


Yearbook on  
**Peace Processes**  
Vicenç Fisas  
**2014**



School of  
Culture of Peace

# 2014 yearbook of peace processes

Vicenç Fisas (ed.)

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## Introduction

This ninth edition of the **Yearbook on Peace Processes**<sup>1</sup> analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

The organisation of the analysis of each conflict follows a similar pattern in most cases: 1) a brief synopsis of the context of the conflict, with a small description of the armed groups and the main actors intervening in each conflict, 2) the background to the peace process, 3) the events that happened in 2013, 4) a table with the most significant events in the year as a summary, 5) a selection of websites where you can monitor the conflict and 6) a table illustrating the relationships among the primary and secondary actors in each conflict, highlighting the spaces of intermediation in each case.<sup>2</sup> At the start of every country, there is a small box with basic statistics on it. The government armed forces are not included in the section of the box called "Armed actors".

The author of this yearbook has tried to stay within the bounds of mentioning new deeds, events, successes, failures or proposals in an attempt to limit personal opinions on these events to the extent possible.

### MODALITIES OR STAGES IN PEACE PROCESSES

Informal indirect contacts  
Formal indirect contacts  
Informal direct contacts  
Formal direct contacts  
Informal explorations  
Formal explorations  
Informal dialogues  
Formal dialogues  
Formal negotiations  
Formal peace process

By **negotiation** we mean the process through which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal actors within the same country) agree to discuss their differences in an agreed-upon setting to find a solution that will meet their demands. This negotiation can be either direct or through third-party facilitation. Formal negotiations usually have a prior, exploratory, phase, which enables the framework (format, venue, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future negotiations to be defined. By **peace process** we mean the consolidation of a negotiation scheme

<sup>1</sup> The yearbook expands on the information provided by the *Escola de Cultura de Pau* through its annual publication "Alerta 2014" (Icària Editorial, 2014), which is updated quarterly through the electronic publication "Baròmetre" (<http://escolapau.uab.cat>).

<sup>2</sup> This "space of intermediation" includes not only the more formal "facilitators or mediators" (which are indicated by letter size or bold face), but also other institutions or individuals that have somehow intervened. Obviously, facilitation efforts that were not made public are not included, even if the author is aware of some of them.

once the thematic agenda and the procedures to follow have been defined, along with the calendar and the facilitators. Therefore, negotiation is just one stage in a peace process.

By **ceasefire** we mean the military decision to halt any combat or use of weapons during a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** includes not only a ceasefire but also the commitment not to engage in kidnapping, harassment of the civilian population, threats, etc.

Depending on the ultimate goals sought and the dynamic of the different phases in the negotiation process, the majority of peace processes can be categorised into one of these five **categories or models**, although some cases may combine two categories:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Trust-building measures
- e) Formulas for self-governance or “intermediate political architectures”

The model of peace process is usually related to the kinds of demands presented and the actors’ capacity to exert pressure or demand (level of symmetry between the military, political and social spheres), although mentors and facilitators, the weariness of the actors, support received and other less rational factors related to leaders’ pathologies, imagined events or historical inertia also come into play. In some cases, though not many, especially if the process has lasted a long time, it might begin in one of the above categories (demobilisation and reinsertion, for example) and then the demands expand to situate the process in another more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all processes or their previous phases of exploration, dialogue and negotiation are undertaken with true sincerity, as it is common for them to be part of the actor’s war strategy, either to win time, to internationalise and gain publicity, to rearm or for other reasons.

Finally, I wanted to note that what we commonly call a “peace process” is actually nothing other than a “process to put an end to violence and armed struggle”. The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement are nothing other than the start of the true “peace process”, which is linked to stage called “post-war rehabilitation”. This stage is always fraught with difficulties, but it is where decisions are truly taken and policies are truly enacted which, if successful, will manage to overcome the violence (both structural and cultural) that will ultimately enable us to talk about truly having “achieved peace”. This yearbook, however, with the exception of a few appendices, shall limit itself to analysing the efforts made in the early stages of this long pathway, without which the final goal would be impossible to reach.

### **The main stages in a peace process**

All peace processes require a huge time investment, and this is proven by the many years that must usually be spent for one to begin and bear fruit. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, peace processes follow a pattern with more or less known phases in which the most time is spent on negotiations. They work with an initial exploratory or testing phase, also called pre-negotiation, in which the actors intervening in the process (explorers) calibrate the conviction of the parties, that is, whether they are truly convinced that they are going to launch a negotiation process in which they will have to give up something. This stage is decisive, since negotiations are often held without true conviction by one of the parties, either the government or the armed group. In this case, the negotiations are destined for failure. The exploratory phase is when the terms of complete and absolute security for the future negotiators are tested, since there is a history of murders or attacks against them and nobody dares to embark on talks without full guarantees of their safety. This safety must be established with very clearly defined rules. Likewise, certain guarantees are sought for compliance with the agreements reached in this early stage; in




this case, timelines and methodologies to be followed are recommended; the pre-agenda or initial agenda is set; the terms of a tentative roadmap are agreed upon; and the conflictive aspects of the basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the meta-conflict) are clarified. In short, in this stage, the goal is to generate trust in the process itself: the role played by potential third parties is agreed upon, the imposition of plans (the very cornerstone of the negotiations) is discarded, and the adversary is recognised, giving him the legitimacy needed to engage in dialogue. Once this exploratory work has been completed, an "agreement on what must be agreed upon" is reached in order to then proceed to determining "how to do it". The sum of all these steps is what sometimes makes up the "roadmap" or initial framework of what must be done to ensure that the process fares well. The roadmap is nothing other than a working schema, often a diagram, in which the steps to follow, which will guide the process, are outlined.

Once the negotiations have started, the parties ascertain whether the interlocutors are valid, that is, whether they are the representatives of the primary actors with the capacity to take decisions. Third-ranked actors have no place at the negotiating table, so it is always necessary to start with an inclusive approach which gives a voice to the actors, even if they are unwanted, who are the keys to resolving the conflict. Although it is unquestionably more comfortable, it makes no sense to invite friendly actors to the negotiating table; rather the true adversaries must be invited. The reason for this negotiation is for the opposing parties to sit down to talk under the mindset of achieving mutual benefit through an "everyone wins, no one loses" or "I win, you win" scheme, thus discarding zero-sum approaches in which one party wins and the other loses.

If the negotiation proceeds satisfactorily, the issues on the substantive agenda can be discussed (the ones on the procedural agenda will have already been agreed upon). At that point, given the fact that trust will have been established, personal relationships will develop, which will make it easier to reach an agreement, or at least partial agreements, with their respective protocols, which in turn lead to the final agreement which outlines how it will be implemented and who will implement it. This finally leads us to implementation agreements, including the forms of verification and resolving any potential disagreements that might arise in the final stages.

## Usual stages in negotiation processes



## Main conclusions of the year

- **Three conflicts ended with a peace agreement:** those of the JEM-Bashar in Sudan and two in India (the UPPK and a faction of the KCP-MC).
- 57% of the **conflicts** identified are currently in open **negotiations**.
- Two groups from **DR Congo**, the APCLS and the Nyatura militias, demobilised unconditionally after the defeat of the M23 group.
- Almost all peace agreements in the last 20 years have ended with a **new constitution** or with constitutional reforms.
- In half of the peace processes, armed groups have had to **wait two to three years before running for election**.
- 76% of negotiations are conducted through **outside mediation**.
- 79.2% of the conflicts that have ended in the last 30 years did so through **negotiations** and a final peace agreement.
- The government of the Central African Republic claimed to be holding talks with the leader of the **armed Ugandan group LRA**, Joseph Kony, in order to get him to surrender.
- At the end of the year, the government of **South Sudan** and soldiers backing the Vice President decided to meet in Ethiopia to reach a peace agreement after 1,000 people were killed in 15 days.
- In **DR Congo**, after the defeat of the armed group M23, it was agreed that combatants that were not guilty of war crimes could join the Army or the police. The demobilisation of the M23 led to the demobilisation of other, smaller armed groups like the APCLS and the Nyatura militias.
- In **Colombia**, negotiations continued with the FARC and the government began to explore starting talks with the ELN guerrillas. There was an intense debate about the pace of the negotiations with the FARC in light of the upcoming elections.
- The Prime Minister of **Pakistan** invited the Taliban insurgency to engage in peace negotiations. The insurgency was receptive to the invitation.
- In **Myanmar**, a political dialogue began with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), a platform that includes most of the insurgencies of the country, and ended with the signing of a general ceasefire. At the close of the year, the government promised to release most political prisoners under an amnesty.
- The government of the **Philippines** conducted the last rounds of negotiations with the MILF, signing the third of the four outstanding annexes in the provisional peace agreement signed in 2012.
- Dialogue between Serbia and **Kosovo** moved forward.
- In a message considered historic, the leader of the armed Kurdish group PKK called for a ceasefire in **Turkey** and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish territory.
- US Secretary of Defence John Kerry paid various visits to **Israel and Palestine** to promote a new negotiating process. At the year's end, Israel released several Palestinian prisoners.
- By the end of the year, the **Syrian conflict** had claimed the lives of 120,000 people and turned 2.3 million others into refugees. The EU only gave asylum to 12,340 Syrians (0.5%).

## Peace processes in 2013

This yearbook analyses the status of 50 negotiating processes, 45 of which have their own section and five of which are briefly commented on below. Over the course of the year, three groups laid down their arms after reaching a peace agreement with their respective governments.

Status of the negotiations at the end of 2013				
Going well (14)	In difficulty (16)	Going poorly (5)	In exploratory stages (7)	Resolved (3)
Mali (MIA) India (ULFA-PTF, URF, KCP-Lamphel, KYKL-MDF, KCP-Pakhanglakpa, KCP-N, KNLF, KRF, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM), Philippines (MILF) Serbia (Kosovo)	Mali (MNLA) Senegal (MFDC) Sudan (SPLM-N, Colombia (FARC), Afghanistan (Taliban) India (ULFA-I, NDFB-P) India-Pakistan (Kashmir) Myanmar (UNFC) Thailand (BRN) Moldova (Transdnistria) Turkey (PKK) Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Israel-Palestine	Sudan-South Sudan Morocco-Western Sahara Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NPA) Cyprus	CAR (LRA) Pakistan (Taliban) Ethiopia (ONLF) Colombia (ELN) India (NDFB-R) Southern Thailand (PULO) Syria	Sudan (JEM-Bashar) India (KCP-MC faction and UPKK)

Thirty-one percent of the negotiations went well (though most of those took place in India), 35.6% had difficulties and 11% went poorly, so the result is moderately optimistic.

### Other attempts at negotiation not covered in the section on countries below

In November, the government of the Central African Republic claimed to be holding talks with the leader of the armed Ugandan group LRA, Joseph Kony, in order to get him to surrender. Government sources said that Kony was in the Central African country and that he demanded security guarantees before surrendering. Kony, the leader of the LRA, is wanted by the International Criminal Court, which accuses him of committing war crimes. The United States is offering five million dollars to anyone that can provide evidence leading to his arrest. Alongside this development, the African Union's Special Envoy for the LRA, Francisco Madeira, reported to the UN Security Council that Kony may be suffering from some kind of illness. In April 2013, the Ugandan Armed Forces suspended their search for Joseph Kony in the Central African Republic due to the hostility with which they were received by the new government, formed in March after the coup d'état carried out by the Séléka rebel coalition.

The Prime Minister of the Tibetan government in exile, Lobsang Sangay, urged the Chinese government to resume peace talks that broke down in 2010. Nine rounds of negotiations were held between 2002 and 2010, but Beijing unilaterally shut down the dialogue due to the political situation in Tibet and because it believed the Dalai Lama was fanning the flames of the violence

frequently breaking out. Lobsang Sangay expressed his willingness to resume the talks anywhere at any time and said that the position of his government was the “middle way” that consists of **giving up on independence for Tibet in exchange for granting real autonomy** to the regions historically inhabited by the Tibetan population. In this sense, the Prime Minister said that during the nine rounds of negotiations that had taken place, his government had already sent Beijing a proposal to establish an autonomous government in Tibet that would be fully compatible with the Chinese Constitution and laws on regional and national autonomy. Finally, Lobsang Sangay said that the Tibetan government in exile’s working group in charge of negotiations with Beijing was expanded to include six new members and would soon study the new economic and security policy guidelines recently approved by Beijing. Furthermore, the government increased security measures in the province of Qinghai after a new case of self-immolation. Since 2009, 123 people have burned themselves alive to protest the political situation in Tibet.

After the six-year peace process between the armed Maoist Communist Party of **Nepal** and the Nepalese government, the special commission in charge of supervising, rehabilitating and integrating approximately 1,400 former Maoist combatants into the Nepalese Army ended on 13 April.

In **Nigeria**, a senior commander of Boko Haram, allegedly the armed group’s second-in-command, declared a unilateral ceasefire in January. The announcement was met with scepticism by some Nigerians due to the lack of clarity over whether Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez was speaking on behalf of the organisation or was representing a rival faction that was willing to negotiate with the government. Abdulazeez said the move was the result of previous meetings with government officials and with the State of Borno, in the northern part of the country. In November, he had raised a set of conditions for a truce, including the immediate release of all group members and negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Nigerian authorities welcomed the announcement as a positive step and military representatives demanded that Boko Haram guarantee 30 days without attacks. However, the violence continued after the ceasefire was declared. Some analysts thought that the ceasefire announcement could reflect fragmentation in the group. Meanwhile, the Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria’s main Muslim leader, proposed an amnesty for Boko Haram just as had been done in the Niger Delta to help to eradicate the violence, but President Goodluck Jonathan said that was not possible because his government did not know who the members of BH were or what their demands were.

In **Pakistan**, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited the Taliban insurgency to engage in peace negotiations. The invitation came during a conference called by the government in which leaders of the main political parties of the country participated, including those that sympathised with the insurgency, where Sharif said that negotiations should be the top priority. **The Taliban insurgency was receptive to the invitation** and the leaders of the armed Taliban opposition group TTP may have met in secret to evaluate the government’s proposal. In addition, prisoners were exchanged between both parties as a trust-building measure, which may have released six members of the TTP and two members of the Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan. However, in late September the persistence of armed attacks by different Taliban factions led the government to reconsider its proposal, especially after an attack on a Christian church in Peshawar that killed 85 people and an attack in Upper Dir that killed a senior commander of the Pakistani Army. Sharif set two preconditions for negotiations: that the insurgency disarm and that it accept the Constitution. Some experts pointed to the enormous fragmentation of the Taliban since 2009 after its leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a drone strike, claiming it could have splintered into 100 insurgent groups. The Pakistani government has banned 60 armed groups.

In **Yemen**, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) continued the work that it began on 18 March. The different committees continued to tackle some issues key to the future of the country, including the electoral system and the future structure of the state. The discussions reflected the differences among the stakeholders involved amidst a context marked by the fragile financial, social and security situation in the country. One of the most controversial subjects was the

structure of the state. Although the discussions created a certain consensus at first regarding the federal option, there was no agreement about the number of regions that would make up a federal state. The demands of the representatives of the southern movement (Hiraak) that decided to participate in the NDC wavered between separation and the temporary implementation of a two-state federal system until a referendum is held on the future of the south. Other parts of the southern movement continued to refuse to participate in the NDC and asserted they were moving towards secession from the north. In this regard, they announced policies of civil disobedience and the boycott of the processes that should start up once the NDC ends: the creation of a Constitution that would be subject to a referendum and the holding of new elections in 2014. Other political groups of the country, including the former ruling party (GPC) and the Islamist Islah party, rejected Hiraak's proposal. Faced with this situation and lacking any guarantees for its other demands, the movement suspended its participation in the dialogue for several weeks. The Houthis' demands stressed the need to compensate victims of the conflicts in the north of the country and to release political prisoners. During the quarter, as part of the transition process, the Yemeni government issued a statement in which it apologised to the people of the country affected by the policies of the former regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, including the events that led to the civil war of 1994 and the military campaigns carried out against the Houthi rebellion since 2004. It is worth noting that the NDC was supposed to finish its work on 18 September, but the deadline passed and the NDC's work was still ongoing. At the quarter's end, a new deadline had still not been set for presenting its conclusions.

Conflicts that have ended in recent years		
2000	Burundi, Sierra Leone	2
2001		0
2002	Angola	1
2003	DR Congo, India (BLTF-BLT, DHD)	3
2004		0
2005	Indonesia (Aceh), Northern Ireland, Sudan (South), India (NLFT), Iraq (Kurdistan)	5
2006	Sudan (East), Sudan (Darfur - SLA Minawi), Nepal (CPN), Israel-Lebanon	4
2007	Ivory Coast	1
2008	Mali (ADC), Benin-Burkina Faso, Burundi (FNL), CAR (various), Kenya, Colombia (ERG), Sri Lanka (TMVP), Georgia-Russia, Lebanon	9
2009	Mali (ATNM), Niger, Chad (National Movement), Central African Republic (FDPC, MNSP), DR Congo (CNDP), Somalia (ARS), India (DHD-J), Myanmar (KNU - KNLA Peace Council), Thailand- Cambodia	10
2010	Nigeria (MEND), Niger (MNJ), Chad (UFCD faction, UFR; UFDD, CDR, UFDD/F), Ethiopia (UWSLF, ONLF faction), Eritrea-Djibouti, Somalia (ASWJ), Sudan (JRM, SLA-FREES), India (KNF, KNLF, KCP-MC Lallumba faction), Myanmar (SSA-N)	17
2011	Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Myanmar (NDAA, KHB), Spain (ETA)	8
2012	CAR (CPJP), India (DHD, APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, IKDA, KRA), Nepal (SKTMMM), Myanmar (KNPP)	13
2013	Sudan (JEM-Bashar), India (UPPK, faction KCP-MC)	3

### PROLONGED OR "UNTREATABLE" IDENTITY CONFLICTS<sup>3</sup>

Country or region	Start of the negotiations	Years elapsed	underlying issue
Kashmir	1949	64	Identity, security, self-government
Cyprus	1974	39	Identity, territory
Palestine	1990	23	Identity, security, territory
Western Sahara	1991	22	Identity, territory

CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES AT THE END OF 2013			
Conflicts and peace processes ending with a peace agreement		Sudan (JEM-Bashar), India (UPPK, KCP-MC faction)	3
Armed conflicts underway	With a consolidated peace process	Mali (MIA, MNLA), Sudan (LJM), Sudan-South Sudan, South Sudan (SSLA, Murle militia, Johnson Uliny), Colombia (FARC), India (ULFA-PTF, NDFB-P, NDF-RD, KNO, UPF, URF, KYKL-MDF, KCP-Lamphel, KCP-Pakhangakpa, KRF, KCP-MC, KCP-N, KNLF), Myanmar (UNFC), Thailand (BRN)	23

<sup>3</sup> Using Edward Azar's terminology.

	With interruptions in the process	Sudan (SPLM-N), South Sudan (Armed Forces loyal to the President vs. Armed Forces loyal to the Vice President), Afghanistan (Taliban), India (ULFA-I), Myanmar (KIA), Philippines (NPA, MNLF), Thailand (PULO), Turkey (PKK), Israel-Palestine	11
	Without negotiations in recent years	Ethiopia (ONLF), Somalia (al-Shabaab), Mali (Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, Sudan (JEM, SRF), Colombia (ELN), Central Africa (LRA), Algeria (AQMI), Libya, Nigeria (BH), DR Congo (various), Afghanistan (al-Qaeda), Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), India (NDFB-I, PREPAK, UNLF, PLA, RPM, CPI-M), Pakistan (Taliban, tribal militias, BLA, BRA, BLF, BLT), Myanmar (KIA), Syria (ELS, jihadists, al-Qaeda), Russia (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria), Iraq, Yemen (Houthis, AQAP)	36
Subtotal			73
Former unresolved armed conflicts that still require negotiation	With a consolidated peace process	Senegal (MFDC), India (NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCM-IM), Philippines (MILF), Cyprus, Kosovo, Moldova (Transdnistria), Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)	11
	With interruptions in the process	Western Sahara, India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	2
	Without negotiations in recent years		0
	Subtotal		13
TOTAL	Ended		3
	With a consolidated peace process		34
	With interruptions in the process		13
	Without negotiations in recent years		36
TOTAL			86

Notes:

The armed conflicts between the government of DR Congo and the armed group M23 ended, as did the fighting between the government of the Central African Republic and Séléka, with both governments prevailing.

This table is a snapshot of the situation at the year's end and does not reflect how things developed over the course of it.

A "consolidated process" means that the parties have agreed on a negotiating method, possible mediation, the schedule and the format. This does not take into account whether the negotiations are going well or poorly, which is described in the table on page 10. "With interruptions in the process" means that the peace process has been punctuated by long interruptions, but negotiations have not broken off definitively.



## Reasons for crisis in the year's negotiations

Security guarantees for an armed opposition leader Imposition of preconditions Failure to define the people that would be involved in a Reconciliation Commission Armed group's refusal to disarm Temporary withdrawal from the negotiating process Failure to release prisoners Failure of armed groups to withdraw Ceasefire violations Marginalisation of breakaway armed group Disagreement about the individuals to decide Slow implementation of the peace agreement Lack of funding to comply with the peace agreement Assassination of a leader by dissidents Disagreements over amnesty for leaders of an armed group Clashes among members of the state over the peace process Disagreement over whether or not to draft a new Constitution Unilateral decision-making Kidnapping Disputes between countries to lead the negotiations Disagreement with the government negotiator Refusal to hold political negotiations before disarmament Attacks Arrest of leaders of advisors of an armed group Armed clashes between the government and the armed opposition group Disagreements over the parties' agendas Financial crisis in the government Lack of democratic reforms Negative influence of a neighbouring country to downplay the importance of negotiations Refusal of one of the parties to participate in an incident prevention mechanism Declaration by one of the parties that the representative of the regional organisation in charge of mediation is a persona non grata Irreconcilable positions on the non-use of force Promotion of settlements in occupied territories
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## Conflicts and peace processes in recent years

The majority of the armed conflicts analysed in this 2014 Yearbook got their start between the 1970s and 1990s. During these years, several armed conflicts have ended, either through a permanent peace agreement (regardless of its quality) or by reaching a provisional cessation of armed hostilities. In any event, the interpretation of most of the conflicts from the 1990s and the fact that many of them have lasted until today enables us to draw preliminary conclusion on what action has been taken in these conflicts from the perspective of 30 years of history. We should mention that some of these conflicts have evolved from an armed to an unarmed phase, although in this section we shall examine all of them.

Of the 108 conflicts in the table below, **39.8% ended by means of a peace agreement**. Those that **have not been finally resolved or remain active account for 43.5% of the total**, and what is even more significant is the fact that **only 10.2% of these conflicts have ended by means of a military victory by one of the parties**. In other words, the vast majority of conflicts are only resolved by negotiations, not military victory, and by embarking on some kind of process that leads to the signing of a final agreement.

Regarding the 54 conflicts that have ended in the last 30 years, 43 ended through a peace agreement (79.6%) and 11 with a military victory (20.4%). This serves to reaffirm that negotiations are an effective means of resolving conflicts.

Status of armed conflicts studied		
	Number	Percentage
Ended with peace agreement	43	39.8%
Currently being resolved	3	2.8%
Military victory	11	10.2%
Unresolved	47	43.5%
TOTAL	108	

Conflicts ended		
	Number	Percentage
By peace agreement	43	79.6%
By military victory	11	20.4%
TOTAL	54	100%

Duration of conflicts that ended by a peace agreement	
Years	Number
1-4	12
5-9	10
10-14	7
15-19	5
20-24	3
25-29	2
30-34	1
35-39	1
40-44	1

53.6% of the conflicts ended in less than 10 years, while 9.8% lasted more than 25 years.

Conflicts underway since the 1980s and their resolution until 2013		
Countries	Period	Resolution
Afghanistan	89-...	Unresolved
Angola – FLEC	75-...	Unresolved
Angola – UNITA	75-02	Peace agreement
Algeria	91-...	Unresolved
Armenia-Azerbaijan	91-...	Unresolved
Burma – CNF	88-	Unresolved
Burma – KNU	48-...	Unresolved
Burma (MNDA)	09-...	Unresolved
Burma – Shan	59-...	Unresolved
Burundi	93-05	Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL)	91-06	Peace agreement
Burundi (FNL)	11-13	Peace agreement
Colombia (M-19)	74-90	Peace agreement
Colombia (EPL)	67-91	Peace agreement
Colombia (MAQL)	84-91	Peace agreement
Colombia (CRS)	91-94	Peace agreement
Colombia – ELN	64-...	Unresolved
Colombia – FARC	64-...	Unresolved
Congo (Ninjas)	98-07	Peace agreement
Congo, DR (Inter-Congolese dialogue)	97-03	Peace agreement
Congo, DR (Kivus and Ituri)	96-...	Unresolved
Ivory Coast	02-07	Peace agreement
Ivory Coast	11	Military victory
Croatia	92-95	Peace agreement
Chad	99-11	Peace agreement
Cyprus	74-...	In resolution phase
El Salvador	80-91	Peace agreement
Eritrea-Djibouti	08-10	Peace agreement
Spain (ETA)	68-11	Ended without negotiations
Ethiopia (OLF)	73-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia (faction ONLF)	84-10	Peace agreement
Ethiopia (ONLF)	84-...	Unresolved
Ethiopia-Eritrea	98-00	Peace agreement
Philippines (Abu Sayaf)	90's-...	Unresolved
Philippines – MILF	78-14	Peace agreement
Philippines – MNLF	70-...	In resolution phase
Philippines – NPA	69-...	Unresolved
Georgia (Abkhazia)	93-...	Unresolved
Georgia (South Ossetia)	90-...	Unresolved
Guatemala – URNG	82-94	Peace agreement
Guinea-Bissau	98-99	Peace agreement
India (CPI-M)	80-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – BLTF-BLT	92-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) –DHD	95-03	Peace agreement
India (Assam) – ULFA	89-...	Unresolved
India (Assam) – NDFB	92-...	In resolution phase
India (Jammu and Kashmir)	89-...	Unresolved
India (Manipur)	03-...	Unresolved
India (Nagaland) – NSCN-IM	80-	Unresolved
India (Punjab)	81-93	Military victory
India (Tripura) – NLFT	89-05	Peace agreement
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	90-...	Unresolved
Indonesia (Aceh)	76-05	Peace agreement
Indonesia (Western Papua)	65-...	Unresolved
Indonesia (Timor Este)	75-99	Peace agreement
Iraq (PJAIC)	05-...	Unresolved
Iraq	03-...	Unresolved
Iraq-Kuwait	91	Military victory
Iraq (Kurdistan)	91-05	Peace agreement
Northern Ireland – IRA	69-05	Peace agreement
Israel-Palestine	64-...	Unresolved
Kosovo	98-10	Ended without peace agreement
Lebanon	89-90	Peace agreement

Lebanon-Israel	06	Peace agreement
Lebanon – Fatah al-Islam	07	Military victory
Liberia	89-96	Peace agreement
Libya	11	Military victory
Mali	90-09	Peace agreement
Mali (North)	11-...	Unresolved
Mozambique- RENAMO	77-92	Peace agreement
Nepal – CPN	96-06	Peace agreement
Nepal - Terai	07-...	Unresolved
Niger - MNJ	07-...	Unresolved
Nigeria (Delta) - MEND	05-10	Peace agreement
Pakistan (Balochistan)	06-...	Unresolved
Pakistan (Northwest Frontier)	01-...	Unresolved
Peru – Shining Path	70-99	Military victory
Central African Republic	03-08	Peace agreement
DR Congo	98-...	Unresolved
DR Congo – M23	13	Military victory
Rwanda – FPR	94	Military victory
Rwanda (FDLR)	97-...	Unresolved
Russia (Chechnya)	94-...	Ended without peace agreement
Russia (Dagestan)	10-...	Unresolved
Russia-Georgia	08	Peace agreement
Russia (Ingushetia)	08-...	Ended without peace agreement
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	11-...	Unresolved
Western Sahara	75-...	Unresolved
Senegal (Casamance)	82-...	Unresolved
Sierra Leone	91-00	Peace agreement
Syria	11-...	Unresolved
Somalia	89-...	Unresolved
Sri Lanka – LTTE	72-09	Military victory
South Africa	61-93	Peace agreement
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)	11-..	Unresolved
Sudan (SLA)	03-06	Peace agreement
Sudan – SPLA	83-05	Peace agreement
Sudan (JEM-Bashar)	03-13	Peace agreement
Sudan – Este	05-06	Peace agreement
Sudan –Southern Sudan	09-12	Peace agreement
Thailand (South) – PULO	68-...	Unresolved
Tajikistan	92-97	Peace agreement
Turkey – PKK	74-...	Unresolved
Uganda – LRA	89-...	Unresolved
Yemen North-South	94	Military victory
Yemen (AQPA)	09-...	Unresolved
Yemen (Al-Houthists)	04-	Unresolved

## The day after a peace agreement

After a peace agreement is signed, a period begins that may be long and is usually referred to as “post-conflict”, although the correct term would be “post-armed violence”, and is essential for a peace process. A peace agreement is only useful when it is possible to turn agreements into reality. The table below reminds us of some of the many aspects that must be implemented.

Country	Date of peace agreement or annexes	Some aspects provided for in the agreements
Mali	18-6-2013	Ceasefire followed by disarmament, presidential elections and talks including all political forces.
Philippines	27-2-2013  15-10-2012	Bangsamoro Basic Law, amendment to the Constitution, creation of a Bangsamoro Transition Authority, creation of a Third Party Monitoring Team to supervise implementation of the agreements and of a Joint Normalisation Committee (until all arms have been confiscated). Bangsamoro replaces the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and brings elections, transitional justice, the strengthening of Islamic law, consideration of the customs and traditions of indigenous peoples, the sharing of natural resources, sustainable development, the creation of a Transition Commission, international monitoring, the signing of a final document once all the points on the agenda are implemented, the MILF disarmament programme, international monitoring of the ceasefire until the MILF's disarmament is complete, need for donors.
South Sudan	27-2-2013	Ceasefire, amnesty, political representation of the SSDM/A in the government, military integration of the SSDM into the SPLA, joint disarmament programme, acknowledgement of the conflict's impact on the civilian population, recognition of the importance of reconciliation, release of prisoners of war, creation of a Joint Incident Committee.
Central African Republic	11-1-2013	Creation of an inclusive national unity government, early legislative elections, reorganisation of the defence and security forces, implementation of the DDR process, creation of a monitoring committee for the agreement, Séléka pledges to cease combat, dissolution of the militias, quartering of forces under the supervision of the MICOPAX.
Yemen	5-12-2011	The Vice President assumes the presidency, elections, national unity government and referendum on a new Constitution. Security Council resolutions.
Chad	25-7-2009	Ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, general amnesty, participation of the National Movement (MN) in managing state affairs, possibility that the MN turns into a political party, demobilisation or integration of the MN into the Armed Forces, organisation of the return of refugees.
Mauritania	3-6-2009	Elections, transitional national unity government, inclusive national dialogue. Mediation by the African Union.
Burundi	4-12-2008	Name change for the Hutu party, participation in public office, release of political prisoners.
Zimbabwe	15-9-2008	Economic development, agricultural reform, referendum for a new Constitution, new government, creation of a Joint Observation and Implementation Committee.
Central African Republic	21-6-2008	Inclusive political dialogue, cessation of hostilities, amnesty (except for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC) and DDR. Mediation by Gabon.

Kenya	23-5-2008	Constitutional and institutional reform, agricultural reform, regional imbalances, poverty and inequality.
Lebanon	21-5-2008	New national unity government.
Uganda	22-2-2008	Participation of all parties to the conflict in government, promotion of education in conflict areas, integration of members of the LRA into the Armed Forces, assistance for displaced persons to return, development plan for the areas affected by the conflict, victim support, reparations and rehabilitation, DDR.
Chad	25-10-2007	Respect for the Constitution, ceasefire, general amnesty and release of prisoners, participation in state affairs, possibility of forming political parties, DDR, voluntary integration into the Armed Forces.
Ivory Coast	4-3-2007	Identification of people, presidential elections, refounding of the Armed Forces, DDR, reunification of the country, amnesty (except for financial crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity), help for displaced people to return, creation of and support for an evaluation committee.
Eastern Sudan	19-6-2006	Participation of the Eastern Sudan Front in government operations, joint management of natural resources, ceasefire, reform of the security system, voluntary integration into the Armed Forces, organisation of a Consultative Conference with civil society.
Nepal	22-11-2005	End of the autocratic monarchy, reestablishment of Parliament, formation of an interim government, elections for a Constituent Assembly, participation of the United Nations in the process, commitment from Maoists not to repeat the errors of the past.
Indonesia (Aceh)	15-8-2005	New law on the government of Aceh, provisional government, elections, Aceh controls 70% of its oil, creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, amnesty, DDR, voluntary integration into the Armed Forces, creation of an Aceh Observation Mission with the help of the EU and the ASEAN.
Sudan (Darfur)	5-7-2005	Respect for the diversity of the country, non-discrimination, federal government system, representation of Darfur in state institutions, sharing of political power, humanitarian assistance, the return of refugees and displaced persons, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Darfur, promotion of reconciliation, sustainable development, security agreements, inclusion of these agreements in the Constitution.
Ivory Coast	6-4-2005	Cessation of hostilities, militia disarmament and dismantlement, security for the civilian population, police cooperation with UN forces (UNOCI), integration of the new forces in government operations, creation of an independent electoral commission, elections.
Burundi	6-8-2004	Democratic system of governance, post-transition Constitution.
Liberia	18-8-2003	Ceasefire, deployment of an international stabilisation force, reform of the security system, establishment of a Human Rights Commission, establishment of a transitional government, suspension of the Constitution until a new president is appointed.
Afghanistan	5-12-2001	Establishment of transitional authority, new Constitution.
East Timor	5-5-1999	Referendum on self-determination organised by the United Nations, rules for the referendum, security agreements.
Northern Ireland	10-4-1998	Clauses to include in UK and Irish legislation, creation of democratic institutions, North South Ministerial Council, human rights, reconciliation and victims, economic, social and cultural aspects, disarmament, security and police, prisoners.

Somalia	22-12-1997	Holding of a National Reconciliation Conference, transitional government, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly.
Sierra Leona	23-10-1997	Cessation of hostilities, reinstallation of legitimate president, sharing of political power, DDR, amnesty.
Guatemala	20-12-1996	Full observance of human rights, support for return and resettlement, right to know the truth about human rights violations, recognition of the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, participatory economic development, increased tax collection and prioritisation of social investment, sustainable development, rural development, strengthening of civilian power, legalisation of the URNG and inclusion in security conditions, elections.
Tajikistan	17-8-1995	Continuous round of talks aimed at concluding a general agreement on the establishment of peace, disarmament of the opposition, voluntary incorporation into the Armed Forces or security forces, voluntary repatriation of refugees, creation of a committee for supervising and ensuring compliance with the general agreement, donor's conference, ceasefire extension.
Burundi	10-9-1994	Government pact, new Constitution, creation of a National Security Council, creation of a Pact Monitoring Committee.
Afghanistan	7-3-1993	Formation of provisional government, elections, new Constitution, establishment of a Defence Council, release of prisoners, ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.
South Africa	21-12-1991	Single citizenship regardless of race, legal protection of democratic values, equality of opportunities, peaceful constitutional changes, multi-party democracy, recognition of diversity of cultures, languages and religions.
El Salvador	25-9-1991	Supervision of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), empowered to prepare the draft legislation necessary for implementing the agreements and that will enjoy international guarantees, purging of the Armed Forces, reduction of the Armed Forces, changes in the Armed Forces' educational system, creation of a National Civil Police, the sharing of land larger than 245 Ha with peasants and small-scale farmers.

Source: Peace Agreement Database Search ([http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field\\_padate\\_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field\\_pacountry\\_tid=&field\\_pathematic\\_tid%5B%5D=32&=Search+Peace+Agreements](http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=&field_pathematic_tid%5B%5D=32&=Search+Peace+Agreements))





## Analyses by countries



# AFRICA

## a) Western Africa

### MALI (Tuareg)

#### Context of the conflict

Independent from France since 1960, Mali has witnessed several rebellions by its Tuareg people, nomads who make up around 10% of the population, mostly live in the north of the country and are politically, economically and socially different from the peoples of the south. In 1916, the Tuareg staged a major revolt that was crushed by France. The conflict was compounded by natural events such as the harsh droughts in 1972 and 1983, which especially affected the north of the country, but also by the attempt to build a unified, single-party country after independence, resulting in the first internal clashes in the early 1960s that were aggravated by the traditional sub-development of the north. Gold mining in the country has not improved the living conditions of the local population. Mali, the third-largest gold producer in Africa, which exports 94% of its production, does not have the means to control production of the precious metal or the impact of the environmental pollution caused by mining operations. In the 1980s, the north of Mali was influenced by the expansionist policies of Libya, a country where, like Algeria, many Tuareg took refuge in the 1970s, receiving military instruction at the time. However, the most significant clashes between the Tuareg and the Malian government took place between 1990 and 1996, which in the end claimed the lives of more than 2,500 people, was muddled by incursions into Mali by the al-Qaeda-linked Algerian Islamist group GSPC and led to the deployment of US and French anti-terrorism units in the Sahel in 2004.

**Population:** 15.3 million inhabitants; less than 100,000 in Kidal  
**Surface area:** 1,240,000 km<sup>2</sup>; region of Kidal: 151,400 km<sup>2</sup>  
**GDP:** 10.262 billion USD  
**Per capita income:** 670 USD  
**HDI:** 182 (of 186)  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 2,500 (since 1990)  
**Armed groups:** MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, France  
**Facilitators:** Switzerland, Burkina Faso, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU

The rebellion began in June 1990, with the rise of the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA) (Tuareg movement created in Libya in 1988) and the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA), which in 1991 reached an agreement with the government in Tamanrasset (Algeria) that was hotly contested in the south. This agreement stipulated that the populations of the three regions of northern Mali would freely manage their local and regional affairs through their representatives. In April 1992, a national pact was signed between the government and the political movements of the north grouped together as the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA) that gave a certain degree of autonomy to these regions, though key parties to the conflict did not participate in the agreement, so the banditry and criminality rife in the region could not be stopped. The agreement did not receive the necessary funding, and the MPA split along clan lines and began a period of infighting, making the conflict worse. The rebels divided into four groups: the aforementioned MPA and the FIAA, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLPA) and the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA). In 1994 the MPKG was created, a militia composed of members of the Songhai ethnic group, which received arms from Songhai communities living in Nigeria and Ghana. The Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) appeared in 2006 and the **National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)** was formed in 2011. Other armed parties to the current conflict include the group **Ansar Dine**, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, the **Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA)**, led by Alghabas Ag Intalla, and the groups **MUJAO** and **AQIM**.

## Background to the peace process

During the second quarter of 2006, there was a minor conflict in the region of Kidal in the north, one of the poorest parts of the country, when hundreds of Tuareg banded together under the name **Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC)** assaulted some military bases, captured arms and vehicles and headed for the mountains bordering Algeria, the country that mediated the group's first negotiations with the Malian government, which resulted in the **Algiers Accords**, signed in July, and the "Agreements on peace, security and development of the region of Kidal", the implementation of which provides for disarming the 3,000-man-strong group. However, the first delivery of arms did not take place until March 2007. After a year of sporadic clashes, the government and the ADC reached a cessation of hostilities agreement in late July 2008 through Algerian mediation. The first meeting in Mali took place in November 2008 (until then they had always been held in Algeria). At the meeting, ADC representatives and Malian ministers sought calming measures that would allow for the disarmament of the Tuareg group to continue.

In mid-2007, part of the ADC split off under the name **Alliance Touareg Niger Mali (ATNM)** or "23 May", led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who announced an alliance with the Tuareg of Niger. Through the mediation of the Gaddafi Foundation, in April 2008 the ATNM reached a cessation of hostilities agreement with the government of Mali and also signed the 2006 Algiers Accords, for which the government proposed investing in the region of Kidal. However, the group did not begin to disarm, which prompted the Malian President to call for peace and the disarmament of all Tuareg groups. In 2009, Ag Bahanga asked to resume negotiations with the government after the Malian Army attacked the ATNM's main training base in January, causing it to flee to Libya. Faced with the Malian's government's insistence on ending the Tuareg rebellion by force, Ag Bahanga requested intermediation from Algeria, the country that is still the chief mediator of the conflict. In July, representatives of the ATNM and ADC met with the government to resume talks under Algerian mediation. However, it was Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi that announced that **Mali and Niger had reached a peace agreement with their respective insurgencies** in October, praising Ag Bahanga's attendance of the ceremony celebrated by the official announcement. The Malian authorities launched a campaign to encourage Tuareg combatants to lay down their arms two weeks after signing the new peace agreement. The governor of the region of Kidal, the stronghold of armed Tuareg groups, stressed the need to make people aware that carrying arms did not promote security, but actually made it worse. Furthermore, the director of the Northern Mali Development Agency, Mohamed Ag Mahmud, said that fighting against the propagation of arms was also key to stopping drug trafficking taking place in the region. Meanwhile, representatives of the communities of northern Mali, specifically Arabs, Fula, Tuareg and Songhai, met for the first time in ten years in Kidal to sign a peace and reconciliation agreement. One of the decisions adopted at the meeting was to create a permanent structure for dialogue among communities that came together on various occasions throughout 2009. In August, the pro-government militia Ganda Koy announced that it would transform into a development association. This step would allow it to benefit from social integration projects and credit offered as part of the peace agreement signed with armed Tuareg groups in 2006. In this vein, in July the government sent 1.3 million CFA to the Northern Development Agency to begin the socioeconomic reinsertion programme written into the agreement's framework of effective application.

In early January 2010, the leaders of the political wing of the Tuareg ADC met in Algeria to evaluate the implementation of peace agreements reached in 2006 in which the government pledged to develop northern Mali and especially the Tuareg community. Its spokesman, Hama Sid Ahmed, highlighted that the deterioration of the road security situation in northern Mali resulting from the activity of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) made this meeting necessary so they could agree on a joint strategy for dealing with the group. Faced with the government's ineffectiveness in addressing the activity of AQIM, an organisation they have accused of being complicit with the Malian authorities, in October the Tuareg of the ATNM decided to reorganise

to pacify the northern region, sorry that the call made by the ADC in January had been ineffective.

The armed Tuareg rebellion that began in January 2012 sprang from the destabilisation of the central government, which resulted from a military coup that overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in March and led to the growing control of the northern part of the country by rebel forces that in April proclaimed the independence of Azawad (name that the Tuareg give to the northern area of Mali). The armed conflict was characterised by the growing strength of jihadist armed groups (**Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM**) that ended up displacing Tuareg insurgents to control the area. Alongside these developments, throughout the crisis initiatives were implemented by different regional and international stakeholders, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, to re-establish institutional order and restore the territorial integrity of Mali.

The armed conflict that broke out in Libya as part of the Arab revolts, and which ended with the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, served as a catalyst and prompted Tuareg groups to return to armed struggle in Mali in early 2012. In previous decades, many Tuareg had emigrated to Libya due to marginalisation and repression in Mali, harsh droughts, economic reasons and after failed attempts at rebellion against Bamako. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was created in October 2011. The organisation brought together different Tuareg groups through a complex system of alliances and loyalties, including exiles returning from Libya and some Tuareg that had joined the Malian Army and defected to the rebels.

The MNLA rebellion began on 17 January 2012. The offensive against Malian forces was joined by Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), an armed jihadist group led by legendary Tuareg commander Iyad ag Ghali, a key player in the rebellions against Bamako in the late 1980s and also an important figure in the signing of the Algiers Accords in 2006. The armed Tuareg rebellion that began in January 2012 sprang from the destabilisation of the central government, which resulted from a military coup that overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in March, and led to the growing control of the northern part of the country by rebel forces that **in April proclaimed the independence of Azawad** (name that the Tuareg give to the northern area of Mali). The armed conflict was characterised by the growing strength of jihadist armed groups (Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM) that ended up displacing Tuareg insurgents to control the area. Alongside these developments, throughout the crisis initiatives were implemented by different regional and international stakeholders, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, to re-establish institutional order and restore the territorial integrity of Mali. The regional organisation ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States, also known by its French acronym, CEDEAO) decided to intervene to facilitate the restoration of constitutional order and promoted a mediation process headed by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. President Compaoré's mediation and the sanctions adopted against Mali by ECOWAS favoured the signing on 6 April of an agreement with the leader of the military government, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, to return power to civilians and facilitate ousted President Touré's departure from the country.

Alongside the loss of control of the northern region to jihadists, the MNLA let go of some of its demands and gave up on independence for the region in October. Leaders of the group were open to negotiating formulas of self-determination and proposed formulas for autonomy similar to those in Quebec, Canada. After various informal contacts, in December 2012 representatives of the MNLA and Ansar Dine held their first direct meeting with delegates of the Malian government in Burkina Faso. The armed groups agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to uphold the integrity of Mali and reject terrorism.

## The peace process in 2013

Early in the year, the situation was characterised by the **beginning of French military intervention with the help of African troops that partially recovered control of the northern part of the country from advancing armed Islamist groups**. In this context, one faction calling itself the **Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA)** splintered off from the armed group Ansar Dine, announcing that it rejected all forms of extremism and was ready for dialogue. This faction, led by Alghabass Ag Intalla and composed fully of Malian citizens, denied any links to AQIM or the MUJAO. The group offered the French and Malian authorities a cessation of hostilities in areas under its control in Kidal and Menaka in order to negotiate an inclusive political agreement. Ag Intalla was Ansar Dine's representative during the attempts at mediation and contacts held between the group and the Malian government in Burkina Faso in 2012.

Three weeks after the start of the French offensive, the armed group MNLA which offered to help Paris in its battle with Islamist radicals, announced that it had regained control of the areas around Kidal and Tessalit, the two main towns in the north of the country. The Tuareg organisation warned that it would not accept the presence of Malian troops in its territory, declared that it would not surrender its weapons, arguing that it had to be able to react to any reprisals from the Malian Army against the Tuareg population, and supported the arrival of a UN peacekeeping mission to the region. The AU Special Representative for Mali, the Burundi politician Pierre Buyoya, maintained contacts with members of the MNLA in Ouagadougou in early March, while at the end of the month, leaders of the group received the UN Special Representative for Mali, David Gressly, in Kidal. The International Crisis Group (ICG) stressed the importance of addressing the structural causes of the crisis in northern Mali and of getting different regional and international stakeholders to help the MNLA to channel its demands through political rather than armed activity. In this regard, the ICG also suggested that the government should not impose preconditions on talks with the armed group, discouraging a demand for immediate disarmament that could hinder any possible talks.

During the second quarter, **the Malian government and the armed Tuareg group MNLA signed a peace agreement** that would help to hold elections in the country in late July after a series of contacts and the implementation of reconciliation initiatives. At the beginning of the period, the debates were focused on forming a dialogue and reconciliation commission led by former Defence Minister Mohamed Salia Sokona. Some Malians thought that the commission had been set up to satisfy the international community, but it remained unclear who would reconcile with whom and how. Nevertheless, the commission began to work and meet with a UN delegation to share experiences on dialogue techniques used in countries such as Togo, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. According to press reports, **MNLA leaders also began training in negotiation techniques in Italy, with Swiss funding**.

After contacts with the MNLA began, it was clear that one of the government's main objectives would be to **return Kidal to the central government (a region where the Tuareg gained control, starting in February, after armed Islamist groups withdrew from the area)**. At the time, the Tuareg group said that it would not disarm and thought that the elections planned for July did not have enough guarantees. Likewise, both the MNLA and the MIA rejected the government's appointment of the governor of Kidal, which they thought should be elected by the local population, and warned the government against sending troops to the region. While some clashes did take place in Kidal in early June between Malian soldiers and MNLA forces, a peace agreement between the Tuareg group and the authorities was announced in the second half of the month. After two weeks of **negotiations in Ouagadougou, under the mediation of the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, and EU and UN delegates**, an agreement was reached that included an immediate ceasefire among the parties, allowed for Malian troops to return to Kidal and provided for elections to be held. The agreement was hailed by various international stakeholders, but analysts also warned that Tuareg demands had not been dealt with in earnest

and complex issues such as disarmament would not be addressed until after the elections. It is worth mentioning that in late June, a reconciliation ceremony took place between the different rival military factions in Mali. During the event, held in the Presidential Palace in Bamako, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, **leader of the coup d'état in March 2012, which aggravated the Malian crisis, apologised to the population.** Also at the event, it was announced that both groups loyal to ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré and followers of Sanogo would release the prisoners belonging to the rival band that they still held in custody.


The agreement signed between the authorities and Tuareg groups allowed elections to be held, which took place according to schedule and ended in the second-round victory of Ibrahim Boubakar Keita in August. The agreement also led to the deployment of military forces in the Kidal region and the withdrawal of MNLA militias to their bases around the area. This agreement was reached in early July by a mixed committee composed of members of the Malian Army, Tuareg groups, representatives of French-led Operation Serval and the regional organisation ECOWAS. After Keita's inauguration, the new government had 60 days (until the end of November) to begin talks with the Tuareg. However, after violent incidents between Malian troops and Tuareg combatants in September, **the MNLA and two other Tuareg groups announced they were pulling out of the peace process** and denounced that the authorities had not fulfilled their promises, including the release of prisoners. Meanwhile, the MNLA was accused of failing to respect the agreement to withdraw its forces, since militia members of the armed group had been seen outside their bases in Kidal. In this context, near the end of the third quarter there were ceasefire violations between the parties that left various people wounded. In recent years, Switzerland has maintained discreet mediation efforts between the government and the MNLA.

However, in early October, **three rebel groups, including the MNLA, returned to negotiations** and called for disarmament, the return of the combatants to their quarters and the release of prisoners. The EU pledged to contribute 615 million euros to support peace and development in Mali.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• French military intervention with the help of African troops partially regained control of the north of the country from advancing armed Islamist groups.</li> <li>• MNLA leaders began training in negotiating techniques in Italy with Swiss funding.</li> <li>• Three rebel groups, including the MNLA, returned to negotiations and called for disarmament, the return of the combatants to their quarters and the release of prisoners.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AlertNet (<a href="http://www.alertnet.org">www.alertnet.org</a>)</li> <li>• Temoust (<a href="http://www.temoust.org">www.temoust.org</a>)</li> <li>• <a href="http://www.kidal.info">www.kidal.info</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.lerepublicain.net.ml">www.lerepublicain.net.ml</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.malikounda.com">www.malikounda.com</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.maliweb.net">www.maliweb.net</a></li> </ul>

Main parties involved in the process





## SENEGAL (Casamance)

### Context of the conflict

Discovered in 1445, Casamance became the first Portuguese colony. It was transferred to French control in 1908 as part of what was then the Federation of Mali, and remained so until Senegal's independence in 1960. Since 1982, the **MFDC** (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) has been waging an armed rebellion through its military wing, **Atika**, to achieve independence for Casamance, a region in the south of the country which is virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia. Casamance is also the only place in Senegal where an

area of tropical jungle remains, with large trees, rivers and wildlife. With 3.5 million inhabitants, Casamance is one of the most important tourist hubs in Senegal, and therefore, tourists have been the target of MFDC actions on several occasions. Offshore the subsoil in this region is rich in oil, while the region is also relatively rich in rice and cashews. The rebellion is led chiefly by people from the Diola ethnic group, a minority compared to the majority Wolofs running the government. The Diola are also present in Guinea Bissau and Gambia, which explains the support that the independence movement receives from these two countries, depending on the situation and the makeup of the dissidences within the MFDC. The Diola, a farming people, founded a kingdom called Gabu in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century. They feel economically and politically marginalised by the central power, which looks down on the other minorities, and are unfavourable to the colonisation of people from the north of the country. The main languages in Casamance are Diola and Portuguese Creole. The USA and France support Dakar in its bid to defeat the MFDC. The conflict has become regionalised and is affecting Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, triggering the exodus of thousands of people. The historical leader of the MFDC was Abbot **August Diamacaoune**, who died in 2007. Diamacaoune offered ceasefire proposals several times (1992, 1995 and 1998), but the peace talks between the MFDC and the government were postponed repeatedly for various reasons (clashes, disagreement about the venue or facilitators, etc.). The Church has played an extremely important role in this region, which has very particular social and religious structures. The conflict has caused around 3,000 deaths. The MFDC has representatives in Switzerland, Portugal, France and Gambia. Both of the factions currently keeping the conflict alive, the Northern Front (led by Salif Sadio) and the Southern Front (led by Cesar Atoute Badiate), earn a living from the illegal trade in cashews and other natural products, giving a more economic than political dimension to the resolution of the conflict.

<b>Population:</b> Senegal (14.1 million), Casamance (3.5 million)
<b>Area:</b> Senegal: 197,000 km <sup>2</sup> ; Casamance: 32,350 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI</b> Senegal: 154 (of 186)
<b>GDP</b> Senegal: 13,962 million dollars
<b>Per capita income:</b> \$ 990
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 3,000
<b>Displaced persons:</b> between 10,000 and 40,000
<b>Armed actors:</b> factions of the MFDC
<b>Facilitators:</b> Community of Sant'Egidio

### Background to the peace process

The earliest peace initiatives date back to 1991, when the government first undertook a reconciliation measure and released many prisoners. Likewise, a first ceasefire was declared at that time. The first splinter within the MFDC between Sidi Badji's Northern Front and Diamacoune's Southern Front came in 1992. In 1999, there was a historical encounter in the capital of Gambia between the president of Senegal, A. Diouf, and Abbot Diamacoune, the leader of the MFDC, launching what was called the "Banjul process", which culminated in a ceasefire. Elections were held in January 2000 with A. Wade declared the winner. He changed the negotiation strategy by eliminating Gambia's mediation and assigning the entire responsibility to a ministerial team. In 2001, the MFDC reached an initial peace agreement with the government of Senegal, although Diamacoune recognised that he did not have control over several dissident sectors. In late December 2004, the government and the MFDC finally signed a general peace agreement in the town of Ziguinchor, which theoretically put an end to 22 years of conflict. The

MFDC gave up its claims for independence and focused more on developing Casamance. The agreement was signed by the Minister of the Interior and the founder of the MFDC, A. Diamacoune, and it stipulated an end to the use of violence, amnesty for members of the group and their voluntary integration into the country's security forces, the start of a demining process, the return of thousands of displaced persons and refugees, and the reconstruction of the region of Casamance. However, the agreement was only partial, since both factions of the group remained active.

In February 2011, the National Conference presented the president of Senegal with a peace plan for Casamance. The proposal included two phases: the creation of a national contact group and the launch of a national commission to supervise the negotiations. The National Conference is a forum for debate in which representatives from the different political parties and civil society took part in an attempt to respond to what are considered questions of state and offering proposals to resolve them. In December, the secretary-general of the MFDC, Jean-Marie François Biagui, announced that during the meeting held in Casamance, his movement's intention was to become a political party and proposed that a federal system be developed in Senegal, thus giving up his pretensions for independence.

In early 2012, **President Abdoulaye Wade** said that he had requested the intermediation of the **Community of Sant'Egidio** to establish dialogue with the MFDC faction led by **Salif Sadio**, considered the most belligerent. In April, the MFDC welcomed the decision of new President **Macky Sall** to involve Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the search for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Casamance. In June, **Salif Sadio** proposed a negotiated exit to the crisis in Casamance through the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio. The positive signs of a possible establishment of talks between the government and the armed group in Casamance, the MFDC, were confirmed with the official announcement that negotiations would take place between the parties over the course of the third quarter. Meetings were held between the parties in Guinea-Bissau in July. A month and a half later, Senegalese Prime Minister **Abdoul Mbaye** confirmed the establishment of discreet negotiations with the MFDC, which would be extended to other stakeholders interested in the crisis in the future. Notably, in September, two rival factions of the MFDC led by **Ousmane Niantang Diatta** and **César Atoute Badiate** entered a reunification agreement. In mid-October, a government delegation met with an MFDC delegation in Rome to discuss a peace agreement. The meeting took place in the Community of Sant'Egidio. Alongside the talks in Rome, the Archbishop of Dakar was ordered by President **Macky Sall** to maintain contacts with **César Atoute Badiate**, the military leader of an MFDC faction. **The Gambian President also joined the process** and, together with the former Mayor of Ziguinchor, promoted a meeting between representatives of the Sadio and Badiate factions to find common ground.

## **The peace process in 2013**

The Community of Sant'Egidio continued with discreet negotiations, but some media outlets reported that the organisation was focusing its efforts on the northern front of the MFDC, the most operational faction led by **Salif Sadio**. This bothered the leaders of the southern front, **Ousmane Niantang Diatta** and **César Atoute Badiate**. Although it has recently been less violent, the southern front still has great capacity, especially since it was reunified, as it is thought to have 80% of the combatants, who are well armed.

At the start of the year, the front's representatives reiterated their willingness to make peace and unite all the guerrilla movements. On 18 January, an important meeting was held in Guinea-Bissau that was facilitated by the Guinea-Bissau-based NGO **Mon Ku Mon** and included six members of the northern front and six members of the southern front. An ad hoc committee was created to carry the message of the entire armed group. Furthermore, on 22 February **Salif Sadio** met secretly with Senegalese President **Macky Sall** in Dakar. The meeting was organised with great discretion by the former Mayor of Ziguinchor and the director of the Facilitators Group for a Lasting Peace in Casamance, **Robert Sagna**. Gambian President **Yahya Jammeh** also played an

important role. Sall and Sadio spoke about the rumour that arms coming from Casamance had reached northern Mali. Other peace initiatives promoted by civil society continued in the region, such as the opening of the House of Peace by a group of youth in Ziguinchor, the capital of Casamance.


In April, the Community of Sant'Egidio confirmed that the head of the MFDC, Salif Sadio, was sought on an international arrest warrant. This confirmation ought to contribute to a climate of trust between the government and the MFDC for negotiations in Rome, since it was one of the preconditions set by the separatist group. In a television appearance, one of the heads of the MFDC, Ousmane Niantang Diatta, made the following request: "That all brotherly combatants of the MFDC, north and south, east and west, lay down their arms for a third ceasefire that will lead to good solutions for fair, honest and disciplined negotiations". Meanwhile, President Sall repeated his request that the MFDC enter into negotiations with the government and thanked Niantang Diatta for his support. In May, Cardinal Théodore Adrien Sarr held a secret meeting with César Atoute Badiatte, of the MFDC. Former Minister and former Mayor of the capital of Casamance, Robert Sagna, also met with various military leaders of the northern front of the MFDC, supporters of Badiatte.

In the third quarter, the initiatives of local and international stakeholders linked to the peace process between the MFDC and the government continued, which were aimed at putting an end to the conflict in Casamance. These initiatives took the form of several events, including the activities of the Working Group for Peace in Casamance, which completed a two-day conclave in Ziguinchor intended to provide guidelines for the government and the MFDC to move ahead in future negotiations coordinated by former Minister and government delegate Robert Sagna. Beforehand, they had worked on issues related to decentralisation to find an alternative to the independence sought by the MFDC. Another prominent episode during the period occurred in September, when a meeting took place between the leader of the MFDC, César Badiatte, and Robert Sagna in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. US diplomat James Bullington also participated in the talks about the peace process. In June, the US President pledged to support efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Casamance. As part of this, the US advisor for Casamance, Sue Ford Patrick, also travelled to The Gambia for three days in September in order to discuss the Casamance conflict with Gambian government officials and non-governmental organisations, according to a press release from the US Embassy in Banjul. It is worth mentioning that in July, Gambian President Yahya Jammeh announced that he would not intervene to resolve the conflict in Casamance unless Senegal asked him directly. The Gambian President also said that he was willing to help Senegal on the condition that Dakar changes its attitude towards Banjul. In November, the second meeting between the Community of Sant'Egidio and Salif Sadio's faction of the MFDC was held in early Rome. In December, with the support of the World Bank and the EU, the organisation Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS) organised a meeting platform for women of Senegal and neighbouring countries to promote peace in Casamance.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Community of Sant'Egidio continued with negotiations discreetly.</li> <li>• An important meeting between six members of the MFDC's northern front and six members of the MFDC's southern front was held in Guinea-Bissau, facilitated by the Guinea-Bissau-based NGO Mon Ku Mon.</li> <li>• Salif Sadio met in secret with Senegalese President Macky Sall in Dakar on 22 February.</li> <li>• A meeting was held between MFDC leader César Badiatte and Robert Sagna in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. US diplomat James Bullington also participated in the talks about the peace process.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa Time (<a href="http://www.africatime.com/senegal">www.africatime.com/senegal</a>)</li> <li>• Afrol News (<a href="http://www.afrol.com">www.afrol.com</a>)</li> <li>• Government (<a href="http://www.gouv.sn">www.gouv.sn</a>)</li> <li>• Le Soleil (<a href="http://www.lesoleil.sn">www.lesoleil.sn</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• Rewni (<a href="http://www.rewni.com">www.rewni.com</a>)</li> <li>• <a href="http://www.homeviewsenegal.sn">www.homeviewsenegal.sn</a></li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



*Space of intermediation*

## b) Horn of Africa

### ETHIOPIA (Ogaden)

#### Context of the conflict

The region of Ogaden is part of what is called the Somali Region in Ethiopia. It covers an area of around 200,000 km<sup>2</sup>, and is divided between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as part of Kenya and Djibouti. The region was annexed to Ethiopia in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the late 1970s there were military clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of this region, and this culminated in 1978 with the Somali regime seriously debilitated. The Ogadeni/Somali population practices a tolerant form of Islam.

**Population:** Ethiopia (94.1 million);  
Ogaden (4.3 million)  
**Area:** Ethiopia (1,104,000 km<sup>2</sup>);  
Ogaden (179,000 km<sup>2</sup>)  
**HDI** Ethiopia: 173 (out of 186)  
**GDP** Ethiopia: 41,605 million dollars  
**Per capita income** Ethiopia \$442  
**Displaced persons:** 650,000  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** + than  
1,000 in 2007  
**Armed actors:** ONLF  
**Facilitators:** Kenya

Since 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has been fighting for the independence or autonomy of the region of Ogaden, a desert area bordering on Somalia. The ONLF was part of the transition government from 1991 to 1995, after the Communist regime, but thereafter it withdrew from government to fight for the independence of what it views as the Ogadeni people. It has a major diaspora in the United States (with numerous pro-peace civil organisations), Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands. It calls for the independence of the Ogadeni/Somali people, an ethnic group 27 million people strong. In 1994 the ONLF called for a referendum on self-rule in Ogaden, an initiative which met with a large-scale military attack by the Ethiopian government. Given this situation, the "elders" in the region called on the government to take up talks to resolve the conflict. In 2007 the ONLF launched attacks against Chinese oil and natural gas facilities (China Petroleum Chemical Corporation) operating in the region of Ogaden, an area where the Malaysian company Petronas also has facilities.

#### Background to the peace process

In late 1998, the government and the ONLF held secret meetings to find a solution, but the meetings ended when the ONLF asked that another organisation participate in the negotiations as a witness. The government also killed one of the negotiators and captured another, who died in prison. In 2007, the ONLF issued a call for international mediation which would help to open up negotiations with the Ethiopian government. In October 2010, part of the ONLF reached a peace agreement with the government which put an end to the armed struggle that it had been waging in the region of Ogaden for decades. The agreement stipulated an amnesty for the imprisoned members of the group and the conversion of the group into a political party. However, a part of the ONLF led by Mohamen Omar Osman kept up the armed struggle, and both factions considered themselves to be the main core of the ONLF, accusing the other part of being insignificant.

In April 2010, the armed group United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), a wing of the former Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI) which operated in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, agreed to turn its weapons in to the Ethiopian government and return to legal status after decades of guerrilla warfare. The WSLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July. Amnesty had previously been granted to the members of the group, and the agreement signalled the launch of development projects in the Ogaden region.

During the third quarter of 2012, contacts took place between the government of Ethiopia and the armed opposition group active in the Ogaden region, the ONLF. Both parties met in Nairobi, Kenya in early September for preliminary talks in which they agreed on a negotiating framework


to put an end to the 28-year-old insurgency. In October, the peace talks stalled. According to the Foreign Secretary of the ONLF, Abdirahman Mahdi, the talks ran aground when the government demanded that the ONLF recognise the Ethiopian Constitution. Mahdi said that they had been fighting with Ethiopia since 1984 and that the current Constitution only dated to 1994, so they could not force the group to recognise it.

## The peace process in 2013

In late June, the ONLF's Executive Committee held its plenary session in Istanbul (Turkey). In July, meetings were held with Western diplomats to speak about political and human rights issues. **The ONLF expressed its willingness to solve the conflict through dialogue.** In August, an International Crisis Group report recommended that Kenya act as a guarantor and that technical support be channelled through the IGAD. In October, the ONLF met in Nairobi with members of the Ogaden community. In late October, a former US Ambassador to Ethiopia said that US policy was aimed at promoting a peace process and stabilising the region.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ONLF expressed its willingness to solve the conflict through dialogue.</li> </ul>
Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AlertNet (<a href="http://www.alertnet.org">www.alertnet.org</a>)</li> <li>All Africa.com (<a href="http://allafrica.com">allafrica.com</a>)</li> <li>Ethiopian News Agency (<a href="http://www.ena.gov.et">www.ena.gov.et</a>)</li> <li>Ogaden Human Rights Committee (<a href="http://www.ogadenrights.org">www.ogadenrights.org</a>)</li> <li>Ogaden News (<a href="http://222.ogadennews.com">222.ogadennews.com</a>)</li> <li>Ogaden Online (<a href="http://www.ogaden.com">www.ogaden.com</a>)</li> <li>Ogaden Voices for Peace (<a href="http://www.ogadenvoice.org">www.ogadenvoice.org</a>)</li> <li>ONLF (<a href="http://www.onlf.org">www.onlf.org</a>)</li> <li>Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> </ul>

## Main parties involved in the process



# SOMALIA

## Context of the conflict

Somalia is a country that is homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. However, it is separated into five main clans, which are in turn divided into sub-clans. In 1969 General Siad Barre led a coup d'état and established a dictatorship. This lasted until he was overthrown in 1991 after three years of armed conflict in the country. The coalition of opposition groups that overthrew the general began an armed struggle for power resulting in the wholesale destruction of the country and the death of hundreds of thousands of people since 1991. This situation brought about US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the establishment of a United Nations mission (UNOSOM) in 1992. The mission failed and withdrew from the country three years later. Despite these precedents, the UN Secretary General recommended establishing a peacekeeping mission on the basis of the communities' proposals. This mission would be focussed on the tasks of disarmament and demobilisation. Some of the country's regions have declared their independence or have agreed to a certain level of autonomy (Somaliland and Puntland).

<b>Population:</b> 10.5 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 638,000 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI:</b> ....
<b>GDP:</b> 1,306 million \$
<b>Per capita income:</b> ...
<b>Displaced persons:</b> + 1 million
<b>Refugees:</b> 400,000
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> hundreds of thousands; 21,000 since 2007.
<b>Armed actors:</b> Al Shabab, ARS dissidents
<b>Facilitators:</b> Turkey

The **al-Shabaab** group arose in 2006 as an Islamist resistance organisation that later became linked to al-Qaeda and at certain times has controlled large parts of the country. For the time being, negotiations with this radical group have not been established. However, negotiations continued among various regions of the country for the purpose of building a federal state.

## Background to the peace process

In spring 2000, the new President of Djibouti, who is also president of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD (a regional organisation made up of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda), organised a reconciliation conference in the city of Arta in his country. A Transitional National Assembly was elected, despite the fact that many clan leaders were absent. In January 2001, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. However, the TNG was not supported by all of the groups and only controlled part of the country and the capital. At the end of this year, a round of talks between the TNG and opposing factions was held in Kenya and an initial agreement was reached. Finally, in late 2002, a round of peace talks was held in Eldoret (Kenya). They were organised under the auspices of IGAD and led to an agreement to cease hostilities and begin a negotiation process on a range of issues. The Transitional Federal Parliament was formed in 2004. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in January 2007. That same year, the peace and reconciliation conference called the National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (NGRC) was held in the outskirts of the capital. The conference was boycotted by the Islamists from the UTI, who demanded that it be held in a neutral country. Parallel to the conference, around 400 opposition figures who gathered in Eritrea agreed to create an alliance opposing the TFG, adopting the name Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS), which later came to be called the ARS. In 2008, the peace talks were resumed in Djibouti between the TFG and the moderate faction of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, under United Nations mediation, which resulted in an agreement on the 26<sup>th</sup> of October. This agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, the radical militia Al-Shabaab, headquartered in Eritrea, announced that it would not heed the agreement and would instead continue to fight against the moderate ARS militia headquartered in Djibouti. In the second half of February 2010, the TFG signed an agreement with the Islamic group Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ)

with the goal of creating an alliance with the groups and factions that opposed the presence of extremist groups in the country.

In February 2011, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) approved the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for another three years. This mandate was about to conclude in August, when a new constitution was to be adopted and the first elections in the country held. In June, the president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reached an agreement with the president of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in which they pledged to postpone the legislative and presidential elections for a one-year period after the date on which the transitional federal institutions were to be renewed, so the elections had to take place before the 20<sup>th</sup> of August 2012 at the latest. Worth noting is the roadmap reached by the National Consultative Conference held in Mogadishu in early September which stipulated a series of tasks that would have to be completed before August 2012, including improvements in security, the writing of a draft constitution, national reconciliation and good governance.

In January 2012, the leaders that met in Puntland reached an agreement on the peace process road map for the country. Representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), of the region of Puntland, of Galmudug and of the group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa signed the Garowe Principles at the Constitutional Conference held there. According to the new agreement, Somalia will have a bicameral Parliament with an upper chamber of federal state representatives. This federal bicameral Parliament will take effect in June 2016. Meanwhile, the **UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Augustine Mahiga, established her office in Mogadishu 17 years after the UN left the country.** In February, the UN Security Council approved an increase in the AU mission in the country, AMISOM. The provisional Constitution was approved by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), composed of 825 members elected by a group of 135 elders (senior Somali leaders with traditional authority in the country). This federal Constitution draft must be approved via a national referendum that will be held once the security situation improves. On 10 September, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was appointed the new President of the country to mark the end to the transition period. In October, the Federal Parliament approved the appointment of Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saa'id) to be the country's new Prime Minister. Both leaders had serious disputes with each other in the final months of the year.

## **The peace process in 2013**

No agreement was reached with the armed group al-Shabaab during the year. Notable early in the year was the process **to form the state of Jubaland**. This created tension between the federal government, which claimed it monitored the process, and the leaders and authorities of the region, which claimed that the process was carried out without interference from the Somali government.

From 7 to 9 July, **talks were held between the federal government and the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland**, in which the Turkish government played an important role. **Turkey hosted and facilitated these talks for the second time since April.** Referring to the documents achieved in earlier rounds in Chevening, Dubai and Ankara, the document signed by both parties in this third round established first the joint management of Somali airspace by proposing the creation of a bilaterally-controlled body based in Hargeisa to share management of the airspace and the benefits derived from it; second both parties' commitment to continue with the talks; and third plans that the next meeting would take place in Turkey within the next 120 days. Many analysts saw this agreement as a victory for Somaliland and said that it follows the lines originating in the conference in London in February 2012, in which the UK government demonstrated its continued support for a solution based on negotiations between peers (a "two-state" solution). The construction of the federal state of Somalia enjoys the sympathy of different organisations and regional governments, as it means creating a national organisation with power shared between federal states and the government, with administration closer to the general public and more




respectful of the clan majorities and minorities in the country. However, while the anti-federalists promote the existence of both countries, Somaliland and Somalia, the current situation and the Constitution also recognise Puntland and Jubaland. On 28 August the federal government and local militias of **Jubaland** reached an agreement that recognised Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as leader of the interim government of Jubaland for the next two years after months of tension and sporadic clashes. In December, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud forced his Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon (Saacid) to resign through a vote of no confidence in the lower chamber of the Somali Federal Parliament.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Talks were held between the federal government and the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, in which the Turkish government played an important role.</li> <li>• The federal government and local militias of <b>Jubaland</b> reached an agreement that recognised Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as leader of the interim government of Jubaland for the next two years.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IGAD (<a href="http://www.igad.org/somalipeace/index.htm">www.igad.org/somalipeace/index.htm</a>)</li> <li>• Interpeace (<a href="http://www.interpeace.org">www.interpeace.org</a>)</li> <li>• International Crisis Group (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• UN (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• Swiss Peace (<a href="http://www.swisspeace.org/fast">www.swisspeace.org/fast</a>)</li> </ul>

### Main parties in the process



# SUDAN (Darfur)

## Context of the conflict

Several different conflicts have been superimposed in Sudan in recent years. The first of these, in the south of the country, began in 1982 and ended with the peace agreements signed in January 2005, despite some persisting tension. The second, located in the western region of Darfur, began in early 2003. This conflict has only intensified over the years and is the situation analysed in this chapter. In addition, there is a third, lesser conflict in the east of the country, which erupted in 2005 and ended in late 2006.

In February 2003, while talks between the government and the SPLA were progressing in the south of the country, a new armed group arose in the Darfur region. Known as the **SLA**, it would subsequently split into many factions. After months of confrontation with the government, both parties agreed to a ceasefire in September. However, there were many violations of this agreement. The government of Chad offered to mediate in the conflict. In October, a new armed group called the **JEM** emerged in the region. This group initially refused to negotiate with the government and criticised the Chadian mediation.

**Population:** 39 million (7.5 in Darfur)  
**Area:** 2,506,000 km<sup>2</sup>; (Darfur, 503,180 km<sup>2</sup>)  
**GDP Sudan:** 51,453 million dollars  
**Per capita income:** \$1,319  
**HDI:** 171 (out of 186)  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 300,000  
**Displaced population and refugees:** 2,700,000  
**Armed actors:** JEM, LJM (Bashar), LJM, SLA  
**Facilitators:** UNAMID, Qatar, UN-AU, Qatar, Txad

## Background to the peace process

In February 2004, the SLA and the JEM attended a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The aim of this meeting was to guarantee humanitarian access to the affected people. In April 2004, a temporary ceasefire agreement was reached in Chad, and both armed groups demanded an end to the region's marginalisation and its inclusion in the peace process that the government was carrying out with the SPLA in the south of the country. This agreement led to the creation of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). In May 2005, under the auspices of Muammar al-Gaddafi, both parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Libya, which would facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Subsequently, in mid-June, the government and the two armed groups met in Abuja (Nigeria) to begin a new round of direct contacts (after a six month break), with mediation from the AU under the leadership of its special envoy, S. Ahmed Salim. Towards the end of July, the SLA and the JEM signed an agreement in Tripoli (Libya) pledging to end the confrontations between the two groups, to release prisoners and to restore trust and coordination. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of May 2006, the Sudanese government and the majority faction of the SLA led by M.A. Minnawi signed a peace agreement in Abuja (Nigeria) under the auspices of the AU.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 dated the 31<sup>st</sup> of July 2007 authorised the establishment of a hybrid operation run jointly by the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur (UNAMID) which was authorised to take any measures needed to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its staff and civilians, without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent upon the government of Sudan. In 2008, the JEM expressed its willingness to discuss the peace proposal for Darfur promoted by Qatar, and it stated that it would send a delegation to Doha to hold consultations with Qatari leaders. In the second half of February 2010, the Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement facilitated by the president of Chad, and they presented a framework for a future peace agreement. In June, the JEM accused the government of having violated the ceasefire

agreement by bombarding its positions in northern Darfur. The surge in skirmishes and military operations in Darfur during the month of May led the armed group to withdraw from the negotiations, as it deemed that the agreements reached with the government had been violated by the renewed outbreaks of violence. In March, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the coalition of armed groups Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella organisation for small factions led by El-Tijani El-Sissi (a member of the Fur ethnic group and former governor of the region) in Qatar. In July, two rebel groups from Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army-FREES (SLA-FREES) and the Justice and Reform Movement (JRM), signed a peace agreement mediated by a reconciliation committee of local leaders and native administrators, with UNAMID as the observer. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of April, the mediators gave to the armed groups LJM and JEM a draft peace agreement with six points for their consideration. While the LJM stated that it was in favour of the agreement, the JEM expressed reluctance and asked to discuss several aspects with government representatives. The main points of contention referred to the section on human rights and freedoms, as well as to the administration of Darfur and the vice presidential posts offered within the central government. The government and the alliance of armed groups LJM signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) in July with the goal of putting an end to the armed conflict in Darfur. In September, a new JEM faction, Democratic Change Forces, headed by the vice president of the group and the leader of the forces in Kordofan, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdein, announced its intention to reach a peace agreement with the government as part of the Doha process. At the end of the year, the top JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, died during an attack by the Sudanese army.

A split occurred in the armed group JEM in the third quarter of 2012. The new faction, led by commander Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim ("Dabajo"), indicated its willingness to negotiate with the Sudanese government and appointed Mohamed Bashar to be the new leader of the armed group JEM-Bashar. In October, representatives of the government and the dissident JEM faction signed a cessation of hostilities agreement and announced that they would sit down for peace talks.

## **The peace process in 2013**

**Negotiations between a faction of the JEM led by Mohamed Bashar (JEM-Bashar) and the Sudanese government continued in Doha (Qatar) throughout the first quarter.** In January, an agenda of negotiations was agreed on. In early February a ceasefire agreement was signed and discussions began about issues such as the sharing of power and wealth, compensation and the return of internally displaced people and refugees, justice and reconciliation and final security provisions based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). In late March, some pacts were signed and the process ended with an official ceremony on 6 April in Doha. JEM-Bashar agreed that some of its combatants would join the Sudanese Army and the rest would demobilise, while members of the JEM would also join the national government, the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the executive and legislative bodies of the five states of Darfur. Both parties also agreed to create three new bodies: one for nomad and farmer issues, a social assistance fund and a credit bank for small businesses. Finally, in January some members of the UN Security Council expressed their concern about the slow implementation of the DDPD and the lack of funding, mainly from the Khartoum government, which made it impossible for institutions like the DRA to perform its functions. This concern had already been expressed by the UNAMID and other stakeholders in late 2012.

**Negotiations between JEM-Bashar and the government of Sudan were sealed with a peace agreement** that was signed on 6 April in Doha (Qatar) based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as part of the Darfur Donor Conference. However, when the JEM-Bashar delegation returned to Darfur via Chad, it was attacked by members of the JEM faction led by Jibril Ibrahim, killing Mohamed Bashar, the group's second-in-command, Suleiman Arko, and five other members. The international commission that supervises implementation of the DDPD

remarked that "it was not only an act of vengeance, but also a calculated and deliberate move to dissuade others that would join the peace process".

In October, the Sudanese government and the JEM (Bashar) faction led by "Dabajo" signed an agreement to implement the peace agreement. The agreement was sponsored by the Doha Pact of 2012 and established that both parties would cease hostilities and begin a peace process. According to the faction's spokesman, Ali el-Wafi, the key issues identified for the negotiations were security, the sharing of power and the future of the refugees. "Dabajo" returned to Khartoum in mid-November where he was received by Sudanese authorities. At the time, the main sector of the JEM, led by Jibril Ibrahim, and the other groups composing the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), SPLM-N and two of the main groups of the SLA, led by Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLA-AW) and Minni Minnawi (the last of which, SLA-Minnawi, signed a peace agreement in 2006 that it broke in 2011), upheld their refusal to establish partial peace negotiations and proposed a comprehensive solution that would remove the regime and establish a democracy that respected the rights of the different regions.

In November, various armed groups that had still not signed a peace agreement met in the capital of Ethiopia with the mediation of the UNAMID, after having done the same in Tanzania in August to discuss the humanitarian situation and the possibilities of entering peace negotiations. These groups said that the democratisation of the country and the creation of a new Constitution were necessary.

The leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), which signed the DDPD in 2011, said that Khartoum was delaying the implementation of security arrangements and was not fulfilling its obligation to include members of the LJM in the civil bureaucracy. In November, the Sudanese government and Tijani el-Sissi's LJM signed a security agreement by which between 2,000 and 3,000 members of the LJM would join the Sudanese Army and police force. The agreement was signed with the intermediation of the UNAMID. Furthermore, at the end of the year, Sudanese Vice President El Haj Adam Yousif proposed an "action plan" that would involve the members of Parliament, the legislative State Councils and the Darfur Regional Authority, in addition to civil society organisations. In mid-December, the Peace Agreement Implementation Committee planned to meet in Cairo (Egypt) with the government, the LJM, the JEM-Bashar, the AU, the Arab League, Burkina Faso, Chad, Qatar, Egypt and all five permanent members of UN Security Council.


Regarding the dispute between Sudan and the armed group SPLM-N in the region of **South Kordofan and Blue Nile**, in June the SPLM-N repeated its request that the government negotiate access for humanitarian workers in South Kordofan and Blue Nile to carry out a polio vaccination campaign, but the government said that a political agreement must be reached before negotiating with the humanitarians. In May, both parties expressed their disagreement over this issue: the SRF said that the humanitarian workers had to enter areas under their control from Ethiopia or Kenya, while the government said they had to enter from Sudan. **The government of Sudan attempted to establish contact with the SPLM-N** through three countries during the months of July and September to resolve the conflict in South Kordofan. The new governor of South Kordofan, Adam al-Faki, also tried to establish relations with the movement in mid-July. However, the SPLM-N rejected the requests for negotiation and claimed it wanted a holistic solution that would cover both areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) and the region of Darfur.

However, a 15-day humanitarian truce was achieved so a polio vaccination campaign could be carried out. In late November, **the SPLM-N's negotiator did not rule out resuming negotiations in Ethiopia in December with the mediation of the AU**. Also notable is the work done by some community mediation associations like the Justice Confidence Centres (JCC) and the Joint Conflict Programme (JCPR). In December, members of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) stressed that the SPLM-N would only accept a comprehensive solution involving regime change.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations between the group JEM (Bashar) and the Sudanese government ended with a peace protocol and later with an agreement.</li> <li>• The Sudanese government and Tijani el-Sissi's LJM signed a security agreement.</li> <li>• The SPLM-N's negotiator did not rule out resuming negotiations in Ethiopia in December with the mediation of the AU to resolve the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IGAD (<a href="http://www.igad.org">www.igad.org</a>)</li> <li>• Incore (<a href="http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries">www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries</a>)</li> <li>• International Crisis Group (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• Issues in Peacebuilding (<a href="http://www.cmi.no/sudan">www.cmi.no/sudan</a>)</li> <li>• JEM (<a href="http://www.sudanjem.com">www.sudanjem.com</a>)</li> <li>• UN (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• Small Arms Survey (<a href="http://www.smallarmsurvey.org">www.smallarmsurvey.org</a>)</li> <li>• Sudan Tribune (<a href="http://www.sudantribune.com">www.sudantribune.com</a>)</li> <li>• UNAMID (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unamid">www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unamid</a>)</li> <li>• African Union (<a href="http://www.africa-union.org">www.africa-union.org</a>)</li> <li>• UNMIS (<a href="http://www.unmis.org">www.unmis.org</a>)</li> <li>• Wikipedia (Darfur Conflict)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



# SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN

## Context of the conflict

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA in the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese Armed Forces, which were opposed to southern independence advocated by the SPLA. The conflict caused the death of more than a million people. In 2005, a peace agreement was signed that granted independence to South Sudan in 2011. However, both countries had to continue negotiating to clarify some points, especially the future of the city of Abyei, located in an oil-rich area.

<b>Population:</b> Sudan: 39 million South Sudan: 10.3 million
<b>Surface area:</b> Sudan: 1,886,681 km <sup>2</sup> South Sudan: 619,745 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI:</b> Sudan: 171 (of 186) South Sudan: ---
<b>GDP:</b> Sudan: 51.453 million USD South Sudan: 10.060 million USD
<b>Per capita income:</b> Sudan: 1,319 USD South Sudan: USD 977
<b>Armed groups:</b> the Armed Forces of both countries
<b>Facilitators:</b> African Union

## Background to the peace process

The first explorations were made in 1988 and the following year, the government and the SPLA signed a first Declaration of Principles by the IGAD, the mediating body, to hold a referendum on self-determination for the southern part of the country.

The beginning of an agreement was reached in July 2002 under the auspices of the IGAD that established autonomy for the south before holding a referendum in 2011. The first direct meeting also took place between the Sudanese President and the leader of the SPLA. Various rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya from 2002 to 2004, in which progress was made on a wide array of issues. These rounds allowed the parties to reach a final peace agreement on 5 January 2005, by which the north and south would keep their Armed Forces separate, a joint force would be formed for the most controversial areas, a six-year autonomy period would be established, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, oil profits would be shared fairly and a national unity government would be formed with a member of the SPLA as Vice President. In addition, it was agreed to not apply Islamic law in the south of the country and each side was allowed to use their own flag. In 2011, a referendum was held and South Sudan became an independent country. The process took 13 years in total and seven years until the peace agreement was signed.

The end of the war with the north and subsequent attainment of independence by South Sudan in 2011 was not enough to bring stability to the southern region. Disputes over territorial control, livestock and political power increased across many communities in South Sudan, raising the number, seriousness and intensity of the clashes among them. The situation worsened still after the general elections in April 2010, when various military figures that had run as candidates or supported political opponents of the ruling party, the SPLM, were not victorious. These military figures refused to recognise the results of the elections and decided to take up arms to back their claim to the right to govern, denounced the dominance of the Dinka and the under-representation of other ethnic groups in the government and described the government of South Sudan as corrupt. Juba's offers of amnesty did not put an end to the insurgency, which has been accused of receiving Sudanese funding and logistical support.

During the year, two important armed fronts formed in the Greater Upper Nile region: the South Sudan Liberation Army, under the command of Peter Gadet, in Unity state, and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army, led by General George Athor, in Jonglei state. Both groups share the aim of overthrowing the government of South Sudan, led by President Salva Kiir, whom they brand as corrupt and accuse of poor governance, while also accusing the main party, the SPLM, of monopolising political power within institutions and of marginalising the rest of the non-Dinka

parties and communities (mostly in the SPLM). They also say that the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) and police are poorly equipped and incapable of ensuring the population's security, despite the fact that they receive large amounts of resources from the government.

The attacks of the SSLA and the SSDM/A, together with the militias led by Gabriel Tang-Ginye (Upper Nile), Gatluak Gai (Unity) and David Yau Yau (Jonglei), caused thousands of fatalities over the course of the year in the Upper Nile region. One of the most serious attacks in terms of the number of victims was perpetrated by the SSDM/A in Fangak county (Jonglei), where 300 people were killed in February and March, according to government sources. The government's response to the insurgency took two forms: a renewal of the offer of amnesty for its leaders, which included having its troops rejoin the Army, and direct combat carried out by the Armed Forces. The military operations aggravated the situation on many occasions when soldiers were accused of attacking, assaulting and killing civilians they had accused of colluding with insurgents. The Army's burning of at least 7,000 homes in Mayom county (Unity state) in May was a clear example of these kinds of actions. In September and October, the SSLA warned NGOs and UN agencies to abandon the states of Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap, as it aimed to launch powerful attacks there. George Athor (SSDM/A) took advantage of the amnesty in January, but continued fighting and expanded his attacks in later months. Athor died in December in a military ambush on the Sudanese border. Similarly, military rebel Gatluak Gai agreed to an amnesty with the government in July, but was killed in mysterious circumstances later in the month in Koch county (Unity). David Yau Yau and Peter Gadet availed of the amnesty in June and August, respectively, but Gadet's group (SSLA) refused to give up the armed struggle. Furthermore, the rebel Gabriel Tang-Ginye remained under arrest in Juba since April. Repeatedly throughout the year, the South Sudanese government accused Khartoum of providing assistance and arms to the military rebels. In this regard, various reports published during the year by Small Arms Survey, which identified and evaluated the material seized from Athor and Gadet's forces by the Army, corroborated suspicions that both groups may have been receiving outside support.

During the third quarter of 2012, various meetings and rounds of negotiation took place between Sudan and South Sudan, and it was not until 27 September that **a partial agreement on security and economic relations was reached** under the auspices of the AU's High-Level Implementation Panel. In addition to the AU's official mediator, Thabo Mbeki, the United States and China had considerable influence in the peace talks. The agreement led to the resumption of oil exports and an agreement to demilitarise the shared border and thereby avoid a military conflagration of major consequence. However, many key points remained unresolved, including the status of the disputed Abyei region and several border areas disputed by both countries.

In October, the **AU's Peace and Security Council unanimously approved to prepare mediation efforts aimed at resolving the dispute over Abyei**, which pits Sudan against South Sudan. The AU's proposal called to hold a referendum in October 2013 in the disputed region, and only members of the Misseriya community residing in Abyei would be eligible to vote. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and the EU expressed their support for the referendum proposal, while Russia said that Abyei should be partitioned, which is also Khartoum's position.

### **The peace process in 2013**

In March, the governments of both countries pledged to implement an agreement signed in September 2012 that created a ten-kilometre demilitarised zone on both sides of the border and that allowed South Sudan to export oil again through Sudanese pipelines. The central banks of both countries agreed on a method to make it easier for Khartoum to collect oil revenues. The transport of oil through Sudanese pipelines was planned to begin soon. Sudan and South Sudan also agreed to form a new mechanism to deal with accusations from both sides that the other side supported rebel groups.

Some reports indicated that Khartoum had given up its demand to possess 50% of the interim governmental positions in the Abyei region, disputed by both countries, which could make it easier to hold a referendum to decide which of the two countries it would join. In late March, the **US-based Carter Center, working in cooperation with the Future Studies Center of Sudan and the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies of South Sudan**, agreed to implement a one-year project aimed at creating a space for debate where practical ideas for establishing peace may be created.

**In April, the President of South Sudan offered amnesty to six rebel group commanders.** At first this was only accepted by the armed group SSLA. According to local sources, the 3,000-member group crossed the border from Sudan with one hundred lorries and delivered weapons to the South Sudan authorities. In June, the leader of another militia that fought in the state of Upper Nile, Johnson Uliny, also took advantage of the amnesty deal.

**Both countries reached an agreement in April.** The main points consisted of opening ten passages at the border, establishing a joint security committee and dealing with rebel demands. Petrol production resumed and crude oil arrived in Sudan on 7 April, following the agreement reached in March. However, Sudan's decision to shut down the pipeline again increased tension between both parties. In June, **both countries accepted AU mediation** to resolve the disputes.

The governments of Sudan and South Sudan negotiated the end of the closure of oil pipelines throughout the month of August after Sudanese Oil Minister Awad al-Jaz announced in early August that the closure was postponed until 6 September rather than the initial date of 22 August. Previously, the date had been postponed from 22 August to 7 August. The presidents of both countries met in Khartoum in early September to start talks about the oil pipeline crisis. As a result, on 4 September Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that the transport of oil from South Sudan through Sudanese infrastructure would not be prevented. Notably, in early July the government of **South Sudan** announced the **beginning of peace talks with rebel leader David Yau Yau**. Previously, the President of the country, Salva Kiir, had asked the elders of the Murle community to persuade Yau Yau to respond to the proposed amnesty.

In October, **Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir** held a meeting in Juba to talk about the status of the Abyei region. Both presidents agreed on the general conditions for the administration of Abyei. Among other things, they settled issues related to Abyei Council and police, as well as payment of 2% of oil sales, including outstanding payments, to the Abyei Administration. The final status of the region has been in dispute since 2005. It is currently under the administration of the UN, with 4,000 "blue helmets" stationed there. Khartoum had opposed the referendum because nomads of the Misseriya ethnic group, citizens of Sudan and supporters of union with Khartoum could not vote. In this regard, thousands of people returned to the region to vote in the non-official referendum held in late October in which the mostly Dinka voters decided to join South Sudan. The referendum was considered illegal by both countries involved in the dispute and by the AU. As preparations for the referendum were being made, the UN Security Council released a statement that asked the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to abstain from any illegal action that could increase tension between both countries. Meanwhile, the AU announced that it would send a mission to Abyei between 5 and 6 November to mediate in negotiations intended to determine the status of the region, reduce tensions in the area and prevent any unilateral action from unfolding.

## **SOUTH SOUDAN**

**In April, the President of South Sudan offered amnesty to six rebel group commanders.** At first this was only accepted by the armed group SSLA. According to local sources, the 3,000-member group crossed the border from Sudan with one hundred lorries and delivered weapons to the South Sudan authorities. In June, the leader of another militia that fought in the state of Upper Nile, Johnson Uliny, also took advantage of the amnesty deal. Notably, in early July the




government of South Sudan announced the **beginning of peace talks with the leader of the Murle militia, David Yau Yau**. Previously, the President of the country, Salva Kiir, had asked the elders of the Murle community to persuade Yau Yau to respond to the proposed amnesty.

On 14 December, there was an **attempted coup d'état** that President Salva Kiir was able to stifle, though it did trigger fierce clashes that left one thousand people dead. Kiir accused former Vice President Riek Machar of orchestrating the coup and ordered his arrest, while Machar denied being behind the events. Later, forces loyal to Machar seized control of Unity, an important oil region, and of Bor, the capital of the state of Jonglei and the scene of a massacre in 1991 between the Dinka ethnic group, to which Kiir belongs, and the Nuer, of which Machar is a member. Both groups continued to dispute control over other important places in battles in different parts of the country. While fears mounted that a new conflict was brewing, the UN announced the arrival of more peacekeeping forces. **Both groups started peace talks in January in Addis Ababa** that included negotiations to release prisoners and agreements to attain a ceasefire. The government announced that it would only consider freeing prisoners when the corresponding investigation and legal process are conducted. Meanwhile, the rebels declared that the government's arrest of senior officials was still an obstacle to peace negotiations.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The governments of both countries pledged to implement an agreement signed in September 2012 that created a ten-kilometre demilitarised zone on both sides of the border and that allowed South Sudan to export oil again through Sudanese pipelines.</li> <li>• The peace negotiations between both countries led to an agreement. Both countries accepted AU mediation to resolve their disputes.</li> <li>• Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir held a meeting in Juba to talk about the status of the Abyei region.</li> <li>• In December, serious clashes broke out between supporters of President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and former Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer. The former accused the latter of planning a coup d'état against him. The fighting could lead to a civil war between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Both parties sent delegates to Ethiopia to begin negotiations.</li> </ul>

#### Main parties involved in the process



## c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

### CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

#### Context of the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR) won independence from France in 1960. For the first six years of its independence it was governed by the dictator D. Dacko. Dacko was later overthrown by his cousin J. B. Bokassa, who set up an eccentric military dictatorship. Later France backed a coup d'état that reinstated Dacko, until he was once again overthrown in 1981, this time by Ange Félix Patassé, who took over ownership of the companies exploiting the country's natural resources. The country suffered from several military mutinies in the 1990s because it failed to pay the soldiers' salaries, and there was a coup in 2003, when the current president François Bozizé came to power. Despite the fact that the country is rich in diamonds, gold, uranium, wood and coffee, the CAR has been suffering from political instability, ineffective governance, insecurity, banditry and deterioration in its economic situation for twenty years, while half of its population remains illiterate. With the economic recession in Europe and the United States, the diamond industry entered into a deep-seated crisis and most companies closed. In the words of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to this country, the roots of the conflicts in the CAR lie in the collapse of its socioeconomic structures and the absence of political dialogue. Since 2003, the conflict between the government and several armed groups has been closely linked to the situation in Darfur (Sudan), which shares a border with the CAR, since the armed groups from both countries take refuge in refugee camps on both sides of the border, generating serious tensions between the two countries. The majority of the conflict is thus centred in the northern region of Vakaga, whose capital Birao has been controlled by the rebel groups on several occasions. 2005 saw the creation of the armed opposition groups the **Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy (APRD)**, and the **Union des Forces du Renouveau (UFR)**, headed by F. Njadder-Bedaya. Another armed group, the **UFDR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement)**, led by Michel Djtodia, is a coalition between three groups (GAPLC, MLCJ and FDC), and the **Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africaines (FDPC)**, led by Abdoulaye Miskine, who was close to former president Patassé. New President Michel Djtodia was Muslim, though only 15% of the population follows Islam. In January 2014, he had to flee the country.

<b>Population:</b> 4.6 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 623,000 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HID:</b> 180 (out of 186)
<b>GDP:</b> 2,184 million dollars
<b>Income per inhabitant:</b> \$472
<b>IDP:</b> 280,000
<b>Armed actors:</b> FDPC, APRD, UFDR, UFR
<b>Facilitators:</b> Gabon

#### Background to the peace process

After the country experienced three mutinies in its armed forces in 1996, in January 1997 the Bangui Agreements were signed between the forces loyal to then-president Patassé and the rebel groups. These agreements called for an inter-African force, called MISAB, whose 800 soldiers would be in charge of demobilising the combatants and ensuring compliance with the agreements. In 1998, after intervention by French troops, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping mission (MINURCA) to protect the capital of the country and replace MISAB. Since 2007, the government has been signing peace agreements with the different armed groups. In February 2007, the government and the FDPC led by Abdoulaye Miskine signed a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) under the mediation of Muammar al-Gaddafi. In April, an agreement was reached with Damane Zakaria's UFDR, with a joint call for a cessation of hostilities and the offer of amnesty for the members of the group. In May 2008, the government signed an agreement with the APDR, run by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who was in exile in France, in Libreville with the

mediation of the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo. Later, in December 2008, the government and several armed opposition groups reached an Inclusive Political Agreement (IPA) with the mediation of the archbishop of Bangui, Paulin Pomodimo, forming a joint government and calling free elections in 2010, which were postponed until 2011. The dialogue was co-facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. Two former presidents also participated in it, André Koulingba and Ange-Félix Patassé, as well as Jean Jacques Demafouth's APRD, Damane Zakaria's UFDR, Florent N'Djadder's UFR and Abakar Sabone's MLCJ (a faction of the UFDR). Months later, in July 2009, Abdoulaye Miskine's FDPC joined (Miskine was in exile in Libya) with mediation by Libya, and in October 2009 Hassan Ousman's MNSP (a faction of the MLCJ) also adhered to the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD). The only rebel group that remained on the margins of the peace process was Charles Massi's Convention des Patriots por la Justice et la Paix (CPJP). In July 2011, the government and a dissident faction of this armed group, which is made up of around 500 combatants, signed a peace agreement in the town of Nzako in the east, after they had reached a ceasefire agreement in June.

Notably, a peace agreement was signed with the armed group CPJP and the government on 25 August 2012. The CPJP was the last armed Central African group active in the country, as the four main armed groups signed various peace agreements in 2008. However, an alliance of different armed groups called Séléka started a rebellion on 10 December 2012, took control of various parts of the country and threatened to overthrow President François Bozizé if he did not implement the peace agreement made in 2007. This alliance, a union of different factions and breakaways from the armed groups CPJP, UFDR and CPSK active in the northern part of the country, and which had reached various peace agreements with the government in recent years, demanded payment of the stipends resulting from the peace agreement and the release of political prisoners. However, it later increased its demands and at the end of the year it said that Bozizé had to step down before any negotiations could begin.

### The peace process in 2013


The peace agreement reached in early January in the Central African Republic was not respected by the parties and the conflict resumed. The rebellion begun in December 2012 by the rebel coalition Séléka forced peace talks to be held with the government led by François Bozizé, who was cornered militarily by the insurgency. Moreover, the international community pressured the government to accept holding peace talks in Libreville, Gabon, on 10 January. Both parties agreed to carry out these contacts in Gabon in order to reach an agreement. The United States, France and the EU urged both parties to reach a political solution and to protect the civilian population. France announced that it would not intervene in the conflict, rejecting President Bozizé's request for military intervention. The ECCAS facilitated the peace talks, which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the parties, with Bozizé remaining in power until his term ended in 2016. Moreover, the agreement included the formation of a national unity government in charge of organising early legislative elections within one year after the National Assembly was dissolved. This government was supposed to be inclusive, with the political opposition participating in it and holding the post of prime minister. The ECCAS (MICOPAX) peacekeeping mission had to be reconfigured and its goal had to be to ensure implementation of the agreements. Moreover, foreign forces had to leave the country. However, violence persisted, waged by some groups belonging to Séléka that opposed the agreement, and in February the rebellion accused Bozizé of failing to comply with the agreements and threatened to resume fighting. In late March, it backed up its promise with an assault on the capital, Bangui, which forced the Central African President to flee with his family to DR Congo where they sought refuge. In August, the leader of the rebellion, Michel Djotodia, became the new President of the country and Nicolas Tiangaye was named Prime Minister, who in turn appointed a new government formed of 34 ministers from different political movements, as established in the Libreville Agreement: nine coming from the rebellion, eight from the old opposition, one former associate of Bozizé and the rest coming from civil society.

At the end of the year, the situation worsened with **clashes between the Christian community, which traditionally held political power, and the Muslim community**, which caused hundreds of fatalities and a grave humanitarian crisis. In response, **France sent a detachment of 1,200 soldiers** to restore order to the situation and force Séléka to withdraw. A UN Security Council resolution in early December approved intervention to put an end to human rights violations and re-establish order. France complained of the little military support obtained from the EU. Finally, in January 2014 President Djotodia had to flee the country in the wake of Séléka's defeat.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The peace agreement reached in early January was not respected by the parties and the conflict resumed.</li> <li>• The rebellion accused Bozizé of failing to comply with the agreements and threatened to resume fighting. In late March, it backed up its promise with an assault on the capital, Bangui, which forced the Central African President to flee.</li> <li>• France sent a detachment of 1,200 soldiers to restore order to the country and force Séléka to withdraw. Séléka's leader had to flee the country in January 2014.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AlertNet (<a href="http://www.alertnet.org">www.alertnet.org</a>)</li> <li>• All Africa (<a href="http://allafrica.com">allafrica.com</a>)</li> <li>• Alwihda (<a href="http://www.alwihdainfo.com">www.alwihdainfo.com</a>)</li> <li>• BINUCA (<a href="http://www.operationspaix.net/BINUCA">www.operationspaix.net/BINUCA</a>)</li> <li>• Centrafrique Presse (<a href="http://www.centrafrique-presse.com">www.centrafrique-presse.com</a>)</li> <li>• Foundation Hirondelle (<a href="http://www.hioldelle.org">www.hioldelle.org</a>)</li> <li>• Government (<a href="http://www.centrafricaine.info/fr.html">www.centrafricaine.info/fr.html</a>)</li> <li>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• Le Confident (<a href="http://www.leconfident.net">www.leconfident.net</a>)</li> <li>• MINURCAT (<a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/minurcat">www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/minurcat</a>) (<a href="http://minurcat.unmissions.org">minurcat.unmissions.org</a>)</li> <li>• United Nations (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc</a>)</li> <li>• UNDP (<a href="http://www.cf.undp.org/p_ala_une.htm">www.cf.undp.org/p_ala_une.htm</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• Sangonet (<a href="http://www.sangonet.com">www.sangonet.com</a>)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (East)

## Context of the conflict

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the DR Congo was immersed in a situation of despotism, with an absence and disintegration of the state. In addition, the country's natural resources were plundered. This situation began during the Belgian colonial period, and except for a brief interval after independence in 1960, it continued for over 30 years under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. This dictatorship was characterised by the repression of political

**Population:** 67,5 million inhabitants  
**Area:** DRC (2,345,000 km<sup>2</sup>), Kivus (124,600 km<sup>2</sup>), Ituri district (65,600 km<sup>2</sup>)  
**GDP:** 18,823 million dollars  
**Per capita income:** \$279  
**HDI:** 186 (out of 186)  
**Armed actors:** M23  
**Facilitators:** Uganda

dissidence, serious human rights violations and a situation where the Mobutu elite amassed wealth by plundering the natural resources for their own benefit. In 1996 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), led by Laurent Desiré Kabila and supported by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, began an uprising against Mobutu which culminated in Mobutu ceding power in 1997. In 1998 Kabila lost the support of his old allies, neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, who invaded the DR Congo under the excuse that they were guaranteeing the security of their borders. These countries supported different armed groups (Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda, the MRC) fighting against Kabila's government. The government was supported by different countries in the region (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad) in a war that has caused around three and a half million deaths through combat, hunger or illness. Plundering the natural resources (gold, diamonds, wood and coltan) has become the driving force behind both the war and the prolonged presence of foreign armed forces in the country. Several neighbouring countries and western multinationals have profited from this enterprise, according to the United Nations. In this chapter we shall limit ourselves to analysing the process under way in the most conflict-ridden provinces in the country: Orientale (especially the Ituri area) with the presence of the **MRC**, **FNI** and **FRPI**; North Kivu, with the presence of the **ADF** (now dismantled), **CNDP** and **Mai-Mai** militias; South Kivu, where the Rwandan group **FDLR** is active; and Katanga, another region where the **Mai-Mai** militias are currently active.

## Background to the peace process

The first stage in the peace process was the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, which was signed in July 1999 by the different countries and armed groups involved in the conflict. This agreement was reached with the facilitation of the regional organisation SADC (the Southern Africa Development Community) and primarily South Africa. It enabled the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in November 1999 (UN Security Council Resolution 1291) to monitor the ceasefire and promote the disarmament of the militias. Its mandate is divided into four phases: enforcing the ceasefire agreements signed in Lusaka; monitoring any violation of the agreements; organising the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants; and facilitating the transition in order to organise credible elections. Its mandate is governed by Chapter VII of the charter, which authorises it to use force if necessary.

Nonetheless, the conflict continued in the east of the country. Laurent Desiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001, and his son Joseph Kabila took over power. It was only then that J. Kabila revitalised and promoted the Inter-Congolese Dialogues (ICD) held in South Africa. The ICD led to negotiations between the belligerent parties in Sun City, which led to the signing of an agreement at the end of these negotiations, known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement. This was signed in Pretoria in December 2002. The Sun City Final Agreement was reached in April 2003, bringing together and summarising the previous agreements. The Sun City Final Agreement led to the integration of the government and the armed opposition groups into the

Transitional National Government (TNG). Joseph Kabila kept his office as president of this government and four vice-presidents were appointed, representing the government, the MLC, the DRC/Goma and the unarmed opposition. The agreement called for a two-year transitional phase, after which general elections would be held and new Congolese armed forces would be formed, which would be made up of the different armed opposition groups.

In early 2005, 6,000 troops from one of the six armed groups in the region, the FAPC, were demobilised. In late July 2006 some of the main militias operating in the eastern region of the DR Congo, within the armed opposition coalition MRC, decided to lay down their weapons, to facilitate the free movement of displaced people in the area in order to exercise their right to vote in the elections. They also agreed to join the country's armed forces gradually in exchange for amnesty for all their members. The agreement was reached through mediation by the UN peace team in the region. One of the demobilised members was a leader of the FNI militia, Peter Karim. In late November 2006 the last three armed groups operating in Ituri signed a Framework Agreement for Peace in Ituri with the government, meaning that they agreed to lay down their weapons and join the DDR process. All told, the groups had 6,000 troops: 3,500 from "Cobra" Matata's FRPI, 1,800 from Peter Karim's FNI (some of which, however, were opposed to demobilising and continued fighting) and 500 from Mathieu Ngudjolo's MRC. In early December the Congolese government accepted the demand to hold direct peace talks with Laurent Nkunda's CNDP militia under the auspices of the United Nations and its Special Envoy, Olesegun Obasanjo, in Kenya. Early January 2009 witnessed a major division within the Congolese Tutsi group CNDP, as the military leader (Chief of Staff) of the rebellion, Bosco Ntaganda, announced the expulsion of General Laurent Nkunda as the leader of the group for reasons of poor governability. Shortly thereafter, Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda in a joint military operation between the Rwandan and Congolese armed forces. Furthermore, the faction of the Tutsi armed opposition group CNDP led by General Bosco Ntaganda, alias "Terminator", and ten other senior leaders of the rebellion, who just days earlier had stated that they had deposed General Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the movement, issued a declaration on the 16<sup>th</sup> of January in which they announced that they were putting an end to the hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces. After the agreement this faction announced that it would join the Armed Forces, and was willing to help in the offensive against the Rwandan Hutu armed opposition group, FDLR.

In late May 2010, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1925 extending MONUC's mandate until the 30<sup>th</sup> of June. It also decided that in view of the new phase that the country had reached, the United Nations' mission in this country **would be called the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) starting on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July.** MONUSCO was to be deployed until the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2011 and it would have at most 19,815 troops, 760 military observers and 1,441 police officers. It would also be supplied with the corresponding civilian, judicial and penitentiary members. The Security Council also authorised the withdrawal of at most 2,000 United Nations troops by the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2010 at the latest in the zones where security conditions allowed it. It further authorised MONUSCO to not only concentrate its efforts on the eastern zone of the country but also to keep a reserve force with rapid deployment capacity in any other part of the country. Finally, the Security Council stressed that the Congolese government was the main body in charge of security and protection of the civilian population. In June, the UN Secretary General appointed Roger Meece, the US ambassador in the DR Congo between 2004 and 2007, as the new UN Secretary General Special Representative to replace Alan Doss.

In August, at least 400 former members of armed groups from North and South Kivu proceeded to be demobilised. From 2009 until August 2010, 4,178 former combatants had laid down their weapons. The event also included a call for the members of the groups Mai Mai Kifuafua, Pareco-FAP and APCLS to disarm and reintegrate into the Congolese armed forces. In late December, a government delegation and a MONUSCO delegation held talks with a delegation of the Mai-Mai militia regarding the possible demobilisation of this group.

The Congolese armed forces and the armed group **Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF)** reached an agreement in **February 2011** after intense negotiations that led to the group's joining the army. The FRF is made up of people from the Banyamulenge community located in the Haute Plateau zone between Uvira and Fizi in the province of South Kivu. The group, led by self-proclaimed Generals Venant Bisogo and, Michel Rukunda, has never posed a military threat, and its membership currently fluctuates between 50 and 500 combatants. However, the army's operations against them led to numerous civilian deaths and had a heavy impact on the humanitarian situation in the region. One of the key issues in the negotiations, the status of the region of Minembwe, was postponed. The Banyamulenge people advocated on behalf of creating an autonomous Banyamulenge entity for the people with its own services and administration, as well as a separate election district. One of the prime leaders of the armed Hutu Rwandan group present in the east of DR Congo, the **FDLR**, namely Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Bisengimana, also known as Sam Mutima-Kunda, abandoned the armed group and joined the DDR programme being conducted by MONUSCO. Mutima-Kunda had been an officer in the former Rwandan army, a company commandant, and his current responsibilities were to mobilise civilian support of the FDLR and facilitate recruitment.

In 2012 the armed group **M23** arose in North Kivu, led by Sultani Makenga and Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero and formed by Tutsis. At first it rose up in arms against the government's alleged breach of the March 2009 agreement, although it later said it was fighting to liberate the entire country and oust Kabila. In July 2013, Rwanda and DR Congo agreed to create a regional force to combat the M23, with the support of the Great Lakes Initiative. In December, **peace talks facilitated by the Ugandan government began between the M23 and the DR Congolese government**, which allowed for the liberation of the city of Goma.

### **The peace process in 2013 with the M23**

The negotiations between the Congolese government and the armed group M23, facilitated by Uganda in Kampala, underwent moments of crisis with continuous mutual accusations of lacking the political desire to participate in the negotiating process, which **ended with French military intervention at the end of the year**. The divisions that took place within M23 at the start of the year and the delivery of Bosco Ntaganda to US authorities in Kigali helped to keep the dialogue process suspended. **However, mention must be made of the progress obtained at the regional level between the governments of DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. In late February, 11 African countries signed a peace agreement in Addis Ababa to stabilise eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes region.** The signatories pledged not to interfere in conflicts that take place in the countries neighbouring them and to abstain from supporting rebel groups, a specific reference to Rwanda, which was accused of giving military support to the M23. This agreement opened the door to intervention by the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of soldiers from countries of the region under the command of the MONUSCO.

However, it was not until late March, after many regional talks were held, that the UN Security Council approved the deployment of the FIB, which it allowed to take defensive measures and fight armed groups in the eastern part of the country. The Congolese Army enjoyed the support of the FIB in various operations. By mid-October its 3,000 troops coming from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi had fully deployed in rebel areas.

Between April and June, no progress was made in the peace talks taking place in Kampala between representatives of the government of DR Congo and the armed group M23, supported by Rwanda. The leader of the M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, had proposed an amnesty for the M23's combatants, but the government refused to offer it, which the group interpreted as a rejection of peace. The government denied a lack of commitment to the process and, **regarding the amnesty, said that the soldiers could avail of it and rejoin the Army, but not the commanders.** Nevertheless,

in early June, Bertrand Bisimwa declared his intention to resume peace negotiations. The Congolese government accepted the offer, but stressed that it would not let the talks drag on forever.

Meanwhile, the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), charged with dealing with the armed groups in the east of the country, began patrolling the streets of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, which some analysts said may also have prompted the M23 to accept restarting peace talks. The M23 had indicated its disapproval of the creation of the FIB and accused the United Nations of choosing war instead of promoting peace. Alongside these developments, the debate on Congolese citizenship started up again, which is one of the deep causes of conflict in the country and in the region, since **Rwanda wanted the Rwandan refugee population in the rest of the world to return to the country or be naturalised by their host countries.** In 2011, the UNHCR and countries hosting Rwandans said that on 30 June 2013, the Rwandan refugee population that fled before 31 December 1998 would lose its refugee status. The most important case was the Rwandan population in DR Congo, where giving Congolese citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Rwandans living there would cause a demographic shift in an area where this issue was already a source of conflict in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Finally, it is worth mentioning that representatives from the different communities of North Kivu province supported the **initiative of Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete to ask Uganda and Rwanda to begin peace negotiations with their respective rebellions.** The President of Intercommunity Coordination for North Kivu, Jean Sekabuhoro, stated at the end of June that both countries must negotiate with their respective rebellions and accept the democratic process like the rest of the African countries. He also welcomed the presence of the Tanzanian component in the UN Intervention Brigade (FIB).

The peace negotiations resumed in September due to the military pressure of the **UN Force Intervention Brigade and the DR Congolese Armed Forces and to the diplomatic pressure exerted by the countries of the region.** The heads of state of the Great Lakes region met in Kampala on 5 September in an attempt to find solutions to the conflict ravaging eastern DR Congo and called for a resumption of peace talks between the DR Congolese government and the armed group M23 and for these negotiations to last a maximum of 14 days. The talks finally resumed on 10 September, one day after the deadline set by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) expired. The paralysis of the peace negotiations between the government and the M23, supported by Rwanda, led to the resumption of hostilities in August. Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo were at the most serious point in recent years, with minor skirmishes and some exchange of gunfire on the border between both countries.

Thus, negotiations started again on 10 September, potentially leading to most of the rebels rejoining the Congolese Army, from which they had deserted in 2012. However, after days of negotiations, the positions remained deadlocked since the government refused to guarantee an amnesty for 100 M23 officers, leaving open the possibility that these commanders could be prosecuted even after peace talks had ended. The rebels that might not be covered by any amnesty were those that participated in multiple rebellions, were included on lists of international sanctions or had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. Government spokesperson Lambert Mende said that reintegrating these individuals would legitimise the use of armed violence. The rejection of a general amnesty was backed by the UN's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mary Robinson. The two main conditions established for disarming the M23 were the neutralisation of the armed group FDLR and the return of Tutsi Congolese refugees.

In October, the peace process between the Congolese government and the armed group M23 was suspended again despite international pressure and the progress made to reach a final agreement. Mary Robinson informed the UN Security Council that the parties had come to an agreement on eight of the 12 articles of the draft peace agreement. The parties agreed on the issues of releasing prisoners; the dissolution of the M23 as an armed group and its transformation into a political party; the return and resettlement of the displaced refugee population; the return of property looted during the capture of Goma in November 2012; the establishment of a national



reconciliation commission; reforms in the government and the financial sector; and the implementation of the 2009 peace agreement and of the current agreement pending finalisation. However, they agreed to return to the negotiating table to try to overcome their differences. The main disagreements between the parties hinged on amnesty for the combatants, disarmament and integration and security agreements for the M23. With regard to amnesty, the government repeated that it would not accept measures involving total impunity or which failed to comply with the Constitution and international commitments. The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Martin Kobler expressed his disappointment that an agreement had not been reached, despite the four intensive days of negotiations and pressure. Alongside Robinson and Kobler, envoys from the AU, the EU and the US also participated in the negotiations. Kobler asked for the UN Security Council's full support for the negotiating process. The UN and the US were concerned about this new hiccup in the process. Chrispus Kiyonga, a Ugandan government minister in charge of mediating the talks, asserted that he believed a final agreement would be reached soon. The M23's Deputy Chief of Communications, Lawrence Kanyuka, said that the Congolese government negotiators withdrew from the talks after demanding that the group expel Roger Lumbala from the M23 negotiating team for having insulted Congolese President Joseph Kabila a month earlier in Burundi.

In late October, the Congolese Army took control of the town of Bunagana, the main base of the armed group M23, marking a turning point in the conflict. The United Nations and Uganda called for a pact to end the conflict. Martin Kobler said that **the M23 was about to vanish as a threat after the Congolese Army took back five towns controlled by the M23**, including Rumangabo, where the group had a large military training base. More than 900 combatants died in the clashes that took place between the Congolese Armed Forces and the M23 in the eastern part of the country between 20 May and 5 November, according to military sources. Violent battles broke out on 25 October, after weeks of relative calm and attempts to restart the peace process in Kampala. On 5 November, **the M23 capitulated before the Congolese Army's large military offensive backed by the UN Intervention Brigade (FIB)**. That same day, hours after the capture of the final hills of Chanzu and Runyonyi, controlled by the M23 along the DC Congolese border with Rwanda and Uganda, the head of the M23 said in a statement that he was ending the rebellion according to the recommendations of the talks in Kampala. A governmental delegation and a rebel delegation were supposed to sign a political agreement on 11 November to put an end to the conflict, but after the military victory, **Kinshasa refused to sign the agreement and preferred to call it a "declaration"**, which would resolve the issues of the combatants' quartering, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Kinshasa rejected a general amnesty for pardons on an individual basis. **Combatants that were not guilty of war crimes could rejoin the Congolese Army or police**. On 20 November, a ceremony to destroy the weapons of former combatants was held in Goma. It is estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 former rebels from different groups could join the security forces, some of them unconditionally. Other self-defence groups of the Rutshuru region said that they would not demobilise at least until they receive some form of financial compensation in addition to being allowed to rejoin the Army for their efforts in the fight against M23. President Joseph Kabila began a tour of the eastern part of the country after the M23's defeat. The UN Security Council was satisfied with how the situation had developed. The UN Secretary-General said that "the Kampala talks came to an **official satisfactory conclusion** on 12 December. The government and the M23 each signed a **separate declaration** that reflected the agreement reached during the talks". **Some armed groups (like the APCLS, Nyatura militias) demobilised as part of the dissolution of the M23.**

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In late February, 11 African countries signed a peace agreement in Addis Ababa to stabilise eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes region.</li> <li>• The peace negotiations taking place in Kampala between the Congolese government and the M23 resumed in September due to the military pressure of the UN Force Intervention Brigade and the DR Congolese Armed Forces and to the diplomatic</li> </ul>


pressure exerted by the countries of the region.

- On 5 November, the M23 capitulated before the Congolese Army's large military offensive backed by the UN Intervention Brigade (FIB).
- Some armed groups (like the APCLS, Nyatura militias) demobilised as part of the dissolution of the M23.

#### Websites of interest

- All Africa ([allafrica.com](http://allafrica.com))
- Congo Daily ([www.congodaily.com](http://www.congodaily.com))
- Congo DR News ([www.drcnews.com](http://www.drcnews.com))
- ICG ([www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org))
- MONUC ([monuc.unmissions.org](http://monuc.unmissions.org))
- MONUSCO ([www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/monusco](http://www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/monusco))
- OCHA ([www.rdc-humanitaire.net](http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net))
- Reliefweb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int))
- SADC ([www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int))

#### Main parties involved in the process



*El espacio de intermediación*

## d) Maghreb

### WESTERN SAHARA

#### Context of the conflict

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when a referendum on self-rule was held. In the same year the territory was invaded by Morocco. As a result, almost half the population fled and settled in the Algerian area of Tinduf, close to the border with the Western Sahara. This incident led to the breaking off of relations between Algeria and Morocco. From then until 1991 there has been an open military confrontation between Morocco and the Saharan people led by the POLISARIO Front. In 1991 some of results of the negotiations begun by the United Nations back in 1988 were put into effect, leading to a ceasefire and the deployment of a United Nations mission (MINURSO). However, since 1991 Morocco has encouraged the colonisation of the Sahara by Moroccan settlers. Morocco was ready to create an autonomous region in the Sahara, while the POLISARIO Front called for the referendum promised, with the option of choosing independence.

<b>Population:</b> 250,000 inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 184,000 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI (Morocco):</b> 130 of 182
<b>Refugee population:</b> 86,000-150,000
<b>Actors:</b> POLISARIO Front
<b>Facilitators:</b> United Nations

#### Background to the peace process

Since the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front was reached in 1991, the United Nations has been working through diplomatic channels to reach a satisfactory agreement between both parties. However, to date the desired results were not obtained in any stages of the process. The government of Morocco has limited itself to offering autonomy, while the POLISARIO Front is demanding that a referendum be held with the option of independence. The so-called Settlement Plan from 1991, which called for a referendum to be held in the short term, was blocked shortly thereafter due to the allegations levelled by Morocco and despite the fact that in 1997, through the Houston Agreements, which were signed by both parties, it seemed that negotiations could be fruitful. The fact is that the new roadblocks put up by Morocco distorted what had been signed in Houston, which required the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, James Baker, to submit a new balanced proposal, or framework agreement, which gave Morocco's demands a considerable advantage, given that it suggested an autonomous regime for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The POLISARIO Front roundly rejected this plan. Furthermore, starting in 2000 the UN Security Council resolutions stopped mentioning the word "referendum". In 2003, James Baker presented a new, more balanced proposal known as the Baker Plan II, which was accepted by the POLISARIO Front as a starting point for negotiations. However, this time the proposal was rejected by Morocco.

In 2007, Morocco submitted its proposal for regional autonomy for Western Sahara to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. The proposal states that this region would be autonomous in its administration, economics, taxation, infrastructure, culture and environmental issues. The state of Morocco, in turn, would keep exclusive jurisdiction over matters of national sovereignty (the flag or national currency), the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, religious and constitutional matters and any matter related to the figure of the king, national security, defence, territorial integrity, foreign relations and judicial power in the kingdom. In early January 2009, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, named diplomat Christopher Ross as his Special Envoy for Western Sahara. Ross is the former US ambassador to Syria and Algeria, and in February he visited the region for the first time and declared his support for finding a solution to the conflict that takes into account the Saharan people's right to self-determination. In early January 2010, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on

Regionalisation (ACR), which was to lay the groundwork for the country's process of regionalisation, which would begin in the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara).

In 2011, it should be noted that the USA stated its support for Morocco's autonomy plan, which it described as "serious, realistic, credible and using an approaching that may satisfy the aspirations of the Saharan people". In July, Morocco and the POLIARIO Front persisted in their differences over the future of Western Sahara. However, according to UN sources, at the meeting held in July in Manhasset, the parties seemed to have listened to the recommendations of the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and begun talks to include representatives of the Saharan people in the negotiation process. This would facilitate the debates on issues like education, the environment and healthcare.

In April 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon accused Morocco of spying on the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In a report submitted to the Security Council, Ban warned there were indications that the confidential communication between the mission in El Aaiún and the UN headquarters in New York had been intercepted. Ban Ki-moon also complained in the report that MINURSO's access to the population was being controlled by Morocco and that the Moroccan security forces posted outside the entrance to the mission's headquarters discouraged people from approaching it. In May, Morocco withdrew its confidence from the UN Secretary-General's Envoy for the Western Sahara, US diplomat Christopher Ross. In mid-September, representatives of the MINURSO, the POLISARIO Front and Morocco met in Geneva (Switzerland) to jointly evaluate implementation of a series of confidence-building measures. In December, Christopher Ross said that he did not favour holding new rounds of informal talks between the POLISARIO and Morocco given that the meetings since August 2009 had not produced any results.

Latest rounds of negotiation		
1 <sup>st</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	June 2007
2 <sup>nd</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	August 2007
3 <sup>rd</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	January 2008
4 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	March 2008
1 <sup>st</sup>	Dürnstein (Austria)	August 2009
2 <sup>nd</sup>	Armonk (New York)	February 2010
3 <sup>rd</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	November 2010
4 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	December 2010
5 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	January 2011
6 <sup>th</sup>	Mellieha (Malta)	March 2011
7 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	June 2011
8 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (New York)	July 2011
9 <sup>th</sup>	Manhasset (Nueva York)	March 2012
10 <sup>th</sup>	Geneva	September 2012

## The peace process in 2013

No formal negotiations took place during the year. The UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy travelled to Mauritania, and between 28 January and 15 February visited the capitals of the member countries of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (Madrid, Moscow, London, Washington and Paris), in addition to Germany and Switzerland. Ross also met with the leader of the POLISARIO Front, Mohamed Abdelaziz, who said in mid-March that the Sahrawi population would keep up their peaceful struggle, but if it was necessary they would take up arms again and fight to achieve their aim of independence. According to press reports, after the recognition of Palestine at the United Nations, the leader wants the POLISARIO Front's efforts to go in the same direction, which should end with a presence of the SADR at the UN.

Between late March and early April, UN Special Envoy Christopher Ross visited the region again, including Sahrawi territory for the first time since he was appointed in 2009. Ross called for the parties to demonstrate flexibility and creativity in the search for a solution to the conflict, while also trying to promote a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, the POLISARIO Front's main ally. Ross also met with the President of Algeria and the King of Morocco during his tour of the region.

With regard to the negotiating process, Ross submitted three ideas with modest goals that would be presented to the parties and neighbouring states. First, bilateral consultations would be held with each party and they would be asked to recognise that the negotiations involve a *give and take* and that the spirit of cooperation must prevail. From here, he would ask each party to present specific ideas about the nature and elements of an agreed solution. This could lead to a period of shuttle diplomacy and, with time, enrich the negotiating process. Second, he would ask each party to think about how to present their proposal in a different way when a new meeting is held face-to-face, meaning that they explain its benefits and advantages for the other party. Finally, he would ask the parties to accept that they will not come to an agreement on the final status on the Western Sahara in the short term and that when a new meeting is held face-to-face, they will be able to discuss the practical aspects of governing the region systematically and notwithstanding the final status.

He submitted three more ideas for the atmosphere of the negotiating process. First, he would renew efforts to encourage Algeria and Morocco to continue developing their bilateral relations, based on ministerial visits that have taken place so far and priority sectors determined through the exchange of messages between the governments of both countries and during his most recent visit to the region. Second, he would encourage the UNHCR to expand its programme of seminars to address unease expressed mostly by women and youth that there was not more contact between Sahrawis in the region and in the refugee camps. Third, while the members of the Arab Maghreb Union continued efforts to revitalise the regional organisation, he would encourage them to think about the role it could play to help to find a solution to the conflict in Western Sahara, which is still the main conflict in the region.

During the first week of April, Ban Ki-moon said that **the climate of instability and insecurity in the Sahel made it all the more urgent to find a solution to the dispute over the Western Sahara, urged the parties to commit to genuine dialogue** and stressed the importance of independent, impartial, sweeping and sustained oversight of the human rights situation in Western Sahara as well as in the refugee camps controlled by the POLISARIO Front in Tindouf, in southern Algeria. The UN Secretary-General's report also highlighted that civil society representatives in the region, especially women and youth, had raised the idea of establishing more direct contact. Thus, Ban hoped to bring these groups together as part of a broad programme of trust-building measures under the auspices of the UNHCR. **The United States proposed expanding the MINURSO's mandate to include the supervision of human rights.** However, this idea was met with irritation from Morocco, which lobbied intensely to sink it. Finally, the Security Council approved extending the MINURSO mandate for another year without granting it prerogatives in terms of human rights.


During the second quarter, there were signals pointing to a **possible rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria**. After a meeting in Rabat about regional security issues, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dahou Ould Kablia, suggested at the end of April that the border between Morocco and Algeria, which has been closed for more than twenty years due to the two countries' differences with regard to the issue of Western Sahara, could be reopened soon if negotiations over the border speed up. Previously, his Moroccan counterpart, Mohand Laenser, visited Algeria to see Kablia in a meeting that the local press described as "favourable".

In August, the senior leader of the Sahrawi group, Mustapha Bachir Essaid, warned that the organisation did not rule out returning to armed struggle if Rabat continued to block the talks. Despite the freeze on the dialogue about the key points of the conflict, representatives of both parties met again in Geneva in the headquarters of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Sahara, Christopher Ross, attending. As part of the meeting, which also aimed to boost trust between the parties, an agreement was reached for a new visit plan in 2014 and for holding cultural seminars. Also during the quarter, various groups continued to demand that the MINURSO include the human rights situation in its mandate. At the end of the year, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) of Morocco said that in the next six years, it would invest 12.5 million euros in the so-called "southern provinces" to boost maritime transport and agricultural and industrial activities.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations were stalled throughout the year.</li> <li>• A meeting on trust-building measures was held.</li> <li>• Ban Ki-moon said that the climate of instability and insecurity in the Sahel made it all the more urgent to find a solution to the dispute over the Western Sahara and urged the parties to commit to genuine dialogue.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Afrol News (<a href="http://www.afrol.com/es/paises/Sahara_occidental">www.afrol.com/es/paises/Sahara_occidental</a>)</li> <li>• ARSO (<a href="http://www.arso.org">www.arso.org</a>)</li> <li>• Gobierno de Marruecos (<a href="http://www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/Sáhara">www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/Sáhara</a>)</li> <li>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• MINURSO (<a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso">www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso</a>)</li> <li>• Naciones Unidas (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc</a>)</li> <li>• Sahara Libre (<a href="http://www.saharalibre.es">www.saharalibre.es</a>)</li> </ul>

Main parties involved in the process



## Latin America

### COLOMBIA

#### Context of the conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has very deep roots that go beyond the emergence of the present guerrillas in the 1960s. Violence characterised the relations between liberals and conservatives from the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the National Front regime (1958-1978). In addition, any alternative political option has been repressed. Therefore the emergence of various guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s can be explained by politics that serve the interests of the elite, social exclusion and the lack of democratic opposition parties. Among the guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (**FARC**) and the National Liberation Army (**ELN**), both of which were formed in 1964. They currently have 10,000 and 3,000 fighters respectively. The violence increased when paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**) emerged in the early 1980s to fight against the insurgents. Within this environment of violence, the production and export of drugs and the recent emergence of new paramilitary structures linked to drug trafficking are other factors that make the conflict more complex. The civilian population is the main victim of the conflict.

<b>Population:</b> 48.3 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 1,139,000 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>GDP:</b> 369,813 million dollars
<b>Per capita income:</b> \$7.656
<b>HDI:</b> 91 (out of 186)
<b>Armed actors:</b> FARC, ELN
<b>Facilitators:</b> Norway, Cuba, Venezuela, Chile

#### Background to the peace process

Since the 1980s, many efforts have been made to build peace by both actors involved in the conflict and by Colombian society. The FARC's position is to achieve structural changes, especially in agricultural matters, while the ELN has shown its desire to develop a participative mechanism in society to achieve the democratisation of the country. In 1982, President Betancur appealed to the guerrillas to reach a peace agreement. Two years later, the FARC ordered a ceasefire that formally lasted until 1990, when president Gaviria ordered an attack on FARC's command centre. In 1990, after lengthy negotiations, the third guerrilla group in the country, M-19, was demobilised, resulting in the approval of a new constitution in 1991 that formally consolidated the rule of law. In 1991, too, other groups (EPL, PRT, MAQL) were demobilised, followed by CER in 1992, CRS, MPM, MMM and FFG in 1994, and finally MIR-COAR in 1998. With regard to the guerrilla groups that were not demobilised then, in 1991 and 1992, meetings were held in Caracas and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between the government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator group, whose members include the FARC, the ELN and the EPL. However, the 1992 talks were suspended when the FARC assassinated a minister they had kidnapped. In January 1999, the United Nations' Secretary General appointed Jan Egeland as his special advisor for Colombia. Three years later, J. Egeland was replaced by James Lemoyne.

#### FARC

International support for the peace process with the FARC reached a high point during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana. This president believed that negotiations could take place in the middle of the conflict without a ceasefire agreement. In late 1998, President Pastrana allowed an extensive swath of the country to be demilitarised in order to negotiate with the FARC, with whom he reached a 12-point agenda (Common Agenda for Change towards a New Colombia, or the La Machaca Agenda from May 1999). However, in February 2002 there were several crises and the FARC hijacked an aeroplane, bringing the talks with the FARC to an end. After negotiations with the FARC were broken off, the situation changed dramatically. A new president, Álvaro Uribe, was elected. He introduced a programme of "democratic security", which was based on the militarisation of the civilian population and military combat against the guerrillas.



This programme was supported by the USA through the Colombia Plan. Since then, negotiations with the FARC have not resumed beyond attempts to reach a humanitarian agreement. In February 2005, the UN Secretary General suspended his mediation mission to seek rapprochement with the FARC after six years of efforts, acknowledging the impossibility of continuing this mission and maintaining direct contact with the guerrilla leaders. In his investiture speech on the 7<sup>th</sup> of August 2010, the new president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, stated that "the doorway to dialogue is not locked", and he added: "During my government, I aspire to sow the seeds for a true reconciliation among Colombians. To the illegal armed groups that cite political reasons and today are speaking once again about dialogue and negotiation, I say that my government will be open to any talk that seeks to eradicate violence and build a more prosperous, equitable and fair society." In early November 2011, after an air attack, the top leader of the FARC, Alonso Cano, died, which opened up a period of uncertainty as to the future of the organisation and a stage of temporary peace talks. He was replaced by Rodrigo Lodoño Echeverri, alias 'Timochenko'. In the second half of November, the president Juan Manuel Santos claimed that he was ready to open the door to dialogue with the FARC guerrillas when he stated that he was convinced that the end to the conflict in Colombia had to come via a political solution. "The key is in my pocket and I am willing to open the doors because I believe that the end should be via a political solution, but I need clear signs that these people are not going to betray the trust of the Colombia people," Santos stated.

The most striking feature of the first few months of 2012 was the information coming from different sources indicating that exploratory talks were taking place abroad between the Colombian government and the FARC, which were confirmed by the President in August, who said that the approaches would be subject to the following guiding principles: 1) to learn from the mistakes of the past so as not to repeat them; 2) any process must lead to ending the conflict and not to prolonging it; and 3) Colombian military operations and presence would be maintained over every centimetre of national territory. The President of Venezuela used his good offices in all these first contacts, in which it was decided that Norway would act as an observer. Later, it was decided that Chile and Venezuela would accompany the process and that Cuba would be a guarantor country like Norway.

At a solemn ceremony in early September, President Santos (in Bogota) and the FARC (in Cuba) announced the **beginning of a serious, dignified, realistic and effective peace process and presented a five-point road map**: 1) comprehensive agricultural development policy; 2) political participation; 3) an end to the conflict; 4) a solution of the illicit drug problem; and 5) victims. The negotiations were raised under the principle that nothing would be agreed on until everything was agreed on. The rules established for the negotiations were as follows:

- Each negotiating team may have 30 members.
- Up to ten people per delegation may participate in each table session and a maximum of five will be plenipotentiary, meaning able to make decisions.
- The table will invite experts at different points on the agenda; these thematic advisors will not be a permanent part of the negotiations.
- The agreement provides for the publication of regular reports.
- The agreement includes a mechanism for receiving suggestions from the public and organisations regarding the items on the agenda.
- The table is autonomous; nothing that happens in the outside world, including events of the war, can affect the discussions.

The FARC raised the issue of a ceasefire at the start of the talks, but President Santos rejected such a possibility and said it could only be discussed at the end of the process. For the moment, public participation would be directed through the Regional Working Tables, which would encourage the different social stakeholders participating in them to present their proposals on thematic issues of the general agreement to end the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace. On 19 November, talks on the agreed agenda began in Havana. The FARC unexpectedly

announced a unilateral two-month ceasefire to give the talks a positive atmosphere. Meanwhile, both the government and the ELN guerrillas showed a willingness to start peace talks. The **ELN** proposed that all popular and social organisations form part of the peace process because “they are irreplaceable in this sense and it is only with their active participation that a real, stable, lasting and deep peace process may be possible that addresses the root causes of the conflict and fulfils the dreams and aspirations of the Colombia we all deserve”.

## ELN

Regarding the ELN, the first negotiations between the government and this guerrilla group date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid, in which they agreed to hold a National Convention. That same year, ELN negotiators met with members of civil society in Mainz (Germany) and signed the “Puerta del Cielo” agreement, which was focused on humanitarian issues. In 1999, the government and the ELN met again in Cuba. The following year, the government authorised the creation of an encounter area in the south of the Bolívar region. Representatives of the Friendly Countries were involved in this process (Cuba, Spain, France, Norway and Switzerland). In June 2000, president Pastrana deemed that attempts to reach an agreement with this group were over. In 2005, the government reached an agreement with this guerrilla group to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba during December with the involvement of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. These talks are known as the “external rapprochement process”. In August 2007, the government and the ELN began the eighth round of peace talks in August in Havana without achieving results or signing the so-called Base Agreement, since they were unable to agree on how to concentrate and verify the guerrilla troops. The government insisted on demanding that they be located in one or several points, including abroad, but at previously determined locations and with the names of all the guerrillas concentrated there; these names would then be given to an international verification commission. However, this was rejected by the ELN, which was not prepared to reveal the identity of its members or gather together in conditions which they perceived as putting them at a military disadvantage. In June 2008, the ELN stated that it did not consider rapprochement with the Colombian government useful, so it did not envisage holding a new round of talks. In early August 2011, the ELN sent a letter to Piedad Córdoba in which it stated that “the ELN has publicly and repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in bilateral talks without conditions; the agenda and rules should be determined by the parties to these talks [...] A government and insurgency committee is the best pathway today, and we are making every effort to achieve it.” In the letter, they also expressed their compliance with international humanitarian law.

In early November 2012, the ELN proposed a bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. A few days later, in its magazine, it announced that the ELN delegation for exploratory talks with the government was formed and ready to deliver for Colombia. At the end of the month, **there was speculation that the ELN and the government could begin exploratory talks in Cuba** and that the guerrilla group’s representative would be Pablo Beltrán. In January 2013, however, President Santos terminated the talks and withdrew the ELN delegates’ right of safe passage.

## The peace process in 2013

Negotiations with the FARC continued during the year and in December the conditions were laid down to begin an exploratory stage with the ELN. At the end of the year, the heads of the ELN and the FARC decided to form a united front to negotiate an end to the conflict. In October, the Senate approved a law that would permit a referendum to be held on the day of the presidential elections on whether to approve or reject the peace agreement if such an agreement is eventually reached with the rebels. Furthermore, the United States pledged 68 million USD for the land

restitution process. According to some analysts, this would include the massive granting of deeds to prevent the killing of peasants that might dare to trickle back and reclaim their land.

After five years of investigation, the consulting firm Cifras y Conceptos calculated that 39,000 Colombians were victims of kidnapping in 40 years, with an impunity rate of 92%. Thirty-seven percent of the abductions were attributed to the FARC and 30% to the ELN. Finally, a UNHCR report indicated that there have been 4.7 million forced displacements in Colombia since 1997. Moreover, a report released by the organisation Somos Defensores said that 37 human rights defenders were killed in the first half of the year. It also revealed the conclusions of the report on Historical Memory after six years of work.

## FARC

In early February, after six rounds of talks in Havana, **the Colombian government and FARC guerrillas reached an agreement on various agricultural issues, the first item on the agenda, which built trust between the parties and a willingness to address the rest, starting with the second point, political participation.** In this regard, a delegation of lawmakers travelled to Cuba to speak with the rebels about this point and about dealing with the victims, which, despite being the last item on the agenda, required deep consideration from both delegations. With regard to the agricultural issue, agreements were made on land access and use, unproductive land, the formalisation of property, the recovery of land occupied illegally and access to land for peasants that lack it through the creation of a land fund covering 400,000-500,000 hectares, cadastral updating, agricultural boundaries and the protection of reserve areas. According to some media outlets, there were negotiations that the FARC would remain in the areas where they are currently located and would commit to eradicating crops, replacing and delivering laboratories and even exit routes for illicit drugs. Thus, it was studied whether said land could be signed over to some guerrilla fighters in exchange for the promise that they become productive. Furthermore, the FARC proposed creating a high-level commission to study the guerrillas' alleged land grab. The commission would include former US President Jimmy Carter and representatives from the Colombian government, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), local peasants and FARC delegates.

In another vein, the Congress' Peace Commissions promoted the **creation of Regional Working Tables to help to put an end to the conflict, specifically regarding the subject of the victims.** The proposals were systematised by the United Nations, which, together with National University's Centre for Thought and Monitoring the Peace Talks, led by Professor Alejo Vargas, was in charge of organising various forums for holding popular discussions about the items on the agenda. The conclusions drawn from these forums were sent to Havana. **Santos was in favour of holding a referendum to validate the agreements with the FARC at the end of the process.** Starting in April, regional meetings led by the Colombian Congress' peace commissions were held all over the country, charged with gathering the victims' views to bring them to the table of talks in Havana. Moreover, the Congress' peace commissions held meetings in various European cities to hear the opinions of Colombian exiles and immigrants. Also worth mentioning is the confrontation between Inspector General Alejandro Ordoñez and Attorney General Eduardo Montealegre. The first spoke out against negotiations with the FARC, while the second defended the process and said he was in favour of searching for formulas other than prison for the guerrilla group once the peace accords are signed, explaining that demining the country could be an alternative punishment for the FARC. On 7 April, "Pablo Catatumbo", a member of the FARC Secretariat, joined the FARC negotiating team. **The High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, said in a lecture that implementing all the points on the negotiation agenda could take ten years.** The tenth round of negotiations ended on 26 May and both parties issued a statement on the agricultural agreements reached.

## JOINT STATEMENT no. 16

Havana, 26 May 2013

The delegates of the government and the FARC-EP declare that:

We have reached an agreement on the first item on the agenda contained in the "General agreement to end the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace".

We have agreed to call it: "Towards a new Colombian countryside: comprehensive rural reform".

In the next round of talks, we will submit the first regular report to the Table.

We have reached agreements on the following subjects:

- Land access and use. Unproductive land. Formalisation of property. Agricultural boundaries and the protection of reserve zones.
- Development programmes with a local focus.
- Infrastructure and land clearance.
- Social development: health, education, housing, the eradication of poverty.
- The stimulation of agricultural production and a supportive and cooperative economy. Technical assistance. Subsidies. Credit. Income generation. Marketing. Formalisation of work.
- Food and nutritional policies.

What we have agreed on in this agreement will be the beginning of radical transformations to the rural and agricultural situation in Colombia equitably and democratically. The agreement is focused on the people, small-scale farmers, access to and distribution of land, the fight against poverty, stimulating agricultural production and reactivating the countryside's economy.

The agreement seeks to allow the greatest number of inhabitants of the countryside without land, or with insufficient land, to access it through the creation of a land fund for peace.

Subject to the Constitution and current law, the national government will gradually formalise all the land occupied or possessed by farmers in Colombia.

Mechanisms for resolving conflicts of use and agricultural jurisdiction to protect property rights with the common good prevailing.

The agreement comes accompanied with plans for housing, potable water, technical assistance, capacity-building, education, land clearance, infrastructure and land reclamation.

The agreement aims to reverse the effects of the conflict and allows the victims of dispossession and forced displacement to return.

The agreement includes gathering and updating rural information to update the land register, seeking legal security and better and more efficient information.

In consideration of future generations of Colombians, the agreement delimits the agricultural boundary, protecting areas of special environmental interest.

The agreement seeks to provide social protection and eradicate hunger through a food and nutrition system.

Discussions about the second point on the agenda, regarding political participation, began in June. The FARC called for postponing the electoral calendar for a year to give time for negotiating all points on the agenda. The government did not accept this proposal. One of the stickiest points was the FARC's proposal to create a constituent, like a peace treaty and new social contract, which the government strongly opposed. As stated in the first point of the agenda, a centre of the National University of Colombia and the United Nations organised a political participation forum in Bogota in which different sectors of society could make suggestions for consideration in the negotiations in Cuba. The FARC also proposed constitutionally redesigning the legal and economic order, the tax system and the role of the Bank of the Republic (requesting popular participation in its Board); restructuring the Army and changing the national security doctrine; and creating a regional chamber to replace the current House of Representatives in a bid to consolidate its local and regional areas of influence. In late June, FARC commander "Pablo Catatumbo" said that they were ready to turn in their weapons, but not abandon them,

showing his willingness to find a way for these weapons to no longer be used in war. The FARC showed interest in the Northern Ireland peace process with regard to the destruction of the arsenals of the IRA and of unionist paramilitary groups, which was done out of view of cameras and journalists. In November 2012, a group of Irish MPs visited President Santos and members of the government's negotiating team. In early June 2013, the London-based human rights organisation Justice for Colombia (JFC) organised a visit to Havana by a group of politicians from the main parties of Northern Ireland, where they met with the FARC's negotiating team. In another vein, there was speculation that the political priority of the FARC is the 2015 local and regional elections, more so than the elections to the Congress in 2014.

In early August, the FARC delegation in Cuba requested access to the property of and participation in public state media, including its programming, with state funding. Specifically, they requested a print newspaper, a magazine on political theory and analysis, a radio station and a television station. In late July, after the release of the Centre for Historical Memory's *iBasta ya!* report, President Santos said that "the state had to recognise its responsibility in the conflict so that we can turn over a new leaf for a Colombia without fear". He added that government players that allied with illegal groups to sow violence in the country had to be tried. As such, he admitted that "through omission or the direct action of some of its members, the state has been responsible for serious human rights violations". The report indicated that between 1958 and 2012, the conflict caused the death of 40,787 combatants and 177,307 civilians. The number of people missing from 1981 to 2010 was 25,000, with 27,023 kidnappings and 150,000 murders. Of the killings, 38.4% were the responsibility of paramilitary forces, 16.8% were caused by guerrillas and 10.1% were came the hands of the security forces.

Santos asked the UN to participate actively in establishing a post-conflict period. Meanwhile, the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) announced that if negotiations with the FARC were successful, the bank "would be able to invest in areas where the state had not been as present as it could have been". A few days later, the delegations of the government and the FARC reported that, after discussing and exchanging views, positions and proposals regarding the second item on the agenda for talks on political participation, agreements began to be built on rights and guarantees for the political opposition in general and for the new movements that will arise once the final agreement is signed in particular. In mid-August, the leader of the FARC, "Timochenko", indicated that "if we achieve a peace agreement with social justice, rest assured that the arms will be in the background" without involving turning in said arms to the state. The resident coordinator of the United Nations in Colombia, Fabrizio Hochschild, declared that these could help to verify the peace accords. Also in August, **the FARC acknowledged their share of responsibility for the thousands of fatalities in the armed conflict for the first time since the talks began in Havana.** The leaders of the FARC also said that their ranks had caused pain and sorrow. They also spoke of the need to deal with the victims, identifying them and giving them compensation with total loyalty to the cause of peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, Commander "Pablo Catatumbo" repeated his demand to immediately create a "commission made of Colombian and foreign experts to investigate the past, to establish the truth about what happened during the time of partisan violence in Colombia". In a statement, the FARC also referred to the need for "collective forgiveness". In the final section of the statement, the FARC also said that they were once again publicly inviting the national government to sign a special agreement to regulate the conflict while their bilateral truce proposal is honoured.

Meanwhile, after five years of investigation, the consulting firm Cifras y Conceptos calculated that 39,000 Colombians were victims of kidnapping in 40 years, with an impunity rate of 92%. Thirty-seven percent of the abductions were attributed to the FARC and 30% to the ELN. Finally, a UNHCR report indicated that there have been 4.7 million forced displacements in Colombia since 1997 and a report by the organisation Somos Defensores said that 37 human rights defenders were killed in the first half of the year. It also revealed the conclusions of the report on Historical Memory after six years of work.

In August, the Colombian President proposed a peace referendum for which the Colombians would be called to the polls in March or May 2014, coinciding with the elections, so the people can decide if they want a negotiated end to the conflict or if they want to stay at war. To be valid, the turnout for the referendum must be at least one quarter of all eligible voters and it must be approved by at least 50% of all votes. The proposal led to a break for the two delegations in Cuba for a few days so they could examine it. **The FARC insisted that a national constituent assembly must be the mechanism for endorsing a possible peace agreement.** In another statement, the FARC asked the government to implement a special information and communication programme for reconciliation and peace with social justice aimed at the general population after a potential peace agreement to end the conflict is signed.

**The Council of State restored the legal status of the Patriotic Union, a political party created by the FARC in the 1980s that was exterminated between 1986 and 1994.** Various analysts interpreted the Council of State's decision as a nod to the FARC's possible return to political struggle after a peace process that includes disarmament. On 21 August, the FARC presented their initiatives to stimulate political and social participation in cities in Havana. According to some media outlets, the possibility of a *peace constituency* that would allow the FARC to actively participate in politics without using arms was not ruled out. During this same period, the FARC insisted on the formation of a commission of Colombian and international jurists that, together with the communities, will study the scope of the state's responsibility for what has happened in the last few decades of internal conflict. In late August, after six months of intense legal debate, seven of the nine magistrates of the Constitutional Court gave their blessing to the Legal Framework for Peace, the Colombian government's road map in negotiations with groups that have taken up arms. The magistrates also said that it did not contradict the Political Charter that the government prioritise the investigation and punishment of the main crimes committed as part of the conflict. However, they did draw clear lines for the scope of a peace settlement. Thus, they said that whoever aspired to the benefits of an alternative punishment must meet requirements such as putting an end to the war, laying down their arms for good, complying with delivering the children that were in their ranks and delivering the bodies of their victims. They also said that measures of transitional justice must be adopted. The next step would be for Congress to regulate the decision and for the public prosecutor to start selecting crimes and the people ultimately responsible for them.

The International Criminal Court sent a letter to the Constitutional Court arguing that punishments that are too light or a pardon for hundreds of crimes as part of the agreements that could be reached with the FARC would allow it to exercise its jurisdiction in the country. The leader of the FARC, Timochenko, rejected the government's decision, which was made without the guerrillas' agreement. Moreover, the FARC's negotiating delegation in Cuba said that the FARC would not submit to any legal framework with unilateral designs. Furthermore, 4,000 proposals from thousands of victims made at nine Regional Tables between May and August were officially submitted to Congress. A group of victims of the conflict travelled to Havana to deliver the proposals gathered from different parts of the country to the two parties. The victims expressed the need to shed light on the truth of what happened during the armed conflict and asked that a truth commission be created for that purpose, something that the FARC have also requested. The guerrillas asked the drafters of the Historical Memory report to meet in Havana with the peace talk delegations in order to complete it and link it to the negotiating table.

**In September, a public forum on illicit drugs was held in Bogota, which was the fourth item in the peace agreement.** The month was marked by a crisis between the FARC and the government, as the latter took unilateral decisions such as indicating that it would put the agreements reached with the FARC to a referendum and denying that a national constituent assembly would be called at the end of the process, as the FARC have requested. At the end of the month, the head of the FARC, Timochenko, denied threatening to break the confidentiality of the process. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the FARC's usual practice until then had been to make declarations almost daily and publicise all their proposals. However, the government adopted a quieter and more

discreet attitude. President Santos made some ministerial changes in late September, appointing a cabinet for peace, meaning a team of trusted individuals that would help to implement the rural development agreements that had been reached with the FARC.

In full discussion on the second item on the agenda, that of political participation, the FARC approved a document titled “Guarantees of political and social participation for peasant, indigenous and African-descended communities, as well as other excluded social groups”, insinuating that it does not solely aim to win guarantees for the FARC. A few days later, they released a document titled “Nine small proposals on political culture for participation, national peace and reconciliation and the right to social and popular protest and demonstration”. They also called for the government to form the Commission to Review and Clarify the Truth of the History of the Internal Colombian Conflict so it may complement the Historical Memory Group’s report and other important initiatives that already existed or were underway.

In October, pressure increased on the FARC delegation to speed up the tempo of the negotiations out of fear that there was not enough time to sign a final agreement before the elections. Thus, a discussion began over whether it was better take a break during the 2014 election period or to continue with negotiations until the last minute. For the FARC, the proposal to take a break would have to be linked to that of the bilateral truce that President Santos rejected. This debate was joined to the **government’s complaint that the FARC wanted what was written in the preamble of the agenda to be deemed items on the agenda**, which would mean discussing structural topics not considered for it. In relation to social movements, the FARC also proposed a national event where the most representative social organisations would agree democratically on a binding legal framework to provide guarantees for their effective existence.

In November, President Santos approved changing the methods of the negotiations with the FARC, with longer rounds and briefer breaks in between. He also added two women to the negotiating table in Cuba: María Paulina Riveros (former director of Human Rights at the Ministry of the Interior) and Nigeria Rentería, a lawyer. It was also revealed that **the government would allow the creation of Special Peace Constituencies in the House of Representatives, not so the FARC’s leadership would have guaranteed seats, but so the inhabitants of the areas where the conflict was most intense could run in the elections** and so social movements, victim organisations and human rights organisations in these regions could compete democratically with the political parties. In mid-November, the government and the FARC announced the 15-point agreement on political participation in Havana.

#### Summary of the agreement on political participation 11 November 2013

1. Create a commission to define the status of the opposition.
2. Design legislation to guarantee and promote public participation.
3. Provide guarantees for demonstrations and protests.
4. Make space in institutional and regional media for the proposals of political forces and social movements.
5. Strengthen community media.
6. Promote a culture of reconciliation, co-existence, tolerance and non-stigmatisation.
7. Create national and regional Reconciliation and Co-existence Councils.
8. Comprehensively review the participatory planning system.
9. Make it easier to form political parties.
10. Give special support to new movements created during the transition stage.
11. Provide guarantees for elections.
12. Comprehensively review how elections and the electoral system are organised.

13. Create Special Transitory Peace Constituencies to provide representation for the areas most affected by the conflict.
14. Provide a comprehensive security system for practicing politics.
15. Focus on gender, ensuring women's participation.

Regarding the **third point on the agenda, which deals with illegal cultivation and began in November**, the head of the FARC delegation in the negotiations in Cuba, "Iván Márquez", called for thought on legalising the use of narcotics. He said that coca leaves could be sold freely, but cocaine could not. Both parties' technical committees worked separately on the subject of illegal cultivation to later deliver reports to the negotiators that would be used for the discussion.

In December, the FARC declared a truce (ceasefire and cessation of hostilities) from 15 December to 15 January. The declaration took place after the chief negotiators of the government and the FARC met behind closed doors to study the tension created by an attack by the FARC. Also at the end of the year, the FARC unveiled a 12-point plan for a Constituent Assembly that would have 141 members and would endorse the peace agreements.

## ELN

Apparently exploratory contacts were held at the end of last year, but without results. Representing the government were Frank Pearl and Alejandro Eder, while the ELN delegation consisted of Gabino and Antonio García. A senior German official served as the point of contact between both parties. **One obstacle for future negotiations was the ELN's demand to participate in civil society, at which the government demurred.** The ELN's agenda could not be different from the one mandated by the communities in the various events held in recent years. A great national peace movement was urgent for the ELN, which would bring together popular and social organisations, parties and other groups. As pointed out by Commander Gabino, in April the ELN assumed the mandate for peace as a strategic objective. A result of the National Convention, this political agreement should end in endorsement by a national constituent assembly. Meanwhile, the Civil Society Facilitation Committee made arrangements to possibly begin negotiations with the ELN. Another roadblock was the ELN's practice of kidnapping.

In late June 2013, the top commanders of the FARC and the ELN issued a declaration for peace. Not long ago, both guerrilla groups advocated working more closely militarily, but this time the declaration was for peace, defined as "the most noble, fair and legitimate aspiration of our people [...]. The political solution to the social and armed conflict, which involves an end to the dirty war and aggression against our people, is part of our strategic outlook for peace in Colombia [...]. The political solution cannot be understood as the simple demobilisation and disarmament of the guerrillas, without structural changes so the status quo is maintained, but as the path leading to solving the causes of the war and to a full democracy [...]. A National Constituent Assembly would be the ideal mechanism to call for genuine new agreements built with society's broadest and fullest participation [...]. (The Assembly) must include the representative participation of the insurgency and the democratic participation of all groups that make up the nation". This joint declaration was interpreted as the FARC's desire for the ELN to begin parallel negotiations, which President Santos said would be possible once the ELN freed a Canadian they had kidnapped. The ELN complied with this condition. At the same time, the ELN released a Colombian Army corporal that was in their custody. But perhaps this was not the only obstacle to resolve. The very nature of the ELN and their insistence on popular participation in potential negotiations made it hard to reach an agreement with the government. As Professor Carlos Medina said, "the ELN's operational emphasis is on organisational aspects, on constructing political imaginaries and social practices of protest related to the social groups that they tend to influence, rather than on military operations". The ELN wanted to see excluded majorities become the main parties in future negotiations, which made it difficult to carry out said negotiations properly. In early July, more than one hundred civil society activists signed a letter supporting potential negotiations between the government and the ELN.



In late August, the ELN released a Canadian they had been holding hostage. Immediately afterwards, the President said that he was ready to start talks with the ELN. The ELN said that they were part of the millions of Colombians categorically opposed to the government's implementation of its mining and energy projects because they give more profits to foreigners than to Colombia and because they push aside agriculture and industry and destroy the environment and biodiversity. They also said that a genuine peace process is one that aims to examine the prominent issues afflicting the great majorities marginalised from power that they have expressed in different places and days of struggle in order to find a solution for them in a true democratic and participatory process. They also said "we have concluded that setting down conditions to start or carry out talks between the insurgency and the government erects obstacles in the process. We already have had many experiences with the positions of various governments, with repeated breaches of established agreements, even with the current government, which will be revealed in due course, and this creates distance and mistrust along the paths to peace in Colombia".

In late September, Norway offered its good offices for talks with the ELN. The ELN's Central Command thought that any negotiations with them would be to discuss the great economic, political and social problems that led to the social and armed conflict. They also said that time could not work as a straitjacket and that the agenda for talks should deal with the communities' requests and demands in their struggles and find the mechanisms so they can participate in the process and in definitions. The ELN expressed their lack of trust that the accords will be honoured, as they are violated rather frequently. However, in October the ELN repeated its intention to start talks with the government and formed a five-person delegation for the exploratory conversations. Also in October, the ELN-related Peoples' Congress issued a statement with five requests:

1. Political recognition for peasants and black and indigenous peoples.
2. Land for the peasants that work it and take care of it.
3. Petrol for a decent life.
4. Mining for a good life.
5. Independent and concerted replacement of illegal crops.

In November, the ELN accepted the challenge to negotiate without a bilateral ceasefire. Shortly thereafter, they released a kidnapped engineer, which was one of the government's conditions for sitting down to talks with the guerrilla movement.


Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas reached an agreement on several aspects of the agricultural issue, the first item on the agenda, and on political participation. At the end of the year, they addressed the drug trafficking problem.</li> <li>• Congress' Peace Commissions promoted the creation of Regional Working Tables to help to end the conflict.</li> <li>• The President recognised that <i>through omission or the direct action of some of its members, the state had been responsible for serious human rights</i>. The FARC acknowledged their share of responsibility for the thousands of fatalities in the armed conflict for the first time since the talks began in Havana.</li> <li>• The victims expressed the need to clarify the truth about what had happened in the armed conflict, asking for a Truth Commission to be created for that purpose, something that the FARC have also requested.</li> <li>• There was a crisis between the FARC and the government, as the latter took unilateral decisions such as indicating that it would put the agreements reached with the FARC to a referendum and denying that a national constituent assembly would be called at the end of the process, as the FARC have requested.</li> <li>• Pressure increased on the FARC delegation to speed up the tempo of the negotiations out of fear that there was not enough time to sign a final agreement before the elections.</li> </ul>

- The Civil Society Facilitation Committee made arrangements to possibly begin negotiations with the ELN.
- The President said that he was ready to start talks with the ELN if the guerrillas stopped kidnapping. The ELN agreed and appointed a five-member negotiating committee.
- The FARC decreed a Christmas truce from 15 December to 15 January.

#### Websites of interest

- Anncol ([www.anncol.info](http://www.anncol.info)) (information on the FARC)
- Congreso de los Pueblos ([www.congresodelospueblos.org](http://www.congresodelospueblos.org))
- Delegación de Paz de las FARC ([www.pazfarc-ep.blogspot.com.es](http://www.pazfarc-ep.blogspot.com.es))
- El Colombiano ([www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/pd.asp](http://www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/pd.asp))
- El Espectador ([www.elespectador.com](http://www.elespectador.com))
- El Tiempo ([eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/index.htm](http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/index.htm))
- ELN ([www.eln-voces.com](http://www.eln-voces.com))
- FARC ([resistenciafariana.blogspot.com](http://resistenciafariana.blogspot.com))
- Fundación Ideas para la Paz ([www.ideaspaz.org](http://www.ideaspaz.org))
- Indepaz ([www.indepaz.org.co](http://www.indepaz.org.co))
- Mesa de conversaciones ([www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co](http://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co))
- Semana magazine ([www.semana.com](http://www.semana.com))
- UNPD ([www.undp.org.co](http://www.undp.org.co))

#### Main parties in the process



# ASIA

## a) Southern Asia

### AFGHANISTAN

#### Context of the conflict

A mountainous, extremely poverty-stricken, ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim country that cultivates opium and gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1919, Afghanistan's pre-existing monarchy came to an end with the coup d'état in 1973, when the country became a republic. A few years later, a Communist government came to power. This government became embroiled in fighting with an Islamic guerrilla group, a situation which led to the intervention of Soviet troops in 1979. The Soviets remained in the country with a total of 100,000 troops until 1989, and they only withdrew after negotiations with the United Nations and constant pressure from a coalition of militias (the Northern Alliance) that was supported by the United States. The civil war resumed, and in 1996 the Taliban forces ended up wresting control of the country. They remained in power until 2001, when an international coalition led by NATO occupied the country ('Operation Enduring Freedom') with a contingent mainly made up of US soldiers. Hamid Karzai became the president of the country. Between 1992 and 1996, the various Afghan militias that were engaged in internecine fighting caused the death of around 50,000 people, most of them civilians. The country lived under constant instability, and the government only controlled the capital. Much of the population are still living as refugees in other countries.

**Population:** 30.6 million inhabitants  
**Area:** 652,000 km<sup>2</sup>  
**GDP:** 10,044 million dollars  
**Per capita income:** \$665  
**HDI:** 175 (out of 186)  
**Armed actors:** Taliban, Al Qaeda, occupation forces  
**Facilitators:** Qatar

#### Background to the peace process

As a result of the Bonn Agreement, which was signed in December 2001, the Interim Authority was created, and the process culminated in September with elections for the National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga) and the provincial councils. Since then, NATO has kept a military contingent in Afghanistan called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate from the United Nations. In March 2001, as the outcome of a Security Council resolution, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created with the purpose of implementing the commitments to reconstruct the country agreed to a few months earlier in Bonn. In early February 2007, the Wolesi Jirga or lower chamber of Afghanistan approved a draft law on amnesty for all the combatants who had participated in the 25 years of conflict, including Mullah Omar, the top Taliban authority, as well as individuals accused of war crimes, like the former Mujahedin (Afghan resistance fighters) who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, some of whom now occupy government posts. In September 2007, the Taliban stated that it was willing to start negotiations with the Afghan government, after President Hamid Karzai made a proposal that negotiations get underway. In early October 2008, President Hamid Karzai revealed that he had asked Saudi Arabia to facilitate peace negotiations with the Taliban leaders, and he stated that his envoys had travelled to Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan to start these talks. In 2009, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, stated that reconciliation with the Taliban might be an important initiative in an armed conflict where a US military victory could not be foreseen. In April 2010, a peace conference was held in which an action plan was drawn up for the reintegration of the low- and middle-ranking Taliban insurgents. The plan included job offers, training and other economic incentives. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, stated that the Taliban were willing to hold negotiations with Western politicians. The Taliban leader had stated that he was no longer interested in governing the country and that the Taliban's objectives were to expel foreigners from the country and restore Sharia law and security. The Taliban had set no preconditions for the talks; instead they had simply stated that they must be honest. In

September, 40% of Afghans went to the polls for the legislative elections, and the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, announced the launch of a peace plan for the country. This new strategy, which would be led by a High Peace Council, had a twofold objective: first, to begin a dialogue with the Taliban leaders, and secondly, to remove the combatants from the base of the insurgency.

In January 2011, Afghanistan and Pakistan created a joint commission to draw up kinds of direct negotiations for the possible beginning of peace talks with the Taliban as part of the peace plan for the country launched by President Hamid Karzai in late 2010. In June, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, announced his plan to withdraw from the country, which stipulated the withdrawal of around 33,000 soldiers by September 2012, 10,000 of whom would be repatriated during 2011. In December, US government sources stated that the talks with the Taliban were at a key juncture and that the US was considering the possibility of moving an unspecified number of Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo back to Afghanistan. The prisoners would then be under the control of the Afghan government. In exchange, it asked the Taliban to implement some kind of trust-building measures, such as denouncing international terrorism or making a public expression of its intention to embark on formal talks with the Afghan government. The US held several meetings with the Taliban in Germany and Doha, specifically with representatives of Mullah Omar.

In January 2012, the Taliban insurgency announced it was opening a political office in Qatar, a move that would eventually have been accepted by Karzai's government, which had been extremely reluctant to continue the peace process. However, the Taliban preferred to continue direct negotiations with the US and not with the Afghan government. In February, the US government and Taliban representatives held various meetings in Qatar in which they may have discussed preliminary confidence-building measures, such as a possible transfer of captives, according to the Taliban. However, the Taliban said that this was not linked to the peace process. Nevertheless, in March the Taliban announced that they were temporarily suspending negotiations with the US government. The main point of disagreement between the Taliban and the US was the issue of the prisoners in Guantanamo. Meanwhile, the High Peace Council appointed Salahuddin Rabbani to be its new chair. Rabbani is the son of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Council's previous chair and former President of Afghanistan, who was assassinated by the Taliban in September 2011. In November, Pakistan released a group of Afghan Taliban prisoners, including the son of a prominent jihadist leader and other Taliban leaders, a move that Afghanistan interpreted as a sign of the neighbouring country's willingness to facilitate negotiations with the Afghan government and the Taliban insurgency. Also, the efforts exerted by Afghanistan's High Peace Council made the beginning of talks possible. In December, there was a meeting between leaders of the Taliban insurgency and Afghan government representatives in France organised by the French think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. The Taliban delegation included Shahabuddin Delawar, the representative of the political office in Qatar, and the meeting was also attended by members of the Afghan government, the Northern Alliance, which battled militarily with the Taliban for years, and Hezb-e-Islami, a Taliban ally. Before the meeting, Afghanistan's High Peace Council proposed a plan to transform the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and other armed groups into political organisations and allow them to participate in all the political and constitutional processes in the country in 2015. According to this plan, Pakistan would replace the United States to lead the peace negotiations.

### **The peace process in 2013**

Both the Taliban groups and the United States denied having restarted talks in March, in response to allegations of talks made daily by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who also accused the US of conniving to justify keeping its soldiers in Afghanistan. According to the media, Karzai travelled to Qatar in late March in order to meet with the Qatari government and explore the possibilities of holding peace talks with the Taliban groups. The Afghan government confirmed the two-day visit and noted that it would discuss the peace process and the opening of a Taliban

office in Qatar. Qatari media said that Karzai held a meeting with the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, as well as the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister. Visiting Afghanistan in March, US Secretary of State John Kerry urged the Taliban groups to begin talks with the government. The United States said it supported the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar.

In February, a round of talks was held in the United Kingdom between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan and British Prime Minister David Cameron. It was the third round of talks since David Cameron promoted this trilateral mechanism in 2012. Unlike in earlier meetings, foreign ministers, military leaders and intelligence officials also participated in this third round. The parties supported the opening of an official Afghan office in Qatar and urged the Taliban militias to do the same. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose relations have gone through moments of confrontation, affirmed that they would work to achieve a peace deal in Afghanistan in six months. Alongside the discussions about the conflict in Afghanistan and the peace process, the parties also addressed the status of Afghan-Pakistani relations. Thus, they said that they were promoting a partnership agreement to strengthen economic and security ties. The agreement would also include a section on border control and could be signed at the end of the year.

There was progress towards possible talks in Afghanistan, though not without controversy and uncertainty. In June, **the Taliban insurgency opened an office in Qatar** after years of negotiations and the United States announced that it would hold talks with the Taliban immediately to start the process to resolve the conflict. **The Taliban insurgency said that it supported a political solution to the Afghan conflict and that it aimed to have good relations with neighbouring countries.** The United States praised the statement as a first step away from what it described as international terrorism, though it expected the Taliban to eventually break its links with al-Qaeda. US government sources also indicated that the bulk of the process would not be talks between the US and the Taliban, but internal Afghan dialogue. In turn, in his June speech in Berlin, US President Barack Obama said that the peace talks and negotiations over an international presence after 2014 were part of a parallel process.

The opening of the office in June under the Taliban flag and in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a symbol and name used when the Taliban controlled the country, raised concern and prompted heavy criticism from the Afghan government, which reacted by suspending talks with the US regarding its presence after 2014 and the bilateral security agreement. In the end, the visible symbols of the Taliban flag and name were removed from the office. Afterwards, the Afghan government approved sending a delegation to Qatar and talking with the insurgency, but it demanded more information on the office in Qatar and guarantees that it would not be involved in a Taliban diplomatic resurgence. Some media outlets reported that President Karzai and his circle feared being marginalised in talks between the United States and Taliban militias. Analysts also pointed to the pressure that could be exerted by some former warlords and ex-commanders of the Northern Alliance, as well as ethnic minority leaders opposed to negotiating with the Taliban. In any case, merely hours after a new Taliban attack against the Presidential Palace in Kabul in late June, **Karzai and Obama ratified their intention to promote reconciliation in Afghanistan through dialogue with Taliban militias.** By June, the Taliban insurgency had still not ruled on whether it was willing to talk with the Afghan government, or only with the United States. Meanwhile, Pakistan praised the opening of the Taliban's political office in Qatar and the announcement of peace talks.

In the third quarter, the dialogue with the Taliban continued to go through major crisis. The tension among the Afghan government, the US and the Taliban largely revolved around **the Taliban office opened in Qatar, which was closed after great disagreement among the parties.** The Afghan government reproached the insurgents for their intention to present this office as an embassy of a government-in-exile after hoisting the Taliban flag there and displaying a plaque that said the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the name of the country during the Taliban's rule) and urged the Qatari authorities to remove the symbols. The Taliban considered the removal

offensive and refused to keep using the office. In an attempt to resolve this tension, the High Peace Council expressed that the parties needed to demonstrate flexibility in their positions and came out against preconditions for dialogue. After the office was closed, the Taliban said they were exploring possible alternative location options and the Afghan government said that it would only accept to enter into negotiations if the office were opened in Turkey or Saudi Arabia. The conditions spelled out by the Taliban to enter into negotiations included the release of Taliban members imprisoned in Guantanamo in exchange for the release of the only US prisoner of war in Taliban hands; the removal of the Taliban from UN and US terrorist lists; and US recognition of the Taliban as a political and not just military player.


Alongside these developments, the crisis produced some important events that could contribute to relaunching the peace process. In September, **the government of Pakistan released Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar**, one of the four founders of the Taliban movement in 1994. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar may be in favour of a political and negotiated solution to the conflict so that, according to Afghan government representatives, despite the limited scope enjoyed by the executive branch, which has said that it will not reform the Constitution, setting him free could facilitate the process. The Taliban leader's release joins that of 30 other members of the Taliban insurgency set free in recent months by the Pakistani government. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that during a meeting as part of the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif repeated their support for a peace process in Afghanistan led by Afghan stakeholders.

In October, the governments of both countries agreed that a delegation of the High Peace Council, the body charged with leading peace negotiations with the Taliban insurgency, would meet in Pakistan with newly released Taliban leader Mullah Baradar. Even though his release was intended to give impetus to the peace process, Taliban sources said that Baradar remained under house arrest and was unable to hold meetings. Following a meeting held in London between Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and British Prime Minister David Cameron, both parties agreed to facilitate the meeting. Sharif also pledged to lend support to holding the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in 2014 and announced that he would visit Kabul soon. **Sharif also repeated his offer of dialogue to the Taliban insurgency and said that Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan would be in charge of the talks for Pakistan.** This invitation, which had also been made in September at a conference called by the government and in which leaders of the main political parties of the country participated, including those that sympathise with the insurgency, was questioned by different political stakeholders due to the ongoing spiral of violence that caused dozens of deaths all over the country. It is worth mentioning the attack that killed a minister of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a member of the PTI party and a supporter of holding talks with the insurgency, in addition to seven other victims. Other attacks in different parts of the country caused various fatalities. The insurgency, and particularly its leader Hakimullah Mehsud, responded by saying that he was willing to sit down for talks, but the government had still not come to it directly and they were waiting for a governmental negotiating team to be appointed. He also demanded an end to drone strikes. Meanwhile, the Independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan said that 2,000 men from the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were still missing following military operations conducted against insurgents, although civil society sources estimated that the figure was 6,000.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Taliban insurgency was able to open an office in Qatar, but it was later closed.</li> <li>• Karzai and Obama announced their intention to promote reconciliation in Afghanistan by holding talks with the Taliban militias.</li> <li>• Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif repeated his offer of dialogue to the Taliban insurgency and said that Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan would be in charge of the talks for Pakistan.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Afghanistan Analyst Network (<a href="http://www.afghanistan-analyst.org">www.afghanistan-analyst.org</a>)</li> <li>• Human Security Report Project (<a href="http://www.hsrgroup.org">www.hsrgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• ISAF (<a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.html">www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.html</a>)</li> <li>• UN (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc</a>)</li> <li>• Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (<a href="http://www.peacebuilding.no">www.peacebuilding.no</a>)</li> <li>• UNDP (<a href="http://www.undp.org/afghanistan">www.undp.org/afghanistan</a>)</li> <li>• Presidency of the Republic (<a href="http://www.president.gov.af">www.president.gov.af</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• UNAMA (<a href="http://www.unama-afg.org">www.unama-afg.org</a>)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



# INDIA

With 1.252 billion inhabitants, a surface area of 3.2 million km<sup>2</sup> and a GDP of 1.8 trillion USD, India is a genuine mosaic with regard to political cultures and traditions, expressed in the many regions inhabited by peoples with aspirations of reunification and self-government, which have led to armed conflict in some of them. This section discusses the processes that have emerged in the regions of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland and deals last with the dispute with Pakistan over the region of Kashmir.

## a) Assam

### Context of the conflict

Assam is a region in northeast India. Many immigrants from Bangladesh have arrived in this region, and as a result several nationalist groups have emerged calling for the region to be liberated. The main nationalist group is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which was created in 1979 and has Maoist leanings.

The ULFA chose to engage in an armed struggle from 1989 onwards. In 1994, 4,000 of its combatants abandoned the group. However, they did not lay down their arms and instead went on to attack ULFA bases in Bhutan. As conditions for talks with the Government, the ULFA requested negotiations abroad in the presence of UN observers. It has carried out attacks against oil company interests and has training bases in Bangladesh.

**Population:** 32 million inhabitants  
**Area:** 78,400 km<sup>2</sup>  
**HDI (India):** 136 (out of 186)  
**GDP (India):** 1,875,213 million dollars  
**Per capita income (India):** \$1,498  
**Armed actors:** ULFA, NDFB, India Mujahideen

The other important group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), created in 1988, which took up arms in 1992. They also fight against the Bangladesh immigrants, who are Muslims, and strive to create "Bodoland", an independent state separate from Assam. It has bases in Bhutan and around 3,500 combatants, many of whom are Christians. There are other groups in the region (BLT, UPDS and DHD) that have reached ceasefire agreements with the government.

### Background to the peace process

In 2004, the ULFA approached the government regarding possible negotiations. During 2005, a delegation of eleven trustworthy citizens, the People's Consultative Group (PCG), was appointed to hold contacts with the Indian government. The contacts were facilitated by writer R. Goswami (who died in 2011) and the former footballer R. Phukan. This consultative group pledge to hold consultations with civil society and to forward the conclusions to the government. The first round of negotiations via the PCG was held on the 25<sup>th</sup> of October 2005. In 2007, the government noted that the doorway was open to a new peace process, but that the leaders of the ULFA had to be the ones to get in touch with the government, thus leaving behind the formula of negotiating via a third party (namely the PCG). In early January 2009, the Alpha and Charlie companies of the 28<sup>th</sup> battalion of the ULFA, which had unilaterally declared a ceasefire in June, created a new organisation which they called ULFA Pro-Negotiations, led by Mrinal Hazarika. They also announced that they were giving up on their demand for sovereignty and independence and would work to achieve greater autonomy for the state of Assam. In June 2010, the Indian government gave the green light for the state of Assam to begin a negotiation process with the ULFA and appointed the former head of the intelligence office, PC Halder, as the interlocutor with the armed group. The Indian government chose not to oppose the requests for release upon bail of the ULFA leaders in order to lay the groundwork for the start of peace talks. In February 2011, the Indian government and the pro-negotiation faction of the ULFA, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, began the first round of formal talks. In August, the ULFA declared for the first time that it did



not want to secede from India and that it would accept reaching some kind of sovereignty within the framework of the Indian constitution.

In 2003, an agreement was signed that put an end to 11 years of clashes between the government and the group BLTF-BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers). In 2003, as well, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the group DHD, which had been founded in 1995 and upheld the independence of the Dimasa people. In mid-September 2009, the DHD-J, also known as Black Widow, started a process of surrendering and turning in its weapons after the ultimatum issued by the government in this vein. With regard to the negotiations with the NDFB, in May 2005 talks began which led to a ceasefire agreement. The faction in favour of negotiations is called NDFB-Progressive, and its secretary general is Govinda Nasumatary, alias B. Swmkhwr, who reached a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2005. With regard to the faction of the NDFB led by Ranjan Daimary, which was traditionally against the peace process, in January 2011 it offered the Indian government a unilateral ceasefire with the goal of being able to start talks with the government.

In early 2010, 419 members and leaders of the armed opposition group Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF), which included 22 women, turned in their weapons. The KLNLF emerged in 2004 as a faction of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS).

In late October 2011, the government signed a peace agreement with the armed opposition group UPDS after two years of negotiations. The agreement called for the creation of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council in that district, as well as its territorial reorganisation.

In January 2012, around 700 insurgents from nine armed opposition groups handed over their weapons to Indian Prime Minister P Chidambaram. The insurgents belonged to the armed groups APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA and KRA. All nine groups belonged to the Kuki community, which inhabits the eastern part of the state, and to the Adivasi community, which lives in the north and west of Assam. Even though the groups have ceasefire agreements with the government, formal peace negotiations had not yet begun. The ULFA faction that supports reaching an agreement with the government (ULFA-PTF) would have accepted constitutional reforms to protect the state's identity and natural resources, meaning that it was stepping away from its initial claim of sovereignty. This faction asked for a separate constitution, similar to the one in Jammu and Kashmir, which affords complete autonomy to manage economic, forest, land, water and mining resources. In October, the Indian government and the government of Assam signed a peace agreement with both factions of the armed opposition group DHD. Reached after various rounds of negotiations, the agreement provided for the armed group to dissolve within six months and greater decentralisation in the district of Dima Hasao and was approved by both factions of the group, DHD(N) and DHD(J). Thus, the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council will now be called the Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council and there will be administrative reorganisation and social and economic development projects. The Indian government could begin negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary, of the armed opposition group NDFB, and is reportedly waiting for a formal letter from the government of Assam that endorses the agreement between the leadership of both parties to start talks.

## **The peace process in 2013**

### **ULFA**

It emerged that the peace talks between the armed group ULFA-PTF (the ULFA faction that supports negotiations) and the central government were having positive results and were on the right track. The group also stated that they did not intend to secede from India, but they did hope to achieve autonomy for the region that is consistent with the Indian Constitution. The pro-negotiation faction, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, met with the governmental delegation in early

March. Rajkhowa, the chief rebel negotiator, was satisfied with the meeting in which there was a point-by-point discussion of various aspects of the group's list of demands (a 12-point document submitted during the talks in June 2012), as well as of a political solution to the conflict, according to the insurgent leader. The armed group's delegation also met with Interior Minister Sushilkumar Shinde. In March, it was revealed that the Secretary General of the ULFA-PTF, Anup Chetia (alias Golap Baruah), could soon be transferred to India by the authorities in Bangladesh, where he resides and served a sentence after being arrested by them in 1997, in order to join the negotiations. This was according to Rajkhowa, while the Indian Interior Minister said that the government would not object to including him in the negotiating process. According to some media outlets, Chetia was an influential figure in the ULFA-PTF, and even in the faction that continued its armed struggle under the leadership of Paresh Barua and had so far been against negotiations with the government.

In the second quarter, sporadic clashes persisted between members of the ULFA and the Indian Armed Forces, while peace talks progressed between the ULFA in favour of dialogue, the ULFA-PTF, and the central government. According to The Times of India, the group abandoned its claim to sovereignty and would not include it in the negotiations. As the newspaper reported, the Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior, Shambhu Singh, said in late June that the parties were very close to finalising a working draft, that they understood the ULFA-PTF's concerns and demands and that the parties were searching for a solution to three issues over which an agreement had not been reached: protecting the political and cultural identity of the original population of Assam, land rights and illegal immigration. These declarations were made after the sixth round of talks held in June among a delegation of 26 members of the ULFA, headed by its leader, Arabinda Raikhowa, and the government. The meeting was chaired by Minister of the Interior RK Singh, who said that he hoped that ULFA Secretary General Anup Chetia, currently imprisoned in Bangladesh, could be repatriated to India very soon. The ULFA-PTF expressed optimism regarding his quick release and the prospect that Chetia could join the negotiations in 2014. In late June, Bangladesh took the first steps towards the repatriation process following Chetia's express notification that he had withdrawn his request for political asylum. Furthermore, the ULFA-PTF thinks that Chetia's participation could lead the ULFA faction opposed to the negotiations, the ULFA-ATF (which changed its name to the ULFA-I during the quarter), to join the negotiating table.

Despite the progress made, some mid-level leaders of the ULFA-ATF expressed some dissatisfaction with the leadership of the group's lack of transparency regarding the content of the negotiating process, as reported in some media outlets. Probal Neog, Jiten Dutta, Antu Choudang and Bijoy Chinese were some of the leaders that voiced criticism during a meeting with other armed groups of the region to discuss illegal immigration in the state of Assam. Jiten Dutta expressed his disappointment, thinking that the country was not being informed about the substance of the talks. He clarified that the interests of the original population of Assam should be included in the negotiations; otherwise, a new armed struggle should be undertaken to protect the population.

With respect to the peace talks in the third quarter between the government and the pro-negotiation faction of the ULFA armed opposition group, the former guaranteed to define five ethnic groups (Moran, Motok, Chutia, Koch-Rajbongshi and Tai-Ahom) as "scheduled tribes", just as the armed organisation had demanded. The agreement took place after a meeting among representatives of the central and state governments and the armed group. This status will guarantee land property rights and ensure the tribes' presence in certain representative institutions. Government sources also said that this recognised status also sought to prevent the Bangladeshi immigrant population from acquiring land. Soon, the government could also consent to other ULFA demands related to granting work permits for Bangladeshi immigrants and to not automatically granting citizenship to people of Bangladeshi descent due to birth.

## NDFB

Also in the Indian state of Assam, the talks that began seven years ago with the NDFB faction that supported negotiations, the NDFB (Progressive), ran into serious difficulties and stalled during the first semester. In mid-January, the leaders of the NDFB (P) met with Interior Minister Sushilkumar Shinde in New Delhi and expressed their dissatisfaction with government interlocutor and former intelligence director PC Haldar, alleged a lack of results in the process and called for a new government interlocutor or the beginning of dialogue on a political level. After a new round of talks with Haldar in New Delhi in late January, the group repeated its criticism and accused the government of engaging in the process with no authority to resolve political issues, speaking in reference to Haldar. As a consequence, they threatened to end their participation in the negotiations if they were not conducted on a political level and under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior, rather than a bureaucrat. They also accused the government of pushing aside their claim to a separate state under the Constitution. Finally, in March the group decided to withdraw from the talks until the Indian government was ready to have a political discussion about its request to create a Bodo state in India. The NDFB (P) explained that following the January meeting, he raised his demands to the Interior Minister in writing, but the Minister did not say whether he would participate in the negotiations so the group did not appear for the round on 28 February.

Meanwhile, preliminary conversations continued between the government and Ranjan Daimary, leader of the Bodo group faction NDFB (RD), who was imprisoned in Guwahati. According to local media, Daimary expressed interest in holding peace talks and once they would have begun, there could be measures for releasing various leaders on bail so they could participate in the process. However, he did not foresee amnesty for atrocious crimes, as the peace talks would take place alongside trials for members facing charges of this kind. The conversations with Daimary were conducted through PC Haldar.

Ranjan Daimary was temporarily released on bail in June to facilitate his participation in negotiations with the government. According to the government's interlocutor for talks with the NDFB (R), former Intelligence Chief PC Haldar, the peace talks could start soon. Both had been in informal contact at Guwahati prison throughout last year in preparation for the talks. With the beginning of formal talks coming up, the NDFB (R) would be the second faction of the NDFB engaged in negotiations, since talks between the government and the NDFB (Progressive), the group's main faction, had been going on for seven years. The third faction of the group, led by IK Songbijit, was opposed to the talks.

## b) Manipur

Manipur is a small state located in the northeast of India which borders with Nagaland to the north, Mizoram to the south and Assam to the west. It shares a boundary with Myanmar to the east. The state has a high rate of unemployment, and the majority ethnic group is the Meiteis.

In 1947, as India awaited independence, Manipur became an independent kingdom. In 1949 it was absorbed by India, and in 1972 it was given the status of a state. There are numerous armed separatist groups that started their actions shortly after the country's independence, including the PREPAK, the UNLF, the KNF and the KCP-MC.

<b>Population:</b> 27 million inhabitants <b>Area:</b> 22,237 km <sup>2</sup> <b>Armed actors:</b> PREPAK, UNLF, KNF, KCP-MC, KCP-Lamphel, URF, KYKL-MDF, UPPK, UPF, KNO
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## Background to the peace process

In 2000, the UNLF set three conditions for negotiating with the government: discussing the issue of sovereignty, demilitarising the region and verification of the negotiations by a third country.

These conditions were not accepted by the government. In February 2001 the government offered a one-month unilateral ceasefire to the different groups in the region, all of which rejected the offer. Several groups from civil society, such as women's organisations, have been very active in promoting peace and human rights in the state. In October 2005 several Kuki groups declared an informal ceasefire with the government. In September 2006 it proposed a plan to resolve the conflict, which included a United Nations plebiscite and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. However, the plan was rejected by the government.

In March 2010 peace negotiations were held between the central state, the government of the state of Manipur and the Kangleipak Communist Party – Military Council (KCP-MC, Lallumba faction), which had been founded in 1980 as a dissident group of PREPAK, in which the members of this organisation turned in their weapons. In order to facilitate the negotiations, the Joint Monitoring Group was created in May. In the past, this organisation sought independence for Manipur. In 1995, after the death of its leader, it was divided into ten factions, one of which is the Lallumba. In March, too, the Secretary of State met with the leaders of the Kuki National Front (KNF), a group formed in 1988 to create the community of Kukiland, to explore the possibilities of opening up peace talks. This group already signed a suspension of operations with the central government in August 2008, and its ranks were gathered into encampments set aside for this purpose.

The first tripartite meeting between the Indian government, the government of the state of Manipur and the United Naga Council (UNC) was held in September. The three representatives met in New Delhi to discuss the status of the Naga population in Manipur. At the meeting, the Indian government expressed its approval of the UNC's gesture to suspend the economic blockade, which in the government's opinion contributed to creating an atmosphere propitious for dialogue.

### The peace process in 2013


Progress appeared on several fronts in the first few months of the year. First, the central and Manipur governments expressed their willingness to start political talks with both Kuki insurgent organisations, the **KNO** and **UPF**. In December 2012, the Indian Interior Ministry's negotiating had travelled to the capital of Manipur, Imphal, and held talks with leaders of the KNO and UPF on the agreement to suspend operations. In late January, it was revealed that a consensus between the central government and both insurgencies had been reached to designate former intelligence director PC Haldar as the interlocutor for the political talks. In early March, the governor of Manipur, Gurbachan Jagat, said that the central and Manipur governments had signed an extension to the operation suspension agreement with the UPF and urged the KNO to sign a similar agreement. In early March, UPF sources said that the political talks could begin shortly and that they had been postponed because of the elections in Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya. Second, the central government, the government of Manipur and three insurgent groups signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding in mid-February that called for suspending operations. The three groups were the **URF**, **KCP-Lamphel** and **KYKL-MDF**. Official sources said that peace talks would begin soon. Even so, leaders of all three groups warned that they would resume their military campaign if the government did not commit to moving towards a peace process.

In April, seven commandos of the **KCP-MC** laid down their arms. This faction, the **KCP Lamphel** and the **KCP-Pakhanglakpa** factions announced their intention to begin peace talks with the central and state governments. The announcement was made at a press conference by the Secretary General of the KCP-Lamphel, Taibang Nganba. The chief commander of the KCP-MC faction, Ningthoujam Romen, was released in June in order to facilitate the peace talks with the Manipur and central governments.

A month later, the **government of Manipur**, the **government of India** and the **UPPK insurgent group** signed a **peace agreement**. In February, 45 members of the UPPK had laid down their arms. After a memorandum of understanding was signed, the Chief Minister of Manipur, Ibobi Singh, urged other armed groups to lay down their weapons as well.

In the third quarter, the **government of the Indian state of Manipur** signed memoranda of understanding with three armed opposition groups (**KCP-N**, **KNLF** and **KRP**). The memoranda committed the rebel organisations to laying down their weapons and beginning peace negotiations. Different media outlets indicated that the trigger for signing these agreements was the release of Lanheiba Meitei, the leader of the KCP-N, who had been arrested in 2011. Over the last year, seven armed opposition groups have agreed to hold peace talks with the government. The Chief Minister of the state, Okram Ibobi, called on 30 other insurgent organisations to join the peace talks. Journalistic sources said that the insurgents of the three factions with which the memorandum had been reached would take advantage of the surrender and rehabilitation policy implemented by the government of Manipur. However, it must be noted that the **main insurgent groups** operating in the state (**PREPEAK**, **UNLF**, **PLA** and **RPF**) were still active and had not reached any type of agreement with the government.

### Main parties involved in the process



## c) Nagaland

### Context of the conflict

The conflict in Nagaland is one of the oldest in India. It involves Christian Tibetan-Burmese tribes who have been fighting for their independence since the 1950s. The main group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which was founded in 1980. There was a schism in the group in 1988, and it divided into the **NSCN (K)**, which operates in the north of the state, and the **NSCN**

**(IM)**, which is better established in the south. The NSCN (IM) has 4,500 combatants and a strong component of Christian fundamentalists. Its leaders are exiled in Thailand. Many other members live in the Netherlands and Ireland. The region is rich in natural gas resources.

<b>Population:</b> 2.2 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 16,600 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI (India):</b> 136 (out of 186)
<b>GDP (India):</b> 1,875,213 million dollars
<b>Per capita income (India):</b> \$1,498
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 20,000
<b>Armed actors:</b> NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK
<b>Facilitators:</b> -

### Background to the peace process

Since the first ceasefire in 1997, the NSCN-IM has held more than 60 rounds of negotiations with the government, many of them in Thailand and others in Amsterdam, in which the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire. The government reiterated to the armed group that the issue of sovereignty was totally off-limits for discussion and that any solution to the conflict had to fall within the country's constitution. The armed group may agree to remain part of India via a special federal relationship with the union. During the second half of February 2010, the central government appointed the former chief secretary of Nagaland, R. S. Pandey, as its interlocutor for the negotiations with the group. The executive noted that it was willing to grant Nagaland the maximum autonomy possible, even if that entailed a constitutional reform. The government and the armed group met once again in Delhi. The armed group was represented by a five-member delegation led by Muivah. The negotiations focused on the 31-point proposal submitted by the armed group, which included the unification of all the districts inhabited by the Naga people, and their own constitution, flag, currency and army. The leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, accepted an Indian passport in February 2011 as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to engage in talks with the government.

In early June 2009, the armed opposition group NSCN-K stated that it was prepared to start formal peace negotiations with the government of India, eight years after having reached a ceasefire agreement with Delhi. The NSCN-K stated that it was willing to set no preconditions for the dialogue and that issues like sovereignty could be discussed at the negotiating table, but without that being an obstacle to starting negotiations. In June 2011, the NSCN-K was grappling with an internal division after the tensions in early May between India-based sectors of the group and sectors operating from Myanmar. Some analysts stated that these tensions might lead to a rapprochement and reconciliation between the India-based sector of the NSCN-K and the NSCN-IM, which is currently involved in talks with the government.

Significant progress was made in the peace process during the third quarter of 2012, after all members of the Nagaland Assembly went to Delhi to meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to tell him that they were ready to give up their seats to make way for a new political agreement emanating from a possible peace agreement between the government and the insurgents ahead of the state elections scheduled for February 2013. After their meeting with the government, the Naga lawmakers held separate meetings with the four main Naga insurgent groups, the NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi or NSCN-KK) and NNC (FGN). All four armed groups were in favour of reconciliation. However, the NSCN-K stated that they would only accept an agreement that included Naga sovereignty. In October, the Indian government and the

armed opposition group NSCN-IM were close to signing a peace agreement. Both parties were reportedly working on a memorandum of understanding that considered different proposals. The agreement would involve establishing autonomous development councils, a unique flag for the state, more autonomy and a special status, in addition to formal recognition of the Naga people's unique history. The armed group began consultations with civil society and said that they would not sign anything until these consultations had terminated. The armed opposition group NSCN-K and the government would have begun peace negotiations in November, but there was no official confirmation in that regard. An insurgent delegation had an informal meeting with the government, although the armed group was apparently waiting to receive a formal invitation to start the process after initially getting a verbal one. No peace negotiations had taken place since a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001.

## The peace process in 2013

In the second quarter, the central government continued to suspend the peace accords with the separatist NNC group due to many attacks by the latter against candidates to the State Assembly at the beginning of the year. In turn, **the NSCN-K and the government jointly agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement that would have expired on 28 April for another year.** This extension was signed on 22 April by a team of five members of the NSCN-K. **The ceasefire agreement between the NSCN-K and the government was also renewed for another year.** Meanwhile, it was learned in April that in its negotiations with the central government, the **NSCN-IM** had presented a proposal for greater autonomy months before, though the group affirmed in April that it had not abandoned its demand for independence and sovereignty. The peace process remained virtually deadlocked over the course of the first nine months with hardly any significant progress in the negotiations between the Indian government and the armed Naga opposition group NSCN-IM. The armed group indicated that it was now the government's turn to move the negotiations forward, since it had already taken the required steps. Nevertheless, the government of Manipur, which played a key role in the process since some of the thorniest issues under negotiation dealt with the situation of the Naga population living in the state, informed the central government of some possible paths for finding a solution to the conflict. One of the proposals referred to the possibility of modifying some laws to potentially create an organisation to protect the customs and traditions of the Naga population in Manipur. In particular, the Manipur Hill Areas Autonomous District Council Act would be reformed. This proposal had to be assessed by the NSCN-IM. Furthermore, the government of Manipur said that it was evaluating whether it was possible to give the Autonomous District Councils more budgetary independence. The central government had pressured the government of Manipur to give up its unbending position regarding the peace process in Nagaland, according to journalistic sources.

At the close of the year, government negotiator RS Pandey resigned in order to dedicate his time to party politics. **After 50 rounds of negotiations, the NSCN-IM proposed a special federal agreement** allowing self-government for the Naga people.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Assam, the ULFA abandoned its demand for sovereignty. It will not be included in negotiations.</li> <li>• The talks that began seven years ago with the NDFB faction that supports negotiations, the NDFB (Progressive), ran into serious difficulties and stalled during the first quarter.</li> <li>• The central government, the government of Manipur and three insurgent groups signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding that called for suspending operations. The three groups were the URF, KCP-Lamphel and KYKL-MDF.</li> <li>• The government of Manipur, the government of India and the insurgent group UPPK</li> </ul>

signed a peace agreement.


- In Manipur, seven commandos of the KCP-MC laid down their arms. This faction, the KCP Lamphel and the KCP-Pakhanglakpa factions announced their intention to begin peace talks with the central and state governments.
- The government of Manipur signed memoranda of understanding with three armed opposition groups in the state, the KCP-N, KNLF and KRP.
- The NSCN-K and the government both agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement that would have expired on 28 April for another year. The NCSN-KK did the same.
- After 50 rounds of negotiations, the NSCN-IM proposed a special federal agreement allowing self-government for the Naga people.

#### Websites on the peace processes in India

- AlertNet ([www.alertnet.org](http://www.alertnet.org))
- Andhra News Net ([www.andhranews.net](http://www.andhranews.net))
- Assam Tribune ([www.assamtribune.com](http://www.assamtribune.com))
- Government of India ([india.gov.in](http://india.gov.in))
- IDSA ([www.idsa.in](http://www.idsa.in))
- Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies ([www.ipcs.org](http://www.ipcs.org))
- Nagaland International Support Centre ([www.nagalim.nl](http://www.nagalim.nl))
- Nagaland Post ([www.Nagalandiapost.com](http://www.Nagalandiapost.com))
- Nagalim ([www.nagalim.nl/naga/index-2.html](http://www.nagalim.nl/naga/index-2.html))
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- SATP ([www.satp.org](http://www.satp.org))
- South Asia Analysis Group ([www.saag.org](http://www.saag.org))
- Wikipedia (Naxalite) (Naxalite-Maoist insurgency)



## Main parties involved in the process: Assam and Nagaland



## INDIA – PAKISTAN (Kashmir)

### Context of the conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir dates back to the partition in 1947, when both countries won independence from the United Kingdom and Kashmir was divided between India (the state of Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan and China. According to the 1947 Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to join either India or Pakistan. Its decision to join India was a source of conflict between the two countries, and the clashes began the same year. India laid claim to the territories controlled by the other countries, arguing that those lands had been administrated by the Maharajah of Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan laid claim to part of an area under Indian control for reasons of Muslim identity. Since then, there have been three armed confrontations (1947, 1948 and 1965), and hostilities resumed in 1971. **In July 1949, both countries signed the Karachi Agreement, which set a ceasefire line that was to be controlled by observers.** As a result, the UN created an observation mission called **UNMOGIP**. This mission is still active and has international observers on the Line of Control. At the end of the 1980s tension mounted, with the added risk of the nuclear weapons that both countries possess.

<b>Population:</b> 13 million (Kashmir) <b>Area:</b> 222,200 km <sup>2</sup> (Kashmir) <b>HDI:</b> India 136; Pakistan 146 (out of 186) <b>GDP:</b> India, 1,875,213 million dollars; Pakistan, 215,117 million dollars <b>Per capita income:</b> India, \$1,498; Pakistan, \$1.295 <b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 47,000-70,000 people since 1989. <b>Actors:</b> APHC, Hizbul Mujahideen <b>Facilitators:</b> ----
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The conflict therefore has two dimensions. The first is an inter-state conflict, involving a border dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. This conflict is evident in the continuous infiltrations of Pakistani groups across the border. The other dimension is intra-state, involving the fighting waged by armed Muslim opposition groups within the Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir against India's central government. Some of these groups are fighting for the independence of a unified Kashmir, while others are fighting for this Indian state's integration into Pakistan. In 1992 the coalition All Parties Hurriyat Conference (**APHC**) was formed. The APHC demanded an internationally monitored referendum, as mentioned in the Security Council's first resolutions. Another conflict involves the dispute over control of the Punjab river basins.

Another important armed group is the **Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)**, created in 1989 and led by Sayeed Salahudeen. This group has been on the EU's list of terrorist groups since 2005 for having perpetrated numerous attacks against India's civilian population.

### Background to the peace process

India has always refused any international mediation; rather it prefers direct bilateral dialogue. It is not in favour of changing the territorial boundaries and is supported by China. In contrast, Pakistan is in favour of internationalising any peace process, and based on the right of self-determination, it is calling for a referendum to be held under UN control, although lately it has declared that it may give up on this demand. The most noteworthy feature of this conflict is the dynamic of creating trust-building measures on both sides and the model of the process, which has become known as the composite dialogue, which consists of addressing all the disputes in a single process so that headway is made on several matters at the same time. In this process, even though it is difficult to reach agreements, once they are reached it is difficult to renege on them.

In 2005, the Pakistani president stated that the dispute over control of Kashmir may be resolved by greater autonomy for the region, while the Indian prime minister declared that a Kashmir without clearly defined borders and with greater autonomy for the zones administered by India would be measures that might help to resolve the conflict and to weaken the border demarcation

in order to detract importance from it. In turn, the coalition of pro-independence parties, APHC, asked that the armed struggle be abandoned in order to pave the way for peace negotiations which would lead to a sustainable peace agreement. In early November 2009, the central government of India announced that it had prepared a set of political measures for the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. During the second half of February 2010, both countries resumed peace negotiations, which had been formally interrupted since the attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. In February 2011, the leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Shabbir Ahmed Shah, called for a referendum in the state to determine the people's aspirations.

**Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited India privately in April 2012 and met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.** It was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state to the neighbouring country in seven years and the first meeting between both leaders since 2009. Singh agreed to visit Pakistan, though a date for the trip was not set. The Indian government authorised direct foreign investment from Pakistan; 600 Pakistani business owners participated in a trade fair in India. In November, the Pakistani government pledged to confer most favoured nation status on India. In June, the Pakistani Foreign Minister invited separatist Kashmiri leaders to participate in negotiations during a trip to Delhi. In the third quarter, India and Pakistan reached an agreement to relax the hitherto restrictive criteria for giving visas to their respective citizens. In October, the Pakistani Oil Minister said that the country was ready to purchase Indian fuel as long as the price was reasonable. He made these declarations while participating in a conference on the petrochemical sector in Delhi. In recent months, India and Pakistan have channelled their relations through **economic diplomacy**.

### **The peace process in 2013**

The year 2013 was characterised by attempts to **give new intensity to confidence-building measures** that had been developed in recent years, overcoming specific moments of tension and confrontation. The beginning of the year was marked by a series of acts of violence along the Line of Control (border) between both countries, which left several people dead. These incidents raised bilateral tensions to the point that several experts thought it was the worst crisis between both nations since the attacks in Bombay (Mumbai) in 2008. While at the end of January both governments said they were ready for dialogue and for taking measures to de-escalate the conflict, tensions resurged in March following a series of incidents aggravated by India's decision to execute a Kashmiri militant accused of attacking the Indian Parliament in 2001, which led to protests in Pakistan. The Pakistani Parliament's decision to condemn the execution sparked demonstrations in India, which saw the move as interference and decided to suspend a series of cricket matches between both countries.

Despite the crisis of the first few months of the year due to various acts of violence along the Line of Control, in the second quarter talks between India and Pakistan did not come to a standstill and the rise to power of the new Pakistani government led by Nawaz Sharif created new expectations. In his electoral platform, Sharif had advocated restarting the peace process between India and Pakistan. After he took office, Sharif said that Pakistan's foreign policy priorities included paying immediate attention to relations with neighbouring countries. According to Sharif, without peace in the region, Pakistan will not be able to grow or develop successfully. As part of the new road map, **the new leader said that Pakistan aspired to a gradual normalisation of relations with India and to finding solutions to outstanding issues, including the conflict over Kashmir.**

After the new government of Pakistan assumed power, Indian government sources also expressed interest in keeping the process active and in participating with Islamabad in a broad framework for cooperation. The Indian government expressed the same to Pakistan through the Prime Minister's Special Envoy Satinder Lambah. Furthermore, in mid-June, Indian Union Minister Farooq Abdullah argued for relaxing the borders between both countries in order to improve relations and make it easier for populations on either side to meet. According to Indian sources,

Indian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ranjan Mathai would meet with his Pakistani counterpart to address the location and schedule of the talks in order to maintain momentum in the process. In this regard, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference faction led by Syed Ali Geelani (All Parties Hurriyat Conference-G) said that they were against the possibility of holding a meeting between Indian and Pakistani leaders in Srinagar (the capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir) or in Muzaffarabad (the capital of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir). According to their argument, India would use the talks there to justify its occupation. In contrast, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference's moderate faction, led by Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, proposed holding an Indo-Pakistani summit on both sides of the border, with leaders from both countries and the local population, to discuss a resolution to the conflict. Mirwaiz stressed that the solution to the conflict must be political and not merely a matter of financial or infrastructural investment. This was said in reference to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit planned for late June to open the Qazigund-Banihal stretch of railroad in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Despite Pakistan and India's willingness to revive the talks process, Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salman Khurshid remarked that serious issues had built up in recent months that had to be tackled before the process could resume, including incidents like the death of an Indian prisoner in a Pakistani prison after being attacked by other prisoners. In any event, he said that he hoped the process would be resumed in its "composed dialogue" format, centred mainly on building trust, prioritising those areas where progress is possible and postponing thornier issues.

Regardless of the incidents of violence that took place in the border area between India and Pakistan, and that marred the peace process in the summer, the third quarter ended with rapprochement between both parties as a result of the meeting held by the countries' prime ministers during the UN General Assembly in New York in September. Both parties expressed their willingness to improve the situation along the Line of Control (as the border separating both countries is called) and to reduce violence in the area. They also acknowledged repeated reports that the ceasefire agreement had been violated. This was the first meeting to take place since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was elected in May. Throughout October, the Indian and Pakistani militaries accused each other of repeatedly violating the ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control, despite both prime ministers' promise to put an end to the confrontations in September. Meanwhile, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said he was ready to exert additional effort to make progress in the negotiating process and include the issue of Kashmir.


Senior Indian and Pakistani military officers met for the first time in 14 years in order to negotiate directly over the situation in Kashmir, a region disputed by both countries. The military commanders met at the Wagah border crossing to agree on ways to guarantee peace along the Line of Control, the *de facto* border that separates both countries and that had been the scene of many violent clashes between both armies in the final months of the year. The meeting took place after a significant escalation in the exchange of accusations between both governments, with Pakistani media outlets echoing statements made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that a fourth war in the disputed region was possible. However, Sharif's office later denied that the leader had said that.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The new leader of Pakistan hoped to gradually normalise relations with India and to find solutions to outstanding issues, including the conflict over Kashmir.</li> <li>• Senior Indian and Pakistani military officers met for the first time in 14 years in order to negotiate directly over the situation in Kashmir.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asian Centre for Human Rights (<a href="http://www.achrweb.org">www.achrweb.org</a>)</li> <li>• Gobierno de la India (<a href="http://india.gov.in">india.gov.in</a>)</li> </ul>

- Gobierno de Pakistán ([www.pakistan.gov.pk](http://www.pakistan.gov.pk))
- Human Security Report Project ([www.hsrgroup.org](http://www.hsrgroup.org))
- ICG ([www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org))
- Incore ([www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries](http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries))
- Kashmir Global ([www.kashmirglobal.com](http://www.kashmirglobal.com))
- Kashmir Watch ([www.kashmirwatch.com](http://www.kashmirwatch.com))
- Reliefweb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int))
- SATP ([www.satp.org](http://www.satp.org))
- Swiss Peace ([www.swisspeace.org/fast](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast))
- UNMOGIP ([www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unmogip/index.html](http://www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unmogip/index.html))
- United States Institute of Peace ([www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org))

### Main parties involved in the process



## b) Southeast Asia

### MYANMAR /BURMA

#### Context of the conflict

There are two types of conflict in Myanmar: one is related to the fight for the democratisation of the country; the other is linked to the rights claimed by the different ethnic minorities. Having gained its independence in 1947, the country had a democratic government from 1948 to 1962, when General Ne Win led a coup d'état. Ne Win was in turn brought down by yet another military coup in 1988.

<b>Population:</b> 4533 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 677,000 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HID:</b> 149 of 186)
<b>GDP:</b> 59,444 million \$
<b>Income per inhabitant:</b> 1.115\$
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 15,000
<b>Displaced population:</b> 500,000
<b>Armed actors:</b> UNFC, KIO
<b>Facilitators:</b> --

Myanmar has a population of 50 million people, divided into 135 ethnic groups and subgroups who practise different religions. The military regime is Buddhist. Many of the ethnic groups have their own military apparatus. The main minorities are the Shan (9%) and the Karen (7%). These ethnic groups still fight against the military junta, although less intensely than in previous decades.

The **Karen** people are political organised under the **KNU** (Karen National Union) and are not involved in drug trafficking, unlike many other ethnic groups. Their military activity is via the **KNLA** (Karen National Liberation Army), created in 1947. The group has around 7,000 combatants. In 1995 the Karen reformed en masse in Thailand, with most of these being unarmed. They have stated that they are willing to completely lay down their arms if they obtain political guarantees of a future institutional framework and if they can earn revenues from gas production. The state of Karen covers 28,725 km<sup>2</sup> and has 1.1 million inhabitants. Even though the majority of Karen are Buddhists, the state also has a high number of Christians (30%) as a result of its past relationship with the British Empire. The Karen have had a ceasefire with the government in place since 2004, and it is currently the oldest conflict in the world (since 1949). The Karen are led by Naw Zipporrah Sein.

The **Shan State Army (SSA)**, created in 1964, reached a peace agreement with the government, but one of its dissidents, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), remained active in pursuing an autonomous Shan state within a federal Burma. In May 2007 the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement were suspended after an agreement could not be reached on the venue where the meeting should be held. The leader of this armed group had agreed to negotiate with the armed forces with mediation by members of the Thai military. In 2009 the government invited them to become border guards, which they accepted in April 2010. However, half of their troops (5,000), led by General Parngfa, were opposed to this agreement. There is also the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which was declared a terrorist group in 2006. The SSA-S also experienced dissidence this year, and it reached a peace agreement with the government.

The **Chin** are an ethnic group consisting of more than one million people with their own language and culture divided between Myanmar and India. In India they are known as the Mizo people. The Burmese side is the home to almost half a million people, and they account for the majority of the population in the Chin state of Myanmar, which borders on India and Bangladesh and was created in 1974. The Chin were Christianised in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, just a few years after the independent Chinland was annexed by British colonialism, and therefore the majority of the population is Baptist. They have a widespread diaspora in India, Malaysia, Canada and the United States. The military junta has persecuted the Chins, regarding them as pro-Western. Since the 1930s, the Chins have been claiming their rights to self-determination, as a continuation of their claims to independence from Myanmar (formerly Burma) in 1948. Forty years later, in

1998, the **Chin National Front (CNF)** was created following the military junta's brutal repression of demonstrations by students calling for democracy in the country. This group, which demanded self-rule for the Chin people and the creation of a territory called Gran Mizoram, organised on the border of the Burmese region of Shin with the Indian state of Mizoram (from which they receive support) and with Bangladesh, and has around 200 military troops. The Secretary-General of the CNF is Thang Lian. Since 1989 the CBF has been part of the National Democratic Front of Burma (NDF), and since 2001 it has been a member of the United Nations' Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The Chin National Council was founded in 2006, and includes the CNF and other Chin organisations.

The production of opium in much of the country has made many of these groups turn to drug trafficking. Such groups fight among themselves and against the government. In parallel to these conflicts, the country is under an autocratic military dictatorship. In 1990, this regime adopted the name SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council). In 1997, it changed its name to the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). Since 1985 the junta has signed agreements with many armed groups. In exchange for renouncing their political and separatist demands, the junta has allowed these groups to control their lucrative activities with total impunity. In 1990 the military junta permitted elections, which were won with a majority by Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the **NLD** (National League for Democracy) and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was later arrested.

## Background to the peace process

With regard to the process of democratisation and reconciliation channelled through the dialogue with the Nobel Peace Prize winner and the NLD, the first meetings took place in late 2000 with the mediation of Malaysia and the United Nations. During the period 2001-2004, the Military Junta made a series of gestures in what could be called "visit diplomacy", which translated into the release of political prisoners before and/or after the periodical visits to the country by the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy to the country, a special Rapporteur on human rights and political leaders from several countries, although there were also periods when the Military Junta did not allow these visits. In 2004, the government promoted a national convention to democratise the country, but the NLD conditioned its participation upon the release of its imprisoned members. Many of these diplomatic manoeuvres to resolve the conflict came via the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is headquartered in Geneva but has had an office in the Burmese capital since 2000, which was closed by the Military Junta in March 2006. In 2009, the most noteworthy event was that the new Obama administration gave signs of being in favour of engaging in direct relations with the Military Junta. The Deputy Secretary of State noted the possibility of creating a format similar to the one used in the negotiations with North Korea, via a six-part dialogue in which ASEAN, Japan, China and India would also participate. US representatives from the delegation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with representatives of the Military Junta. Late in the year, the US government stated that it was hoping to start a dialogue process between the Military Junta and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after the party she leads, the NLD, had publicised a letter that Suu Kyi had sent to the leader of the Junta, General Than Shwe, in which she expressed her willingness to work with the government to put an end to the sanctions that were harming the country. In 2010, the Military Junta had authorised the reopening of some offices of the main democratic opposition party, the NLD. The opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, met in May with the US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, and the head of the US diplomatic mission in the country. After the elections, the Military Junta released the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after seven and a half years of house arrest.

With regard to the KNU, the government's first meeting with this Karen group was held in 1996, albeit with no results. The second meeting was in late 2003, and it ended with a verbal cessation of hostilities agreement. In 2007, a splinter of the group and the KNU/KNLPAC was formed, which signed a peace agreement with the Military Junta. Another faction, the KNU/KNLA Peace

Council, reached an agreement with the Military Junta in 2009 which stated that the members of the group could serve as border guards on the border with Thailand.

In April 2011, General Than Shwe officially dissolved the Military Junta, which had been established in 1988 via a coup d'état, after taking possession of the new government of the union, which replaced the Junta. In July, the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi offered to facilitate ceasefire agreements and peace processes between the government and the ethnic insurgency. In parallel, the coalition of ethnic groups United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), established in February, submitted a ceasefire proposal to EU representatives at a meeting held in Bangkok and issued an appeal for the European organisation to facilitate a dialogue between the Burmese government and the ethnic groups. In August, Suu Kyi met with President Thein Sein for the first time. In August, the leaders of the UNFC assembled a team to hold peace negotiations with the government. In turn, the Parliament approved the creation of a peace committee aimed at mediating with the insurgent groups.

In November 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Myanmar and met with President Thein Sein. Clinton announced small concessions from the Burmese regime in response to advances in democracy which had been made, but she asked for more headway. Likewise, five ethnic armed groups met with representatives of the government, and three of them reached informal ceasefire agreements with the Executives. The groups that participated in the negotiations were the KIO, KNP, CNF, SSA-S and KNU.

In 2012, the Burmese government established a strategy for peace with the ethnic groups through a three-stage process. The first stage would include a ceasefire, the opening of liaison offices and freedom of movement when carrying arms, the second stage would entail confidence-building measures, political dialogue and regional development and in the third stage an agreement would be signed before members of Parliament. In January, the armed opposition group KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government. In addition to the ceasefire, both parties agreed to possibly permit unarmed patrols in their respective territories and to let the KNU open liaison offices in land under government control. In the second quarter, a KNU delegation met for the first time with President Thein Sein and with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon. In November, the armed group said they were committed to self-government for the Karen people and the creation of a federal government system that would allow greater autonomy, but did not want to be independent from Myanmar. In December, the KNU elected General Muty Say Poe to be their new leader.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the armed group ABSDF held negotiations with government representatives for the first time on the Thai border and agreed to hold more meetings to reach a ceasefire and peace agreement. In early June, informal negotiations were also held with the KIO, a group that repeated their demand for government troops to withdraw from their area of control. They also said that their goal was to end the conflict, and not to sign a ceasefire agreement. The KIO also requested international observers as witnesses to a potential peace agreement. The KIO said that they would not sign a ceasefire agreement until government troops withdrew. Moreover, the KIO and other Kachin leaders announced the creation of a centre for justice and negotiations intended to gather different views of the peace process and all information about the negotiations. In February, the government and the NMSP signed a four-point agreement after three rounds of negotiations. The NMSP said that the government only aimed to maintain the ceasefire, and not to move towards any political agreements. In the third quarter, the PNLO signed a ceasefire agreement with the government and agreed that peace negotiations would be held in the following three months. Moreover, the armed Karenni opposition group KNPP signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in the second quarter that was a result of the negotiations between both parties in Kayah State.



## The peace process in 2013

At the start of the year, there was a clear push for dialogue between the government and the sole armed group with which it had not reached a ceasefire agreement, the KIO, so the informal talks that began in 2012 continued. Following an escalation of violence between the Burmese Army and the KIO in Kachin State, on 18 January the government declared a unilateral ceasefire around Laiza, the largest city in the state, to pave the way for political talks with the KIO that were supposed to start the day after, although the violence rendered the truce partially worthless. Meanwhile, Parliament passed a motion calling for a ceasefire and peace talks to put an end to 18 months of conflict. Talks between the central government and the KIO finally took place in the city of Ruili, China, in February, under the impetus of China, which, according to some media, acted as a mediator while others described it as a coordinator and witness. These talks addressed issues such as establishing a channel of communication between the parties, reducing tension and inviting observers and witnesses to subsequent rounds.

This round gave way to the **beginning of political dialogue with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC)**, an umbrella for many insurgent groups like the KIO, KNU, KNPP, SSPP, NMSP, ANC and PNLO, among others. Previously, in January, the UNFC released a statement that announced that its member organisations had decided to maintain a ceasefire and hold peace talks with the government and that they would have to be conducted with the UNFC as the sole negotiator and not with the organisations individually. Thus, in late February the government and the UNFC met to talk about political goals, the framework for dialogue and timetables. According to a joint statement released later, the talks were frank and friendly. The government team was led by former general and peace negotiator Aung Min, who pointed out that tension with the KIO had subsided in recent weeks.

There was a new round of talks in Ruili between the government and KIO delegations in March with the participation of four members of the UNFC, two of the SSPP/SSA, two of the RCSS/SSA, two of the NDAA, four of the Kachin State Peace Creating Group, a Chinese ministerial advisor and two Chinese Foreign Ministry officials. The KIO delegation was headed by a member of the Permanent Committee of the Peace Talk Creating Group. The subsequent joint press release said that the talks had been cordial and that a working agreement would not be reached until both parties agreed on a ceasefire based on mutual understanding, respect and trust in order to start a genuine political conversation. Both parties also agreed to continue coordinating with each others' troops in the conflict zone, in order to reduce confrontation, and to establish coordination and supervision offices if necessary. Furthermore, they agreed to continue to implement the agreements reached in the current round and the one held in February, planned a new meeting for early April and said they would continue coordinating to achieve real political talks nationwide in scope.

In May, the chief negotiator of the Burmese government, Aung Min, announced that the government was planning to hold a conference nationwide in scope that would include all the ethnic groups in the country, address the ceasefire issue and give impetus to the subsequent inclusive dialogue. In late May, **the government and the KIO reached a seven-point agreement** at a meeting held in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, referring to the KIO's historical demands regarding the need for the separation of forces, the establishment of a monitoring and verification mechanism for the conflict and the start of talks on political issues. The UN Special Envoy for Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, participated in this new round of talks. Observers from China were also present at the meeting, as well as representatives of eight of the armed groups in Myanmar, including some linked to the Wa, Karen, Shan, Karenni and Mon ethnic groups. This was the first time that the KIO accepted to participate in negotiations in Myanmar; the previous two rounds of talks had taken place in China.

**Myanmar also made progress in its talks with the RCSS (and its armed wing, the SSA)**, an insurgency with which it had already reached ceasefire agreements in 2011 and 2012. A

delegation from the group met with Burmese President Thein Sein for the first time on 10 June. The RCSS/SSA delegation was headed by Lieutenant General Yawd Serk and President Thein was accompanied by the chief negotiator for the Burmese government, Aung Min, and by the Minister of the President's Office, Soe Thane. At the meeting, which was held in the capital, Naypyidaw, both parties agreed to work on relocating troops, reducing hostilities and creating a team to monitor the conflict. Inclusive political talks were planned, according to the road map described by President Thein. The meeting also addressed the internally displaced population, food security, transport issues and the subject of identity cards for the Shan ethnic population. The RCSS/SSA is the second armed group that has met with President Thein since he took power in 2011. Meanwhile, representatives of the Karen National Union (KNU) met with Burmese government officials in Myawaddy in early June to hold unofficial talks on military issues and to develop a "code of conduct" governing how both parties interact.

In July, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) proposed that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi participate as a mediator (or at least as an observer) in the peace talks that the government was holding with it. One of the main blocks to progress in the peace process was the government's intention to reach a nationwide ceasefire agreement and then address the different armed groups' political demands, while the UNFC thought that talks on the ceasefire and the political causes of the conflict should be carried out at the same time. In August, the government and the All Burma Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF) announced the beginning of a truce, considered the first step to beginning talks that could put an end to 25 years of conflict. The agreement would allow four liaison offices to open in Myanmar.

Mention must be made of the process carried out by the government and the different ethnic insurgent groups aimed at achieving a general ceasefire for the entire country for the month of October. Although the government expressed its readiness to achieve the ceasefire, different armed groups were sceptical about it. However, prominent among the initiatives it set out to achieve was the **conference on confidence-building measures held in September that enjoyed the participation of more than 300 ethnic group, political party and government representatives**. The conference ended with five objectives to explore in greater detail in the peace process: 1) a national ceasefire; 2) the abolition of democratic laws or laws that are problematic in other aspects, including the law of illegal associations; 3) the establishment of a federal union that guarantees equality and autonomy for the ethnic groups or the country; 4) the organisation of a conference like that of Panglong; and 5) the reformation or redrafting of the 2008 Constitution. Meanwhile, some sources said that the **National Defence and Security Council (a high-level government body in which the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces participate)** would acquire greater weight in the peace negotiations at the expense of the main government negotiator so far, U Aung Min, who may resign.

The leaders of 18 armed ethnic organisations, including the KIO, KNU and SSA-South, as well as the leaders of the umbrella organisation UNFC, met in Kachin State in October to discuss the government's general ceasefire proposal for the entire country and to agree on positions to take entering negotiations with the government, currently planned for early November. Some leaders pointed out that this meeting was more important than the one for the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which established ethnic autonomy. The armed Wa group UWSA was notably absent, which may have been due to the fact that the group did not feel that its desire to create an autonomous Wa state was sufficiently represented and that had been sceptical that a general ceasefire was possible. However, while this meeting was taking place, **clashes continued between the government and the KIO**, which caused a large humanitarian crisis because thousands of people were trapped by the armed violence. Days before the outbreak of fighting, **the government and the KIO had held talks and reached some partial agreements, but did not sign a ceasefire agreement**. Coinciding with these discussions, the government freed 56 political prisoners, almost all of which had been imprisoned for belonging to different ethnic insurgent organisations.

In November, the government and the main armed ethnic opposition groups agreed to sign a general ceasefire agreement for the entire country, which would establish a framework for conducting and maintaining political dialogue. This decision was made after the armed ethnic opposition groups held another meeting that resulted in **17 armed organisations (out of the 18 participating) agreeing to the general ceasefire as a condition for political talks.** Afterwards, a delegation of leaders of the UNFC coalition of insurgent groups visited Rangoon and Naypyidaw for the first time in decades, highlighting the Armed Forces' need to get involved in peace negotiations to give them a more substantive nature, since even though the government was holding talks, the Burmese Army was still carrying out armed operations in Kachin State. The delegation urged the commander in chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, to get involved in the peace process. In addition, **the UNFC asked opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to participate more actively in the peace process** after meeting with her in Rangoon, inviting her to the negotiations that would be held with the government at the end of the year. Moreover, representatives from 12 different political parties met with the leaders of the UNFC in Thailand to talk about the peace process. Alongside this progress in the negotiations, clashes were renewed between the Burmese Armed Forces and the armed opposition group KIO, forcibly displacing thousands of civilians.


At a two-day meeting, eleven leaders of Burmese political parties, the UNFC and civil society organisations discussed how to **structure a future Burmese Army that includes the armed ethnic opposition groups** of Myanmar. Organised by the government agency Myanmar Peace Centre, the meeting was the first formal discussion between the political party representatives and rebel leaders. The discussions focused on the creation of a federal Burmese Army that would integrate the armed groups of the different ethnic minorities. Some challenges included how to make the recruitment process more inclusive, how to build trust among the parties and how to grant a certain degree of autonomy to the regions without dividing the military. In mid-November, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), consisting of 1,000 fighters in northern Shan State, rejected the ceasefire offered by the government and its demand that they disarm prior to political negotiations. At the end of the year, the government promised to release most of the political prisoners through a pardon.

In December, the Burmese Armed Forces launched a **new offensive against positions of the armed Kachin opposition group KIA** in the southern part of Kachin State, using heavy weapons and forcibly displacing the civilian population of the area. The attacks, which began on 24 December, lasted several days. Sources of the armed group said that the resumption of fighting **endangered the continuity of the peace negotiations**, since it was a deliberate attack carried out by the Burmese Armed Forces. Humanitarian organisations providing assistance to the civilian population indicated that the attack could also have repercussions for all negotiations being conducted with all the insurgent groups, and not just with the KIA, risking the possibility of not reaching a general ceasefire agreement for the entire country, which is expected to be signed in early 2014.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political talks began with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), an umbrella organisation for different insurgency groups like the KIO, KNU, KNPP, SSPP, NMSP, ANC and PNLO, among others.</li> <li>The government and the KIO reached a seven-point agreement. However, at the end of the year, a new offensive against positions of the armed Kachin opposition group KIA endangered the future of the negotiations.</li> <li>In November, the government and the main armed ethnic opposition groups agreed to sign a general ceasefire agreement for the entire country, which would establish a framework for conducting and maintaining political dialogue.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (<a href="http://www.altsean.org">www.altsean.org</a>)</li> <li>• Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx">www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx</a>)</li> <li>• Burma Issues (<a href="http://www.burmaissues.org">www.burmaissues.org</a>)</li> <li>• Burmanet News (<a href="http://www.burmanet.org/news">www.burmanet.org/news</a>)</li> <li>• Centro para el Diálogo Humanitario (<a href="http://www.dhcentre.org">www.dhcentre.org</a>)</li> <li>• CNF (<a href="http://www.chinland.org">www.chinland.org</a>)</li> <li>• Democratic Voice of Burma (<a href="http://www.dvb.no">www.dvb.no</a>)</li> <li>• Gobierno (<a href="http://www.myanmar.com">www.myanmar.com</a>) (<a href="http://www.myanmar.gov.mm">www.myanmar.gov.mm</a>)</li> <li>• Karen National Union (<a href="http://www.karennationalunion.net">www.karennationalunion.net</a>)</li> <li>• Myanmar News.Net (<a href="http://www.myanmarnews.net">www.myanmarnews.net</a>)</li> <li>• Myanmar Peace Monitor (<a href="http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org">www.mmpeacemonitor.org</a>)</li> <li>• PILPG (<a href="http://www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html">www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html</a>)</li> <li>• The Burma Project (<a href="http://www.soros.org/initiatives/bpsai">www.soros.org/initiatives/bpsai</a>)</li> <li>• The Kachim Post (<a href="http://www.kachimpost.com">www.kachimpost.com</a>)</li> <li>• Transnational Institute (<a href="http://www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project">www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project</a>)</li> <li>• UNPO (<a href="http://www.unpo.org">www.unpo.org</a>)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



# PHILIPPINES

## Context of the conflict

Even though the Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, 8% of the population is Muslim. However, in recent decades, armed Muslim groups have emerged, as have communist guerrillas. Despite the two popular revolts in the last twenty years (in 1986 to bring down President F. Marcos, and in 2001, to depose President Estrada), the country is still in the hands of a landowning oligarchy with no intention of resolving the serious structural problems in the country: corruption, a lack of infrastructure, rural underdevelopment, a lack of basic services, serious

human rights violations with impunity, etc. The expansion of the communist guerrillas, led by the **NPA** (the New People's Army) is linked to the system of land exploitation. The Muslim rebellion, led by the **MILF** (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front), is related to the socioeconomic discrimination against the southern population, and particularly against the people who live on the island of Mindanao and on the Sulu archipelago. This discrimination has led to regional nationalism, since two-thirds of the country's Muslims live in this region. The 1990s saw the emergence of a new radical terrorist group, **Abu Sayaf**, operating primarily in the Sulu archipelago. The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic state in the south of the country. It is accused of being in contact with Al-Qaeda and has not begun any negotiation process with the government.

**Population:** 98.4 million inhabitants  
**Area:** 300,000 km<sup>2</sup>  
**HDI:** 114 (out of 186)  
**GDP:** 250,182 million dollars  
**Per capita income:** \$2,542  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 120,000  
**Displaced persons:** 2 million  
**Armed actors:** NPA, MILF, MNLF, Abu Sayyaf  
**Facilitators:**  
MILF: Malaysia  
NPA/NDF: Norway  
MNLF: OCI, Indonesia

The **NPA** was formed in 1969 and is the military arm of the **Communist Party of the Philippines** (the **CPP**). It is also part of the **NDF** (the National Democratic Front), which is the umbrella organisation for several groups and acts as the NPA's political arm and negotiator. The NPA has around 6,000 combatants and is led by J. M. Sison "Joma", who is exiled in the Netherlands. The NPA distanced itself from the popular revolution of 1986, which led to considerable divisions within the group. As a result, many leaders and combatants abandoned the armed struggle. The **MILF** was founded in 1978 as a result of a division in the **Moro National Liberation Front** (**MNLF**), which had been formed in 1969. After several years of negotiations, it reached a peace agreement with the government (the Manila Agreement). Libya initially mediated in this agreement, but it was subsequently replaced by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The agreement obtained autonomy for the southern provinces. The **MILF** were opposed to this 1996 agreement and demanded Mindanao's independence. The **MILF** has around 10,000 combatants. In October 2005 the government announced the signing of a **cessation of hostilities agreement with the armed opposition group RPM-M**, a faction that had broken away from the NPA a few years earlier and has been holding talks with the government over the last two years.

## Background to the peace process

After rejecting the Manila agreements of 1996, two years later the **MILF** found support from Libya to start negotiations with the Philippine government, albeit with no results. In 2001, president offered negotiations abroad, suspended military operations and started talks in Malaysia under the auspices of Libya, and reached a ceasefire. Throughout 2004, the government of the Philippines and the **MILF** also held exploratory talks in Malaysia, which became a facilitating country, in which they agreed to an initial three-point agenda: security, rehabilitation of areas of conflict and protection of the ancestral lands on the island of Mindanao. The **MILF** gave up on independence but in exchange was demanding formulas of self-government which expressed a greater degree of autonomy in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM). In 2008, the government and the MILF declared that they would sign a Memory of Understanding on Ancestral Lands (MOA) in Malaysia, the most controversial aspect of the negotiations in recent years. Both parties also pledged to reach a global peace agreement within the next 15 months that would include the three main points on the negotiating agenda: security, rehabilitation and development, and ancestral lands. In early August, however, as a precautionary measure, the Supreme Court suspended the signing of the MOA hours before the Philippine government and the MILF were getting ready to sign the document in Malaysia. In 2009, the government and the MILF signed the framework agreement on forming an international support group for the negotiation process in Kuala Lumpur; this group would be made up of governments, mainly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the EU, as well as by international NGOs or eminent individuals. In 2010, while the government was speaking about "reinforced autonomy" which would extend the competences of the Moro people over the zone currently falling with the ARMM, the MILF was advocating the creation of a "Bangsamoro sub-state" which would expand the powers and scope of the current ARMM. In September, the MILF's chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, declared that his group had formally abandoned its petition for independence for certain regions of Mindanao and that it had given the government a proposal to create a sub-state or an autonomous republic that would have all the competences except foreign affairs, national defence, currency and postal service.

With regard to the NPA, it has been negotiating with the government since 1986 via the National Democratic Front (NDF); the negotiations were launched in the Netherlands in 1986. Since 2009, they have been facilitated by Norway, and they seek structural changes on the political, social and economic fronts. In 1992, new talks were held with the government in the Netherlands, at which a four-point agreement was defined, The Hague Joint Declaration on human rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms and disarmament. In 1993, talks were held in Hanoi and again in 1994 in the Netherlands. In 1995 the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was reached, which granted immunity to around 100 people with ties to the negotiation process. In 1997 a thematic agenda to be negotiated was established, which allowed the negotiating teams to reach a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998. However, this agreement was not validated by the president of the country. In 2004, the government held a meeting in Oslo with NPA delegates, and both parties agreed to establish a joint committee charged with supervising implementation of the human rights agreements. In 2005, the negotiations were broken off, and in 2008 the government and the NDF agreed to meet again and reactivate the joint committee to supervise human rights and international humanitarian law after a three year hiatus. Since then, this committee has met several times. The government and the NDF have expressed their satisfaction with the agreements reached during the first round of formal negotiations held in Oslo between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2011 with the facilitation of the Norwegian government. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the agreements signed between 1992 and 2004; they established a calendar of meetings of constitutional groups and of signing agreements (the agreement on social and economic reforms, the agreement on political and constitutional reforms, and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities), and they re-established the joint committee to supervise the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). In June, the NDF's negotiating panel suggested that the round of peace talks scheduled for that same month should be postponed until the government released 17 NDF consultants who, according to the organisation, should be protected under the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG).

With regard to the MNLF, which reached a peace agreement with the government in 1996, in 2007 it reached significant agreements on the application of all the provisions in the 1996 agreement in which it set up five working groups: Sharia and the legal system, security forces, natural resources and economic development, political system and representation, and education. Since 1996, there have been negotiations to implement the agreements signed that year. In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya,

in order to resolve the issues that had been standing in the way of full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996. In November 2011, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), through its Committee for Peace in the South Philippines, started contacts with the government and the MNLF to resolve the three pending issues in the negotiations in order to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement, which had also been facilitated by the OIC. The three aspects on which no agreement had yet been reached were the division of strategic minerals, the establishment of a provisional government (according to the MNLF, the government did not implement the establishment of a transitional mechanism as called for in the 1996 agreement) and holding a plebiscite to expand the territorial base of the ARMM.

On 15 October 2012, in Manila, the government and the MILF signed a framework agreement to resolve the conflict in Mindanao and to create a new political body, called Bangsamoro, which would replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao after a transition period when the basic law of the new body would be drafted. Later, the new law would be subject to a referendum. If approved, elections would be announced to form a government to replace the Transition Commission. According to both parties, the entire process should be finalised before President Benigno Aquino's term ends in 2016. In November, the 33<sup>rd</sup> round of peace negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur came to a conclusion. This round addressed three main issues: the sharing of power, the sharing of wealth and normalisation (a concept referring to disarmament, demobilisation and the reinsertion of MILF combatants). Meanwhile, tensions between the MILF and certain MNLF factions (especially the one led by Nur Misuari) rose markedly after the peace agreement was signed. Nur Misuari said the agreement was illegitimate and urged the MILF to join the negotiations between the MNLF and the government to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement. Other senior MNLF officials even threatened to return to war and to resume their demands for independence if the group was marginalised from the peace process.

Furthermore, the MILF urged the MNLF to form a united front around the aspirations of the Moro people. Sheikh Muhammad Muntassir, the chief da'wah officer of the MILF, urged the MNLF's leaders not to pursue a "selfish" agenda, but to defend the legitimate aspirations of the population. He made this call after the government and the MILF agreed that the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) would act as an observer in the negotiations. In 2010, the OIC already promoted a meeting between the leaders of the MILF and the MNLF in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), which led to the creation of a coordination body. Through various resolutions, the OIC called for cooperation to achieve peace and development for the Moro people.

## **The peace process in 2013**

### **MILF**

In January 2013, the government declared that it should not take more than two months to agree on the four annexes that accompany the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro signed on 15 October 2012 with the MILF that will enable the signing of a definitive comprehensive peace agreement. By that date, the Transition Commission, the body of 15 people designated by the government and the MILF charged with drafting the proposal for the Bangsamoro Constitution, the new organisation that will replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, should be composed and operational. These statements were made a few days after the end of the 34<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur. Although no joint statement was released following the three-day meeting, as usually occurs, the MILF said that huge progress had been made in each of the four annexes. In some of them, including in the one on power sharing, nearly total agreement was reached, while in the others, like the one on sharing financial resources and on "normalisation", the new head of the government's negotiating team, university Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (who replaced Marvic Leonen in the position, now on the Supreme Court), said that the process to disarm combatants would be gradual. The leader of the MILF, Ebrahim

Murad, pointed out that the process would only begin under the government of the new Bangsamoro body and warned that it should include government militias active in the Bangsamoro region. However, **the MILF ordered its combatants not to wear uniforms or carry weapons in public places**, a measure taken as a show of goodwill by the government. Furthermore, according to Ebrahim Murad, the MILF expressed its desire that the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which has supervised the ceasefire agreement since 2004, expand its powers to also oversee the implementation of the humanitarian and rehabilitation aspects of the agreements. The MILF leader also declared that the IMT, which is headed by Malaysia and consists of Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway and the EU, could supervise the implementation of a possible peace agreement signed by the parties during the transition stage. Furthermore, the MILF said that it had already designated the eight people that would sit on the Transition Commission. The other seven members of the Transition Commission would be designated by the government. The MILF did not want to publish the people's names yet because first they wanted to inform the Malaysian facilitator for the peace talks and the government through its negotiating team.

The 35<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations, held in January, were not clearly successful according to the Malaysian facilitator, Ghafar Tengku Mohammed, as there were deep-rooted disagreements about wealth and power sharing. Nonetheless, the Third Party Monitoring Team began its work, a group of observers in charge of supervising the implementation of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, signed on 15 October 2012, and its four annexes. During the month, the MILF warned President Benigno Aquino not to seize hydrological resources of Davao del Sur, nor to make agreements with private oil and gas companies before signing the final agreement. The 36<sup>th</sup> round took place during the first week of February. Both parties signed the annex on "transitional arrangements and modalities", which will establish a road map for the agreement. The government named the members of the Transition Commission, the body in charge of drafting the basic law of the new political system of Bangsamoro that will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao around 2016 with more powers and financial resources. The Transition Commission will be led by Mohagher Iqbal, member of the MILF, and will consist of eight members appointed by the MILF and seven members chosen by the government. Four women and two Lumad (indigenous people) will participate. The 37<sup>th</sup> round, originally scheduled for the third week of March, was postponed until early April. Aquino explained that he needed more time to revise the drafts of the three remaining annexes. Mohagher Iqbal, the chief negotiator of the MILF, intended to sign the annexes and the global agreement before the May 13 elections. In fact, both parties had committed to sign the four annexes before the end of March.

Despite the fact that several rounds of negotiation had been held between the government and the MILF, and that both parties had repeatedly expressed their intention to sign a comprehensive peace agreement as soon as possible, **there were some episodes of tension between the government and the MILF during the second quarter and peace negotiations moved forward slowly**. The 37<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations began in early April, which began to address the three annexes to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro that had yet to be resolved, although they were still pending during the following round of negotiations. In late April, the Transmission Commission, a 15-person body charged with drafting the Bangsamoro Constitution, which is supposed to replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), met for the first time. During the session, agreement was reached on the internal rules of operation and the procedure to establish the working groups, with the participation of external experts on designing constitutions and on strategies of political influence. However, the Commission cannot start with the main task of drafting the Bangsamoro Constitution until a peace agreement is signed between the government and the MILF. Although both parties' negotiating teams agreed to meet after the elections on 13 May to address the three outstanding annexes to the agreement, the MILF expressed its frustration with the slow pace of the negotiations and exhorted the government to avoid further delays.



With national and local elections approaching on 13 May, the MILF and the government signed an agreement to guarantee security and normalcy. The fact that President Benigno Aquino's party prevailed in these elections, including in some traditional strongholds of the MILF, was welcomed by the group in the sense that it could bolster the legitimacy of the negotiating process underway. For its part, **the MILF announced its intention to keep the MILF as an Islamic organisation, but also to form a political party during 2013 in order to compete in the 2016 elections** once the new Bangsamoro government has replaced the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The government had announced its intention to sign a comprehensive peace agreement with the MILF before July, when Congress would resume activity after the aforementioned elections. However, the fact that the negotiating process did not move forward in the weeks following the elections led to the MILF criticising the government for breaking its word and for the slow pace of the process. Some MILF leaders even declared that they were losing faith in the government. The MNLF said that some MILF commanders were abandoning the group's party line and enrolling in the MNLF because they thought the peace process was headed for failure. Meanwhile, the government's negotiating team justified the delays in resuming the peace negotiations due to the consultations it was holding with representatives of both legislative chambers, including those elected in May. In June, the government finally announced that it would resume peace talks with the MILF in July to tackle the three outstanding points before a comprehensive peace agreement can be signed: power sharing, wealth redistribution and a return to normalcy ("normalisation"). One of the members of the government's negotiating team even said he was confident that the comprehensive agreement could be signed within two months. Finally, **the United Nations' and World Bank's launch of a three-year programme to provide technical assistance during the transition process in Mindanao** is worth mentioning, especially with regard to drafting the new Bangsamoro Basic Law and to supporting the Transition Commission and the government's and MILF's negotiating teams.

In the third quarter, three rounds of negotiations were held during the quarter that achieved substantial progress and in which the second of four outstanding annexes for reaching a comprehensive peace agreement in Mindanao was even signed. In fact, in mid-July, during the 38<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, an agreement on wealth sharing and income creation was signed that provides, among other things, that 75% of the revenue coming from the exploitation of natural resources will be managed by the government of Bangsamoro, or that the income obtained from the energy sector will be split equitably between both governments. Various analysts say that the signing of this agreement is highly important because Mindanao is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the country and has virtually no tax system that ensures sufficient government funds. During this round of negotiations, the Third Party Monitoring Team also met for the first time, which is in charge of supervising implementation of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro and its four annexes. This team is led by Alistair MacDonald, the former EU Ambassador to the Philippines and composed of two representatives of intergovernmental organisations and two other representatives of local NGOs. During the 39<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations, which was held in August, significant progress was made in the annexes related to sharing power. In addition, for the first time the negotiations were attended by observers from the Philippine Congress, civil society organisations and the Transition Commission, which is charged with drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law. A few weeks before, President Benigno Aquino had urged Congress to approve the Law by late 2014 to help to establish the peace process. During the 39<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations, both parties also jointly pledged to dismantle the armed Khilafah Islamic Movement, allegedly responsible for some recent attacks such as the bombing in Cagayan de Oro in late July that killed eight people and left dozens injured.

In late September, after the end of the 40<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government and the armed group MILF announced the **inclusion of the Italian religious group Community of Sant'Egidio into the International Contact Group** and the beginning of the **Independent Commission on Policing's work in mid-October, which will be led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police**. The Commission's recommendations will be sent to the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which will assess whether or not it will be included in the future

Bangsamoro Basic Law. The government and the MILF declared that substantial progress was made during the ten days of negotiations, but not enough to conclude and sign the two outstanding annexes of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro: those of “normalisation” and “sharing power”. The other two annexes on “wealth sharing” and “transitional arrangements” had already been signed in February and July, respectively. Both the government and the MILF acknowledged that the negotiations had been difficult and that the issues under discussion were sensitive, but they also pledged to explore creative solutions to sign both annexes, which should lead to the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between both parties.

In December, the government and the MILF signed a power-sharing agreement, one of the last issues pending in the negotiations to reach a global peace agreement. With the signing of this agreement, **three of the four annexes of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro of late 2012 have been signed**, leaving only negotiations over the so-called “normalisation” (which includes demobilisation of the MILF and the creation of a police force for Bangsamoro, the withdrawal of the Philippine Armed Forces from some regions, the eradication of criminal groups and the creation of mechanisms of transitional justice, among other things), issued that were solved in January 2014. However, the MILF and some other analysts thought that this last point could be one of the most sensitive in the entire negotiating process. The power-sharing agreement designates the powers assumed by the central government, those assumed by the Bangsamoro government and those that will be shared. The central government’s powers include foreign relations, defence, currency, immigration and international trade. The agreement also regulates the creation of the Bangsamoro Assembly, which will guarantee the representation of women, Christians and indigenous peoples. The government expressed satisfaction that this annex had been signed, which it considers the cornerstone of the entire peace process.

## **NPA/NDF**

### **Background to the peace process**

In May 2012, the NPA and its political wing, the NDF, expressed its willingness to resume peace talks with the government. One of the consultants to the NDF’s negotiating team, Edre Olalia, declared that the NDF had proposed a special track to the government (called the Proposal for Alliance and Peace) aimed at streamlining and complementing the negotiating process that both parties had agreed on in early 2011. Some elements in the **NDF’s proposal included strengthening national independence and promoting industrial development, implementing agricultural reform and signing a truce leading to a lasting peace**. Olalia also declared that in October the government sent an emissary of President Benigno Aquino to the Netherlands to talk with the leadership of the NDF, for which he expressed some hope that the dialogue could be resumed in the short or medium term. In December, the head of the government’s negotiating team, Alex Padilla, publicly voiced his optimism about the possible resumption and the future of the peace process. Days before, special government representatives met in The Hague (Netherlands) with members of the NDF’s leadership. The governmental delegation was led by the President’s political advisor Ronald Llamas, while the NDF’s delegation was headed by the leader and founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison. The meeting was facilitated by Norwegian Ambassador Ture Lundh. During the meeting, the NDF said that both parties had agreed to talk about agricultural reform, development, industrialisation, democracy, human rights, national independence and peace.

### **The peace process in 2013**

No substantial progress was made during the year. Both parties were unmotivated for the first few months of the year and accused each other of sabotaging the peace process. In this vein, civil society groups staged some protests to pressure the parties to resume negotiations during the quarter. Despite the mutual accusations of non-compliance, the truce during Typhoon Pablo was

respected until mid-January, as had been stipulated. Early in the year, the **government admitted that over the previous year and a half, the peace talks had been particularly difficult**, but declared that further progress was expected during 2013. However, the peace talks scheduled for February, which were supposed to be hosted by the government of Norway, did not take place due to the arrest of Kennedy Bangibang, a consultant for the NDFP. For its part, the NDFP accused the government of boycotting what was supposed to be a historic meeting between the leader of the Communist movement, José María Sison, and President Benigno Aquino, based on the government's refusal to release the NDFP's consultants and its breach of its unilateral, simultaneous and indefinite ceasefire. According to the government, the NDFP was imposing unacceptable conditions.

In the second quarter, the peace process remained stalled after the government declared that official negotiations with the NDF had ended, which had been interrupted since February 2011. The so-called "special track" agreed upon by both parties to try to restart the talks had also become bogged down by early 2013. Thus, in June, the government appointed the head of the government's negotiating team with the NDF, Alex Padilla, to the presidency of PhilHealth, a public health care company. Manila stated that the appointment did not imply that the government was no longer interested in negotiating with the NDF. In this regard, both President Benigno Aquino and the Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process, Teresita Quintos-Deles, announced that they were working on a new focus to try to resolve the conflict through talks, although details about this have not yet emerged. The government accused the NDF of sabotaging both the official negotiations and the "special track" due to its lack of political desire and imposition of preconditions on the talks, while the NDF attributed the failure of the negotiations primarily to the government's breach of some agreements signed in recent years, especially the Hague Joint Declaration and the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees. **The NDF announced its intention to continue its armed struggle until Benigno Aquino's term ends and the political conditions for new talks change**, even though it occasionally made some statements during the quarter that indicated its willingness to resume talks under certain conditions.

There were some causes for hope during the third quarter, such as demonstrations in favour of resuming peace talks, various government declarations in which it showed a readiness to resume dialogue under certain conditions and confirmation by the facilitator of the talks, Norwegian Ambassador Ture Lundh, that the peace process has not ended and that it could start again during the current term of President Benigno Aquino, which will end in 2016. Thus, Ture Lundh urged various sectors of civil society (including journalists, business organisations and human rights groups) to get more actively involved in demonstrations to demand that both parties resume the talks, as various religious organisations have done in recent years.

Despite the stalled dialogue and the mutual accusations that continued to be made, in September the government's chief negotiator, Alex Padilla, said he was willing to resume the negotiating process if the NDF gave signs of goodwill and sincerity and had a clear negotiating agenda to end the violence and make a peace agreement possible. **Padilla also spoke of the need for a new negotiating framework for resuming talks**. Later, in mid-September, Padilla showed readiness to **recommend the release of some consultants of the NDF, but only under the laws of the country**. The NDF maintained that 13 of its consultants covered by the JASIG were still being detained, while the government argued that those people were not on the list of persons covered under the agreement delivered by the NDF. Moreover, Manila claimed that some of the people that were released precisely because they were covered by the agreement resumed the armed struggle or went back into hiding. Formal negotiations have remained inactive since February 2013, while the so-called "special track" collapsed shortly thereafter, in April 2013. The "special track" was a proposal made by the NDF to speed up the peace talks alongside official talks held between the government's negotiating team and the NDF. This proposal consisted of forming a Committee of National Unity, Peace and Development to carry out a programme of agricultural reform, rural development and industrialisation. Implementation of the agreement would make it possible to sign a cessation of hostilities. However, **neither the official negotiations nor the "special track"**

were successful. The government accused the NDF of demanding the release of the aforementioned consultants as a precondition to dialogue, while the NDF accused the government of focusing the dialogue solely on the need to sign a cessation of hostilities without tackling the substantial aspects and the social, political and economic issues of the negotiating agenda in advance.

## **MNLF**

### **Background to the peace process**

The MNLF, which signed a peace accord with the government in 1996, reached significant agreements in 2007 regarding the application of all the provisions of the 1996 accord, for which five working groups were formed: sharia and the legal system, the security forces, natural resources and economic development, the political and representation system and education. Since 1996, there have been negotiations to implement the agreements signed that year. In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya to resolve the issues that had made the full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996 difficult. In November 2011, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) Peace Committee for Southern Philippines initiated contacts with the government and the MNLF to resolve the three outstanding issues to be negotiated to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement, also facilitated by the OIC. The three aspects over which there was still no agreement were the sharing of strategic minerals, the formation of a provisional government (according to the MNLF, the government did not establish a transition mechanism provided for in the 1996 agreement) and the holding of a referendum to expand the territorial base of the ARMM.

In June, the Philippine government and the MNLF created a 42-point list of agreement during the tripartite review of the 1996 accord, in which the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also participated. However, after the framework agreement between the government and the MILF was unveiled, the leader and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, declared that the agreement was illegal and could lead to the resumption of armed conflict in Mindanao. In October, during the third round of informal talks held in Davao, the MILF and the MNLF agreed on the creation of a unity committee and an ad hoc joint secretariat to discuss aspects concerning both of them and to promote a joint agenda.

### **The peace process in 2013**

In July, the MNLF announced the resumption of negotiations with the government to fully implement the 1996 peace accord. The talks were resumed shortly after the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which had helped with the 1996 agreement, urged the government of the Philippines to synchronise and harmonise the content of the negotiations with the MNLF and the substance of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in 2012 between Manila and the MILF. The MNLF declared that it saw no conflict between both frameworks for negotiation, since both attempted to solve the problems of the Moro people, but it also warned that if an agreement was not reached with the government of the Philippines, it would ask the OIC to raise the issue before the United Nations.


Serious clashes in September between the armed forces of the Philippines and the MNLF faction led by Nur Misuari led to the disruption and probably the paralysis of the peace talks, which have been inactive in recent quarters due to Nur Misuari's opposition to negotiations between the government and the MILF. The fifth session of the tripartite negotiations to review implementation of the 1996 peace agreement planned for 16 September was cancelled by the MNLF shortly prior to the beginning of its attack on the city of Zamboanga on 9 September. The

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's Peace Committee for Southern Philippines, which performs the tasks of facilitating the negotiating process and is currently chaired by Indonesia, told the parties that it is in talks to determine the date and place of the meeting that was postponed. However, the fact that a court issued a warrant to locate and capture Nur Misuari at the request of the government makes it likely that the talks will be interrupted for a while. In addition, Manila had already stated on several occasions that it intended to put an end to the process to review the 1996 peace agreement and to begin the phase to implement the different agreements that had been reached since the process began in 2007. According to the government, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's Peace Committee for Southern Philippines shared this assessment. In recent months, Nur Misuari had used this argument to accuse the government of wanting to end dialogue with the MNLF. In August, the tension between both parties had already increased significantly after Misuari announced his intention to declare the Bangsamoro Republic unilaterally. After the outbreak of violence in Zamboanga, the Philippine government urged the Indonesian government and the entire Peace Committee for Southern Philippines to submit proposals or lend their help in resolving the crisis, but according to Manila there was no response. Meanwhile, the Office of the Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process said that it had contacted the leaders of the different factions currently dividing the MNLF to urge them not to participate in the fighting in Zamboanga.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MILF announced its intention to keep the MILF as an Islamic organisation, but also to form a political party during 2013 in order to compete in the 2016 elections.</li> <li>• The third of four outstanding annexes to reach a comprehensive peace agreement was signed with the MILF in Mindanao.</li> <li>• The NDF announced its intention to pursue its armed struggle until Benigno Aquino's term ends and the political conditions for a new dialogue process change.</li> <li>• Neither official negotiations with the NDF nor the "special track" were successful.</li> <li>• Regarding the MNLF, Manila stated on several occasions that it intended to put an end to the process to review the 1996 peace agreement and to begin the phase to implement the different agreements that had been reached since the process began in 2007.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx">www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx</a>)</li> <li>• Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (<a href="http://www.hdcentre.org">www.hdcentre.org</a>)</li> <li>• MILF (<a href="http://www.luwaran.com">www.luwaran.com</a>)</li> <li>• NDF (<a href="http://home.wanadoo.nk/ndf">home.wanadoo.nk/ndf</a>) (<a href="http://www.ndf.net/joomla">www.ndf.net/joomla</a>) (<a href="http://home.casema.nl/ndf">home.casema.nl/ndf</a>)</li> <li>• NPA (<a href="http://www.philippinerevolution.org">www.philippinerevolution.org</a>)</li> <li>• OIC (<a href="http://www.oic-oci.org">www.oic-oci.org</a>)</li> <li>• Presidential Office for the Peace Process (<a href="http://www.opapp.gov.ph">www.opapp.gov.ph</a>)</li> <li>• <a href="http://www.mindanao.news">www.mindanao.news</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.philnews.com">www.philnews.com</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.theworldpress.com/press/philippinespress.htm">www.theworldpress.com/press/philippinespress.htm</a></li> </ul>

## Main parties involved in the process



## Thailand (South)

### Context of the conflict

The insurgency in southern Thailand is centred in the regions of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. The region of Pattani (or Patani in Malay), which borders on Malaysia, is populated by Muslims (Islam reached the region in the 15th century), while Buddhists are the majority in the rest of Thailand. The Kingdom of Siam exercised sovereignty over this region since the 16th century, until the British colonial administration forced the king of Siam to transfer the sovereignty of his land to the United Kingdom in 1909, with the exception of Pattani, which remained under Siamese dominion. During the 20th century, the region was progressively Thailandised, although it has conserved its different religion (Islam) and its own language (Yawi). In 1939, Siam changed its name to Thailand. The region of Pattani is one of the poorest in the country. Even though at least 80% of the population is Muslim, 90% of the public administration positions, including the police and the army, are held by Buddhists.

**Population:** Thailand (67 million), South (2 million)

**Area:** Thailand (513,000 Km<sup>2</sup>); South (11,000 Km<sup>2</sup>)

**HDI** Thailand: 103 (out of 186)

**GDP Thailand:** 385,694 million dollars

**Per capita income in Thailand:** \$5,757

**Armed actors:** PULO, BRN, BIPP, Bersatu

**Facilitators:** Malaysia, Indonesia, OCI, Sweden

In 1968 the **Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)** was founded by Bira Kotanila, exiled in Syria and it has also been led by K. Abdul Rahman, the an armed faction named **PULA**, whose purpose was to achieve independence in the region of Pattani, offering continuity to the struggles of the ancient Malay sultanates occupied by Siam (currently Thailand). The PULO has its overseas office in Sweden. It embarked on an active period of guerrilla activities between 1976 and 1981, after which is entered into a long period of decline due to military repression, the amnesties granted by the Thai government and the hurdles placed by Malaysia for the PULO rearguard to act on its soil. In 1989, PULO and three other organisations (Barisan Revolusi Nasional (**BRN**), founded in 1960; the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (**BNPP**) and the Mujahideen Pattani (**GMIP**), founded in 1986), joined together in an umbrella organisation called **Bersatu** or the Council of the Muslim People of Patani. In 1995, the PULO suffered from dissidence, and the **New PULO** was created, which also joined Bersatu. In 2001, there was another outburst of activities by these separatist groups, with several massacres in the ensuing years, especially in 2004, resulting in a total of 3,000 deaths since then.

### Background to the peace process

The attempts to negotiate with insurgent groups in the south of the country have been thwarted several times by the anonymity of many of their leaders. In 2004, however, the government contacted **Wan A. Kadir Che Man**, one of the Bersatu leaders exiled in Malaysia, who had expressed his willingness to engage in negotiations with the government on some type of autonomy for the region. However, the attempt did not meet with much success due to Wan A. Kadir's inability to stop the ongoing violence. Later, several Bersatu leaders, such as its spokesperson, **K. Makhota**, expressed their interest in undertaking a negotiating process similar to the one that was taking place in Indonesia (Aceh) and the Philippines (Mindanao) to **reach either autonomy or the status of "special administrative region"** as held by the island of Phuket, also located in the south of Thailand.

In early 2005, the Thai government created the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), initially led by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. The goal of the NRC was to achieve peace in the south of the country. Mid-year, the NRC submitted a report in which it recommended introducing Islamic law in the region, accepting Yawi as a working language in the region, establishing a disarmed peacekeeping force and setting up a strategic administrative

centre for peace in the southern provinces. In mid-September, however, a faction of the Thai army perpetrated a **coup** that brought down the prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, when he was in New York. The coup leaders gathered together in the self-proclaimed Council for Political Reform and were legitimised by the king, Bhumidol Aduyadej. According to its authors, the non-violent coup was prompted by the need to put an end to the climate of government corruption and the social division that were being created amongst the Thai people. The goal of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Sonthi Boonyarataglin, was to embark on talks with the separatist rebel leaders in the south of the country. In October, he confirmed that representatives of several armed opposition groups operating in the south, including the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Bersatu, had got in touch with the armed forces with the intention of starting talks, which it agreed to. He also underscored the fact that these were talks, not negotiations, while also acknowledging the need for a political dialogue to put an end to the conflict. These declarations were issued after **the prime minister appointed by the military coup masterminds**, Surayud Chulanot, had set resolution to the conflict in the south of the country as one of his top priorities and had apologised for the excesses committed by the state. Before the coup, the current prime minister and the armed forces and the NRC had all publicly expressed their preference for a negotiated solution, in clear opposition to the posture of the deposed prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who had opted for a police strategy that triggered an escalation in the violence. However, by 16th September, the armed forces that had perpetrated the coup had already issued a truce "signal" via their Security Centre when holding a peace seminar in the central mosque of Yala (south). Likewise, the new government expressed its intention to reinstate the politicians who achieved stability in the region before the arrival of T. Shinawatra, and they also **reinstated the South Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC)**, a civilian body that had been dissolved by the previous government. One of the most prominent opposition groups, the PULO, was pleased by the recent changes.

Within this new context, and due to its heavy influence over the Pattani people, **Malaysia suggested that it intermediate in the conflict** under terms to be defined by Thailand. In October, it launched several messages along these lines, although many analysts pointed out that any future negotiations should be held in another country, such as Singapore. In any event, in mid-October the new Thai prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, visited Malaysia to study how the two countries could work together. **A PULO spokesperson stated that the preconditions for opening up negotiations were that they be facilitated by a third party**, that the delegation representing the insurgent movements was regarded as official by the Thai government, and that immunity must be ensured for the members of this delegation. The Thai media also reported that several informal meetings had already been held in several different European cities between members of the Thai government and the Muslims from the south. According to the Malaysian national news agency, these groups had agreed to withdraw their demands for independence in exchange for amnesty, economic development for the region and fostering the use of the Malay language in schools. However, and in spite of the political climate in the country, civilian murders and confirmations between the security forces and armed opposition groups continued. This could be due to the lack of authority over militants in Thailand by the leaders exiled to Malaysia who were prepared to negotiate, given that most of these belong to a previous generation. For this reason, the Perdana World Peace Organisation (PGPO), led by Mahathir Mohamad, believed that these historic leaders' return to Thailand might help defuse the situation in the region, although he also acknowledged that the peace process had to be gradual due to the fragmentation of the armed opposition groups. In November, the government also suggested granting a more prominent role to Islamic law in the region, while it simultaneously rejected any notion of independence. Nevertheless, the PULO, which agreed to participate in the peace process, issued a communiqué criticising the government's conciliatory policy and interpreting the steps it had taken as partial, while also claiming that its hidden agenda was to "Thailandise" the Malays. The PULO thus rejected any attempt at this kind of assimilation and expressly declared the model of peace process pursued with the communists in the 1980s as inapplicable to this case.



The government declared that it was examining the possibility of including certain elements of Sharia law into the three southern province with Muslim majorities as part of its conflict management strategy in the south of the country. Midway through April, the Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont, publicly declared his willingness to offer amnesty to the members of the secessionist armed groups operating in the south of the country. He also refused the military aid offered by the US government to manage the conflict as it was regarded as an internal matter that the government viewed itself as capable resolving, despite the fact that more than 2007 people had died and a much higher number had been injured since early 2000. In August, the Indonesian government declared that it had accepted the request from its Thai counterpart to cooperate in resolving the conflict affecting the southern provinces with a Malay-Muslim majority. This request had been officially submitted during a visit by the prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, to the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, although it had already been drafted months earlier by the King of Thailand. Indonesia, which had already initiated contacts with leaders in southern Thailand, stated that it would try to cooperate in finding a solution to the conflict that respects the territorial integrity of the country. It also stated that it might use the peace agreement reached in the province of Aceh signed in August 2005 as a model. Meanwhile, the Thai government held exploratory talks with the insurgency in Geneva and Stockholm. The head of international affairs of the PULO, Kasturi Mahkota, lives in Stockholm. In mid-October, a report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that the increasing use of paramilitary forces in the south of the country was weakening the efforts to counter the armed insurgency in this zone.

After the new government was formed, early in the year the Minister of the Interior declared that it was considering granting a certain degree of autonomy to the southern provinces with a Muslim majority, although he did not outline any specific measure. The minister also declared that the autonomous Chinese region of Xinjiang, which also has a Muslim majority, might serve as a model. However, the new Prime Minister, Samak Sundaravej, played down the intentions of his executive with regard to granting a certain degree of self-governance to the southern provinces. During the second quarter of the year, no major headway was made and clashes were heightened. In late July, three presumed leaders of the Thailand United Southern Underground (TUSU), an organisation that includes 11 armed secessionist groups, announced on several TV stations the start of a ceasefire in the south of the country, which would remain in place until 14th July. These individuals, who expressed their loyalty to the King and their desire for unity among the Muslim and Buddhist communities, also called on other armed groups to put an end to the violence. The former head of the armed forces, former Minister of Defence and current leader of one of the six parties in the government coalition, Chetta Tanajaro, declared that the ceasefire announcement was preceded by several months of informal talks with the leaders of the insurgency. These talks, in which no members of the government participated directly, would have benefited from the cooperation of Malaysia and several European governments, including Switzerland. Likewise, one of the main leaders of PULO, one of the longest standing armed opposition groups, declared that TUSU was created in an opportunistic way to divide the pro-independence movement and that the armed hostilities would continue in the southern provinces of Thailand. In late September, press agencies leaked the news that the government of Thailand had held a closed-door meeting in Indonesia with five Muslim representatives from the south of the country under the mediation of the Vice President of Indonesia, Yusuf Kalla. The meeting lasted two days and was held in the presidential palace in Bogor, and they agreed to hold a new meeting in November. The governmental delegation was led by General Khwanchart Klahan, and the Muslims by leaders of the Pattani Malay Consultative Congress (PMCC), which serves as an umbrella for several insurgent organisations. The Muslims' demands included the introduction of Islamic law and the Yawi language into the educational system and improvements in the local economy. However, the Thai government claimed that the meeting was a private initiative, despite the fact that the media claimed that it was official but that the government was not interested in making it public. Despite this, in late October the President of the Indonesian Parliament, Agung Laksono, expressed to a Thai delegation visiting Indonesia Jakarta's willingness to facilitate a second round of negotiations between representatives of the Thai government and representatives of the

insurgent organisations operating in the south of the country. Agung Laksono declared that the conflict in southern Thailand was an internal affair, but he offered Bangkok Indonesia's experience in handling identity conflict. In late November, the Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat resigned after the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the three parties in the government coalition and nullified 37 political posts from the People's Power Party, including Somchai Wongsawat himself, based on fraud in the last elections held in December 2007. In December, the Parliament elected and the King ratified the leader of the Democratic Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva, as new Prime Minister of the country, with 235 votes in favour and 198 against. Abhisit Vejjajiva is the country's fifth leader in the past five years.

Early in the year 2009, the armed forces declared that the insurgency was well organised and divided into five groups, including the BRN-Coordinate, **an umbrella organisation that coordinates the different insurgent activities**, and the RKK, the most active group of military cells, with between 3,000 and 3,500 members. The new government announced its intention to create a new administrative structure to handle the main problems in the south of the country. Several sectors of civil society from different political sensibilities would take part in this organisation. The Vice Prime Minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, will coordinate the set-up of the organisation, which is regarded as a top priority on the agenda of the new executive. However, during the entire first quarter there were clashes in the region that led to numerous victims. Early in April, on the occasion of the ASEAN summit, the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Malaysia met to address cooperation on insurgency affairs. The new leader of Malaysia, Najib Razak, declared that he empathised with the Thai government's approach and pledged to pay greater attention to the actions by the insurgency in southern Thailand. The government created the Council of Ministers on the Development of the Five Southern Border Provinces Special Zone, an organisation whose purpose is to coordinate and implement the government's new strategy to manage the conflict in the south of the country. According to the government, this strategy would place a greater emphasis on development, human rights and respect for the unique religion and culture of the region. Also worth noting is that in early May, the ambassadors of 14 European countries, along with the Thai Foreign Minister, visited the south of the country to learn firsthand about the political situation and the government's efforts to manage the conflict. The Foreign Minister also announced that similar visits would take place shortly by ambassadors from Muslim countries, from America and from Africa. He also stated that representatives from Bahrain would soon visit the region to analyse the possibilities of investing in the food sector. In late May, the Vice Prime Minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, declared that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 insurgents active in southern Thailand and that the solution to the conflict could not solely entail military and police repression; rather what was required is a rise in development and quality of life in the southern provinces. From 2004 until May 2009, more than 8,900 incidents of violence had been recorded, in which 3,471 people had died and 5,470 had been injured. In turn, the head of the armed forces refused to start talks with the armed groups and stated that **the government's approach to handling the conflict consisted of promoting economic, social, cultural and educational development in the region**. After serious clashes in recent months, a visit by representatives from the United Nations and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to learn firsthand about the situation in the south of the country led the government to deny both organisations permission to help resolve the conflict, as the local media had claimed. In late October, the Thai Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, cautiously supported the suggestion made by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, to grant the southern Thai provinces a degree of autonomy as part of a strategy to put an end to the escalation in violence in the region. The attacks and violent acts continued in the meantime. Likewise, **the vice president of the armed opposition group PULO, Kasturi Mahkota**, expressed his support for a dialogue with the government on some kind of autonomy for the southern part of the country with the mediation of a third party (which might be Malaysia, according to several sources).

## The peace process in 2013

The most prominent event in the peace process throughout the year was the government's dealings with the armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). In March, **the government of Thailand and the BRN began exploratory peace talks facilitated by the government of Malaysia.** According to a joint statement, both parties agreed to the terms of reference for the dialogue, exchanged information and laid the foundation for generating enough mutual trust to reduce levels of violence and resolve the conflict affecting the southern part of the country. The government delegation was led by the Secretary General of the Thai National Security Council, Paradorn Pattanatabut, while the insurgent delegation was headed by Ustaz Hassan Taib. According to some sources, the BRN would have raised the creation of troops in the south, an amnesty for the insurgents and the creation of a special administrative zone for the southern part of the country, but the government wanted the talks to focus on reducing violence.

The second round of peace negotiations was held in late April. The day before it began in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), the BRN released a video with five demands to the Thai government, including the designation of the Malaysian government as a mediator (and not as a facilitator), the attendance of members of ASEAN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at the talks as observers, the release of all detained insurgents with charges against them dropped and recognition of the group as a national liberation movement. The video also mentioned the insurgency's continued struggle to overthrow colonial domination and oppression, as well as its desire to obtain an independent state for the Pattani nation. Some analysts believed that the BRN's demands were impossible for the government to meet and may be considered a strategy to put an end to negotiations, while others thought that the maximalist demands formed part of the BRN's negotiation strategy. The government did not comment specifically on the video, though on previous occasions it had rejected independence for the southern part of the country and the release of prisoners. Meanwhile, much of the opposition stated that the conditions were unacceptable and even less so if the BRN would not renounce violence. Bangkok gave the BRN a month to demonstrate that it represented and controlled the insurgent movement by lowering the number of attacks. In April, the government stated its belief that more insurgent groups wanted to join the peace talks. Moreover, the Indonesian government ruled out involvement in the peace process after participating timidly in the past as some voices had requested.

After the conclusion of the third round of negotiations on 14 June, the BRN, publicly issued its demands to the government in exchange for enacting a cessation of hostilities during Ramadan, which began on 10 July. The demand with greatest political and media impact was for the Thai Armed Forces to withdraw to their military bases. Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung clearly ruled out this possibility, arguing that the BRN could control the activity of its members on the ground and that the state had to guarantee security in the southern part of the country. Meanwhile, Paradorn Pattanatabut said that he hoped to receive the BRN's proposals officially through Malaysian mediation before making any public statement on their content. However, he declared that the Thai government must respond to the demands of the population of southern Thailand, and not only to those of one group in particular. Rebel representative Hassan Taib called for patience and warned that it could take years for the violent insurgency to end, and that negotiations were the government's only path to guaranteeing peace.

Even though no round of formal talks was held during the third quarter between the government and the armed opposition group BRN, both parties maintained constant contact and even agreed to reduce violence during the month of Ramadan. In mid-July, after intense pressure from the government of Malaysia and the call of more than 640 imams from the southern part of the country for the parties to make progress in the peace process, the facilitator of the talks announced that both parties has reached an agreement (later known as the Ramadan Peace Initiative) to lower levels of violence in the south of the country for 40 days, including Ramadan, which was celebrated from 10 July to 18 August. Although the agreement was not binding, both parties considered the initiative an opportunity to demonstrate their degree of sincerity and

commitment to the dialogue process. According to the agreement, the BRN was committed to reducing the use of attacks with explosive devices and the number of attacks against the civilian population. In turn, the government pledged to reduce the intensity of its counterinsurgency operations, replace its soldiers with police officers in certain regions and bring certain prisoners closer to their places of origin. It must be pointed out that in early July, two of the members of the government most sceptical about the peace talks, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, left their posts after a government shakeup in which Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra became the Minister of Defence. Also in July, the government of Indonesia demonstrated its willingness to participate in the peace process if requested by the government of Thailand. In this context, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that its possible role would not necessarily include participating in the peace talks, but sharing its experience in resolving conflicts in Indonesia, such as Aceh. Meanwhile, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also expressed its full support for the ongoing negotiations, though without referring to one of the demands publicly raised by the BRN: the OIC's participation as an observer in the peace negotiations.


In early August, the BRN released a video that announced it was suspending its participation in the peace negotiations because it thought that the government was not paying attention to any of its demands. This statement coincided with an increase in levels of violence in the days prior. In light of this announcement, the Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed his commitment to the negotiating process and ensured that the government would not abandon the path of dialogue. Following the period when both parties had promised to reduce the violence, the Internal Security Operations Command announced that the number of fatalities during Ramadan was the lowest since 2007. In early September, the BRN sent the government its demands through the Malaysian facilitator, which included releasing all the alleged insurgents in detention, recognising that the BRN represents the rights of the Melayu Pattani people, accepting the government of Malaysia as the facilitator of the dialogue, including members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, ASEAN or some NGOs as observers and granting the Melayu Pattani people rights to the land of Pattani. During a new round of talks in mid-September, the government announced that various government organisations would study the main demands raised by the BRN formally and in writing, demanded that the group not make their content or details of the peace talks public and urged them to demonstrate that they have a certain degree of control over the levels of violence in the south of the country. In this regard, the organisation Deep South Watch was optimistic about the future of the dialogue process because the death toll associated with the armed conflict was the lowest since it began in 2004, because the proportion of civilian fatalities had decreased since the talks started and because, according to a survey conducted in June, more than half the population in the southern part of the country supported the current peace talks between the government and the BRN.

The government announced its intention to resume dialogue with the armed opposition group **BRN in November, after postponing peace talks indefinitely in mid-October.** At the time, the government stated that the reason for this decision was the BRN leadership's apparent lack of control over factions of the group allegedly responsible for the many acts of violence that took place in the south of the country. However, on 30 October the government acknowledged its fear that BRN would use the commemoration of the ninth anniversary of the Tak Bai incident (in which more than 80 people died in military custody) to enforce its demands. In the last (third) round of negotiations, the BRN formalised its five demands in writing, which it had already made public through a video. Meanwhile, Bangkok pledged to study the demands. In October, it also emerged that two other armed opposition groups, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and the Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani (BIPP), expressed their willingness to join the peace talks, which may have even led to various meetings between the government and the **PULO leadership in Sweden**, where many of the group's leaders have been living in exile. In early October, the BRN informed Malaysia, acting as a facilitator, of a change in its representatives for the peace negotiations, although neither details nor reasons were given.

In early December, the government dissolved Parliament in response to the general protests rocking the country, which called for the Prime Minister to resign.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The government of Thailand and the armed opposition group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) began exploratory peace talks facilitated by the government of Malaysia.</li> <li>• The BRN released a video that announced it was suspending its participation in the peace negotiations because it thought that the government was not paying attention to any of its demands. However, at the end of the year, the government expressed its willingness to resume negotiations.</li> <li>• Confidential meetings took place with the PULO in Sweden.</li> </ul>
Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx">www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx</a>)</li> <li>• Asia Times (<a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia.html">www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia.html</a>)</li> <li>• Global Times (<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx">www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx</a>)</li> <li>• International Crisis Group (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• National Reconciliation Commission (<a href="http://www.ncr.or.th">www.ncr.or.th</a>)</li> <li>• Pataninews (<a href="http://www.pataninews.net/english.asp">www.pataninews.net/english.asp</a>)</li> <li>• Perdana Leadership Foundation (<a href="http://www.perdana.org.my">www.perdana.org.my</a>)</li> <li>• PULO (<a href="http://puloinfo.net">puloinfo.net</a>)</li> <li>• The Diplomat (<a href="http://thediplomat.com">thediplomat.com</a>)</li> <li>• The Nation (<a href="http://www.nationmultimedia.com">www.nationmultimedia.com</a>)</li> </ul>

#### Main parties involved in the process



## EUROPE

### a) South Eastern Europe

## CYPRUS

### Summary of the conflict

Colonised by many different cultures throughout its history, the island of Cyprus (9,250 sq. km - not much larger than the Spanish Basque Country) came under British administrative authority in 1878. The first revolts in favour of union with Greece took place in 1931, and in the 1950s they were led by archbishop Makarios. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 with Makarios as president (a post he held until 1973, three years before his death) and a constitution that strove to balance the interests of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island. Enforcement of the constitution however encountered several setbacks, leading to a series of institutional crises, especially at the end of 1963, which culminated in a meeting of the UN Security Council in the wake of Greece's complaints about Turkey's aggression. As a result, in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up, with 2,400 troops at first and 930 currently. This force is entrusted with performing the functions of good offices and creating trust-building measures. From the start, these forces laid down 180 km long ceasefire lines spanning the island, as well as a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the clashing forces. This zone has been the site for meetings between the two communities as well as monthly meetings by representatives of political parties organised by the Slovakian embassy.

<b>Population:</b> 1,1 million inhabitants
<b>Area:</b> 9,250 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HID:</b> 31 of 186
<b>GDP:</b> 22,768 million dollars
<b>Income per inhabitant:</b> \$20,700
<b>Facilitators:</b> UN

In July 1974 a coup d'état was staged by Greek-Cypriots and Greeks in favour of union with Greece, which was followed by occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. Since then the island has remained divided into two homogeneous communities. In August 1974 a ceasefire came into effect. Throughout almost all these years, Turkey has kept a contingent of 30,000 soldiers in the occupied zone on the island. In addition, the United Kingdom keeps two military bases under British sovereignty on the island. In 2004 Cyprus (as an island) became a member of the European Union, although enforcement of the bulk of EU laws was suspended for the northern part of the island.

### Background to the peace process

The Cypriots have been negotiating an agreement that would allow them to resolve the division of the island for over 35 years, and this has come largely in the hands of different UN secretary generals. Between 1977 and 1979, both communities discussed bicomunal, bizonal and federal formulas without any of them actually coming to fruition. In the 1990s, federal and confederal approaches were once again discussed, although no agreement was ever reached on each community's proportion in their participation in the institutions. In view of the stalemate, in 1992 the new secretary of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, presented yet another plan based once again on the principles of creating a bizonal, bicomunal territory, which yet again irritated the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. In consequence, Boutros-Ghali decided to change tack and began to promote a milder strategy based on trust-building measures, which included a reduction of troops, a decrease in restrictions for people to communicate with each other and similar measures. In November and December 2001, new direct talks were held after a four-year hiatus under the auspices of the UN. In November, the UN Secretary General proposed that a

confederal state be created, made up of two cantons and a shared government. This would definitively become the UN Peace Plan, which has been revised on three occasions, the latest version being the one from February 2003. The plan was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leader, but it was supported by the Turkish leader Erdogan.

In July 2006, after holding a meeting sponsored by the UN's Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders agreed to start a process of technical negotiations on the issues that were affecting the daily lives of the citizens of both communities, and to simultaneously address substantive issues in order to reach a comprehensive agreement for the future of the island. They also agreed to a list of principles, including the commitment to unify Cyprus based on a bizonal and bicomunal federation, as well as political equality, as recommended in the UN Security Council resolutions. In mid-August 2009, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader concluded the first phase of direct negotiations to resolve the conflict on the island. The direct talks, which began on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of September 2008, included discussions on six chapters: governability and power-sharing; issues linked to the EU; security and guarantees; territory; property and economic affairs; and the writing up of the matters agreed to and in dispute. In mid-September, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader started the second phase in the direct talks to resolve the conflict on the island, with a new meeting under UN mediation. The leaders of the two communities met for the first time since the trilateral encounter with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in late January 2011. At this meeting, the leaders address issues regarding the EU and economic matters. At the next meeting, they were scheduled to discuss governability and power-sharing, as well as the EU and property. The UN Secretary General stated in July that the leaders of the two communities on the island had accepted his proposal to strengthen the UN's role in the peace talks.

In April 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon informed the leaders of both communities of Cyprus that not enough progress had been made in the negotiating process to be able to organise the desired international conference on the reunification of the island. His views were shared by his Special Advisor to Cyprus, Alexander Downer, who said that talks had stalled with regard to the sharing of executive power under the federal framework, as well as the issue of private property lost during the conflict. In the third quarter, direct peace talks were paralysed pending the Greek Cypriot elections of 2013, although dialogue between the parties was kept alive through meetings held by their technical committees.

### The peace process in 2013

Throughout the year, no significant progress was made in attempts to resolve the conflict. The Greek Cypriot elections in February and the severe economic crisis affecting Cyprus slowed the negotiating process on the island even more. Previously, the Greek Cypriot government had accused the Turkish Cypriot government and Turkey of using the Cypriot presidency of the EU as an excuse to temporarily interrupt the peace process. The candidate of the conservative Democratic Rally, Nicos Anastasiades, won the presidential election with 57% of the vote in the second round. After his first meeting with him, **the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor to Cyprus, Alexander Downer, said that the new government's top priority was to resolve the financial crisis.** Downer stressed Anastasiades' commitment to resolve the conflict, but said nothing about any possible timetable for negotiations to be held on the dispute in the island. Nevertheless, he added that **the UN would work to prepare for the resumption of the peace process and discussions would be held with various stakeholders involved, including Turkey and the UN Security Council.** Downer also sat down with Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu in a meeting considered productive. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Minister said that his government would be willing to discuss a two-state solution if the negotiating process aimed at reunification fails and if there is no agreement to create a joint committee on how the island's energy resources are used.

After months of stalemate, some foundations for resuming talks began to be laid in the second quarter. **Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, met at a dinner organised by UN Special Envoy to Cyprus Alexander Downer on 30 May.** It was the first meeting between the two leaders since Eroğlu was elected in February, but both men denied that it was a political meeting or a step towards restarting the negotiating process. Anastasiades had previously told the United Nations that the event would be purely social in nature. Later, in June, Turkish Cypriot President Derviş Eroğlu affirmed that he was hoping to resume talks in October. Likewise, the Greek Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Kasoulides, said that the process would not be relaunched before the autumn of 2013. Meanwhile, on top of the difficult economic situation in Greece, which has contributed to the slowdown of the process in recent months, the internal political crisis in Turkish Cyprus resulted in the departure of the government after a motion of no confidence was passed in early June with the approval of both opposition voters and the ruling UBP party. These political disagreements also coincided with growing social dissatisfaction with the government. Turkey also urged the Turkish Cypriot government to enact political and economic reforms. Previously, in May, the government and the opposition had approved holding early elections in late July, thereby moving up the scheduled date planned for April 2014. After the motion passed, an interim government was approved until the early elections on 28 July.


Discussions on preparations for resuming negotiations to resolve the conflict in Cyprus continued during the third quarter. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades in late September, coinciding with the UN General Assembly. At the meeting, they covered issues related to the progress achieved to prepare the ground for restarting the talks. Ban Ki-moon praised Anastasiades for his role in managing the economic and financial crisis on the island. Meanwhile, in mid-July Turkish Cypriot President Derviş Eroğlu said that the talks that could be relaunched in October were the last chance to reach a solution.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Throughout the year, no significant progress was made in attempts to resolve the conflict.</li> <li>Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, met at a dinner organised by UN Special Envoy to Cyprus. Anastasiades held very tense relations with Downer and asked him to resign.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cyprus Mail (<a href="http://Cyprus-mail.com">Cyprus-mail.com</a>)</li> <li>FES Cyprus Newsletter (<a href="http://www.fescyprus.org/media/newsletter">www.fescyprus.org/media/newsletter</a>)</li> <li>UN Security Council (<a href="http://www.un.org">www.un.org</a>)</li> <li>Interpeace (<a href="http://www.interpeace.org">www.interpeace.org</a>)</li> <li>ONU (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc</a>)</li> <li>PILPG (<a href="http://www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html">www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html</a>)</li> <li>UN peace plan (<a href="http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org">www.cyprus-un-plan.org</a>)</li> <li>UNFICYP (<a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyyp">www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyyp</a>)</li> <li><a href="http://www.cyprus-conflict.net">www.cyprus-conflict.net</a></li> </ul>



## Main parties involved in the process



# KOSOVO

## Summary of the conflict

A former Ottoman possession, from the 14<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Kosovo was re-conquered by the Serbs in 1913 as it regarded this land as the cradle of the Serbian nation. The Serbs colonised the region for several years, while the Kosovar elite emigrated to Turkey. In 1945, Tito founded the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which was made up of six republics, one of them Serbia, which in turn had two

autonomous provinces, one of which was Kosovo (or Kosove in Albanian). Kosovo was mainly populated by Albanian Muslims. Two-thirds of the Albanian people living in the former Yugoslavia reside in Kosovo, a small territory measuring 10,900 km<sup>2</sup> that has higher unemployment rates and is considerably more economically backward than the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1966 the local population withstood systematic political repression, until in 1968 Tito allowed an autonomous university in the Albanian language to be created in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. This measure was followed by other decisions that expanded the rights of the Albanian population. In 1981 there were serious clashes between the Albanian and Serbian communities, which were the harbingers of the harsh conflict that was to emerge years later. In 1990, as a reaction to the surge of nationalism in several Yugoslav republics, Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomous status, dissolved the parliament and the Albanian government, and undertook a process of repression in the region. This only served to further spur several republics to distance themselves from Serbia, which in turn gave rise to a series of armed conflicts starting in 1991, first with Slovenia, and later with Croatia and Bosnia. These conflicts came to an end with the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, after numerous resolutions by the UN Security Council and military intervention by NATO.

**Population:** 1.8 million

**Area:** 10,900 km<sup>2</sup>

**GDP:** 6.499 million dollars

**Per capita income:** \$3,480

**Deaths due to the conflict:** 13,400

**Armed actors:** none currently

**Facilitators:** UN (UNMIK, SGSE), OSCE, NATO (KFOR), Troika (USA, Russia, EU), EULEX

In 1991 the clandestine authorities of Kosovo organised a referendum, and virtually the entire population voted in favour of sovereignty. The following year, clandestine elections were held in which Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was proclaimed President of Kosovo. Thus began a non-violent strategy of confrontation with Serbia and the creation of parallel structures. Serbia's reaction was to militarise the region by sending 20,000 soldiers and police officers there, in addition to the ultra-nationalistic paramilitary forces that inspired terror among the Albanian populace. In 1997, shortly after the 1995 Dayton Agreements, which did not mention Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) emerged, with broad support from the Albanian Diaspora (around 400,000 people) living in Switzerland, Germany and the United States, and with rearguard bases in northern Albania. The goal of the UCK was to achieve independence for Kosovo. In 1998, when the UCK controlled around 40% of Kosovar territory, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic launched a major military operation in Kosovo in which over 1,500 people died and many people were forced to become refugees (around 800,000) and were displaced from their homes (500,000). This Serbian operation was followed by a NATO military action that led to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops, Albanian attacks on Serb civilians, and the deployment of NATO troops.

In 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved a proclamation of independence for the hitherto Serbian province. In August 2010, the International Court of Justice, the UN's legal body, issued a non-binding ruling that the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

## Background to the peace process

In 2006, several rounds of negotiations were started between the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo to debate the status of the latter province. The Serbian Parliament unanimously approved a new constitution which claimed its sovereignty over Kosovo, reaffirming Serbia's position against the option of independence as a solution to Kosovo's status. In the early days of January 2007, the United Nations Special Envoy for the process on the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, submitted his proposal on the ultimate status to the countries in the Contact Group before it was forwarded to the Security Council to be discussed in April. The plan, which was regarded as independence under international supervision, stated that Kosovo would have its own constitution and state symbols (flag and anthem) as well as its own army, but only with light weapons, and the ability to sign international agreements. Martti Ahtisaari's proposal was initially rejected by Serbia and supported by Kosovo and the EU.

In mid-February 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved the proclamation of independence of what until then had been a province of Serbia. In early April, the Kosovo Parliament approved the new constitution which stipulated that Kosovo was a parliamentary, secular and democratic republic and that it considered Kosovo a sovereign, indivisible state. In a non-binding opinion, the International Court of Justice, the UN's legal body, declared in August 2010 that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244. With this ruling, approved by ten votes in favour and four against, the court responded to the question submitted by the General Assembly at the behest of Serbia. However, the text did not weigh in on whether or not Kosovo had the right to secede. In March 2011, negotiations got underway between Kosovo and Serbia under the aegis of the EU to address, at least in the first phase, issues that were affecting the daily lives of the people. The dialogue was expected to focus on three areas: the rule of law, freedom of movement and regional cooperation. Ever since the negotiation process had gotten underway, Serbia and Kosovo had reached agreements on trade, freedom of movement, property registration and mutual recognition of university degrees.

In February 2012, **Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement related to Kosovo's representation in regional forums.** According to the agreement, Kosovo will participate in the forums under the name of "Kosovo" and with a footnote in the documents referring to UN Resolution 1244 as well as the non-binding ruling of the International Court of Justice. Alongside these developments, both parties also agreed on a technical protocol for **implementing the pact on Integrated Border Management (IBM).** In May, Serbia and Kosovo reached an **agreement related to holding Serbian legislative and presidential elections in Kosovo.** Meanwhile, the Pristina government said it was ready to address the past and reconcile with Serbia, but urged Serbia to apologise for the crimes committed before and during the Kosovo War. **The Kosovar government authorised the creation of a national working group that will deal with the subject of transitional justice and reconciliation.** According to the government, the body will be formed by all stakeholders involved, including the families of missing persons, war veterans and political prisoner associations. In the third quarter, both parties accused each other of not fulfilling the agreements reached as part of the talks still mediated by the EU since March 2011, which then resulted in formal agreements on freedom of movement, the mutual recognition of university degrees, representation in regional forums and border management. Despite the mutual accusations of breaching the agreements, at the UN General Assembly both parties pledged to continue with the technical dialogue mediated by the EU and aimed at normalising relations between both territories. In December, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement to begin to implement the pact on Integrated Border Management that was signed in 2011. Meanwhile, Serbia and Kosovo also reached an agreement for goods aimed for the Serb-majority northern part of Kosovo to enter Kosovo duty-free.

## The peace process in 2013

Talks between Serbia and Kosovo made progress in the first few months of the year with new rounds of negotiations that helped to improve diplomatic relations between both parties and to achieve a new agreement, even though disagreements arose regarding the interpretation and implementation of the pacts reached, in addition to the topics of discussion. In the fourth round of the negotiating process, in January, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached a tentative agreement on collecting customs duties that would go to the development of northern Kosovo. However, there were disagreements over the new pact's terms. Thus, the government of Kosovo later declared that it would establish a special fund within its general budget aimed at northern Kosovo. Serbia denounced that it had not been agreed that the money would stop in the Pristina government. According to European sources, the duties collected would go to a fund under the auspices of the EU, with no agreement yet on other technical details. Meanwhile, in January the Serbian Parliament passed a resolution that reaffirmed the non-recognition of the independence of Kosovo but authorised implementation of the agreements made, stated that the aim of dialogue was to protect the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo and enjoined new agreements as part of the dialogue process and in line with the resolution, such as obtaining a broader accord with Pristina, while also showing a openness to further concessions. This parliamentary resolution was based on a political platform that the government had adopted days before, in January, which called for a greater level of territorial and political autonomy for the Serbian municipalities of Kosovo. However, the resolution made no explicit demands for autonomy. Still, Serbian representatives of northern Kosovo gave their support to it. The resolution was part of the Serbian government's position of greater willingness to engage in dialogue with Kosovo and the need to achieve a broad agreement to resolve the conflict.

Another step towards improving relations was the meeting that took place in early February between Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic and Kosovar President Atifete Jahjaga, the first such meeting since Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Both sides described the meeting as positive and pledged to continue with the dialogue process. It was followed by the fifth round of dialogue at the end of the month, between the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, in which the parties agreed to work to overcome the parallel institutions in the Serb areas of Kosovo and to move towards establishing an association of Serb-majority municipalities, even though the parties disagreed over the interpretation of their agreement. Hopes about the possibility of an agreement soared in March, when there were two new rounds, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the month. Thus, they achieved substantial progress in the talks, but did not reach an agreement in the round in early April, in which the deputy ministers also participated. According to EU Foreign Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton, the gap between Belgrade and Pristina was not wide, but deep. No new formal meetings were planned, but rather a few days of reflection for both parties to give room to reach an agreement.

In the second quarter, developments in talks continued, culminating in the achievement of a key pact to normalise relations in April, including a solution for the situation of the Serbian areas of Kosovo. The 15-point pact recognised Pristina's authority over the territory of Kosovo and planned to decentralise power in the Serbian areas, dismantle parallel political and legal structures, create the post of police commander for these areas (which would be someone from the Serbian community, proposed by the decentralised authorities and appointed by Pristina) and establish a permanent division of the Court of Appeals in northern Kosovo, which would be composed of a majority of Serbian judges, in addition to other aspects. The pact was ratified by the parliaments of both Serbia and Kosovo, despite protests from some Serbian and Albanian groups in Kosovo.

This pact was followed by an agreement in late May on the plan to implement it. A tentative agreement was reached on 22 May, but was subject to consultations with political parties for final approval. Finally, the definitive agreement was reached in extremis. The May agreement laid out the road map to follow to normalise relations and covered five areas: legislative changes,

the association of Serbian municipalities, police, courts and elections. According to the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, a working group with representatives from both parties was created during the early stage to think about the possible changes needed in current legislation. Thaci said the second part of the implementation plan referred to the creation of a community of Serbian municipalities. Some sources pointed out that Serbia was committed to begin dismantling the security structures under its control in the Serbian areas of Kosovo in mid-June, and this could be completed by mid-July. Meanwhile, in late October, a decentralisation mechanism for Serbian-majority municipalities would be implemented to group them under an association of municipalities. This progress in the talks came shortly before the EU summit in late June, when it would be decided whether or not to initiate negotiations with Serbia and Kosovo for possibly integrating into and joining the EU, respectively. According to Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic, after the implementation agreement, talks between Serbia and Kosovo would continue on issues such as the property of internally displaced people and refugees, Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo and the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo.

Progress was made in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in the third quarter with the implementation of measures that formed part of the agreement reached by the parties in April to normalise relations. Thus, Serbia dismantled the local authorities of four Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo: Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok. These authorities operated outside the government of Kosovo, with political and financial support from Serbia. Police stations and courts were also dismantled. In turn, after various previous disputes, Serbia and Kosovo also approved of **solutions to different disagreements on holding local elections in Kosovo on 3 November**, which would be the first to take place under Kosovo's control in the Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. Thus, **the ballots would not bear symbols of Kosovo**. Furthermore, Serb politicians would be allowed to visit Kosovo during the electoral campaign if they formalised the request according to institutional procedures. In mid-July, the Parliament of Kosovo approved the draft amnesty bill on the second vote. The bill had been promoted by the government and urged by the EU as part of the talks to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The new law contained a clause stating that crimes that resulted in physical harm or murder were ineligible for amnesty. EU Foreign Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton urged Kosovo to approve the amnesty law.

In contrast, the round of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in late August reached no final agreement on telecommunications and energy and it was stated that no new related consultation was needed. There was also no agreement on ballots in this round, an issue that was resolved by the central electoral committee's decision later to print them without symbols. In other news, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hajredin Kuci, said that **the government of Kosovo was preparing a strategy to assume the responsibilities of the EU's mission (EULEX) once its mandate ended in June 2014**. According to Kuci, Kosovo had sufficient capacity to govern itself and ensure the rule of law and stability. The head of the EULEX, Bernd Bochar, made no decision on which scenario to follow after the mission's mandate ends. In October, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaci met in Brussels (Belgium) at what was considered a historic encounter facilitated by the EU, with EU Foreign Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton attending.


At the 19<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations facilitated by the EU and held in Brussels, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim Thaci reached an **agreement on the basic aspects of the police in the Serb-majority areas of Kosovo**. Both parties agreed that a person of Serb origin would lead the police force in the northern part of Kosovo. Furthermore, Serb Kosovar and Albanian Kosovar agents would make up the force proportionally. However, the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo **did not reach an agreement in the following round, on 13 December, on the judiciary in northern Kosovo**. Dacic blamed the failure on the Kosovar government's "unacceptable" demand that the jurisdiction of the court of Mitrovica include Albanian towns. According to Dacic, this would mean the assimilation of four Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo. Even so, the parties promised to continue talking in January. Moreover, despite the lack of agreement on the judiciary, the heads of state and government of the EU

approved a European summit in mid-December to start negotiations with Serbia regarding its entry into the EU. The negotiations began in January 2014. The negotiating framework with the EU establishes that at the end of the process, Belgrade and Pristina will sign a legally binding agreement to normalise their relations.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A pact signed in May laid out the road map to follow to normalise relations and covered five areas: legislative changes, the association of Serbian municipalities, police, courts and elections.</li> <li>• At the end of the year an agreement was reached on the basic aspects of the police in the Serb-majority areas of Kosovo.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Courrier des Balkans (<a href="http://www.balkans.eu.org">www.balkans.eu.org</a>)</li> <li>• EULEX (<a href="http://www.eulaex-kosovo.eu">www.eulaex-kosovo.eu</a>)</li> <li>• Government of Kosovo (<a href="http://www.ks-gov.net">www.ks-gov.net</a>)</li> <li>• Government of Serbia (<a href="http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu">www.serbia.sr.gov.yu</a>)</li> <li>• KFOR (<a href="http://www.nato.int/kfor">www.nato.int/kfor</a>)</li> <li>• UN (<a href="http://www.un.org">www.un.org</a>)</li> <li>• OSCE (<a href="http://www.osce.org/kosovo">www.osce.org/kosovo</a>)</li> <li>• PILPG (<a href="http://www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html">www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html</a>)</li> <li>• UNMIK (<a href="http://www.unmikonline.org">www.unmikonline.org</a>)</li> <li>• UNOSEK (<a href="http://www.unosek.org">www.unosek.org</a>)</li> <li>• Wikipedia (Kosovo)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



## MOLDOVA (Transnistria<sup>4</sup>)

### Summary of the conflict

Although internationally the region of Transnistria is considered to be part of the Republic of Moldova (an independent country since the beginning of 1992), most of its inhabitants (predominantly Slavs) have considered themselves to be independent from the Republic since September 1990, when the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of Transnistria declared its independence and established its capital in Tiraspol, with its own currency, constitution, parliament, flag and media. Most of the population is declared Christian. Several studies indicate that there are high levels of corruption, censorship and organised crime in the region.

**Population:** 537,000-700,000 inhabitants, over 3.5 million in Moldova  
**Area:** 4,163 km<sup>2</sup>  
**GDP Moldova:** 7,253 million dollars  
**Per capita income Moldova** \$2,072  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 1,000-1,500  
**Facilitators:** OSCE

Situated between the Dniester and Nistre rivers, this region was under the control of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when it was handed over to Imperial Russia. After the Russian Revolution at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the region became autonomous under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although during World War II it was annexed by Romania. Later its inhabitants were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan for having collaborated with the German army and its Russian allies. Later, as a result of the Paris Peace Treaties, it was made part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. Since 1956, the 14<sup>th</sup> Soviet army has remained in the area to control the enormous military arsenals deployed there, this being one of the reasons for the conflict in Moldova.

The conflict broke out as a result of the August 1989 proclamation declaring Moldovan (written in the Roman alphabet) to be the official language of the country (compared with the Cyrillic alphabet used by a large part of the population in Transnistria), and negotiations began for reunification with Romania (before the fall of Ceaucescu in December). This move was rejected by the people of Transnistria, who proclaimed independence the following year, creating paramilitary corps for its defence (the "workers' detachments" which would later become the Republican Guard). The war, which did not last long, began in early 1992 and resulted in some 1,500 dead and 100,000 refugees. Shortly afterwards, in July, a ceasefire agreement was signed, the presence of the Soviet army in the area was made official and a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up to supervise the ceasefire in the Security Zone, as well as the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF), made up of delegations from Russia, Moldova and Transnistria. Since 1994, the OSCE Mission in Moldova has formed part of the JCC as an observer. In December 2006, there was a referendum which overwhelmingly ratified the independence of Transnistria, which aspired to join Russia (the majority of the population speaks Russian) and which had been blocked by the Republic of Moldova since the beginning of the armed conflict. The region, which represents only between 12% and 15% of Moldova, nevertheless produces 35% of the GDP, holds the greatest industrial wealth of Moldova (40%) and produces 90% of the electricity. This has caused significant economic tensions, among other reasons because of the region's capacity to cut off the electricity supply to Moldova. Since 1991, the president of the region of Transnistria has been Igor Smirnov, who renewed his mandate in the 2006 elections with 82% of the vote.

### Background to the peace process

In March 1992, the chancellors of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine met in Helsinki and agreed to principles to peacefully resolve the conflict. They also created consultation mechanisms

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<sup>4</sup> The region is also called Transdniéster, Transdnitsria or Pridnestrovia (in Russian).

in order to coordinate their efforts. A few months later, they held several discussions within the CIS to deploy a peace-keeping force in Moldova. In July of that same year, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation for a peaceful solution to the conflict, which in addition to a ceasefire also agreed to create a demilitarised security zone stretching 10 km on either side of the Dniester River.

Since February 1993, the OSCE has been the body charged with the negotiations to find a solution to the conflict through a mission in Moldova headquartered in its capital, Chisianu. The purpose of this mission is to define the status of Transdniestria through dialogue among the clashing parties. According to the OSCE, the key issues in the conflict are language, Moldova's pretensions of unifying with Romania, the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria and the definition of the status of this region. Since autumn 2005, the EU and the USA have joined the OSCE's efforts as observers. In April 2008, the presidents of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria met for the first time in seven years and agreed to spearhead trust-building measures that would, in turn, allow the negotiations, which had been stopped for two years, to resume. Moldova has usually stated its support for talks in their 5+2 format (Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, with the USA and EU as observers), while Transdniestria has preferred the 2+1 format (Moldova, Transdniestria and Russia). In March 2011, the government of Moldova created a new structure dedicated to the conflict in Transdniestria, the Reintegration Commission, whose mission is to promote and coordinate the application of a shared policy by all Moldovan institutions in the sphere of reintegration. In July, the Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Firat and the leader of Transdniestria, Igor Smirnov, met in the capital of the pro-independence region, Tiraspol, at a football match in what was described as another round of *football diplomacy*. In December, the first official meeting was held as part of the formal negotiations to resolve the conflict in Transdniestria in the 5+2 format, after these negotiations had been suspended for almost six years.

The second round of negotiations in 5+2 format took place in February 2012, which had been restarted in late 2011 after six years of deadlock. Held in the Irish capital, Dublin, the meeting came in a context of optimism and some rapprochement between the parties and was preceded by a series of measures taken by Transdniestria since the new leader of the region, Yevgeny Shevchuk, came to power. These measures, which were welcomed by Moldova, included **lifting all taxes on Moldovan goods entering the region, simplifying customs and border procedures and allowing two Moldovan television stations to broadcast in Transdniestria**. In April, Moldova and Transdniestria reached an agreement on the main principles and procedures for maintaining negotiations, including the frequency of the meetings and some items on the agenda of future rounds of negotiations, the role of the working groups in strengthening confidence-building measures and the possibilities of consolidating the results of the negotiations. The agenda that would be followed in the negotiating process was subdivided into various dimensions: social and economic issues, humanitarian and human rights issues, security and political arrangement of the conflict. In June, the leaders of Moldova and Transdniestria agreed to re-establish all transport corridors between both regions, including the rehabilitation of a bridge over the Dniester River. In September, a new round of talks was held in Vienna between Carpov, Shtanski and mediators and observers that ended with agreements to intensify talks over human rights and to establish a joint forum for dialogue with civil society and the media in both regions. This new meeting also focused on education.

## The peace process in 2013

Representatives of Moldova and the region of Transdniestria met in mid-February in Lviv (Ukraine) as part of the negotiating process under the 5+2 format (Moldova and Transdniestria as parties to the conflict; the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as mediators; and the US and the EU as observers). The OSCE's subsequent statement urged both parties to maintain the momentum of



the negotiations, which would be continued with another round in May in the Ukrainian city of Odessa, and repeated its offer to host a meeting between the leaders of Moldova and Transdniestria this year. In this regard, the leader of the *de facto* independent region, Yevgeny Shevchuk, rejected the proposal of a 1+1 meeting with the Moldovan President during the 5+2 meeting in Lviv. According to Shevchuk, the necessary conditions had not yet been set for discussing the status of Transdniestria in the negotiating process and there were social and economic problems to resolve, after which the process would pick up steam. Added to the difficulties of the negotiating process was a political crisis in Moldova, which began with the resignation of the government after a motion to censure was adopted by Parliament and submitted by the opposing Communist Party, which had held power previously, under allegations of corruption in part of the government. Moreover, the UN released its first report on human rights in the region of Transdniestria. In it, independent expert Thomas Hammarberg called for reforms to be made to the penitentiary system and for priority to be given to issuing measures against human trafficking. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, praised the authorities' cooperation in Hammarberg's visits to the region and in providing access to the area. She also urged local authorities to develop an action plan for human rights.

Moldova and Transdniestria participated in a new round in the negotiating process, which was held in late May in Odessa (Ukraine) in 5+2 format. The parties agreed on a new confidence-building measure: dismantling a cable car that had not been used in more than ten years to avoid risks to the population below (located in the towns of Rybnitsa and Rezina) and discussions about various matters, including the freedom of movement and the disposal of radioactive waste. The Special Representative of the Presidency of the OSCE, Andrii Deshchytsia, described the talks as "frank but constructive" and urged the parties to maintain regular bilateral meetings at all levels until the next round of 5+2 talks in Vienna in mid-June. Thus, the OSCE welcomed the meeting between the chief negotiators for both parties, Eugen Carpov and Nina Shtanski, which took place in the OSCE mission headquarters in Moldova in late May.

Despite the gradual progress made in building trust, some security incidents occurred on 26 April when Transdniestrian authorities set up two checkpoints between the towns of Varnita (under Moldova's control) and Bender (under the control of the separatist authorities). This led to clashes between the Moldovan population, which wanted to dismantle the checkpoints, and Transdniestrian security forces. The Joint Control Commission (a joint mechanism for supervising the situation in the security zone) intervened to put an end to the incidents. The head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Jennifer Brush, condemned the incidents and called for both parties to reduce the tension. Moreover, she urged the Transdniestrian authorities to refrain from unilateral action that may lead to destabilisation in the area. Moreover, in early June, the President of Transdniestria approved a decree that unilaterally defined the borders of the breakaway region, including land currently under Moldovan jurisdiction, which increased tension in the context of dialogue.


In late July, a joint action plan was approved to conserve natural resources. The agreement was reached by the group of experts on agriculture and environmental issues that was created in 2008 along with the rest of the joint groups of experts working on the negotiating process. The OSCE mission to Moldova encouraged the rest of the working groups to make progress in areas such as telecommunications, transport, education and security. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister of Moldova, Iure Leanca, and the leader of Transdniestria, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, met in the capital of Transdniestria, Tiraspol, on 23 September. In this meeting, both leaders signed an agreement to expand the decision to resume freight rail service passing through Transdniestria. Speaking through Ukrainian Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara, the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE welcomed the agreement as a sign of a constructive approach to resolve issues of mutual interest. In a new round of the 5+2 negotiating process in early October, the parties exhaustively discussed issues related to freedom of movement. Thus, the importance of moving towards a simplification of the administrative obstacles to the movement of people on both sides was repeated, which would improve the wellbeing of both communities and increase trust between

them. It was agreed that they would continue to work towards achieving that goal. At the same meeting, they also discussed implementing the agreement on environmental issues and the sustainable use of natural resources, reached in July, as well as the agreement to dismantle the unused cable car in the towns of Rybnitsa and Rezina. The next round of the 5+2 process is planned for late November.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A joint action plan was approved to conserve natural resources.</li> <li>• The Prime Minister of Moldova, Iure Leanca, and the leader of Transdniestria, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, met in the capital of Transdniestria.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• Moldavia Azi (<a href="http://www.azi.md/en">www.azi.md/en</a>)</li> <li>• OSCE (<a href="http://www.osce.org/Moldavia">www.osce.org/Moldavia</a>)</li> <li>• Parliament of Transdniestria (<a href="http://www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng">www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng</a>)</li> <li>• Pridnestrovie (<a href="http://www.pridnestrovie.net">www.pridnestrovie.net</a>)</li> <li>• Wikipedia (Trasnsnistria)</li> </ul>

### Main parties involved in the process



## TURKEY (PKK)

### Summary of the conflict

Kurdistan, with a population of 33 million, most of whom are Muslims, and a total area measuring 550,000 sq. km, is divided amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. It is regarded as the most populous stateless nation in the world. Over 20 million Kurds inhabit Turkish territory. Their origins go back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In the Middle Ages the Kurds lived in relative freedom, and during the Ottoman Empire they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. With the fall of this empire, and as a result of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, their land was divided amongst several different states. Shortly thereafter, Kurdistan's immense oil wealth was discovered, especially in the part inside Iraq. In 1924 Atatürk proclaimed Turkey's independence. From that year until 1938 there were fourteen uprisings by the Kurdish people.

<b>Population:</b> Turkey (7.9 million); Turkish Kurdistan (20 million)
<b>Area:</b> Turkey (784,000 km <sup>2</sup> ); Turkish Kurdistan (220,000 km <sup>2</sup> )
<b>HDI</b> Turkey: 90 (out of 186)
<b>GDP</b> (Turkey): 788,299 million dollars
<b>Per capita income</b> (Turkey) \$10,525
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 37,000
<b>Armed actors:</b> PKK, TAK
<b>Facilitators:</b> ---

There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) since 1984, with a total of 37,000 deaths, most of them Kurds. The PKK was created in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan ("Apo"). In subsequent years the PKK abandoned its goal of winning independence for Kurdistan and agreed to seek formulas for autonomy for each territory. It is largely financed by donations from the vast Kurdish diaspora around the world, especially in Europe and the United States. It has also received aid from the Greek-Cypriot community. The Kurds have support organisations in several different countries, such as the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) with headquarters in London and offices in the United States. The USA is also home to the KNCA, the Washington Kurdish Institute and the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN). In the past, the PKK also received periodic support from Iran and Syria. It has around 6,000 combatants. In 1995 the PKK created the exiled Kurdish parliament, with headquarters in Europe.

In 1987 the Turkish government decreed an exceptional status for eleven Kurdish provinces. President Turgut Özal (1989-1993) began peace efforts by creating a Ministry for Human Rights and promising the Kurdish people a certain degree of autonomy and the freedom to speak their own language. However, Özal's death and the renewed outbreak of PKK offensives put an end to the prospects of a negotiated solution. Since 1995, despite several unilateral ceasefires by the PKK, the government has continued its brutal fight against this group, destroying thousands of towns, displacing around two million Kurds and creating Kurdish militias charged with putting down the PKK and its support bases. In the 1995 offensive, the Turkish government deployed 35,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region. After a serious political crisis between Turkey and Syria in October 1998, the latter country withdrew its support of the PKK and forced Öcalan to leave Damascus, where he had lived for years. In February 1999 Öcalan was captured in Kenya by the Turkish secret services and was later sentenced to death, although this ruling was commuted in 2002. With the wane in the PKK's activities in 2000, the Turkish government began tentative reforms to ease the restrictions on the Kurdish culture.

The Kurdish conflict, just like the one in Cyprus, has been conditioned or influenced by Turkey's negotiations to join the EU. In 1998 the European Commission approved a document stating that a civilian, not military, solution must be found to the situation in southeast Turkey. Both the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (since 1995) have issued declarations to the same effect. In addition, the International Socialist has a Working Group on the Kurdish Question (SIMEC), headed by the Swede Conny Frederiksson, who is also the advisor to a civilian platform that studies the Kurdish question as part of the relations between Turkey and the EU. In November 2002 the moderate, pro-European Islamists in the Party for Justice and Development

(PJD) won the elections with an absolute majority, and their leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, succeeded in being appointed Prime Minister in March 2003 after the sentence preventing him from holding this post was lifted. In view of the invasion and later conflict in Iraq, where much of the Kurdish community lives, the new Turkish government sealed an alliance with Iran and Syria to prevent the Kurdish autonomy already existing in northern Iraq from becoming the start of independence for all Kurdish territories. This move has unquestionably hindered partial agreements with the Kurds from being reached, in this case with those living on Turkish soil.

**In 2004 a new armed group appeared, called the Taybazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, abbreviated TAK), apparently with no ties to the PKK or perhaps made up of dissidents from the PKK. This group is pursuing independence for Turkish Kurdistan, and it was added to the EU's terrorist lists in late 2006. In 2005 the Democratic Society Movement (DTP) was founded, a pro-Kurdish party regarded as the successor of the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), which was founded in 1997 and was the continuation of a party that was banned because of its ties to the PKK. The DTH has mayors in 55 towns in southeast Turkey, mainly inhabited by Kurds. Its leaders include Leyla Zana, who was imprisoned for three years for having spoken Kurdish in the Turkish parliament. The party is jointly led by Nurettin Demirtas.**

Secret talks have been taking place over the last few years between the Turkish government and the leader of the PKK, Öcalan, which received a special boost in 2013.

## **Background to the peace process**

The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire several times (1993, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2009 and 2010), but without this being reciprocated by the Turkish armed forces, and without it serving as a spur to start a negotiation process. The year after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested, in February 2000 the PKK announced the end of its armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy, but the Turkish army rejected the unilateral ceasefire. In April 2002, the PKK once again gave up its claims for the independence of Turkish Kurdistan and its armed struggle at its 8<sup>th</sup> Congress, at which the party changed its name to KADEK (Congress of Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), or Kongra-Gel. This party was still presided over by Öcalan, who was imprisoned and at that time condemned to death. The Turkish Minister of Defence stated that he would continue to view the PKK as a terrorist organisation and that he would ignore the unilateral ceasefires. In 2005, the PKK created the Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK) as a platform to promote the federal process in Kurdistan. In the second half of November 2009, the government presented to Parliament the first specific measures in its democratisation initiative to resolve the Kurdish question, as a continuation of the Parliamentary discussion started in early November. This involved several short-term advances in cultural, political and social issues. In mid-December, the Constitutional Court declared the pro-Kurdish party DTP illegal because of its presumed ties with the PKK, which cast doubt on the government's plan to undertake reforms and motivated the PKK to interpret it as a declaration of war.

In July 2010, the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, proposed the disarmament of the PKK in exchange for political and cultural rights for the Kurdish people. Karayilan stated that he was ready to disarm under United Nations supervision if Turkey accepted a ceasefire and fulfilled certain conditions. In May 2011, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* stated that Turkey had been holding talks with Qandil (in reference to the PKK troops based in the mountains of Qandil, Iraq). *Milliyet* cited comments from the co-president of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, in which he claimed that Turkey had been in touch not only with the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, currently imprisoned in Imrali, but with Qandil as well. The talks held in 2006 and 2007 were followed by the talks in 2008 with the three areas of the PKK (Öcalan in Imrali, the leaders in Qandil and representatives in Europe) with the support of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, according to *Milliyet*. In July, the leader of the PKK stated that an agreement had been reached with the state delegation, with which it had been engaged in contacts on the establishment of a Peace Council to achieve a solution to the Kurdish

conflict. A recording leaked to the press in September revealed talks between a Turkish intelligence service (MIT) officer and senior PKK officials in Oslo. The leaked talks had taken place in 2010, had reached the level of negotiations, and had continued until mid-2011. The PKK's demands had been accepted by the government, although not formalised. They included issues like education in the native language, constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish identity, self-governance, *democratic autonomy* (a term which the Kurdish movement often uses), and house arrest for Öcalan. The government could not sign a document like that, but it could implement some of its aspects. In late September, in a context of tension in Turkey due to the surge in violence by the PKK, the Turkish Prime Minister himself, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that the negotiations had reached a stalemate and that the struggle against the PKK would continue until the group laid down its weapons.

In June 2012, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, submitted a proposal to make progress in solving the Kurdish conflict through the Turkish Parliament. In the third quarter, some limited progress was made related to prospects for resolution, despite the seriously deteriorated atmosphere in terms of security. In late September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that it would be possible to hold new negotiations with the PKK, and even with its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. In November, following the end of a hunger strike undertaken by around 700 Kurdish prisoners, Erdogan said that he was not opposed to resuming formal talks with the PKK. **Erdogan also said that the Turkish intelligence services (MIT) could meet with the leader of the PKK.**

### The peace process in 2013

**For the first time in many years, the Turkish government and the PKK, through its leader Abdullah Öcalan, reached a series of agreements with mutual concessions that led to a positive outlook.**

After the start of the dialogue between the authorities and PKK's supreme leader, Abdullah Öcalan, which was unexpectedly announced in December 2012, further progress towards resolving the conflict took place during the first quarter of 2013, despite the fears of some analysts, who were concerned about the lack of a clear road map or the structural fragility of the dialogue. The format, consisting of talks between representatives of the Turkish intelligence services and Öcalan at Imrali prison, where he has been incarcerated since 1999, continued with some public statements by government officials and the Kurdish movement on their respective positions and interests. These were mostly constructive in terms of aspirations to end the violence, but they also generated different expectations concerning the steps, rhythms and guarantees necessary to achieve it. The government repeatedly demanded that the PKK lay down their arms as a requirement to address possible reforms and move towards peace.

On 3 January, independent MP, co-chair of the pro-Kurdish platform DTK and respected Kurdish public figure Ahmet Türk; Kurdish BDP party MP Ayla Akat Ata; and lawyer Meral Danis visited Öcalan for a few hours. The government's approach seemed to recognise Öcalan as a key power player. After the 3 January meeting with the MPs, Hürriyet reported some declarations made by Öcalan, who stated that if the process was not sabotaged, important measures would be taken in the following months. According to Öcalan, the aim was to create an environment where arms were not necessary. He also said that he was the only authority for a disarmament process for the PKK, Hürriyet reported. Some media outlets, like Today's Zaman, indicated that new talks between the government and the PKK would follow a timetable for a declaration of disarmament in the first few months of 2013. According to these reports, **the group could begin to disarm in spring. The newspaper Taraf said that the PKK would move its troops from southeastern Turkey to northern Iraq.** Meanwhile, the main opposition party, the CHP, expressed its support for the talks between the government and the PKK and welcomed the Prime Minister's public admission that the meetings were taking place.

The second visit to Öcalan was made by BDP MP and parliamentary group chair Pervin Buldan and BDP MPs Sirri Süreyya and Altan Tan in February. Following this second visit, Öcalan publicly sent letters to the BDP, the KCK's bases in Qandil and their representatives in Europe, by way of consultation. According to BDP's co-chairman, Selahattin Demirtas, the letter included references to the possibility that the new Constitution should refer to an umbrella identity (Turkish citizenship), but without specifying any ethnic identity. It also mentioned the need for legal guarantees for a possible withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish soil and recommended the creation of parliamentary committees on the Kurdish issue. The answers were sent mid-March. A third visit followed around that time, again including Buldan and Süreyya and Demirtas. After this meeting, it was announced that Öcalan would make a historic appeal on 21 March, coinciding with the Kurdish Newroz festival.

In a message considered historic and transmitted through the BDP during the Newroz festival, **Öcalan called for the weapons to fall silent and for PKK fighters to withdraw from Turkish territory**, albeit without specifying a date. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarded the message positively, although caution was urged until it was implemented. However, he stated that the fighters should disarm before leaving Turkey so as to avoid confrontations. In that regard, some analysts warned of the unlikelihood of a disarmed withdrawal, given the failed precedents. The PKK announced that the ceasefire would come into force on 21 March, yet it would maintain the right to self-defence.

Other developments included the approval of a law permitting the use of Kurdish by defendants in legal procedures. During the second quarter, the government worked on the **creation of a "wise people" commission to contribute to the peace process**. According to Turkish media, Öcalan and the BDP were also involved in forming the group. Its composition was revealed in early April, consisting of 63 people from different fields and with different approaches divided into seven sub-groups, one for each of the seven geographical regions of Turkey. According to Erdogan, the groups' activities would include meeting with opinion leaders, organising conferences and seminars, establishing bilateral contacts and contacting local, national and international media. Only 12 of the 63 people selected were women, and only one woman was a group chair (in addition to four temporary female chairs and two female secretaries). The commission was therefore criticised by the BDP, which stressed that it did not include enough women, academics or individuals who could truly and directly represent the Kurdish people. In any case, the degree of mistrust between the parties and the accumulated grievances continued to be patent. Specifically, the Kurds mainly criticised the results of the parliamentary subcommittee's investigation of the Turkish Army's killing of 34 civilians in December 2011 after it allegedly misidentified them as PKK fighters. According to the subcommittee's report, there was no evidence of intent and the deaths were due to inadequate coordination between the Turkish Army and intelligence services. Meanwhile even though several Kurdish representatives, including several mayors, were released after having been arrested as part of the KCK lawsuit, several thousand people remained in detention and further arrests were made.

In spring, as planned, **PKK forces began to withdraw from Turkey to northern Iraq**. In early April, on the eve of Öcalan's birthday, a BDP delegation visited him again as authorised by the government. Like in the visit in March, the group of visitors was composed of the co-chair of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, MP Pervin Buldan and MP Sirri Süreyya Önde. The MPs later carried a letter from Öcalan to Erbil, the capital of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (Iraq) to be delivered in turn to the political and military leaders of the PKK in northern Iraq regarding the PKK's withdrawal, which Öcalan called for in his historic speech on 21 March. Against the backdrop of a unilateral ceasefire by the armed group and in response to Öcalan's call, the PKK began to withdrawal on 8 May, with the first group arriving to the Kurdish region of Iraq in the middle of the month with no incidents. The acting leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, had warned that they would defend themselves through violent means if they were attacked by the Turkish Army. Karayilan said that the PKK was withdrawing from Turkey unconditionally, but stressed that the democratisation process after the guerrilla forces' withdrawal ought to include

steps such as reforms to the law on political parties, to the electoral threshold and to the anti-terrorism law, the abolition of paramilitary units ("village guards") and the release of people detained for the lawsuit against the KCK (Kurdish organisation that includes the PKK). The withdrawal of PKK forces was criticised by the central Iraqi government.

A BDP delegation visited Öcalan again in June, this time composed of Demirtas and Buldan, while Sirri Süreyya did not receive authorisation from the government. After this meeting on 7 June, the delegation met again with the leader of the KCK in the mountainous area of Qandil (northern Iraq), where the organisation's bases are located. According to Buldan, a new meeting was scheduled in the weeks to come. Shortly afterwards, Öcalan's brother, Mehmet Öcalan, was authorised to visit him in mid-June. In the form of a message conveyed through his brother, Öcalan affirmed that the first part of the process to resolve the conflict was complete, though he also noted that some of his demands had not been met. According to Öcalan, the second part would start soon, though there was no certainty about how it would develop and he had both hopes and doubts about it. The leader of the PKK argued that Turkey had to end its system of paramilitary forces known as "village guards" and questioned if new members were being recruited for these forces and if new infrastructure was being built for them. Öcalan said that for the resolution process to move forward, he would require more regular visits from his lawyers, the BDP and family members. The BDP later made a series of proposals for democratisation reforms to the government. Both parties had a meeting planned for the end of June, in which the resolution process and other issues would be addressed. The BDP asked to hold two meetings per week with Öcalan from then on. In addition, at the end of June, the BDP urged the Turkish government to do its part in the peace process and avoid any action that could derail it. Furthermore, it announced demonstrations in several cities to pressure the government to move the process forward. The BDP repeated that its demands included releasing Öcalan and Kurdish activist and political prisoners, lifting the restrictions on Kurds receiving education in their mother tongue and lowering the 10% electoral threshold. In early July, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed to continue the peace process and called for calm and patience.

Alongside the talks between the Turkish government and the leader of the PKK, several measures were implemented in May, such as the government's creation of a **group of wise people** that included journalists, artists, civil society representatives and others. Also in May, **a parliamentary committee was launched to supervise the conflict resolution process**. The group includes 10 members of the ruling AKP party and one member of the BDP. The Kemalist CPH party and the Turkish ultranationalist MHP party (the two other groups with representation in Parliament) refused to participate in the new committee. Yet despite such significant advances, there were also misgivings about issues such as approval of the fourth judicial reform package. According to various media outlets, the changes introduced did not bring improvements to the thousands of people (judges, journalists, lawyers and activists) detained in relation to the legal proceedings against the KCK, despite having no organic connection to any armed group or having engaged in violence.

**The dialogue was negatively affected between July and August by mutual accusations of not taking adequate steps**, which led to significant setbacks and Kurdish declarations in October that it was ending. In July, the government accused the PKK of failing to complete the withdrawal of its armed forces to northern Iraq, saying that around 20% of the combatants had crossed the border, meaning it had failed to fulfil its commitments. In exchange, the PKK accused the government of not moving forward in the process, blaming it for the lack of democratic reforms. Thus, on various occasions in July and August, the PKK gave the government an ultimatum in this respect. Meanwhile, the government announced that it would submit a new democratisation plan in September, although its launch had been delayed. In mid-September, two representatives of the pro-Kurdish party BDP, its co-chair Selahattin Demirtas and MP Pervin Buldan met with the top leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in prison since 1999, on the tenth parliamentary visit authorised by the government since the dialogue process began. After the visit, **the BDP**

transmitted a message from Öcalan on the need for a new format and for moving from a period of dialogue to a new step of substantial negotiations.

On 30 September, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan submitted the democratisation plan, which included opening the debate on the electoral threshold, after which the current restrictions of 10% could drop to 5%, be eliminated or stay the same; approving education in Kurdish in private schools (and not public ones); authorising the use of Kurdish and other languages different than Turkish in political propaganda; and lifting barriers to original place names in languages other than Turkish; among other measures, to which were added other changes that affected broad political and social dynamics in Turkey beyond the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish nationalist movement, including the BDP, criticised the reform plan, describing it as insufficient, and accused the government of refusing consultation in designing it. On 1 October, the Kurdish organisation KCK, in which the PKK is involved, denounced that the government was not seeking a solution to the conflict, but wanted to see it stagnate and that it was interested in victory in the upcoming local and presidential elections in Turkey in 2014. Over the following days, the co-chair of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, said that the government had ended the peace process *de facto*. According to Demirtas, the reform plan was not part of the dialogue process, which had been based on mutual dialogue since its beginnings and sought to provide returns for the ruling party, AKP. Demirtas affirmed that there was no more dialogue.

In late October, Cemil Bayik, the co-chair of the KCK, the body that unites the organisations of the Kurdish nationalist movement, said that the dialogue between the Turkish government and the supreme leader of the KCK/PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, had reached an end. He blamed the Turkish government, which he accused of failing to respond to Kurdish demands. According to Bayik, if the government did not agree to hold substantive negotiations, there would be a civil war in Turkey. The KCK enunciated three conditions for continuing to seek a resolution: improving Öcalan's conditions in prison, legal changes (and according to some media, constitutional ones) and an independent third party's participation by supervising the dialogue. In turn, Öcalan said that the first stage of the process had ended on 15 October and he was awaiting the government's response to his proposal to continue the process, conveyed orally and in writing. This was asserted by representatives of the pro-Kurdish BDP party in October, after two of its MPs visited Öcalan, who has been in prison since 1999. The Turkish government barred the co-chair of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, from attending this visit allegedly because of Demirtas' harsh criticism of the democratisation reforms announced by the government in late September, which aggravated tension between the government and the BDP. Öcalan said that during the year of dialogue, no progress was made on creating a legal foundation. He said he urgently hoped that the second stage would be more substantive and profound, given the fragility of the process. In addition, he welcomed the context of non-violence, linked to the PKK's unilateral ceasefire. Öcalan also called for holding an Islamic congress in Diyarbakir that would respond to the use of violence by Islamist groups, including al-Nusra Front, against the Kurds in Syria. Cemil Bayik also criticised Turkey's support for groups that fought against Kurdish organisations in Syria. In another statement, the KCK pointed out that any solution to the Kurdish issue should respond to three demands: recognition of the Kurdish existence, including its identity-related, cultural and legal aspects, as well as freedom of thought and organisation; recognition of Kurdish self-determination; and recognition of mother-tongue education.

After the setbacks in the dialogue between Turkey and the PKK that occurred between August and October, which led the Kurdish nationalist movement to consider it terminated, the process received a boost in November with new gestures from both sides. The government authorised a new visit by a delegation of Kurdish politicians to the leader of the PKK imprisoned since 1999, Abdullah Öcalan (BDP MPs Idris Baluken and Pervin Buldan, in addition to Sirri Süreyya Önder, the deputy chair of the new Kurdish political group HDP, and ally of the BDP). According to Önder, Öcalan said that current peace talks were insufficient, the format was flawed and a legal framework was needed. Öcalan's brother, Mehmet Öcalan, who also visited the PKK leader, stressed Öcalan's willingness to move on to negotiations, but on a legal foundation, to overcome




the current fragility. Turkey also approved on two lawyers' visit to Öcalan in December, although on the condition that they were not lawyers from the firm he usually hires. Due to government constraints, the last visit that Öcalan received from his legal team was in July 2011. Authorisation was also planned to be given to **members of the Group of Wise People to visit Öcalan in December**. This measure would respond to Öcalan and the Kurdish movement's demand to reduce Öcalan's isolation in the dialogue process. Furthermore, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the President of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Massoud Barzani, visited Diyarbakir, the symbolic capital of Turkish Kurdistan, where they urged commitment to the peace process. During the visit, Erdogan visited the local city council for the first time, where he met with various Kurdish politicians. And yet despite these gestures, the dialogue continued to be fragile, partly due to the pre-electoral atmosphere in Turkey, the rivalry between Öcalan and Barzani and the influence of the civil war in Syria. Indeed, in November, the PKK-linked Kurdish group in Syria, the PYD, announced the beginning of the creation of a provisional autonomous government in the areas under its control, prompting criticism from Turkey, the Kurdish authorities of northern Iraq and Syrian Kurdish groups close to Barzani.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Öcalan communicated with his bases of support through visits by Kurdish delegations authorised by the Turkish government.</li> <li>• Öcalan called for the weapons to fall silent and for PKK fighters to withdraw from Turkish territory.</li> <li>• A "group of wise people" was created at the government's behest, which included journalists, artists, civil society representatives and others.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUTCC (<a href="http://www.eutcc.org">www.eutcc.org</a>)</li> <li>• Firat: <a href="http://en.firatnews.com">en.firatnews.com</a></li> <li>• Info-Türk (<a href="http://www.info-turk.be">www.info-turk.be</a>)</li> <li>• Kurdish Human Rights Project (<a href="http://www.khrp.org">www.khrp.org</a>)</li> <li>• Kurdish Info (<a href="http://www.kurdish-info.eu">www.kurdish-info.eu</a>)</li> <li>• Kurdish Media (<a href="http://www.kurdmedia.com">www.kurdmedia.com</a>)</li> <li>• Kurdistan National Congress (<a href="http://www.kongrakurdistan.org">www.kongrakurdistan.org</a>)</li> <li>• Today's Zaman (<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com">www.todayszaman.com</a>)</li> <li>• Turkish Daily News (<a href="http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr">www.turkishdailynews.com.tr</a>)</li> <li>• Washington Kurdish Institute (<a href="http://www.kurd.org">www.kurd.org</a>)</li> <li>• <a href="http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com">www.freedom-for-ocalan.com</a></li> </ul>

## Main parties involved in the process



*Space of intermediation*

## b) Caucasus

### ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabakh)

#### Context of the conflict

In 1988, after a long period under the Soviet regime, a conflict arose in Nagorno-Karabakh (an enclave with an Armenian majority in the southwest of the country), when the local assembly voted to be administered by Armenia, and the Azerbaijan authorities rejected this decision. The tension over this conflict escalated, with open warfare war eventually breaking out between 1991 and 1994. More than 30,000 people died in this war, and one million people were displaced. **A ceasefire was signed in 1994**, and peace negotiations have been under way since then. The negotiations address two main points: the enclave's status and the return of territories occupied by the Armenian army. Currently, the construction of an oil pipeline running between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, at a cost of 2.9 billion dollars, is playing an important role in the peace process. The company British Petroleum has enormous influence over Azerbaijan, an oil-rich country. In recent years, both countries have substantially increased their military spending, which in 2012 accounted for 3.8% of the GDP of Armenia (387 million USD) and 4.6% of the GDP of Azerbaijan (3.186 million USD). Despite the many meetings held between both countries, no progress has been made so far.

**Population:** Nagorno-Karabakh (145,000); Armenia (3 million) and Azerbaijan (9,4 million)  
**Area:** Armenia (30,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Azerbaijan (87,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Nagorno-Karabakh (4,400 Km<sup>2</sup>)  
**HID:** 87 (Armenia), 82 (Azerbaijan), out of 186  
**GDP:** Armenia: 9,950 million dollars; Azerbaijan: 68,727 million dollars  
**Income per inhabitant:** Armenia: \$3,316; Azerbaijan: \$6,896  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 30,000  
**Displaced persons:** 720,000  
**Armed actors:** Armed forces in the two countries  
**Facilitators:** Minsk Group of the OSCE (France, Russia and USA), Turkey

#### Background to the peace process

The attempts to reach a peace agreement in the past decade have been channelled through the mediation of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, which was created in 1992. This group is co-led by France, Russia and the USA, and it includes the following participants: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its strategy is to reinforce the economic cooperation between the latter two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In July 1999, the OSCE approved the installation of an office in Erevan (Armenia), which has been operating since February 2000 and conducts political, economic, environmental and humanitarian activities. It operates independently of the Minsk Group. The president of Azerbaijan has often been highly critical of the OSCE's mediation and the role of the UN. What is more, he has always opposed participation by any representative of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations.

In December 2006, the self-proclaimed independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh approved a constitution in a referendum which described the region as a sovereign, democratic and social state with powers over the territory currently controlled by the separatist government, although it did not address issues like citizenship or the thorny question of the return of Azeri refugees in a region with an ethnic Armenian majority. In the second half of January 2010, the presidents of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, met with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in Sochi (Russia) and reached a verbal agreement on the preamble of the latest version of the basic principles for resolving the conflict. This document envisioned a process carried out in phases instead of a "package solution". The steps to follow would be the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azeri districts of Agdam, Fizuli, Djebrail, Zangelan and

Gubadli, which border on Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as from 13 towns in the occupied district of Lachin; the restoration of communications; and a donor conference to be held to raise funds for rehabilitation, as well as the deployment of peace observers to ensure the safety of the displaced persons as they return home. In the second phase, according to Mammadyarov, the Armenian forces would withdraw from Lachin and Kalbajar, which would be followed by the return of the Azeri population to Nagorno-Karabakh. After that, a decision would be taken on the status of the territory inside Azerbaijan, without this affecting its territorial integrity. Likewise, the proposal contained in the "Madrid Principles" includes a referendum with participation by the people who used to live in Nagorno-Karabakh before the war, the securing of a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, the return of the refugees to their homelands and the aid of international forces. In March 2011, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, held a tripartite meeting with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in the Russian city of Sochi. After the meeting, they issued a communiqué in which they stated their intention to resolve all the controversies peacefully.

Relations between both countries deteriorated in the third quarter of 2012, partly due to the tension linked to Azerbaijan's pardon of an Azeri officer accused of killing an Armenian officer in 2004, which also affected the negotiating process. As in previous months, no progress was made during this period, and even the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Araz Azimov, described the negotiations as "suspended". According to Azimov, regular meetings were held with the Minsk Group mediating body at different levels, but no negotiations took place in which specific issues were addressed with a concrete timetable. In turn, according to the Azerbaijani agency APA, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev affirmed **that the negotiating group had worked for twenty years and had still achieved no results**. According to Aliyev, neither the conditions of peace nor war could go on forever. Thus, he accused Armenia of shoring up the status quo and of refusing to withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, the Minsk Group expressed its concern about the lack of tangible progress in the process. The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan met separately with the Minsk Group representatives. In October, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian accused Azerbaijan of preparing for war in Nagorno-Karabakh and denounced that the Azerbaijani government had been acquiring arms in preparation for a new conflict.

#### Notes about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)

- Situation of "no war, no peace" that benefits the governing elites. For many analysts, this is the main problem.
- A lot of money is spent on the confrontation and war propaganda, but little is spent on the tripartite dialogue and peacebuilding.
- Since the ceasefire was signed in 1994, 3,000 civilians and members of the military have died due to hostilities and ceasefire violations.
- There is a risk that Azerbaijan will try to forcibly recover its land occupied by Armenia in the 1991-1994 war.
- A highly militarised 160-mile-long Line of Contact divides the military forces of both countries and is controlled by only six OSCE observers.
- There are no mechanisms to investigate incidents that occur along the Line of Contact.
- Many analysts advocate establishing a "corridor" joining Lachin (Armenia) with Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Neither the OSCE nor either government approve of the Track II diplomacy conducted by International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Pax Christi, USIP Eurasia Foundation, Crisis Management Initiatives, EPNK, Saferworld, etc.
- Both the OSCE and the EU rejected the referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2006 on a new Constitution, which won majority approval.
- Azerbaijan is particularly hostile to the mediation of the OSCE.
- Armenia does not support the future presence of a peacekeeping operation.

- There are two working documents: the Madrid Principles of 2007, revised in 2009 to rectify terms that were too general, such as “future determination”, which was not fully accepted by Armenia, and the Kazan document.
- Mistrust between both communities since the war, despite the fact that they lived together peacefully for many years. Construction of exclusive identities with divergent national mythologies and narratives. This is a good example of how stereotypes and “images of the enemy” are constructed. Changes of attitude among the general population are necessary and dialogue between both communities must be increased.
- Few initiatives for dialogue between both communities, especially among the youth. International stakeholders, including the negotiators, do not encourage the people’s participation.
- It would be a good idea to increase the number of meetings between the presidents and foreign ministers of both countries.
- More confidence-building measures (CBMs) are needed to reduce the level of hostility and promote the desire for understanding at the community level.
- Elitism and secrecy in negotiations that prompts suspicious attitudes in the communities. The people and institutions that promote dialogue encounter many obstacles.
- Belief that Armenia has expansionist plans. It does not wish to vacate the seven provinces of east Azerbaijan that it holds.
- It would be useful to suspend military manoeuvres that take place near the Line of Contact.
- A strategy to demilitarise Nagorno-Karabakh could be studied.
- Areas of cooperation among all communities must be identified.
- The challenges lies not so much in “resolving” the conflict as in “transforming” it, which would require greater public participation. For now, the strategies are “zero-sum”, in which one side wins and the other loses. It would be interesting to promote a “win-win” solution.
- Turkey is an ally of Azerbaijan, to which it has provided generous military aid, although recently Turkey has drawn closer to Armenia. Iran and the United States have also supported Azerbaijan. Thanks to its energy resources, Azerbaijan has been able to boost its military budget considerably.
- Russia is a staunch ally of Armenia, a country where it has two military bases. It provides it with plenty of weaponry. Russia does not pay enough attention to the mediation of the Minsk Group (Russia, USA and France) and benefits from the status quo.
- The different alliances between the United States and Russia make it difficult for negotiations to proceed smoothly and undermine the effectiveness of the Minsk Group, which has failed to manage the conflict over the last 20 years. The two great powers play a decisive role in resolving the conflict.
- Azerbaijan believes that the relationship that Armenia establishes with Nagorno-Karabakh is essential within the context of the newly declared self-governing areas in the former Soviet territory.
- Azerbaijan demands that Armenian troops withdraw from seven provinces between Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian border.
- Nagorno-Karabakh requests that its independence be recognised before Armenian troops vacate Azerbaijani territory.
- Nagorno-Karabakh also demands to be present at the negotiations promoted by the Minsk Group. So far, neither country has promoted the participation of the most affected population, that of Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Any solution to the conflict must also account for the 600,000 refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh now in Azerbaijan, as well as the 250,000 displaced to Armenia or within Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Armenia ignores UN Security Council resolutions.
- Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are subject to an arms embargo imposed by the OSCE and the United Nations.
- The EU is largely absent from the peace process and has delegated this function to France. The EU’s Special Representative for the area has never visited Nagorno-Karabakh.
- The conflict is not a priority on the international community’s agenda.

## The peace process in 2013

The process continued with no significant progress in the first few months of the year. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian met in Paris in late January. A statement from the Minsk Group said that both parties expressed their support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and their determination to continue with negotiations. During the meeting, ideas presented by the Minsk Group in October 2012 were discussed, as well as possible confidence-building measures and issues linked to civilian flights landing in or leaving from Nagorno-Karabakh. Subsequently, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group met separately with both top diplomats on 2 and 3 March, respectively. The mediators expressed concern about civilian flights to the separatist region and about violent incidents along the Line of Contact. In this sense, they discussed how to strengthen the ceasefire. Furthermore, in late March the Minsk Group met with Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and his Foreign Minister, then did the same with their Azerbaijani counterparts in early April. They also made two trips to Nagorno-Karabakh in late March and early April and met with the authorities of the region. The mediating team highlighted the lack of violent incidents around the festivities of Newroz (Persian New Year) and Holy Week.

Despite the deadlock and the fragility along the Line of Contact, with fresh ceasefire violations, the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elmar Mammadyarov, said in May that the peace process could receive a new boost once the electoral cycle runs its course through the region (Armenia held its presidential election in February and Azerbaijan has its own presidential election scheduled for the end of the year). At a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, Mammadyarov attributed the standstill of the peace process to the elections. Moreover, in May, the co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk Group and the special representative of the rotating presidency of the OSCE, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met separately with the foreign ministers of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, doing the same in a subsequent trip with the two countries' presidents, also separately.

Co-chairs of the Minsk Group	
Russian Federation	Igor Popov
France	Jacques Faure
USA	James Warlick


The co-chairs of the international OSCE Minsk Group met on various occasions during the third quarter with the Foreign Minister of Armenia, Edward Nalbandian and the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov. In one of these meetings, in early July, **both top diplomats voiced their commitment to the aims set out in the meetings in June to reduce tension between the parties and create conditions to organise a meeting at the highest level during 2013.** Taking advantage of the UN General Assembly, in late September there was a joint meeting between the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, the special representative of the rotating presidency of the OSCE and the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. According to the OSCE's statement, the co-mediators told the parties they support a peaceful resolution to the conflict based on the non-use of force or threat of force; territorial integrity; and equal rights and self-determination for peoples. The co-chairs of the mediating body are planning to travel to both countries in November to talk with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan about preparations for a possible meeting between them this year. Meanwhile, the new American co-chair of the Minsk Group, James Warlick, visited the region for the first time in September with meetings in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a journey in which he met separately with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian, as well as with the foreign ministers of both countries. At these meetings, Warlick urged the parties to enter direct talks.

Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Vienna in mid-November under the auspices of the OSCE's Minsk group at the first meeting they held since January 2012 amidst the stagnation of the negotiating process to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years. According to the statement of the co-chairs of the mediating body (Russia, the United States and France), they agreed to move the negotiations forward to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict and hold a new meeting in the months to come. Moreover, in order to intensify the process, they ordered their foreign ministers to continue working with the Minsk Group on the discussions held thus far. However, Armenian, Azerbaijani and international analysts were sceptical of the prospects for real progress. The process has been stalled since 2010, without an agreement among the parties called the Basic Principles (proposed by the OSCE in 2005 and partially reformulated in later years), which would serve as a basis for negotiating a final agreement. The Basic Principles include Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, provisional status for Nagorno-Karabakh, the right of return for the displaced population and a possible decision on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a binding expression of will and international security guarantees. Even so, the November meeting between both presidents at least gave formal support to diplomatic negotiations in a context of warnings about risks in the region.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Vienna in mid-November under the auspices of the OSCE's Minsk group at the first meeting they held since January 2012.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conciliation Resources (<a href="http://www.c-r.org">www.c-r.org</a>)</li> <li>Eurasia Net (<a href="http://www.eurasianet.org">www.eurasianet.org</a>)</li> <li>Government of Armenia (<a href="http://www.gov.am/en">www.gov.am/en</a>)</li> <li>Government of Azerbaijan (<a href="http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal.index_e.html?lang=en">www.azerbaijan.az/portal.index_e.html?lang=en</a>)</li> <li>Government of Nagorno-Karabakh (<a href="http://www.karabakh.net/engl/gov?id=1">www.karabakh.net/engl/gov?id=1</a>)</li> <li>Institute for War and Peace Reporting (<a href="http://www.ipwpr.net">www.ipwpr.net</a>)</li> <li>OSCE (<a href="http://www.osce.org/yereban">www.osce.org/yereban</a>) (<a href="http://www.osce.org/baku">www.osce.org/baku</a>)</li> <li>Peace Building &amp; Conflict Resolution (<a href="http://www.peacebuilding.am/eng">www.peacebuilding.am/eng</a>)</li> <li>PILPG (<a href="http://www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html">www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html</a>)</li> <li>President of Nagorno-Karabakh (<a href="http://www.presidentt.nkr.am">www.presidentt.nkr.am</a>)</li> <li>Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>Swiss Peace (<a href="http://www.swisspeace.org">www.swisspeace.org</a>)</li> <li>Wikipedia (War in Upper Karabakh) (Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh)</li> </ul>

## Main parties involved in the process





## GEORGIA (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)

### Context of the conflict

There has been a conflict in the **Abkhazia** region of Georgia, in the northeast of the country, since the summer 1992. The conflict began after the local government made several attempts to separate from the Republic of Georgia, and confrontations were caused by the deployment of 2,000 Georgian soldiers, which led to 6,000 deaths. In **September 1992**, a ceasefire was signed. The Russian Federation was involved in this agreement. The following year, the United Nations peace mission **UNOMIG** was created to monitor this agreement, and in **May 1994**, the **Moscow ceasefire and separation of forces agreements were signed**. In 1999 there was a referendum in Abkhazia, after which it declared itself independent. The former President of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze, promised on several occasions "to broaden Abkhazia's powers" of self-government, as long as it formed an integral part of Georgia. In recent years, Russia has kept 3,000 soldiers on the border as a CIS peace force. In November 1999 Russia and Georgia agreed that Russia would close two of its four military bases in Georgia. More than 20 years after the ceasefire, the situation remains deadlocked, with Abkhazia enjoying de facto independence.

**Population:** Georgia: 4.3 million inhabitants; Abkhazia, 0.5 million inhabitants.  
South Ossetia; 70,000  
**Area:** Georgia: 70,000 km<sup>2</sup>; Abkhazia: 8,400 km<sup>2</sup>; South Ossetia: 3,900 km<sup>2</sup>  
**HDI Georgia:** 72 (of 186)  
**GDP Georgia:** 15,830 million dollars  
**Per capita income Georgia:** \$3,681  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 6,000 in Abkhazia; 1,000 in South Ossetia  
**Facilitators:** OSCE, UN, EU

In 1992 the autonomous region of **South Ossetia** was created in Georgia, two years before the former USSR created the autonomous Republic of North Ossetia. In 1990 South Ossetia declared itself a sovereign republic. This led the Georgian parliament to declare a state of emergency in the territory and withdraw the status of autonomous region. All of these factors led to confrontations, until a Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace force brought about a ceasefire in 1992. The conflict resumed in May 2004, when the President of South Ossetia threatened to use force against any threat from Georgia. Days later, South Ossetia withdrew from the international commission which was monitoring the peace agreement. This measure was followed by clashes between the Georgian armed forces and South Ossetia's armed groups. South Ossetia's authorities intended to join North Ossetia and thus become a part of the Russian Federation. In 2008, after military clashes between Georgia and Russia, this region cut off all links with Georgia and proclaimed its independence.

### Background to the peace process

The OSCE has had a mission in Georgia since December 1992, with the general headquarters in Tbilisi and the goal of promoting peace negotiations in the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission also supported the UN's peace efforts. The mission's mandate is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to assist in the development of the democratic institutions. Since December 1999, the mandate also includes keeping watch over the border between Russian and Georgia. In 1992, the "Agreement of Principles between Georgia and Russia to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict" was signed, which included a ceasefire and the creation of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) made up of representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. This commission has never been warmly received by Georgia, which considers itself a minority before it. In the first half of November 2006, South Ossetia supported the independence of the territory in a referendum, which was not internationally recognised, with more than 90% of the 50,000 voters in favour of secession, and the re-election of the president of the region, E. Kokoity, who cited the independence of South Ossetia and integration with Russia as his political priorities.

The stagnation in the Abkhazia process can be described as a "dynamic process of non-peace", since there is no progress on the key issues: the return of 200,000 Georgian refugees, the ultimate status of Abkhazia and the economic future of the republic. In April 2008, the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, announced a new peace plan to resolve the conflict with Abkhazia, which offered the territory what the Georgian leader called "unlimited autonomy" within Georgia and which included the creation of the post of vice president, to be occupied by an Abkhaz representative.

In recent years, talks between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia have been held in Geneva on security in the southern Caucasus, with the mediation of the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, and with participation by the USA, which has an incident prevention and response mechanism. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2010, the government of Georgia approved an action plan to implement the objectives contained in the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation", which set forth the guidelines that the government should follow in its relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The government of Georgia's strategy was rejected several times by the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a speech before the European Parliament in November, the president of Georgia, Dmitry Saakashvili, announced Georgia's unilateral commitment not to use force to restore control over its territory. According to Saakashvili, Georgia would use peaceful means and would retain the right to defend itself only in the event of new attacks and invasion of the Georgian territory under Georgia's control. In recent years, Russia had demanded that Georgia sign agreements not to use force with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia defended the need for a non-aggression pact with Russia, which it regarded as the main actor in the conflict. In the more recent years, Russia had come to defend unilateral declarations not to use force, although it had discarded the possibility of adopting a measure of this kind itself, as it was asking Georgia to do. In December, the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced their willingness to pledge not to use force, claiming that they would not use force against Georgia, its people, its territory or its armed forces. In March 2011, Russia stressed that it was not a party in the conflict, so it saw no reason for it to sign a commitment not to use force, while it still asked Georgia to sign this kind of agreement with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also in December, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia asked that the discussions on international security arrangements be removed from the agenda of the Geneva negotiations, one of the key issues that until then had been linked to the question of the non-use of force, a controversial topic and frequently the subject of arguments in the process.

In February 2012, Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze accused Russia of trying to put an end to the Geneva talks by reducing the frequency of the rounds and rejecting key discussions within both working groups that make up the negotiating format: the group on security issues and the group on humanitarian issues. According to Georgia, in the first group Russia explicitly rejected addressing security arrangements and said it would not commit to the use of force because it did not consider itself a party to the conflict, whereas Georgia had already adopted a unilateral commitment in that regard. In April, the former head of the security committee of the region, Leonid Tibilov, took over as the new President of South Ossetia after his second-round election victory that gave him 54.12% of the vote against special envoy for human rights David Sanakoev, who carried 42.65%. In June, the 20<sup>th</sup> round of the Geneva negotiating process was held and no progress was made. The Abkhazian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Chirikba, said that the format of the process had to be changed and that it currently limited effective decision-making, although he did not specify in detail what he wanted to change. In October, as part of its programme aimed at conflict resolution, the entering government stressed public diplomacy, joint economic and business projects and promoting contacts between the populations on both sides of the border. According to the programme, resolving the conflict depends on constructing democratic institutions and fixing socioeconomic problems in Georgia in order to convince the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the advantages of living in a unified state. In November, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Chirikba said that the government was ready to sign an agreement on the non-use of force with Georgia as long as the format of the Geneva negotiations changed the status Abkhazian participation to that of a "delegation". Meanwhile,

the 22<sup>nd</sup> round of negotiations on the conflict in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was held in Geneva, the first round for the new Georgian government after the elections in October. The head of Georgia's negotiating team, Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze (who is staying on as Deputy Foreign Minister, although he now combines those duties with his leadership of the negotiations), acknowledged some progress related to the first of the two working groups that structure the negotiations, the one devoted to security issues, where steps were taken to prepare a draft on the non-use of force. However, according to the Georgian representative, the second group, focused on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, was hampered by the attitudes and positions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, which attempted to discuss possible changes to the format of the process instead of specific proposals on humanitarian issues in Georgia.

## The peace process in 2013

The negotiating process between Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, with external facilitation, continued without making any clear progress during the first few months of the year. The 23<sup>rd</sup> round, held in March, ended with no agreements other than the commitment to hold a new round in August. The international facilitators (the UN, OSCE and EU) said in a later statement that the parties appreciated the calm and stability on the ground and agreed to continue working on the discussion on the non-use of force. The Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister, who is leading his country's negotiating team, said that the parties' positions on the non-use of force remained unchanged while Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said that expectations about a successful round had not materialised. Meanwhile, in the negotiating process' working group on humanitarian issues, the parties tackled the possibility of organising visits to both sides of the administrative border for people affected by the conflict.

Before the round was held, the Georgian Minister for Reintegration had pointed out that his government had placed a priority on continuing the Geneva talks and that Georgia was not closed to discussing Abkhazia and South Ossetia's attempts to change the format, but a change of format could not be an objective in itself and had to aim to achieve results. Moreover, he warned of Russia's attempts to undermine the process.

Outside the scope of the negotiating process, as part of the close relations between Georgia and the elites of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the top leader of Abkhazia, Alexander Ankvab, in Moscow in March to address cooperation issues. The meeting was criticised by Georgia. Meanwhile, Georgia and Russia continued their rapprochement that began with the change of government in Georgia and representatives of both parties met in early March. Despite the gradual diplomatic rapprochement that had taken place in the months prior, tensions rose because of some military exercises carried out by Russia in the Black Sea that were harshly criticised by Georgia, which said that they were provocative and unplanned, though they did not involve Russian forces in Abkhazia. Russia described Georgian criticism as politically motivated.

The period from April to June continued to be marked by **Abkhazia's refusal to participate in the regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)**, a stance it has maintained since April 2012 and whose revocation was dependent on the departure of the head of the EU mission, who was considered a persona non grata. Nevertheless, other mechanisms of dialogue between the parties were kept active with the help of the EU, such as the 24-hour hotline and participation in the Geneva talks that bring together representatives of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia, as well as international facilitators (the EU, OSCE and UN). In the 23<sup>rd</sup> round, which took place in March, once again no agreement was possible for a joint position on the non-use of force. According to the Russian representatives during that round, the discussion over a draft text prepared by the co-mediators was postponed until the next meeting by Georgia's refusal to refer it to expert evaluation and by **the Georgian representatives' insistence on obtaining unilateral commitments from Russia on the non-use of force, which Russia found**

**unacceptable.** In addition, during that round Abkhazia requested that in future rounds, the possibility of providing travel conditions to citizens that only have passports from de facto independent regions would be discussed. A new round took place in late June. Russia described the results as disappointing, while Georgia blasted Abkhazia and South Ossetia for their “destructive” approach and denounced their attempts to change the format of the negotiations. The United States also deplored the fact that some participants reduced their involvement in the working group on humanitarian issues.

Georgia and Russia expressed their willingness to normalise relations, even though **Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was irrevocable.** In late September, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Abkhazian leader Alexander Ankvab amidst a certain reduction in Russian budgetary support to the region. Meanwhile, **Georgia restated its willingness to promote a policy for the regions based on restoring contacts among the population, repairing bridges among the communities and conducting public diplomacy** as key elements for advancing towards a political resolution of both conflicts. This was described in early August by Defence Minister Irakli Alasania, who reiterated that no stakeholder could hamper the policy, including Russia. Furthermore, Alasania mentioned Georgia’s willingness to get involved in direct talks with what he described as “our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers”. The Georgian Minister of the Interior expressed his desire to start the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) again as soon as possible, which is a communication schedule of regular meetings involving Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and the EU in order to prevent and give a rapid response to security incidents that has been paralysed since March 2012 due to Abkhazia’s refusal to participate because of disagreements with the head of the EU mission (EUMM), Andrzej Tyszkiewicz. After Toivo Klaar was appointed the new head-of-mission in September 2013, Georgia hoped that the IPRM meetings could resume.

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, stated that relations would be restored, that all necessary efforts would be exerted into doing so and that they would be successful. His counterpart Dmitry Medvedev indicated that the Russian and Georgian peoples should maintain their mutual sympathy and that both countries must develop good relations. With regard to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia, Medvedev said that there was a common desire to cooperate and develop normalised lives and that Russia would not hinder that purpose, although once again he repeated that recognition of the independence of both regions was irrevocable.

Moreover, in the working group devoted to humanitarian issues, the representatives of the various delegations exchanged ideas on the subjects of disappeared people and on the possibility for populations affected by the conflict to pay visits to the other side of the border. The need to stipulate procedures to tackle medical emergencies was also highlighted, as was the importance of preserving cultural heritage. The round at the end of June ended with mutual criticism and accusations between Georgia, on one side, and Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other. Work continued on a draft for a joint declaration of the non-use of force, but according to Georgia there was no progress in this regard due to the parties’ irreconcilable positions.

Relations between Georgia and South Ossetia continued to be marked by distance and deep antagonism over stances on status, despite the change in language introduced by the new Georgian government following the October 2012 elections. Thus, **the government of South Ossetia said that the new government’s policy was not much different from that of its predecessors.** South Ossetia criticised Georgia for its unwillingness to acknowledge the existing reality, in reference to the independence of the region. According to South Ossetian authorities, Georgia should sign an agreement on the non-use of force with South Ossetia and start to delimit and demarcate the border between South Ossetia and Georgia.

Meanwhile, **the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) continued active** during the quarter and held several meetings, including one in July and another in September and an ad hoc meeting in August. During the meetings, joint visits were proposed to places on the


administrative border where the placement of fences and other obstacles by Russian troops raises concern. It was also announced that an evaluation of demining needs would be made, an aspect linked to concern to ensure the communities' safety at harvest time. Furthermore, the direct hotline between both parties was activated in August, which facilitated the release of a minor that was detained with three adults when they crossed the line of the administrative border with South Ossetia.

The delegations of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia held the twenty-sixth round of negotiations known as the Geneva talks on 18 December co-chaired by the OSCE, the UN and the EU, without reaching an agreement yet on the non-use of force. After the previous round, in November, the co-chairs indicated that the parties had agreed to continue working on a shared declaration on the non-use of force that could be adopted in the near future. However, in the round in December, an agreement was not possible. According to a statement made later, the parties agreed to keep working on the issue. The Georgian government said that the differences between the parties had become clear once again. The co-chairs appreciated the relative calm and stability in the border areas, though they also drew attention to the fences and other obstacles around the borders and to their negative impact on the population. Furthermore, Georgian President Georgy Margvelashvili said in late December that taken together with other steps towards Europe, the Association Agreement with the EU approved at the European summit in November would help to solve problematic issues with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was irrevocable.</li> <li>• During the quarter, Russia and Georgia expressed their willingness to move forward in normalising relations.</li> <li>• The government of South Ossetia said that the new Georgian government's policy was not much different from that of its predecessors.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AlertNet (<a href="http://www.alertnet.org">www.alertnet.org</a>)</li> <li>• Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (<a href="http://www.cipdd.org">www.cipdd.org</a>)</li> <li>• Caucasian Knot (<a href="http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru">eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru</a>)</li> <li>• Caucaz Europeanews (<a href="http://www.caucaz.com">www.caucaz.com</a>)</li> <li>• Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (<a href="http://www.cacianalyst.org">www.cacianalyst.org</a>)</li> <li>• Civil Georgia (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng">www.civil.ge/eng</a>)</li> <li>• Georgia Today (<a href="http://www.georgiatoday.ge">www.georgiatoday.ge</a>)</li> <li>• Government of Georgia (<a href="http://www.government.gov.ge">www.government.gov.ge</a>)</li> <li>• Institute for War and Peace Reporting (<a href="http://www.iwpr.net">www.iwpr.net</a>)</li> <li>• International Alert (<a href="http://www.international-alert.org">www.international-alert.org</a>)</li> <li>• International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (<a href="http://www.iccn.ge">www.iccn.ge</a>)</li> <li>• International Crisis Group (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</li> <li>• Media News (<a href="http://www.medianews.ge">www.medianews.ge</a>)</li> <li>• OSCE Mission to Georgia (<a href="http://www.osce.org/georgia">www.osce.org/georgia</a>)</li> <li>• Parliament of Georgia (<a href="http://www.parliament.ge">www.parliament.ge</a>)</li> <li>• Partners-Georgia (<a href="http://www.partners.ge">www.partners.ge</a>)</li> <li>• PILPG (<a href="http://www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html">www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html</a>)</li> <li>• Presidency of Georgia (<a href="http://www.president.gov.ge">www.president.gov.ge</a>)</li> <li>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</li> <li>• Swiss Peace (<a href="http://www.swisspeace.org">www.swisspeace.org</a>)</li> <li>• UNAG online Magazine (<a href="http://www.civil.ge">www.civil.ge</a>)</li> <li>• UN Association of Georgia (<a href="http://www.una.ge">www.una.ge</a>)</li> <li>• UNOMIG (<a href="http://www.unomig.org">www.unomig.org</a>)</li> </ul>

## Main parties involved in the process



## Middle East

### ISRAEL – PALESTINE

#### Context of the conflict

The roots of the conflict date back to the end of World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This led the Palestinian territory to be put under UK administration under the Mandate System adopted by the League of Nations. This mandate lasted from 1922 to 1947. During this time, many Jews immigrated to Palestine, particularly at the time of the Nazi persecution in the 1930s. In

1947 the UK passed the problem on to the United Nations. In the same year, the UN's Resolution 181 declared that the territory under British mandate would be divided into two states with no territorial continuity. This division was never wholly implemented. The partition of the Holy Land by the United Nations and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 were the main factors that sparked the current conflict. Shortly after the British left the area, Israel occupied 77% of Palestinian territory and a large part of Jerusalem. Zionist paramilitary groups massacred many Palestinians and drove some 800,000 Palestinians into exile. There were five wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982) before the present conflict. The PLO was founded in 1959, and soon afterwards Yasser Arafat became its leader. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, establishing a security ring around Israel, intensifying the Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and triggering a second exodus of Palestinians (half a million). In 1974 the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the PLO. In 1982 Israel invaded the Lebanon, leading to a large-scale massacre in the Palestine refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, and leading to the expulsion of Arafat in 1983, who went into exile in Tunis. In 1987 the desperation of the occupied Palestinian population led to the first "Intifada" (1987-1992), at the same time that Arafat began gestures aimed at bridging the gap with the United States, convinced that it was the only country capable of putting pressure on Israel. The second Intifada began in September 2000. Since then, more than 5,500 people have died, 80% of them Palestinians. In 2002, Israel began to build a wall to separate the two communities, thus spurring increasing criticism from the international community.

**Population:** Israel (7.7 million inhabitants); Palestine (4.3 million)  
**Area:** Israel (22,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Palestine (6,240 km<sup>2</sup>)  
**HDI:** Israel (16 out of 186)  
**GDP** Israel: 241,069 million dollars; Palestine: 10,255 million dollars  
**Per capita income** Israel: \$31,308; Palestine: \$2,385  
**Deaths due to the conflict:** 7,500 (since 2000)  
**Armed actors:** Israeli armed forces, Hamas, Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades  
**Facilitators:** Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU, UN), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Arab League (Follow-up Committee)

#### Background to the peace process

In the past two decades, countless initiatives have been undertaken to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine, with no results. Israel is demanding full security guarantees, while Palestine is asking for the return of refugees, sharing the capital of Jerusalem and an end to the Jewish settlements in its territory. In 1990, the first secret negotiations got underway in Oslo, which led to the signing of the first agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Washington. In essence, the principles contained in the Oslo Agreement are the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the Palestinians' right to self-governance in these zones through the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian government would last five years on an interim basis, during which period its status would be renegotiated (starting in May 1996). The issues on Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security and the precise borders were not addressed. The interim self-governance would take place in phases. Two years earlier, in 1991, the Madrid Conference was held, which was guided by the principle of exchanging "peace for territories". At this conference, the bases for future bilateral negotiations were laid. In 1995, the so-called "Barcelona Process" was launched to stimulate cooperation among all the countries in the Mediterranean, including Israel. In 1995, too, the Oslo II process got underway, which called

for a zone under Palestinian control, a zone with a mixed administration and another zone controlled by Israel, with motorways that would join the zones under Israeli control. In 1998, this process was totally paralysed.

In 2002, with the conflict in a state of wholesale deterioration, the number of peace initiatives multiplied, including the creation of the International Working Group for Palestinian Reform, the actions of the Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU and UN), and most notably, the Quartet's "Roadmap" or peace plan dating from December 2002, which contained three stages that would conclude with the creation of an independent Palestinian state in 2005. In 2005, the conflict between Israel and Palestine took a qualitative leap after the death of Yasser Arafat, the election victory of M. Abbas in the Palestinian presidential elections and the subsequent opening of direct talks with the government of Israel. Throughout 2006, the thorny peace process between Israel and Palestine was initially marked by the victory of the group Hamas in the January elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and by the subsequent international block of the new Islamist government. In 2007, the peace conference held in Annapolis (Maryland, USA) ended, the first peace talks held between the Palestinian National authority (PNA) and Israel in seven years. The conference defined the beginning of talks based on the Roadmap, which would start on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December with biweekly meetings of the negotiation teams led by the joint steering committee. Likewise, the communiqué stated that there was agreement to discuss all the fundamental issues, without exception, in an attempt to create an independent Palestinian state. The fundamental issues agreed upon, known as the "final status", were the future of Jerusalem, the borders, water, refugees and the settlements.

During the first week of May 2010, the resumption of indirect talks between the Israelis and Palestinians was announced in an attempt to make headway in the peace process. The round of talks ended without any signs of progress, and with no date to continue the dialogue, which should have spread over the ensuing four months and address key issues, such as Jerusalem and the status of the refugees. The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met in Washington on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September in a new round of direct talks between the parties, the first in 20 months. Abbas had demanded a total cessation of colony building, including in Jerusalem, as a step prior to talks, but he ended up giving in to the intense international pressures, and Washington announced, at least officially, that the restoration of contacts came "with no conditions". Netanyahu's priorities were security, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (the refugees could only return to a Palestinian state) and an end to the conflict, without the possibility of admitting further claims in the future. In January 2011, the Qatari television channel *Al-Jazeera* and the British newspaper *The Guardian* started to divulge more than 1,600 internal documents on the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis during the past decade, in which they revealed that the Palestinian negotiators offered Israel sovereignty over most of Jerusalem. The Palestinian representatives gave up the right for the refugees to return, and they accepted instead the return of a symbolic number of between 5,000 and 10,000 of them. The Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, stated that Israel was willing to make "painful" concessions and to hand over some territories, but it stressed that it would not return to the 1967 borders. What is more, he stressed that Jerusalem would not be divided, that the issue of the Palestinian refugees could only be resolved outside Israeli's borders and that a future Palestinian state must be completely demilitarised. The Israeli prime minister also discarded the possibility of negotiating with Hamas. In September, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, submitted a request to the United Nations to recognise and accept Palestine as member state number 194 in the international organisation, and it asked for recognition of a Palestinian state in the borders prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Palestinian proposal to the UN was submitted in a climate of total stagnation in the talks with the government Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, UNESCO accepted Palestine as a full member of the organisation in the midst of open opposition from the USA and Israel. With regard to the talks between the Palestinian groups, in April 2011 Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement that put an end to the profound gulf between the Palestinian factions since 2007.



In February 2012, Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze accused Russia of trying to put an end to the Geneva talks by reducing the frequency of the rounds and rejecting key discussions within both working groups that make up the negotiating format: the group on security issues and the group on humanitarian issues. According to Georgia, in the first group Russia explicitly rejected addressing security arrangements and said it would not commit to the use of force because it did not consider itself a party to the conflict, whereas Georgia had already adopted a unilateral commitment in that regard. In April, the former head of the security committee of the region, Leonid Tibilov, took over as the new President of South Ossetia after his second-round election victory that gave him 54.12% of the vote against special envoy for human rights David Sanakoev, who carried 42.65%. In June, the 20<sup>th</sup> round of the Geneva negotiating process was held and no progress was made. The Abkhazian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Chirikba, said that the format of the process had to be changed and that it currently limited effective decision-making, although he did not specify in detail what he wanted to change. In October, as part of its programme aimed at conflict resolution, the entering government stressed public diplomacy, joint economic and business projects and promoting contacts between the populations on both sides of the border. According to the programme, resolving the conflict depends on constructing democratic institutions and fixing socioeconomic problems in Georgia in order to convince the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the advantages of living in a unified state. In November, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Chirikba said that the government was ready to sign an agreement on the non-use of force with Georgia as long as the format of the Geneva negotiations changed the status Abkhazian participation to that of a "delegation". Meanwhile, the 22<sup>nd</sup> round of negotiations on the conflict in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was held in Geneva, the first round for the new Georgian government after the elections in October. The head of Georgia's negotiating team, Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze (who is staying on as Deputy Foreign Minister, although he now combines those duties with his leadership of the negotiations), acknowledged some progress related to the first of the two working groups that structure the negotiations, the one devoted to security issues, where steps were taken to prepare a draft on the non-use of force. However, according to the Georgian representative, the second group, focused on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, was hampered by the attitudes and positions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, which attempted to discuss possible changes to the format of the process instead of specific proposals on humanitarian issues in Georgia.

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Georgia and Russia expressed their willingness to normalise relations, even though **Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was irrevocable**. In late September, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Abkhazian leader Alexander Ankvab amidst a certain reduction in Russian budgetary support to the region. Meanwhile, **Georgia restated its willingness to promote a policy for the regions based on restoring contacts among the population, repairing bridges among the communities and conducting public diplomacy as key elements for advancing towards a political resolution of both conflicts**. This was described in early August by Defence Minister Irakli Alasania, who reiterated that no stakeholder could hamper the policy, including Russia. Furthermore, Alasania mentioned Georgia's willingness to get involved in direct talks with what he described as "our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers". The Georgian Minister of the Interior expressed his desire to start the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) again as soon as possible, which is a communication schedule of regular meetings involving Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and the EU in order to prevent and give a rapid response to security incidents that has been paralysed since March 2012 due to Abkhazia's refusal to participate because of disagreements with the head of the EU mission (EUMM), Andrzej Tyszkiewicz. After Toivo Klaar was appointed the new head-of-mission in September 2013, Georgia hoped that the IPRM meetings could resume.

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, stated that relations would be restored, that all necessary efforts would be exerted into doing so and that they would be successful. His counterpart Dmitry Medvedev indicated that the Russian and Georgian peoples should maintain their mutual sympathy and that both countries must develop good relations. With regard to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia, Medvedev said that there was a common desire to cooperate and develop normalised lives and that Russia would not hinder that purpose, although once again he repeated that recognition of the independence of both regions was irrevocable.

Moreover, in the working group devoted to humanitarian issues, the representatives of the various delegations exchanged ideas on the subjects of disappeared people and on the possibility for populations affected by the conflict to pay visits to the other side of the border. The need to stipulate procedures to tackle medical emergencies was also highlighted, as was the importance of preserving cultural heritage. The round at the end of June ended with mutual criticism and accusations between Georgia, on one side, and Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other. Work continued on a draft for a joint declaration of the non-use of force, but according to Georgia there was no progress in this regard due to the parties' irreconcilable positions.

Relations between Georgia and South Ossetia continued to be marked by distance and deep antagonism over stances on status, despite the change in language introduced by the new Georgian government following the October 2012 elections. Thus, **the government of South Ossetia said that the new government's policy was not much different from that of its predecessors.** South Ossetia criticised Georgia for its unwillingness to acknowledge the existing reality, in reference to the independence of the region. According to South Ossetian authorities, Georgia should sign an agreement on the non-use of force with South Ossetia and start to delimit and demarcate the border between South Ossetia and Georgia.

Meanwhile, the **Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)** continued active during the quarter and held several meetings, including one in July and another in September and an ad hoc meeting in August. During the meetings, joint visits were proposed to places on the administrative border where the placement of fences and other obstacles by Russian troops raises concern. It was also announced that an evaluation of demining needs would be made, an aspect linked to concern to ensure the communities' safety at harvest time. Furthermore, the direct hotline between both parties was activated in August, which facilitated the release of a minor that was detained with three adults when they crossed the line of the administrative border with South Ossetia.


The delegations of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia held the twenty-sixth round of negotiations known as the Geneva talks on 18 December co-chaired by the OSCE, the UN and the EU, without reaching an agreement yet on the non-use of force. After the previous round, in November, the co-chairs indicated that the parties had agreed to continue working on a shared declaration on the non-use of force that could be adopted in the near future. However, in the round in December, an agreement was not possible. According to a statement made later, the parties agreed to keep working on the issue. The Georgian government said that the differences between the parties had become clear once again. The co-chairs appreciated the relative calm and stability in the border areas, though they also drew attention to the fences and other obstacles around the borders and to their negative impact on the population. Furthermore, Georgian President Georgy Margvelashvili said in late December that taken together with other steps towards Europe, the Association Agreement with the EU approved at the European summit in November would help to solve problematic issues with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was irrevocable.</li> <li>• During the quarter, Russia and Georgia expressed their willingness to move forward in normalising relations.</li> <li>• The government of South Ossetia said that the new Georgian government's policy was not much different from that of its predecessors.</li> </ul>

Websites of interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alternative Information Center (<a href="http://www.alternativenews.org">www.alternativenews.org</a>)</li> <li>• BBC (<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/default.stm">news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/default.stm</a>)</li> <li>• Haaretz (<a href="http://www.haaretz.com">www.haaretz.com</a>)</li> <li>• Incore (<a href="http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries">www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries</a>)</li> </ul>

- Interpeace ([www.interpeace.org](http://www.interpeace.org))
- IPCRI ([www.ipcri.org](http://www.ipcri.org))
- Middle East Research and Information Project ([www.merip.org](http://www.merip.org))
- Mideast Web ([www.mideastweb.org](http://www.mideastweb.org))
- Foreign Ministry of Israel ([www.mfa.gov.il/mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa))
- Mundo Árabe ([www.mundoarabe.org](http://www.mundoarabe.org))
- United Nations ([www.un.org/spanish/peace/palestine](http://www.un.org/spanish/peace/palestine)) ([www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc](http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc))
- PLO Negotiation Affairs Department ([www.nad-plo.org/index.php](http://www.nad-plo.org/index.php))
- Reliefweb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int))

## Main parties involved in the process



# SYRIA

## Context of the conflict

The civil war in Syria is a conflict stemming from the “Arab Spring” that blossomed in Tunisia and Egypt and reached Syria in early 2011, when large peaceful demonstrations took place in some cities that were brutally repressed by the military of President Bashar Assad. Faced with the regime’s heavy-handed response and the ruthlessness of the Syrian Armed Forces, which did not hesitate to bombard the civilian population, destroy cities and use tanks to kill unarmed civilians, reaching an estimated death toll of 120,000 by the end of 2013, groups of civilians opposing the government organised into self-defence forces with the help of some Western and Middle Eastern countries and succeeded in conquering several important cities in the country after a few months. The conflict became a magnet for combatants from various countries, some linked to al-Qaeda, which joined the rebel ranks in a disorderly manner, making it difficult to reach agreements to at least negotiate a ceasefire or a humanitarian truce.

<b>Population:</b> 22.4 million
<b>Surface area:</b> 186,475 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>HDI:</b> 116 (of 186)
<b>GDP:</b> 46.540 billion USD
<b>Per capita income:</b> 2,077 USD
<b>Deaths due to the conflict:</b> 120,000
<b>Refugees:</b> 2.3 million
<b>Armed groups:</b> Free Syrian Army, jihadist groups, al-Qaeda
<b>Facilitators:</b> UN, Arab League

The fortunes of the conflict shifted towards the regime due to the support given to it by Hezbollah’s Lebanese militias. This regionalised the conflict, as did the mass exodus of people fleeing to other countries. The international community’s attempts to open negotiations with the regime of Bashar Assad were unsuccessful due to the President’s lack of seriousness and most combatants’ refusal to negotiate with him, as they demand that he leave power. The Syrian regime was largely able to stay afloat with the military and political aid of Russia, which provided it with plenty of weaponry and vetoed any UN Security Council resolution against it.

## Background to the peace process

Throughout 2012, violence persisted in the country as regional and international peace initiatives emerged. An Arab League observer mission entered the country in late December, but was unable to stop the conflict from escalating. The mission’s work was marred by complaints by some of its members about the observers’ alleged closeness to Bashar Assad’s regime and ineffectiveness in preventing abuse against the civilian population. In addition, the mission was led by Sudanese General Mohamed al-Dabi, who was the subject of controversy due to accusations that he had violated human rights in his country. In light of this, several Arab countries withdrew their contingents from the mission. Although Damascus had authorised extending the mission in the country, it ended up withdrawing from Syria in late January. The Arab League then proposed a new peace plan, which included Bashar Assad’s resignation, the transfer of power to a Vice President, the formation of a national unity government and talks with the opposition within two weeks. This plan was rejected by the Syrian government.

In mid-February, the Arab League and the United Nations designated former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the Special Envoy for Syria. The international official called on the parties to cooperate to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and negotiated intensely with Chinese and Russian representatives to ensure their support for a peace proposal. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev described Annan’s initiative as the last chance to avoid civil war in Syria. Annan’s plan included six points: the opening of an inclusive political process that reflects the aspirations of the Syrian people, an end to violence among all parties under UN supervision, ensured access to humanitarian aid, the release of political prisoners, guarantees for the freedom of expression and circulation of journalists and respect for the right of association and peaceful demonstration. Assad’s government accepted the proposal in late March, but his final decision was met with scepticism from the international community, which demanded guarantees of

implementation. Syrian opposition groups also distanced themselves from the plan because they thought it allowed Assad to buy time and continue repressing the dissidents. Towards the end of March, the truce had not been implemented, even though 10 April had been set as the starting date of the ceasefire, which in the end was not honoured. **While the ceasefire between the parties provided for in the peace plan, never took place**, news sources reported on the actions of Bashar Assad's forces, which resulted in many civilian fatalities, as well as incidents instigated by rebel forces. Damascus did not fulfil its commitment to withdraw heavy weapons from the cities. In June, international powers agreed to establish a transitional government in Syria as a way to put an end to the violent conflict in the country. To find a negotiated way out of the crisis, UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan announced that the new government would include members of the current government and of the opposition on the basis of mutual consent. The agreement, which was signed after a meeting in Geneva, did not make it clear what the role of current Syrian President Bashar Assad would be in this process. The agreement was accepted by Russia, the main source of support for the Syrian regime. Moscow achieved the deal without preconditions and without blocking Assad's possible participation in the new government, although members of the opposition in exile were expected to reject the potential participation of the leader and some of his family members and closest advisors. The United States interpreted the agreement differently than Russia, saying that it sent a clear message to the Syrian President of the need to step down. The United Kingdom also said that Assad and his associates could not lead the transition. Annan called a meeting after admitting that the six-point peace plan that he had proposed to the parties on behalf of the UN and the Arab League had been largely ignored by Damascus. Annan stressed that the transition had to be led by the Syrians and that it had to respond to their legitimate aspirations. One day before the meeting in Geneva, Assad declared that he would not accept any solution imposed from the outside and that he would not cede to foreign pressure. Until late June, the proposal of a transition government was the only option for a political solution on the table. The Geneva meeting was attended by representatives of the five permanent member countries of the UN Security Council, in addition to Turkey, Kuwait, Qatar, the UN Secretary-General, the leader of the Arab League and the EU's top diplomat. There were no representatives of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian government or the Syrian opposition at the meeting.

Faced with the failure of his peace plan and his attempts to bring the parties closer to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, Kofi Annan, **decided to resign** in early August. Annan's plan called for the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from the cities, the cessation of hostilities, access for humanitarian agencies and the international press to the areas in conflict and the beginning of talks between the warring parties. During the quarter, the UN also ended its observer mission in the country, which was replaced by a contact office. The mission was set up in April to support the implementation of Annan's peace plan. After leaving it, the mission's military chief, Norwegian General Robert Mood, said that outside intervention was not the right way to solve the crisis and that involving Turkey was key to ending the conflict in Syria.

Against this backdrop, on 1 September **Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi assumed the duties of mediator** left by Annan. Throughout the month, Brahimi held meetings with different stakeholders involved in the conflict, including Syrian President Bashar Assad. Meanwhile, at Egypt's request, a regional initiative that also included Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey was activated. However, Riyadh's representatives were absent from both meetings held in September. At the end of the quarter, Brahimi reported on the situation in Syria to the United Nations Security Council and warned that it was extremely serious, that it was getting worse and that he saw no prospects for a rapprochement of positions in the short term. In late September, representatives from 20 opposition parties tolerated by the Syrian government called for the parties in conflict to halt the violence immediately to open the way to a political process that would guarantee a radical change in the country and the end of the Assad regime. However, their appeal was dismissed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which thought that it could send mixed messages to the international community about the possibilities of negotiation.

## The peace process in 2013

The year began with President Bashar Assad's offer in early January to hold a national dialogue and a constitutional referendum to put an end to the crisis. However, the Syrian leader remained defiant, accusing his adversaries of terrorism and describing the crisis in the country as a plot instigated from abroad. Assad's plan was met with outright rejection by part of the opposition and sectors of the international community, since it did not include his resignation as a first step to begin a political transition in the country. The Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, Lakhdar Brahimi, expressed his disappointment about the missed opportunity, as Damascus' proposal was no different than others that also failed in the past. The Algerian diplomat stressed that both sides in the conflict were irreconcilable and regional powers remained deeply divided over it. In this context, Brahimi, whose mandate was extended to the end of 2013, focused part of his efforts on reaching an agreement between the United States and Russia regarding the Syrian crisis and said that the horrors visited on the country were unprecedented and could have serious consequences for the region.

In this context, in late January, Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the main opposition platform in exile, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), laid down a set of conditions for starting direct talks with Damascus anywhere outside the country that had Syrian Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa as the interlocutor. These conditions included the release of 160,000 prisoners and the renewal of dissidents' passports. Until then, the exiled opposition had always called first for Assad's resignation. However, Khatib's proposal once again exposed **divisions between the Syrian dissidents**, as some groups of the coalition dismissed it. In February, Brahimi backed Khatib's proposal for negotiations depending on the *acceptability* of the government's delegation, while Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said that the regime was ready to hold talks with the opposition, including armed groups. Weeks before, Walid had asserted that members of the Syrian *nationalist* opposition that gave up their weapons and rejected any form of foreign intervention could join the new government. Against this backdrop, a meeting between Khatib and the Russian Foreign Minister in Munich was hailed as a sign of diplomatic progress. In mid-February, however, a meeting of the senior leadership of the **Syrian National Coalition concluded that the essential criteria for negotiating with the regime would require the resignation of Assad and the entire military and state security leadership**, since they could not form part of a political solution to the conflict. The Syrian opposition also threatened not to attend a meeting of the Friends of Syria Group in Rome due to the lack of international support, but finally participated after receiving guarantees of direct aid. In late March, Khatib resigned from his post. According to some analysts, the leader thought that the opposition platform had become too influenced by Islamist groups and by countries such as Qatar. He was also against the election of a Syrian government in exile.

Given the exacerbation of the armed conflict in Syria, in early May the United States and Russia agreed to hold a new peace conference in Geneva in June. This news was welcomed by the Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, because it raised expectations about the possibility of unblocking concerted action by the Security Council against the war. In principle it was hoped that the meeting would take the statement adopted in June 2012, after a meeting of the Action Group for Syria, as a starting point. Damascus considered attending the meeting as long as no preconditions were set. Gathered in Istanbul, the Syrian opposition in exile, which some internal dissident groups in Syria did not view as their legitimate representative, showed division again and declared that they would only participate in talks in Geneva if a date were placed on Bashar Assad's resignation and if both Iran and Hezbollah withdrew their support from Damascus. Meanwhile, Russia underlined the importance of Teheran's participation in the talks. Alongside these discussions over the meeting in Geneva, the former head of the Syrian opposition, Moaz al-Khatib, unveiled a proposal for a negotiated solution to the conflict. His 16-point plan included the transfer of power from Assad to his Vice President or to the Prime Minister; the dissolution of Parliament; a 100-day period in which a provisional government would adopt some measures such as the restructuration of the military and security forces; the



release of political prisoners and permission for access to international aid. The proposal also provided for Assad to leave Syria with 500 people to a country willing to accept them and stipulated that the warring parties must stop using heavy weapons under international supervision and that a pardon be granted for all legal action taken during the war (though not for action considered crimes, such as the murder of civilians, torture, rape and kidnapping). After the 100-day period, the provisional government's powers would be transferred to a transitional government established by international guarantees.

The Friends of Syria Group, which brings together the countries that support the dissidents (including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), announced urgent support for the rebel forces so they could hold back government troops, which advanced positions during the third quarter. The group justified the decision due to the failure to reach an agreement for concerted action by the UN Security Council (blocked by Russia and China) and to the need to tip the balance on the ground so the regime would accept negotiations. The US and Russian presidents addressed the subject during a meeting of the G-8, but come late June a date had still not been set for the meeting in Geneva. Against this backdrop, the Syrian Foreign Minister stressed that they would not attend the meeting to transfer power to the opposition, but to discuss the formation of a national unity government. Brahimi was pessimistic about the possibility of holding the meeting in the short term and told Russia and the United States that the supply of arms to both sides must stop in order to avoid a worsening of the situation and to facilitate a negotiated solution.

A good deal of attention during the third quarter was focused on the consequences of the chemical attack carried out in August around Damascus, an event that raised international tension and led the United States to warn of an attack on the Syrian regime, which at times seemed imminent. Against this backdrop, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon focused his efforts on asking the parties to give time for diplomacy and for the weapons inspectors to conclude their investigation into the attack. After a series of negotiations between Russia and the United States, both parties agreed on a resolution text that was approved in September by the UN Security Council (the first such resolution on the Syrian crisis) that established the **destruction of chemical stockpiles in Syria before mid-2014**. The possibility of using measures of force against Syria if it did not fulfil its new commitments was mentioned, but hinged on the approval of a new resolution.

In this context, there were new calls to hold the postponed conference in Geneva (Geneva 2) to find a solution to the crisis, which was finally held in January 2014. The Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, Lakhdar Brahimi, insisted on the need for the parties to not set preconditions for the dialogue. After a new change of leadership, the main opposition group in exile, the Syrian National Coalition, said that it was ready to attend the conference if the goal was to establish a transitional government with total executive powers. However, rebel organisations in Syria reiterated their rejection of talks with the Damascus regime. Furthermore, different groups that represent the Kurdish population of Syria were also divided on how to participate in the conference, as part of the Syrian opposition or with independent representation. One of the purposes of the meeting in Geneva would be to address implementation of the resolution adopted in the Swiss city in June 2012 by various countries. All five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, the United States, France and the United Kingdom) were expected to attend the meeting, although Brahimi stressed that the participation of other key countries would be important, including Iran, which was not invited in the end. Even though the Syrian crisis created 2.3 million refugees, EU member states only gave refuge to 12,340 people (0.5%).


Most significant events of the year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Syrian National Coalition concluded that the essential criteria for negotiating with the regime would require the resignation of Assad and the entire military and state security leadership.</li> </ul>

- Calls increased to hold the postponed conference in Geneva (Geneva 2) to find a solution to the crisis.

#### Websites of interest

- Al Jazeera ([www.aljazeera.com](http://www.aljazeera.com))
- Al-Monitor ([www.al-monitor.com](http://www.al-monitor.com))
- BBC ([www.bbc.co.uk/news](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news))
- Le Monde ([www.lemonde.fr](http://www.lemonde.fr))
- SADA ([carnegieendowment.org](http://carnegieendowment.org))

#### Main parties involved in the process



# APPENDIX



## Appendix 1. Elections following peace agreements

	Peace agreement	Election date	Description
Northern Ireland	April 1998	March 2007	The Good Friday Agreement took place in April 1998. However, the IRA did not renounce armed struggle until 2005 and began to disarm in September, though it would not disappear until 2008. A year before, in March 2007, elections were held and in May a government shared by Catholics and Protestants was formed. At first, the IRA delivered its arms to an international commission, which later melted them all down in the presence of a Catholic priest and a Protestant pastor. The event occurred with no publicity or photographs to avoid a feeling of victory or defeat.
El Salvador	January 1992	May 1994 (presidential)	The first exploratory contacts began in 1984 during the term of José Napoleón Duarte. The peace agreement was signed in January 1992 during the term of the conservative Alfredo Cristiani. In December, the FMLN turned into a political party. In May 1994, the presidential election was won by the conservative Armando Calderón. In March 2009, a member of the FMLN won the presidential election.
Guatemala	December 1996	December 1999 (presidential)	The presidential election held in 1985 was won by Vinicio Cerezo, who began the democratic transition and the first contacts with the URNG guerrilla group. The peace agreement was signed in December 1996 during the term of Álvaro Arzú, which was not wholly fulfilled. In 1999 a referendum was held to ratify part of the peace agreement, which was lost. At the end of that same year, the presidential election was won by Alfonso Portillo. The URNG candidate, Álvaro Colom, came in third, but captured the presidency a few years later (2008-2012).
Angola	April 2002	September 2012 (legislative and presidential)	Before the presidential election in 2012, presidential and legislative elections were held very early in September 1992, with the participation of UNITA in the legislative elections, extending their mandates from 4 to 4 years, until September 2008, when the second legislative elections were held, with a clear drop in support for UNITA. In the September 1992 elections, the ruling party, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won the parliamentary vote, but UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi refused to run against Dos Santos in the presidential election. This caused the civil war to go on for another decade. The definitive peace agreement with UNITA came after its leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in 2002. At the time, the president was José Eduardo dos Santos.
South Africa	1994	May 1994	Due to the loss of seats in the partial elections in 1991, President de Klerk called for a referendum for 17 April 1994 on whether or not to continue with the peace process. The result was 68% for and 31% against. The general elections held in May 1994 were won by Nelson Mandela and a transitional government was established, which led to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 1996, a new Constitution was approved.
Sudan	January 2005	April 2010 (presidential and legislative)	In June 1989, Omar al-Bashir became President after a coup d'état. In 1996, to legitimise his power, he held a referendum that elected him Head of State with all powers. The opposition did not participate in the first elections since the coup d'état of 1989, alleging fraud and organisational shortcomings. Most international observers (Carter Center, EU, IGAD, Arab League) noted deficiencies, but endorsed the elections. Under the umbrella group TAMAM, the 3,500 local observers also reported significant deficiencies. Omar al-Bashir won 68% of the votes and his party, the PCN, won 314 of the 400 seats in Parliament. Salva Kiir, of the MPLS, was elected President of South Sudan and Vice President of Sudan, with 93% of the vote, which foreshadowed his victory in the referendum in 2011.

Indonesia (Aceh)	August 2005	December 2006 (regional)	A resounding victory for the GAM, the former guerrilla militia, which carried 15 of the 19 districts. Former GAM leader I. Yusuf won 38% of the votes and was proclaimed Governor. The EU's Electoral Observation Mission was present, which identified some administrative problems. The Asian Network for Free Elections (Anfre) reported cases of intimidation.
		May 2009 (legislative)	The Aceh Party, the party founded from the former GAM guerrilla militia, won 48.89% of the votes in the province, followed by the Democratic Party (led by President Susilo Bambang), with 10.96% of the votes. Various political groups denounced intimidation by some former GAM combatants. Meanwhile, the Aceh Party suffered several attacks in the weeks running up to the elections. However, the elections were held without any significant incidents. They were supervised by six local organisations, seven governmental ones and eight international ones (Carter Center, International Republican Institute, the Australian and US embassies, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Asian Network for Free Elections Foundation, and National Democracy Institute).
Nepal	June 2006	April 2008 (Constituent Assembly)	The Maoist party and former armed opposition group CPN (M) won the elections to the Constituent Assembly, carrying 116 of 240 seats through the majority system and 100 more through the proportional system, in which it received 29.28% of the votes. Coming in second was the previous majority party, the Nepali Congress, and CPN (UML) took third place. The Constituent Assembly is notably inclusive and representative of ethnic, caste, religious and regional diversity in the country, as well as gender issues (a third of its MPs are women). After the elections, the leader of the former Maoist guerrilla militia CPN, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as Prachanda, was appointed Prime Minister.
CAR	December 2008	January 2011 (legislative and presidential)	(Initially scheduled for October 2010)
Burundi	December 2008	May 2010 (local)	The President's party won an absolute majority and the opposing FNL party, formerly an armed group, won 14% of the votes. Opposition parties denounced electoral fraud. The EU deployed an Electoral Observation Mission composed of 82 people.
		June 2010 (presidential)	Pierre Nkurunziza was elected President in the election of August 2005. Five candidates in the 2010 elections, including Agaton Rwasa, leader of the former armed opposition group FNL, withdrew from the elections to protest the fraud committed in the local elections in May. President Nkurunziza won with 91% of the votes. Turnout was 77%.

## Appendix 2. Main armed groups in the conflicts studied

Mali	Government, France and armed opposition groups MNLA and MIA
Senegal (Casamance)	Government and armed opposition group MFDC
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Government and armed opposition group ONLF
Somalia	Government and al-Shabaab
Sudan (Darfur)	Government and armed opposition groups JEM, JEM (Bashar) and LJM
Sudan – South Sudan	Governments of Sudan and South Sudan
CAR	Government and Séléka coalition of armed forces

DR Congo (East)	Government and armed opposition group M23
Western Sahara	Government of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front
Colombia	Government and ELN and FARC guerrillas
Afghanistan	Government and Taliban groups
India	Government and Naxalite armed opposition groups ULFA, NDFB, various groups in Manipur, NSCN-IM and NSCN-K
India-Pakistan	Governments of India and Pakistan
Philippines	Government and guerrillas MILF, MNLF and NPA
Thailand (South)	Government and armed opposition groups Bersatu, BRN, BIPP and PULO
Myanmar	Government, UNFC coordinator of armed ethnic groups, KIO
Moldova	Governments of Moldavia and of the region of Transdnistria
Cyprus	Governments of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities
Kosovo	Governments of Serbia and of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo
Turkey	Government and guerrilla del PKK
Armenia-Azerbaijan	Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and of the self-proclaimed independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Georgia	Governments and authorities of the de facto independent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Israel-Palestine	Government of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority
Palestine	Fatah and Hamas
Syria	Government, Free Syrian Army and jihadist organisations

Appendix 3. Main armed groups not engaged in negotiations		
Country	Group	Characteristic
Algeria	AQIM	Linked to al-Qaeda
Libya	Various	Anti-Gaddafi militias, pro-Gaddafi militias, Taliban militias
Mali	Ansar Dine, AQIM, MIA, MUJAO	Tuareg groups and al-Qaeda militias
Central African Republic	Séléka	Armed opposition group
Nigeria	Boko Haram	Islamist insurgency
Somalia	al-Shabaab	Linked to al-Qaeda
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)	SPLA-N, SRF, PDF	Armed opposition groups
South Sudan	Division between the Armed Forces	Supporters of the President against supporters of the former Vice President
DR Congo	Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FRT, PARECO, APCLS	Ethnic-based armed opposition groups
Uganda	LRA	Messianic militia
Colombia	ELN	Armed opposition group
Peru	Shining Path	Armed opposition group
Afghanistan	Various	Taliban militias
Philippines	Abu Sayyaf	Linked to al-Qaeda
India (Assam)	ULFA-I	Separatist group
India (Jammu and Kashmir)	JKLF – Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen	Separatist groups
India (Manipur)	PLA – UNLF – RPF – PREPAK	Separatist groups
India	CPI-M	Naxalite group
Iraq	Various	Various insurgent groups, al-Qaeda
Pakistan	Various	Taliban militias
Pakistan (Balochistan)	BLA – BRA – BLF – BLT	Armed nationalist groups
Thailand (South)	Various	Separatist groups
Russia (Chechnya)	Various	Separatist groups
Russia (Dagestan)	Various	Islamist insurgency
Russia (Ingushetia)	Jamaat Ingush	Islamist insurgency
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	Various	Separatist groups
Yemen	al-Qaeda	Islamist insurgency
Yemen	Various	Houthi, Salafist militias
Syria	Various	Pro-government militias, FSA, al-Nusra Front, Salafist groups



#### Appendix 4. Age of conflicts without negotiations

	Start of the conflict	Years underway	
Colombia (ELN)	1964	49	
India (CPI-M)	1967	46	
India (Manipur)	1982	31	
Uganda	1986	27	
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	1991	22	
Algeria	1992	21	
Russia (Chechnya)	1999	14	
Others	after 2000	23	

#### Appendix 5. Facilitators in the conflicts studied

Mali	Burkina Faso, AU
Senegal (Casamance)	Community of Sant'Egidio
Ethiopia (ONLF)	Kenya
Somalia	-
Sudan (Darfur)	Qatar (Ahmed Abdullah al-Mahmud), UNAMID, Chad, AU
Sudan-South Sudan	AU
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)	Ethiopia
CAR	ECCAS, Gabon
RD Congo (M23)	Uganda
Western Sahara	UN (Christopher Ross)
Colombia (FARC)	Norway, Cuba (guarantors)
Afghanistan	Qatar
India (Assam)	-
India (Manipur)	-
India (Nagaland)	-
India-Pakistan	-
Philippines (MILF)	Malaysia (Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak)
Philippines (MNLF)	Indonesia, OIC
Philippines (NPA)	Norway (Ture Lundh)
Thailand (South)	Malaysia
Myanmar	-
Cyprus	UN (Alexander Downer)
Kosovo	Russia, United States, EU
Moldavia	OSCE (Philip Remler)
Turkey	-
Armenia-Azerbaijan	OSCE Minks Group: France, Russia and United States
Georgia	UN, OSCE, EU

Israel-Palestine	United States
Syria	UN, Arab League


#### Appendix 6. Negotiation times in certain conflicts (status at the end of 2013)

	Start of the conflict	Start of the negotiations	Years the conflict lasted	Years until the first negotiation
India-Pakistan	1947	1949	65	2
<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>29</b>
Colombia – ELN	1964	1991	48	27
Colombia – FARC	1964	1983	48	19
Palestine	1967	1990	45	23
Philippines – NPA	1969	1986	44	17
<b>Northern Ireland</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Philippines - MNLF</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>
Cyprus	1974	1974	38	0
<b>Angola</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Cabinda</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>27</b>
Western Sahara	1975	1991	37	16
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Indonesia – GAM</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>24</b>
Philippines – MILF	1978	1998	34	20
India – CPI	1980	2002	32	22
India – NSCN	1980	2003	32	23
<b>Senegal – MFDC</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Sudan – SPLA</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>16</b>
Ethiopia – ONLF	1984	1998	28	4
Turkey – PKK	1986	1994	26	8
Uganda – LRA	1984	2009	28	25
Armenia-Azerb.	1991	1994	21	3
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>
Somalia	1991	2000	21	9
Algeria	1992	1999	20	7
<b>Bosnia-H.</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
Georgia-Abkhazia	1992	1992	20	0
<b>Tajikistan</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Burundi –FNL</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>
Nigeria-MEND	1994	2008	18	14
DR Congo – FDLR	1994	2004	18	10
<b>Nepal – CPN</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Congo- Ninjas</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Ethiopia-Eritrea</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>DR Congo</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Liberia-Lurd</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
Sudan – Darfur	2003	2003	9	0
Yemen	2004	2006	8	2
<b>Sudan - east</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Georgia - Russia</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

(Bold type indicates the conflicts that are finished).

## Appendix 7. Tell me what it was like... The mirrors of peace

Even though all the conflicts and their respective peace processes or negotiations are different, there tend to be certain aspects in each of them that explain why they attract attention, such as their methodology, objectives or other reasons. This table illustrates the processes in which the actors, either governmental or armed, have studied, observed or travelled to other regions to find out firsthand how their process unfolded, creating interesting mirrors where inspiration can be found for dealing with their own difficulties.



## Appendix 8. Conflicts, peace processes and UN Security Council resolutions in 2013

	Resolution number
Mali	2100
Senegal	
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Libya	2095
Somalia	2093 – 2102 – 2111 – 2124 – 2125
Sudan	2091 – 2109 – 2113 – 2126 – 2132
South Sudan	2104 – 2132
Central African Republic	2088 – 2121 – 2127
Burundi	2090
DR Congo	2098
Uganda	
Algeria	
Western Sahara	2099
Colombia	
Afghanistan	2096 – 2120
India	
India-Pakistan (Kashmir)	
Pakistan	
China (Tibet)	
Philippines	
Myanmar	
Thailand (South)	
Cyprus	2089 – 2114
Kosovo	
Turkey (PKK)	
Armenia-Azerbaijan	
Georgia	
Moldova (Transdniestria)	
Russia (Chechnya)	
Russia (Ingushetia)	
Russia (Dagestan)	
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	
Iraq	2110
Israel-Palestine	
Israel-Syria	2108 – 2131
Syria	2118
Yemen	

## Appendix 9. Managing the past in recent peace agreements

Country	Year of peace agreement	Initiatives	Year	Delay
El Salvador	1992	Creating a <b>Truth Commission</b> and subsequent general amnesty	1992	0 years
South Africa	1994	Creating a <b>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</b>	1994	0 years
Guatemala	1996	Creating a <b>Historical Clarification Commission</b>	1997	1 year
		Creating an <b>International Commission against Impunity</b>	2007	11 years
Tajikistan	1997	Creating a National Reconciliation Commission which approved a law on mutual pardon and a draft amnesty law	----	---
Northern Ireland	1998	Creating a <b>Consultative Group on the Past</b> , which has not found the support to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	2007	9 years
Angola	2002	---	---	---
Sierra Leone	2002	Creating a <b>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</b> and the existence of a Special Court for Sierra Leone	2002	0 years
Liberia	2003	Amnesty after the peace agreement and later creating a <b>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</b>	2005	2 years
Indonesia (Aceh)	2005	The peace agreement granted amnesty to the members of the GAM and called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be set up, which has not yet been done.	---	---
Southern Sudan	2005	---	---	---
Nepal	2006	In 2009, there was a verbal commitment to create a Commission on Disappeared Persons and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.	---	---
Burundi	2008	The peace agreement contained provisional immunity for the FNL members and its transformation into a political party. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be created.	---	---

## Appendix 10. Peace processes in recent years

This appendix summarises the peace processes that have taken place in 12 countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Angola, South Africa, Liberia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Burundi, Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal. It encompasses processes begun between 1984 (El Salvador) and 2002 (Nepal), which lasted between four years in Nepal and 21 years in Northern Ireland. The majority had mediators (four by the United Nations), and as for the underlying causes, four were the democratisation of the country, five were political power-sharing and three were self-governance. In two of the processes (Guatemala and South Africa), there was widespread participation by society, while the remaining processes were conducted in a more pyramidal fashion. Once the agreements were reached, an amnesty for combatants was called in all the countries, although Truth Commissions were created in only some of them. All the opposition groups that fought in the conflict ended up holding positions of responsibility in the new governments that emerged after the peace agreements.

	Negotiation period	Years	Mediation	Underlying cause
El Salvador	1984-1994	10	UN	Democratisation of the country
Guatemala	1985-1996	11	UN	Democratisation of the country
Northern Ireland	1987-2008	21	-	Self-governance
Angola	1988-2002	14	Portugal, Russia, USA	Political power-sharing
South Africa	1989-1994	5	-	Democratisation of the country
Liberia	1990-2003	13	ECOWAS	Political power-sharing
Tajikistan	1992-1997	5	UN	Political power-sharing
Sierra Leone	1994-2002	8	UN	Political power-sharing
Southern Sudan	1998-2005	7	IGAD	Self-governance
Burundi	1998-2008	10	Tanzania South Africa	Political power-sharing
Indonesia (Aceh)	2000-2005	5	CDH Finland	Self-governance
Nepal	2002-2006	4	-	Democratisation of the country

The reasons for engaging in negotiations and starting the peace processes were diverse, but in all cases the people's weariness with war and desire for peace were crucial. In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the regional context favourable to talks (Contadora Group) played a key role, as it did in Tajikistan. In Guatemala, the presidential elections that fostered a change in the political scene were influential, while in Northern Ireland and South Africa the economic need to achieve peace was an important factor. In Tajikistan and South Africa, the fact that the guerrillas no longer had a safe rearguard was a determining factor. External pressure exerted an influence in South Africa, Angola, southern Sudan and Burundi. The humanitarian crisis was the trigger in southern Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh); in the latter country, a natural catastrophe, the tsunami, catalysed the process. Finally, in Nepal, popular demonstrations against the monarchy paved the way for the negotiations that led to the definitive peace agreement.

## The process in El Salvador

A civil war broke out in 1980 which led to the death of 75,000 people, as the FMLN guerrillas clashed with the country's repressive militaristic government. In 1983, the Security Council approved a resolution in which it stated its support for the peace-building activities of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), which had embarked on a series of consultations in five Central American countries. Between 1984 and 1987, the first four exploratory dialogue encounters were held, to no avail, between the government and FMLN representatives. These talks were mediated by the archbishop of El Salvador, Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas. At the last meeting, the Nunciature Round in October 1987, a communiqué was issued that expressed the desire to reach a ceasefire and to back the decisions taken by the Contadora Group. This was a stage in which both parties' positions matured and became more flexible. The Esquipulas Process gained prominence in 1986, which used the efforts of the Contadora Group and was joined by the Support Group (Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) with the backing of the OAS and the UN. Between 1987 and 1990, the Central American presidents called for a negotiated political solution.

In September 1989, the Secretary General of the United Nations conducted his first good offices spurred by a request by President Cristiani and the FMLN made in Mexico. The Secretary General appointed Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto his special representative. The agreement signed in Mexico between the government and the FMLN included a decision to embark on a dialogue process with the purpose of putting an end to the armed conflict. However, in November, the FMLN launched a general offensive to demonstrate its strength. The offensive was contained by the armed forces, leading both parties to reach the conclusion that they were militarily tied.

In April 1990, a dialogue meeting was held in Geneva sponsored by the United Nations and in the presence of the Secretary General. At this meeting, an agreement was signed that laid down a series of rules to be followed in the negotiation process and stated both parties' desire to reach a negotiated, political solution. The goals were to end the armed conflict via political means, to promote the country's democratisation, to ensure unlimited respect for human rights and to reunify Salvadoran society. In May of the same year, a meeting was held in Caracas where a general negotiating agenda and calendar were drawn up. The process was divided into two phases: in the first, political agreements would be reached in areas that enabled the armed conflict to come to an end; and in the second, the guarantees and conditions needed for the FMLN to rejoin the country's civil, institutional and political life would be set forth. In July, the San José Agreement (Costa Rica) was reached, which outlined both parties' commitment to respect human rights and called for a UN verification mission (the future ONUSAL) before reaching a ceasefire.

In April 1991, an agreement was reached in Mexico City in which the negotiations on land tenancy were considered closed and constitutional reforms on judicial, military, electoral and human rights matters were included. The Truth Commission was created to investigate the serious violent deeds that had taken place since 1980; the commission received more than 22,000 grievances. In May, UN Security Council Resolution 693 was approved, which stipulated the formation of a United Nations Observers' Mission for El Salvador, whose initial mandate was to verify compliance with the San José Human Rights Agreements. Later, its mandate would be expanded. The mission had a three-fold organisation: a human rights division, a military division and police observers. In September, the UN Secretary General intervened directly by seating the parties in New York (New York Agreement) at a summit at which they agreed to the minimum security guarantees for a ceasefire. These guarantees were later verified by the nascent National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), made up of all the political forces in the country. In December, final negotiations were held at the UN headquarters in New York, and on the 31<sup>st</sup> of this same month an agreement was reached.

In January 1992, a general amnesty was declared and the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed, which led to a change in the armed forces (elimination of officers involved in the dirty war

and reduction in troops), the creation of the National Civil Police force, the dissolution of the military intelligence services, the elimination of the paramilitary corps, a change in the judicial system, the defence of human rights, the creation of a Truth Commission, changes in the electoral system, the transformation of the FMLN into a political party, the adoption of economic and social measures and the expansion of the ONUSAL mandate (Military and Police Division). February witnessed a cessation of the armed clash and the start of demobilisation. In December, the FMLN was legalised as a political party, and the next day, the definitive end to the conflict was officially celebrated.

There were several determining factors in reaching the agreements: the Salvadoran people's desire for peace, changes in civil law, the de-legitimisation of the armed forces, the murder of six Jesuit priests, the military standoff between the armed forces and the FMLN, more flexible positions, United Nations mediation, the efforts of friendly countries (Spain, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), the positive role played by the Catholic Church and the National Reconciliation Commission, the new geopolitical scene (end of the Soviet empire, defeat of the Sandinistas), pressure from the United States late in the game and the influence of the Contadora Group. The process lasted ten years.

## **The process in Guatemala**

Just like many peace processes, the one in Guatemala needed many years, more than one decade, to transform the earliest contacts into the agreement signed in 1996. The origins date back to 1983, when Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formed the Contadora Group with the purpose of stimulating democratic changes in Central America and generating, in little time, regional pressure in favour of peace in the region. The Contadora Group is an example of how an external factor can become a driving force in creating an atmosphere that is friendly to dialogue and negotiation, to such an extent that these processes would not have existed in Guatemala, nor in El Salvador and Nicaragua, without this initiative.

Furthermore, the regional pressure dovetailed with the first steps towards civility taken inside the country shortly thereafter. Guatemala had been enmeshed in years of conflict and militarisation, and it was not until 1984 that Guatemalan military officers gave the first signs of agreeing to transfer power to civilian hands. These signs materialised in the 1985 presidential elections, which Vinicio Cerezo won. He became the president who launched the much-awaited transition to democracy after years of military dictatorship. Cerezo was also the first to make overtures to the guerrillas, specifically in Spain at the headquarters of the Guatemalan embassy, in an initial exploration of the URNG guerrilla's willingness to embark on a negotiation process. Even though the right conditions were not in place at that time, the encounter was decisive for starting a maturation process which would bear fruit years later. In any event, without the courage to take this first step and in the absence of Cerezo's vision of the future, peace would never have been achieved in Guatemala.

In 1986 and 1987, there was yet another regional push with the Esquipulas I and II Agreements, with the slogan "peace for democracy". The upshot of these meetings was the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala, which in the ensuing years would play a prominent role in achieving peace. In parallel, pro-peace social and religious groups also blossomed. They would end up being the hallmark of Guatemala's experience: the decisive contribution of its civil society in a scope of involvement rarely seen in peace processes. At that time, the contribution by a single person, the U.S. Lutheran pastor Paul Wee, was also crucial. Wee was the former Secretary General of the Lutheran World Federation whose good offices fostered the earliest encounters between the URNG and the military. While in South Africa the human factor is discussed in reference to the decisive contribution by Nelson Mandela, the history of Guatemala must pay tribute to the crucial figure of Paul Wee, as without his efforts the process would have taken another pace and a different course. Paul Wee fostered the creation of a favourable atmosphere, which paved the way for the Grand National Dialogue called in 1989.



In 1990, an extremely important process got underway that was dubbed the "Oslo Consultations", as the first meeting between the URNG and the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was held in that city, which enshrined Norway as one of the most active countries in peace diplomacy. That encounter ushered in a series of meetings between CNR delegates and the URNG in different countries: in El Escorial, Spain, with the presence of the political parties; in Ottawa, Canada, with the business sector; in Quito, Ecuador, with the religious groups; in Metepec, Mexico, with representation of the people and trade unions; and finally in Atlixco, Mexico, with the representatives of educational organisations, small business owners and university colleges. These meetings laid the groundwork for the start of direct negotiations between the URN and the government in 1991. These negotiations lasted five years. President Serrano, who replaced Cerezo, launched the Total Peace initiative, which made it possible to sign an agreement in Mexico in April with an eleven-point negotiation agenda. The main items included strengthening civil society and the role of the army, indigenous peoples, constitutional reform and the election system, resettling the displaced population, socioeconomic conditions and agricultural reform. A second round of negotiations was held in Querétaro, Mexico, in July, at which the principles for the democratisation of the country were discussed. As can be seen, much of Guatemala's process was conducted outside the country.

In 1993, under the presidency of Ramiro de León, institutional reforms were undertaken in Guatemala and the National Reconciliation Commission was disbanded. However, a permanent peace fund was created to give the people a voice, and at the end of the year, more formal negotiations were launched with the URNG after several "ecumenical encounters" organised by pastor Paul Wee. The following year, negotiation rounds were held in Mexico, and UN mediation got underway with the Framework Agreement for Resumption of the Negotiation Process; this entailed a series of rounds that lasted until the final agreement, signed in 1996. The figure of "friendly countries" was launched, which included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States and Venezuela. These countries provided diplomatic and economic support to the project. The United Nations created MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala), whose mandate lasted until 2004. In March, the important Global Agreement on Human Rights was signed by the government and the URNG. It is worth noting that this agreement was signed without a ceasefire, that is, in the midst of the hostilities, but with the purpose of "humanising" the war. It was agreed to ask that a Standing Civil Society Assembly be created, which started in April of that year and lasted until 1996. Its mandate was to debate the underlying issues addressed in the bilateral negotiations. With the ASC, Guatemala's process provided a hugely enriching model of citizen participation, as it is one of the processes in which civil society had the most chances to influence the negotiating table under an operating scheme in which ten delegates were appointed for each social sector represented. These delegates were charged with adopting "least common denominator" proposals to be brought to the negotiating table.

Finally, a peace agreement was signed in 1996 that put an end to 36 years of armed conflict. It consisted of 13 agreements and 300 commitments, not all of which were fulfilled, partly because they were overly ambitious and partly because a referendum which was supposed to ratify some of them failed to pass in 1999. Thus, the process in Guatemala is criticised for having overly high aspirations, which sheds light on the dilemma of which is better: a less ambitious but more realistic agreement, or the opposite. In any event, the agreement put an end to the armed violence and enabled an International Commission against Impunity to be created years later in 2007.

## **The process in Northern Ireland**

The peace process in Northern Ireland lasted a little over a decade. Its immediate origins date back to the mid-1980s, when the atmosphere was conducive to peace, either because of weariness with war, contagion from other processes, the economic need to achieve peace, support from the new US administration or the people's fervent desire for peace. In 1987, the first secret talks were launched between John Hume, leader of Northern Ireland's Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the British government. Eleven years later, Hume was awarded the Nobel

Peace Prize for his contributions to peace in Northern Ireland. In 1990, the channel of communication was opened with the leaders of Sinn Féin, and in December 1993 the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, which accepted Northern Ireland's right to self-determination and pledged to facilitate an agreement with the Irish people, as well as allowing Sinn Féin to join the political dialogue. This led the IRA to declare a ceasefire in 1994, which lasted until February 2006. In January 2005, the loyalist paramilitary groups declared a ceasefire, and in November of the same year, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, travelled to Northern Ireland, which amounted to an enormous boost to the peace process.

In June 1996, inclusive multi-party negotiations were held, initially without Sinn Féin, with the mediation of former US Senator George Mitchell. These negotiations operated under the principle of "sufficient consensus", that is, the decisions were taken by simple majority, as long as the main parties participated. Decision-making also included what was called "parallel consent", in which a majority of both nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants was needed. The negotiations were conducted under the principle that "nothing was agreed until everything was agreed"; that is, the partial agreements would not be valid until everything had been agreed to. Under former Senator Mitchell's mediation, it was stipulated that only peaceful and political means would be used in the process. This was called the "Mitchell principles". At this time, the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, demonstrated her courage by visiting prisons to meet with prisoners from the IRA and protestant paramilitary groups with the purpose of convincing them to take part in the peace process. In 1997, the IRA declared a second truce, which allowed Sinn Féin to rejoin the multi-party talks. Finally, a peace agreement called the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed in April 1998. This agreement called for police reform, reform of the institutions of Northern Ireland, the formation of a British-Irish Ministerial Council, a North South Ministerial Council and a Human Rights Commission. Seven years later, in 2005, the IRA gave up its armed struggle. In 2007, a government shared between Catholics and Protestants was started, and the IRA was officially, permanently disbanded in 2008. Reconciliation will take many years and the wounds will probably not be fully healed for another generation, but at least headway can be made in the absence of attacks.

## The process in Angola

The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and lasted 26 years, causing half a million deaths. It pitted the government forces of the MPLA, who received support from the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc countries, against the rebel forces of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi and initially supported by the United States, South Africa, Zaire and other African governments. The first attempt at negotiations came in December 1988, when an agreement was forcibly signed in New York; however, it did not address the causes of the conflict or entail an interruption in foreign interference. The first important official agreements (the Bicesse Agreement in May 1991 and the Lusaka Agreement in November 1994), both reached under the auspices of the international community, did not manage to put a halt to the military clashes, while the third one, the Luena Memorandum from 2002, in which the international community hardly played a role, enabled a cessation of hostilities to be reached and put an end to the war.

The official negotiations began in Portugal in 1990 under the auspices of the Troika made up of Portugal, the USSR and the United States. This led the MPLA to agree to turn Angola into a multi-party state. In May 1991, the Bicesse Agreement was signed in Portugal with mediation by the government of that country in the presence of President Dos Santos and Savimbi. This agreement stipulated that elections had to be held with UNITA's participation and United Nations supervision, although neither of the sides had given up its aspirations to achieve a military victory. A second UN mission was set up in Angola (UNAVEM II) with the mission of observing and verifying the disarmament process and backing the creation of a single new national army. In the meantime, the non-military social and political forces were left on the sidelines of the process. The MPLA won the elections, which were called too hastily in September

1992, and UNITA declared them fraudulent; as a result, the hostilities resumed without UNAVEM II unable to do anything. The United States stopped supporting UNITA and recognised the government of Angola, leading the UN to open sanctions against UNITA, which in October 1993 was forced to recognise the Bicesse Agreement and resume the talks. For one year, in the midst of combats that substantially curtailed UNITA's capacities, both parties held a dialogue mediated by the United Nations Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the troika. This led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, which stipulated that UNITA had to disarm in exchange for participating in the National Unity and Reconciliation Government. UNITA, however, did not disarm and continued to exploit the diamond resources in an effort to continue the war, which led the Security Council to step up its sanctions against UNITA in June 1998. Under the Lusaka Protocol, both parties had to conclude the electoral process under UN supervision, in addition to a cessation of hostilities, the cantonment of UNITA troops and disarmament. In February 1995, the United Nations Mission UNAVEM III was created with the mission of helping the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements. Savimbi met with President Mandela in May 1995, and shortly thereafter the MPLA offered Savimbi the Vice Presidency of the country. In March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos reached an agreement to form a coalition government. When the UNAVEM III mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created with a contingent of 1,500 troops, but in 1999 the Angolan government, which felt militarily strong enough to defeat UNITA, asked for it to be closed, so it moved from Luanda to New York. The permanent truce between the MPLA and UNITA was only reached in 2002 when the leader of the latter, Jonas Savimbi, was murdered from several gunshots on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, which allowed a ceasefire to be reached with the new leader, the Secretary General of UNITA, Paulo Lukamba, and a National Unity Government to be formed. UNITA abandoned its armed struggle and became a political party. It officially demobilised in August 2002. The peace agreement became official in the Luena Memorandum dating from April 2002. The negotiation process had lasted 14 years.

## **The process in South Africa**

The process in South Africa, which lasted less time, also emerged as the result of a nurturing atmosphere. In the late 1980s, South Africa was experiencing governability problems. There was a great deal of outside pressure regarding the policy of apartheid, the country was suffering from a major economic crisis and Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was losing outside support as the result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire. In 1989, all of these factors conspired in favour of negotiations, which the recently appointed President De Klerk would transform into major reforms. De Klerk opened up secret negotiations with Mandela, who was now the mastermind of a process that would shake the world and become a benchmark for other countries seeking a model of transition to democracy and reconciliation. Mandela used his extraordinary powers of persuasion to earn the trust and respect of his opponents and turn the secret talks into formal negotiations. He was released in 1990, at the same time that all the political groups were legalised and the transitional period got underway. In March of the following year, the churches called a peace conference, which was warmly welcomed by the business community. Indeed the business sector became one of the most fervent in its support of change, to such an extent that a consultative business movement was created. In April, President De Klerk announced a peace summit, and shortly thereafter a Civil Facilitating Commission and a National Peace Convention were created. From then on, a parallel process unfolded: first, the National Peace Accord was launched from 1991 to 1994 as the instrument of citizen participation, and secondly the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was orchestrated, made up of five working groups, along with the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) as a formal negotiation mechanism between the government and the political parties, including the ANC.

The instrument for citizen participation, the National Peace Accord, worked with two kinds of structures: a National Peace Commission (made up of 60 people) and a National Peace

Secretariat (made up of seven people), as well as regional and local structures. The latter were made up of 11 regional peace commissions (with representatives from political parties, business, trade unions, local authorities, police, local commissions and other sectors), 260 local peace commissions (which reflected the composition of each community and reported to the regional commissions) and 15,000 peace monitors. This civic structure, which bears deep-down similarities to the Civil Society Assembly in Guatemala, debated the issues on the negotiation agenda for three years until general elections were held in 1994. Nelson Mandela won, and a transition government was sworn in, which gave rise to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated until 1999. In December 1996, the new constitution was approved, ushering in the new South Africa of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, full of challenges yet free of apartheid. All of this was thanks to the courage and mass appeal of President Mandela, the miraculous "human factor" in South Africa, a process which, along with its charismatic leader, has given the world a participatory model with a unique experience of reconciliation, in which forgiveness was conditioned upon revelation of the truth. The peace process lasted five years.

## The process in Liberia

In 1980, Samuel Doe took power after the popular uprising. The civil war got underway in 1989, when Charles Taylor left Doe's government and met with a group of rebels from the NPFL in the Ivory Coast and attacked the capital. The UN responded to this in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook several initiatives to resolve the conflict, including the intervention of a regional ceasefire observer force (ECOMOG), which became an opposition faction in the conflict. Taylor was supported by Libya. Another dissident, Johnson, captured and killed Doe in 1990. ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as the President and with Johnson's support. In 1992, ULIMO, made up of Doe sympathisers, started a guerrilla war. The Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to facilitate talks between ECOWAS and the conflicting parties. A coalition government was formed in 1993. With mediation by ECOWAS, a peace agreement was reached in Cotonu (Benin), after which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established with the goal of consolidating the ceasefire. The next year, it was impossible for elections to be held due to skirmishes, but several complementary peace agreements were negotiated to join the Cotonu Agreements. In August 1995, after numerous negotiations and a dozen failed peace agreements, the Abuja (Nigeria) Agreement was signed, which included the leaders of the clashing factions in a transitional government and required the disarmament of the guerrillas for the elections.

In 1997, Taylor formed the National Patriotic Party and won the elections. He was elected President and promoted a policy of reconciliation and national unity. Even though the main militias had been dissolved in order to become political organisations, rebel groups continued operating from Sierra Leone and Guinea, giving rise to a second civil war. UNOMIL ended its mandate, and the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL), which managed to reach an agreement with the rebel groups to share power in the country. In 1999, ECOMOG withdrew from the country. In 2000, groups opposed to Taylor were formed, such as LURD (with support from Guinea), which began a war financed by diamond resources. In February 2000, a meeting sponsored by the King of Morocco was held in Rabat, in which the heads of state of the Mano River Union countries participated. At this meeting, the leaders pledged to resolve their differences and agreed to set up a Joint Security Committee on a sub-regional level. However, the dialogue process was suspended when President Taylor decided not to attend the September meeting, alleging concerns over his personal safety. Days later, a ten-member International Contact Group on Liberia was set up in New York under the joint presidency of ECOWAS and the EU with the purpose of securing greater participation by the international community in the efforts to resolve the crisis.

In early 2003 MODEL was formed with the support of the Ivory Coast; this group opposed Taylor and fought alongside LURD. By May, both rebel groups had seized control of two-thirds of the country and were threatening to take the capital, so the government and the rebels were forced to negotiate an agreement to put an end to the civil war. In June, negotiations were held among all the parties participated in Accra under the sponsorship of Ghana and ECOWAS facilitation. Taylor said that he was willing to resign if this would contribute to achieving peace. Days later, a ceasefire agreement was signed, which was violated by LURD several times. In July, spurred by intensified combats and in view of the threat of a humanitarian crisis, the Secretary General decided to appoint Jacques Paul from the USA his Special Representative for Liberia with the mandate to support the incipient transition agreements. He also proposed that international troops be deployed and that the UNOL be closed. In early August, the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force, and due to pressure from the USA, UN and EU, Taylor resigned because of his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone and harassment from LURD. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of August, the Accra Agreement was signed by the government, LURD, MODEL and the political parties as part of the ECOWAS peace process. The militias disarmed and a National Transitional Government was instated until the 2005 elections. The peace agreement also stipulated an amnesty and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Through this agreement, the parties asked the United Nations to deploy a 15,000-member force in Liberia (UNMIL) to support the National Transitional Government and ensure implementation of the agreement. The war ended in October when the United Nations and the US military intervened and banished Taylor to Nigeria. He was later transferred to The Hague to be tried by the International Criminal Court. The conflict, which lasted 14 years, had taken 250,000 lives and left one million displaced persons. The negotiations lasted 13 years.

## The process in Tajikistan

In 1992, one year after Tajikistan proclaimed its independence from the USSR, a civil war broke out which led to 50,000 deaths. In May, the Tajik opposition, an informal coalition of Islamic groups and other forces, took power after two months of demonstrations. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), led by Abdullo Nuri, took refuge in Afghanistan after being defeated in December.

In September of that same year, the first United Nations exploratory mission was conducted based on an appeal from President Rakhmonov to the UN Secretary General. A second United Nations exploratory mission was held in November, with the active participation of four countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. In April, Ismat Kittani was appointed the Secretary General's special envoy. In January 1993, Kittani was replaced by Ramiro Piriz-Ballón. In March 1993, the "non-official inter-Tajik dialogue" got underway when seven individuals from different factions in the war gathered round the same table in Moscow. The talks continued after a peace agreement was signed in 1997, and they exerted some influence on the outcome of events. In September 1993, the CIS Council of Ministers deployed collective peace forces, made up of contingents from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The hostilities had waned considerably.

In April 1994, the first round of negotiations was held in Moscow with an inclusive agenda (political agreement, the problem of refugees and consolidation of the state). In June, a second round of negotiations was held in Teheran with participation by the OECD as an observer. In September, a consultative meeting took place in Teheran, where a provisional ceasefire agreement was signed, prepared by the United Nations teams. At that meeting, the Russian and Iranian chancellors played a prominent role in convincing the UTO. In October, the third round of talks was held in Islamabad with participation by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as an observer. This round concluded with a protocol that set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire. In December, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was created with the mission of supervising the situation and backing regional peace initiatives.

In May 1995, the fourth round of talks was held in Almaty with an agreement to exchange prisoners and repatriate refugees. The UTO submitted a proposal for a transition government, which was rejected by the government. In July and August, the United Nations team flew between Dushanbe and Kabul five times to hold "consultative negotiations" between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the UTO, Nuri. In August, President Rakhmonov and Nuri signed a *Protocol* on the *Fundamental Principles* for establishing *Peace and National Accord* in Tajikistan, which became the roadmap and stipulated that a "continuous round" of negotiations be held. In November, the first phase in the continuous round was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, where the discussion topics included how to integrate representatives from the opposition into the government and representatives from the opposite military units into the armed forces. In July 1996, the third phase in the continuous rounds was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, and Ramiro Piriz-Ballón was replaced by the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Gerd Merrem. In December, Rakhmonov and Nuri met in Afghanistan and agreed to a cessation of hostilities.

In January 1997, the Protocol on Refugees was signed in Teheran with key participation by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati. From January to May, rounds of talks were held in Teheran, Moscow, Meshed (Iran) and Bishkeh, in which both parties agreed to the modalities of the DDR, the integration of the armed forces, the legalisation of the Islamic Renaissance Party and a 30% share in the power structure for UTO representatives. The Protocol on Political Affairs was signed in the Bishkeh round with the good offices of the President of Kyrgyzstan. In March, the Protocol on Military Affairs was signed, which enabled the CIS armed forces to accompany the units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) from Afghanistan to the gathering zones supervised by UNMOT. The Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, played a key role in this process. Finally, on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June, the General Peace Agreement was signed at the Kremlin. In July, the first meeting of the National Reconciliation Commission was held in Moscow, which approved a mutual forgiveness law and a draft amnesty law that was approved days later by the Parliament. In November, a donor conference was held in Vienna, where 96 million dollars were pledged. The Security Council extended UNMOT's mandate and changed its mission so it could cooperate with the National Reconciliation Commission, supervise the DDR and coordinate the United Nations' assistance during the transitional period. In 1999, peaceful elections were held and Rakhmonov was re-elected president. The peace process lasted five years.

There were several key factors in the negotiations: weariness of war; Russia's and Iran's interest in peace (the last few rounds were held in the capitals of both countries); the moderating influence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the Tajik opposition; the advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the loss of the rearguard for the Tajik opposition); the fundamental role played by the United Nations and its Department of Political Affairs; the skilful handling of the process by the friendly countries; the Security Council's clear mandate; the adept coordination of the four CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia); the participation of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan as observers; the role of the OSCE and the OIC, who were allies in the process and guarantors of the peace agreement; the negotiations, which were not interrupted despite the surrounding conflict and noncompliance with the ceasefire (the negotiations were part of the war strategy); the personal relations between the Tajik President Rakhmonov, and the Tajik opposition leader, Nuri, who took the helm of their respective delegations seven times; the confidentiality of the process; the usual format of consultations between the leaders of the delegations and the United Nations mediators, who always wrote the first drafts, which were accepted 95% of the time; and the existence of the "non-official inter-Tajik dialogue", which bore a positive influence on the course of the negotiations.

## The process in Sierra Leone

A civil war broke out in 1991 in which 75,000 people died. It was triggered by a rebellion against President Momoh led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with Foday Sankoh at the

helm. Momoh was defeated the next year in a military coup. Captain Strasser became the President, and the RUF issued new demands, leading the conflict to continue. In October, the RUF took control of the diamond mines, which also prolonged the conflict.

In 1994, President Strasser asked for the good offices of the UN Secretary General to encourage the RUF to negotiate with the government. The Secretary General sent a civil servant to try to forge contacts with the RUF, but to no avail. In view of this development, the Secretary General appointed Berhanu Dinka his Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, with the mission of engaging in contacts with the RUF. In 1995, the UN, ECOSAP and the OAU tried to negotiate a solution, and in December of the same year the international British organisation Alert helped to set up a meeting between the UN and the RUF in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). In March 1996, presidential elections were held and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected. The RUF did not participate and forged ahead with the conflict, but on the 25<sup>th</sup> of March the outgoing government and the RUF signed a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed to hold negotiations with a view to solving the conflict. These negotiations were held with mediation by Ivory Coast, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth. In April, Kabbah and Sankoh met face-to-face in the Ivory Coast; they agreed to a ceasefire and to set up working groups. The OAU decided to get more actively involved and appointed a special envoy. The negotiations ended with the signing of the Abidjan Agreement in November, which initially put an end to the conflict. The agreement called for amnesty, the conversion of the RUF into a political party and a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. The agreement also called for electoral, judicial and police reform. Between December 1996 and January 1997, an evaluation group sent by the UN Secretary General visited Sierra Leone, and on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January this group managed to meet with the leader of the RUF.

In March 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, and in May of the same year, Paul Koroma led a military coup with the support of the RUF. He created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, with which he fought the ECOMOG (Military Observer Group) troops in the country. In October, talks were held in Conakry and a peace plan was signed that called for a cessation of hostilities, an ECOMOG verification mechanism, the DDR, immunity for participants in the coup, the return of Sankoh and the reinstatement of President Kabbah's constitutional government. In February 1998, in response to a joint attack by the RUF and the army of the junta, ECOMOG launched a military attack that led to the dissolution of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. President Kabbah once again occupied his post and appointed a new government. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was also created. Foday Sankoh, who had been arrested, issued a call for surrender, but the skirmishes continued, partly due to Liberia's support of RUF members.

In 1999, new negotiations were held between the government and the rebels. In May, the Lomé Convention was signed and a dialogue got underway between the government and the RUF. The government transported Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé with a promise of amnesty. The government of Togo facilitated the negotiations. A ceasefire was declared and the prisoners of war were released. The main provisions in the agreement were the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the establishment of a national unity government, the granting of the vice presidency to Sankoh, the establishment of a Council of Notables and Religious Leaders to act as mediators, an amnesty, the scheduling of elections, the start of a DDR and a restructuring of the armed forces, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the gradual withdrawal of ECOMOG forces. It was agreed that Togo, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth would serve as the guarantors of the agreement. In October, Sankoh and Koroma returned to Freetown and UNAMISIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) was created to fulfil the Lomé Convention. In November, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja, which called for UNAMISIL to perform a supervisory function and for the DDR to immediately resume. This agreement triggered divisions within the RUF.

In May 2000, 500 UN troops were kidnapped by the RUF, which prompted a British military intervention, the disbandment of the RUF and the arrest of Sankoh. However, in November the

Abuja I Accord was signed, which declared a ceasefire supervised by UNAMSIL and the handover of weapons by the RUF, as well as DDR programme and the restructuring of the armed forces. Given the fact that the fighting continued, in 2001 the Guinean troops conducted an offensive against the RUF. However, in May the Abuja II Accords setting out a DDR programme were signed between the RUF and the government. The war finally came to an end in January 2002. Sankoh died in prison. The peace process, with all its ups and downs and incidents of non-compliance, lasted eight years.

## **The process in southern Sudan**

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA from the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese armed forces, which were opposed to independence for the south of the country, which the SPLA was advocating. The conflict led to the death of more than one million people. The first explorations were conducted in 1988, and the following year the government and the SPLA signed a tentative Declaration of Principles of IGAD, the mediator, to hold a referendum on self-determination in the south of the country.

In July 2002, a theoretical agreement was reached under the auspices of IGAD, which established autonomy in the south before a referendum was held in 2011. The first direct meeting between the President of Sudan and the SPLA leader also took place. Between 2002 and 2004, several rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya, in which headway was made on an extensive agenda of issues. These rounds made it possible for a definitive peace agreement to be reached on the 5<sup>th</sup> of January 2005, in which the north and south would keep separate armed forces, a joint force would be created for the more disputed areas, autonomy would be set for six years, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, the oil profits would be equitably split and a National Unity Government would be formed, with one vice presidency set aside for the SPLA. Likewise, it was agreed not to apply Islamic law in the south of the country and that each territory would have its own flag. The process lasted a total of 13 years, and seven went by before a peace agreement was signed.

## **The process in Burundi**

The start of the conflict in Burundi dates back to 1983, when the country's Hutu prime minister was assassinated, triggering a cycle of violence that led to the death of 300,000 people. The first peace talks did not start until five years later, in 1998, in Tanzania. They were initially facilitated by the president of that country, Nyerere, and later by Nelson Mandela. In August 2000, the Arusha Agreement was signed with the participation of 17 political parties and the majority of Hutu organisations in the country, which led to the formation of the first transition government. Between 2002 and 2003, agreements were signed with two other major groups, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which left pending the agreement with just a single group, the FNL, whose leader, Agathon Rwasa, did not sign a peace agreement until six years later.

The first negotiations with Rwasa's FNL were held between 2002 and 2004 in Gabon, Tanzania, Switzerland, Kenya, the Netherlands and South Africa, although they were fruitless. In 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created with the mandate to help to implement the efforts to restore peace and reconciliation. Its mandate lasted until 2006, when a General Ceasefire Agreement was signed with the FNL in September in Tanzania, which along with South Africa was a mediator in the conflict. This agreement stipulated the following: a) rectification of the ethnic question, already identified as one of the causes of the conflict; b) provisional immunity for FNL members and its transformation into a political party; c) the repatriation of refugees and the return of the displaced population; and d) a revision of the composition of the security and defence forces. In October of the same year, a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was created, which took over the baton from the ONUB with the mandate of supporting the government in its efforts on behalf of peace and stability.



Finally, in December 2008 a peace agreement was signed with the FNL, with the presence of the South African mediator, Charles Nqakula. The next step was political power-sharing, with 33 posts set aside for the FNL and the launch of the group's disarmament. The process had lasted ten years.

### **The process in Indonesia (Aceh)**

The conflict in Indonesia (Aceh) started in 1976, when the armed opposition group GAM claimed independence for Aceh. The conflict led to the death of 15,000 people. The earliest talks were held in 2000 with the facilitation of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, headquartered in Geneva. These talks led to the signing of a Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. However, both parties were still clashing because they were unwilling to give up armed activity. Another influential factor was that Timor-Leste had just won independence and the Indonesian army was unwilling to lose another region. The second round of negotiations was held in May 2002, also in Geneva, and the third in May 2003 in Tokyo. However, the GAM was insisting on independence for Aceh, an option that was rejected outright by the government. As a result, martial law was instated and the hostilities resumed. Yet during this same period, a 46-year-old Finnish financial consultant, Juha Christensen, managed to keep up discreet contacts with the clashing parties, which would come to be of vital importance to the future of the negotiations.

A tsunami hit in December 2004, leading to the death of 170,000 people in the region, which was devastated. This natural catastrophe, which required the government to open up Aceh to the international community, totally altered the situation and triggered reactions that helped spur the resumption of the negotiations. The first contacts occurred in January 2005 with the mediation of the Crisis Management Initiative, driven by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Several noteworthy events took place within the space of a few months: a bilateral truce, a meeting in Sweden with GAM exiles, the withdrawal of the arrest warrant against GAM leaders and a change in GAM criteria, as it ceased to demand independence and instead agreed to advanced autonomy. Thus, a special autonomy was negotiated, and the facilitator set a deadline for reaching an agreement (summer). Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding between the GAM and the government was signed in August 2006, which put an end to 30 years of conflict. The agreement was based on the end of hostilities and the disarmament of the GAM, the withdrawal of the military and police forces, amnesty for GAM members and their participation in politics, as well as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In December of the same year, the GAM candidate was proclaimed governor of the region of Aceh. The peace process, in all its stages, lasted five years.

### **The process in Nepal**

The conflict got underway in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), a Maoist guerrilla force, opposed the forces of the Nepalese monarchy. The conflict led to 10,000 deaths. In 2002, the first secret talks were held and a tentative and temporary bilateral ceasefire was reached. The next year, formal talks were held, but to no avail. In November 2005, the CPN reached an alliance with seven Nepalese parties, pledging to establish a democracy, respect human rights, call UN-supervised elections and embark on a UN-supervised disarmament. One year later, in June 2006, an agreement was reached between the government and the CPN, and in November the peace agreement was signed that put an end to ten years of conflict. This agreement was comprised of the following points: 1) to implement the 12-point agreement reached on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 2005 between the CPN and the seven political parties, as well as the ceasefire code of conduct signed by the government and the CPN on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 2006; 2) to conduct their respective activities peacefully and mindful of the commitments of a multi-party government system, civil liberties, the fundamental rights, human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law and the democratic norms and values.; 3) to ask the United Nations to assist in managing the armed forces and weapons of both parties, as well as to observe the impartial elections for the Constituent Assembly; 4) to guarantee the democratic rights

established by the grassroots movement in 1990 and 2006, based on the commitments expressed in the 12-point agreement, in the preamble of the ceasefire code of conduct and in the draft of an interim constitution, and consequently to set up an interim government, set a date for the election of a Constituent Assembly and dissolve the congress and the Maoist government through an alternative agreement based on consensus; 5) to deem that these issues are of national importance and must be fulfilled based on understanding; 6) to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the Nepalese people are part of the process of creating a new constitution, without their being influenced by fear, threats or violence. International observation and monitoring will be needed for the elections; and 7) to restructure the state gradually in order to resolve the problems associate with class, race, region and gender, through elections for a Constituent Assembly. This includes a commitment to transform the ceasefire into lasting peace and to resolve problems through dialogue, with special attention to democracy, peace, prosperity, progress, independence, the sovereignty of the country and self-esteem. In 2008, Nepal ceased to be a monarchy and became a democratic federal republic. In accordance with the peace agreement, the United Nations will supervise the cantonment and reintegration of the Maoist forces, while the government will restructure its armed forces. The peace process lasted four years.

Good lessons from the processes	
El Salvador	Delegitimisation of the armed forces Positive role of the United Nations and the countries in the region Human rights agreement in the midst of the conflict Role of the National Reconciliation Commission
Guatemala	Participation of civil society Regional pressure Role of the National Reconciliation Commission Good offices of Paul Wee The guerrilla's consultations with civil society
Northern Ireland	Role of prisoners Methodology of the negotiation (sufficient consensus, parallel consent, Mitchell principles)
Angola	Security Council sanctions on diamonds
South Africa	Participation of civil society (National Peace Agreement) Truth and Reconciliation Commission Persuasive, conciliatory role of Nelson Mandela
Tajikistan	Good mediation by the United Nations Good help from the countries in the region Continuous rounds of negotiations in the midst of the conflict
Southern Sudan	Direct encounter between the guerrilla leader and the President of the country Continuous rounds of negotiations
Indonesia (Aceh)	Speed of the process Flexibility of the parties Taking advantage of a natural and humanitarian catastrophe (tsunami)
Nepal	United Nations verification

## Appendix 11. Websites of interest

- Alertnet ([www.alertnet.org](http://www.alertnet.org))
- Armed Conflict Database ([acd.iiss.org](http://acd.iiss.org))
- Berghof Research Center ([www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org))
- Center for Humanitarian Dialogue ([www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org))
- CIDCM ([www.cidcm.umd.es](http://www.cidcm.umd.es))
- Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme ([www.clingendael.nl](http://www.clingendael.nl))
- Conciliation Resources ([www.c-r.org](http://www.c-r.org))
- Conflictbarometer ([hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer](http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer))
- Crisis Management Initiative ([www.cmi.fi](http://www.cmi.fi))
- Crisis Watch ([www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch))
- Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford ([www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace))
- Escola de Cultura de Pau ([www.escolapau.org](http://www.escolapau.org))
- European Centre for Conflict Prevention ([www.conflict-prevention.net](http://www.conflict-prevention.net))
- FEWER ([www.fewer.org](http://www.fewer.org))
- FriEnt ([www.frient.de](http://www.frient.de))
- German Working Group on Development and Peace ([www.frient.de](http://www.frient.de))
- Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict ([www.gppac.org](http://www.gppac.org))
- Incore ([www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries](http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries))
- Interpeace ([www.interpeace.org](http://www.interpeace.org))
- International Alert ([www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org))
- International Crisis Group ([www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org))
- International Peace Academy ([www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org))
- Kreddha ([www.kreddha.org](http://www.kreddha.org))
- United Nations ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org))
- Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre ([www.peacebuilding.no](http://www.peacebuilding.no))
- Peace Accords Matrix ([peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/topic](http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/topic))
- Peace and Justice Update ([peace.sandiego.edu/reports/updates.html#bottom](http://peace.sandiego.edu/reports/updates.html#bottom))
- Peace Negotiations Watch ([www.publicinternationallaw.org](http://www.publicinternationallaw.org))
- People Building Peace ([www.peoplebuildingpeace.org](http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org))
- PRIO ([www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current](http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current))
- Project Ploughshares ([www.ploughshares.ca](http://www.ploughshares.ca))
- Public International Law & Policy Group ([www.publicinternationallaw.org](http://www.publicinternationallaw.org))
- Reliefweb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int))
- Responding to Conflict ([www.respond.org](http://www.respond.org))
- SIPRI ([www.sipri.se](http://www.sipri.se))
- Swiss Peace ([www.swisspeace.org/fast](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast))
- The Conflict Resolution Information Source ([www.crininfo.org](http://www.crininfo.org))
- The Joan B. Kroc Institute ([kroc.nd.edu](http://kroc.nd.edu))
- Today's Mediation News ([www.crininfo.org/news\\_feeds/v2\\_negotiation.cfm](http://www.crininfo.org/news_feeds/v2_negotiation.cfm))
- United States Institute of Peace ([www.usip.org/library/pa.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html))
- UN Peacemaker ([peacemaker.unlb.org](http://peacemaker.unlb.org))
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University ([www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se))
- Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ([www.wilsoncenter.org](http://www.wilsoncenter.org))

## Escola de Cultura de Pau

The Autonomous University of Barcelona's Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) was created in 1999 for the purpose of organising a variety of academic and research activities related to the culture of peace, conflict prevention and transformation, disarmament and human rights promotion.

It is run by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

The Escola de Cultura de Pau's main activities include:

- The **post-graduate diploma in the Culture of Peace** (208 classroom hours)
- Elective subjects: "Culture of peace and conflict management" and "Peace education and education in conflict"
- The **Peace Processes Programme**, which monitors and analyses different countries with peace processes or formalised negotiations underway, as well as countries with negotiations still in the exploratory phase. It includes awareness-raising initiatives and intervention in conflicts to facilitate dialogue amongst the stakeholders involved.
- The **Education for Peace Programme**, which strives to promote and develop knowledge, values and skills for peace education.
- The **Conflict and Peace-building Programme**, which monitors international events related to armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises and the gender dimension in peace-building in order to draft the annual *A/ert!* report, monthly reports and quarterly publications.

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This ninth edition of the **Yearbook on Peace Processes** analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

Vicenç Fisas is the Director of the School for a Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). He also holds the UNESCO Chair in Peace and Human Rights at the UAB. He has a doctorate in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, won the National Human Rights Award in 1988, and is the author of over 30 books on conflicts, disarmament and research into peace. Some of his published titles include "Manual de procesos de paz" (Handbook of Peace Processes), "Procesos de paz y negociación en conflictos armados" (Peace Processes and Negotiation in Armed Conflicts), "La paz es posible" (Peace is Possible) and "Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos" (Peace Culture and Conflict Management).



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