EU representatives at a meeting held in Bangkok and issued an appeal for the European organisation to facilitate a dialogue between the Burmese government and the ethnic groups. In August, Suu Kyi met with President Thein Sein for the first time. In August, the leaders of the UNFC assembled a team to hold peace negotiations with the government. In turn, the Parliament approved the creation of a peace committee aimed at mediating with the insurgent groups.

In November 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Myanmar and met with President Thein Sein. Clinton announced small concessions from the Burmese regime in response to advances in democracy which had been made, but she asked for more headway. Likewise, five ethnic armed groups met with representatives of the government, and three of them reached informal ceasefire agreements with the Executives. The groups that participated in the negotiations were the KIO, KNP, CNF, SSA-S and KNU.

The peace process in 2012

The Burmese government established a peace strategy with the ethnic groups via a three-stage process: the first is a ceasefire, the opening of liaison offices and the freedom of movement when they are not bearing weapons; the second is trust-building measures, political dialogue and regional development; and the third is the signing of an agreement in the presence of members of Parliament.

The armed opposition group **KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government in January**. The KNU, which started its armed activities in 1948 and is the oldest active armed group in the country, had never signed any agreement with the government. The negotiations were held in Pa-an, the capital of the Karen state, and the delegations were led by the Minister of Railways and the chief government negotiator, Aung Min, who is at the helm of the Union Peace Building Group, and General Mutu Say Poe, on behalf of the KNU. In addition to the ceasefire, both parties agreed on the possibility of allowing unarmed patrols in the respective territories and for the KNU to open liaison offices in territories under government control. It will presumably do so in Pegu, a city near Rangoon with a large Karen population. The KNU stressed that this time the government did not demand that they turn in their weapons. In February, the KNU issued a call for the withdrawal of

the government troops from the ethnic zones and for the ceasefire reached to be implemented through a four-phase roadmap. These phases included a lasting ceasefire, an initial political dialogue, the resolution of the underlying political problems through national reconciliation, and finally political participation. In March, the KNU criticised the fact that the armed forces were violating the ceasefire agreement they had with the armed group after attacking the group's position several times. The government may be gathering armaments and other military supplies in the Karen state despite the ceasefire agreement with the KNU, as reported by several local media sources // displaced persons on the border with Thailand and the armed group itself. What is more, the persons displaced as a result of this conflict had not yet returned to their homes for fear of a resumption of the conflict. In May, the KNU questioned the role of former soldiers who are now businessmen with links to the negotiations in their capacity as government consultants. In the second quarter, **a KNU delegation met with President Thein Sein and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the first time in Rangoon.** The KNU leaders described the meeting with the president as constructive, and they stressed that he had mentioned the possibility of legalising the group. With regard to the meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, they stressed the desire to work with her in the future. There had been a previous meeting between the KNU and a government delegation led by Aung Min in which the KNU expressed the need for a ceasefire for the entire country as well as an end to human rights abuses. The KNU opened liaison offices in Pegu and Tenasserim, and the government noted that it was waiting to open more offices in the future. Additionally, representatives of the government and the insurgents visited a town in Pegu Division to learn the needs of the civilian population displaced by the armed conflict. In September, the third round of negotiations was held.

In the third quarter, **the KNU and the government signed a draft code of conduct for the troops,** which must be approved by President Thein Sein. What is more, at the meeting at which the document was signed, the government also agreed to reposition its troops on the front. This had been one of the armed group's most pressing requests, as in the months prior to the meeting it had demanded the withdrawal of the troops from the zones under its control.

In November, KNU leaders met with representatives of ten Karen civil society organisations. The latter expressed their support for the peace negotiations with the government and asked that all sectors of Karen society be included and that political questions take priority over economic interests. In turn, the armed group stated that it was in favour of self-determination for the Karen people and the creation of a federal government system that would allow for greater autonomy, but that it did not wish to secede from Myanmar. In December, the KNU elected military chief General Muty Say Poe as its new leader.

On another front, **Norway promoted a peace plan which came with 66 million dollars, called the**

Norwegian Peace Support Initiative, to rehabilitate the eastern zone of this country, which has been affected by the armed conflict for decades. The plan will start with a pilot phase in the Karen state and aims to create the conditions that will allow the displaced persons to return, help to open liaison offices for the armed groups and create community development committees. The aid will be channelled via organisations that have government approval, yet also the approval of the insurgent organisations, especially the KNU. The group charged with advising on the establishment of this plan was made up of personalities like Charles Petrie and Ashley South. The Vice Foreign Minister of Norway, Torgeir Larsen, who travelled to Myanmar and met with representatives of the KNU, the army, civil society and displaced persons, stated that the internally displaced persons and refugees in the country's border zones would not be forced to return home. The KNU announced that it would open a liaison office in the Three Pagodas Pass zone in the Karen state to facilitate further headway on the ceasefire process. This is the third of these offices that the armed group was opening, and it claimed that it was helping to ensure that there are no violations of the ceasefire.

Likewise, **the leaders of the armed group ABSDF held negotiations with government representatives for the first time** on the border with Thailand and agreed to hold further meetings to reach a ceasefire and a peace agreement. However, no date was set for this second encounter.

In February, the negotiations between the government and the **KIO** ended without any agreement being reached. After the meeting, which was held in the Chinese city of Ruili, both parties issued a joint communiqué in which they stated that they would meet again. KIO representatives described the meeting as frank. This was the second encounter between these two parties. The first, which was held in the same city, took place in November. In turn, the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi stressed the importance of resolving this conflict due to the serious impact it was having on the people, and she underscored the need for a political agreement to be reached and for there to be ethnic harmony in the country. Parallel to the talks, **the ground clashes between both parties continued** daily, which was clearly hindering any possibility of an agreement. In March, the negotiations between the government and the KIO held on the border with China failed. The parties agreed to meet again, but no date was set. However, the armed group expressed its satisfaction and stated that the talks had been more frank than on other occasions. It also stressed the need for more discussion on the withdrawal of Burmese troops from the zone, which was the main point of contention between the parties. The KIO believed that a necessary condition for signing a ceasefire agreement was the withdrawal of the troops from the zone under its control, while the government stated that this point could only be discussed after a ceasefire agreement was reached. On another front, the main opposition party, the NLD, asked the government and the Electoral Commission for permission to start talks

with the KIO on the security situation in the state of Kachin. This initiative came after the announcement that the elections would be postponed in three election districts in this state as a result of the violence. The armed group stated that they would not get in the way of the elections and that they were open to dialogue with any group on the people's rights and the political situation in the country. It also revealed that President Thein Sein would be at the head of a government peace committee in charge of the negotiations with the armed opposition ethnic groups. The committee would be divided into two sections, a central committee and a working committee. Thein Sein would preside over the central committee. Some of the current negotiators, like Aung Thuang, would not be part of the new body. Thuang, who takes harsher positions on the negotiations, achieved no headway in his talks with the KIO despite the meetings held with the two parties. In early June, informal negotiations were also held with the KIO, a group that repeated its demand for the government troops to withdraw from the zone under its control. It also stated that its goal was to end the conflict, not to sign a ceasefire agreement. The KIO also asked for international observers as witnesses of a potential peace agreement. The KIO stated that it would not sign a ceasefire agreement until the government troops were withdrawn. The chief of the KIO delegation sent a letter to the UN Secretary General in which it urged this organisation to help in the negotiations and to support humanitarian aid for the displaced persons, which are estimated at 75,000. In June, **the clashes between the KIO and the armed forces continued despite some headway in the peace negotiations.** The clashes were taking place on a daily basis. The last contact between the two parties had been on the 20th of June through a meeting between the government negotiator, Aung Min, and leaders of the armed group in the state of Kachin. The government submitted a proposal to reposition its military forces and it was agreed to hold a new meeting between the parties on a date and at a venue yet to be determined.

In the third quarter, the KIO rejected the government's offer to hold peace negotiations in the capital of the country, Naypyidaw, stating that it could not meet with the government as long as its general military headquarters were under siege. In recent months, both parties had made different offers of places to hold a meeting, although they had reached no agreement. Likewise, the KIO and other Kachin leaders announced that they were creating a centre on justice and negotiations with the intention of gathering different visions of the peace process, as well as information on the negotiations.

In October, representatives of the government and the KIO met again in the city of Ruili on the border of China and Myanmar. After the meeting, the armed group said that **the government had pledged to start a political dialogue**, stated that it had not wanted to address the issue of a possible ceasefire, and noted that without political negotiations a ceasefire agreement could be violated at any time. In turn, the government noted that the lack of high-level KIO leaders at the meeting had been an

obstacle. The government sent a delegation that included four ministers and other senior officials. The executive asked the KIO to guarantee peace and security along the motorway that connects the cities of Myitkyina and Putao. In December, the government launched a heavy offensive against the KIO near its general military headquarters on the border with China in the city of Laiza, thus opening up a new front in the armed struggle. In parallel to the escalation in armed clashes, the government suggested to the KIO a new round of negotiations for January, to which the KIO has not yet responded.

Aung Min, the chief government negotiator with the ethnic armed opposition groups, launched an offer of informal talks to several dissident organisations in exile. Aung Min was addressing the coordinator of seven opposition groups called the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB), along with the Democratic Party for a New Society. Likewise, the Minister of Industry, Aung Thuang, met with representatives of the armed opposition group **UWSA** to discuss the development of the zones under Wa control. Furthermore, the president of the Mon armed opposition group NMSP stated that the Mon people wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the army to the extent possible, but that if the 2008 constitution was not reformed, no agreement would be reached. Aung Min, the chief government negotiator, offered to hold a meeting in January, although this was rejected by the armed group. However, some sectors in Mon society stated that this was the time to sign a ceasefire agreement, as other armed ethnic groups were doing.

In February, **the government and the NMSP signed a four-point agreement after three rounds of negotiations.** The NMSP noted that this agreement was different to the ceasefire agreement reached in 1995 because this one allows politics to be discussed. In April, seven **delegates from the NMSP met with a government delegation** headed by the Railway Minister, Aung Min. This was the fifth meeting with the government after a preliminary five-point agreement was signed in early February. The NMSP opened up four representation offices. At the meeting, the ceasefire, regional development, education, health economic affairs and the release of prisoners were discussed. In June, the NMSP threatened to break the ceasefire agreement reached in February if the government did not start political negotiations with all the armed groups before the end of the year. The NMSP stated that the government only wanted to maintain the ceasefire but not make headway in the political agreements.

In February, **the ceasefire agreement between the armed forces and the armed group DKBA was broken** in the state of Karen; this agreement had been reached three months previously. The DKBA stated that the armed forces attacked one of its bases, to which the group responded with another attack in which three soldiers died.

In April, partial parliamentary elections were held which resulted in the victory of the opposition party of

Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, which won 43 of the 44 seats for which it ran a candidate, out of the total of 45 seats up for election.

In parallel, the UNFC, the coordinator that groups together different ethnic armed groups, issued a call to Aung Min to hold multilateral peace talks as soon as possible. Aung Min's team stated that the government was open to this kind of talks, but that it was more focused on bilateral efforts.

In May, the CNF and the government signed a fifteen-point agreement which included a ceasefire, the opening of a liaison office, freedom of movement for the CNF members and visas to travel abroad. In the forthcoming negotiations the discussions will centre on the abolition of opium crops, ethnic matters, democratisation and development cooperation. Finally, in May **the government and members of the PNLO met**, after their ceasefire had been in place since December. In the third quarter, the PNLO signed a ceasefire agreement with the government and agreed to hold peace negotiations within the next three months.

In May, **the RCSS-SSA and the government signed a 12-point agreement** which included combating illicit drugs, opening offices, establishing a joint peace-keeping team, economic development projects and the release of prisoners.

Likewise, **the Karen armed opposition group KNPP signed a ceasefire agreement** with the government in the second quarter as a result of the negotiations held by both parties in the state of Karen. After this agreement was signed, only the armed group KIO remained actively engaged in clashes with the armed forces. The agreement included 17 points out of a 20-point agenda. The three remaining points, on which an agreement had not yet been reached, will be addressed at a subsequent meeting. These points refer to reopening the KNPP in the state of Karen, the withdrawal of government troops from the zones under the armed group's control and a cessation of the construction of hydroelectric dams in the state. Both parties agreed to set up an observation group that would supervise compliance with the agreement. A second peace agreement was signed in August.

In the third quarter, the Chin insurgent group CNF established a 23-person committee for the peace negotiations with the goal of this leading the way from a ceasefire agreement to political dialogue with the central government. The forthcoming negotiations between the executive and the CNF are scheduled for October.

Aung Min, the government's chief negotiator with the armed opposition ethnic groups, launched an offer of informal talks to several dissident organisations in exile. Aung Min addressed the coordinator of the seven opposition groups, the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB) and the Democratic Party for a New Society. Likewise, the Minister of Industry, Aung Thauang, met with

representatives of the Wa armed opposition group **UWSA** to discuss development of the zones under Wa control. Furthermore, the president of the Mon armed opposition group NMSP stated early in the year that they would not sign a ceasefire agreement with the government since they believed that this brought no political benefits, stressing that they had had a ceasefire with the armed forces for 15 years, but that there had never been any political dialogue. The NMSP leader stated that the Mon people wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the army to the extent possible, but that if the 2008 constitution were not reformed no agreement could be reached. Aung Min, the government's chief negotiator, offered to hold a meeting in January, but this offer was rejected by the armed group. However, some sectors in Mon society stated that now was the time to sign a ceasefire agreement, as other armed ethnic groups were doing.

In February, **the government and the NMSP signed a four-point agreement after three rounds of negotiations**. The NMSP noted that this agreement was different to the ceasefire agreement reached in 1995 because this one allows politics to be discussed. In April, seven **delegates from the NMSP met with a government delegation** headed by the Railway Minister, Aung Min. This was the fifth meeting with the government after a preliminary five-point agreement was signed in early February. The NMSP opened up four representation offices. At the meeting, the ceasefire, regional development, education, health economic affairs and the release of prisoners were discussed. In June, the NMSP threatened to break the ceasefire agreement reached in February if the government did not start political negotiations with all the armed groups before the end of the year. The NMSP stated that the government only wanted to maintain the ceasefire but not make headway in the political agreements.

In February, **the ceasefire agreement between the armed forces and the armed group DKBA was broken** in the state of Karen; this agreement had been reached three months previously. The DKBA stated that the armed forces attacked one of its bases, to which the group responded with another attack in which three soldiers died.

On another front, the **SSA-S** and the armed forces had clashed twice since a ceasefire agreement had been signed in December 2011. The group accused the armed forces of conducting military activities despite the agreements, which, according to analysts, was a sign of the internal tensions within the government between the reformist sectors and those more uncomfortable with the transformations that the country was undergoing. In March, the Railway Minister and the government negotiator with the armed groups, Aung Min, assured the **SSA-S** that he would meet with the president, Thein Sein, to discuss the violations by the armed forces to the ceasefire agreement reached with this group. Ever since the agreement was reached, the armed forces had clashed with the SSA-S 14 times and the armed group had suffered from an indeterminate number of deaths and injuries. The armed

group stated that the majority of clashes came after the army entered the lands under SSA-S control without prior notice, as called for in the ceasefire agreement. In May, **the Burmese government and the armed opposition group SSA-S signed a peace agreement along with the RCSS.** This agreement, which has 12 points, included issues like territorial demarcation, the eradication of opium crops – one of the core issues in the agreement – and economic development. What is more, it also explored the possibility of a return of the people who have been displaced as a result of the armed conflict. However, a few days after the peace agreement was signed, there were clashes between government troops and the SSA-S. The armed group claimed that the clashes took place when the armed forces entered a zone under rebel control, although there were no victims as a result of this clash.

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In April, **the ALP and the government of Arakan signed a five-point agreement** which enabled offices to be opened, banned crossing the other's areas with weapons and allowed the possibility of travelling around the country. Subsequently, the 18 ALP delegates met with Aung San Suu Kyi. The ALP has been at odds with the government for over 40 years.

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In October, the coalition of armed opposition groups United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) announced that it was planning a meeting with a government peace delegation headed by Minister Aung Min. this was the first meeting of this kind, since to date the peace negotiations with the insurgency had been bilateral, not multilateral. The meeting was going to be held in Thailand in November, and it would address political issues.

In December, it was confirmed that the armed opposition group ABSDF, formed after the heavy repression of students in 1988, met with representatives of the government, politicians and activists in Rangoon to discuss a possible negotiation process. Likewise, the armed opposition group CNF stated that it would hold another round of negotiations with the government in January, after having met in December. The agenda for this discussion would include implementation of the agreements reached to date.

PHILIPPINES	
Population:	94.9 million inhabitants
Area:	300,000 Km ²
HDI:	112 (out of 187)
GDP:	164,600 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$1,790
Deaths due to the conflict:	120,000
Armed actors:	NPA, MILF, MNLF, Abu Sayyaf
Facilitators:	Norway, Malaysia, Libya, Church, OCI, FCD, UNPO, CDH, Arabia, Qatar

Context of the conflict

Even though the Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, 8% of the population is Muslim. However, in recent decades, armed Muslim groups have emerged, as have communist guerrillas. Despite the two popular revolts in the last twenty years (in 1986 to bring down President F. Marcos, and in 2001, to depose President Estrada), the country is still in the hands of a landowning oligarchy with no intention of resolving the serious structural problems in the country: corruption, a lack of infrastructure, rural underdevelopment, a lack of basic services, serious human rights violations with impunity, etc. The expansion of the communist guerrillas, led by the **NPA** (the New People's Army) is linked to the system of land exploitation. The Muslim rebellion, led by the **MILF** (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front), is related to the socioeconomic discrimination against the southern population, and particularly against the people who live on the island of Mindanao and on the Sulu archipelago. This discrimination has led to regional nationalism, since two-thirds of the country's Muslims live in this region. The 1990s saw the emergence of a new radical terrorist group, **Abu Sayyaf**, operating primarily in the Sulu archipelago. The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic state in the south of the country. It is accused of being in contact with Al-Qaeda and has not begun any negotiation process with the government.

The **NPA was formed in 1969 and is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (the CPP). It is also part of the NDF** (the National Democratic Front), which is the umbrella organisation for several groups and acts as the NPA's political arm and negotiator. The NPA has around 6,000 combatants and is led by J. M. Sison "Joma", who is exiled in the Netherlands. The NPA distanced itself from the popular revolution of 1986, which led to considerable divisions within the group. As a result, many leaders and combatants abandoned the armed struggle. The **MILF** was founded in 1978 as a result of a division in the Moro National Liberation Front (**MNLF**), which had been formed in 1969. After several years of negotiations, it reached a peace agreement with the government (the Manila Agreement). Libya initially mediated in this agreement, but it was subsequently replaced by the

Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The agreement obtained autonomy for the southern provinces. The MILF were opposed to this 1996 agreement and demanded Mindanao's independence. The MILF has around 10,000 combatants. In October 2005 the government announced the signing of a **cessation of hostilities agreement with the armed opposition group RPM-M**, a faction that had broken away from the NPA a few years earlier and has been holding talks with the government over the last two years.

Background to the peace process

After rejecting the Manila agreements of 1996, two years later the MILF found support from Libya to start negotiations with the Philippine government, albeit with no results. In 2001, president offered negotiations abroad, suspended military operations and started talks in Malaysia under the auspices of Libya, and reached a ceasefire. Throughout 2004, the government of the Philippines and the MILF also held exploratory talks in Malaysia, which became a facilitating country, in which they agreed to an initial three-point agenda: security, rehabilitation of areas of conflict and protection of the ancestral lands on the island of Mindanao. The MILF gave up on independence but in exchange was demanding formulas of self-government which expressed a greater degree of autonomy in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 2008, the government and the MILF declared that they would sign a Memory of Understanding on Ancestral Lands (MOA) in Malaysia, the most controversial aspect of the negotiations in recent years. Both parties also pledged to reach a global peace agreement within the next 15 months that would include the three main points on the negotiating agenda: security, rehabilitation and development, and ancestral lands. In early August, however, as a precautionary measure, the Supreme Court suspended the signing of the MOA hours before the Philippine government and the MILF were getting ready to sign the document in Malaysia. In 2009, the government and the MILF signed the framework agreement on forming an international support group for the negotiation process in Kuala Lumpur; this group would be made up of governments, mainly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the EU, as well as by international NGOs or eminent individuals. In 2010, while the government was speaking about "reinforced autonomy" which would extend the competences of the Moro people over the zone currently falling with the ARMM, the MILF was advocating the creation of a "Bangsamoro sub-state" which would expand the powers and scope of the current ARMM. In September, the MILF's chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, declared that his group had formally abandoned its petition for independence for certain regions of Mindanao and that it had given the government a proposal to create a sub-state or an autonomous republic that would have all the competences except foreign affairs, national defence, currency and postal service.

With regard to the NPA, it has been negotiating with the government since 1986 via the National Democratic Front

(NDF); the negotiations were launched in the Netherlands in 1986. Since 2009, they have been facilitated by Norway, and they seek structural changes on the political, social and economic fronts. In 1992, new talks were held with the government in the Netherlands, at which a four-point agreement was defined, The Hague Joint Declaration on human rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms and disarmament. In 1993, talks were held in Hanoi and again in 1994 in the Netherlands. In 1995 the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was reached, which granted immunity to around 100 people with ties to the negotiation process. In 1997 a thematic agenda to be negotiated was established, which allowed the negotiating teams to reach a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998. However, this agreement was not validated by the president of the country. In 2004, the government held a meeting in Oslo with NPA delegates, and both parties agreed to establish a joint committee charged with supervising implementation of the human rights agreements. In 2005, the negotiations were broken off, and in 2008 the government and the NDF agreed to meet again and reactivate the joint committee to supervise human rights and international humanitarian law after a three year hiatus. Since then, this committee has met several times. The government and the NDF have expressed their satisfaction with the agreements reached during the first round of formal negotiations held in Oslo between the 15th and 21st of February 2011 with the facilitation of the Norwegian government. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the agreements signed between 1992 and 2004; they established a calendar of meetings of constitutional groups and of signing agreements (the agreement on social and economic reforms, the agreement on political and constitutional reforms, and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities), and they re-established the joint committee to supervise the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). In June, the NDF's negotiating panel suggested that the round of peace talks scheduled for that same month should be postponed until the government released 17 NDF consultants who, according to the organisation, should be protected under the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG).

With regard to the MNLF, which reached a peace agreement with the government in 1996, in 2007 it reached significant agreements on the application of all the provisions in the 1996 agreement in which it set up five working groups: Sharia and the legal system, security forces, natural resources and economic development, political system and representation, and education. Since 1996, there have been negotiations to implement the agreements signed that year. In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya, in order to resolve the issues that had been standing in the way of full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996. In November 2011, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), through its Committee for

Peace in the South Philippines, started contacts with the government and the MNLF to resolve the three pending issues in the negotiations in order to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement, which had also been facilitated by the OIC. The three aspects on which no agreement had yet been reached were the division of strategic minerals, the establishment of a provisional government (according to the MNLF, the government did not implement the establishment of a transitional mechanism as called for in the 1996 agreement) and holding a plebiscite to expand the territorial base of the ARMM.

The peace process in 2012

After 15 years of negotiations, the president, Benigno Aquino, announced in early October that the MILF and the government had reached a **framework agreement that contains a roadmap and the essential contents of a future definitive peace agreement**. This agreement, which was reached during the 32nd round of peace negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, stipulates the **creation of a new political entity called Bangsamoro which would replace the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and expand all its competences and economic resources, as well as its territorial scope**. Some of the exclusive competences of the central government will be defence and external security, foreign policy, current and postal service, among others. Some of the matters in which the new political entity will expand its sphere of competences include justice, security, tax collection and the exploitation of natural resources. The Congress will appoint a 15-member Transitional Commission (seven members to be chosen by the government and eight by the MILF) which should, among other issues, draw up the Basic Law of Bangsamoro. Once this law has been approved in a referendum, the ARMM would be abolished. After elections are held in Bangsamoro and the legislative assembly and the new government of Bangsamoro are established, which the agreement schedules for 2016, the Transitional Commission will cease to operate. After this transitional period, the government and MILF negotiating panels, as well as the government of Malaysia (as the facilitator) and a supervisory team called the Third Party Monitoring Team will evaluate the progress made during this stage, as well as the degree to which the agreements reached have been implemented. The framework agreement also stipulates that the MILF will gradually demobilise its troops, just as the armed forces will transfer its functions to the police force set up in Bangsamoro. In this vein, the agreement also charges the supervision of the cessation of hostilities agreement (until the complete demobilisation of the MILF) to the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH), the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) and the International Monitoring Team (IMT).

In his televised speech to announce the agreement with the MILF, Benigno Aquino expressed his appreciation for the facilitation efforts by the government of Malaysia and announced that the MILF had given up its claims to create

an independent Islamic state in the south of the country. The Ministers of the Interior and Defence publicly declared that the National Police and Armed Forces did not discard the possibility of allowing MILF members to join their respective forces. However, the same unanimity could not be found among members of the government and on the government negotiating panel when determining whether signing an eventual peace agreement with the MILF (and approving the Fundamental Law of Bangsamoro) would entail a constitutional reform or not. In any event, the government wished to clarify that even though Bangsamoro would have an asymmetrical relationship with the central state, it would not be a sub-state within the Philippines, as had been speculated, and that it would be under the direct supervision of the president of the country. In turn, **the MILF expressed its gratitude to President Aquino for his efforts and stated its hopes with regard to the future of the peace process, yet it also recalled that the agreement reached is only a roadmap for an agreement which is expected to be implemented before the president's mandate ends in 2016.** Likewise, the MILF itself acknowledged that it was considering the possibility of forming a political party that would run in the elections in the new Bangsamoro political entity. The United Nations, the EU and several governments (such as the US, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia) congratulated both sides for the agreement and offered to cooperate in its implementation.

In October, **the government and the MILF signed a framework agreement in Manila to resolve the conflict in Mindanao and create a new political entity, called Bangsamoro,** which was to replace the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao after a transitional period in which the fundamental law of this new entity would be drawn up. Subsequently, the new law would be submitted to a referendum, and if approved elections would be held to elect a government to replace the Transitional Commission. As both parties agreed, the entire process must be concluded before the end of the mandate of the current President, Benigno Aquino. Both parties expressed their satisfaction with the agreement because they believed that it resolved the historical conflict in Mindanao by safeguarding the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines while also recognising the identity of the Moro people, restoring the main nucleus of their ancestral lands and making it possible for the Moro people to govern themselves. However, both parties also warned that there were still several issues yet to be resolved. Thus, the two negotiating panels were scheduled to meet in Kuala Lumpur to address these issues. The government believed that a definitive peace agreement might be drawn up before the end of the year. In a speech just a few days after the peace agreement was signed, the leader of the MILF, Ebrahim Murad, stated that for the peace process to conclude successfully, the support of the entire country and international community was essential, and he asked for foreign investment to develop the region and economic aid to support the education and reintegration of combatants. Likewise, he also asked for cooperation for the unity of the MILF and

other organisations that represent the Moro people to successfully conclude the peace process. Murad noted that the framework agreement signed was flexible, and that therefore it should make room for the demands of organisations other than the MILF. Murad discarded a merger or integration between the MILF and the MNLF because each group has its own dynamics, structures and personalities, but he did call for closer cooperation and the establishment of a common agenda in the interests of the Moro people. In November, the 33rd round of peace negotiations concluded in Kuala Lumpur, the first round held after the framework agreement on Bangsamoro was signed on the 15th of October. During this round of negotiations, three main issues were discussed: power-sharing, wealth-sharing and “normalisation” (a concept that refers to disarmament, demobilisation and the reinsertion of the MILF combatants). Likewise, the tensions between the MILF and certain factions of the MNLF (especially the one led by Nur Misuari) became noticeably more acute after the signing of the peace agreement. Nur Misuari denied the legitimacy of this agreement and asked the MILF to join the negotiations between the MNLF and the government on the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. Other senior officials from the MNLF even threatened to return to war and resume their demands for independence if the group was left outside the peace process.

In early January 2013, the government declared that it should take no more than two months to reach agreements on the four annexes that complement the framework agreement on Bangsamoro signed on the 15th of October, which would allow a global, definitive peace agreement to be signed. By that date, the Transitional Commission should already be up and running; this is a 15-person organisation (appointed by the government and the MILF) which is charged with drafting the proposed constitution of Bangsamoro, the new entity which will replace the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These declarations came just a few days after the end of the 34th round of negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur. Even though at the end of the three-day meeting no joint communiqué was issued, as is common, the MILF declared that much headway had been made in each of the four annexes. In some of them, such as the one on power-sharing, almost full agreement had been reached, while in others, such as the one on the division of economic resources or the one on “normalisation”, many issues still remained pending. With regard to the so-called “normalisation”, the new chief of the government's negotiating panel, university professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (who replaced Marvic Leonen in the role, who is now on the Supreme Court), declared that the disarmament process of combatants would be gradual. The MILF leader, Ebrahim Murad, stated that this process would only start under the government of the new entity, Bangsamoro, and he also noted that this must include the government militias that operate in Bangsamoro land. However, the MILF ordered its combatants not to bear weapons or wear military uniforms in public places, a measure that the government hailed as a sign of goodwill. What is more, the MILF, according to Ebrahim Murad, expressed its desire for the International Monitoring Team,

which has been supervising the ceasefire agreement since 2004, to expand its competences in order to also supervise the implementation of the agreements on humanitarian matters and rehabilitation. The leader of the MILF also declared that the IMT, which is led by Malaysia and made up of troops from Brunei, Dar-Es-Salaam, Indonesia, Japan, Norway and the EU, may supervise implementation of the eventual peace agreement signed by the parties during the transitional stage. Likewise, the MILF also declared that it had already chosen the eight people that it may appoint to the Transitional Commission. The other seven shall be appointed by the government. The MILF did not want to publicly announce the names because it first wanted to notify the Malaysian facilitator of the peace talks and the government through its negotiating panel.

Likewise, **the MILF asked the MNLF to form a united front regarding the Moro people's aspirations for self-government.** Sheikh Muhammad Muntassir, the chief da'wah official of the MILF, asked the MNLF leaders not to follow a "selfish" agenda but instead to defend the legitimate aspirations of the people. This appeal came after the consent of the government and the MILF for the **Secretary General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to serve as the observer of the negotiations.** Back in 2010, the OIC had promoted an encounter between MILF and MNLF leaders in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), which led to the creation of a coordination body. Through several resolutions, the OIC also called for cooperation to achieve peace and development for the Moro people.

In February, **the government and MNLF delegations travelled to Bandung (Indonesia) to continue with the negotiations on full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement.** These negotiations were sponsored and facilitated by the Committee for the South Philippines of the OIC. Each of the two delegations had five members, and the MNLF delegation was led by the founder of the group, Nur Misuari. In previous weeks, OIC representatives had travelled to the Philippines to meet with the parties and prepare for the encounter. On these visits, the presidential councillor for the peace process, Teresita Quintos-Deles, had expressed the government's political will to reach an agreement that is satisfactory to both parties. Once in Indonesia, Nur Misuari met with the president of the organisation Muhammadiyah, which is the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia and is part of the International Contact Group in the peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. In June, **the Philippine government and the MNLF drew up a list of 42 points of consensus during the tripartite revision of the 1996 agreement,** in which the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) also participated. The MNLF stressed that the issues on the agenda were the same ones being discussed with the MILF, since they had addressed matters like power-sharing and wealth-sharing, autonomy, strategic minerals, regional security and the political representation of the Moro people, among others. The

MNLF stated that even though they were optimistic, they could not ensure that the tripartite revision of the agreement would conclude before the regional elections scheduled for the following year in Mindanao.

In the third quarter, the MNLF stated that during the tripartite rounds of negotiation (between the government, the MNLF and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), 42 points had been agreed upon in matters like power-sharing, the sharing of economic resources, the management of natural resources, education, regional security and structures of self-governance and competences. According to the MNLF, the agreements were quite similar to those being reached by the government and the MILF. On the other hand, just a few days before the MILF accused the government of participating in a spiral of violence triggered by the armed opposition group BIFF (a splinter of the MILF) and after these accusations were adamantly denied by the MNLF, the MILF asked the MNLF (the factions led by Muslimin Sema and Nur Misuari) to engage in talks to work towards fulfilling the aspirations of the Moro people and to put an end to the violence being waged by the BIFF. The MNLF did not explicitly react to this invitation to dialogue, but it did declare that it would not pose as an obstacle for the advancement of negotiations between the government and the MILF. The MNLF also pledged to work with the government in the efforts to convince the people of the benefits that peace would bring to Mindanao. However, after learning about the framework agreement between the government and the MILF, the leader and founder of the MNLF, **Nur Misuari, declared that this agreement was illegal and could lead to the resumption of the armed conflict in Mindanao.**

In October, the MILF and the MNLF, during the third round of informal talks held in Davao in late October, agreed to create a single committee and appoint an ad hoc secretary to debate their shared issues and to spearhead a shared agenda. This meeting came after some of the top leaders of the MNLF, which had been divided into three main factions for some time, had expressed their fear that the peace agreement signed between the government and the MILF would replace the peace agreement reached between the MNLF and the government in 1996 and void it of content, while it might also serve as an obstacle to the tripartite talks (between the government, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the MNLF) which had been going on for years in order to fully implement that agreement. In this sense, the leader of the main and largest faction of the MNLF, Muslimin Sema, demanded that a four-part forum be established (Philippine government, OIC, MILF and MNLF) to harmonise the two negotiation processes and two peace agreements and make them compatible with each other. According to Sema, in the talks to implement the 1996 agreement, 42 points of consensus had already been reached on issues that are very similar to the contents of the peace agreement recently signed by the government and the MILF. The founder of the MNLF and leader of another of its factions, Nur Misuari, also believed that four-sided talks could be a solution to the existence

of two negotiation processes that are addressing similar issues. The leader of the MILF, Ebrahim Murad, was not opposed to this formula. In this sense, it should be noted that after several voices asked the government and the MILF not to politically marginalise the MNLF, some government sources declared that it was studying the possibility of the executive giving the MNLF one of the seven posts on the Transitional Committee to which it, the government, has a right (the MILF will appoint the other eight members). In turn, Nur Misuari, who had been very belligerent with the signing of the agreement between the MILF and the government, and even warned about the risk of the resumption of the armed conflict on Mindanao, denied having asked his combatants to take up their weapons again. Likewise, he denied having gotten in touch with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BICC), a splinter of the MILF, to ask them to prevent the signing of a peace agreement on the 15th of October using any means necessary.

In May, the NPA and its political wing, the NDF, expressed their willingness to resume the peace talks with the government, and this announcement was welcomed by the government. However, the government rejected the NPA's accusations that the government was delaying the talks. The chief government negotiator, Alexander A. Padilla, stated that the executive had abided by the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) and that, in contrast, the NDFP had been the party that hindered access to the documentation needed to ensure the release of the negotiators. In this sense, the government stressed that it had released six of the leading consultants, two of whom had gone underground, and in this respect it condemned the fact that of the 300 prisoners in question, 95 of them were actually members of the armed group Abu Sayyaf, so the government asked the NPA whether it truly wanted to be associated with this Islamist group. In any event, Padilla stated that the NDFP's declarations and those of its leader, Jose Maria Sison, opened the doorway to the resumption of dialogue, which had been stalled since February 2011. In early May, Sison accused the government of stalling the process, especially because of its staunch position demanding the immediate capitulation of the NDF; of undermining The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992, as it described this as a divisive document instead of a viable framework for negotiations; of covering, consenting to and perpetuating illegal murders, torture and detentions of NDF members in violation of the JASIG; and of continuing to detain more than 350 political prisoners, who had been arrested on false charges of common crimes in violation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. In mid-June, **the NDF and the Philippine government, meeting in Oslo, decided to resume the negotiations.**

In September, a member of the government panel, Ednar G., declared that the negotiations may resume in late September or early October, although there was no official confirmation. According to Dayanghirang, at that meeting the issues agreed to at the informal meeting

held by both parties in Oslo on the 14th and 15th of June under the facilitation of government of Norway would be addressed. At the June meeting, the government expressed its interest in signing a ceasefire agreement or in lowering the levels of violence, and it also expressed its concern with the NPA's use of antipersonnel mines as well as its attacks against the civilian population and businesses. In turn, the NDF demanded the release of all or most of its 14 imprisoned members, whom the group viewed as the consultants to the peace process and who would therefore have immunity guarantees. In early September, the NPA's launch of a grenade against a group of minors, which led 48 of them to be injured, motivated harsh accusations from the government against the NPA, to such an extent that certain members of the government declared that the continuation of the dialogue process was in danger. The NPA apologised for this action, indemnified the victims, presented an action programme for the protection of minors, announced the establishment of a special office for the protection of minors (which would depend on the group's Human Rights Committee) and declared that the people behind this grenade attack would be duly sanctioned as called for in the NPA's codes of conduct. However, the government stated that even the United Nations discredited the internal justice mechanisms administered by the NPA and demanded that the NPA turn over the individuals behind this attack.

One of the consultants on the NDF's negotiating panel, Edre Olalia, declared that **the NDF had proposed to the government a "special way" (called the Proposal for Alliance and Peace) with the goal of speeding up and complementing the negotiating process that both parties agreed to undertake in early 2011.** Some points in the NDF's proposal included strengthening national independence and promoting industrial development, launching agrarian reform and signing a truce that would lead to lasting peace. What is more, Olalia also declared that in October the government sent an emissary of President Benigno Aquino to Holland to talk with the leaders of the NDF, so he expressed some hope that the talks could be resumed in the short or middle term. In December, the head of the government panel, Alex Padilla, publicly expressed his optimism at the possible resumption of talks and the future of the peace process. Days earlier, special representatives of the government had met in The Hague (Netherlands) with leaders of the NDF. The government delegation was led by the president's political advisor, Ronald Llamas, while the NDF delegation was led by the leader and founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison. The encounter was facilitated by Norwegian Ture Lundh. The NDF declared that at the meeting both parties had agreed to discuss agrarian reform, development, industrialisation, democracy, human rights, national independence and peace. Shortly after the meeting concluded, both parties agreed to a temporary suspension of hostilities between the 20th of December 2012 and the 15th of January 2013. However, just a few days after the start of the truce, both parties began to repeatedly accuse the other of violating the agreement.

Most significant events of the year

- The MILF and the government reached a framework agreement which contains a roadmap and the essential contents of a future definitive peace agreement.
- The NDF and the Philippine government, meeting in Oslo, decided to resume negotiations.

Websites of interest

- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org)
- MILF (www.luwaran.com)
- NDF (home.wanadoo.nl/ndf) (www.ndf.net/joomla) (home.casema.nl/ndf)
- NPA (www.philippinerevolution.org)
- OIC (www.oic-oci.org)
- Presidential Office for the Peace Process (www.opapp.gov.ph)
- www.mindanao.news
- www.philnews.com
- www.theworldpress.com/press/philippinespress.htm

EUROPE

South Eastern Europe

CYPRUS	
Population:	1,1 million inhabitants
Area:	9,250 Km ²
HDI:	31 of 187
GDP:	23,603 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$29,619
Facilitators:	UN

Context of the conflict

Colonised by many different cultures throughout its history, the island of Cyprus (9,250 sq. km - not much larger than the Spanish Basque Country) came under British administrative authority in 1878. The first revolts in favour of union with Greece took place in 1931, and in the 1950s they were led by archbishop Makarios. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 with Makarios as president (a post he held until 1973, three years before his death) and a constitution that strove to balance the interests of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island. Enforcement of the constitution however encountered several setbacks, leading to a series of institutional crises, especially at the end of 1963, which culminated in a meeting of the UN Security Council in the wake of Greece's complaints about Turkey's aggression. As a result, in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up, with 2,400 troops at first and 930 currently. This force is entrusted with performing the functions of good offices and creating trust-building measures. From the start, these forces laid down 180 km long ceasefire lines spanning the island, as well as a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the clashing forces. This zone has been the site for meetings between the two communities as well as monthly meetings by representatives of political parties organised by the Slovakian embassy.

In July 1974 a coup d'état was staged by Greek-Cypriots and Greeks in favour of union with Greece, which was followed by occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. Since then the island has remained divided into two homogeneous communities. In August 1974 a ceasefire came into effect. Throughout almost all these years, Turkey has kept a contingent of 30,000 soldiers in the occupied zone on the island. In addition, the United Kingdom keeps two military bases under British sovereignty on the island. In 2004 Cyprus (as an island) became a member of the European Union, although enforcement of the bulk of EU laws was suspended for the northern part of the island.

Background to the peace process

The Cypriots have been negotiating an agreement that would allow them to resolve the division of the island for

over 35 years, and this has come largely in the hands of different UN secretary generals. Between 1977 and 1979, both communities discussed bicomunal, bizonal and federal formulas without any of them actually coming to fruition. In the 1990s, federal and confederal approaches were once again discussed, although no agreement was ever reached on each community's proportion in their participation in the institutions. In view of the stalemate, in 1992 the new secretary of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, presented yet another plan based once again on the principles of creating a bizonal, bicomunal territory, which yet again irritated the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. In consequence, Boutros-Ghali decided to change tack and began to promote a milder strategy based on trust-building measures, which included a reduction of troops, a decrease in restrictions for people to communicate with each other and similar measures. In November and December 2001, new direct talks were held after a four-year hiatus under the auspices of the UN. In November, the UN Secretary General proposed that a confederal state be created, made up of two cantons and a shared government. This would definitively become the UN Peace Plan, which has been revised on three occasions, the latest version being the one from February 2003. The plan was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leader, but it was supported by the Turkish leader Erdogan.

In July 2006, after holding a meeting sponsored by the UN's Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders agreed to start a process of technical negotiations on the issues that were affecting the daily lives of the citizens of both communities, and to simultaneously address substantive issues in order to reach a comprehensive agreement for the future of the island. They also agreed to a list of principles, including the commitment to unify Cyprus based on a bizonal and bicomunal federation, as well as political equality, as recommended in the UN Security Council resolutions. In mid-August 2009, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader concluded the first phase of direct negotiations to resolve the conflict on the island. The direct talks, which began on the 3rd of September 2008, included discussions on six chapters: governability and power-sharing; issues linked to the EU; security and guarantees; territory; property and economic affairs; and the writing up of the matters agreed to and in dispute. In mid-September, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader started the second phase in the direct talks to resolve the conflict on the island, with a new meeting under UN mediation. The leaders of the two communities met for the first time since the trilateral encounter with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in late January 2011. At this meeting, the leaders address issues regarding the EU and economic matters. At the next meeting, they were scheduled to discuss governability and power-sharing, as well as the EU and property. The UN Secretary General stated in July that the leaders of the two communities on the island had accepted his proposal to strengthen the UN's role in the peace talks.

The peace process in 2012

In February the negotiations continued between the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities with several rounds which covered complicated matters like property. The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, asked his special advisor Alexander Downer to present an evaluation of the negotiation process in late March. According to Ban Ki-moon, if the report was positive, **a multilateral conference may be called in late April or early May**. Recently, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, stated that the 1st of July would be the date when the dialogue process came to an end, dovetailing with Cyprus' turn at the Presidency of the EU. In March, the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community, Dervis Eroglu and Demetris Christofias, met as part of the negotiation process. According to Christofias, the meeting went much like the others, and he stated that they continued to address the issue of property and that there were still significant differences between both sides' positions. They were scheduled to meet again late in the month. The UN Secretary General Special Advisor stated that the talks were going more slowly than expected, according to the Turkish news agency Anatolia. On previous occasions, Downer had stated that he expected the process to make definitive headway during the first half of 2012, before Cyprus took on the rotating presidency of the EU. The two Cypriot leaders met with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in mid-April.

In April, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, announced to the leaders of both communities on the island that they had not made enough headway in the negotiation process for the scheduled international conference on the reunification of the island to be held. His opinion was shared by his special advisor on Cyprus, Alexander Downer. According to Downer, **the talks were stalled on the issue of executive power-sharing under the federal system, as well as on the issue of the private property lost during the conflict**. Ban Ki-moon asked both parties to take decisive measures to move the process forward. In May, **the Turkish-Cypriot leaders proposed that the UN spearhead trust-building measures between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities**, since he believed that there would be no forthcoming progress in the talks on reunification. The proposal was forwarded to the UN Secretary General Special Envoy for the island, Alexander Downer. In June, the Greek-Cypriot government stated that it would remain neutral after it took possession of the rotating EU presidency in July, and that it was ready to continue the peace talks on the division of the island.

Likewise, the Greek-Cypriot leader, Demetris Christofias, asked Turkey not to promote alternative scenarios for Cyprus, and he stated that the purpose of both parties on the island was to achieve a solution that would establish a bizonal and bicommunal federation with political equality for a state with a single sovereignty, single citizenship and a single international personality.

In the third quarter, **the direct peace talks were paralysed as Cyprus awaited the forthcoming Greek-Cypriot elections in 2013, although the talks between both sides remained alive through meetings of the technical committees**. This paralysis dovetailed with Cyprus' rotating presidency of the EU between July and December. After meeting with the UN Secretary General, the then-Greek-Cypriot President, Demetris Christofias, who did not run for re-election, stated in September that he agreed with the UN General Assembly that the Greek-Cypriot party was ready to continue the negotiations in order to reach a solution. What is more, Christofias expressed his disappointment with the lack of headway in the process of direct talks, although he also claimed that he had done everything within his power to progress towards reunification, and he stressed that the solution lay with Turkey. For his part, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated in late June that the talks would resume after the Greek-Cypriot elections if a deadline were set for negotiations and if the embargo against the Turkish-Cypriot entity were lifted. In turn, the UN Security Council, which renewed the mandate of the UNFICYP mission, asked both parties to return to the negotiating table.

Most significant events of the year

- The direct peace talks were paralysed as Cyprus awaited the forthcoming Greek-Cypriot elections in 2013, although the talks between both parties remained alive through meetings of the technical committees.

Websites of interest

- UN Security Council (www.un.org)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- ONU (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationalallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- UN peace plan (www.cyprus-un-plan.org)
- UNFICYP (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp)
- www.cyprus-conflict.net
- Wikipedia (Cyprus dispute)

KOSOVO	
Population:	2 million
Area:	10,900 Km ²
HDI:	+/- 70
GDP (Serbia):	43,900 million dollars;
Per capita income (Serbia):	\$6,000
Deaths due to the conflict:	13,400
Armed actors:	none currently
Facilitators:	UN (UNMIK, SGSE), OSCE, NATO (KFOR), Troika (USA, Russia, EU), EULEX

Context of the conflict

A former Ottoman possession, from the 14th to early 20th century, Kosovo was re-conquered by the Serbs in 1913 as it regarded this land as the cradle of the Serbian nation. The Serbs colonised the region for several years, while the Kosovar elite emigrated to Turkey. In 1945, Tito founded the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which was made up of six republics, one of them Serbia, which in turn had two autonomous provinces, one of which was Kosovo (or Kosove in Albanian). Kosovo was mainly populated by Albanian Muslims. Two-thirds of the Albanian people living in the former Yugoslavia reside in Kosovo, a small territory measuring 10,900 km² that has higher unemployment rates and is considerably more economically backward than the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1966 the local population withstood systematic political repression, until in 1968 Tito allowed an autonomous university in the Albanian language to be created in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. This measure was followed by other decisions that expanded the rights of the Albanian population. In 1981 there were serious clashes between the Albanian and Serbian communities, which were the harbingers of the harsh conflict that was to emerge years later. In 1990, as a reaction to the surge of nationalism in several Yugoslav republics, Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomous status, dissolved the parliament and the Albanian government, and undertook a process of repression in the region. This only served to further spur several republics to distance themselves from Serbia, which in turn gave rise to a series of armed conflicts starting in 1991, first with Slovenia, and later with Croatia and Bosnia. These conflicts came to an end with the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, after numerous resolutions by the UN Security Council and military intervention by NATO.

In 1991 the clandestine authorities of Kosovo organised a referendum, and virtually the entire population voted in favour of sovereignty. The following year, clandestine elections were held in which Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was proclaimed President of Kosovo. Thus began a non-violent strategy of confrontation with Serbia and the creation of parallel structures. Serbia's reaction was to militarise the region

by sending 20,000 soldiers and police officers there, in addition to the ultra-nationalistic paramilitary forces that inspired terror among the Albanian populace. In 1997, shortly after the 1995 Dayton Agreements, which did not mention Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) emerged, with broad support from the Albanian Diaspora (around 400,000 people) living in Switzerland, Germany and the United States, and with rearguard bases in northern Albania. The goal of the UCK was to achieve independence for Kosovo. In 1998, when the UCK controlled around 40% of Kosovar territory, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic launched a major military operation in Kosovo in which over 1,500 people died and many people were forced to become refugees (around 800,000) and were displaced from their homes (500,000). This Serbian operation was followed by a NATO military action that led to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops, Albanian attacks on Serb civilians, and the deployment of NATO troops.

Background to the peace process

In 2006, several rounds of negotiations were started between the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo to debate the status of the latter province. The Serbian Parliament unanimously approved a new constitution which claimed its sovereignty over Kosovo, reaffirming Serbia's position against the option of independence as a solution to Kosovo's status. In the early days of January 2007, the United Nations Special Envoy for the process on the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, submitted his proposal on the ultimate status to the countries in the Contact Group before it was forwarded to the Security Council to be discussed in April. The plan, which was regarded as independence under international supervision, stated that Kosovo would have its own constitution and state symbols (flag and anthem) as well as its own army, but only with light weapons, and the ability to sign international agreements. Martti Ahtisaari's proposal was initially rejected by Serbia and supported by Kosovo and the EU.

In mid-February 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved the proclamation of independence of what until then had been a province of Serbia. In early April, the Kosovo Parliament approved the new constitution which stipulated that Kosovo was a parliamentary, secular and democratic republic and that it considered Kosovo a sovereign, indivisible state. In a non-binding opinion, the International Court of Justice, the UN's legal body, declared in August 2010 that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244. With this ruling, approved by ten votes in favour and four against, the court responded to the question submitted by the General Assembly at the behest of Serbia. However, the text did not weigh in on whether or not Kosovo had the right to secede. In March 2011, negotiations got underway between Kosovo and Serbia under the aegis of the EU to address, at least in the first phase, issues that were affecting the daily lives of the people. The dialogue was expected to focus on three areas: the rule of law, freedom

of movement and regional cooperation. Ever since the negotiation process had gotten underway, Serbia and Kosovo had reached agreements on trade, freedom of movement, property registration and mutual recognition of university degrees.

The peace process in 2012

In February, **Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on Kosovo's representation in regional forums.**

According to the agreement, Kosovo would participate in the forums under the name of Kosovo and with a footnote in the documents that would refer to both UN Resolution 1244 and the non-binding resolution handed down by the International Court of Justice. The agreement was welcomed by both sides. However, several problems in its implementation arose during the month of March which led both Serbia and Kosovo to abandon some forums while mutually accusing each other of failing to comply with the agreement. In parallel, the parties also agreed to a technical protocol for the implementation of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) pact. The agreements were reached as part of the new round of talks under EU mediation. Ever since the IBM agreement had been reached the previous December, there was a certain stalemate in the ways it should be implemented.

In May, **Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on holding parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia and Kosovo.**

Kosovo was opposed to these elections, while Serbia upheld the right of the Serbian people of Kosovo to participate in the elections. Ultimately, negotiations between Belgrade, Pristina and Brussels led to an agreement in which Kosovo agreed to allow elections to be held inside Kosovo under OSCE stewardship. The elections, which were held on the 6th of May, occurred without incident according to the OSCE, which expressed its satisfaction at the peaceful climate. On the other hand, **the government of Pristina stated that it was willing to address the past and reconcile with Serbia**, but it asked Serbia to apologise for the crimes it had committed both before and during the war in Kosovo. What is more, it stated that the majority of obstacles to starting a reconciliation process came from Serbia, which, Pristina claimed, continued to behave aggressively towards the authorities from Kosovo and towards its sovereignty. The Kosovo government authorised a national working group to be created to deal with the issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. The body would be made up of all the stakeholders involved, according to the government, including the families of disappeared persons, war veterans and associations of political prisoners, among others. In June, Serbia's outgoing negotiator in the talks with Kosovo, Borislav Stefanovic, stated that the next round of talks would be led by the president of Serbia himself, the nationalist Tomislav Nikolic, or by the new prime minister, once the new government was formed after the general elections in May. This change signalled that the status of the Serbian negotiating team had been ratcheted up. On the other hand, Serbia and

Kosovo pledged to cooperate in the efforts to exhume the remains of the disappeared persons. Serbia's and Kosovo's commission on disappeared persons made a joint inspection of the location of a mass grave in the town of Zhilivoda, where the exhumations started in 2010 but were interrupted several times. It is calculated that it may contain the remains of around 20 Serbian Kosovars. Both commissions pledged to work in a climate of cooperation.

In the third quarter, **both parties accused the other of failing to comply with the agreements reached as part of the dialogue mediated by the EU** and being held since March 2011, which since then had resulted in formal agreements on freedom of movement, mutual recognition of university degrees, representation in regional forums and border management.

In this sense, Belgrade decided not to participate in a regional summit in Croatia to protest the presence of representatives from Kosovo. At this summit, the Kosovo Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, did meet with the former president of Serbia, Boris Tadic. However, **in September Serbia said that it wanted to begin to implement the agreement on Integrated Border Management, which involves all the parties.** Despite the cross-accusations on failing to implement the agreements, at the UN General Assembly both parties pledged to continue with the technical dialogue process mediated by the EU and targeted at normalising relations between both territories. The Serbian president, Tomislav Nikolic, who reiterated that Serbia would never recognise Kosovo, did express his support for direct negotiations with Kosovo at a higher political level. In the meantime, the Kosovo government once again discarded the possibility of partitioning Kosovo as a solution to the conflict on northern Kosovo, which has a Serbian majority and operates outside the control of the Pristina administration. On the other hand, the end of the mandate of the International Monitoring Group for Kosovo, through which a group of 25 countries provided advice on Kosovo's independence process, was another factor adding to the tensions in the relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

In October, the Prime Ministers of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, and Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, met in Brussels (Belgium) at a meeting described as historical, facilitated by the EU and with the presence of the EU Foreign Affairs representative, Catherine Ashton. Both Dacic and Thaci had held separate meetings with Ashton before the joint meeting. According to Ashton, at the meeting they discussed the continuation of the talks between Serbia and Kosovo mediated by the EU, which began in March 2011. Ashton's report also stressed that the parties agreed to continue the talks on the normalisation of relations and that both parties pledged to work together. The event transpired in a positive, constructive climate, according to Ashton, who stated that they would meet again shortly. After the meeting, Dacic stressed that Serbia's position with regard to its refusal to recognise Kosovo's independence had not changed, but he stated that the time had indeed come for a historical agreement

and that they were willing to hold talks on the ultimate status of the territory.

In November, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci, met once again in Brussels as part of the talks facilitated by the EU. The chief of EU foreign policy, Catherine Ashton, described the talks as honest and open. At the meeting, the parties agreed to continue to work towards the full implementation of all the agreements and positively assessed the result of the joint working group on integrated border control. What is more, at the meeting, Thaci asked for Serbia's cooperation to help ascertain the whereabouts of 1,700 people who disappeared as part of the armed conflict in 1999. In December, **the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement to begin implementation of the integrated border management agreement** reached in late 2011. Following the guidelines agreed to for this new meeting of the negotiation process facilitated by the EU, which brought both parties together in early December in Brussels, implementation began at two border posts on the 10th of December and was extended to two other posts on the 31st of December. According to the agreement, all the authorities and agents involved in border management would work in a coordinated fashion. What is more, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to appoint officials who would serve as liaisons between the parties in order to supervise the implementation process. These liaisons would be located in EU offices in the capital of the opposite country. Later, Serbia denied that these posts were ambassadors, as Kosovo alleged. Serbian

sectors in northern Kosovo which were blocking the Jarinje crossing with barricades to express their discontent with the agreement finally took down their barricades after an encounter with senior Serbian officials. Likewise, Serbia and Kosovo also reached an agreement so that goods heading to northern Kosovo, which has a Serbian majority, could enter Kosovo without paying duties.

Most significant events of the year

- Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on Kosovo's representation in regional forums.
- The government of Pristina stated that it was willing to address the past and reconcile with Serbia.
- The prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement to begin implementation of the Integrated Border Management agreement.

Websites of interest

- Courrier des Balkans (www.balkans.eu.org)
- EULEX (www.eulaex-kosovo.eu)
- Government of Kosovo (www.ks-gov.net)
- Government of Serbia (www.serbia.sr.gov.yu)
- KFOR (www.nato.int/kfor)
- UN (www.un.org)
- OSCE (www.osce.org/kosovo)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- UNMIK (www.unmikonline.org)
- UNOSEK (www.unosek.org)
- Wikipedia (Kosovo)

MOLDOVA (Transnistria ⁵)	
Population:	537,000-700,000 inhabitants, over 3.5 million in Moldova
Area:	4,163 Km ²
GDP (Moldavia):	5,600 million dollars
Per capita income (Moldavia):	\$1,560
Deaths due to the conflict:	1,000-1,500
Facilitators:	OSCE

Context of the conflict

Although internationally the region of Transnistria is considered to be part of the Republic of Moldova (an independent country since the beginning of 1992), most of its inhabitants (predominantly Slavs) have considered themselves to be independent from the Republic since September 1990, when the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of Transnistria declared its independence and established its capital in Tiraspol, with its own currency, constitution, parliament, flag and media. Most of the population is declared Christian. Several studies indicate that there are high levels of corruption, censorship and organised crime in the region.

Situated between the Dniester and Nistre rivers, this region was under the control of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, when it was handed over to Imperial Russia. After the Russian Revolution at the beginning of the 20th century, the region became autonomous under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although during World War II it was annexed by Romania. Later its inhabitants were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan for having collaborated with the German army and its Russian allies. Later, as a result of the Paris Peace Treaties, it was made part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. Since 1956, the 14th Soviet army has remained in the area to control the enormous military arsenals deployed there, this being one of the reasons for the conflict in Moldova.

The conflict broke out as a result of the August 1989 proclamation declaring Moldovan (written in the Roman alphabet) to be the official language of the country (compared with the Cyrillic alphabet used by a large part of the population in Transnistria), and negotiations began for reunification with Romania (before the fall of Ceaucescu in December). This move was rejected by the people of Transnistria, who proclaimed independence the following year, creating paramilitary corps for its defence (the “workers’ detachments” which would later become the Republican Guard). The war, which did not last long, began in early 1992 and resulted in some 1,500 dead and 100,000 refugees. Shortly afterwards, in July, a ceasefire agreement was signed, the presence

of the Soviet army in the area was made official and a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up to supervise the ceasefire in the Security Zone, as well as the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF), made up of delegations from Russia, Moldova and Transnistria. Since 1994, the OSCE Mission in Moldova has formed part of the JCC as an observer. In December 2006, there was a referendum which overwhelmingly ratified the independence of Transnistria, which aspired to join Russia (the majority of the population speaks Russian) and which had been blocked by the Republic of Moldova since the beginning of the armed conflict. The region, which represents only between 12% and 15% of Moldova, nevertheless produces 35% of the GDP, holds the greatest industrial wealth of Moldova (40%) and produces 90% of the electricity. This has caused significant economic tensions, among other reasons because of the region’s capacity to cut off the electricity supply to Moldova. Since 1991, the president of the region of Transnistria has been Igor Smirnov, who renewed his mandate in the 2006 elections with 82% of the vote.

Background to the peace process

In March 1992, the chancellors of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine met in Helsinki and agreed to principles to peacefully resolve the conflict. They also created consultation mechanisms in order to coordinate their efforts. A few months later, they held several discussions within the CIS to deploy a peace-keeping force in Moldova. In July of that same year, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation for a peaceful solution to the conflict, which in addition to a ceasefire also agreed to create a demilitarised security zone stretching 10 km on either side of the Dniester River.

Since February 1993, the OSCE has been the body charged with the negotiations to find a solution to the conflict through a mission in Moldova headquartered in its capital, Chisianu. The purpose of this mission is to define the status of Transnistria through dialogue among the clashing parties. According to the OSCE, the key issues in the conflict are language, Moldova’s pretensions of unifying with Romania, the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria and the definition of the status of this region. Since autumn 2005, the EU and the USA have joined the OSCE’s efforts as observers. In April 2008, the presidents of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria met for the first time in seven years and agreed to spearhead trust-building measures that would, in turn, allow the negotiations, which had been stopped for two years, to resume. Moldova has usually stated its support for talks in their 5+2 format (Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, with the USA and EU as observers), while Transnistria has preferred the 2+1 format (Moldova, Transnistria and Russia). In

⁵ The region is also called Transdniéster, Transdnitsria or Pridnestrovia (in Russian).

March 2011, the government of Moldova created a new structure dedicated to the conflict in Transdniestria, the Reintegration Commission, whose mission is to promote and coordinate the application of a shared policy by all Moldovan institutions in the sphere of reintegration. In July, the Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat and the leader of Transdniestria, Igor Smirnov, met in the capital of the pro-independence region, Tiraspol, at a football match in what was described as another round of *football diplomacy*. In December, the first official meeting was held as part of the formal negotiations to resolve the conflict in Transdniestria in the 5+2 format, after these negotiations had been suspended for almost six years.

The peace process in 2012

The former parliamentary spokesman and young entrepreneur **Yevgeny Shevchuk was the winner in the second round of presidential elections in the region of Transdniestria**, which were held in late December. He garnered 73.88% of the votes, compared to his rival, Anatoly Kaminsky, the candidate supported by Moscow, who earned 19.67%. The former president, Igor Smirnov, was eliminated in the first round held on the 11th of December. Shevchuk stated that relations with Russia were his top priority. After his victory, Shevchuk stressed the importance of improving relations with the neighbouring countries, including Moldova and Ukraine, to ensure the free movement of people and goods. What is more, he stated that his first steps as president would be aimed at simplifying the border crossing procedures between Transdniestria and Moldova. According to the new leader, the people were tired of the low standard of living and the hardships they faced, and they hoped that decisions and real changes would impact the economy and the social and political situation with positive changes. The announcement of the commitment to improved relations with Moldova, however, also came with a reaffirmation of Transdniestria's independence. In any event, the announcement on improving the situation and border crossing procedures was welcomed by the acting president of Moldova, Marian Lupu. A few days after his victory, Shevchuk's commitment was translated into the lifting of customs duties for the goods imported from Moldova – duties which had been in effect since 2006. The new president suggested that Moldova adopt a constructive position on this issue and that it create the conditions needed for the measures to be mutually beneficial.

In February, the second meeting in the negotiations in the 5+2 format were held, which had been resumed in late 2011 after a six-year hiatus. This round, which was held in the capital of Ireland, Dublin, came in a context of rapprochement and optimism among the parties and was preceded by a battery of measures adopted by Transdniestria after the new leader of the region, Yevgeny Shevchuk, took power. These measures, which were warmly welcomed by Moldova, included a total lifting of the duties on goods from Moldova that entered the region, a simplification of customs and border procedures and the

start of the broadcast of two Moldovan television channels in Transdniestria. According to the leader of Transdniestria, now the region was awaiting further steps from Moldova. Prior to the 5+2 meeting, **Shevchuk stated that at the meeting he would be asking Moldova to discuss small but realistic steps in the spheres of the economy, transport and communications** in order to minimise the obstacles that were hindering economic development and communication between both territories, with the goal of building trust and addressing more complicated political issues later. In this way, at this 5+2 meeting, issues such as the status of Transdniestria and the peace-keeping format would not be addressed. Both Moldova and Transdniestria confirmed their intention to continue with a constructive, substantial dialogue. In March, according to the government of the region of Transdniestria, the formal negotiations had not yet resumed, which contrasted with Moldova's statements, which did describe the two rounds held since late 2011 as formal. According to the Foreign Minister of Transdniestria, Nina Shtanski, official negotiations would only be possible when a coordinated agenda had been drawn up. Shtanski said that for the time being what was taking place were **negotiations on negotiations**. On the other hand, the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and the leader of Transdniestria, Yevgeny Shevchuk, met during the concert by singer Lara Fabian in the capital of Moldova, Chisinau. According to Filat, both leaders spoke about a wide range of topics, although he provided no further details.

In April, Moldova and Transdniestria reached an **agreement on the main principles and procedures for holding negotiations**, including the frequency of the meetings, as well as certain points on the agenda of the future rounds of negotiation, the role of the working groups in strengthening the trust-building measures and the possibilities of consolidating the results of the negotiations. With regard to the agenda to be followed in the negotiation process, it was subdivided into several dimensions: social and economic issues, the humanitarian and human rights dimension, security and a political solution to the conflict. Among the principles, the parties agreed that the negotiations would be conducted based on equality and mutual respect. This was the outcome of two days of talks held in Vienna. Both parties positively rated this round of talks, as did the OSCE, the mediating body along with Russia and Ukraine in the 5+2 format, in which the EU and the USA are the observers. In the negotiations held in Vienna, Moldova was represented by its chief negotiator, Eugen Carpov, while the delegation from Transdniestria was led by Nina Shtanski. The next round will be held in mid-July in Vienna. According to the leader of Transdniestria, this region had chosen the tactic of small steps, which could offer chances to resolve the political differences between the parties. On the other hand, the authorities of Transdniestria were hoping to be able to restore a direct telephone line with Moldova. In June, the leaders of Moldova and Transdniestria agreed to restore all the transport corridors between both territories, including the refurbishment of a bridge over the Dniester River. This measure included restoring all the railway lines

as quickly as possible, as well as lifting restrictions for transport carriers. In a joint communiqué, both leaders stated that if the problems linked to the corridors were solved reciprocally, this would entail considerable headway towards freedom of movement and would create the conditions for solutions to other issues. The agreement was reached as part of another meeting in the 5+2 format (Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as the main parties and mediators, plus the USA and the EU as observers) held in Germany.

In the third quarter, Moldova and Transdniestria continued the rapprochement process begun in late 2011, when the peace negotiations were resumed in the context of the new government in the secessionist region. After the meeting between the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and the leader of Transdniestria, Evgeny Shevchuk, in Germany in late June, which both parties described as constructive, in early July new talks were held in Vienna under the 5+2 negotiation format (Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as the mediators and USA and the EU as observers). In the July round, the chief negotiators for Moldova and Transdniestria, Eugen Carpov and Nina Shtanski, respectively, participated, as did representatives of the mediators and observers. **According to the OSCE, these new talks were positive and contributed to strengthening the results attained since late 2011.** The international actors also backed the process. Germany asked for a new international impetus to make headway towards resolving the conflict. In turn, the Moldovan authorities and the OSCE met in the capital of Moldova in August to debate development initiatives for Transdniestria, including a proposal for a regional development agenda that focuses on the pro-independence region. Later, in September, a new round of talks were held, in Vienna as well, between Carpov, Shtanski and mediators and observers, which concluded with **agreements to intensify the dialogue on human rights as well as to establish a joint forum for dialogue with civil society and the media in both**

territories. This new meeting also focused on education, and it included issues like the recognition of degrees and the freedom of movement, as well as the reopening of the Gura Bîcului Bridge to vehicular traffic. The round was described as highly productive and was held based on the principles, procedures and agenda agreed to in April. The areas include socioeconomic issues, human rights and legal and humanitarian matters, and institutional, political and security aspects related to a global agreement.

In November, the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat stated that the situation with regard to the conflict was much better than three years earlier, and he stressed that there had visible been headway in the process. According to Filat, there were ties between the parties, active negotiations and functional working groups. As an example of the specific results, he stressed the recognition of educational degrees from Transdniestria and an end to the obstacles to schools that used the Latin alphabet. Filat also advocated the withdrawal of barriers to the freedom of movement of Moldovan nationals between both shores of the Dniester River, as well as an end to restrictions on visits by Moldovan officials to Transdniestria.

Most significant events of the year

- In April, Moldova and Transdniestria reached an agreement on the main principles and procedures for holding negotiations.
- Agreements were reached to intensify the dialogue on human rights as well as to establish a joint forum for dialogue with civil society and the media in both territories.

Websites of interest

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- Moldavia Azi (www.azi.md/en)
- OSCE (www.osce.org/Moldavia)
- Parliament of Transdniestria (www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng)
- Pridnestrovie (www.pridnestrovie.net)
- Wikipedia (Transnistria)

TURKEY (PKK)	
Population (Turkey):	(73.6 million); Turkish Kurdistan (20 million)
Area (Turkey):	(784,000 km ²); Turkish Kurdistan (220,000 km ²)
HDI (Turkey):	92 (out of 187)
GDP (Turkey):	652,400 million dollars
Per capita income (Turkey):	\$8,720
Deaths due to the conflict:	40,000
Armed actors:	PKK
Facilitators:	–

Context of the conflict

Kurdistan, with a population of 33 million, most of whom are Muslims, and a total area measuring 550,000 sq. km, is divided amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. It is regarded as the most populous stateless nation in the world. Over 20 million Kurds inhabit Turkish territory. Their origins go back to the 18th century. In the Middle Ages the Kurds lived in relative freedom, and during the Ottoman Empire they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. With the fall of this empire, and as a result of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, their land was divided amongst several different states. Shortly thereafter, Kurdistan's immense oil wealth was discovered, especially in the part inside Iraq. In 1924 Atatürk proclaimed Turkey's independence. From that year until 1938 there were fourteen uprisings by the Kurdish people.

There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) since 1984, with a total of 37,000 deaths, most of them Kurds. The PKK was created in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan ("Apo"). In subsequent years the PKK abandoned its goal of winning independence for Kurdistan and agreed to seek formulas for autonomy for each territory. It is largely financed by donations from the vast Kurdish diaspora around the world, especially in Europe and the United States. It has also received aid from the Greek-Cypriot community. The Kurds have support organisations in several different countries, such as the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) with headquarters in London and offices in the United States. The USA is also home to the KNCA, the Washington Kurdish Institute and the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN). In the past, the PKK also received periodic support from Iran and Syria. It has around 6,000 combatants. In 1995 the PKK created the exiled Kurdish parliament, with headquarters in Europe.

In 1987 the Turkish government decreed an exceptional status for eleven Kurdish provinces. President Turgut Özal (1989-1993) began peace efforts by creating a Ministry for Human Rights and promising the Kurdish people a certain degree of autonomy and the freedom to speak their own language. However, Özal's death and

the renewed outbreak of PKK offensives put an end to the prospects of a negotiated solution. Since 1995, despite several unilateral ceasefires by the PKK, the government has continued its brutal fight against this group, destroying thousands of towns, displacing around two million Kurds and creating Kurdish militias charged with putting down the PKK and its support bases. In the 1995 offensive, the Turkish government deployed 35,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region. After a serious political crisis between Turkey and Syria in October 1998, the latter country withdrew its support of the PKK and forced Öcalan to leave Damascus, where he had lived for years. In February 1999 Öcalan was captured in Kenya by the Turkish secret services and was later sentenced to death, although this ruling was commuted in 2002. With the wane in the PKK's activities in 2000, the Turkish government began tentative reforms to ease the restrictions on the Kurdish culture.

The Kurdish conflict, just like the one in Cyprus, has been conditioned or influenced by Turkey's negotiations to join the EU. In 1998 the European Commission approved a document stating that a civilian, not military, solution must be found to the situation in southeast Turkey. Both the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (since 1995) have issued declarations to the same effect. In addition, the International Socialist has a Working Group on the Kurdish Question (SIMEC), headed by the Swede Conny Frederiksson, who is also the advisor to a civilian platform that studies the Kurdish question as part of the relations between Turkey and the EU. In November 2002 the moderate, pro-European Islamists in the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) won the elections with an absolute majority, and their leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, succeeded in being appointed Prime Minister in March 2003 after the sentence preventing him from holding this post was lifted. In view of the invasion and later conflict in Iraq, where much of the Kurdish community lives, the new Turkish government sealed an alliance with Iran and Syria to prevent the Kurdish autonomy already existing in northern Iraq from becoming the start of independence for all Kurdish territories. This move has unquestionably hindered partial agreements with the Kurds from being reached, in this case with those living on Turkish soil.

In 2004 a new armed group appeared, called the Taybazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, abbreviated TAK), apparently with no ties to the PKK or perhaps made up of dissidents from the PKK. This group is pursuing independence for Turkish Kurdistan, and it was added to the EU's terrorist lists in late 2006. In 2005 the Democratic Society Movement (DTP) was founded, a pro-Kurdish party regarded as the successor of the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), which was founded in 1997 and was the continuation of a party that was banned because of its ties to the PKK. The DTH has mayors in 55 towns in southeast Turkey, mainly inhabited by Kurds. Its leaders include Leyla Zana, who was imprisoned for three years for having spoken Kurdish in the Turkish parliament. The party is jointly led by Nurettin Demirtas.

Background to the peace process

The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire several times (1993, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2009 and 2010), but without this being reciprocated by the Turkish armed forces, and without it serving as a spur to start a negotiation process. The year after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested, in February 2000 the PKK announced the end of its armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy, but the Turkish army rejected the unilateral ceasefire. In April 2002, the PKK once again gave up its claims for the independence of Turkish Kurdistan and its armed struggle at its 8th Congress, at which the party changed its name to KADEK (Congress of Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), or Kongra-Gel. This party was still presided over by Öcalan, who was imprisoned and at that time condemned to death. The Turkish Minister of Defence stated that he would continue to view the PKK as a terrorist organisation and that he would ignore the unilateral ceasefires. In 2005, the PKK created the Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK) as a platform to promote the federal process in Kurdistan. In the second half of November 2009, the government presented to Parliament the first specific measures in its democratisation initiative to resolve the Kurdish question, as a continuation of the Parliamentary discussion started in early November. This involved several short-term advances in cultural, political and social issues. In mid-December, the Constitutional Court declared the pro-Kurdish party DTP illegal because of its presumed ties with the PKK, which cast doubt on the government's plan to undertake reforms and motivated the PKK to interpret it as a declaration of war.

In July 2010, the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, proposed the disarmament of the PKK in exchange for political and cultural rights for the Kurdish people. Karayilan stated that he was ready to disarm under United Nations supervision if Turkey accepted a ceasefire and fulfilled certain conditions. In May 2011, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* stated that Turkey had been holding talks with Qandil (in reference to the PKK troops based in the mountains of Qandil, Iraq). *Milliyet* cited comments from the co-president of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, in which he claimed that Turkey had been in touch not only with the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, currently imprisoned in Imrali, but with Qandil as well. The talks held in 2006 and 2007 were followed by the talks in 2008 with the three areas of the PKK (Öcalan in Imrali, the leaders in Qandil and representatives in Europe) with the support of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, according to *Milliyet*. In July, the leader of the PKK stated that an agreement had been reached with the state delegation, with which it had been engaged in contacts on the establishment of a Peace Council to achieve a solution to the Kurdish conflict. A recording leaked to the press in September revealed talks between a Turkish intelligence service (MIT) officer and senior PKK officials in Oslo. The leaked talks had taken place in 2010, had reached the level of negotiations, and had continued until mid-2011. The PKK's demands had been accepted by the government, although

not formalised. They included issues like education in the native language, constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish identity, self-governance, *democratic autonomy* (a term which the Kurdish movement often uses), and house arrest for Öcalan. The government could not sign a document like that, but it could implement some of its aspects. In late September, in a context of tension in Turkey due to the surge in violence by the PKK, the Turkish Prime Minister himself, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that the negotiations had reached a stalemate and that the struggle against the PKK would continue until the group laid down its weapons.

The peace process in 2012

In March, **the government adopted a new strategy on the Kurdish question**, as reported by the Turkish newspapers *Milliyet* and *Taraf*, which gradually spread to the other media. The interpretations by the local analysts varied, as some stressed that this strategy emphasises security, while others believe that it focuses on the dimension of addressing the Kurdish question via civil routes. Some analysts stressed that the strategy separated the overarching Kurdish question from the conflict with the PKK. Thus, the strategy stated that Kurdish rights should not be captive to the talks with the PKK, that the Kurdish people in the southeast would be protected from the military pressure exerted by the PKK and the KCK, and that solutions would be sought directly via civil policy. It was also noted that the armed conflict would continue as long as the PKK continued to conduct armed actions, and that **if there were more talks with the PKK it would only be on the question of disarmament**. With regard to political and civil questions, it also sought to reinforce local power. In this sense, the government was considering withdrawing its reserves to the European Charter of Local Government of the Council of Europe, which Turkey had signed in 1988, albeit with reservations. The Kurdish nationalist movement asked for the reserves to be withdrawn several times and requested the impetus of local governments. Some analysts stated that the new strategy placed a great deal of emphasis on the security dimension. In this sense, it stated that as long as the PKK was waging armed actions, the actions by the security force would continue. In turn, the co-president of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, stated that the government's announced strategy on the Kurdish question brought nothing new; rather it was the same concept of security that it had pursued until then, which was exemplified in the security force strategy during the celebrations of Newroz (a Kurdish tradition to celebrate the New Year) this year. In this sense, the state banned celebrations to be held before Newroz day on the 21st of March, unlike in previous years, while the Kurdish nationalist movement challenged that ban and held its events anyway. The social tensions led to protests and clashes.

Before the newspapers discussed a new strategy, in early March the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that Turkey would achieve a solution to the Kurdish

conflict regardless of the cost, while the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Besir Atalay, promised democratisation measures.

In turn, the PKK announced in February the start of a new period of “resistance and liberation”. It also declared its rejection of the Turkish state and suggested that there should begin to be a detachment from the state through specific measures. The PKK justified this new phase as a reaction to the regime of isolation imposed on its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, to the macro-arrests of Kurdish politicians and activists, and to the lack of a plan to solve the conflict on the part of the government. In turn, the Kurdish party BDP and the Kurdish platform DTK asked for a solution that would include Öcalan.

The Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated in April that **the government may engage in talks with the pro-Kurdish party BDP if it showed itself capable of taking decisions independently of the PKK**. Erdogan stated that the country would never sit to negotiate at a table with the PKK, that it would fight the PKK, but that it would speak with their political wing – referring to the BDP – if it was capable of making decisions and had a will of its own. These statements came in the wake of the appeal by the co-president of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, to start negotiations between the government and the BDP. In this sense, he stated that the BDP was prepared to negotiate if the government showed a sincere, courageous attitude, but he added that no one expected the BDP to treat the PKK like an enemy.

In June, **the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, presented a proposal for making headway towards a solution to the Kurdish conflict through the Parliament of Turkey**. The proposal, which was presented by the Parliamentary spokesman, Cemil Çiçek, contained ten points. First, the Kurdish question remained a key issue on Turkey’s agenda, and the stalemate on this question meant a continuation of the violence. Secondly, the history of Turkey is full of evidence that the Kurdish question cannot be resolved through policies focusing on security. Third, alternative options should be put into practice, with new mechanisms that guarantee a democratic solution that allows for social peace. Fourth, the Parliament is the main arena where the basic problems affecting society as a whole should be addressed. In this sense, the solution to the Kurdish problem requires a national agreement. Fifth, society wishes to recover from the climate of stagnation that has come with a rise in polarisation and tension. The people are asking for a solution that guarantees peace, tranquillity, trust, security and the prevention of further deaths. Sixth, in a context in which the Parliament is seeking reconciliation for the new constitution, it is unacceptable that a similar effort is not made in relation to the Kurdish question. Seventh, the objective of this proposal is to make an effort to allow for an opportunity for direct, constant dialogue between the political parties in order to minimise the diversity of approaches and establish a political language of reconciliation and democratic solution. Eighth, the proposal includes the creation of a committee of wise persons which would act in

coordination with the Parliamentary Commission on Social Agreement. Ninth, this Parliamentary commission must have eight members, with equal participation by all the political parties represented in Parliament. The committee of wise persons would determine its working methods and rules, along with the mission of the committee of wise persons. Tenth, there is a need to determine the operation and development of the process to achieve a social agreement. The proposal was warmly welcomed by the AKP and the BDP. However, the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, criticised the government for asking the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq for help against the PKK. According to the CHP, the Kurdish regime in this Iraqi region would not fight against the PKK. According to Kılıçdaroğlu, the Kurdish president of the region of northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, may contribute to resolving the conflict, but it would be erroneous to connect the Kurdish question solely to Barzani. He also added that it would be more dangerous for Turkey if the Kurdish problem is transformed into an international problem.

In the third quarter, there were new limited advances in the prospects for resolving the conflict, despite the climate of serious deterioration in security. In late September, **the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that new negotiations might be held with the PKK, and even with its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan**. He made this declaration at several media appearances. However, on many of these occasions, Erdogan linked the possibility of new negotiations with the PKK laying down its weapons, and he stated that a ceasefire would not be enough. In fact, in view of the rise in violence, Erdogan remarked repeatedly that the military operations against the group would continue as long as it continued its attacks and until it laid down its weapons. On behalf of the PKK, parallel to the communiqués from this quarter in which it announced that it was adopting a new offensive military strategy on a larger scale over mastery of the territory, senior political and military leaders from the group expressed their support for a dialogued solution. Among them, the president of the Legislative Council of the KCK (the organisational system of the Kurdish nationalist movement, which includes the PKK), Zübeyir Aydar, who participated in the failed negotiations in Oslo – talks between the state and the PKK with international facilitation held between 2009 and 2011 – stated that he was prepared to resume the Oslo talks. In any event, **he noted that one problem was Öcalan’s isolation and lack of ability to communicate, as the group had had no word from him for over 14 months. According to Aydar, even though the group takes decisions in its Executive Council, without Öcalan it might have difficulties implementing them**, so he reiterated Öcalan’s demands in this respect: health, security and freedom of movement in order to be able to participate in a process. Still, in late September the Executive Council of the KCK stated that there were currently no negotiations with the state, and it described Erdogan’s declarations as a new tactical move. The KCK stressed that the government had to wait for a Kurdish response once the government had decided to take specific, evident steps towards Öcalan

being able to play a role in the dialogue and negotiation process. In early October, Murat Karayilan, the president of the Executive Council of the KCK, stressed that the only way to reach a permanent solution to the Kurdish conflict was through talks with Öcalan, and that these talks should take place in such a way that they guarantee him a safe, free environment. According to Karayilan, in order to resolve the Kurdish question, the government has to work with the PKK, with Öcalan and with the BDP as its interlocutors. With this statement it was responding to the criticisms levelled by Erdogan against the BDP, after several of its representatives saluted members of the PKK at a fortuitous encounter in the southeast. In the press, Erdogan's words were interpreted as a refusal to negotiate with the BDP, even though in the previous quarter Erdogan had stated that the government would not speak with the PKK but it would talk with the pro-Kurdish party.

In a context of political rivalry, the main opposition party in Turkey, **the CHP, publicised a document which was supposedly one of the documents worked on by the government and the PKK during the so-called Oslo talks.** In 2011, the government and the PKK accused each other of being to blame for the failure of the talks in June of that year, after they were released in September 2011. Even though Erdogan stated that he had not approved any document, rendering the documentation invalid, **judging from the document revealed by the CHP, the parties had reached an agreement on nine points,** according to the Turkish newspaper *Today's Zaman*. The first point is the determination to resolve the conflict in the context of the Oslo and Imrali way (in reference to Öcalan). The second point was a commitment to continue the contacts in order to achieve a permanent solution, as well as a commitment on the need to conduct all the efforts upon a constitutional, legal foundation. The third part stated that the parties should convey their opinions and suggestions on the drafts of several documents, including the documents presented by Öcalan at a meeting in prison in May 2010, within the deadline of the first week of June 2011. The Kurdish side would adopt these drafts, in theory. Fourth, the parties had to negotiate the names for a Constitutional Council, a Peace Council and a Truth and Justice Commission, which are referred to in those documents, and to present their lists of proposed members during the same timeframe. Fifth, the Turkish party had to guarantee that two individuals who represent the organisation could visit Öcalan as soon as possible after the elections. The sixth point states that the end of pressure on members of the media, of detentions of the legal and political representatives of the Kurds and the release of individuals detained in operations against the KCK are important steps to resolve the Kurdish question. The Turkish side had to first guarantee the release of Kurdish politicians detained during the celebrations of the Kurdish festival of Newroz. Seven, the parties had to inform the public on the need for peaceful elections free of a tense atmosphere. Eight, all the military, political and diplomatic operations had to end and the political parties have to take precautions to resolve the Kurdish question. Both parties had to end their military operations and

movements by the 15th of June 2011. Ninth, both parties decide that they will meet in the second half of 2011 to address other issues on the agenda and to hold new negotiations after preparing for the encounter.

Likewise, the co-president of the Kurdish party DTP, Selahattin Demirtas, stated in September that the Kurds would never accept living under the direct administration of any country or nation, and that even though he noted that there was not currently a strong desire to establish a state of its own, peaceful coexistence under a federal model or autonomy is inevitable. In turn, the CHP asked the government about the supposed declarations leaked by the deputy secretary of the intelligence services during the so-called Oslo talks in which he stated that the region would be autonomous, and that the education services would be managed by the municipalities and provinces.

In November, **after the end of the hunger strike of about 700 Kurdish prisoners, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that he was not opposed to the resumption of formal negotiations with the PKK.** Erdogan stated that the Turkish secret services (MIT) may meet with the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. According to the Turkish leader, there is no obstacle to their meeting because the essential point was finding a solution to the conflict. Erdogan also noted that the MIT and Öcalan met with regard to the hunger strike at Öcalan's request. According to the Turkish newspaper *Radikal*, three meetings were held on this topic before Öcalan's call for the end of the hunger strike. Likewise, after the strike ended, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül stated that now was the time for the Parliament to debate and step up its efforts to resolve the Kurdish question. Likewise, prior to the end of the hunger strike, the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay had stated that the government was laying the groundwork for a resumption of the negotiations with the PKK, but that the hunger strike had sabotaged the process.

Despite the escalation in violence in 2012, the government announced in December **the existence of talks between the state and the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan,** which would pave the way to a new negotiation process to resolve the conflict. On the 28th of December, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan admitted that the meetings with Öcalan continued in order to yield results and ensure that the government could keep taking measures as long as there was a chance of getting results. In turn, he noted that he as a politician could not hold these meetings, but that the state had agents that could and were doing so. His main advisor, Yalçın Akdoğan, also acknowledged the existence of talks between the government and the leader of the PKK regarding disarmament, and that the government saw Öcalan as its main interlocutor. Days later, the Turkish media reported that the Deputy Secretary for Intelligence Services (MIT), Hakan Fidan, - who also participated in the previous negotiation process known as the Oslo negotiations, in 2001 – had met with Öcalan for four hours on the 22nd of December in Imrali prison, where Öcalan was being held. Some media sources stated that

they met for two days. Another sign of the opportunities that were arising was the government-authorised visit by two parliamentarians from the Kurdish movement to Öcalan on the 3rd of January. The independent MP, co-president of the pro-Kurdish platform DTK and respected Kurd, Ahmet Türk, the MP of the Kurdish party BDP, Ayla Akat Ata, and the lawyer Meral Danis visited Öcalan for several hours. The BDP described the meeting as positive and stated that they would issue a communiqué in the forthcoming days. This was the first visit from one of Öcalan's lawyers since the 17th of August 2011 and the first visit by parliamentarians since he entered prison in 1999. The parliamentarians were expected to make further visits. The Kurdish movement and Öcalan himself had always insisted that Öcalan should be the interlocutor and key figure in any dialogue process with the government. The government's current approach seemed to acknowledge Öcalan as the key actor holding the power. After the meeting on the 3rd of January with the parliamentarians, *Hürriyet* reported on Öcalan's declarations and stated that if the process were not sabotaged, important measures may be implemented in the forthcoming months. According to Öcalan, the goal was to create an environment that eliminated the need for weapons. What is more, he also stated that he was the only authority for a disarmament process of the PKK, according to *Hürriyet*. Some media, such as *Today's Zaman*, stated that **the new talks between the state and the PKK would follow a calendar for a declaration to abandon weapons in early 2013**. According to these media sources, the group may begin a disarmament process in

the spring. The newspaper *Taraf* stated that the PKK would move its troops from southeast Turkey to northern Iraq in the spring. Likewise, the main opposition party, the CHP, expressed its support for the dialogue between the state and the PKK, and positively assessed the prime minister's public admission of the existence of the meetings.

Most significant events of the year

- The main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, presented a proposal for making headway towards a solution to the Kurdish conflict through the Parliament of Turkey.
- After the end of the hunger strike of about 700 Kurdish prisoners, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that he was not opposed to the resumption of formal negotiations with the PKK.
- The government announced the existence of talks between the state and the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

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- Kurdish Human Rights Project (www.khrp.org)
- Kurdish Info (www.kurdish-info.eu)
- Kurdish Media (www.kurdmedia.com)
- Kurdistan National Congress (www.kongrakurdistan.org)
- Today's Zaman (www.todayszaman.com)
- Turkish Daily News (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr)
- Washington Kurdish Institute (www.kurd.org)
- www.freedom-for-ocalan.com

Caucasus

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabakh)	
Population (Nagorno-Karabakh):	(145,000); Armenia (1,13 million) and Azerbaijan (9,3 million)
Area (Nagorno-Karabakh):	(4,400 Km ²); Armenia (30,000 km ²); Azerbaijan (87,000 km ²)
HDI:	86 (Armenia), 91 (Azerbaijan), out of 187
GDP:	Armenia: 9,500 million dollars; Azerbaijan: 42,500 million dollars
Per capita income:	\$3,100; Azerbaijan: \$4,840
Deaths due to the conflict:	30,000
Armed actors:	Armed forces in the two countries
Facilitators:	Minsk Group of the OSCE (France, Russia and USA), Turkey

Context of the conflict

In 1988, after a long period under the Soviet regime, a conflict arose in Nagorno-Karabakh (an enclave with an Armenian majority in the southwest of the country), when the local assembly voted to be administered by Armenia, and the Azerbaijan authorities rejected this decision. The tension over this conflict escalated, with open warfare war eventually breaking out between 1991 and 1994. More than 30,000 people died in this war, and one million people were displaced. **A ceasefire was signed in 1994**, and peace negotiations have been under way since then. The negotiations address two main points: the enclave's status and the return of territories occupied by the Armenian army. Currently, the construction of an oil pipeline running between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, at a cost of 2.9 billion dollars, is playing an important role in the peace process. The company British Petroleum has enormous influence over Azerbaijan, an oil-rich country.

Background to the peace process

The attempts to reach a peace agreement in the past decade have been channelled through the mediation of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, which was created in 1992. This group is co-led by France, Russia and the USA, and it includes the following participants: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its strategy is to reinforce the economic cooperation between the latter two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In July 1999, the OSCE approved the installation of an office in Erevan (Armenia), which has been operating since February 2000 and conducts political, economic, environmental and humanitarian activities. It operates independently of the Minsk Group. The president of Azerbaijan has often been highly critical of the OSCE's mediation and the role of the UN. What is more, he has always opposed participation by any representative of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations.

In December 2006, the self-proclaimed independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh approved a constitution in a referendum which described the region as a sovereign, democratic and social state with powers over the territory currently controlled by the separatist government, although it did not address issues like citizenship or the thorny question of the return of Azeri refugees in a region with an ethnic Armenian majority. In the second half of January 2010, the presidents of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, met with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in Sochi (Russia) and reached a verbal agreement on the preamble of the latest version of the basic principles for resolving the conflict. This document envisioned a process carried out in phases instead of a "package solution". The steps to follow would be the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azeri districts of Agdam, Fizuli, Djebrail, Zangelan and Gubadli, which border on Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as from 13 towns in the occupied district of Lachin; the restoration of communications; and a donor conference to be held to raise funds for rehabilitation, as well as the deployment of peace observers to ensure the safety of the displaced persons as they return home. In the second phase, according to Mammadyarov, the Armenian forces would withdraw from Lachin and Kalbajar, which would be followed by the return of the Azeri population to Nagorno-Karabakh. After that, a decision would be taken on the status of the territory inside Azerbaijan, without this affecting its territorial integrity. Likewise, the proposal contained in the "Madrid Principles" includes a referendum with participation by the people who used to live in Nagorno-Karabakh before the war, the securing of a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, the return of the refugees to their homelands and the aid of international forces. In March 2011, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, held a tripartite meeting with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in the Russian city of Sochi. After the meeting, they issued a communiqué in which they stated their intention to resolve all the controversies peacefully.

The peace process in 2012

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the acquisitions, orders and plans to acquire armaments in Armenia and Azerbaijan may boost the risk of a conflict over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has considerably increased the volume of weapons it is importing (especially from Israel, South Africa and Turkey), and Armenia has announced plans to acquire more advanced weapon systems, especially from Russia.

In January, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, met once again with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, to address the status of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Sarkisian and Aliyev pledged to accelerate the talks, and in the communiqué issued after the meeting they praised the mediation of the OSCE's Minsk Group as well as the work done since the last meeting. The former Russian

Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that **both leaders had pledged to distance themselves from extreme positions**. However, there was no specific headway and the formal declarations came in a context of mutual accusations of violations of the ceasefire. In June, **the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan were heightened** after several armed incidents and a dozen mortal victims, in the midst of mutual accusations of violations of the ceasefire.

The relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated in the third quarter, partly owing to the tensions linked to the pardon granted by Azerbaijan to an Azeri official accused of murdering an Armenian official in 2004, which also had repercussions on the negotiation process. Just as in the previous quarters, there was no headway, and **the Azeri Deputy Foreign Minister even regarded the negotiations as “suspended”**. **According to Araz Azimov, periodical meetings of the Minsk Group were held at different levels; however, no negotiations were being held in which specific issues were being addressed with a specific calendar**. In turn, according to the Azeri news agency APA, the Azeri President Ilham Aliyev stated that the negotiation group had worked for 20 years but with no results. According to Aliyev, neither the conditions for peace nor the conditions for war could last forever. Likewise, he also accused Armenia of strengthening the status quo of refusing to withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. In turn, the Minsk Group expressed its concern with the lack of tangible headway in the process. During this quarter,

the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan met separately with representatives of the Minsk Group.

In October, the Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian accused Azerbaijan of preparing for war in Nagorno-Karabakh and accused the Azeri government of having purchased armaments in preparation for a new confrontation.

Most significant events of the year

- Both leaders pledged to distance themselves from extreme positions.

Websites of interest

- Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org)
- Eurasia Net (www.eurasianet.org)
- Government of Armenia (www.gov.am/en)
- Government of Azerbaijan (www.azerbaijan.az/portal.index_e.html?lang=en)
- Government of Nagorno-Karabakh (www.karabakh.net/eng/gov?id=1)
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.ipwpr.net)
- OSCE (www.osce.org/yereban) (www.osce.org/baku)
- Peace Building & Conflict Resolution (www.peacebuilding.am/eng)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- President of Nagorno-Karabakh (www.presidentt.nkr.am)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org)
- Wikipedia (War in Upper Karabakh) (Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh)

GEORGIA (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)

Population (Georgia):	4,3 million inhabitants; Abkhazia, 0.5 million inhabitants. South Ossetia; 70,000
Area (Georgia):	70,000 Km ² ; Abkhazia: 8,400 Km ² ; South Ossetia: 3,900 Km ²
HDI (Georgia):	75 (of 187)
GDP (Georgia):	11,100 million dollars
Per capita income (Georgia):	\$2,530
Deaths due to the conflict:	6,000 in Abkhazia; 1,000 in South Ossetia
Facilitators:	OSCE, UN, EU

Context of the conflict

There has been a conflict in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, in the northeast of the country, since the summer 1992. The conflict began after the local government made several attempts to separate from the Republic of Georgia, and confrontations were caused by the deployment of 2,000 Georgian soldiers, which led to 6,000 deaths. **In September 19 92, a ceasefire was signed.** The Russian Federation was involved in this agreement. The following year, the United Nations peace mission **UNOMIG** was created to monitor this agreement, and **in May 1994, the Moscow ceasefire and separation of forces agreements were signed.** In 1999 there was a referendum in Abkhazia, after which it declared itself independent. The former President of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze, promised on several occasions “to broaden Abkhazia’s powers” of self-government, as long as it formed an integral part of Georgia. In recent years, Russia has kept 3,000 soldiers on the border as a CIS peace force. In November 1999 Russia and Georgia agreed that Russia would close two of its four military bases in Georgia.

In 1992 the autonomous region of **South Ossetia** was created in Georgia, two years before the former USSR created the autonomous Republic of North Ossetia. In 1990 South Ossetia declared itself a sovereign republic. This led the Georgian parliament to declare a state of emergency in the territory and withdraw the status of autonomous region. All of these factors led to confrontations, until a Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace force brought about a ceasefire in 1992. The conflict resumed in May 2004, when the President of South Ossetia threatened to use force against any threat from Georgia. Days later, South Ossetia withdrew from the international commission which was monitoring the peace agreement. This measure was followed by clashes between the Georgian armed forces and South Ossetia’s armed groups. South Ossetia’s authorities intended to join North Ossetia and thus become a part of the Russian Federation. In 2008, after military clashes between Georgia and Russia, this region cut off all links with Georgia and proclaimed its independence.

Background to the peace process

The OSCE has had a mission in Georgia since December 1992, with the general headquarters in Tbilisi and the goal of promoting peace negotiations in the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission also supported the UN’s peace efforts. The mission’s mandate is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to assist in the development of the democratic institutions. Since December 1999, the mandate also includes keeping watch over the border between Russian and Georgia. In 1992, the “Agreement of Principles between Georgia and Russia to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict” was signed, which included a ceasefire and the creation of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) made up of representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. This commission has never been warmly received by Georgia, which considers itself a minority before it. In the first half of November 2006, South Ossetia supported the independence of the territory in a referendum, which was not internationally recognised, with more than 90% of the 50,000 voters in favour of secession, and the re-election of the president of the region, E. Kokoity, who cited the independence of South Ossetia and integration with Russia as his political priorities.

The stagnation in the Abkhazia process can be described as a “dynamic process of non-peace”, since there is no progress on the key issues: the return of 200,000 Georgian refugees, the ultimate status of Abkhazia and the economic future of the republic. In April 2008, the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, announced a new peace plan to resolve the conflict with Abkhazia, which offered the territory what the Georgian leader called “unlimited autonomy” within Georgia and which included the creation of the post of vice president, to be occupied by an Abkhaz representative.

In recent years, talks between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia have been held in Geneva on security in the southern Caucasus, with the mediation of the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, and with participation by the USA, which has an incident prevention and response mechanism. On the 3rd of July 2010, the government of Georgia approved an action plan to implement the objectives contained in the “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation”, which set forth the guidelines that the government should follow in its relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The government of Georgia’s strategy was rejected several times by the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a speech before the European Parliament in November, the president of Georgia, Dmitry Saakashvili, announced Georgia’s unilateral commitment not to use force to restore control over its territory. According to Saakashvili, Georgia would use peaceful means and would retain the right to defend itself only in the event of new attacks and invasion of the Georgian territory under Georgia’s control. In recent years, Russia had demanded that Georgia sign agreements not to use force with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia

defended the need for a non-aggression pact with Russia, which it regarded as the main actor in the conflict. In the more recent years, Russia had come to defend unilateral declarations not to use force, although it had discarded the possibility of adopting a measure of this kind itself, as it was asking Georgia to do. In December, the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced their willingness to pledge not to use force, claiming that they would not use force against Georgia, its people, its territory or its armed forces. In March 2011, Russia stressed that it was not a party in the conflict, so it saw no reason for it to sign a commitment not to use force, while it still asked Georgia to sign this kind of agreement with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also in December, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia asked that the discussions on international security arrangements be removed from the agenda of the Geneva negotiations, one of the key issues that until then had been linked to the question of the non-use of force, a controversial topic and frequently the subject of arguments in the process.

The peace process in 2012

In February, the Georgian Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze, accused Russia of trying to put an end to the dialogue process in Geneva by lowering the frequency of the rounds and rejecting key discussions within the two working groups that are part of the negotiating format: the group on security issues and the group on humanitarian matters. According to Georgia, in the former group, Russia was explicitly refusing to address security arrangements, while it was also refusing to pledge to the non-use of force since it does not consider itself an actor in the conflict, whereas Georgia had already adopted a unilateral commitment not to use force. What is more, Vashadze warned about Russia's plans to hold military exercises in September along with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With regard to the second group, Georgia accused Russia of refusing to discuss the voluntary, safe and dignified return of displaced persons. With regard to the frequency of meetings, the Georgian government warned that they had gone from monthly meetings to meetings every three months. In April, the former head of the security committee from the region, Leonid Tibilov, became the new president of South Ossetia after his victory in the second round of elections, in which he garnered 54.12% of the votes compared to the special envoy for human rights, David Sanakoev, who earned 42.65% of the votes. In June, the twentieth round of negotiations in the Geneva process was held, without headway. The issues addressed, according to international experts, included the legal aspects of the concept of occupation. Later, while Russia stated that the session revealed that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia were occupied territories, Georgia claimed that it was clear that Russia's military presence entailed occupation. The round was held in a climate in which the incident prevention and response mechanism had been suspended by Abkhazia since March, when it declared the head of the EU's supervisory mission in Georgia, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, a *persona non grata*.

In the third quarter, the Geneva negotiation process which involves Georgia, Russia Abkhazia and both entities, with mediation by the EU, the UN and the OSCE, continued to grapple with numerous difficulties. **The head of foreign relations of Abkhazia, Vyacheslav Chirikba, stated that the format of the process had to change and that the current method was limiting effective decision-making**, although he did not provide details on which questions he wanted to see changed. In any event, it remains to be seen how the victory in the Georgian parliamentary elections held on the 1st of October of the opposition party Georgian Dream, led by the magnate Bidzina Ivanishvili, will affect the Geneva process, as this party is in favour of rapprochement and establishing good relations with Russia. With regard to Abkhazia, prior to the elections, Ivanishvili had expressed his support for building trust between the Abkhaz and Georgian people, and he included the possibility of restoring the railway line between Georgia and Russia through Abkhazia; he also aspired to return Abkhazia to Georgia under its own will. On the other hand, Abkhazia reaffirmed its April decision not to participate in the meetings on the incident prevention and response mechanism (IPRM), while the head of the EU mission EUMM, Andrej Tyszkiewicz, continued to participate in these meetings. In April, Abkhazia described Tyszkiewicz as a *persona non grata* for asking "disrespectfully" for the EUMM mission to have access to Abkhaz territory. The Abkhaz authorities had stated that there would be no meetings of the IPRM in the near future, since the mandate of the head of the EUMM had not been renewed. On other matters, the USA stated that it would recognise neutral identity documents on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued by Georgia to people from both areas but that the authorities of these regions reject.

In October, the incoming government included in its conflict resolution programme an emphasis on public diplomacy, along with joint economic and business projects, as well as a stress on fostering contacts between the people on either side of the frontier. According to this programme, building democratic institutions and resolving socioeconomic problems in Georgia are crucial to resolving the conflicts in order to convince the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia about the advantages of living in a united state. Likewise, it also included reform plans of the Georgia-based governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in exile, which would be transferred functions related to the displaced persons and the creation of representative organisations for these persons via elections. Likewise, the 21st round in the Geneva negotiation process was held. At this round, the delegation from South Ossetia expressed its concern over the presence of Georgian police along the border line. In turn, the Georgian delegation expressed its concern over the obstacles put up by Abkhazia to developing the incident prevention and response mechanism. What is more, Georgia also condemned the human rights violations in the occupied lands, including the right to be educated in one's native language, the freedom from arrest and harassment and freedom of movement, according to the

Georgian Foreign Minister. Representatives of the incoming Georgian government participated in this new round as observers. The candidate for the position of new minister to resolve the conflict and member of the party Georgian Dream, Paata Zakareishvili, stated that the format of the talks would allow the parties to work together more closely in the future, since the incoming government had the intention of changing Georgia's approach to certain issues. Zakareishvili had already mentioned the offer to consider Abkhazia and South Ossetia parties in the conflict. What is more, it will also try to minimise the Russia factor, stating that Russia cannot serve as a mediator. Another new development included an attenuation of the law on occupied territories, which stipulates prison for whoever enters Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia. As the head of foreign affairs for Abkhazia and the head of its negotiation team, Vyacheslav Chirikba, described, this 21st round was transitional, but he added that there were no reasons for optimism at the future new government. On the other hand, he recalled that **Abkhazia had previously proposed shifting from the format of negotiation experts to the format of delegations.**

In November, the head of foreign affairs for Abkhazia, Vyacheslav Chirikba, stated that his government was willing to sign an agreement on the non-use of force with Georgia only if the format of the Geneva negotiations changed such that Abkhazia's status changed was elevated to the level of "delegation". Abkhazia stressed that its purpose was to gain international recognition, especially from Georgia, of its independent status. On the other hand, Chirikba also stated that despite the change in government in Georgia, they were not expecting major changes in Georgia's position in the negotiation process. In December, **the relations between Georgia and Russia continued its improvement since the coalition Georgian Dream reached power**, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, which might have future repercussions on the conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is possible that the direct bilateral talks may address issues related to the two regions, without duplications, once other less thorny issues have been resolved, such as Russian-Georgian trade and economic relations. Likewise, the 22nd round of negotiations on the conflict over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were held in Geneva, the first round with the new Georgian government that emerged after the October elections. The head of the Georgian negotiation team, the Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze – who is at the head of this ministry for the second time, although now he has also

been given the responsibility for the negotiations – noted some headway with the first working group into which the negotiations have been divided, that is, the group discussing security issues. In this sense, progress was made in the preparation of a draft on the non-use of force. In contrast, according to the Georgian representative, the second group, which was focusing on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, was being hindered by the attitude and position of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, which were trying to debate possible changes in the format of the process, as opposed to Georgia's specific proposals on humanitarian issues. In turn, the UN representative in the process, Antti Turunen, positively assessed the parties' willingness to carry on with the negotiations and stressed the situation of relative calm and stability currently existing in the conflict zone. The next round of negotiations is scheduled for late March 2013.

Most significant events of the year

- The head of foreign relations of Abkhazia stated that the format of the process had to change.
- The relations between Georgia and Russia continued its improvement since the coalition Georgian Dream reached power.

Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (www.cipdd.org)
- Caucasian Knot (eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru)
- Caucas Europe news (www.caucaz.com)
- Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org)
- Civil Georgia (www.civil.ge/eng)
- Georgia Today (www.georgiatoday.ge)
- Government of Georgia (www.government.gov.ge)
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.iwpr.net)
- International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
- International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (www.iccn.ge)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Media News (www.medianews.ge)
- OSCE Mission to Georgia (www.osce.org/georgia)
- Parliament of Georgia (www.parliament.ge)
- Partners-Georgia (www.partners.ge)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- Presidency of Georgia (www.president.gov.ge)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org)
- UNAG online Magazine (www.civil.ge)
- UN Association of Georgia (www.una.ge)
- UNOMIG (www.unomig.org)

MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL – PALESTINE	
Population (Israel):	(7.6 million inhabitants); Palestine (4.3 million)
Area (Israel):	(22,000 Km ²); Palestine (6,240 Km ²)
HDI (Israel):	(17 out of 187)
GDP (Israel):	192,000 million dollars; Palestine: 4,500 million dollars
Per capita income (Israel):	\$25,790; Palestine: \$4,500
Deaths due to the conflict:	7,500 (since 2000)
Armed actors:	Israeli armed forces, Hamas, Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
Facilitators:	Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU, UN), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Arab League (Follow-up Committee), Switzerland.

Context of the conflict

The roots of the conflict date back to the end of World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This led the Palestinian territory to be put under UK administration under the Mandate System adopted by the League of Nations. This mandate lasted from 1922 to 1947. During this time, many Jews immigrated to Palestine, particularly at the time of the Nazi persecution in the 1930s. In 1947 the UK passed the problem on to the United Nations. In the same year, the UN's Resolution 181 declared that the territory under British mandate would be divided into two states with no territorial continuity. This division was never wholly implemented. The partition of the Holy Land by the United Nations and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 were the main factors that sparked the current conflict. Shortly after the British left the area, Israel occupied 77% of Palestinian territory and a large part of Jerusalem. Zionist paramilitary groups massacred many Palestinians and drove some 800,000 Palestinians into exile. There were five wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982) before the present conflict. The PLO was founded in 1959, and soon afterwards Yasser Arafat became its leader. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, establishing a security ring around Israel, intensifying the Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and triggering a second exodus of Palestinians (half a million). In 1974 the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the PLO. In 1982 Israel invaded the Lebanon, leading to a large-scale massacre in the Palestine refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, and leading to the expulsion of Arafat in 1983, who went into exile in Tunis. In 1987 the desperation of the occupied Palestinian population led to the first "Intifada" (1987-1992), at the same time that Arafat began gestures aimed at bridging the gap with the United States, convinced that it was the only country capable of putting pressure on Israel. The second Intifada began in September 2000. Since then, more than 5,500 people have died, 80% of

them Palestinians. In 2002, Israel began to build a wall to separate the two communities, thus spurring increasing criticism from the international community.

Background to the peace process

In the past two decades, countless initiatives have been undertaken to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine, with no results. Israel is demanding full security guarantees, while Palestine is asking for the return of refugees, sharing the capital of Jerusalem and an end to the Jewish settlements in its territory. In 1990, the first secret negotiations got underway in Oslo, which led to the signing of the first agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Washington. In essence, the principles contained in the Oslo Agreement are the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the Palestinians' right to self-governance in these zones through the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian government would last five years on an interim basis, during which period its status would be renegotiated (starting in May 1996). The issues on Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security and the precise borders were not addressed. The interim self-governance would take place in phases. Two years earlier, in 1991, the Madrid Conference was held, which was guided by the principle of exchanging "peace for territories". At this conference, the bases for future bilateral negotiations were laid. In 1995, the so-called "Barcelona Process" was launched to stimulate cooperation among all the countries in the Mediterranean, including Israel. In 1995, too, the Oslo II process got underway, which called for a zone under Palestinian control, a zone with a mixed administration and another zone controlled by Israel, with motorways that would join the zones under Israeli control. In 1998, this process was totally paralysed.

In 2002, with the conflict in a state of wholesale deterioration, the number of peace initiatives multiplied, including the creation of the International Working Group for Palestinian Reform, the actions of the Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU and UN), and most notably, the Quartet's "Roadmap" or peace plan dating from December 2002, which contained three stages that would conclude with the creation of an independent Palestinian state in 2005. In 2005, the conflict between Israel and Palestine took a qualitative leap after the death of Yasser Arafat, the election victory of M. Abbas in the Palestinian presidential elections and the subsequent opening of direct talks with the government of Israel. Throughout 2006, the thorny peace process between Israel and Palestine was initially marked by the victory of the group Hamas in the January elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and by the subsequent international block of the new Islamist government. In 2007, the peace conference held in Annapolis (Maryland, USA) ended, the first peace talks held between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Israel in seven years. The conference defined the beginning of talks based on the Roadmap, which would start on the 12th of December with biweekly meetings of the negotiation

teams led by the joint steering committee. Likewise, the communiqué stated that there was agreement to discuss all the fundamental issues, without exception, in an attempt to create an independent Palestinian state. The fundamental issues agreed upon, known as the “final status”, were the future of Jerusalem, the borders, water, refugees and the settlements.

During the first week of May 2010, the resumption of indirect talks between the Israelis and Palestinians was announced in an attempt to make headway in the peace process. The round of talks ended without any signs of progress, and with no date to continue the dialogue, which should have spread over the ensuing four months and address key issues, such as Jerusalem and the status of the refugees. The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met in Washington on the 2nd of September in a new round of direct talks between the parties, the first in 20 months. Abbas had demanded a total cessation of colony building, including in Jerusalem, as a step prior to talks, but he ended up giving in to the intense international pressures, and Washington announced, at least officially, that the restoration of contacts came “with no conditions”. Netanyahu’s priorities were security, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (the refugees could only return to a Palestinian state) and an end to the conflict, without the possibility of admitting further claims in the future. In January 2011, the Qatari television channel *Al-Jazeera* and the British newspaper *The Guardian* started to divulge more than 1,600 internal documents on the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis during the past decade, in which they revealed that the Palestinian negotiators offered Israel sovereignty over most of Jerusalem. The Palestinian representatives gave up the right for the refugees to return, and they accepted instead the return of a symbolic number of between 5,000 and 10,000 of them. The Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, stated that Israel was willing to make “painful” concessions and to hand over some territories, but it stressed that it would not return to the 1967 borders. What is more, he stressed that Jerusalem would not be divided, that the issue of the Palestinian refugees could only be resolved outside Israeli’s borders and that a future Palestinian state must be completely demilitarised. The Israeli prime minister also discarded the possibility of negotiating with Hamas. In September, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, submitted a request to the United Nations to recognise and accept Palestine as member state number 194 in the international organisation, and it asked for recognition of a Palestinian state in the borders prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Palestinian proposal to the UN was submitted in a climate of total stagnation in the talks with the government Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, UNESCO accepted Palestine as a full member of the organisation in the midst of open opposition from the USA and Israel. With regard to the talks between the Palestinian groups, in April 2011 Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement that put an end to the profound gulf between the Palestinian factions since 2007.

The peace process in 2012

In early January, a meeting was held in Jordan between the Israeli representative, Yitzhak Molcho, and the Palestinian representative, Saeb Erekat, in the first direct contact between senior officials from both sides since September 2010. This meeting ended with no headway, according to press reports, although Jordanian sources claimed that the Israelis had pledged to study a Palestinian proposal on border and security issues. Meantime, Jordan kept up its offer to host talks between the parties. In this context, several analyses stressed that King Abdullah of Jordan had taken on a more active role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in recent months. In February, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas blamed Israel for the **failure of the contacts between Palestinian and Israeli delegations in Jordan**. According to this leader, the Israelis presented no detailed proposals on security and border issues.

In January, Israel insisted that it would not negotiate with the PNA if Hamas was part of the Palestinian executive. Press reports claimed that Meshal had expressed to Abbas his support for peaceful resistance and a truce in Gaza and the West Bank, but that he was not willing to recognise Israel. Hamas formally communicated that its leader in exile, Khaled Meshaal, had stated that he wished to retire and had no pretensions of leading the Islamist party. According to press reports, several leaders asked him to reconsider his position. However, they also stressed that the report reflected the internal tensions and frictions between the Syria-based leadership and the leaders in Gaza, who have been governing these territories after the outbreak of the conflict with Fatah in 2007. In February, Hamas and Fatah agreed that the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, would lead the national unity government after the reconciliation agreement between both groups in April 2011. Hamas was opposed to Salam Fayyad, Abbas’ first choice, as the leader of this interim administration. The new government was to prepare presidential and parliamentary elections in Gaza and the West Bank, which could be held in April, although Palestinian sources stressed that more time might be needed to organise the elections. Abbas and the Hamas leader in exile, Khaled Meshal, met in Qatar. On the days after the meeting, some prominent Hamas leaders in Gaza questioned the agreement. The internal divisions on the agreement within the Islamist group triggered doubts and speculations on the feasibility of the reconciliation between the two factions. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated its criticisms and stressed that Abbas had chosen to share power with the Islamist group instead of negotiating with Israel. On a visit to Teheran, the prime minister of Hamas in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, stressed that the Islamist group would never recognise Israel.

In May, **more than 1,500 Palestinian prisoners who were on a hunger strike put an end to their protest after the Israeli authorities agreed to the majority of their demands, which were linked to the status of their detention**. The agreement reached with Egyptian mediation meant that the prisoners had completed the

arrest period called for in their administrative arrest (without charges), they would be released, the solitary confinement of around 20 prisoners would end and families could visit more than 400 prisoners whose relatives lived in the Gaza Strip. The formula of administrative detention applied by Israel would extend for six months and could only be extended thereafter if proof against the detainees was produced. In June, press reports revealed that in the most recent period, **representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel had held meetings with the goal of identifying formulas that would allow them to move the peace process forward.** According to the sources cited by the press, the Palestinian negotiating team was led by Ahmed Qurea, while the Israeli side was led by the Minister of Defence, Ehud Barak. In mid-June, one of the chief Palestinian negotiators, Saeb Erekat, confirmed that these secret contacts had been underway since the 17th of April. The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, stressed in recent weeks that no negotiations would be held with Israel until it stopped building more settlements. Abbas claimed that the Palestinians were willing to engage in informal contacts if Israel released more Palestinian prisoners and if it allowed weapons to be imported for the PA security forces.

In late September, **Abbas decided to ask the UN General Assembly to grant Palestine the status of non-member state of the organisation.** This recognition would mean that Palestine's representation would shift from its current status of "non-member observer" in the UN to "observer state", thus taking a position similar to that of the Vatican. The Israeli government is opposed to this change in status because it would imply that that Palestinians could adhere to international agreements and join international organisations, such as the International Criminal Court, where they could file grievances against Israel over the occupation of its territories. In his message to the UN, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, claimed that the conflict would be resolved not with unilateral declarations but with negotiations that lead a demilitarised Palestinian state to recognise Israel as a Jewish state. The debate to analyse this request was held in mid-November, after the US presidential elections; Washington was opposed to these UN initiatives, arguing that a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could only be reached via direct negotiations, which have been blocked in practice since 2010. Representatives of Hamas also expressed their scepticism at Abbas' UN initiative, and they believed that the problem is not terminology – whether it is a Palestinian state or authority – but Israeli occupation.

During the third quarter, press reports stressed that Abbas held a meeting with the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, Shaul Mofaz, in July. He also met with the Special Envoy of the Quartet for the Middle East, Tony Blair, in August. In September, as part of the protests on the West Bank over the rise in prices, Israel showed its willingness to help the PNA deal with the popular uprising. Analysts believe that this position revealed the Israeli government's fear that the protests would lead to a surge in demonstrations against its occupation. In this context, **the Israeli**

Minister of Defence, Ehud Barak, expressed his support for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from some of the settlements in the West Bank as a "practical" way to deal with the difficulties of an agreement with the Palestinians. According to his plan, Israel would retain most of the colonies in the border zones, along with a military presence in the area of the Jordan River.

In October, the head of EU foreign policy, Catherine Ashton, visited the region in order to revive the peace process for the Middle East. During her trip, Ashton condemned Israel's decision to build almost 800 new homes in the Gilo settlement, which Israel considers part of greater Jerusalem. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, responded to these criticisms by stating that they demonstrated a lack of understanding of the region and that the EU should concern itself with its own affairs. In this context, in late October a coalition of 22 NGOs issued an appeal to the EU to ban products from the Israeli settlements. In November, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict underwent a major escalation which left more than 160 mortal victims in its wake, the vast majority of them Palestinian. On the 21st of November, the parties reached a ceasefire agreement in Cairo that contained four main points. The first is a commitment from Israel to put an end to the hostilities against Gaza by sea, land and air, including incursions targeted against individual. Secondly, all the Palestinian factions, in turn, pledged to halt their hostilities against Israel, including the launch of rockets and border attacks. Thirdly, it was determined that 24 hours after the start of the ceasefire, talks would begin in order to open the border crossings to Gaza and allow for the free movement of people and goods. Finally, Egypt received both parties' guarantees that they would respect the agreement and supervise any incident that could be considered a violation of the agreement.

The United Nations General Assembly elevated Palestine's status in the international organisation and recognised it as a non-member state, thus granting it a position similar to that of the Vatican. In the vote, which was held on the 29th of November, this bid earned a total of 138 votes in favour, 41 abstentions and nine votes against, including Israel, the USA and the Czech Republic. The General Assembly thus gave its de facto recognition of a Palestinian state and the borders prior to the 1967 war. The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, likened this recognition from the UN to Palestinian state's birth certificate. The Israeli government warned that this measure would not change the status on the ground, stressed that no Palestinian state could be created without taking security guarantees for Israelis into account, and accused Abbas of not wanting peace. The UN's decision sparked huge demonstrations in the Palestinian territories. Regarded as a highly symbolic recognition, Palestine's new status in the UN may lead to new attempts on the part of the Palestinians to gain access to institutions like the International Criminal Court, where they could file grievances against Israel.

Late in the year, Fatah and Hamas showed some signs of rapprochement. On the 25th of November, the Islamist

group announced the release of political prisoners from Fatah, a measure that was replicated by the Palestinian organisation led by Mahmoud Abbas. Before the vote in the UN General Assembly, Hamas had also expressed its support for the initiative being spearheaded by the PNA. In the early days of December, the leader of Hamas in exile, Khaled Meshal, visited Gaza for the first time and participated in the commemorations of the anniversary of the first Intifada and the 25th anniversary of the Islamist group. Meshal had not been in Palestinian territory since his family had been forced to flee the zone in 1967, and he had only taken a brief trip to the West Bank in 1975. During his stay in Gaza, Meshal held meetings to debate issues related to Palestinian reconciliation. In mid-December, thousands of Palestinians participated in the celebrations of Hamas' anniversary in Nablus after the PA authorised the event, the first of its kind in the West Bank since 2007. In the ensuing days, thousands of people participated in Hamas' celebrations in other towns in the West Bank, including Hebron.

Most significant events of the year

- The contacts between Palestinian and Israeli delegations in Jordan failed.
- Abbas decided to ask the UN General Assembly to grant Palestine the status of non-member state of the organisation.
- Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement.
- The United Nations General Assembly elevated Palestine's status in the international organisation and recognised it as a non-member state.

Websites of interest

- Alternative Information Center (www.alternativenews.org)
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 - Haaretz (www.haaretz.com)
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 - IPCRI (www.ipcri.org)
 - Middle East Research and Information Project (www.merip.org)
 - Mideast Web (www.mideastweb.org)
 - Foreign Ministry of Israel (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa)
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 - United Nations (www.un.org/spanish/peace/palestine) (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
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 - Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
 - Wikipedia (Arab-Israeli conflict) (peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict)
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1. THE ACTORS IN THE ARMED CONFLICTS ANALYSED

Senegal (Casamance)	Government and armed opposition group MFDC
Ethiopia	Government and armed opposition group ONLF
Somalia	Government and armed opposition group al-Shabab
Sudan (Darfur)	Government and armed opposition groups JEM, SLA and LJM
CAR	Government and armed opposition group CPJP faction
DR Congo	Government and armed opposition group FRF faction
Sahara	Government of Morocco and Polisario Front
Colombia	Government and ELN and FARC guerrillas
Afghanistan	Government and Taliban
India	Government and Naxalite armed opposition groups ULFA, NDFB, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and UPDS
India-Pakistan	Governments of India and Pakistan
Philippines	Government and guerrillas MILF, MNLF and NPA
Myanmar	Government, political opposition group NLD and several guerrillas
Moldova	Governments of Moldova and de la region of Transnistria
Cyprus	Governments of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities
Kosovo	Governments of Serbia and de la self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo
Turkey	Government and PKK guerrilla
Armenia-Azerb.	Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Georgia	Government and authorities of the self-proclaimed autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Israel-Palestine	Government of Israel and Palestinian National Authority
Palestine	Palestinian groups
Israel-Palestina	Gobierno de Israel y Autoridad Nacional Palestina
Palestina	Fatah y Hamas

APPENDIX 2. ARMED GROUPS NOT ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS

Country	Group	Comment
Algeria	AQMI	Linked to al-Qaeda
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	ONLF	Secessionist group. One sector has signed a peace agreement
Nigeria	Boko Haram	Fundamentalist Islamist group
DR Congo (east)		Several militias
Somalia	Al-Shabab	Linked to al-Qaeda
South Sudan		Several militias
Uganda	LRA	Messianic militia
Colombia	ELN	Longstanding guerrillas
Peru	Shining Path	Armed opposition group
Philippines	Abu Sayyaf	Linked to al-Qaeda
India (Jammu and Kashmir)	JKLF – Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen	Secessionist groups
India (Manipur)	PLA – UNLF – PREPAK – KNF – KNA – KYKL, RPF	Secessionist groups
India	CPI-M	Naxalite group
Iraq		Several insurgent groups
Pakistan	Terihrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Taliban militia
Pakistan (Balochistan)	BLA – BRA – BLF - BLT	Nationalist insurgency
Thailand (south)		Secessionist groups
Russia (Chechnya)		Secessionist groups
Russia (Dagestan)		Fundamentalist Islamist group
Russia (Ingushetia)	Jamaat Ingush	Islamist group
Yemen	Al-Qaeda	

APPENDIX 3. AGE OF THE CONFLICTS WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS

	Start of the conflict	Years underway	Notes
India (CPI-M)	1967	44	The government has made proposals for negotiations
India (Manipur)	1982	29	
Uganda	1986	25	
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	1991	20	
Algeria	1992	19	
DR Congo (east)	1998	13	
Russia (Chechnya)	1999	12	
Others	after 2000	-10	

APPENDIX 4. THE FACILITATORS IN THE CONFLICTS ANALYSED

Senegal (Casamance)	Sant Egidio Community
Ethiopia (ONLF)	-
Somalia	-
Sudan (Darfur)	Qatar (Ahmed Abdullah al-Mahmud), UN-AU (Djibril Bassolé)
CAR	Paulin Pomodimo, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Western Sahara	UN (Christopher Ross)
Colombia	Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile
Afghanistan	Qatar
India (Assam)	Mamoni Raisom Goswani
India-Pakistan	-
China-Tibet	-
Philippines (MILF)	Malaysia (Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak)
Philippines (MNLF)	Indonesia
Philippines (NPA)	Norway (Ture Lundh)
Myanmar	-
Cyprus	UN (Alexander Downer)
Kosovo	-
Moldova	OSCE (Philip Remler)
Turkey	-
Armenia-Azerbaijan	Minsk Group of the OSCE: France (Bernard Fassier), Russia (Igor Popov) and USA (Robert Bradtke)
Georgia	UN, OSCE, EU
Israel-Palestine	Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU, UN)
Palestine	Egypt

APPENDIX 5. NEGOTIATION TIMES IN CERTAIN CONFLICTS (STATUS AT THE END OF 2012)

	Start of the conflict	Start of the negotiations	Years the conflict lasted	Years until the first negotiation
India-Pakistan	1947	1949	65	2
Guatemala	1960	1989	36	29
Colombia – ELN	1964	1991	48	27
Colombia – FARC	1964	1983	48	19
Palestine	1967	1990	45	23
Philippines – NPA	1969	1986	44	17
Northern Ireland	1970	1985	35	15
Philippines - MRLF	1972	1993	24	21
Cyprus	1974	1974	38	0
Angola	1975	1991	27	16
Cabinda	1975	2002	30	27
Western Sahara	1975	1991	37	16
Timor-Leste	1975	1998	24	23
Indonesia – GAM	1976	2000	29	24
Philippines – MILF	1978	1998	34	20
India – CPI	1980	2002	32	22
India – NSCN	1980	2003	32	23
Senegal – MFDC	1982	1991	24	9
Sri Lanka	1983	1983	26	0
Sudan – SPLA	1983	1999	22	16
Ethiopia – ONLF	1984	1998	28	4
Turkey – PKK	1986	1994	26	8
Uganda – LRA	1984	2009	28	25
Armenia-Azerb.	1991	1994	21	3
Sierra Leone	1991	1996	10	5
Somalia	1991	2000	21	9
Algeria	1992	1999	20	7
Bosnia-H.	1992	1992	3	0
Georgia-Abkhazia	1992	1992	20	0
Tajikistan	1992	1994	5	2
Burundi –FNL	1993	2002	13	9
Nigeria-MEND	1994	2008	18	14
DR Congo – FDLR	1994	2004	18	10
Nepal – CPN	1996	2003	10	7
Congo- Ninjas	1998	1999	5	1
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998	1998	2	0
DR Congo	1998	1998	3	0
Liberia-Lurd	2000	2002	3	2
Ivory Coast	2002	2002	4	0

	Start of the conflict	Start of the negotiations	Years the conflict lasted	Years until the first negotiation
Sudan – Darfur	2003	2003	9	0
Yemen	2004	2006	8	2
Sudan - east	2005	2006	1	1
Kenya	2008	2008	1	0
Georgia - Russia	2008	2008	1	0

(Bold type indicates the conflicts that are finished).


APPENDIX 6. RANK OF THE COUNTRIES ANALYSED ACCORDING TO THEIR GLOBAL PEACE INDEX⁶ (over a total of 158 countries)

Rank	Country	Score
54	Morocco	1,867
64	Serbia	1,920
66	Moldova	1,927
73	Cyprus	1,957
78	Senegal	1,994
115	Armenia	2,238
116	Niger	2,241
130	Turkey	2,344
132	Azerbaijan	2,360
133	Philippines	2,415
139	Myanmar	2,525
141	Georgia	2,541
142	India	2,549
143	Yemen	2,601
144	Colombia	2,625
146	Nigeria	2,801
149	Pakistan	2,625
150	Israel	2,842
154	DR Congo	3,073
157	Afghanistan	3,252
158	Somalia	3,392

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2012.

⁶ Este índice está formado por 22 indicadores que analizan la paz interna y externa de los países.

APPENDIX 7. TELL ME WHAT IT WAS LIKE... THE MIRRORS OF PEACE



Even though all the conflicts and their respective peace processes or negotiations are different, there tend to be certain aspects in each of them that explain why they attract attention, such as their methodology, objectives or other reasons. This table illustrates the processes in which the actors, either governmental or armed, have studied, observed or travelled to other regions to find out firsthand how their process unfolded, creating interesting mirrors where inspiration can be found for dealing with their own difficulties.

APPENDIX 8. CONFLICTS, PEACE PROCESSES AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN 2012

Senegal	
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Libya	2040
Somalia	2036 -2060 -2067 -2072 -2073 -2077
Sudan	2035 -2046 -2047 -2057 -2063 -2075
South Sudan	
CAR	
Burundi	
DR Congo	2053 -2078
Uganda	
Algeria	
Western Sahara	2044
Colombia	
Afghanistan	2041
India	
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	
Pakistan	
Philippines	
Myanmar	
Thailand (south)	
Cyprus	2058
Kosovo	
Turkey (PKK)	
Armenia-Azerbaijan	
Georgia	
Moldova (Transnistria)	
Russia (Chechnya)	
Russia (Ingushetia)	
Russia (Dagestan)	
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	
Iraq	2061
Israel-Palestine	2042 -2043
Syria	
Yemen	2051
Siria	2042 – 2043
Yemen	2051

APPENDIX 9. MANAGING THE PAST IN RECENT PEACE AGREEMENTS

Country	Year of peace agreement	Initiatives	Year	Delay
El Salvador	1992	Creating a Truth Commission and subsequent general amnesty	1992	0 years
South Africa	1994	Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	1994	0 years
Guatemala	1996	Creating a Historical Clarification Commission	1997	1 year
		Creating an International Commission against Impunity	2007	11 years
Tajikistan	1997	Creating a National Reconciliation Commission which approved a law on mutual pardon and a draft amnesty law	—	—
Northern Ireland	1998	Creating a Consultative Group on the Past , which has not found the support to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2007	9 years
Angola	2002	—	—	—
Sierra Leone	2002	Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the existence of a Special Court for Sierra Leone	2002	0 years
Liberia	2003	Amnesty after the peace agreement and later creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2005	2 years
Indonesia (Aceh)	2005	The peace agreement granted amnesty to the members of the GAM and called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be set up, which has not yet been done.	—	—
Southern Sudan	2005	—	—	—
Nepal	2006	In 2009, there was a verbal commitment to create a Commission on Disappeared Persons and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.	—	—
Burundi	2008	The peace agreement contained provisional immunity for the FNL members and its transformation into a political party. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be created.	—	—

APENDIX 10. PEACE PROCESSES IN RECENT YEARS

This appendix summarises the peace processes that have taken place in 12 countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Angola, South Africa, Liberia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Burundi, Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal. It encompasses processes begun between 1984 (El Salvador) and 2002 (Nepal), which lasted between four years in Nepal and 21 years in Northern Ireland. The majority had mediators (four by the United Nations), and as for the underlying causes, four were the democratisation of the country, five were political power-sharing and three were self-governance. In two of the processes (Guatemala and South Africa), there was widespread participation by society, while the remaining processes were conducted in a more pyramidal fashion. Once the agreements were reached, an amnesty for combatants was called in all the countries, although Truth Commissions were created in only some of them. All the opposition groups that fought in the conflict ended up holding positions of responsibility in the new governments that emerged after the peace agreements.

	Negotiation period	Years	Mediation	Underlying cause
El Salvador	1984-1994	10	UN	Democratisation of the country
Guatemala	1985-1996	11	UN	Democratisation of the country
Northern Ireland	1987-2008	21	-	Self-governance
Angola	1988-2002	14	Portugal, Russia, USA	Political power-sharing
South Africa	1989-1994	5	-	Democratisation of the country
Liberia	1990-2003	13	ECOWAS	Political power-sharing
Tajikistan	1992-1997	5	UN	Political power-sharing
Sierra Leone	1994-2002	8	UN	Political power-sharing
Burundi	1998-2008	10	Tanzania South Africa	Political power-sharing
Indonesia (Aceh)	2000-2005	5	CDH Finland	Self-governance
Nepal	2002-2006	4	-	Democratisation of the country

The reasons for engaging in negotiations and starting the peace processes were diverse, but in all cases the people's weariness with war and desire for peace were crucial. In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the regional context favourable to talks (Contadora Group) played a key role, as it did in Tajikistan. In Guatemala, the presidential elections that fostered a change in the political scene were influential, while in Northern Ireland and South Africa the economic need to achieve peace was an important factor. In Tajikistan and South Africa, the fact that the guerrillas no longer had a safe rearguard was a determining factor. External pressure exerted an influence in South Africa, Angola, southern Sudan and Burundi. The humanitarian crisis was the trigger in southern Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh); in the latter country, a natural catastrophe, the tsunami, catalysed the process. Finally, in Nepal, popular demonstrations against the monarchy paved the way for the negotiations that led to the definitive peace agreement.

The process in El Salvador

A civil war broke out in 1980 which led to the death of 75,000 people, as the FMLN guerrillas clashed with the country's repressive militaristic government. In 1983, the Security Council approved a resolution in which it stated its

support for the peace-building activities of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), which had embarked on a series of consultations in five Central American countries. Between 1984 and 1987, the first four exploratory dialogue encounters were held, to no avail, between the government and FMLN representatives. These talks were mediated by the archbishop of El Salvador, Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas. At the last meeting, the Nunciature Round in October 1987, a communiqué was issued that expressed the desire to reach a ceasefire and to back the decisions taken by the Contadora Group. This was a stage in which both parties' positions matured and became more flexible. The Esquipulas Process gained prominence in 1986, which used the efforts of the Contadora Group and was joined by the Support Group (Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) with the backing of the OAS and the UN. Between 1987 and 1990, the Central American presidents called for a negotiated political solution.

In September 1989, the Secretary General of the United Nations conducted his first good offices spurred by a request by President Cristiani and the FMLN made in Mexico. The Secretary General appointed Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto his special representative. The agreement signed in Mexico between the government and the FMLN included a decision to embark on a dialogue

process with the purpose of putting an end to the armed conflict. However, in November, the FMLN launched a general offensive to demonstrate its strength. The offensive was contained by the armed forces, leading both parties to reach the conclusion that they were militarily tied.

In April 1990, a dialogue meeting was held in Geneva sponsored by the United Nations and in the presence of the Secretary General. At this meeting, an agreement was signed that laid down a series of rules to be followed in the negotiation process and stated both parties' desire to reach a negotiated, political solution. The goals were to end the armed conflict via political means, to promote the country's democratisation, to ensure unlimited respect for human rights and to reunify Salvadoran society. In May of the same year, a meeting was held in Caracas where a general negotiating agenda and calendar were drawn up. The process was divided into two phases: in the first, political agreements would be reached in areas that enabled the armed conflict to come to an end; and in the second, the guarantees and conditions needed for the FMLN to rejoin the country's civil, institutional and political life would be set forth. In July, the San José Agreement (Costa Rica) was reached, which outlined both parties' commitment to respect human rights and called for a UN verification mission (the future ONUSAL) before reaching a ceasefire.

In April 1991, an agreement was reached in Mexico City in which the negotiations on land tenancy were considered closed and constitutional reforms on judicial, military, electoral and human rights matters were included. The Truth Commission was created to investigate the serious violent deeds that had taken place since 1980; the commission received more than 22,000 grievances. In May, UN Security Council Resolution 693 was approved, which stipulated the formation of a United Nations Observers' Mission for El Salvador, whose initial mandate was to verify compliance with the San José Human Rights Agreements. Later, its mandate would be expanded. The mission had a three-fold organisation: a human rights division, a military division and police observers. In September, the UN Secretary General intervened directly by seating the parties in New York (New York Agreement) at a summit at which they agreed to the minimum security guarantees for a ceasefire. These guarantees were later verified by the nascent National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), made up of all the political forces in the country. In December, final negotiations were held at the UN headquarters in New York, and on the 31st of this same month an agreement was reached.

In January 1992, a general amnesty was declared and the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed, which led to a change in the armed forces (elimination of officers involved in the dirty war and reduction in troops), the creation of the National Civil Police force, the dissolution of the military intelligence services, the elimination of the paramilitary corps, a change in the judicial system, the defence of human rights, the creation of a Truth Commission, changes in the electoral system, the transformation

of the FMLN into a political party, the adoption of economic and social measures and the expansion of the ONUSAL mandate (Military and Police Division). February witnessed a cessation of the armed clash and the start of demobilisation. In December, the FMLN was legalised as a political party, and the next day, the definitive end to the conflict was officially celebrated.

There were several determining factors in reaching the agreements: the Salvadoran people's desire for peace, changes in civil law, the de-legitimisation of the armed forces, the murder of six Jesuit priests, the military standoff between the armed forces and the FMLN, more flexible positions, United Nations mediation, the efforts of friendly countries (Spain, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), the positive role played by the Catholic Church and the National Reconciliation Commission, the new geopolitical scene (end of the Soviet empire, defeat of the Sandinistas), pressure from the United States late in the game and the influence of the Contadora Group. The process lasted ten years.

The process in Guatemala

Just like many peace processes, the one in Guatemala needed many years, more than one decade, to transform the earliest contacts into the agreement signed in 1996. The origins date back to 1983, when Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formed the Contadora Group with the purpose of stimulating democratic changes in Central America and generating, in little time, regional pressure in favour of peace in the region. The Contadora Group is an example of how an external factor can become a driving force in creating an atmosphere that is friendly to dialogue and negotiation, to such an extent that these processes would not have existed in Guatemala, nor in El Salvador and Nicaragua, without this initiative.

Furthermore, the regional pressure dovetailed with the first steps towards civility taken inside the country shortly thereafter. Guatemala had been enmeshed in years of conflict and militarisation, and it was not until 1984 that Guatemalan military officers gave the first signs of agreeing to transfer power to civilian hands. These signs materialised in the 1985 presidential elections, which Vinicio Cerezo won. He became the president who launched the much-awaited transition to democracy after years of military dictatorship. Cerezo was also the first to make overtures to the guerrillas, specifically in Spain at the headquarters of the Guatemalan embassy, in an initial exploration of the URNG guerrilla's willingness to embark on a negotiation process. Even though the right conditions were not in place at that time, the encounter was decisive for starting a maturation process which would bear fruit years later. In any event, without the courage to take this first step and in the absence of Cerezo's vision of the future, peace would never have been achieved in Guatemala.

In 1986 and 1987, there was yet another regional push with the Esquipulas I and II Agreements, with the slogan

“peace for democracy”. The upshot of these meetings was the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala, which in the ensuing years would play a prominent role in achieving peace. In parallel, pro-peace social and religious groups also blossomed. They would end up being the hallmark of Guatemala’s experience: the decisive contribution of its civil society in a scope of involvement rarely seen in peace processes. At that time, the contribution by a single person, the U.S. Lutheran pastor Paul Wee, was also crucial. Wee was the former Secretary General of the Lutheran World Federation whose good offices fostered the earliest encounters between the URNG and the military. While in South Africa the human factor is discussed in reference to the decisive contribution by Nelson Mandela, the history of Guatemala must pay tribute to the crucial figure of Paul Wee, as without his efforts the process would have taken another pace and a different course. Paul Wee fostered the creation of a favourable atmosphere, which paved the way for the Grand National Dialogue called in 1989.

In 1990, an extremely important process got underway that was dubbed the “Oslo Consultations”, as the first meeting between the URNG and the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was held in that city, which enshrined Norway as one of the most active countries in peace diplomacy. That encounter ushered in a series of meetings between CNR delegates and the URNG in different countries: in El Escorial, Spain, with the presence of the political parties; in Ottawa, Canada, with the business sector; in Quito, Ecuador, with the religious groups; in Metepec, Mexico, with representation of the people and trade unions; and finally in Atlixco, Mexico, with the representatives of educational organisations, small business owners and university colleges. These meetings laid the groundwork for the start of direct negotiations between the URN and the government in 1991. These negotiations lasted five years. President Serrano, who replaced Cerezo, launched the Total Peace initiative, which made it possible to sign an agreement in Mexico in April with an eleven-point negotiation agenda. The main items included strengthening civil society and the role of the army, indigenous peoples, constitutional reform and the election system, resettling the displaced population, socioeconomic conditions and agricultural reform. A second round of negotiations was held in Querétaro, Mexico, in July, at which the principles for the democratisation of the country were discussed. As can be seen, much of Guatemala’s process was conducted outside the country.

In 1993, under the presidency of Ramiro de León, institutional reforms were undertaken in Guatemala and the National Reconciliation Commission was disbanded. However, a permanent peace fund was created to give the people a voice, and at the end of the year, more formal negotiations were launched with the URNG after several “ecumenical encounters” organised by pastor Paul Wee. The following year, negotiation rounds were held in Mexico, and UN mediation got underway with the Framework Agreement for Resumption of the Negotiation

Process; this entailed a series of rounds that lasted until the final agreement, signed in 1996. The figure of “friendly countries” was launched, which included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States and Venezuela. These countries provided diplomatic and economic support to the project. The United Nations created MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala), whose mandate lasted until 2004. In March, the important Global Agreement on Human Rights was signed by the government and the URNG. It is worth noting that this agreement was signed without a ceasefire, that is, in the midst of the hostilities, but with the purpose of “humanising” the war. It was agreed to ask that a Standing Civil Society Assembly be created, which started in April of that year and lasted until 1996. Its mandate was to debate the underlying issues addressed in the bilateral negotiations. With the ASC, Guatemala’s process provided a hugely enriching model of citizen participation, as it is one of the processes in which civil society had the most chances to influence the negotiating table under an operating scheme in which ten delegates were appointed for each social sector represented. These delegates were charged with adopting “least common denominator” proposals to be brought to the negotiating table.

Finally, a peace agreement was signed in 1996 that put an end to 36 years of armed conflict. It consisted of 13 agreements and 300 commitments, not all of which were fulfilled, partly because they were overly ambitious and partly because a referendum which was supposed to ratify some of them failed to pass in 1999. Thus, the process in Guatemala is criticised for having overly high aspirations, which sheds light on the dilemma of which is better: a less ambitious but more realistic agreement, or the opposite. In any event, the agreement put an end to the armed violence and enabled an International Commission against Impunity to be created years later in 2007.

The process in Northern Ireland

The peace process in Northern Ireland lasted a little over a decade. Its immediate origins date back to the mid-1980s, when the atmosphere was conducive to peace, either because of weariness with war, contagion from other processes, the economic need to achieve peace, support from the new US administration or the people’s fervent desire for peace. In 1987, the first secret talks were launched between John Hume, leader of Northern Ireland’s Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the British government. Eleven years later, Hume was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to peace in Northern Ireland. In 1990, the channel of communication was opened with the leaders of Sinn Féin, and in December 1993 the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, which accepted Northern Ireland’s right to self-determination and pledged to facilitate an agreement with the Irish people, as well as allowing Sinn Féin to join the political dialogue. This led the IRA to declare a ceasefire in 1994, which lasted until February 2006. In January 2005, the loyalist paramilitary groups

declared a ceasefire, and in November of the same year, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, travelled to Northern Ireland, which amounted to an enormous boost to the peace process.

In June 1996, inclusive multi-party negotiations were held, initially without Sinn Féin, with the mediation of former US Senator George Mitchell. These negotiations operated under the principle of “sufficient consensus”, that is, the decisions were taken by simple majority, as long as the main parties participated. Decision-making also included what was called “parallel consent”, in which a majority of both nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants was needed. The negotiations were conducted under the principle that “nothing was agreed until everything was agreed”; that is, the partial agreements would not be valid until everything had been agreed to. Under former Senator Mitchell’s mediation, it was stipulated that only peaceful and political means would be used in the process. This was called the “Mitchell principles”. At this time, the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, demonstrated her courage by visiting prisons to meet with prisoners from the IRA and protestant paramilitary groups with the purpose of convincing them to take part in the peace process. In 1997, the IRA declared a second truce, which allowed Sinn Féin to rejoin the multi-party talks. Finally, a peace agreement called the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed in April 1998. This agreement called for police reform, reform of the institutions of Northern Ireland, the formation of a British-Irish Ministerial Council, a North South Ministerial Council and a Human Rights Commission. Seven years later, in 2005, the IRA gave up its armed struggle. In 2007, a government shared between Catholics and Protestants was started, and the IRA was officially, permanently disbanded in 2008. Reconciliation will take many years and the wounds will probably not be fully healed for another generation, but at least headway can be made in the absence of attacks.

The process in Angola

The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and lasted 26 years, causing half a million deaths. It pitted the government forces of the MPLA, who received support from the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc countries, against the rebel forces of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi and initially supported by the United States, South Africa, Zaire and other African governments. The first attempt at negotiations came in December 1988, when an agreement was forcibly signed in New York; however, it did not address the causes of the conflict or entail an interruption in foreign interference. The first important official agreements (the Bicesse Agreement in May 1991 and the Lusaka Agreement in November 1994), both reached under the auspices of the international community, did not manage to put a halt to the military clashes, while the third one, the Luena Memorandum from 2002, in which the international community hardly played a role, enabled a cessation of hostilities to be reached and put an end to the war.

The official negotiations began in Portugal in 1990 under the auspices of the Troika made up of Portugal, the USSR and the United States. This led the MPLA to agree to turn Angola into a multi-party state. In May 1991, the Bicesse Agreement was signed in Portugal with mediation by the government of that country in the presence of President Dos Santos and Savimbi. This agreement stipulated that elections had to be held with UNITA’s participation and United Nations supervision, although neither of the sides had given up its aspirations to achieve a military victory. A second UN mission was set up in Angola (UNAVEM II) with the mission of observing and verifying the disarmament process and backing the creation of a single new national army. In the meantime, the non-military social and political forces were left on the sidelines of the process. The MPLA won the elections, which were called too hastily in September 1992, and UNITA declared them fraudulent; as a result, the hostilities resumed without UNAVEM II unable to do anything. The United States stopped supporting UNITA and recognised the government of Angola, leading the UN to open sanctions against UNITA, which in October 1993 was forced to recognise the Bicesse Agreement and resume the talks. For one year, in the midst of combats that substantially curtailed UNITA’s capacities, both parties held a dialogue mediated by the United Nations Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the troika. This led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, which stipulated that UNITA had to disarm in exchange for participating in the National Unity and Reconciliation Government. UNITA, however, did not disarm and continued to exploit the diamond resources in an effort to continue the war, which led the Security Council to step up its sanctions against UNITA in June 1998. Under the Lusaka Protocol, both parties had to conclude the electoral process under UN supervision, in addition to a cessation of hostilities, the cantonment of UNITA troops and disarmament. In February 1995, the United Nations Mission UNAVEM III was created with the mission of helping the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements. Savimbi met with President Mandela in May 1995, and shortly thereafter the MPLA offered Savimbi the Vice Presidency of the country. In March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos reached an agreement to form a coalition government. When the UNAVEM III mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created with a contingent of 1,500 troops, but in 1999 the Angolan government, which felt militarily strong enough to defeat UNITA, asked for it to be closed, so it moved from Luanda to New York. The permanent truce between the MPLA and UNITA was only reached in 2002 when the leader of the latter, Jonas Savimbi, was murdered from several gunshots on the 22nd of February, which allowed a ceasefire to be reached with the new leader, the Secretary General of UNITA, Paulo Lukamba, and a National Unity Government to be formed. UNITA abandoned its armed struggle and became a political party. It officially demobilised in August 2002. The peace agreement became official in the Luena Memorandum dating from April 2002. The negotiation process had lasted 14 years.

The process in South Africa

The process in South Africa, which lasted less time, also emerged as the result of a nurturing atmosphere. In the late 1980s, South Africa was experiencing governability problems. There was a great deal of outside pressure regarding the policy of apartheid, the country was suffering from a major economic crisis and Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was losing outside support as the result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire. In 1989, all of these factors conspired in favour of negotiations, which the recently appointed President De Klerk would transform into major reforms. De Klerk opened up secret negotiations with Mandela, who was now the mastermind of a process that would shake the world and become a benchmark for other countries seeking a model of transition to democracy and reconciliation. Mandela used his extraordinary powers of persuasion to earn the trust and respect of his opponents and turn the secret talks into formal negotiations. He was released in 1990, at the same time that all the political groups were legalised and the transitional period got underway. In March of the following year, the churches called a peace conference, which was warmly welcomed by the business community. Indeed the business sector became one of the most fervent in its support of change, to such an extent that a consultative business movement was created. In April, President De Klerk announced a peace summit, and shortly thereafter a Civil Facilitating Commission and a National Peace Convention were created. From then on, a parallel process unfolded: first, the National Peace Accord was launched from 1991 to 1994 as the instrument of citizen participation, and secondly the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was orchestrated, made up of five working groups, along with the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) as a formal negotiation mechanism between the government and the political parties, including the ANC.

The instrument for citizen participation, the National Peace Accord, worked with two kinds of structures: a National Peace Commission (made up of 60 people) and a National Peace Secretariat (made up of seven people), as well as regional and local structures. The latter were made up of 11 regional peace commissions (with representatives from political parties, business, trade unions, local authorities, police, local commissions and other sectors), 260 local peace commissions (which reflected the composition of each community and reported to the regional commissions) and 15,000 peace monitors. This civic structure, which bears deep-down similarities to the Civil Society Assembly in Guatemala, debated the issues on the negotiation agenda for three years until general elections were held in 1994. Nelson Mandela won, and a transition government was sworn in, which gave rise to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated until 1999. In December 1996, the new constitution was approved, ushering in the new South Africa of the 21st century, full of challenges yet free of apartheid. All of this was thanks to the courage and mass

appeal of President Mandela, the miraculous "human factor" in South Africa, a process which, along with its charismatic leader, has given the world a participatory model with a unique experience of reconciliation, in which forgiveness was conditioned upon revelation of the truth. The peace process lasted five years.

The process in Liberia

In 1980, Samuel Doe took power after the popular uprising. The civil war got underway in 1989, when Charles Taylor left Doe's government and met with a group of rebels from the NPFL in the Ivory Coast and attacked the capital. The UN responded to this in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook several initiatives to resolve the conflict, including the intervention of a regional ceasefire observer force (ECOMOG), which became an opposition faction in the conflict. Taylor was supported by Libya. Another dissident, Johnson, captured and killed Doe in 1990. ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as the President and with Johnson's support. In 1992, ULIMO, made up of Doe sympathisers, started a guerrilla war. The Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to facilitate talks between ECOWAS and the conflicting parties. A coalition government was formed in 1993. With mediation by ECOWAS, a peace agreement was reached in Cotonu (Benin), after which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established with the goal of consolidating the ceasefire. The next year, it was impossible for elections to be held due to skirmishes, but several complementary peace agreements were negotiated to join the Cotonu Agreements. In August 1995, after numerous negotiations and a dozen failed peace agreements, the Abuja (Nigeria) Agreement was signed, which included the leaders of the clashing factions in a transitional government and required the disarmament of the guerrillas for the elections.

In 1997, Taylor formed the National Patriotic Party and won the elections. He was elected President and promoted a policy of reconciliation and national unity. Even though the main militias had been dissolved in order to become political organisations, rebel groups continued operating from Sierra Leone and Guinea, giving rise to a second civil war. UNOMIL ended its mandate, and the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL), which managed to reach an agreement with the rebel groups to share power in the country. In 1999, ECOMOG withdrew from the country. In 2000, groups opposed to Taylor were formed, such as LURD (with support from Guinea), which began a war financed by diamond resources. In February 2000, a meeting sponsored by the King of Morocco was held in Rabat, in which the heads of state of the Mano River Union countries participated. At this meeting, the leaders pledged to resolve their differences and agreed to set up a Joint Security Committee on a sub-regional level. However, the dialogue process was suspended when

President Taylor decided not to attend the September meeting, alleging concerns over his personal safety. Days later, a ten-member International Contact Group on Liberia was set up in New York under the joint presidency of ECOWAS and the EU with the purpose of securing greater participation by the international community in the efforts to resolve the crisis.

In early 2003 MODEL was formed with the support of the Ivory Coast; this group opposed Taylor and fought alongside LURD. By May, both rebel groups had seized control of two-thirds of the country and were threatening to take the capital, so the government and the rebels were forced to negotiate an agreement to put an end to the civil war. In June, negotiations were held among all the parties participated in Accra under the sponsorship of Ghana and ECOWAS facilitation. Taylor said that he was willing to resign if this would contribute to achieving peace. Days later, a ceasefire agreement was signed, which was violated by LURD several times. In July, spurred by intensified combats and in view of the threat of a humanitarian crisis, the Secretary General decided to appoint Jacques Paul from the USA his Special Representative for Liberia with the mandate to support the incipient transition agreements. He also proposed that international troops be deployed and that the UNOL be closed. In early August, the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force, and due to pressure from the USA, UN and EU, Taylor resigned because of his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone and harassment from LURD. On the 18th of August, the Accra Agreement was signed by the government, LURD, MODEL and the political parties as part of the ECOWAS peace process. The militias disarmed and a National Transitional Government was instated until the 2005 elections. The peace agreement also stipulated an amnesty and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Through this agreement, the parties asked the United Nations to deploy a 15,000-member force in Liberia (UNMIL) to support the National Transitional Government and ensure implementation of the agreement. The war ended in October when the United Nations and the US military intervened and banished Taylor to Nigeria. He was later transferred to The Hague to be tried by the International Criminal Court. The conflict, which lasted 14 years, had taken 250,000 lives and left one million displaced persons. The negotiations lasted 13 years.

The process in Tajikistan

In 1992, one year after Tajikistan proclaimed its independence from the USSR, a civil war broke out which led to 50,000 deaths. In May, the Tajik opposition, an informal coalition of Islamic groups and other forces, took power after two months of demonstrations. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), led by Abdullo Nuri, took refuge in Afghanistan after being defeated in December.

In September of that same year, the first United Nations exploratory mission was conducted based on an appeal

from President Rakhmonov to the UN Secretary General. A second United Nations exploratory mission was held in November, with the active participation of four countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. In April, Ismat Kittani was appointed the Secretary General's special envoy. In January 1993, Kittani was replaced by Ramiro Piriz-Ballón. In March 1993, the "non-official inter-Tajik dialogue" got underway when seven individuals from different factions in the war gathered round the same table in Moscow. The talks continued after a peace agreement was signed in 1997, and they exerted some influence on the outcome of events. In September 1993, the CIS Council of Ministers deployed collective peace forces, made up of contingents from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The hostilities had waned considerably.

In April 1994, the first round of negotiations was held in Moscow with an inclusive agenda (political agreement, the problem of refugees and consolidation of the state). In June, a second round of negotiations was held in Teheran with participation by the OECD as an observer. In September, a consultative meeting took place in Teheran, where a provisional ceasefire agreement was signed, prepared by the United Nations teams. At that meeting, the Russian and Iranian chancellors played a prominent role in convincing the UTO. In October, the third round of talks was held in Islamabad with participation by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as an observer. This round concluded with a protocol that set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire. In December, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was created with the mission of supervising the situation and backing regional peace initiatives.

In May 1995, the fourth round of talks was held in Almaty with an agreement to exchange prisoners and repatriate refugees. The UTO submitted a proposal for a transition government, which was rejected by the government. In July and August, the United Nations team flew between Dushanbe and Kabul five times to hold "consultative negotiations" between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the UTO, Nuri. In August, President Rakhmonov and Nuri signed a *Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for establishing Peace and National Accord* in Tajikistan, which became the roadmap and stipulated that a "continuous round" of negotiations be held. In November, the first phase in the continuous round was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, where the discussion topics included how to integrate representatives from the opposition into the government and representatives from the opposite military units into the armed forces. In July 1996, the third phase in the continuous rounds was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, and Ramiro Piriz-Ballón was replaced by the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Gerd Merrem. In December, Rakhmonov and Nuri met in Afghanistan and agreed to a cessation of hostilities.

In January 1997, the Protocol on Refugees was signed in Teheran with key participation by the Iranian Foreign

Minister, Velayati. From January to May, rounds of talks were held in Teheran, Moscow, Meshed (Iran) and Bishkek, in which both parties agreed to the modalities of the DDR, the integration of the armed forces, the legalisation of the Islamic Renaissance Party and a 30% share in the power structure for UTO representatives. The Protocol on Political Affairs was signed in the Bishkek round with the good offices of the President of Kyrgyzstan. In March, the Protocol on Military Affairs was signed, which enabled the CIS armed forces to accompany the units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) from Afghanistan to the gathering zones supervised by UNMOT. The Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, played a key role in this process. Finally, on the 27th of June, the General Peace Agreement was signed at the Kremlin. In July, the first meeting of the National Reconciliation Commission was held in Moscow, which approved a mutual forgiveness law and a draft amnesty law that was approved days later by the Parliament. In November, a donor conference was held in Vienna, where 96 million dollars were pledged. The Security Council extended UNMOT's mandate and changed its mission so it could cooperate with the National Reconciliation Commission, supervise the DDR and coordinate the United Nations' assistance during the transitional period. In 1999, peaceful elections were held and Rakhmonov was re-elected president. The peace process lasted five years.

There were several key factors in the negotiations: weariness of war; Russia's and Iran's interest in peace (the last few rounds were held in the capitals of both countries); the moderating influence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the Tajik opposition; the advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the loss of the rearguard for the Tajik opposition); the fundamental role played by the United Nations and its Department of Political Affairs; the skilful handling of the process by the friendly countries; the Security Council's clear mandate; the adept coordination of the four CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia); the participation of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan as observers; the role of the OSCE and the OIC, who were allies in the process and guarantors of the peace agreement; the negotiations, which were not interrupted despite the surrounding conflict and noncompliance with the ceasefire (the negotiations were part of the war strategy); the personal relations between the Tajik President Rakhmonov, and the Tajik opposition leader, Nuri, who took the helm of their respective delegations seven times; the confidentiality of the process; the usual format of consultations between the leaders of the delegations and the United Nations mediators, who always wrote the first drafts, which were accepted 95% of the time; and the existence of the "non-official inter-Tajik dialogue", which bore a positive influence on the course of the negotiations.

The process in Sierra Leone

A civil war broke out in 1991 in which 75,000 people died. It was triggered by a rebellion against President Momoh led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with Foday

Sankoh at the helm. Momoh was defeated the next year in a military coup. Captain Strasser became the President, and the RUF issued new demands, leading the conflict to continue. In October, the RUF took control of the diamond mines, which also prolonged the conflict.

In 1994, President Strasser asked for the good offices of the UN Secretary General to encourage the RUF to negotiate with the government. The Secretary General sent a civil servant to try to forge contacts with the RUF, but to no avail. In view of this development, the Secretary General appointed Berhanu Dinka his Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, with the mission of engaging in contacts with the RUF. In 1995, the UN, ECOSAP and the OAU tried to negotiate a solution, and in December of the same year the international British organisation Alert helped to set up a meeting between the UN and the RUF in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). In March 1996, presidential elections were held and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected. The RUF did not participate and forged ahead with the conflict, but on the 25th of March the outgoing government and the RUF signed a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed to hold negotiations with a view to solving the conflict. These negotiations were held with mediation by Ivory Coast, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth. In April, Kabbah and Sankoh met face-to-face in the Ivory Coast; they agreed to a ceasefire and to set up working groups. The OAU decided to get more actively involved and appointed a special envoy. The negotiations ended with the signing of the Abidjan Agreement in November, which initially put an end to the conflict. The agreement called for amnesty, the conversion of the RUF into a political party and a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. The agreement also called for electoral, judicial and police reform. Between December 1996 and January 1997, an evaluation group sent by the UN Secretary General visited Sierra Leone, and on the 3rd of January this group managed to meet with the leader of the RUF.

In March 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, and in May of the same year, Paul Koroma led a military coup with the support of the RUF. He created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, with which he fought the ECOMOG (Military Observer Group) troops in the country. In October, talks were held in Conakry and a peace plan was signed that called for a cessation of hostilities, an ECOMOG verification mechanism, the DDR, immunity for participants in the coup, the return of Sankoh and the reinstatement of President Kabbah's constitutional government. In February 1998, in response to a joint attack by the RUF and the army of the junta, ECOMOG launched a military attack that led to the dissolution of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. President Kabbah once again occupied his post and appointed a new government. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was also created. Foday Sankoh, who had been arrested, issued a call for surrender, but the skirmishes continued, partly due to Liberia's support of RUF members.

In 1999, new negotiations were held between the government and the rebels. In May, the Lomé Convention

was signed and a dialogue got underway between the government and the RUF. The government transported Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé with a promise of amnesty. The government of Togo facilitated the negotiations. A ceasefire was declared and the prisoners of war were released. The main provisions in the agreement were the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the establishment of a national unity government, the granting of the vice presidency to Sankoh, the establishment of a Council of Notables and Religious Leaders to act as mediators, an amnesty, the scheduling of elections, the start of a DDR and a restructuring of the armed forces, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the gradual withdrawal of ECOMOG forces. It was agreed that Togo, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth would serve as the guarantors of the agreement. In October, Sankoh and Koroma returned to Freetown and UNAMISIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) was created to fulfil the Lomé Convention. In November, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja, which called for UNAMISIL to perform a supervisory function and for the DDR to immediately resume. This agreement triggered divisions within the RUF.

In May 2000, 500 UN troops were kidnapped by the RUF, which prompted a British military intervention, the disbandment of the RUF and the arrest of Sankoh. However, in November the Abuja I Accord was signed, which declared a ceasefire supervised by UNAMSIL and the handover of weapons by the RUF, as well as DDR programme and the restructuring of the armed forces. Given the fact that the fighting continued, in 2001 the Guinean troops conducted an offensive against the RUF. However, in May the Abuja II Accords setting out a DDR programme were signed between the RUF and the government. The war finally came to an end in January 2002. Sankoh died in prison. The peace process, with all its ups and downs and incidents of non-compliance, lasted eight years.

The process in southern Sudan

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA from the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese armed forces, which were opposed to independence for the south of the country, which the SPLA was advocating. The conflict led to the death of more than one million people. The first explorations were conducted in 1988, and the following year the government and the SLPA signed a tentative Declaration of Principles of IGAD, the mediator, to hold a referendum on self-determination in the south of the country.

In July 2002, a theoretical agreement was reached under the auspices of IGAD, which established autonomy in the south before a referendum was held in 2011. The first direct meeting between the President of Sudan and the SPLA leader also took place. Between 2002 and 2004, several rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya, in which

headway was made on an extensive agenda of issues. These rounds made it possible for a definitive peace agreement to be reached on the 5th of January 2005, in which the north and south would keep separate armed forces, a joint force would be created for the more disputed areas, autonomy would be set for six years, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, the oil profits would be equitably split and a National Unity Government would be formed, with one vice presidency set aside for the SLPA. Likewise, it was agreed not to apply Islamic law in the south of the country and that each territory would have its own flag. The process lasted a total of 13 years, and seven went by before a peace agreement was signed.

The process in Burundi

The start of the conflict in Burundi dates back to 1983, when the country's Hutu prime minister was assassinated, triggering a cycle of violence that led to the death of 300,000 people. The first peace talks did not start until five years later, in 1998, in Tanzania. They were initially facilitated by the president of that country, Nyerere, and later by Nelson Mandela. In August 2000, the Arusha Agreement was signed with the participation of 17 political parties and the majority of Hutu organisations in the country, which led to the formation of the first transition government. Between 2002 and 2003, agreements were signed with two other major groups, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which left pending the agreement with just a single group, the FNL, whose leader, Agathon Rwasa, did not sign a peace agreement until six years later.

The first negotiations with Rwasa's FNL were held between 2002 and 2004 in Gabon, Tanzania, Switzerland, Kenya, the Netherlands and South Africa, although they were fruitless. In 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created with the mandate to help to implement the efforts to restore peace and reconciliation. Its mandate lasted until 2006, when a General Ceasefire Agreement was signed with the FNL in September in Tanzania, which along with South Africa was a mediator in the conflict. This agreement stipulated the following: a) rectification of the ethnic question, already identified as one of the causes of the conflict; b) provisional immunity for FNL members and its transformation into a political party; c) the repatriation of refugees and the return of the displaced population; and d) a revision of the composition of the security and defence forces. In October of the same year, a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was created, which took over the baton from the ONUB with the mandate of supporting the government in its efforts on behalf of peace and stability.

Finally, in December 2008 a peace agreement was signed with the FNL, with the presence of the South African mediator, Charles Nqakula. The next step was political power-sharing, with 33 posts set aside for the FNL and the launch of the group's disarmament. The process had lasted ten years.

The process in Indonesia (Aceh)

The conflict in Indonesia (Aceh) started in 1976, when the armed opposition group GAM claimed independence for Aceh. The conflict led to the death of 15,000 people. The earliest talks were held in 2000 with the facilitation of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, headquartered in Geneva. These talks led to the signing of a Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. However, both parties were still clashing because they were unwilling to give up armed activity. Another influential factor was that Timor-Leste had just won independence and the Indonesian army was unwilling to lose another region. The second round of negotiations was held in May 2002, also in Geneva, and the third in May 2003 in Tokyo. However, the GAM was insisting on independence for Aceh, an option that was rejected outright by the government. As a result, martial law was instated and the hostilities resumed. Yet during this same period, a 46-year-old Finnish financial consultant, Juha Christensen, managed to keep up discreet contacts with the clashing parties, which would come to be of vital importance to the future of the negotiations.

A tsunami hit in December 2004, leading to the death of 170,000 people in the region, which was devastated. This natural catastrophe, which required the government to open up Aceh to the international community, totally altered the situation and triggered reactions that helped spur the resumption of the negotiations. The first contacts occurred in January 2005 with the mediation of the Crisis Management Initiative, driven by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Several noteworthy events took place within the space of a few months: a bilateral truce, a meeting in Sweden with GAM exiles, the withdrawal of the arrest warrant against GAM leaders and a change in GAM criteria, as it ceased to demand independence and instead agreed to advanced autonomy. Thus, a special autonomy was negotiated, and the facilitator set a deadline for reaching an agreement (summer). Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding between the GAM and the government was signed in August 2006, which put an end to 30 years of conflict. The agreement was based on the end of hostilities and the disarmament of the GAM, the withdrawal of the military and police forces, amnesty for GAM members and their participation in politics, as well as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In December of the same year, the GAM candidate was proclaimed governor of the region of Aceh. The peace process, in all its stages, lasted five years.

The process in Nepal

The conflict got underway in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), a Maoist guerrilla force, opposed the forces of the Nepalese monarchy. The conflict led to 10,000 deaths. In 2002, the first secret talks were held and a tentative and temporary bilateral ceasefire was reached. The next year, formal talks were held, but to no avail. In November 2005, the CPN reached an alliance

with seven Nepalese parties, pledging to establish a democracy, respect human rights, call UN-supervised elections and embark on a UN-supervised disarmament. One year later, in June 2006, an agreement was reached between the government and the CPN, and in November the peace agreement was signed that put an end to ten years of conflict. This agreement was comprised of the following points: 1) to implement the 12-point agreement reached on the 22nd of November 2005 between the CPN and the seven political parties, as well as the ceasefire code of conduct signed by the government and the CPN on the 22nd of May 2006; 2) to conduct their respective activities peacefully and mindful of the commitments of a multi-party government system, civil liberties, the fundamental rights, human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law and the democratic norms and values.; 3) to ask the United Nations to assist in managing the armed forces and weapons of both parties, as well as to observe the impartial elections for the Constituent Assembly; 4) to guarantee the democratic rights established by the grassroots movement in 1990 and 2006, based on the commitments expressed in the 12-point agreement, in the preamble of the ceasefire code of conduct and in the draft of an interim constitution, and consequently to set up an interim government, set a date for the election of a Constituent Assembly and dissolve the congress and the Maoist government through an alternative agreement based on consensus; 5) to deem that these issues are of national importance and must be fulfilled based on understanding; 6) to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the Nepalese people are part of the process of creating a new constitution, without their being influenced by fear, threats or violence. International observation and monitoring will be needed for the elections; and 7) to restructure the state gradually in order to resolve the problems associate with class, race, region and gender, through elections for a Constituent Assembly. This includes a commitment to transform the ceasefire into lasting peace and to resolve problems through dialogue, with special attention to democracy, peace, prosperity, progress, independence, the sovereignty of the country and self-esteem. In 2008, Nepal ceased to be a monarchy and became a democratic federal republic. In accordance with the peace agreement, the United Nations will supervise the cantonment and reintegration of the Maoist forces, while the government will restructure its armed forces. The peace process lasted four years.

Good lessons from the processes	
El Salvador	Delegitimisation of the armed forces Positive role of the United Nations and the countries in the region Human rights agreement in the midst of the conflict Role of the National Reconciliation Commission
Guatemala	Participation of civil society Regional pressure Role of the National Reconciliation Commission Good offices of Paul Wee The guerrilla's consultations with civil society
Northern Ireland	Role of prisoners Methodology of the negotiation (sufficient consensus, parallel consent, Mitchell principles)
Angola	Security Council sanctions on diamonds
South Africa	Participation of civil society (National Peace Agreement) Truth and Reconciliation Commission Persuasive, conciliatory role of Nelson Mandela
Tajikistan	Good mediation by the United Nations Good help from the countries in the region Continuous rounds of negotiations in the midst of the conflict
Southern Sudan	Direct encounter between the guerrilla leader and the President of the country Continuous rounds of negotiations
Indonesia (Aceh)	Speed of the process Flexibility of the parties Taking advantage of a natural and humanitarian catastrophe (tsunami)
Nepal	United Nations verification

APPENDIX 11. WEBSITES OF INTEREST

Alertnet (www.alertnet.org)
Armed Conflict Database (acd.iiss.org)
Berghof Research Center (www.berghof-center.org)
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org)
CICDM (www.cidcm.umd.es)
Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (www.clingendael.nl)
Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org)
Conflictbarometer (hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer)
Crisis Management Initiative (www.cmi.fi)
Crisis Watch (www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch)
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace)
Escola de Cultura de Pau (www.escolapau.org)
European Centre for Conflict Prevention (www.conflict-prevention.net)
FEWER (www.fewer.org)
FriEnt (www.frient.de)
German Working Group on Development and Peace (www.frient.de)
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (www.gppac.org)
Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
International Peace Academy (www.ipacademy.org)
Kreddha (www.kreddha.org)
United Nations (www.un.org)
Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
Peace Accords Matrix (peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/topic)
Peace and Justice Update (peace.sandiego.edu/reports/updates.html#bottom)
Peace Negotiations Watch (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
People Building Peace (www.peoplebuildingpeace.org)
PRIO (www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current)
Project Ploughshares (www.ploughshares.ca)
Public International Law & Policy Group (www.publicinternationallaw.org)
Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Responding to Conflict (www.respond.org)
SIPRI (www.sipri.se)
Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
The Conflict Resolution Information Source (www.crinfo.org)
The Joan B. Kroc Institute (kroc.nd.edu)
Today's Mediation News (www.crinfo.org/news_feeds/v2_negotiation.cfm)
United States Institute of Peace (www.usip.org/library/pa.html)
United States Institute of Peace (www.usip.org/library/pa.html)

APPENDIX 11. WEBSITES OF INTEREST

UN Peacemaker (peacemaker.unlb.org)

Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University (www.ucdp.uu.se)

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (www.wilsoncenter.org)

Escola de Cultura de Pau

Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) was created in 1999 with the purpose of organising a variety of academic and research activities related to the culture of peace, conflict prevention and transformation, disarmament and promoting human rights.

The Escola is run by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The main activities held by the Escola de Cultura de Pau include the following:

- The **post-graduate diploma in the Culture of Peace** (post-degree programme consisting of 230 classroom hours).
- **Elective subjects:** “Peace culture and conflict management” and “Educating for peace and in conflicts”.
- **Peace Processes Programme**, which monitors and analyses the different countries with peace processes or formalised negotiations underway, as well as those countries with negotiations still in the exploratory phase. It includes awareness-raising initiatives and intervention in conflicts to facilitate dialogue amongst the actors in a conflict.
- **The Education for Peace Programme.** The team in this programme strives to promote and develop the knowledge, values and skills for Education for Peace.
- **Programme on Conflicts and Peace-building**, a programme that monitors international events related to armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises and the gender dimension in peace-building on a daily basis in order to draw up the annual report Alert!, bimonthly reports and quarterly publications.

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This eighth edition of the **Yearbook on Peace Processes** analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

Vicenç Fisas is the Director of the School for a Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). He also holds the UNESCO Chair in Peace and Human Rights at the UAB. He has a doctorate in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, won the National Human Rights Award in 1988, and is the author of over 30 books on conflicts, disarmament and research into peace. Some of his published titles include "Manual de procesos de paz" (Handbook of Peace Processes), "Procesos de paz y negociación en conflictos armados" (Peace Processes and Negotiation in Armed Conflicts), "La paz es posible" (Peace is Possible) and "Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos" (Peace Culture and Conflict Management).

