

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

2015



**MEASURING PEACE, ITS CAUSES
AND ITS ECONOMIC VALUE**



Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP has offices in Sydney, New York and Mexico City. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

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CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
1	RESULTS AND FINDINGS	5
	Highlights	
	2015 Global Peace Index rankings	8
	Regional overview	10
	Risers and fallers	16
	GPI domain and indicator: Annual changes	20
	Trends in the Global Peace Index domains	22
	Ongoing domestic and international conflict	23
	Societal safety and security	29
	Militarisation	35
2	TRENDS IN PEACE	43
	Highlights	45
	Eight-year trends	46
	Indicator trends	49
	Regional trends	55
	Global distribution of peace	59
3	GLOBAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE	63
	Highlights	65
	Conceptual overview and methodology	68
	Global violence containment: Results and trends	72
	Trends in global violence containment expenditure	74
	Countries with the highest cost of violence containment as a per cent of GDP	77
	Countries with the highest cost of violence containment expenditure	78
4	POSITIVE PEACE	79
	Why Positive Peace is transformational	81
	Defining and measuring Positive Peace	82
	Positive Peace and resistance movements	91
	Positive Peace and the close link to other development goals	94
	Five post-conflict countries with largest Positive Peace improvements	97
	ANNEXES	99
	Annex A: GPI methodology	100
	Annex B: GPI indicator sources, definitions and scoring criteria	103
	Annex C: Violence containment costs by country	112
	Annex D: 2015 GPI Domain Scores	114
	REFERENCES	117
	END NOTES	120

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the ninth edition of the **Global Peace Index (GPI)**, which ranks the nations of the world according to their level of peacefulness. The index is composed of 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources and ranks 162 independent states, covering 99.6 per cent of the world's population. The index gauges global peace using three broad themes: *the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic and international conflict and the degree of militarisation.*

In addition to presenting the findings from the 2015 GPI and its eight-year trend analysis, this year's report provides an updated methodology to account for the economic impact of violence on the global economy. The report also contains a new analysis on Positive Peace and describes its relationship to development and other significant and positive societal outcomes. A detailed thematic analysis of the three aforementioned domains of the GPI is also included.

Last year the global GPI score remained stable. However, while the average level of global peacefulness was stable, a number of indicators and countries did deteriorate while others improved. Four out of the nine geographical regions experienced an improvement in peace: Europe, North America, sub-Saharan Africa and Central America and the Caribbean. The other five regions became less peaceful. The most substantial changes in the Index occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where several countries suffered from an upsurge in violence related to sectarian strife and civil conflicts, resulting in the region being ranked as the least peaceful in the world.

The *societal safety and security domain* improved slightly last year, driven by falls in the *homicide rate* and the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*. The improvements in homicide rates mainly reflected data updates in some high homicide countries. This improvement was counterbalanced by deteriorations in the *ongoing conflict* and *militarisation* domains, owing to increases in *deaths from internal conflict*, non-payment of UN peacekeeping dues, and a continuing deterioration in the *impact of terrorism* indicator.

Iceland is the most peaceful country, with the ten highest ranking nations in the GPI all being stable democracies. Nordic and Alpine countries are particularly well represented. Asia-Pacific is also represented at the top, with New Zealand ranked 4th, Japan at 8th and Australia at 9th.

MENA now ranks as the most violent region, overtaking South Asia from last year's GPI. Yet again, Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region in the world, supported by a lack of domestic and external conflicts. It was also the region that experienced the largest improvement in its score compared with 2014, continuing its eight-year trend of improving peacefulness.

This year Guinea-Bissau had the largest improvement in peace, resulting in a rise of 24 places in the rankings to 120th. The next four largest improvements occurred in Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Tajikistan and Benin. A common theme among the largest improvers was a fall in the level of organised conflict, which occurred in all of the four aforementioned African nations.

Cancelling out its strong improvement in the 2014 edition of the GPI, Libya experienced the largest deterioration this year. Its score deteriorated substantially and consequently it fell 13 places down to 149th to become the 14th least peaceful country. Unsurprisingly the second biggest decline was recorded for the Ukraine, due to the conflict between Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government as well as the instability caused by Russia's annexation of Crimea. Other countries that substantially deteriorated were Djibouti and Niger which fell 42 and 28 places, respectively.

Over the past eight years the average country score deteriorated 2.4 percent, highlighting that on average the world has become slightly less peaceful. However, this decrease in peacefulness has not been evenly spread, with 86 countries deteriorating while 76 improved. MENA has suffered the largest decline of any region in the world, deteriorating 11 per cent over the past eight years.

The eight-year downward trend in peacefulness has been driven predominately by the deterioration in indicators of internal peacefulness. Of the five key indicators which deteriorated by more than five per cent, four are internal and one external:

refugees and IDPs as a percentage of the population, deaths from internal conflict, the impact of terrorism, the likelihood of violent demonstrations and perceptions of criminality.

The deterioration in the indicators measuring the number of *refugees and IDPs* and the *impact of terrorism* is most concerning. The latest UNHCR estimates indicate that more than 50 million people are now either refugees or internally displaced because of conflict and violence, which is the highest number since the end of the Second World War. A third of people displaced by conflict inside their own countries in 2014 are in Iraq and Syria alone.

Terrorism has grown steadily over the last decade, a trend that shows no sign of abating. Deaths caused by terrorism increased by 61 per cent in 2013, which resulted in almost 18,000 people being killed in terrorist attacks. Of those deaths, 82 per cent occurred in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. The threat of terrorism has also affected many of the world's most peaceful countries, with terrorist attacks occurring in France, Denmark and Australia in the last year.

On the positive side, several indicators of external peacefulness actually improved over the last eight years. *Relations with neighbouring countries* has grown stronger, particularly in South America, *financial contributions to UN peacekeeping* funding has improved and the number and intensity of external conflicts has fallen as many countries wound down their military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is important to note that peace is becoming more unevenly distributed. While Europe continued its long-term trend of improvement, the Middle East continued its recent trend of deterioration, further increasing the distance between the most and least peaceful regions and countries. In Europe and in many other developed countries, homicide rates and other forms of interpersonal violence continue to drop and are at historic lows.

In 2008, there were only three countries that had a score worse than 3 out of 5: Somalia, Iraq and Sudan. However, by 2015 this increased to nine countries: Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Pakistan, highlighting the further deterioration amongst the least peaceful countries in the world.

The economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2014 was substantial and is estimated at US\$14.3 trillion or 13.4 per cent of world GDP. This is equivalent to the combined economies of Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Since 2008, the total economic impact on global GDP has increased by 15.3 per cent, from US\$12.4 trillion to US\$14.3 trillion.

Large increases in costs are due to the increases in deaths from internal conflict, increases for IDP and refugee support, and GDP losses from conflict, with the latter accounting for 38 per cent of the increase since 2008. The major expenditure categories are military spending at 43 per cent, homicide and violent crime at 27 per cent and internal security officers, including police, at 18 per cent. While the cost of UN peacekeeping has more than doubled since 2008, it still

**VIOLENCE
COSTS
13.4%
OF WORLD GDP**



only accounts for less than 0.17 per cent of violence containment expenditure.

The report outlines **new findings on Positive Peace**, highlighting its impact on peace, development and other important societal goals. In societies where Positive Peace is stronger, developmental goals are more likely to be achieved. These societies are more resilient when faced with crisis and have fewer grievances. They are more likely to achieve non-violent positive outcomes when faced with resistance movements and are more likely to adapt and make concessions to reconcile grievances. Additionally, Positive Peace is also statistically associated with many other outcomes considered desirable: stronger business environments, better performance on well-being measures, gender equality and better performance on ecological measures.

The report also includes a thematic analysis of the three domains of the GPI:

Ongoing domestic and international conflicts:

This section comments on the six major MENA conflicts occurring in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Israel and Lebanon. It identifies many of the drivers of these conflicts, which include challenges to government legitimacy, deepening sectarian divides, the destabilising presence of ISIL and the cross-cutting proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Societal safety and security:

This section analyses the effects of urbanisation on violence, and finds that peace generally increases with higher levels of urbanisation. This is a by-product of higher levels of development. However, countries that have weak rule of law, high levels of intergroup grievances and high levels of inequality are more likely to experience deteriorations in peace as urbanisation increases.

Militarisation:

Since 1990, there has been a slow and steady decrease in measures of global militarisation, with large changes in militarisation occurring rarely and usually associated with larger, globally driven geopolitical and economic shifts. Surprisingly, very few major socio-economic measures are associated with militarisation; however, the research did find that countries with weak Positive Peace factors are more likely to use the military for internal suppression.

GLOSSARY

The following terms used throughout the 2015 Global Peace Index Report are defined here for reference:

Correlation

The statistical relationship between two variables. IEP uses linear correlations to compare the strength of the association between different variables.

Correlation coefficient

A value between -1 and 1 that shows the strength of the correlation between two variables, where -1 means a perfect negative correlation, 0 means no correlation and 1 means a perfect positive correlation.

Direct cost of violence

Costs which are directly attributed to a specific form of violence or violence prevention. This includes items such as materials, expenses and labour. For example, the direct costs of violent crime can include such items as court and hospital costs.

Economic impact of violence

Includes the total direct and indirect costs of violence multiplied by a factor of two. This represents the total flow on effects on the world economy and the opportunity cost due to the misallocation of resources into non-productive areas associated with violence.

External peace

A set of indicators that measures how peaceful a country is outside its national borders.

Global Peace Index (GPI) domains:

- **Ongoing domestic and international conflict**
Indicators of the number and intensity of ongoing civil and international wars.
- **Societal safety and security**
Indicators of the levels of safety and security within a country, such as the perception of criminality in society, the level of political instability and the rate of homicides and violent crimes.
- **Militarisation**
Indicators of a nation's military capacity, both in terms of the economic resources committed to the military and support for multilateral operations.

Indirect cost of violence

Accounts for costs that are not directly related to an act of violence and accrue over the long run. This can include losses of income due to injury or pain or grievance of others who were not directly involved in the crime.

Internal peace

A set of indicators that measures how peaceful a country is inside its national borders.

Multiplier

A factor of proportionality that estimates how much one variable changes in response to a change in another variable. For example, the economic impact of violence is calculated using a multiplier of two.

Negative Peace

The absence of violence or fear of violence.

Positive Peace

The attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. These same factors also lead to many other positive outcomes that support the optimum environment for human potential to flourish.

Positive Peace Index (PPI)

A composite measurement of Positive Peace based on 24 indicators grouped into eight domains.

Resilience

The ability of a country to absorb and recover from shocks, for example natural disasters or fluctuations in commodity prices.

Significant

Of high importance or noteworthiness.

Significant, statistically

A result that is unlikely to be due to chance alone, as measured statistically using probability. A standard definition is a p-score of less than .05. This means that there is only a 5% chance that the results of an analysis are due to chance.

Violence containment

Economic activity related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property.

RESULTS & FINDINGS



The 2015 Global Peace Index score remained stable compared with 2014, but still registered a worse performance than in 2008. For 2015, four out of the nine geographical regions experienced an improvement in peace while five became less peaceful.

The most substantial change in the index was recorded for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) — where several countries suffered from an upsurge in violence related to sectarian strife and civil conflicts, as well as a rise in actions by Islamist extremist groups. It was followed by South America, where ypeacefulness was most affected in some countries by a rise in the perceptions of criminality and in popular protests. MENA now ranks as the most violent region, overtaking South Asia (which includes Afghanistan) from last year's GPI. Yet again, Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region in the world, supported by a lack of domestic and external conflicts. It was also the region that experienced the largest relative improvement in its score compared with 2014.

In terms of societal safety and security, there was a modest deterioration in the score for violent crime, even though there was improvement in the homicide rate. Globally, the incarceration rate increased. Latin America remained the world's most violent region in terms of societal safety and security, as highlighted by its poor results in most related categories. This is particularly the case for Central America and the Caribbean, the lowest ranked region and where many of the world's highest homicide rates can be found. There was a general improvement in the score for political instability, with only Asia-Pacific recording a slight erosion.

However, political terror worsened overall, the result of a deterioration in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, South Asia and especially MENA. In the case of Latin America, this may reflect a harder line taken by security forces to deal with crime, civil protests and guerrilla movements (in the case of Colombia). In MENA it results from growing civil conflicts and terrorist acts by extremist groups, along with efforts by state security forces to counter these challenges. On the other hand, the score decreased overall for the likelihood of violent demonstrations, driven by improvements in Europe, Central America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa and MENA (the latter as protests related to the Arab Spring abated). Finally, the number of refugees and IDPs rose during the past year, exacerbated by an increase in the intensity of internal conflict in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in certain Latin American countries, notably Colombia. In Colombia, a potential peace agreement being negotiated between government and leftist guerrilla groups offers hope of an end to the region's longest-standing conflict.

With regards to ongoing domestic and international conflict, there was a modest improvement in the number of deaths from external conflict, driven by a better score for Europe. All other regions showed no change. Relations with neighbouring countries deteriorated in Europe, resulting from score changes for the Baltic states, and in MENA; driven by a large

81 *Countries became*
 MORE
 + PEACEFUL

78 *Countries became*
 LESS
 - PEACEFUL

(SINCE 2014)

change for Libya. Although there were no new wars between countries, tense relationships between the two Koreas, concerns over China's growing military assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, the potential further expansion of the Middle East conflicts across borders, and the possibility that conflict between Russia and the Ukraine escalates into all out military confrontation suggest these may become hotspots for international conflict in the future. In the case of deaths from internal conflict, the scores for most regions deteriorated (the exceptions being South America and Central America and the Caribbean). The individual countries with the biggest score erosion for this indicator were Ukraine and Central African Republic, owing to ongoing and worsening civil wars. For the indicator of internal conflicts fought, internal conflict escalated most in the Middle East and North Africa. The situation improved in South America and South Asia.

Lastly, the militarisation domain was characterised by stability in the armed services personnel rate globally. However, this masked increases in personnel in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific, as these were offset by decreases in MENA. By contrast, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased globally; three regions, Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific, posted a reduction in military expenditure, while the others registered increases. The arms trade (exports) saw a fall or remained stable



in most regions, with the exception of Russia and Eurasia, reflecting the continued flow of Russian arms to the MENA region. Much of this has been sent to support Syrian government forces against the rebels which, in contrast, have received much lower quantities of weaponry from the West.

In terms of nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities, this variable was stable in the 2015 index versus 2014. The improvement registered in 2014 may reverse as Middle East countries seek to bolster their capabilities amid broadening conflict in countries such as Yemen (where a coalition of neighbouring countries led by Saudi Arabia have engaged in air strikes). An increase in aggressions by Russia against Ukraine could also trigger rearmament among NATO countries. This would be particularly evident in some of the NATO states bordering or close to Russia but could also affect core countries like Germany which over the past few years have trimmed down their armed forces and stocks of heavy weaponry.

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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1	Iceland	1.148	11	Portugal	1.344	21	Spain	1.451	31	Botswana	1.597
2	Denmark	1.150	12	Ireland	1.354	22	Hungary	1.463	32	Bulgaria	1.607
3	Austria	1.198	13	Sweden	1.360	23	Slovakia	1.478	33	Kuwait	1.626
4	New Zealand	1.221	14	Belgium	1.368	24	Singapore	1.490	34	Costa Rica	1.654
5	Switzerland	1.275	15	Slovenia	1.378	25	Mauritius	1.503	35	Taiwan	1.657
6	Finland	1.277	16	Germany	1.379	26	Romania	1.542	36	Italy	1.669
7	Canada	1.287	17	Norway	1.393	27	Croatia	1.550	37	Lithuania	1.674
8	Japan	1.322	18	Bhutan	1.416	28	Malaysia	1.561	38	Estonia	1.677
9	Australia	1.329	19	Poland	1.430	29	Chile	1.563	39	United Kingdom	1.685
10	Czech Republic	1.341	20	Netherlands	1.432	30	Qatar	1.568			

THE STATE OF PEACE




2015 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE GLOBAL STATE OF PEACE

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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80	Mozambique	1.976	91	Armenia	2.028	102	Djibouti	2.113	113	Uzbekistan	2.187
81	Equatorial Guinea	1.987	92	Guyana	2.029	103	Brazil	2.122	114	Sri Lanka	2.188
82	Cuba	1.988	92	Peru	2.029	104	Algeria	2.131	115	Congo	2.196
83	Burkina Faso	1.994	94	United States	2.038	105	Cote d'Ivoire	2.133	116	Honduras	2.210
84	Bangladesh	1.997	95	Saudi Arabia	2.042	106	Turkmenistan	2.138	117	Guinea	2.214
84	Ecuador	1.997	96	Papua New Guinea	2.064	107	Bahrain	2.142	118	Guatemala	2.215
86	Morocco	2.002	97	Trinidad and Tobago	2.070	108	Tajikistan	2.152	119	Ethiopia	2.234
87	Kazakhstan	2.008	98	Haiti	2.074	109	Jamaica	2.153	120	Guinea-Bissau	2.235
88	Angola	2.020	99	Gambia	2.086	110	Belarus	2.173	121	Kyrgyzstan	2.249
89	Paraguay	2.023	100	Dominican Republic	2.089	111	Cambodia	2.179	122	Mauritania	2.262
90	Bolivia	2.025	101	Swaziland	2.102	111	Uganda	2.179	123	El Salvador	2.263

40	Latvia	1.695	49	United Arab Emirates	1.805	60	Argentina	1.865	70	Moldova	1.942
41	Laos	1.700	51	Malawi	1.814	61	Greece	1.878	71	Jordan	1.944
42	South Korea	1.701	52	Albania	1.821	62	Nepal	1.882	71	Togo	1.944
43	Mongolia	1.706	53	Bosnia & Herzegovina	1.839	63	Lesotho	1.891	71	Macedonia	1.944
44	Uruguay	1.721	54	Ghana	1.840	64	Panama	1.903	74	Nicaragua	1.947
45	France	1.742	55	Zambia	1.846	64	Tanzania	1.903	74	Oman	1.947
46	Indonesia	1.768	56	Vietnam	1.848	66	Gabon	1.904	76	Tunisia	1.952
46	Serbia	1.768	57	Montenegro	1.854	67	Madagascar	1.911	77	Benin	1.958
48	Namibia	1.784	58	Timor-Leste	1.860	68	Cyprus	1.924	78	Liberia	1.963
49	Senegal	1.805	59	Sierra Leone	1.864	69	Kosovo	1.938	79	Georgia	1.973



124	China	2.267	135	Turkey	2.363	146	Colombia	2.720
125	Zimbabwe	2.294	136	South Africa	2.376	147	Yemen	2.751
126	Thailand	2.303	137	Egypt	2.382	148	Israel	2.781
127	Eritrea	2.309	138	Iran	2.409	149	Libya	2.819
128	Mali	2.310	139	Rwanda	2.420	150	Ukraine	2.845
129	Niger	2.320	140	Chad	2.429	151	Nigeria	2.910
130	Burundi	2.323	141	Philippines	2.462	152	Russia	2.954
130	Myanmar	2.323	142	Venezuela	2.493	153	North Korea	2.977
132	Azerbaijan	2.325	143	India	2.504	154	Pakistan	3.049
133	Kenya	2.342	144	Mexico	2.530	155	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.085
134	Cameroon	2.349	145	Lebanon	2.623	156	Sudan	3.295
						157	Somalia	3.307
						158	Central African Republic	3.332
						159	South Sudan	3.383
						160	Afghanistan	3.427
						161	Iraq	3.444
						162	Syria	3.645

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

EUROPE

Europe remained the most peaceful geographical region in the world, securing the top three positions in the Global Peace Index. Iceland came out on top as the most peaceful country in the world. Denmark's score fell moderately following its decision to increase *military expenditure* and due to the *impact of terrorism* as a result of the 2015 Copenhagen shootings. France and Belgium also saw their scores worsen owing to the *impact of terrorism*; France's score was pulled down largely by the terror attack on the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine.

Greece was the region's greatest improver, jumping 22 places in the global rankings. The country experienced an improvement in a host of indicators, including reduced *violent crime* and *political terror*. In spite of a still economically problematic situation, the country has stabilised, particularly for indicators in the social safety and security domain. Portugal was the greatest improver locally, jumping five places in the both the global and European rankings. Portugal's score was boosted by a reduction in *political instability* following its exit from the EU/IMF economic and financial adjustment programme. Like neighbouring Spain, Portugal also benefitted from a reduction in the *likelihood of violent demonstrations* at anti-austerity marches. The Balkan countries were again among the biggest gainers. As was the case in 2014, the improvement in their scores was primarily due to a reduction in *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*—a trend that was largely followed across the wider region. A reduction in *political instability* also contributed to the improvement in the score for these countries. Serbia's score for *political instability* was reduced after one party, the Serbian Progressive Party, won an outright majority in the March 2014 election—marking a turning point in the country's post-communist history.

A number of countries across the region saw their score improve for *external conflicts fought*. This can primarily be accounted for by the withdrawal of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan in December 2014. The UK, a major player in Afghanistan, rose eight places in the global rankings as a result of its exit from the Afghan mission.

TABLE 1 EUROPE RANKINGS

EUROPE	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Iceland	1	1.148	-0.002	1
Denmark	2	1.150	+0.010	2
Austria	3	1.198	-0.003	3
Switzerland	5	1.275	-0.036	4
Finland	6	1.277	-0.016	5
Czech Republic	10	1.341	-0.030	6
Portugal	11	1.344	-0.045	7
Ireland	12	1.354	-0.006	8
Sweden	13	1.360	-0.006	9
Belgium	14	1.368	0.020	10
Slovenia	15	1.378	-0.008	11
Germany	16	1.379	-0.024	12
Norway	17	1.393	+0.013	13
Poland	19	1.430	-0.050	14
Netherlands	20	1.432	-0.035	15
Spain	21	1.451	-0.079	16
Hungary	22	1.463	+0.010	17
Slovakia	23	1.478	+0.008	18
Romania	26	1.542	-0.040	19
Croatia	27	1.550	+0.009	20
Bulgaria	32	1.607	+0.037	21
Italy	36	1.669	+0.026	22
Lithuania	37	1.674	-0.026	23
Estonia	38	1.677	+0.064	24
United Kingdom	39	1.685	-0.091	25
Latvia	40	1.695	+0.010	26
France	45	1.742	-0.006	27
Serbia	46	1.768	-0.104	28
Albania	52	1.821	-0.051	29
Bosnia and Herzegovina	53	1.839	+0.003	30
Montenegro	57	1.854	-0.004	31
Greece	61	1.878	-0.123	32
Cyprus	68	1.924	+0.011	33
Kosovo	69	1.938	0.000	34
Macedonia (FYR)	71	1.944	-0.057	35
Turkey	135	2.363	+0.027	36
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.566		

NORTH AMERICA

Across the Atlantic, the North America score improved slightly. This was largely due to an improvement in the US, which moved up two places in the global rankings. The score for external conflicts fought improved, as President Barack Obama, sought to reduce US military involvement abroad, trying to wind down the US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last US combat troops left Afghanistan at the end of 2014, and the remaining troops transitioned to a training and support role. The Obama administration has also worked hard to strike a nuclear disarmament deal with Iran, pushing back the deadline for talks to June 2015 to give negotiators more time. Meanwhile, Canada remains one of the most peaceful countries in the world. However, an armed attack in October 2014, where a gunman fatally shot a Canadian soldier outside parliament, caused the *impact of terrorism* score to deteriorate, resulting in a small decline for the Canadian score as a whole. The incident was used as justification for a bill to expand the counter-terrorism powers of the domestic intelligence agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). In addition, Canada has steadily increased its involvement in the international coalition fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), after deploying military personnel in October 2014. Aside from that, there was little change in the scores, which saw some modest improvement due to lower military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in both countries. Overall, the region retained its position as the second most peaceful in the world, behind Europe (largely on account of Canada's score).

TABLE 2 NORTH AMERICA RANKINGS

NORTH AMERICA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Canada	7	1.287	+0.012	1
United States of America	94	2.038	-0.037	2
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.662		

“ The South China Sea remains a potential area for conflict, with countries involved in the dispute all showing a worsening of their scores in the 2015 index.

ASIA-PACIFIC

The Asia-Pacific region ranked third behind Europe and North America in the Global Peace Index. However, as a region it contains the most diversity, with three countries in the top ten and a single country, North Korea, in the bottom ten of the overall rankings. The South China Sea remains a potential area for conflict, with countries involved in the dispute (China, Vietnam and the Philippines) all showing a worsening of their scores in the 2015 index. Although the likelihood of further military skirmishes in the disputed waters is high, a large-scale military engagement remains unlikely. The Philippines suffered from an escalation of internal conflicts between the government and rebel groups occurring late in the measurement period. Myanmar showed a worsening of its score, partly driven by the imposition of martial law in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in Shan State on the border with China, which is reflected in a deterioration in likelihood of violent demonstrations. The continuing conflict risks intervention from China, which would escalate the situation further. The laggard of the region, North Korea, remains a concern for global peace with continued belligerence and isolation. Notable improvements in the Asia-Pacific region include Indonesia, which, thanks to improvements in the level of violent crime and a reduced impact of terrorism, was the most improved country in the region, rising 12 places to a rank of 46th in the overall rankings in 2015. Australia has moved up four places to ninth in the overall rankings, joining New Zealand and Japan in the top ten of the world rankings.

TABLE 3 ASIA-PACIFIC RANKINGS

ASIA-PACIFIC	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
New Zealand	4	1.221	0.000	1
Japan	8	1.322	-0.013	2
Australia	9	1.329	-0.047	3
Singapore	24	1.490	-0.015	4
Malaysia	28	1.561	+0.019	5
Taiwan	35	1.657	+0.066	6
Laos	41	1.700	+0.001	7
South Korea	42	1.701	-0.085	8
Mongolia	43	1.706	-0.010	9
Indonesia	46	1.768	-0.109	10
Vietnam	56	1.848	+0.107	11
Timor-Leste	58	1.860	-0.052	12
Papua New Guinea	96	2.064	+0.022	13
Cambodia	111	2.179	+0.001	14
China	124	2.267	+0.097	15
Thailand	126	2.303	-0.018	16
Myanmar	130	2.323	+0.085	17
Philippines	141	2.462	+0.112	18
North Korea	153	2.977	-0.042	19
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.881		

SOUTH AMERICA

South America's overall regional score eroded slightly in the 2015 index compared with 2014. This caused it to drop slightly below the global average. Among the South American countries, there were improvements for Chile (owing to a better score for *weapons exports*), Ecuador (improvement in *political terror* and *internal conflicts fought*) and Peru, with the latter showing the strongest improvement thanks to a decrease in the number of *deaths from internal conflict*. Chile retained its position as the region's most peaceful country, and the second most peaceful, after Canada, in the Western Hemisphere. The score declined for all the other countries in South America, with the most notable deterioration for Uruguay, Venezuela and Brazil. Despite Uruguay's fall, it was still the second most peaceful country in South America. Uruguay's change was as a result of a rise in the *security officers and police rate*. Brazil's score worsened owing to deterioration in *political instability*, and in the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*. Brazil has been affected by economic stagnation and rising inflation, which has triggered social discontent. There have also been multiple widespread protests reflecting discontent with a series of corruption scandals affecting the government. Ongoing internal tensions eroded Venezuela's score, and it and Colombia remained the two lowest-scoring countries in the region. Venezuela continues its military build-up (mostly with Russian-supplied weapons), which has rapidly seen it possess one of the most modern arsenals in the continent. To this are added the increased risk of *violent demonstrations*, *violent crime* and *political instability*, as the economic crisis has deepened and anti-government sentiment has risen. Colombia's score continued to suffer as a result of its performance in *refugees and IDPs*, which are the product of its ongoing conflict with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, as well as erosion in the score for *political terror* (as government actions against rebels continued). Ongoing peace negotiations with the government offer some hope of an improvement in the medium term.

TABLE 4 SOUTH AMERICA RANKINGS

SOUTH AMERICA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Chile	29	1.563	-0.013	1
Uruguay	44	1.721	+0.108	2
Argentina	60	1.865	+0.050	3
Ecuador	84	1.997	-0.030	4
Paraguay	89	2.023	+0.011	5
Bolivia	90	2.025	-0.026	6
Guyana	92	2.029	+0.039	7
Peru	92	2.029	-0.138	8
Brazil	103	2.122	-0.075	9
Venezuela	142	2.493	-0.099	10
Colombia	146	2.720	+0.049	11
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.053		

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Peace in Central America and the Caribbean remains challenging, but the region managed to improve slightly compared with its 2014 scores. It remains less peaceful than the global average, however. Costa Rica, Jamaica and Honduras were the strongest gainers. In Costa Rica's case, this was mostly because of improvement in the scores for *homicide rate* and for *relations with neighbouring countries*. Jamaica registered better scores in several categories, with the most significant changes for *UN peacekeeping funding* and *likelihood of violent demonstrations*. Even with these improvements, however, Jamaica ranks quite low compared to the global average in the domestic peace ranking, on account of its high *homicide rate* and overall *level of violent crime*. Honduras, a country long plagued by gang-related and other violence, saw improvements in *intensity of internal conflict* and the *security officers and police rate*. The countries whose scores slipped the most in the 2015 index were El Salvador and Nicaragua. In El Salvador's case, notable worsening of the scores for *UN peacekeeping funding* and for *political terror* outweighed modest improvements for *external conflicts fought* and *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*. In Nicaragua, the erosion in the scores for *violent crime* and *political terror* also outweighed improvement in areas such as *UN peacekeeping funding* and the *incarceration rate*. Overall, Central America and the Caribbean continued to be the lowest ranked region in the world in terms of homicide rates and violent crime, as well as in *perceptions of criminality*. This is especially the case for the so-called golden triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras), as well as Caribbean states such as Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. This is mostly due to urban gang violence as well as drug-related crime. Mexico continues to have the worst overall peace score among the Central American and

TABLE 5
CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN RANKINGS

CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Costa Rica	34	1.654	-0.111	1
Panama	64	1.903	+0.012	2
Nicaragua	74	1.947	+0.049	3
Cuba	82	1.988	-0.014	4
Trinidad and Tobago	97	2.070	+0.009	5
Haiti	98	2.074	-0.040	6
Dominican Republic	100	2.089	+0.011	7
Jamaica	109	2.153	-0.049	8
Honduras	116	2.210	-0.050	9
Guatemala	118	2.215	-0.014	10
El Salvador	123	2.263	+0.073	11
Mexico	144	2.530	-0.016	12
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.091		

Caribbean countries, and remains mired in domestic conflict against drug-related violence. Despite this, it saw improvement in the score for *security officers and police rate*, as the government of Enrique Peña Nieto has eased off a bit, compared with his predecessor, in term of aggressive tactics against drug cartels. More positively, many countries in this region (including Mexico) in this region benefit from the absence of intra-regional conflicts, generally friendly *relations with neighbouring countries* and minimal *nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities* among them.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa's score improved in 2015, albeit fractionally, putting it further ahead of regions including Russia and Eurasia, South Asia and MENA. This overall improvement masks sharp variations in country performance, however; sub-Saharan states registered some of the sharpest score changes, both positive and negative. For example, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire registered the largest score improvements worldwide. In both cases, this reflects a substantial improvement in the *societal safety and security* and the *ongoing domestic and international conflict* domains, due respectively to the holding of credible and predominantly peaceful elections and a decline in the number of attacks by former rebels. An improvement of the *intensity of internal conflict* contributed to a 29-place improvement for Benin, thanks largely to the announcement of elections (eventually held in April 2015) and a court ruling against a constitutional change that would have allowed the president to stand for a third term. However, sub-Saharan states are also in the top-five worldwide in terms of sharpest negative score changes. Djibouti's ranking declined 42 places, reflecting a rising incidence of social unrest, crime and resentment of the government's authoritarian rule. However, Geography also plays a role, as Djibouti borders notoriously unstable Somalia, which has served to increase the availability of small arms, reflected in the related score. Geography is also a factor for Niger, which fell 28 places to 129th. Niger is one of a number of sub-regional states to have felt the *impact of terrorism* due to Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based Islamist terrorist group, which launched several fatal attacks in Niger in early 2015. Given porous borders, stretched resources and regional cooperation, which has thus far proved ineffective, Niger will struggle to contain the threat posed by Boko Haram. South Sudan's ranking declined by only three places, but this was on top of by far the sharpest fall in the 2014 GPI. It remains embroiled in the civil conflict that broke out in December 2013, and which has thus far proved immune to numerous peace efforts.

TABLE 6 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA RANKINGS

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Mauritius	25	1.503	+0.013	1
Botswana	31	1.597	-0.100	2
Namibia	48	1.784	0.000	3
Senegal	49	1.805	-0.129	4
Malawi	51	1.814	-0.101	5
Ghana	54	1.840	-0.056	6
Zambia	55	1.846	+0.076	7
Sierra Leone	59	1.864	-0.015	8
Lesotho	63	1.891	+0.047	9
Tanzania	64	1.903	-0.024	10
Gabon	66	1.904	-0.025	11
Madagascar	67	1.911	-0.013	12
Togo	71	1.944	-0.019	13
Benin	77	1.958	-0.171	14
Liberia	78	1.963	+0.015	15
Mozambique	80	1.976	-0.007	16
Equatorial Guinea	81	1.987	-0.093	17
Burkina Faso	83	1.994	+0.033	18
Angola	88	2.020	-0.105	19
The Gambia	99	2.086	+0.015	20
Swaziland	101	2.102	+0.050	21
Djibouti	102	2.113	+0.224	22
Cote d'Ivoire	105	2.133	-0.215	23
Uganda	111	2.179	+0.013	24
Republic of the Congo	115	2.196	-0.052	25
Guinea	117	2.214	-0.037	26
Ethiopia	119	2.234	-0.143	27
Guinea-Bissau	120	2.235	-0.266	28
Mauritania	122	2.262	+0.003	29
Zimbabwe	125	2.294	-0.147	30
Eritrea	127	2.309	-0.041	31
Mali	128	2.310	+0.088	32
Niger	129	2.320	+0.214	33
Burundi	130	2.323	+0.009	34
Kenya	133	2.342	-0.086	35
Cameroon	134	2.349	+0.148	36
South Africa	136	2.376	+0.034	37
Rwanda	139	2.420	-0.027	38
Chad	140	2.429	-0.071	39
Nigeria	151	2.910	+0.130	40
Democratic Republic of the Congo	155	3.085	-0.033	41
Somalia	157	3.307	-0.079	42
Central African Republic	158	3.332	+0.107	43
South Sudan	159	3.383	+0.169	44
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.199		

RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Russia and Eurasia recorded a modest deterioration in its overall score this year, while its position in the regional ranking was unchanged. However, the aggregate regional score masks significant variation between countries. Ukraine recorded one of the biggest falls in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas region. This conflict was initially driven by external aggression, but now also contains a civil component. As a consequence, Ukraine's score on several metrics—*access to small arms, intensity of internal conflict, terrorism impact* and *violent crime*—have all deteriorated. Despite the conclusion of a second ceasefire agreement in February 2015, the prospects of a long-term resolution to the conflict look poor. Heightened geopolitical competition between Russia and the West raises the likelihood of further conflict across the region in the coming years. While new dividing lines were drawn in the Donbas, 2014 also saw an upsurge of deadly ceasefire violations in the “frozen” conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In November 2014, Armenian forces downed an Azerbaijani helicopter gunship, marking a significant escalation of the conflict. The deterioration in both countries' scores is due to an increase in the number of deaths from ceasefire violations compared with recent years, reflected in a deterioration of their scores for number of *deaths from internal conflict*. Azerbaijan's overall score was also pulled down by a marked increase in *weapons imports*. Elsewhere in the region, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyzstan showed a modest improvement in their scores, thanks principally to decrease in the *level of violent crime* and *political instability* over the past year. In a global context, the region continues to rank poorly, with Moldova, its best ranked country, coming only 70th in the overall index. This reflects the dominant position of the security and military complexes in many countries, the proliferation of territorial conflicts, high risk of political instability, and the high incarceration rate, among other factors.

TABLE 7 RUSSIA AND EURASIA RANKINGS

RUSSIA AND EURASIA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Moldova	70	1.942	-0.014	1
Georgia	79	1.973	-0.126	2
Kazakhstan	87	2.008	-0.092	3
Armenia	91	2.028	+0.039	4
Turkmenistan	106	2.138	+0.071	5
Tajikistan	108	2.152	+0.175	6
Belarus	110	2.173	+0.046	7
Uzbekistan	113	2.187	+0.009	8
Kyrgyz Republic	121	2.249	+0.097	9
Azerbaijan	132	2.325	+0.042	10
Ukraine	150	2.845	+0.354	11
Russia	152	2.954	-0.016	12
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.248		

SOUTH ASIA

South Asia's position went up a notch in the regional rankings, but only because conditions deteriorated at a faster pace in MENA. Overall, the individual composite scores of most countries in the region worsened, with just Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh registering gains. Against the backdrop of the withdrawal of most international forces from Afghanistan, the number of *deaths from internal conflict* in the country rose last year in tandem with an increase in *political terror*.

“Ukraine recorded one of the biggest falls in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas region. This conflict was initially driven by external aggression, but now also contains a civil component.”

Crucially, the uncertainty stemming from the shift in responsibility for security from foreign troops to Afghan forces means that the chances of sustained internal conflict remain high. Pakistan's score has similarly deteriorated, on the back of a worsening of its *perceptions of criminality*; as a result, the country remains second from the bottom in South Asia. The country's dire domestic security situation continues to be hampered by the presence of Islamist militant groups. Even though the number of *deaths from internal conflict* did not worsen significantly over the past twelve months, Pakistan suffered a handful of high-profile incidents—most notably the separate attacks on Jinnah International Airport and an army-run school in Peshawar. Albeit not to the same extent, the number of casualties from internal conflict also rose in India where a Maoist insurgency stills runs rife. The downgrade in India's score is tempered, however, by an improvement in political stability. The world's second most-populous country witnessed an historic election in 2014 as the Bharatiya Janata Party secured India's first one-party majority since the mid-1980s.

TABLE 8 SOUTH ASIA RANKINGS

SOUTH ASIA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Bhutan	18	1.416	-0.027	1
Nepal	62	1.882	-0.078	2
Bangladesh	84	1.997	-0.058	3
Sri Lanka	114	2.188	+0.073	4
India	143	2.504	+0.057	5
Pakistan	154	3.049	+0.009	6
Afghanistan	160	3.427	+0.056	7
AVERAGE		2.352		

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East and North Africa region remains blighted by conflict and returns the worst regional score in the Global Peace Index. The score deteriorated from last year's index, as mild improvements, notably in Egypt and Tunisia, were outweighed by worsening scores in particular in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria. The burgeoning regional influence of ISIL, the Sunni jihadist group, was an important factor behind this. ISIL made significant territorial gains across western and northern Iraq in 2014, adding to its presence in Syria, which remains locked in a bloody stalemate between government forces loyal to the president, Bashar al-Assad, and numerous rebel groups fighting against it. This meant a worsening of a number of scores for Iraq, including for the intensity of internal conflict and political terror. For Syria, the score for *internal conflicts fought* deteriorated to reflect the ongoing civil war. Meanwhile, the post-Arab-Spring transition has floundered in Libya, which has sunk into a low-level civil war between Islamist and nationalist groups. At the root of this is the refusal of Islamist militias to recognise the legitimacy of the liberal-dominated parliament elected in June. Libya Dawn, an umbrella group of Islamist militias, seized control of Tripoli in August and forced the government and parliament to relocate to eastern Libya, harming indicator scores such as *political instability* and *intensity of internal conflict*. As a result, Libya suffered the largest score decline within MENA. Yemen is another country where the post-Arab-Spring transition has destabilised its domestic situation. In early 2015 the advance of Houthi rebels forced the resignation of the government and prompted the interim president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, to flee the country; Yemen has consequently had worsening scores for *intensity of internal conflict* and *political instability*, among others. Yemen is currently facing its biggest existential crisis since the north-south civil war in 1994. Amid the gloom, two noteworthy improvers are Tunisia, which successfully concluded parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014, and Egypt, where the military-backed Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was elected president in May, has brought greater political stability and a decrease in the *intensity of internal conflict* for now, leading to an improvement in Egypt's overall score.

TABLE 9

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA RANKINGS

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	OVERALL RANK	OVERALL SCORE	CHANGE IN SCORE	REGIONAL RANK
Qatar	30	1.568	+0.080	1
Kuwait	33	1.626	-0.049	2
United Arab Emirates	49	1.805	+0.043	3
Jordan	71	1.944	+0.112	4
Oman	74	1.947	+0.075	5
Tunisia	76	1.952	-0.040	6
Morocco	86	2.002	+0.035	7
Saudi Arabia	95	2.042	+0.027	8
Algeria	104	2.131	-0.030	9
Bahrain	107	2.142	-0.019	10
Egypt	137	2.382	-0.191	11
Iran	138	2.409	-0.002	12
Lebanon	145	2.623	+0.005	13
Yemen	147	2.751	+0.165	14
Israel	148	2.781	+0.056	15
Libya	149	2.819	+0.419	16
Sudan	156	3.295	+0.059	17
Iraq	161	3.444	+0.122	18
Syria	162	3.645	+0.061	19
AVERAGE	109	2.385		


“ In early 2015 the advance of Houthi rebels forced the resignation of the government and prompted the interim president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, to flee the country; Yemen has consequently had worsening scores for intensity of internal conflict and political instability, among others.

RISERS & FALLERS

This year Guinea-Bissau had the largest improvement in peace, resulting in a rise of 24 places in the rankings to 120th. Cote d'Ivoire did not improve quite as much as Guinea-Bissau in terms of its raw score, but did nevertheless rise 26 places to 105th. The three other biggest improvements were in Egypt (rising nine places), Tajikistan (rising 19 places) and Benin (rising 29 places). A common theme across the top risers was a decrease in the level of organised conflict, which occurred in all four of the African nations in the top five. Peaceful elections in Guinea-Bissau and Benin helped to add a measure of political and social stability and domestic conflicts eased in Egypt and Cote d'Ivoire.

Cancelling out its strong improvement in the 2014 GPI, Libya was the country that saw the most severe deterioration in peace this year. Its score worsened by +0.419, more than double its -0.171 improvement last year. Consequently Libya fell 13 places down to 149th. Unsurprisingly the second biggest decline was for Ukraine: following a popular revolution which brought down the administration of Viktor Yanukovich, Russia moved to destabilise the country, meaning it scored poorly on organised conflict indicators. *Access to small arms* and the level of organised conflict, which were common problems amongst the bottom five fallers, caused Djibouti and Niger to plummet 42 and 28 places, respectively. South Sudan also fell for its third consecutive year, slipping a further 3 places to 159.

“ A common theme across the top risers was a decrease in the level of organised conflict, which occurred in all four of the African nations in the top five. Peaceful elections in Guinea-Bissau and Benin helped to add a measure of political and social stability, and domestic conflicts eased in Egypt and Cote d'Ivoire.





TOP FIVE NATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACE

GUINEA-BISSAU

RANK 120

Change in score 2014/15: **-0.266**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▲ 24**

Guinea-Bissau had the most significant increase in peace in the 2015 Global Peace Index, stemming largely from improvements in its domestic situation. The holding of credible and predominantly peaceful elections in 2014 has reduced tensions and improved security; that the army accepted the result was also a sign of greater stability. Moreover, the newly elected administration includes the country's two largest parties, who are historical rivals, reducing the risk that election losers will disrupt the peace process. The election and consequent return to some form of constitutional order translated into improvements in the *intensity of internal conflict*, *political instability*, *violent demonstrations* and *violent crime*.

Widespread poverty and unemployment will continue to fuel anger and sporadic outbreaks of unrest. But the presence of a democratically elected government with robust support from donors will continue to ease some popular frustration. The authorities have also embarked on a gradual army reform process, aimed at reinforcing civilian control over the military, thus reducing the risk of army interference in political matters, and furthering the cause of political stability.

COTE D'IVOIRE

RANK 105

Change in score 2014/15: **-0.214**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▲ 24**

Cote d'Ivoire had the second biggest improvement in its score (-0.214). Similar to Guinea-Bissau this improvement is due to an improvement in its domestic situation. The number of attacks by former rebels has fallen over the past year, and has been limited to pockets of insecurity along the border with Liberia and some areas in the north of the country. The authorities' efforts to demobilise ex-rebels and ex-militia members have supported an improvement in the *intensity of internal conflict*. More hard-line members of the political opposition have now been marginalised, while the moderate factions are keen to be reintegrated. Challenges remain, however, such as integrating former rebels into civilian life or the regular armed forces and quelling the sporadic attacks

against civilian and military targets in the more precarious regions mentioned above. Still, the willingness to engage in violent fighting appears to have declined, resulting in improvement in indicators such as *deaths from internal conflict* and *violent demonstrations*.

EGYPT

RANK 137

Change in score 2014/15: **-0.192**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▲ 9**

While Egypt had one of the largest declines in its score in 2014, it had an improvement of -0.192 this year. Egypt improved overall due to its large improvement in its domestic situation. Since the election of former defence minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as president in May 2014, levels of crime have dropped, reflecting the effectiveness of the security apparatus. This resulted in an improvement in the *perceptions of criminality* indicator, as security forces' visible presence on the streets has been enhanced compared to the period under the deposed Muslim Brotherhood regime of Morsi. Relatedly, the *intensity of internal conflict* and *political instability* have also improved due to the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, and an overall improvement in the security picture, which had deteriorated since the 2011 uprising against Hosni Mubarak.

TAJIKISTAN

RANK 108

Change in score 2014/15: **-0.175**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▲ 19**

Politically, the most important factor behind an improvement in Tajikistan's score was a modest thaw in relations with neighbouring Uzbekistan, which in the past has subjected Tajikistan to considerable economic and political pressure owing to differences over issues of border demarcation, energy and water. Common concerns over security—linked mostly to Russia's military actions against Ukraine from late February 2014 on the pretext of protecting Russian speakers, but also to the approach of the drawdown of US troops from neighbouring Afghanistan—seem to have been behind a modest rapprochement between Imomali Rahmon and Islam Karimov, the presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, respectively made public in the wake of a meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tajikistan's capital, Dushanbe, in September 2014.

BENIN

RANK 77

Change in score 2014/15: **-0.171**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▲ 29**

Benin's ranking in the 2015 Global Peace Index improved dramatically (up 29 places to 77th). After recurring delays, which sparked widespread public protests in 2014, a date was set for both local and parliamentary elections this year, easing concerns that the current president, Boni Yayi, and the ruling Forces armées togolaises pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE), would seek to extend their rule in power by amending the constitution. In fact, the legislative elections eventually passed smoothly on April 26th. Benin is also seeking to deepen ties with neighbours, and recent efforts such as the cross-border railway project with Niger and Common External Tariff have resulted in an improvement in relations with neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Benin has also taken part in joint efforts to combat the Nigeria-based Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist outfit, and pledged troops to a multi-national force. Still, ties with Nigeria remained strained, particularly over cross-border smuggling.



TOP FIVE NATIONAL DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE

LIBYA

RANK 149

Change in score 2014/15: **+0.419**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▼ 13**

After two years of consecutive improvement, Libya tumbled quickly back down the rankings to 149th due to a score deterioration of +0.419. From a domestic perspective, Libya is embroiled in a low-level civil war, with rival governments in the east and the west vying for legitimacy. Thus the intensity of internal conflict has gotten worse, exacerbated by the Islamic State-styled militancy in the east of the country. Following on from this, a key factor in Libya's fall in the 2015 rankings is a deterioration in its relations with neighbouring countries. Relations between the internationally recognised government in the east and Turkey, Qatar and Sudan have soured owing to their alleged material and logistical support of Islamist militias. Meanwhile, relations between the self-declared Islamist-government in Tripoli, on the one hand, and Egypt and the UAE, on the other hand, have also deteriorated due to their support of the rival government in the east. Libya's borders have also become extremely porous, allowing easier *access to small arms*.

UKRAINE

RANK 150

Change in score 2014/15: **+0.354**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▼ 18**

Ukraine is the only country outside of Africa to feature among the five countries suffering the sharpest deterioration in peace over the past year. Apart from Russia itself, Ukraine remains the lowest ranked country in the Russia and Eurasia region, at 150th overall. The war with Russian-backed separatists has been a key driver in the declining scores in several indicators. The conflict began with Russia's military takeover of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula following the overthrow of the government of Viktor Yanukovich in late February. From April it extended to the Ukrainian mainland, when separatist militias – made up of some locals, as well as mercenaries linked to the ousted regime, local criminal gangs and Russian nationalist volunteers – began to seize urban centres across south-east Ukraine, backed heavily by Russian weapons, intelligence and finance, with regular Russian troops intervening directly if necessary to prevent a separatist defeat. Accompanying the worsening of the intensity of internal conflict, the ease of *access to small arms* has risen due to the Russian-backed uprisings, leading to an influx of weapons of all kinds into the Donbas region.

DJIBOUTI

RANK 102

Change in score 2014/15: **+0.255**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▼ 42**

Djibouti this year fell 42 places to 102nd. Fear of suppression has historically kept occurrences of public protest rare. However, the *likelihood of violent demonstrations* has increased as unrest exploded in the wake of the contentious 2013 legislative election and is likely to increase as the 2016 presidential poll approaches. Similarly, rising incidence of social unrest shows that the historical grip of the government on its population is slipping. Thus widespread poverty and unemployment are fuelling a higher *level of violent crime*. *Ease of access to small arms* has also increased due to instability in Somalia. The Somali government has been unable to keep control of the entirety of its nation, meaning insurgent groups have been able to travel and trade weaponry. Al-Shabab have claimed responsibility for terrorist strikes in Djibouti, and further attacks cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, Djibouti's role in contributing troops to the Africa Union Mission in Somalia and hosting US and French military operations means the country's role in external conflicts has increased and the *impact of terrorism* remains pertinent.

NIGER

RANK 129

Change in score 2014/15: **+0.214**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▼ 28**

Niger's score worsened by +0.214 this year, meaning it fell 28 places to 129th in the 2015 ranking. Internally, the Nigeria-based Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram launched several deadly attacks on Nigerien soil in early 2015. This suggests the group is seeking to expand its influence across the sub-region, especially after several high-profile attacks in Cameroon. Given the porous borders, stretched resources, and lack of effective regional cooperation Niger will struggle to contain the threat posed by Boko Haram. As well as impacting the intensity of internal conflict this caused a deterioration of the terrorism impact score.

SOUTH SUDAN

RANK 159

Change in score 2014/15: **+0.169**

Change in rank 2014/15: **▼ 3**

South Sudan's peace level declined for the third consecutive year. The country remains embroiled in a civil conflict between forces loyal to the president, Salva Kiir, and those fighting on behalf of his former deputy, Riek Machar. This commenced in December 2013 and has continued despite numerous attempts to reach an overall peace agreement, and threats of sanctions from the UN and others. This has contributed to a decline in the score for the *internal conflicts fought* indicator. Faced with a protracted conflict, the government has increased *military expenditure*, and increased the number of armed service personnel, leading to deteriorations in these scores. At the same time, tensions remain high with Sudan. Although Sudan's president has expressed qualified support for his South Sudanese counterpart, both sides continue to allege that the other government is offering support to rebel groups, and there are periodic cross-border attacks, contributing to a decline in the score for *external conflicts fought*.

“ A key factor in Libya's fall in the 2015 rankings is a deterioration in its relations with neighbouring countries. Relations between the internationally recognised government in the east and Turkey, Qatar and Sudan have soured owing to their alleged material and logistical support of Islamist militias.

GPI DOMAIN & INDICATOR


ANNUAL CHANGES

The global country average, calculated by averaging the score for the 162 countries measured in the GPI, remained approximately the same from 2014 to 2015. Most countries recorded little movement with 66 per cent of countries registering less than a three per cent change in their peacefulness.

The *societal safety and security* domain improved slightly, driven by falls in the *homicide rate* and the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*. This improvement was counterbalanced by deteriorations in the *ongoing conflict* and *militarisation* domains, owing to increases in *deaths from internal conflict* and in the *impact of terrorism* as well as an increase in un-paid contributions to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

FIGURE 1 CHANGE IN GPI SCORE FROM 2014 TO 2015 BY DOMAIN

While average global peacefulness has barely changed, there were noticeable changes in the *militarisation* and *societal safety & security* domains.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index


INDICATOR IMPROVEMENTS

Figure 1 highlights the five indicators that improved the most from 2014 to 2015, along with the five indicators that deteriorated the most over the same period. The biggest improvements occurred in the *homicide rate* with the country average improving by 16 per cent, however, most of this change stems from a revision of the homicide data by the UNODC. Whilst the new revised data is significantly lower for several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the revised figures over the last eight years are consistent with previous analysis conducted by IEP, which found that the long-term homicide rate is increasing as shown in the trends section of this report on page 43. The *external conflicts fought* indicator improved by three per cent. This continues a trend that began in 2012, as countries which had committed troops to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq began to scale back their involvement. Both the United States and the United Kingdom, the two countries with the most prominent external roles in the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, saw their scores for *external conflicts fought* improve by 0.72, with improvements of more than 1.0 being experienced by Poland, Romania, Albania, Australia and Latvia.

Political instability improved slightly, with an average improvement in score of 0.04. In total 47 countries experienced improvements on this indicator while 34 countries deteriorated. The largest improvements were for Madagascar, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, with the most significant deteriorations occurring in Sierra Leone, Libya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There were also significant improvements in several countries from the MENA region including Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, a number of European countries became more unstable politically, with Russia, France, Spain, the Czech Republic and Finland all experiencing deteriorations. However, most countries, 81 in all, experienced no change.

FIGURE 2 FIVE MOST IMPROVED AND FIVE MOST DETERIORATED GPI INDICATORS, 2014–2015

Internal peace improved, however this was largely due to revised homicide data.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

Violent demonstrations and the *level of violent crime* improved slightly. Ukraine is the only country that experienced a large increase in the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*. By contrast, 13 countries recorded significant improvements in the indicator, with the most significant improvement occurring in Spain. According to the 2015 GPI, the *likelihood of violent demonstrations* in Spain is now the lowest it has been since the inception of the GPI, as the volatility associated with the global financial crisis and high youth unemployment begins to abate.

INDICATOR DETERIORATIONS

The largest deterioration occurred in the *UN peacekeeping funding* indicator, which deteriorated for the first time since 2012, after three consecutive years of significant improvement. This indicator accounted for the deterioration in the militarisation domain. In all, 43 countries experienced large deteriorations in their financial commitment to UN peacekeeping, with the largest occurring in Liberia, North Korea, Cameroon and Benin. In spite of this deterioration, there were a number of countries that improved in meeting their required UN financial commitments, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The three largest improvements in *UN peacekeeping funding* occurred in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Gabon.

The number of *deaths from organised internal conflict* continued to rise, with the deterioration being confined to a small number of countries. In total 42 countries experienced deaths from internal conflict with only 17 of these countries recording a decrease in the number of deaths while 25 countries experienced higher levels of fatalities. The countries which experienced the most marked increases were in the Middle East with the death toll continuing to rise in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

The *impact of terrorism* indicator also deteriorated, with terrorism being closely linked to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and Afghanistan. There were also a number of high profile terrorist attacks in OECD countries, most notably in France, Denmark and Australia, highlighting the risk of terrorism in countries with otherwise high levels of internal peacefulness.

“ The likelihood of violent demonstrations in Spain is now the lowest it has been since the inception of the GPI, as the volatility associated with the global financial crisis and high youth unemployment begins to abate.

Finally, the number of refugees and IDPs as a percentage of the global population continued to grow, driven largely by the fallout from civil wars in the MENA region, terrorism and political instability around the world. The total number of refugees and IDPs is now over 50 million people worldwide, around 0.75 per cent of the global population. The largest percentage increase in *refugees and IDPs* occurred in South Sudan, where it is estimated that over 17 per cent of the population is currently displaced. Syria has the largest total number of refugees and displaced people with an estimated 43 per cent of the population being displaced, equating to approximately 9.55 million people. There is a clear link between conflict and displacement, with Syria, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine also recording large increases in *refugees and IDPs* due to the deteriorating conditions of their conflicts.

TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX DOMAINS

Globally, the number of international armed conflicts is in decline. Indeed, the indicator measuring *external conflicts fought* has improved 15.4 per cent between the 2008 and 2015 GPI. However, overall the world has become slightly less peaceful in the last decade.

The GPI measures Negative Peace using three domains of peacefulness – *ongoing domestic and international conflict, societal safety and security and militarisation*. As a result, even though the number of international wars is declining, the GPI indicates that overall peacefulness has slightly deteriorated: the *impact of terrorism is getting worse, deaths from internal conflict* have been rising and more people are

now displaced than at any time since the end of the Second World War.

In order to better understand the multidimensional nature of peace, IEP has investigated some of the major themes in global peacefulness across the three domains of the GPI. The following pages of the 2015 GPI report examine the issues facing the world in the previous year and some of the key challenges and opportunities in the years ahead.

For the full list of indicators included in each of the three domains, refer to the GPI Methodology in Annex A of this report.



ONGOING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

This sub-section provides descriptive analysis of the six major conflicts occurring in the MENA region within Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Israel and Lebanon. It identifies drivers of these conflicts, which include challenges to government legitimacy, deepening sectarian divides, the destabilising presence of ISIL and the cross-cutting proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.



SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

This sub-section analyses the effects of urbanisation on violence, and finds that peace generally increases with higher levels of urbanisation. This is a by-product of higher levels of development. However, if countries have weak rule of law, high levels of intergroup grievances and high levels of inequality, they are more likely to experience deteriorations in peace as urbanisation increases.



MILITARISATION

Since 1990, there has been a slow and steady decrease in measures of global militarisation with large changes in militarisation occurring rarely and usually associated with larger, globally driven geopolitical and economic shifts. Surprisingly, very few major socio-economic measures are associated with militarisation; however, the research did find that countries with weak Positive Peace factors are more likely to use the military for internal suppression.



ONGOING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

A LOOK AT THE EVOLVING CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN 2014

Since the start of the Iraq war, the Middle East has been descending into deeper levels of violence. Currently, most of the countries in the region are either suffering from internal conflicts or being affected by these conflicts. Much of the violence in the region is centred in the two least peaceful countries in this year's GPI, Iraq and Syria. The major conflicts in the Middle East also feature high levels of terrorism as a key dimension.

These conflicts are strategically significant for the whole world for a variety of reasons, not least because much of the world's oil supply comes from this region. What has been particularly troubling in the past year has been their fluid nature, their increasing intensity and the deepening of Shia versus Sunni conflicts. While there is a lot of uncertainty about how events may unfold, what is clear is that the dynamics underlying these conflicts are complex. The fact that each conflict includes numerous state and non-state participants with different tactical and strategic interests only serves to further complicate the situation and make the path to peace less clear.

In assessing the evolving nature of conflict in the region, IEP has focused this analysis on the six countries most affected by conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Israel and Lebanon were selected based on the fact they had the highest number of conflict-related civilian and battle fatalities in the region in 2014, as recorded by the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Armed Conflict Database. The section analyses some of the more important drivers of violence and sets out some of the opportunities for building peace.

KEY FEATURES OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION INCLUDE:

- Five of the six conflicts are what is termed internationalised internal conflicts, meaning that international actors are involved in the civil wars.
- Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya all face critical challenges to government legitimacy, which serve to exacerbate violent conflict. This failure of state legitimacy has resulted in a power vacuum.
- Sectarian divides between Sunni and Shia groups both drive violence and are driven by violence.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is present in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and recently Lebanon, and its rapid expansion is increasing instability in the broader Levant region.
- Proxy conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran are impacting internal civil conflicts.

Internationalised internal conflicts have unique and complex dynamics, including trafficking, displacement, the involvement of foreign fighters and support for the conflict from outside groups, all of which can distort the nature of the conflict.³

TABLE 10 KEY CONFLICT STATISTICS FOR COUNTRIES PROFILED, 2014

COUNTRY	CONFLICT-RELATED FATALITIES	TOTAL DISPLACED PERSONS ¹	INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)	REFUGEES ORIGINATING FROM THE COUNTRY	FOREIGN REFUGEES RESIDING IN THE COUNTRY	COST OF VIOLENCE (US\$)	COST AS % OF GDP
Syria	71,667	9,550,265	6,520,800	3,029,465	149,377	\$56,736,469,736	42%
Iraq	18,489	2,330,057	1,903,943	426,114	254,215	\$152,322,962,059	31%
Yemen	3,836	337,026	334,512	2,514	245,801	\$9,951,422,174	9%
Libya	3,060	67,338	63,985	3,353	25,561	\$14,673,899,539	14%
Israel*	2,414	1,043	0	1,043	48,201	\$32,214,622,557	12%
Lebanon	360	4,238	0	4,238	1,115,988	\$6,646,573,618	8%

Source: IEP and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

*Not including Palestine; according to the BADIL Resource Centre 6.8 million Palestinian refugees and 519,000 IDPs have been displaced since 1949.²



These internationalised internal conflicts affect all of the three domains of the GPI and highlight the interconnectedness between different aspects of violence. Two good examples are indicators from the *societal safety and security* domain. In some cases, civil conflicts combined with outside support have created an environment where terrorism has flourished. In others, terrorism has contributed to the escalation of civil war. The *impact of terrorism* indicator for each of these countries is notably worse than the average for MENA. Additionally, four of the six countries covered in this section – Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya – get the worst possible score for *ease of access to small arms and light weapons*.

“ Religious identity or other loyalties often supersede national boundaries in the countries analysed. Therefore, if the state lacks legitimacy among the population, citizens are likely to look elsewhere for the benefits typically provided by governments – especially protection.

The ousting of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq began the most recent realignment of power in the Middle East. President Nouri al-Maliki, who replaced Iraq’s post-Hussein transitional government, failed to build consensus between the Sunni and Shia groups in the country. Disenfranchisement of Sunni communities under al-Maliki created the environment for militias to grow, many of which were Islamist and hostile to both Shia dominated government and western influences. ISIL was the most successful of these groups and used the context of the Syrian civil war to expand into Syria. Eight of the top ten military leaders of ISIL are believed to be Iraqi Ba’athists and three former Hussein-government generals have joined the organisation.⁴

Religious identity or other loyalties often supersede national boundaries in the countries analysed. Therefore, if the state lacks legitimacy among the population, citizens are likely to look elsewhere for the benefits typically provided by governments – especially protection. These shortcomings in state legitimacy are evidenced by persistently poor measures of Positive Peace: the attitudes, institutions and structures that support peaceful societies. For the past decade, the MENA region has had an average Positive Peace Index score of 3.3 out of 5, compared to the much better average of 2.2 for Europe.⁵ Reflecting the seriousness of the conflicts, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya continue to score much lower than the regional average in Positive Peace.

It is an oversimplification to say that divides between Sunnis and Shia, or even Islamists and others, are the only source of conflict, as described in IEP’s recent paper, *Five Key Questions Answered on the Link between Peace and Religion*. Many MENA countries have both Shia and Sunni populations and are peaceful, such as Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. However, as intergroup grievance is a key correlate of violence, the presence of violence heightens sectarian divides.

These conflicts have complicated relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia as both governments support competing armed groups which exacerbate other regional dynamics. This is most notable in Yemen where in early 2015 Iran was supporting the Houthis while Saudi Arabia was directly bombing their positions in support of President Hadi. The regional conflicts are further complicated by the engagement of global powers, such as the US and Russia, who see the region as strategically significant.

Analysis of each conflict highlights what the International Crisis Group calls “the recruitment potential that war and chaos provide.”⁶ Mounting tensions and disintegrating security have been advantageous to ISIL. The group has taken advantage of sectarian rhetoric and anti-western sentiment to swell its ranks with foreign fighters. The power vacuum created by failed or failing states have also increased the appeal of their caliphate as an alternative to problematic governments, albeit at a significant cost.

ISIL has brought a new dimension to the conflicts within the region. On 29 June 2014, ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself caliph, or ultimate Muslim political and religious leader.⁷ In renewing the Levant caliphate, ISIL has attempted to apply an interpretation of Sharia that includes the use of slavery, execution on religious grounds and war as a means of religious salvation.⁸ ISIL’s Sunni followers believe themselves to be acting out Quranic prophecy, including victory in an international war.⁹

Although abhorrent to most people, the appeal of ISIL cannot be underestimated: ISIL is engaged in sophisticated and well-targeted global social media campaigns, it provides a unifying purpose for the disenfranchised, and it is aligned with Wahhabism and the Salafist schools that have broad appeal in Saudi Arabia and other parts of MENA. Understanding this appeal in the regional context is critical for countering ISIL’s success.

Containing ISIL requires quelling its source of power: not just territory or its financial sources, but addressing the sectarian divide that drives Sunni communities to the organization. Where there are fewer and fewer peaceful alternatives, ISIL gains ground.



SYRIA

RANK 162

GPI score:

3.65

2014 was the worst year so far in the Syrian civil war and was also the deadliest conflict in the world in 2014, resulting in at least 72,000 civilian and battle-related deaths. This is nearly three times more deaths than those that resulted from conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon combined.¹⁰ The armed conflict in Syria began in 2011 when popular reform movements swept through MENA, leading to demonstrations seeking political and economic change from the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Since then, Syria has been “the scene of many disputes,” as the instability of the region and the engagement of global powers played out inside and across its borders.¹¹ Consequently, Syria remains the least peaceful country in the 2015 GPI. In 2014, Syria was the setting for many conflicts: between Assad’s government and opposition militias, the government and ISIL, and ISIL and other militias vying for territory. This context has provided a fertile environment for ISIL to flourish and expand its territory. The variety of religious identities in the country combined with the government being dominated by the Alawite minority contribute to the conflict dynamics, as different religious groups align with different factions. Sunni groups account for 74 per cent of the population, while 13 per cent are Shia (Alawite, Twelvers and Ismailis), 10 per cent are Christian and the remaining three per cent are Druze.¹²

“ 2014 was the worst year so far in the Syrian civil war and was also the deadliest conflict in the world in 2014, resulting in at least 72,000 civilian and battle-related deaths.

In addition to the civil war and a major humanitarian crisis, Syria was the theatre for two significant challenges to global peacefulness that came to a head in 2014: an influx of foreign fighters seeking to join the ranks of ISIL and the entanglement of multiple power struggles between both regional and international influences. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence estimates that 9,730 foreigners joined various armed groups in Iraq and Syria in 2014. In comparison, the high-end estimate for the three prior years stands at 11,000 in total, which makes at least 20,000 foreign fighters over the duration of the conflict.¹³ Crisis Group finds that the engagement of foreign fighters is fuelling sectarian polarisation: “As Sunnis from Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon and the West have joined the opposition rebels, Shiite Lebanese, Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans and Pakistanis have entered Syria on behalf of the regime.”¹⁴

And while individuals from at least 50 countries have joined on the side of ISIL or the Syrian opposition, foreign governments have supported both the Government of Syria and various non-state actors. The US, which has supported some of the Syrian opposition, expanded its anti-ISIL air strikes from Iraq to Syria in September 2014, which at times has been helpful for Assad.¹⁵ Arguably, Assad’s position in the conflict has marginally deteriorated over the course of 2014, despite Iranian and Russian support. Meanwhile, the already fragmented opposition must defend itself on two fronts, fighting in Aleppo against the government while fending off ISIL to the east.¹⁶ With the regime weakened, ISIL advancing, the opposition splitting its resources and no parties willing to come to the negotiating table, it is difficult to find a viable solution.¹⁷ It may be that only a shift in the regional power balance or an agreement between the regional powers can break the stalemate in the Syrian crisis.

The dynamics between Iran and Saudi Arabia mean that neither can move decisively toward halting ISIL. However, an agreement between Iran and the US, an ally of Saudi Arabia, on Iran’s nuclear program could pave the way for productive negotiations regarding Syria. Carnegie Fellow Karim Sajadpour cites a former senior aid to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani: “The best way to resolve US-Iranian tensions in Syria, he argued, is to find a ‘Syrian Karzai’ — a Sunni Arab politician palatable to Tehran, Washington, and the Syrian people.”¹⁸ If, how and when that might come to pass remain to be seen.

IRAQ

RANK 161

GPI score:

3.44

The conflict in Iraq deteriorated significantly in 2014, with the number of fatalities more than doubling from 8,256 in 2013 to 18,489 in 2014 and the indicator for *intensity of internal conflict* reaching the worst possible score. As ISIL undertook a rapid and violent expansion across the region during 2014, it is not surprising to see both Syria and Iraq experience deteriorations in their GPI scores. Iraq is the second least peaceful country in the 2015 GPI, after Syria.

The fall of the Saddam Hussein regime expedited the realignment of power within the Middle East. Since the fall, political figures that had been in political exile in Tehran returned to Iraq and took a role in government. This has led to the opportunity for rapprochement between Iraq and Iran, as evidenced by the December 2014 signing of a memorandum of understanding for Tehran to provide military support to Iraq as well as the involvement of militias supported by Iran, such as Hezbollah, and Iranian military advisors in the fight against ISIL. Violence in Iraq has escalated in part due to the concentration of power under Nouri al-Maliki’s largely Shia government which disenfranchised the Sunni, leading to grievances and the expansion of violent groups such as ISIL.



While ISIL has been active in Iraq for several years, the organisation gained substantial territory in 2014, heightening international concerns after publicising decapitations of prisoners. This led to a reengagement of the US in Iraq, with the strategic bombing of ISIL positions and the deployment of military advisers to the Iraqi army.

The UN Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) documented possible war crimes and crimes against humanity by both ISIL and Iraqi security forces, including summary extrajudicial executions, sexual violence and violence against civilians, including children.¹⁹ Before the end of the year, al-Maliki resigned after significant internal and international pressure and amidst criticism that his government had increased the fragmentation between Sunni and Shia communities and was counterproductive for peace. The Kurdistan Regional Government, which has long disputed Baghdad's authority over the Kurdish areas inside Iraq, also faced armed confrontations with ISIL, further exemplifying the entanglement of conflicts throughout the region.

Iraq's Positive Peace scores for *well functioning government* and *acceptance of the rights of others* have been stubbornly poor for the past decade. International Crisis Group noted midyear that the political alienation of Sunni communities in Iraq and their sense of repression and neglect from the Iraqi state are among the longstanding dynamics of conflict. The report notes that governance reforms have been "sacrificed in the interest of fighting 'terrorism', conveniently defined to encompass all forms of Sunni violence and insurgency, but not Shiite equivalents – an ill-conceived strategy that has produced the result it is seeking to prevent."²⁰

In contrast, free flow of information improved by 27 per cent, largely driven by an increase in mobile phone subscriptions per capita. However, without an accompanying improvement in the freedom of the press, increased access to digital information is actually benefiting ISIL's capabilities in propaganda and social media.²¹

YEMEN

RANK 147

GPI score:

2.75

Yemen experienced approximately 3,800 conflict-related deaths in 2014, the highest number recorded since IISS began tracking conflict there in 2009. Similarly, Yemen's intensity of organised internal conflict indicator deteriorated to the worst possible score of 5 out of 5 in the 2015 GPI. Overt conflict broke out in March of 2015, as simmering tensions rapidly deteriorated into civil war. The World Health Organization found that, "At least 1,080 people had been killed in the country, including 48 children and 28 women, and a further 4,352 people had been injured in the violence between March 19 and April 20 [2015]."²²

The Republic of Yemen is a fairly new state, resulting from an agreement to merge North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990. Saudi Arabia has a history of military and economic support

for both the Saleh and Hadi governments and also various tribes within the country. In 2011, following other Arab Spring movements, Yemeni citizens protested unemployment, economic conditions and corruption, as well as then-President Ali Ahmed Saleh's attempt to remove presidential term limits from the constitution.

“ A diplomatic solution in Libya holds promise for the region, as the spread of extremism relies on the absence of credible, peaceful alternatives. For any peace process to be successful, an agreement would involve power sharing arrangements and that groups would not face undue reprisals.

One of the groups participating in the revolution was the Houthis, who represent the Zaidi Shia tribes from the north. The Houthis gained ground via the 2011 uprisings by building partnerships with other Yemeni groups and broadening their popular support.²³ In September 2014, the Houthis took over the capital, Sana'a, which resulted in military support from Saudi Arabia for the ousted government of interim president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi against the Houthis and cumulating in airstrikes by the Saudis.

In March 2015, while a ten-nation coalition led by Saudi Arabia carried out air strikes against Houthi fighters inside Yemen, the Arab League announced the creation of a joint military force. "Yemen is battling three security crises," finds IISS, "a violent 'al-Houthi' insurgency in the north, a secessionist movement in the south, and the presence of al-Qaeda across the country."²⁴ Throughout the past year, groups fighting the Houthis have received support from Saudi Arabia while the Houthis are being backed by Iran.²⁵

The conflict has escalated amidst political and diplomatic breakdowns since 2011. President Hadi was arrested by the Houthis. He first resigned but then retracted his resignation and subsequently fled to Riyadh.²⁶ At the start of 2015, with a civil war unfolding and a pending humanitarian crisis, the country was immediately in need of an acceptable president or presidential council.

The underlying factors of the 2011 unrest have not yet been resolved, namely rivalries between elites, corruption and economic distress.²⁷ Indeed, Yemen's poor Positive Peace score for the corruption domain is influenced by the *factionalised elites* indicator, which has deteriorated 10.5 per cent since 2005. The possibility of peace is severely hampered by the lack of trust between the Houthis and Hadi's supporters. Multiple agreements have been proposed and both sides have repeatedly violated them. In mid-May 2015 a humanitarian ceasefire was signed but air strikes were conducted a day after raising doubts over long term ceasefire.



It seems that only regional backing for a sustained ceasefire and tangible action to build trust across conflict lines will prevent Yemen from slipping into deeper violence. The conflicting parties will need to make concessions; a protracted civil war is more likely to benefit groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL than anyone else.

LIBYA

RANK 149

GPI score: 2.85

After the ousting of former-Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi there were high hopes that Libya would transition into a peaceful society. However, tribal and clan clashes resulted in a power vacuum which has now created an environment where other Islamist groups have formed and ISIL has gained a foothold. The Libyan conflict is currently escalating, with IISS recording 3,060 conflict-related fatalities in 2014. This is a 12-fold increase from 2013.

Libya's GPI score had improved after 2012, reflecting some progress since the 2011 Revolution. However the peace did not last long, with the ensuing civil war resulting in the sharpest deterioration in any country's score in the 2015 GPI. Libya is now ranked 149th. The score was affected by deteriorations in *political instability* and the *likelihood of violent demonstrations* and a resulting rise in *refugees and IDPs*, now numbering up to 7.3 per cent of the population. Moreover, the involvement of Islamist groups in the strife has driven a deterioration in Libya's *relations with neighbouring countries*, particularly Egypt.

Libya faces a different crisis of legitimacy than its neighbours. Rather than one weak government challenged by non-state groups, Libya entered 2015 with two parliaments, two prime ministers, and militias defending two capital cities. The General National Congress (GNC), elected in 2012 and currently based in Tripoli, includes Islamist groups alongside secular constituencies. The Council of Deputies based in Tobruk and elected in 2014, includes defectors from the Qaddafi regime as well as loyalists and anti-Islamist groups.²⁸ Each of these two governments represents a diverse set of stakeholders in Libyan society, making the diplomatic process both more complex but likely more viable.

Adding to the complications, tribal militias and jihadist groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum. Most notably, radical Islamist fighters seized Derna in 2014 and Sirte in 2015 in the name of ISIL, where the group beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Egypt has retaliated with airstrikes.

There are two diplomatic opportunities to curtail violence. Firstly, the UN process can encourage participation in negotiations and observance of ceasefires and calls to de-escalate. Secondly, an agreement on a head of state could lay the groundwork for a disarmament process and pave the way for integrated armed forces that would be representative of the various groups.²⁹ If either of these two outcomes can be brought about inclusively and with buy-in from multiple

stakeholder groups, the stability needed for peacebuilding could be achieved.

A diplomatic solution in Libya holds promise for the region, as the spread of extremism relies on the absence of credible, peaceful alternatives. For any peace process to be successful, it will need to proceed on the basis that an agreement would involve power sharing arrangements and that groups would not face undue reprisals.

ISRAEL

RANK 148

GPI score: 2.78

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reignited in 2014 by the tragic deaths of several young people from both sides of the conflict. Israel's score fell in the 2015 GPI due to the conflict, which was mainly reflected in the deterioration in its score for *intensity of internal conflict*, and is now ranked 148th in the GPI. IISS recorded 2,414 conflict-related deaths in 2014, up from 79 in 2013. Although a ceasefire was in place at the start of the year, a border clash in March 2014 resulted in the most rocket launches into Israel since 2012.³⁰ Several violent clashes between Israel and different Palestinian groups occurred through April, May and June of 2014, culminating in the July-August hostilities in Gaza. Events escalated after the kidnapping and eventual death of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. Israeli forces searched thousands of homes in the area and arrested approximately 400 Palestinians.³¹ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Hamas for the kidnapping and, citing rocket fire from Hamas-controlled Gaza, Israel commenced airstrikes over Gaza on 7 July 2014. Ground troops followed ten days later.³² In less than two months, 2,104 Palestinians were killed, including 1,462 civilians, almost 500 of whom were children. Israeli casualties numbered 66 soldiers and seven civilians.³³

At the start of 2014, Palestine and Israel were engaged in peace talks, but negotiations broke down before an agreement could be reached for the 29 April deadline. Hamas and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a reconciliation agreement on 24 April 2014, meant to unify the Palestinian national movement and the two governments in Gaza and the West Bank.³⁴ The agreement, however, prompted Israel's refusal to continue talks with an administration that included Hamas.³⁵ A new Palestinian unity government was nonetheless sworn in in June, with varying degrees of recognition from the international community, including the US, the EU and the UN.³⁶

Crisis Group documented some Israeli actions that facilitated the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza, including the limited issuing of work and travel permits to Palestinians and a UN monitoring mechanism to deliver building materials to the private sector. These steps do not constitute an end to the blockade, nor is the volume of goods sufficient for unmet needs, but it has resulted in a slight alleviation of tensions.³⁷



During the elections in Israel in early 2015 provocative statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu drew international condemnation, including from the US. His successful re-election campaign promised voters that a Palestinian state would not be realised. This declaration makes it unlikely that the Israeli government will support progress toward a two-state solution.

LEBANON

RANK 145

GPI score:

2.62

Lebanon has faced varying levels of ongoing conflict for decades and the number of conflict-related fatalities climbed to 360 in 2014. The country saw tension and violence escalate as Lebanese militias became involved in the Syrian conflict. Syria had maintained a military presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005 and Hezbollah considers Syria a crucial ally.³⁸ “The two countries share a 365-kilometre, un-demarcated and largely porous border as well as extremely close communal ties.”³⁹ UNHCR’s plan in Lebanon for 2014 aimed to support 1.5 million Syrian refugees and another 1.5 million Lebanese affected by the Syrian conflict, highlighting that the Syrian war is having significant consequences on the people of Lebanon.⁴⁰

By February 2014, Hezbollah was actively fighting Syrian rebels inside Syria and later extended its actions against ISIL into Iraq. Hezbollah’s actions have been countered by Islamist militias becoming active in Lebanon, with some in the Shia community interpreting recent suicide bombings as reprisals.⁴¹ By October, clashes were being reported inside Lebanon between Sunni groups that support Syrian rebels and Alawite groups aligned with the Syrian regime.⁴²

The influx of millions of Syrian refugees has the potential to significantly impact the Lebanese economy. Together, the cost of violence to the Syrian and Lebanese economies is approximately US\$63 billion.⁴³ This economic burden may have a substantial impact on development and could be a driver of further violence.

Rather than relying on refugee camps, Lebanon is allowing Syrian refugees to integrate into the economy by renting accommodation and purchasing their own goods.⁴⁴ This may have both a positive and negative effect on the country. The influx of refugees improves the supply of human capital and creates consumers who need housing and other essential services. Due to these policies Lebanon may be unique, as it is possible, according to the World Bank, that the net economic effect of refugee inflows will be positive in the short term.⁴⁵ However, strains do exist with many Syrians moving into the poorest areas of Lebanon and having little access to support services.⁴⁶ In early 2015, UNHCR had only secured ten per cent of its funding requirement for the year. Furthermore, refugee inflows could depress wages by increasing labour supply and further existing socio-economic divides.

“ It seems that only regional backing for a sustained ceasefire and tangible action to build trust across conflict lines will prevent Yemen from slipping into deeper violence. The conflicting parties will need to make concessions; a protracted civil war is more likely to benefit groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL than anyone else.

SOCIETAL SAFETY & SECURITY



THE EFFECTS OF URBANISATION ON PEACE

In 2014, 54 per cent of the world’s population is living in urban areas. By 2050, the UN predicts an additional 2.5 billion people will be living in cities, with 90 per cent of the increase occurring in Africa and Asia.⁴⁷ Understanding the likely effects of urbanisation on violence is paramount.

In this analysis IEP reviewed the level of urbanisation and societal safety and security for 162 countries and performed a series of statistical analyses to determine under what circumstances urbanisation has both a positive and negative effect on a country’s safety and security. The study was conducted at a national level due to the broader range of data available and to obtain a more holistic understanding of the effects of urbanisation.

The analysis finds that urbanisation is generally a positive factor for peace. High levels of urbanisation reflect high levels of development and, in most places, are associated with better *societal safety and security scores*. However, mid to lower income countries that have weak rule of law, inequitable resource distribution and intergroup grievances face a risk of


increased violence with increasing urbanisation. This underscores the importance of Positive Peace as a driver of resilience in times of change.

KEY FINDINGS:

- IEP’s statistical analysis finds that low levels of rule of law, high levels of inter-group grievance and high levels of income inequality are associated with higher violence in urbanised environments.
- In general, higher levels of urbanisation lead to higher levels of peace through associated developmental benefits.
- Countries with strong Positive Peace scores can manage increases in urbanisation safely. However, countries that are low in Positive Peace measures risk deteriorations in peace as a result of increased urbanisation.

FIGURE 3 URBAN POPULATION BY LEVEL OF PEACEFULNESS, 1950-2050

The global urban population will grow significantly in coming decades, largely in the countries that have low levels of peacefulness today.



Source: IEP and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs



- Rule of law was found to be the most significant variable in explaining safety and security in countries with higher levels of urbanisation.
- Factors that were not statistically related to urbanisation and peace include educational outcomes, pace of urbanisation and per cent of the population between ages 15 and 24.
- The global urban population is expected to grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Nearly 1.9 billion will be in the countries that currently have low or very low levels of peacefulness.
- The projected urban population growth in the world's least peaceful countries is more than four times greater than the growth that will occur in the rest of the world.
- Increased urbanisation poses the greatest risk for safety and security in Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Haiti and Bolivia due to their low levels of Positive Peace.

The urban population of the 162 countries included in the GPI is expected to grow more than 2.3 billion people by 2050. Despite the enormity of this demographic shift, research findings on peace and urbanisation are contradictory. Cities can be very beneficial for development, especially in terms of improving economic opportunities for those living in urban areas and for rural communities as well. However, cities can also be the site of heightened interpersonal and collective violence, which is reflected in increased homicide rates, gang activity or armed opposition groups.⁴⁸ For example, rates of homicide and violent crime are typically higher in large cities than in rural areas. In Central and South America the majority of homicides take place in cities of greater than 50,000 people.⁴⁹

Sub-Saharan Africa has an average *societal safety and security score* of 2.84, which is in the bottom 25 per cent of country scores, and will also experience the largest growth of any region, with 751 million additional people living in urban areas by 2050. As a result, the region faces the greatest challenges in maintaining current levels of peace while urbanising. Similarly, the vast majority of the increase among GPI countries – 81 per cent, or nearly 1.9 billion people – will be in the places that currently have low or very low levels of peacefulness. This is more than four times greater than the growth that will occur in countries with moderate and high levels of peacefulness. Approximately 30 per cent of the global increase will be in China and India.

As a result of the coming increases in urbanisation, it is important to understand what factors are likely to lead to more peaceful transitions. Factors associated with Positive Peace – the attitudes, institutions and structures that support and sustain peaceful societies – are statistically related to peacefulness in highly urbanised countries.

URBANISATION AND SAFETY AND SECURITY

Concerns about urbanisation and its effects on peace and violence have recently come to the fore of policy and development debates. More work is needed to fully understand the relationships between urbanisation, peace and other social factors.

It is well understood that urbanisation is an integral part of the development process. Countries that are able to build safe, well developed urban centres typically reap many benefits, including economic growth, greater employment opportunities, reduced environmental impact and higher levels of safety and security.

This relationship may seem surprising given common perceptions about urbanisation, some of the more prominent ones being:

- Densely populated areas provide more opportunities for interpersonal violence;
- Urban areas typically have higher homicide rates than rural areas, therefore it is expected that more highly urbanised countries would also have higher national homicide rates;
- Urban environments can accentuate and combine commonly-cited drivers of interpersonal violence, such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities.

BOX 1 MEASURING URBANISATION


Urbanisation can be measured in many ways. This analysis focused on the level of urbanisation, or the percentage of a country's population living in an urban area. The analysis has used the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) datasets, which measures each country's level of urbanisation based on the criteria used by national statistical offices. Therefore what constitutes an urban environment does vary by country. For example, an urban area in Japan must have at least 50,000 residents. But less dense or developed countries often have a much lower threshold. Nicaragua defines an urban area as a municipality with at least 1,000 inhabitants. Using local definitions ensures that assessments of urbanisation are appropriate for the country in question.

Yet despite concerns about the perceived risks associated with urbanisation, highly urbanised countries tend to be more peaceful, as shown in figure 4. There is a moderate correlation ($r=-0.41$) between the percentage of a country's population living in an urban area and that country's societal safety and security score in the 2015 GPI.



FIGURE 4 LEVEL OF URBANISATION VS. SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY SCORES, 2015

More peaceful countries tend to be more highly urbanised and also tend to be high-income.



Source: IEP and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs


The relationship between the level of urbanisation and safety and security indicates that urbanisation is a key output of development; therefore high-income countries are more urbanised than low-income countries as seen in figure 4. Generally, many of the same factors needed for development to occur also improve the likelihood of societies being peaceful. Notably, there is no low-income country with more than 65 per cent of its population living in urban areas.

URBANISATION AND HOMICIDE RATES

Homicide rates tend to be higher in urban areas. Despite this, there is not a significant correlation between the level of urbanisation and homicide rates ($r=-0.21$) at the country level. Treating countries with exceedingly high homicide rate as outliers, the correlation between the level of urbanisation and the homicide rate increases ($r=-0.47$), as does the correlation between the level of urbanisation and societal safety and security ($r=-0.48$).⁵⁰ The relationship between the level of urbanisation and most countries' homicide rates is presented in figure 5. In general, high income countries have high levels of urbanisation and lower homicide rates.

FIGURE 5 LEVEL OF URBANISATION VS. HOMICIDE RATES AFTER REMOVING OUTLIERS, 2015

Among countries with more moderate homicides rates, homicide tends to decline as urbanisation increases.



Source: IEP and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

There are 31 countries with very high homicide rates, listed in table 11, ranging between 13.6 and 90.4 per 100,000 people. There is no statistically significant relationship between the level of urbanisation and homicide rates among these countries. In these places, the normal process of development and urbanisation does not seem to explain changes in rates of violence. There are typically other challenges facing society that result in high rates of homicide. For example, some of the countries with outlier homicide rates are major producers of or trafficking routes for illegal drugs, involved in conflicts or have high levels of corruption within the police and judiciary. Of the 31 countries with outlier homicide rates, 24 have scores for perceptions of corruption that are worse than the global average.



TABLE 11 CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTRIES WITH OUTLIER HOMICIDE RATES, 2015

Countries with very high homicide rates are predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa or Central America and the Caribbean. There is no statistically significant relationship between the homicide rate and level of urbanisation within these countries, indicating that other factors are more relevant.

*Scored 1 to 5, where 1 is the best possible score.

COUNTRY	2015 HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000 PEOPLE	2015 SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY SCORE*	2015 GPI SCORE*	REGION	GOVERNMENT TYPE	INCOME LEVEL	PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION SCORE*
Honduras	90.4	3.1	2.21	Central America and Caribbean	Hybrid regime	Lower middle income	4.00
Venezuela	53.7	3.38	2.49	South America	Hybrid regime	Upper middle income	4.48
El Salvador	41.2	3.14	2.26	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income	3.52
Guatemala	39.9	2.99	2.21	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income	3.86
Jamaica	39.3	2.89	2.15	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.57
Lesotho	38	2.4	1.89	Sub-Saharan Africa	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income	3.05
Swaziland	33.8	2.93	2.1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Lower middle income	3.33
South Africa	31	3.25	2.38	Sub-Saharan Africa	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.29
Colombia	30.8	3.64	2.72	South America	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.62
Trinidad and Tobago	28.3	2.96	2.07	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	High income	3.57
Democratic Republic of the Congo	28.3	3.76	3.09	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Low income	4.33
Brazil	25.2	3.08	2.12	South America	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.33
Rwanda	23.1	3.04	2.42	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Low income	3.05
Dominican Republic	22.1	2.8	2.09	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.86
Mexico	21.5	3.23	2.59	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.71
Nigeria	20	3.6	2.91	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Lower middle income	4.10
Equatorial Guinea	19.3	2.57	1.99	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	High income	4.93
Botswana	18.4	2.04	1.6	Sub-Saharan Africa	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	2.38
Panama	17.2	2.62	1.9	Central America and Caribbean	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.62
Namibia	17.2	2.37	1.78	Sub-Saharan Africa	Flawed democracy	Upper middle income	3.05
Guyana	17	2.82	2.03	South America	Flawed democracy	Lower middle income	3.95
Myanmar	15.2	2.76	2.32	Asia-Pacific	Authoritarian regime	Low income	4.38
Iraq	15	4.34	3.44	Middle East and North Africa	Hybrid regime	Lower middle income	4.62
Afghanistan	15	4.2	3.43	South Asia	Authoritarian regime	Low income	4.81
Malawi	15	2.27	1.81	Sub-Saharan Africa	Hybrid regime	Low income	3.81
Somalia	15	4.08	3.31	Sub-Saharan Africa	—	Low income	5.00
Guinea-Bissau	15	2.74	2.23	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Low income	4.48
Guinea	15	2.88	2.21	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Low income	4.19
Kenya	15	2.94	2.34	Sub-Saharan Africa	Hybrid regime	Low income	4.19
South Sudan	13.9	4.17	3.38	Sub-Saharan Africa	—	Lower middle income	4.67
Cote d'Ivoire	13.6	2.76	2.13	Sub-Saharan Africa	Authoritarian regime	Lower middle income	3.86



URBANISATION AND POSITIVE PEACE

Urbanisation appears to be a positive factor for creating peaceful societies. This is because higher levels of development are associated with both higher levels of urbanisation and higher levels of peace. This is especially true in high-income countries, where the level of urbanisation strongly correlates with low homicide rates ($r = -0.72$). Instead, it is the combination of weak social structures and urbanisation that lead to higher levels of violence, rather than simply urbanisation alone. This underscores the fact that high levels of Positive Peace are crucial for ensuring resilience during times of change, such as increasing urbanisation.

IEP conducted a number of multivariate analyses to answer the question, ‘in what context does a country’s level of urbanisation affect societal safety and security?’ Based on a review of previous research it was hypothesised that the combination of increasing urbanisation and other social stressors, rather than just urbanisation alone, would lead to poor safety and security outcomes. IEP tested various iterations of five different multivariate regression models to identify the factors that best explain safety and security outcomes in the context of urbanisation. The combination of factors that best predicted societal safety and security scores was:

- Rule of law
- Urbanisation
- Intergroup grievance
- Income inequality

High levels of urbanisation are associated with poor scores for *societal safety and security* when rule of law, intergroup grievance and income inequality are poor.⁵¹

This complements the analysis of urbanisation and peace across all countries. By and large, high levels of urbanisation reflect high levels of development, which are associated with high levels of peacefulness. This implies that countries with strong Positive Peace can manage increasing urbanisation safely. However, countries which are low in these Positive Peace measures – rule of law, intergroup grievance and income inequality – risk deteriorations in their *societal safety and security* scores as a result of increasing urbanisation.


The relative impact of each of these variables on *societal safety and security* scores is highlighted in figure 6. Rule of law has the largest effect on safety and security, followed by intergroup grievance, income inequality and urbanisation.

It is important to highlight that the research investigated various combinations of variables in order to understand what set of factors together best explain peace in the context of urbanisation. Many development variables did not prove statistically significant and therefore are not useful predictors of societal safety and security in the context of urbanisation, including:

- Rate of urbanisation
- Level of trust throughout society
- Discrepancies in occupational outcomes between ethnic groups
- Discrepancies in educational outcomes between ethnic groups
- Uneven economic development between groups
- Quality of infrastructure
- Adult female literacy rate (as a measure of gender inequality)
- Gender Inequality Index, measuring labour market participation, reproductive health and women’s empowerment
- Percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24
- Poverty gap, measured at either US\$1.25 per day, US\$2 per day or the country-specific urban poverty line

FIGURE 6 RELATIVE IMPACT OF POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS ON SAFETY AND SECURITY

Rule of law has the largest effect on safety and security scores, followed by intergroup grievance, income inequality and urbanisation.



Adjusted $r^2 = 0.75$

Source: IEP

The term urbanisation is also often used to describe the process of people moving from rural to urban areas and cities becoming larger and more developed. It is this process that is often a concern for policy makers, as urban planning, infrastructure development and creating adequate employment opportunities can be a challenge during rapid urban population growth. It is often hypothesised that the stress of rapid urbanisation leads to violence. However, IEP did not find a relationship between the rate of change in urbanisation and better or worse *societal safety and security* scores.⁵²



Poverty and youth bulges are typically considered risk factors for urban violence. However these factors were found not to be statistically significant in this study. Recent studies have had findings consistent with this one: inequality is often a more

important factor than poverty and the relationship between youth bulges and violence remains unclear.⁵³

This research can also help to identify the countries that are at risk of deteriorating in peacefulness during the development process. As more people move into cities, countries that can improve their Positive Peace factors, such as the rule of law, social cohesion and more equitable economic opportunities, are more likely to mitigate the potential adverse effects that increasing urbanisation can have on safety and security. The countries identified in table 13 have very poor scores for rule of law, intergroup grievance and income inequality, suggesting that increased urbanisation in these places poses a risk of deteriorating safety and security.

Countries identified as being at high risk rank in the bottom quartile for all three measures: rule of law, intergroup grievances and income inequality. Those that are considered at moderate risk score in the bottom quartile for rule of law and intergroup grievance and the bottom half for income inequality. Countries which are already highly urbanised, such as Bolivia and Iran, are less likely to see further deteriorations in *societal safety and security* due to urbanisation. However, countries with currently low levels of urbanisation, such as Chad and Myanmar, are more likely to experience increases in violence if they do not improve in the other three indicators.

TABLE 12 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED IN MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEFINITION AND SOURCE
Rule of law	Rule of law score, World Bank, 2014
Income inequality	Gini coefficient, Human Development Index, 2012
Intergroup grievance rating	Fund for Peace rating on the "legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia", International Institute of Social Studies Indices of Social Development, 2010
Level of urbanisation	Percentage the population living in an urban area, UN DESA, 2015

TABLE 13 COUNTRIES WITH THE GREATEST RISK OF ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM URBANISATION

The countries in the lowest quartile for rule of law, intergroup grievance and income inequality face the greatest risk for deteriorations in *societal safety and security* during further urbanisation.

COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN AN URBAN AREA, 2015	2015 SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY SCORE	RULE OF LAW SCORE	INTERGROUP GRIEVANCE RATING	GINI COEFFICIENT (MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY)
		Lower score indicates a higher level of peace (scale: 1 to 5)	Higher score indicates stronger rule of law (scale: -2.5 to 2.5)	Higher score indicates lower social cohesion (scale: 1 to 10)	Lower score indicates greater equality (SCALE: 0 to 1)
HIGH RISK COUNTRIES					
Zimbabwe	32%	2.97	-1.57	9.0	.50
Central African Republic	40%	4.03	-1.83	8.8	.56
Democratic Republic of the Congo	42%	3.76	-1.55	8.5	.44
Nigeria	48%	3.60	-1.16	9.5	.49
Haiti	59%	2.78	-1.30	7.6	.59
Bolivia	69%	2.56	-1.07	7.7	.56
MODERATE RISK COUNTRIES					
Chad	22%	2.77	-1.37	9.6	.40
Myanmar	34%	2.76	-1.22	9.0	.40
Yemen	35%	3.10	-1.16	7.8	.38
Guinea	37%	2.88	-1.42	8.2	.39
Cameroon	54%	2.96	-1.05	7.7	.39
Cote d'Ivoire	54%	2.76	-0.93	8.8	.42
Mauritania	60%	2.70	-0.95	8.0	.40
Iran	73%	2.74	-0.98	7.7	.38



MILITARISATION

MEASURING MILITARISATION AND UNDERSTANDING ITS CORRELATES

Militarisation is a complex phenomenon and is affected by events occurring within a country's borders as well as regional and international events. Military spending is one of the larger sectors of global government spending, representing approximately US\$3.09 trillion PPP dollars⁵⁴ or 2.9 per cent of global GDP. This section looks at how national income, internal governance, and other forms of violence relate to militarisation.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Large changes in the levels of global or regional militarisation are rare. They are associated with geopolitical realignments and global economic shifts.
- There is a statistically significant link between the *Political Terror Scale* and *militarisation*. This suggests that countries which are weak in other aspects of their GPI factors are more likely to use their military capacity domestically.
- Militarisation on its own is not the deciding factor for internal repression, but rather dependent on the mix of Positive Peace factors within a country. In lower income countries, two Positive Peace factors, *low levels of corruption* and the *equitable distribution of resources*, deteriorate with increases in *militarisation*.
- Surprisingly, militarisation does not meaningfully correlate with public opinion data such as the *World Values Survey*, *Gallup World Poll* and *Social Progress Index*, among others.
- Survey data from wealthy, highly militarised countries highlights that these countries have stronger disapproval of disarmament movements and a more positive view of the role of the military.
- High income, highly militarised countries tend to be the largest net donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Two datasets have been used to measure militarisation.

The first is the *militarisation* domain of the GPI and the second is Bonn International Centre for Conversion's (BICC) Global Militarisation Index (GMI). The GMI has been used for displaying long-term trends while the GPI has been used for statistical analysis. Both datasets contain the following information:

- Levels of arms production
- The size of defence expenditures
- Number of armed service personnel
- Volume of weapons exports and imports.

The key difference between the GPI and GMI militarisation scores is that the GMI includes irregular forces as part of the total number of armed services personnel per 100,000.

To determine which factors are statistically associated with militarisation, IEP has compared the *militarisation* domain of the GPI against 8,500 datasets, indices and attitudinal surveys. Because economic size and capacity are primary factors affecting militarisation, IEP has separated higher and lower GDP per capita countries in this analysis. Low income countries often lack the resources to achieve an efficient level of militarisation while balancing poor state capacity and generally high levels of violence.

Higher income countries are defined as countries with a per capita income greater than US\$4,086, representing the top half of global income distribution, and lower income countries are countries below US\$4,085 per capita income and in the bottom half of global income distribution.

The GMI was used to illustrate militarisation trends over time. It provides a supplement to the GPI data, as it extends back to 1990 while the GPI only covers 2008 to 2015.

As would be expected, there is a clear relationship globally between both lower internal and external levels of peacefulness and *militarisation*. Higher levels of *militarisation* in lower income countries are statistically associated with lack of security legitimacy, higher levels of corruption and a less equitable distribution of national resources. This reflects the fact that low income countries with high corruption and

“ Higher levels of militarisation in lower income countries are statistically associated with lack of security legitimacy, higher levels of corruption and a less equitable distribution of national resources.



inequities tend to have governments that will direct resources into military capacity which can be used to suppress dissent.

When reviewing the GMI time series, the data shows that major changes in militarisation are uncommon at either the global or regional level and require major global or regional shifts in relations or economic conditions. One such example is the ending of the Cold War, which resulted in large reductions in militarisation in several Central American countries as post-civil war peace processes took effect in the early 1990s.

The fact that changes in militarisation follow global or regional trends can be seen in the case of Central America in the early 1990s. After a number of ceasefires in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, substantial reductions in military expenditure subsequently occurred as the region halted their civil wars. Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala experienced some of the largest falls in militarisation recorded globally since 1990.

An example of economic development resulting in changes in militarisation can be seen in the case of China. Its rise as an economic power has subsequently led to an expansion of its military and a gradual shift in its defensive posture.

Interestingly, public opinion polling data about military posture and expenditures do not correlate with changes in the *militarisation* scores. This is important because it highlights that, in most cases, militarisation is driven by long term structural factors beyond the annually surveyed preferences of the citizenry of most countries and even the policy makers.

The results of this research will help organisations and policymakers to better understand the dynamics associated with militarisation.

MEASURING MILITARISATION

The *militarisation* domain of the GPI is built using a set of variables that describe a nation's military capacity, both in terms of the economic resources committed to the military and support for multilateral operations. The variables are:

- Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP
- Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people
- Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons, both imports and exports
- Financial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions
- Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities.

These variables are weighted and combined to make a single score representing a country's level of militarisation. The weightings used are the same as those used in the construction of the GPI, as presented in the methodology section.

TABLE 14 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST MILITARISATION IN 2015, INCLUDING PERCENTAGE CHANGE, 2008-2015

Israel has the highest level of militarisation in the world according to the GPI and is also the most militarised country in the world according to the GMI.

COUNTRY	GPI MILITARISATION SCORE, 2008	GPI MILITARISATION SCORE, 2015	SCORE CHANGE 2008-2015	PERCENT CHANGE
Israel	3.853	3.708	-0.145	-4%
North Korea	3.106	3.247	0.141	5%
Russia	3.065	3.067	0.002	0%
United States	2.476	2.546	0.070	3%
Pakistan	2.353	2.436	0.083	4%
France	2.482	2.428	-0.054	-2%
India	2.329	2.351	0.022	1%
Syria	1.946	2.249	0.303	16%
Yemen	2.441	2.241	-0.199	-8%



As countries become more militarised they also tend to become less peaceful. They are also more likely to experience negative changes in other domains of the GPI, such as societal safety and security and levels of ongoing domestic and international conflict.



KEY CORRELATES OF MILITARISATION

As countries become more militarised they also tend to become less peaceful. They are also more likely to experience negative changes in other domains of the GPI, such as societal safety and security and levels of ongoing domestic and international conflict. This typically occurs when countries have low levels of Positive Peace.

Correlating militarisation scores against a variety of Positive Peace factors and other attitudinal and survey data found the following:

- **High levels of militarisation are significantly correlated with lower external peace and higher levels on the *Political Terror Scale*, which measures the use of state suppression on its citizens.**
- **Citizens in high income, highly militarised countries tend to have a stronger disapproval of disarmament movements and a more positive view of the role of the military.**
- **High income, highly militarised countries tend to be the largest net donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA).**
- **In lower income countries, two Positive Peace factors, *low levels of corruption* and *equitable distribution of resources* are significantly correlated with militarisation. As militarisation increases, corruption increases and resources become more concentrated (i.e., less equally distributed).**

In high income countries, there is a strong correlation between the size of annual ODA and *militarisation*, indicating that more highly militarised, wealthy countries also tend to provide the largest amounts of development assistance. It is important to note the OECD's measure of ODA used here does not include military related assistance. Many high income militarised states also provide military support to other governments through defence cooperation programs and supporting their allies' security capabilities. The US is the largest provider of military assistance and provides US\$5.7 billion in military aid through defence cooperation agreements.⁵⁵

Additionally, public opinion in wealthy, militarised countries tends to favour strong national defence capabilities and the disapproval of disarmament movements. In these countries the military is generally highly regarded and the military generally plays a more significant role in social and cultural life.

TABLE 15

NOTABLE GLOBAL CORRELATES OF MILITARISATION

Across all 162 GPI countries, militarisation correlates most strongly with political violence.

INDICATOR	SOURCE	CORRELATION WITH MILITARISATION (r value)
Political violence	Political Terror Scale, GPI	0.57
Security legitimacy	Polity IV	0.56
Internal peace	Global Peace Index, IEP	0.54
Perceptions of criminality	Global Peace Index, IEP	0.52
Religiously affiliated terror groups active	Social Hostilities Index	0.45

TABLE 16 NOTABLE CORRELATES OF MILITARISATION IN HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES

Militarised high income countries tend to have less external peace, meaning they are more likely to be involved in conflicts but also tend to be larger net providers of ODA. Attitudes about disarmament are negative in more militarised countries.

INDICATOR	SOURCE	CORRELATION WITH MILITARISATION (r value)
External peace	Global Peace Index, IEP	0.73
Disarmament movement: strongly disapprove (% of population)	World Values Survey	0.69
Net overseas development aid (ODA), millions US\$	OECD DAC	0.66
Aims of country: strong defence forces (% of population agree)	World Values Survey	0.56
Political violence	Political Terror Scale, GPI	0.54
ODA to basic social services, million US\$	OECD DAC	0.53

Note: High income countries are defined as the top 50% in gross GDP, low income are the bottom 50%.




Low income countries that divert resources to militarisation are less likely to provide equitable access to health care and education and are more likely to be corrupt.



FIGURE 7

SIZE OF COUNTRY'S 2014 ODA AND 2015 MILITARISATION

Wealthy militarised countries tend to have higher levels of net ODA.



Source: IEP and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

In lower income countries, two of the eight Positive Peace factors are significantly negatively correlated with militarisation – *low levels of corruption* and *equitable distribution of resources*. Low income countries that divert resources to militarisation are less likely to provide equitable access to health care and education and are more likely to be corrupt.

Political violence correlates significantly with *militarisation* for both high and low income countries, underlining the fact that military capacity, as opposed to just internal security forces, is an enabling factor in state sponsored violence towards its citizens. The size of the internal security forces compared to militarisation does not show a meaningful correlation, with an $r = 0.18$.

TABLE 17

NOTABLE CORRELATES OF MILITARISATION IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES

Positive Peace indicators measuring whether resources are distributed equitably and the levels of corruption are significantly correlated with militarisation.

INDICATOR	SOURCE	CORRELATION WITH MILITARISATION (r value)
Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	SIPRI	0.65
Political violence	Political Terror Scale	0.62
Perceptions of criminality	Global Peace Index, IEP	0.61
Internal peace	Global Peace Index, IEP	0.61
Equitable distribution of resources	Positive Peace Index, IEP	0.6
Negative view of perception of security forces' legitimacy	Polity IV	0.58
Number of people killed in battle annually	IISS	0.58
Low Levels of corruption	Positive Peace Index, IEP	0.58

The pattern of militarisation in high and low income countries provides a view of what militarisation 'looks like' from the perspective of countries in different economic groups. Countries generally use their military capacity for defence, emergency support, fighting wars or for internal repression. There is also a large trade in military sales, with the wealthy, militarised countries mainly exporting military capacity to lower income countries either through direct sales or as part of aid packages.

“ Political violence correlates significantly with militarisation for both high and low income countries, underlining the fact that military capacity, as opposed to just internal security forces, is an enabling factor in state sponsored violence towards its citizens.



ATTITUDINAL DATASETS THAT DO NOT CORRELATE WITH MILITARISATION

Table 18 contains some of the more interesting survey responses that do not correlate with *militarisation*. While descriptive indicators of governance, resource distribution and legitimacy correlate with militarisation, this study highlights how few societal perceptions affect militarisation.

TABLE 18 GLOBAL ATTITUDINAL SURVEY QUESTIONS WHICH DO NOT SHOW A STRONG CORRELATION WITH MILITARISATION

INDICATOR*	SOURCE	CORRELATION WITH MILITARISATION**
Confidence in local police (no) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.2
Freedom in your life (dissatisfied) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.2
Express political views (most are afraid) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.13
Standard of living (getting better) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.11
Confidence in military (yes) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.09
Confidence in national government (yes) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.07
Corruption in government (yes) (%)	Gallup World Poll	0.03
Confidence in military (no) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.01
Corruption in government (no) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.04
Confidence in national government (no) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.05
Standard of living (satisfied) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.15
Freedom in your life (satisfied) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.2
Educational system (satisfied) (%)	Gallup World Poll	-0.23

*GWP data is the percentage of the population in each of the countries surveyed. For example the first indicator in the list describes the relationship between militarisation and countries with higher percentages of the population who lack confident in the local police. **Militarisation source: IEP


While indicators of such as the *Political Terror Scale* and *equitable distribution of resources* correlate with *militarisation*, citizen attitudes about these factors do not correlate strongly with militarisation. In table 17 (Notable Correlates of Militarisation in Low Income Countries) there is a significant correlation between levels of corruption and *militarisation*. In table 18, however, there is almost no correlation between citizens' believing there is corruption in government and increased *militarisation*. There is a slightly larger correlation between how much freedom people feel in their lives and *militarisation*.

POLITICAL TERROR AND MILITARISATION

As noted previously, one of the strongest and most consistent correlates with *militarisation* is the level of political terror. As governments attain more military capacity, they also have the opportunity to use this capacity for repressive purposes. These military capabilities could be used to target citizens in civil war or by authoritarian governments using military tactics for law enforcement.

FIGURE 8 2014 POLITICAL TERROR SCALE VS. 2015 GPI MILITARISATION SCORE

There is a close relationship between militarisation and the Political Terror Scale measuring state sponsored violence.



As nations develop their military capacity it can be easily turned inward to stop political competition or repress dissent. It is important to state that militarisation on its own is not the deciding factor for internal repression, but rather dependent on the mix of Positive Peace factors within a country. Some recent examples of this include Syria, which had one of the highest levels of militarisation globally at the start of the civil war.



NATIONAL LEVEL TRENDS IN MILITARISATION

Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq have all experienced increases in militarisation as part of their recent or ongoing wars, while increases in countries like Chad, Venezuela, Djibouti and the Republic of the Congo are the result of significant increases in defence spending and arms imports, particularly between 2011 and 2015.

Norway, a country better known for its support of global humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts, has also had an increase in its *militarisation* score. The increase has been driven by exports of air defence systems, ships and advanced weaponry.

TABLE 19 TEN COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION IN MILITARISATION SCORES, 2008-2015 (POSITIVE CHANGE INDICATES INCREASED MILITARISATION)

COUNTRY	2008 MILITARISATION	2015 MILITARISATION	SCORE CHANGE	PERCENT CHANGE
Chad	1.529	2.182	0.653	42.72%
Syria	1.952	2.677	0.725	37.15%
Norway	1.369	1.828	0.460	33.60%
Venezuela	1.593	2.124	0.531	33.36%
Afghanistan	1.719	2.204	0.485	28.25%
Djibouti	1.598	2.003	0.405	25.38%
Iraq	1.734	2.169	0.435	25.07%
Republic of the Congo	1.526	1.889	0.363	23.77%
Jamaica	1.518	1.874	0.357	23.50%

Source: IEP



Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq have all experienced increases in militarisation as part of their recent or ongoing wars, while increases in Chad, Venezuela, Djibouti and the Republic of the Congo's are the result of significant increases in defence spending and arms imports.

GLOBAL TRENDS IN MILITARISATION

The GMI measures a country's defence spending, percentage of the population in armed services or paramilitaries and the amount of heavy weapons.⁵⁶

GMI analysis points out that high and low levels of militarisation both lead to negative outcomes in terms of peacefulness. High militarisation can have effects on social spending and is usually in response to regional threats. Low militarisation comes with its own problems. Countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo have very low militarisation, which, combined with poor Positive Peace, leads to an inability to maintain security in their territory or prevent outbreaks of internal violence.

If we review the GMI time series of global militarisation since 1990, there was a slow but steady 14 per cent decline in militarisation up until the global financial crisis when budgetary considerations in the advanced western economies caused a further sharp dip, along with the drawdown of forces in Iraq.

Central America and Caribbean countries have achieved a higher levels of demilitarisation than the global average; where the GMI declined 27 per cent for the region since 1990 and makes an excellent case study of how different global factors combine to reduce militarisation. A number of factors influenced this reduction:


- **Less competition for regional influence**
- **Multiple regional efforts at reconciliation within the region**
- **Peacekeeping missions being deployed across the region.**

These significant reductions in militarisation were the result of multiple changes at the country, regional and global levels, underscoring the fact that changes are associated with geopolitical realignments and global economic shifts.



FIGURE 9 ERITREA GMI SCORE, 1993–2006

Eritrean militarisation build up post-independence and leading up to the Ethiopia-Eritrea war.



Source: GMI, Bonn International Centre for Conversion

“ Norway, a country better known for its support of global humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts, has also had an increase in its militarisation score. The increase has been driven by exports of air defence systems, ships and advanced weaponry.

There are also normally increases in militarisation after independence or regime changes. In the case of new countries, the main reason for this is the rapid expansion of military capacity as new countries need to build a competent military.


One example is in Eritrea during the 1990s. In 1993, Eritrea became an independent country, seceding from Ethiopia. There was a corresponding increase in militarisation. There was a further upward trend in militarisation leading up to the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea war.

When reviewing the trends in militarisation there are two aspects that become apparent. The first is that there is relatively little variation in militarisation at the regional or international level, except for rare circumstances of major economic or geostrategic change. The second is that militarisation spikes in weak or conflict-affected states in response to specific events such as government transitions and post-conflict recovery.

FIGURE 10

GLOBAL AND CENTRAL AMERICAN LEVELS OF MILITARISATION, 1990–2013


The large drop in Central American and the Caribbean militarisation in 1995 was a result of both major global changes and security policies in the Central American region.



Source: GMI, Bonn International Centre for Conversion

TRENDS IN PEACE






TRENDS IN PEACE OVER THE LAST

8 YEARS

[2008-2015]



The world has become slightly less peaceful between 2008 and 2015, with the average GPI country score deteriorating by 2.4 per cent.

- The decrease in peacefulness was driven by the deterioration of indicators of internal peacefulness. Indicators of external peacefulness actually improved, as many countries wound down their military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- This divergence between internal and external indicators supports previous analysis undertaken by IEP and others, which suggests that whilst conflicts between states are becoming less frequent, conflicts within states are becoming more intense in certain regions.
- The level of terrorism has grown steadily over the last decade, and shows no sign of abating. Deaths from terrorism increased by 61 per cent from 2012 to 2013, with almost 18,000 people being killed in terrorist attacks in 2013. Eighty-two per cent of these deaths occurred in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria.
- The threat of terrorism has also affected many of the world's most peaceful countries, with terrorist attacks occurring in France, Denmark and Australia in the last year.
- The number of armed conflicts of all kinds has remained more or less constant since the year 2000. However, the number of protracted and intense conflicts has increased. In 2010 there were four conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths; by 2013, this had increased to seven.
- There has been a large increase in the total number of refugees and IDPs, fleeing armed conflict and civil war. The latest UNHCR report estimates that more than 50 million people are now either refugees or internally displaced.
wThis is the highest number since the end of the Second World War.
- The level of perceived criminality in society, level of violent crime and the likelihood of violent demonstrations have shown significant increases in the last eight years.
- Despite the overall decrease in peacefulness worldwide, some indicators have improved. Financial contributions to UN peacekeeping funding have improved, relations with neighbouring countries have grown stronger, particularly in South America, and the number and intensity of external conflicts have fallen.
- There are large regional variations in peacefulness and each region is faced with different challenges in attempting to contain violence. In Central America, drug-related violence has seen the homicide rate in many countries increase significantly. In the Middle East and North Africa, terrorism and internal conflict threaten regional stability.
- Countries with high levels of peacefulness are much less likely to have large year-on-year changes in their GPI score, whilst less peaceful countries fluctuate strongly in both directions.
- The seven least peaceful countries in the world are becoming increasingly conflictual, separating them farther from all other countries in the index.

EIGHT-YEAR TRENDS

The world has become slightly less peaceful.

The world has become slightly less peaceful over the last eight years, deteriorating by 2.4 per cent. However, this decrease in peacefulness has not been evenly spread, with 76 countries improving while 86 deteriorated. MENA has suffered the largest decline of any region in the world, deteriorating 11 per cent in eight years. This decrease in peacefulness reverses a long-term trend dating back to the Second World War which had seen steady increases in peace, especially after the end of the Cold War.

Violence and violent conflict have been ever-present over the past eight years. Conflict in Iraq and Syria has led to the rise of ISIL and a massive increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people. Violence has also been prominent in other regions around the world, with terrorism and civil unrest coming to the fore in Nigeria, as well as an increase in violence and death related to drug trafficking in Central America where the average homicide rate doubled from the 2008 to 2015 GPI. Additionally, the violent crime indicator is higher in Central America than in any other region.

The number and intensity of these high-profile conflicts and atrocities has had a detrimental impact on peace but hides a subtle and gradual trend of increased peacefulness in many countries and regions. 76 countries became more peaceful, along with four of the nine GPI regions: Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and Russia & Eurasia.

On average, a number of indicators improved over the period:

- **Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP**
- **Number, duration and role in external conflicts**
- **Number of deaths from organised conflict (external)**
- **Political Terror Scale**
- **Financial contributions to UN peacekeeping missions**

The long term trend in peacefulness is also positive. Over the last sixty years, the world has become more peaceful. There has been a marked and consistent downturn in levels of violence and conflict since the end of the Second World War. Conflict and war, particularly colonial and interstate conflicts, have decreased consistently, as has the number of people killed in conflicts. In the last 30 years developed countries have experienced large decreases in homicide, assault, and robbery.


If the peace analysis is extended by centuries or even millennia, the trend becomes even stronger. Many forms of violence and conflict, from interpersonal direct confrontation, to homicide, to war, to public attitudes towards the acceptability of violence, have decreased since the beginning of recorded history.⁵⁷

This mismatch between the long-term historical data and recent short-term trends shows that peace has not improved in a linear manner; sometimes going down and sometimes improving. This lends confidence to humanity's ability to reverse the short-term trend and the long-term prospects for a more peaceful world.

Figure 11 illustrates the GPI trend from 2008 by averaging the scores of the 162 GPI countries for each year from 2008 to 2015. This shows that there has been a deterioration in the average country's score since 2008, with a 2.4 per cent increase in GPI score over the last eight years. Seventy-six countries saw improvements in their GPI scores over this time period, with 86 registering deteriorations in peacefulness. The largest average decrease in peacefulness occurred between 2008 and 2010, with every indicator except for four becoming less peaceful. Subsequent years have had either small deteriorations or very small improvements in peacefulness. Whilst the change in the overall score does not seem to be very significant or revealing, when disaggregated into its internal and external components a clearer trend emerges.

FIGURE 11 OVERALL GPI SCORE, COUNTRY AVERAGE 2008–2015

The average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated by around 2.4 per cent since 2008.




Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

Internal peace measures the levels of direct violence and the fear of violence within a country's borders, incorporating conflict, interpersonal, and deadly violence indicators, as well as indicators of state repression and public perceptions of the level of criminality within a country. External peace measures the ability of a country to project force outside of its borders, and whether it is currently engaged in doing so. Figure 12 is an index trend chart that highlights the percentage change in internal and external peace scores from 2008 to 2015. This allows for a direct comparison of the changes in internal and external peace since the 2008 GPI.

FIGURE 12 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PEACE SCORE SINCE 2008

Both internal and external peacefulness deteriorated until 2010. Since then, external peace has improved while internal peace has deteriorated.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index


Both internal and external peace deteriorated until 2010, after which external peace began to improve and internal peace continued to deteriorate. The average level of external peace is now slightly better than it was in 2008, while internal peace has decreased around four per cent.

Figure 13 (overleaf) provides an explanation for the divergence between internal and external peacefulness. It tracks the changes in every GPI indicator from 2008 to 2015, with indicators that have changed by more than five per cent highlighted and named.

“ The long term trend in peacefulness is positive. Over the last sixty years, the world has become more peaceful. There has been a marked and consistent downturn in levels of violence and conflict since the end of the Second World War. Conflict and war, particularly colonial and interstate conflicts, have decreased consistently, as has the number of people killed in armed conflicts.

FIGURE 13 GPI INDICATOR MAJOR CHANGE INDEX (2008=1)

Two GPI indicators have improved by more than five per cent over the last eight years.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

Only two indicators have improved by more than five per cent, both of them from the external peace domain. The *financial contributions to UN peacekeeping* has improved considerably, particularly after 2012, although there has been some deterioration in the last year. The other indicator to improve significantly is *external conflicts fought*, which has been revised as part of changes to the 2015 GPI methodology and improved by 15.4 per cent. This stands in contrast to the *internal conflicts fought* indicator that has fallen substantially. Thirty-three countries have improved their *external conflicts fought* score by more than 20 per cent of the total scoring range, with 18 countries improving their score by more than 50 per cent of the total scoring range. The main reason for this drastic reduction in external conflict was that countries involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq began to scale back their involvement and draw down troops. Denmark, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway and the United States all began to lessen their involvement in these two conflicts over the past five years.

“ There were an estimated 12.8 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2013, an increase of 23 per cent from 2004.

Whilst only two indicators, both of them external, improved by more than five per cent over the last eight years, five other indicators deteriorated by more than five per cent:

- Refugees and IDPs as a percentage of the population
- Number of deaths from internal conflict
- Impact of terrorism
- Likelihood of violent demonstrations
- Level of perceived criminality in society

Four of these indicators are from the internal peace domain, with only *refugees and IDPs* being part of the external peace domain. The increases in peacefulness that did occur are the result of external conflicts coming to an end, or becoming more internally focused. This fits a broader pattern identified by IEP in previous years, in which conflicts between countries are becoming less common. However, this decrease in conflict between states has been offset by increases in civil unrest, which has been on the increase as conflicts between groups within states has intensified in the last eight years. Regional cooperation and *relations with neighbouring countries* have also improved on average.

INDICATOR TRENDS

The average level of global peacefulness has decreased over the last eight years but this decline in peacefulness has not been evenly distributed across countries and regions. The increase in violence has also been confined to a subset of GPI indicators, while the majority have remained fairly stable over the past eight years. The large deteriorations were concentrated in a small number of countries, and almost as many countries improved as deteriorated, with 76 countries becoming more peaceful and 86 countries becoming less peaceful.

The following analysis looks at changes in the level of violence over the last decade for four of the indicators which have deteriorated the most since 2008: terrorism impact, refugees and IDPs, internal conflicts fought and homicide rate.

TERRORISM

There has been a surge in deaths from terrorism over the past decade. After the end of the Cold War and various peace processes led to the waning of ideological and nationalist terrorism, the start of the 21st century saw a sharp increase in terrorism by religious groups, often in the context of ongoing conflict. Figure 13 highlights the number of deaths from terrorism each year over the period 1998 to 2013.

The increase in deaths from terrorism has been particularly noticeable over the past three years, increasing by 61 per cent between 2012 and 2013 alone. Although a comprehensive


dataset of 2014 terrorism deaths is not yet available, modelling conducted by IEP suggests that this trend will continue. The majority of deaths from terrorism have occurred in countries suffering from protracted civil conflict or war, with 82 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2013 occurring in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However, the impact of terrorism has been felt in an increasing number of countries across the globe, with the number of countries experiencing more than 50 deaths from terrorism in a year rising from 15 in 2012 to 24 in 2013. A total of 60 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2013.

A handful of terrorist organisations are responsible for the majority of deaths. The Taliban, ISIL, Boko Haram and al-Qa'ida and its affiliates were responsible for 63 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2013. All four groups have remained active in 2014 and 2015. The most notable recent incident took place in Nigeria in January 2015, when Boko Haram reportedly massacred as many as 2,000 civilians. Although the boundary between a terrorist group and an armed insurgency is not always clear, the dataset does distinguish all four groups are responsible for a large number of conflict-related deaths as well.

Whilst the majority of deaths from terrorism have occurred in the developing world, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and the northernmost parts of sub-Saharan Africa, there have been a number of deaths from terrorism in OECD countries. Five per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in OECD countries in 2013, mainly Turkey and Mexico. There have been a number of high-profile terrorist attacks in Western Europe in 2014 and 2015. In January 2015, two terrorists who identified themselves as part of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula shot and killed 11 staff of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, and in February 2015 two shootings resulted in three people being killed and five injured in Denmark. Concerns have also been raised about the number of foreign recruits that terrorist groups have been able to attract from European countries, with estimates from national government agencies suggesting that over 1,800 Europeans had joined ISIL, including 700 from France and 400 from the United Kingdom.

FIGURE 14 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000–2013

Deaths from terrorism have increased fivefold over the last fifteen years.




Source: IEP, Global Terrorism Index

FIGURE 15

TOTAL REFUGEES AND IDPs, UNHCR ESTIMATES, 1997–2014

The number of internally displaced people increased by over 300% from 2004 to 2014.



Source: UNHCR, 2014 Mid-Year Trends

REFUGEES AND IDPs


The rise in the number of refugees and IDPs as a percentage of the population over the last decade has been staggering, with a large portion of the increase being driven by conflicts in MENA. This surge in refugees and IDPs illustrates that direct violence has tremendous social and economic ramifications, and that the consequences of violence will continue to be felt for years or even decades after a conflict has concluded. Figure 15 highlights the increase in the number of refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs who are being protected or assisted by UNHCR from 2004 to 2013.

In 2013 there were over 36 million people who were either internally displaced, refugees or seeking asylum, an increase of 131 per cent in less than a decade. These estimates also do not include stateless people, other groups that are protected or monitored by UNHCR and

FIGURE 16

REFUGEES AND IDPs BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, PER CENT OF THE GLOBAL TOTAL, 2013

Countries with low levels of peacefulness account for the majority of the world's refugees and IDPs.



Source: UNHCR, 2014 Mid-Year Trends

IDPs who are not being assisted by UNHCR. When these other groups are included, the most recent estimates from UNHCR suggest that over 50 million people are currently refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced. This is the highest number of refugees and IDPs since the end of the Second World War. This figure amounts to about 0.75 per cent of the current world population, meaning that 1 in every 133 people in the world is either a refugee or internally displaced.

The number of refugees and asylum seekers increased steadily from 2004 to 2013. There were an estimated 12.8 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2013, an increase of 23 per cent from 2004. By contrast, the number of internally displaced people grew almost exponentially from 5.4 million in 2004 to 23.9 million in 2013, an increase of 324 per cent.

Many of the new IDP camps are located in Syria, where the Syrian civil war and associated violence has led to over 6.5 million people becoming internally displaced and a further 3 million refugees. Given that the pre-conflict population of Syria was approximately 21.5 million, this means that approximately 40 per cent of the Syrian population are refugees or displaced. Violence and civil conflict have also displaced millions of people in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, whilst the occupation of Afghanistan and other conflicts in that region has led to an exodus of over 2.6 million Afghans. Figure 16 shows the percentage of global refugees and IDPs by country of origin for 2013.

ARMED CONFLICT AND WAR


The number of armed conflicts involving state actors has not changed significantly in the last fifteen years. Similarly, most conflicts have largely occurred in similar geographic regions. Sub-Saharan Africa has the majority of external conflicts fought with an average of ten conflicts a year, followed by South Asia with eight, Asia-Pacific with six and MENA with five.

Although sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of conflicts, these conflicts tend not to last as long as in other regions. There were only three conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 which started more than three years ago, two of which are long-standing conflicts in Ethiopia. In contrast, in 2013, conflicts in South Asia and MENA started on average ten and 14 years ago respectively.

Conflicts in South Asia and MENA also had much higher battle-related deaths than conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, with an average of 1,500 deaths for South Asia and 5,600 deaths for MENA, compared to 550 deaths for sub-Saharan Africa. The epicentre of conflict has shifted from West Africa to the Middle East. The last three years saw conflicts end in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Rwanda and Senegal. In the same period conflicts began or escalated in Syria and Iraq.

FIGURE 17 NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BY YEAR AND REGION, 1999–2013

The majority of armed conflicts occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Asia-Pacific and MENA.



Source: UCDP Note: Only includes conflicts with two actors that have over 25 battle deaths in the calendar year.

“ Although sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of conflicts, these conflicts tend not to last as long as in other regions.

BOX 2 TYPES OF CONFLICT

Armed conflicts are conflicts which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.

Internal armed conflicts, also known as civil wars, are armed conflicts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups.

Internationalized internal armed conflicts are internal armed conflicts which have interventions from other states on one or both sides of the conflict. An example of an internationalized internal armed conflict has been the conflict between the government of Afghanistan, with support from other state actors, including NATO partners up until 28 December 2014, against the Afghani Taliban.

Non-state conflicts are conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year

involving two organised armed groups, neither of which is a government. In 2013, this included the conflict between ISIL and the Free Syrian Army as well as other conflicts within the Syrian civil war that do not include state actors.

One-sided conflicts are violence used by a state or non-state actor against civilians which result in at least 25 deaths. It does not include extrajudicial killings which, among other things, are measured in the Political Terror indicator for the GPI. In 2013, ISIL was the most deadly group for one-sided conflicts, killing over 2,000 civilians.

Interstate conflicts are conflicts between two different states. The number of interstate conflicts has fallen since the Cold War; in seven out of the last 15 years there were no interstate conflicts.

In 2013, the number of conflicts including state and non-state actors increased to the highest levels since 2004. This was largely due to the recent rise in the number of non-state conflicts, which stands at 48 and is the highest in fifteen years. Non-state conflicts are conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year involving two organised armed groups, neither of which is a government of a state.


Whilst the number of civil wars has decreased by 30 per cent in fifteen years, the number of conflicts which started as civil disputes but then involved regional and international powers has increased. These conflicts are known as internationalized internal conflicts and, in 2013, included conflicts with international involvement in Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia as well as Syria, Libya and Iraq.

Non-state conflicts also surged in 2013, with the biggest increases occurring in Nigeria, Sudan and Syria. These countries had 22 non-state conflicts, up from nine in 2012. In Nigeria there have been conflicts between smaller, largely ethnic-based groups, including the conflict between the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram and the Civilian Joint Task Force, which is a vigilante group formed in northern Nigeria to protect towns. Non-state conflicts also intensified in Sudan with skirmishes between tribesmen, farmers and ethnic clans. The rise in Syria reflects the increasing number of militias in the Syrian civil war.

One-sided conflicts have remained lower than the high seen earlier in the twenty-first century. One-sided conflicts are where high levels of violence are directed by a government towards the people they govern. These peaked in 2002 and have remained under 30 per year since 2007.

FIGURE 18 NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BY ALL CONFLICT TYPES, 1999-2013

The number of conflicts in 2013 reached the highest level since 2004.



Source: UCDP

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Non-State conflicts surged in 2013, with the biggest increases occurring in Nigeria, Sudan and Syria.


HOMICIDE

Accurately assessing movements in the global homicide rate is a difficult task. Limited country data, sporadic updating and the high variance between different estimation methods mean that there is no single, agreed-upon global homicide rate and that tracking changes year-on-year involves some form of data estimation or imputation. IEP uses the Economist Intelligence Unit country analysts' estimates of the homicide

FIGURE 19

GLOBAL HOMICIDE TOTAL DEATHS AND RATE, 2005-2012

The global homicide rate has been increasing.



Source: UNODC, EIU, IEP Calculations

rate in countries where no data is available. These experts are in contact with the relevant police and government authorities, as well as members of civil society, and are well placed to make meaningful and accurate estimates of the homicide rate in their country of expertise. However, these estimates are not available for the years before 2005, so it is only possible to construct a global trend from 2005 to 2012, which is the latest year for which UNODC homicide data is available. Figure 19 shows the total number of homicides and IEP's estimate of the global homicide rate for the period 2005 to 2012.

According to IEP's estimates, the global homicide rate increased 16.67 per cent between 2005 and 2012, increasing from 5.46 deaths per 100,000 people to 6.37. In absolute terms, this represents an increase in the number of people killed per year of over 95,000. In total, IEP estimates that over three and a half million people were intentionally killed in the eight-year period between 2005 and 2012. However, over the same time period, 85 countries actually saw improvements in their homicide rate with declines in 73 countries.

Figure 19 highlights the trend in the global homicide rate compared to the GPI country average and median homicide rates in the 162 countries measured in the GPI. The global homicide rate represents the total number of homicides divided by the world population, expressed as a rate per 100,000 people.

All three homicide rates display a similar trend wherein the homicide rate increased until 2010 and then decreased leading up to 2012. The fact that the country average homicide rate is so much higher than the global rate and the country median highlights the fact that the distribution of homicide rates is strongly skewed, with a few outlying countries having much higher homicide rates than the rest of the world. The decrease in the homicide rate over the last two years is partially explained by revisions made to the UNODC dataset as public health estimates, which tend to overestimate homicides, were replaced with police-recorded homicide data, which tend to underestimate homicides.

In general, the homicide rate in most countries tends to move slowly and predictably, with the homicide rate in previous years being the best predictor of the homicide rate in the future. Large swings in the homicide rate in the short-term are usually the result of civil unrest or some kind of external shock that leads to the breakdown of the rule of law. For example, in Mexico, drug-trade related violence was the primary driver of a 64 per cent increase in the homicide rate. In Honduras, which now has the highest homicide rate in the world, there was a 48 per cent increase in the homicide rate between 2007 and 2012. Large increases like these were concentrated in a few countries. Overall, the majority of countries actually saw their homicide rate fall from 2005 to 2012. Homicide rates in 85 countries decreased, compared to 73 that increased, although the average increase in homicides was far larger than the average fall.

BOX 3 THE LONG-TERM GLOBAL PEACE TREND

Proponents of the theory that the world is becoming more peaceful, even in spite of recent events, often draw attention to the fact that recent increases in violence are dwarfed by historical levels of violence. This is for the most part true: the battle deaths rate has increased over the past five years, however, it is much lower than it was in 1990 and 2000. Similarly, in many developed countries, homicide rates have been decreasing since the 1980s. Incidents of mass killings have declined and the total number of armed conflicts has been stable for the past decade. However, this long term trend has been uneven, resulting in large deteriorations at different stages in history, such as during the First and Second World War.


The fact that so many indicators in the GPI have deteriorated over the last eight years should be cause for concern. Whilst the increase in violence over the last decade is not large by historical standards, the potential for further conflict is high. For example, the ramifications of the Syrian civil war are being felt across the globe. It has weakened regional stability, increased the risk of terrorist attacks in other countries and contributed to a humanitarian crisis as more and more people are displaced.

Similarly, even though interpersonal violence is now lower in many countries than it has been for decades, expenditure on violence containment has been increasing. For example, in the US, while the homicide rate is now lower than it has been at any time since 1962, per capita spending on violence containment has increased significantly. Adjusted for inflation, spending on protective services per capita is now over six times higher than it was in 1962.

FIGURE 20

HOMICIDE RATE: GLOBAL, GPI AVERAGE, GPI MEDIAN, 2005-2012

There is a very similar trend between the global, country average and country median homicide rates.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

THE GLOBAL HOMICIDE RATE

While all three measures of global homicide used in figure 20 show an increase from 2005 to 2012, they are calculated in slightly different ways.

GPI Country Average Homicide Rate:

This is an average of the homicide rates of the 162 GPI countries, based on UNODC data and EIU estimates.

GPI Country Median Homicide Rate:

This is the middle homicide rate of the 162 GPI countries. The median rate is less likely to be skewed by countries with either very high or very low homicide rates.

Global Homicide Rate:

This measure treats the world as a single country, adding up total global homicides and using the total world population to calculate a global homicide rate.

REGIONAL TRENDS

Different regions of the world have vastly different levels of peace, as shown in figure 21, with no single region having the worst or best score on all three GPI domains.

Central America has both the best *militarisation* score and the worst *societal safety and security* score. North America is the only region where *societal safety and security* is not the worst performing domain due to the large size of the US and Canadian militaries. For this domain, there is a clear gap between the three most peaceful and the six least peaceful regions.


Over the last eight years there has been limited variation in regional peacefulness, as shown in figure 22. Four regions became slightly more peaceful and four became slightly less peaceful, with only MENA deteriorating significantly.

In 2008, MENA had the same level of peacefulness as sub-Saharan Africa, and was the 6th most peaceful region in the world. By 2015 it has become the least peaceful region in the world, deteriorating by 11 per cent over the period. No other region in the world changed its rank relative to the other regions of the world. Europe and North America remained the most peaceful regions, with Asia-Pacific being the third most peaceful.

Table 20 summarises the changes in each region by indicator, showing the indicator with the highest improvement and biggest deterioration respectively.

FIGURE 21 2015 GPI DOMAIN SCORES BY REGION

Different regions have very different peace profiles.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

“ Over the last eight years there has been limited variation in regional peacefulness... Four regions became slightly more peaceful and four became slightly less peaceful, with only MENA deteriorating significantly.

TABLE 20 GPI OVERALL SCORE AND OVERALL SCORE CHANGE BY REGION, 2008–2015


There was a wide range of indicators that deteriorated across the GPI regions.

REGION	BIGGEST IMPROVEMENT	CHANGE	BIGGEST DETERIORATION	CHANGE
Asia-Pacific	Number, duration and role in external conflicts	-0.36	Homicide rate	0.32
Central America and Caribbean	Number, duration and role in external conflicts	-0.55	Level of perceived criminality in society	1.00
Europe	Number, duration and role in external conflicts	-0.91	Likelihood of violent demonstrations	0.31
Middle East and North Africa	Armed services personnel rate	-0.26	Refugees and IDPs	0.74
North America	Deaths from external conflict	-1.00	Impact of terrorism	0.75
Russia and Eurasia	Number, duration and role in external conflicts	-1.30	Deaths from internal conflict	0.33
South America	Relations with neighbouring countries	-0.36	Incarceration rate	0.50
South Asia	UN peacekeeping funding	-0.22	Likelihood of violent demonstrations	0.43
Sub-Saharan Africa	UN peacekeeping funding	-0.25	Homicide rate	0.43

The indicator that most improved in four regions was *external conflicts fought*, which measures the number, duration and role that state actors have in conflicts outside their own borders. Two regions had their biggest improvement on the *UN peacekeeping funding* indicator. Two regions had their biggest indicator deterioration on the *homicide rate*, whilst another two had it on the *violent demonstrations* indicator. The other five regions had unique indicators representing their biggest deteriorations.

FIGURE 22 GPI OVERALL SCORE AND OVERALL SCORE CHANGE BY REGION, 2008–2015

The Middle East and North Africa is now the least peaceful region in the world.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

THE LEAST PEACEFUL REGION MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA



MENA experienced more upheaval and uncertainty than any other region over the past decade. It moved from being the fourth least peaceful to the least peaceful region in the world, with 13 of its 19 countries deteriorating, most notably Syria, which is the country with the largest overall fall in the index over the past decade. It moved from 88th to 162nd, becoming the least peaceful country in the world.

Whilst the early stages of the Arab Spring looked like they would usher in an era of democratic reform, this initial promise has faltered as the region has been beset with a series of armed uprisings and civil wars. A recent poll of Arab youth found that 39 per cent now doubt that democracy can ever work in the Middle East.⁵⁸ Only 15 per cent see a lack of democracy as being the biggest obstacle facing the Middle East in 2015, compared to 41 per cent in 2012, and only 38 per cent of respondents in 2015 felt that the Arab world is better off after the Arab Spring, compared to 72 per cent in 2012.

As shown in figure 23, of the ten largest indicator movements in MENA, nine of them were deteriorations and only one was an improvement. The indicator with the biggest deterioration was *refugees and IDPs*, followed by *deaths from internal conflict*, *perceptions of criminality* and *intensity of internal conflict*.


The one indicator to show a significant improvement was the *armed services personnel rate*, which fell in MENA from the 2008 to the 2015 GPI. The size of this change in MENA was skewed by very large reductions in three countries. In Syria and Libya the size of the armed forces fell as the result of turmoil and defections caused by their respective civil wars, whilst in Israel, the size of the armed forces fell due to the end of the conflict with Lebanon, as army reservists were removed from active duty.

Libya has had the largest year-on-year fall in peacefulness, when its score deteriorated in 2011 as the result of the Libyan civil war.

In general, the reduction in army size in MENA matches the broader global trend, with 138 countries seeing the size of their armed forces decline over the last eight years. This trend can be attributed to the increasing sophistication of military forces worldwide, as well as to austerity measures resulting from the Global Financial Crisis.

FIGURE 23 TEN LARGEST INDICATOR SCORE CHANGES, MENA, 2008-2015

A vicious cycle of violence is driving down peacefulness in the Middle East and North Africa.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index



Whilst the early stages of the Arab Spring looked like they would usher in an era of democratic reform, this initial promise has faltered as the region has been beset with a series of armed uprisings and civil wars.

THE MOST PEACEFUL REGION EUROPE




Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world according to the 2015 GPI and its peacefulness has increased every year for the last three years. However, the major reason for this overall improvement was positive change in external peacefulness, driven by a winding down of involvement in Afghanistan and decreasing military expenditure due to budget constraints.

The debt, growth and budgeting problems confronting many European countries are placing some strains on its internal cohesiveness. According to the 2012 Eurobarometer survey, only 4 per cent of Europeans were very optimistic about the future of the European Union (EU), with 10 per cent of respondents being very pessimistic. Most Europeans see the economy as the most pressing issue facing the EU. Crime is not seen as a very important issue by many, while terrorism is of increasing concern across most European countries. In 2012, only five per cent of Europeans thought that terrorism was one of the two most important issues facing the EU. That number rose to 11 per cent in 2014. Concerns about immigration and social cohesion have also risen in the past few years, with 24 per cent of Europeans feeling that immigration was one of the two most important issues in Europe, up from nine per cent in 2012. Nevertheless, Europeans retain a high level of confidence in the police. In 2014, 68 per cent of Europeans reported that they tended to trust the police, up from 64 per cent in 2003.

Figure 24 highlights the ten largest indicator score changes in Europe from 2008 to 2015. Five improved and five deteriorated, with the largest overall change being recorded on the *external conflicts fought* indicator. Of the indicators that deteriorated, four were internal: the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*, *political instability*, *impact of terrorism* and *level of violent crime*. Conversely, three of the indicators with the largest improvement were external: *Political Terror Scale*, *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP* and *nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities*.

FIGURE 24 TEN LARGEST INDICATOR SCORE CHANGES, EUROPE, 2008–2015

External indicators have improved, but a number of internal indicators have deteriorated.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index




The debt, growth and budgeting problems confronting many European countries are straining internal cohesiveness.

GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF PEACE

The world has become less peaceful over the last decade, but this decrease in peacefulness was not evenly distributed between countries or regions around the world. A certain amount of peace inequality exists between nations, with the majority of countries remaining relatively stable and a minority experiencing large increases in conflict and violence. Furthermore, the more peaceful a country is, the more likely it is to remain peaceful.

FIGURE 25 GPI SCORE VS GPI SCORE CHANGE

More peaceful countries have smaller fluctuations in peacefulness.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index


The less peaceful a country is, the more likely it is to experience large swings in peacefulness. This is mainly driven by the lack of societal resilience (Positive Peace) where shocks to the society can easily result in violent responses. Similarly large increases in peace are possible when countries are ridden by conflict and that conflict then ceases.

Figure 25 overleaf shows the year on year changes in peacefulness for every year since the GPI's inception. Each dot represents a country: the green dots are countries that experienced increases in peacefulness and the red dots are deteriorations. The pie chart for each year shows how many countries experienced improvements or deteriorations in total.

Both large deteriorations and improvements in peacefulness are not evenly distributed across all 162 GPI nations. Peacefulness is 'sticky' amongst countries with high levels of peacefulness, while countries with low levels of peacefulness are much more volatile. The greatest volatility has occurred amongst countries ranked in the 20 least peaceful of the GPI.

FIGURE 26 DISTRIBUTION OF GPI YEAR-ON-YEAR SCORE CHANGES, 2008-2015

Each dot represents a single country's YOY score change. The pie charts summarise how many countries improved and deteriorated each year.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

Figure 26 illustrates the relationship between a country's GPI score in the previous year and its change in GPI score the following year. For example, its 2008 score is compared against the change in score from 2008 to 2009.

Figure 26 illustrates the fact that peacefulness is 'sticky' amongst countries that already have low levels of violence and conflict. The countries that have developed strong Positive Peace factors – the attitudes, institutions, and structures that are associated with peaceful environments – are better able to respond to external shocks when they occur, such as Iceland's response to the Global Financial Crisis or Japan's response to the Tohoku earthquake. The average magnitude of year-on-year change is largest in countries with a score greater than 3.0, as shown in figure 27.


Countries with a GPI score greater than 3.0 had average increases in peacefulness of .08 and average deteriorations of 0.1, compared to average increases of .025 and deteriorations of .024 amongst countries with GPI scores lower than 1.25. There are much smaller differences in score changes amongst mid-ranked countries on the GPI. It should be noted that many of the countries at the bottom of the GPI had been mid-ranking prior to descending into conflict. Importantly, once conflict ends, countries can rise rapidly back towards the middle rankings of the GPI.

Over the last eight years, year-on-year score fluctuations for most countries have tended to revert to the mean across most of the GPI scoring range, meaning that there is very little difference in the level of peacefulness of a country ranked first in 2008 and

FIGURE 27

AVERAGE GPI SCORE CHANGE BY SCORE TRANCHE

Less peaceful countries have larger improvements and deteriorations in peacefulness.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

the country ranked first in 2015. Figure 28 shows the relationship between GPI score and rank for 2008 and 2015. The exception to this is the 20 bottom ranked countries that have progressively become less peaceful.


In 2008, there were only three countries on the GPI that had a score worse than 3.0 (Somalia, Iraq and Sudan) and no countries had a score worse than 3.5. However, in 2015 there were nine countries with scores greater than 3.0: Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Pakistan. This demonstrates how the least peaceful countries accounted for the majority of the fall in peacefulness.

There is a clear demarcation between the twenty least peaceful countries in the world and the other GPI nations, and a strong separation between the seven least peaceful countries and the rest of the world.

The distribution of peacefulness by population is also skewed. The fact that only seven countries have much lower levels of peacefulness than the rest of the world seems encouraging, however, more peaceful countries tend to have smaller populations and many more people live in countries with low levels of peace. Figure 29 shows the total population of people living the world's twenty least peaceful countries compared to the twenty most peaceful.

FIGURE 28 GPI SCORE VS GPI RANK, 2008 AND 2015


The biggest changes between 2008 and 2015 occurred in the 20 least peaceful countries.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

FIGURE 29 TOTAL POPULATION, 20 MOST PEACEFUL VS 20 LEAST PEACEFUL COUNTRIES, 2015 GPI

Over two billion people live in the 20 least peaceful countries in the world, compared to less than 500 million in the 20 most peaceful.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index


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FIGURE 30 RATIO OF PEOPLE LIVING IN MOST TO LEAST PEACEFUL COUNTRIES, 2015 GPI

Almost four times as many people live in the bottom half of the world's peacefulness distribution.



Source: IEP, Global Peace Index

Out of an estimated global population of 7.2 billion, less than 500 million people live in the 20 most peaceful countries, compared to over 2.3 billion people who live in the twenty least peaceful countries. Even if nations with the largest populations like China and India are excluded from the analysis, there are still almost three times as many people living in the 20 least peaceful countries compared to the 20 most peaceful.

Figure 30 highlights how this pattern is true for the ten least peaceful countries to the ten most peaceful countries, as well as comparing the top and bottom half of the GPI.

“ There are still almost three times as many people living in the 20 least peaceful countries compared to the 20 most peaceful.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE



GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN 2014

US\$14.3 TRILLION



WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO
13.4%
OF WORLD GDP

WHY?

Losses from conflict
\$817 billion

Internal security
spending \$1.3 trillion

Losses from crime and
interpersonal violence



IF THE WORLD DECREASED VIOLENCE BY ONLY 10% ...

...\$1.43 trillion

IN SPARE ECONOMIC RESOURCES & ACTIVITY COULD BE GENERATED:

Support global economic recovery

= **6X** the total value of Greece's bailout and loans from the financial crisis

Maximise development

= **10X** total official development assistance (ODA) from rich to poor countries

Poverty alleviation

= **3X** the total earnings of the 1.1 billion people living in extreme poverty under \$1.25 a day

The economic impact of violence on the global economy was US\$14.3 trillion in 2014, which represents 13.4 per cent of world GDP. This is equivalent to the combined economies of Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.

- The amount is comprised of US\$7.16 trillion in current yearly costs and an economic multiplier of the same amount. The economic multiplier represents the additional economic activity that would flow from the more productive redirection of expenditure resulting from the reduction in violence.
- If global violence were to decrease by ten per cent uniformly, an additional US\$1.43 trillion would effectively be added to the world economy each year. This is more than six times the total value of Greece's bailout and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and other Eurozone countries combined.
- Since 2008, the total economic impact of violence has increased by 15.3 per cent, from US\$12.4 trillion to US\$14.3 trillion PPP. Large increases in costs have occurred due to deaths from internal conflict, IDPs and refugee support, UN peacekeeping and GDP losses from conflict. This reflects the deterioration in global peace.
- Half of the increase in violence containment costs since 2008 is due to deteriorations in the conflict indicators. The violence containment indicator that deteriorated the most in percentage terms was deaths from internal conflict which increased 378 per cent. In absolute terms, GDP losses from conflict increased US\$360 billion globally.
- IEP's comprehensive calculation of military expenditure accounts for over US\$3 trillion globally, which is twice as much as the four largest companies in the United States (Apple, ExxonMobil, Google and Microsoft).
- Total internal security expenditure, encompassing police, private security guards and national security agencies, now accounts for 18 per cent of violence containment expenditure.
- The only category of violence containment to improve was deaths from external conflict, reflecting the trend away from external conflicts between states to internal conflicts within states.
- The number of refugees and IDPs numbers has increased substantially to over 50 million, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the highest number since the end of World War II. Related costs increased by 267 per cent to US\$93 billion dollars since 2008.
- While UN peacekeeping costs have more than doubled since 2008, it is important to note they only account for less than 0.17 per cent of total violence containment expenditure.

KEY FINDINGS

IEP's violence containment model is the leading global analysis of its kind, incorporating 15 variables and accounting for direct and indirect costs of violence and conflict. It is a conservative estimate as many items cannot be counted or fully accounted for, due to data limitations.

From 2013 to 2014, global violence containment expenditure increased marginally to its highest point since 2008. Currently, total violence containment expenditure, without taking into account the multiplier effect totals US\$7.16 trillion PPP, which is 15.3 per cent higher than 2008. In comparison, world GDP has increased by 18.8 per cent over the same time period.

The total economic impact of violence in 2014 was US\$14.3 trillion, which is equivalent to the combined economy of every G7 member bar the United Kingdom and the United States.

These figures include both direct and indirect expenditure with costs being accounted for in the current year.

Violence impacts individuals and societies in a number of ways. The costs associated with violence and conflict can be measured by their direct, immediate impact and the indirect costs which arise as a result of conflict and violence. Examples of direct costs include court and incarceration costs paid by individuals or the state, capital destruction due to terrorist activity or expenditure on security and police forces.

TABLE 21 GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE BY CATEGORY, 2014 (US\$ BILLION PPP)

CATEGORY	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT INDICATOR	DIRECT	INDIRECT	US\$ (BILLIONS) TOTAL IMPACT WITH MULTIPLIER	% OF TOTAL VIOLENT CONTAINMENT
Military	Global military expenditure	\$3,091	n/a	\$6,181	43.2%
Crime and interpersonal violence	Homicide	\$130	\$895	\$2,061	14.4%
Internal security	Police services	\$773	n/a	\$1,545	10.8%
Crime and interpersonal violence	Violent and sexual crime	\$83	\$590	\$1,346	9.4%
Conflict	GDP losses from conflict	\$604	n/a	\$1,207	8.4%
Internal security	Private security services	\$376	n/a	\$752	5.3%
Crime and interpersonal violence	Incarceration	\$255	n/a	\$510	3.6%
Conflict	Losses from IDPs and refugees	\$2.5	\$125	\$255	1.8%
Internal security	National security agency costs	\$117	n/a	\$235	1.6%
Conflict	Deaths from internal conflict	\$40	n/a	\$81	0.56%
Conflict	Terrorism	\$4.5	\$27.5	\$64	0.5%
Crime and interpersonal violence	Fear from violence	\$27	n/a	\$54	0.38%
Conflict	UN peacekeeping	\$12	n/a	\$24	0.17%
Crime and interpersonal violence	Small arms industry	\$3	n/a	\$6	0.05%
Conflict	Deaths form external conflict	\$1	n/a	\$1	0.01%
TOTAL				\$14.3	

Indirect costs associated with violence and conflict include the lost productivity that would have otherwise occurred if the violence and conflict did not occur. This includes lost earnings and the psychological effects that affect productivity as a result of crime. The increased risk of being a victim of crime alters individuals' behavioral patterns, often decreasing consumption. While all violence has an indirect cost, IEP methodology only includes indirect costs associated with homicides, terrorism, serious assaults and sexual crimes. As indirect costs are difficult to measure the study only uses authoritative estimates.

Assessing the economic costs of violence also provides an ability to measure the potential direct and indirect savings and gains that would result from decreases in violence. Direct benefits relate to the costs saved as a result of decreased violence, for example, reduced expenditure on the criminal justice system due to lower crime has a positive effect on government spending. Indirect benefits represent the increased level of economic activity that may flow from productivity gains. For example, lower prison populations due to decreased levels of crime would mean those currently serving sentences could otherwise be contributing productively to the national economy.

IEP implements a one-to-one multiplier to both direct and indirect costs to conservatively assess the full economic impact if the world's level of violence decreased. This is to account for the flow-on effects caused by the diversion of funds from less productive activities related to preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence into more productive growth orientated investments.

If global violence was to decrease by 10 per cent uniformly, an additional US\$1.43 trillion would effectively be incorporated into the world economy each year. This is the equivalent to more than six times the total value of Greece's bailout and loans from the IMF, European Central Bank (ECB) and other Eurozone countries combined. It is also equivalent to eight times the US federal expenditure on education. Decreasing violence containment expenditure would allow funds to be diverted into more productive areas such as business development, health, education and infrastructure. This would result in further improvements to human capital and greater social welfare.

“ If global violence was to decrease by 10 per cent uniformly, an additional US\$1.43 trillion would effectively be incorporated into the world economy each year. This is more than six times the total value of Greece's bailout and loans.

FIGURE 31 GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE, 2008–2014
(US\$ TRILLIONS PPP 2014)

Due to the decrease in global peace, the economic impact of violence to the world economy increased by US\$2 trillion to US\$14.3 trillion between 2008 and 2014.



Source: IEP

CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW & METHODOLOGY

Violence destroys human and physical capital as well as social and political institutions.

It can lead to disruptions in consumption, investment, trade and production. Further, violence requires the diversion of investment from productive areas such as business development, education, infrastructure and health into areas of violence containment such as large security forces, high prison populations or the military. While it has been found in a wide range of studies that the cost of violence on society is large, there is no universally agreed upon method to holistically aggregate the current and future financial effects of violence and conflict.

IEP's approach is conservative and holistic and stands as one of the few regularly updated attempts to account for direct and indirect expenditures that are incurred because of violence. IEP takes a holistic and comprehensive approach to counting the costs of violence that looks at both the costs of preventing violence, creating it and dealing with its consequences. This concept of accounting for the holistic costs associated with violence is referred to as violence containment expenditure. The definition of violence containment expenditure is: forms of economic activity related to dealing with the consequences or prevention of violence, where the violence is directed against people or property.

Within the violence containment framework there are 15 indicators grouped into four categories of violence containment. These four categories are military, crime and interpersonal violence, conflict and internal security and include the following 15 line items:

1. Military

- **Military expenditure**
Includes military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and spending on other key government budget items such as Veterans Affairs Departments which deal with the consequences of war and conflict.

2. Crime and interpersonal violence

- **Homicide**
Counts the number of homicides recorded each year multiplied by the direct costs of loss of life which are average court, investigation and health costs. Indirect costs are lost earnings and productivity as well as the cost of grievance accrued in the current year.
- **Violent and sexual crime**
Counts the number of severe violent physical attacks on individuals including severe sexual assault and rape and is based on UNODC data. Average underreporting rates are also applied to account for underreporting. Minor assaults such as slapping, punching and threats are not included.
- **Incarceration**
Based on the average cost of incarcerating an individual based on incarceration rate per 100,000. Also includes those on pre-trial detention for the current year.
- **Fear from violence**
Counts the reduction of individuals' consumption as a consequence of fear of violence. Based on a conservative average of existing studies and Gallup World Poll data on fear.

- **Small arms industry**
Counts the dollar value of total imports and trade of small arms. Based on data from the Small Arms Survey.

3. Conflict

- **GDP losses from conflict**
Counts GDP losses as a result of conflict and are calculated as within two to eight per cent of GDP, dependent on the severity of the conflict. Based on Collier, IMF and World Bank studies.⁵⁹
- **Losses from IDPs and refugees**
Calculates the lost production of refugees and IDPs who are no longer a part of the formal economy. Based on the number of IDPs and refugees per country counted by UNHCR and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) multiplied by the participation rate in each relevant country, accounting for GDP per capita. Further, UNODC funding by donor country is also added to the model.
- **Deaths from internal conflict**
Counts the direct cost of battle-related deaths that have occurred as a consequence of conflict internal to the country.
- **Terrorism**
Counts the economic impact of deaths, injuries, asset damage and ransom payments that occur as a consequence of terrorism.
- **UN and peacekeeping operations**
Counts the total collections for UN peacekeeping missions and operating costs of the UN around the world.

4. Internal security

- **Deaths from external conflict**
Counts the direct costs of battle-related deaths that have occurred as a consequence of conflicts that a country is engaged in outside their respective country.
- **Police services**
Counts yearly total government expenditures on police departments based on number of police personnel per 100,000 people.

- **Private security services**
Based on estimates on the amount of expenditure on security personnel employed by private bodies, such as security guards employed by business.

- **National security agency costs**
Total national expenditure on security and intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, MI6 and Russian FSB. Based on a range of relevant government sources.

This methodology allows violence containment expenditures to be measured by specific category and indicator as well as by country for every year since the beginning of the GPI time series in 2008. This allows comparison of yearly trends for the indicators included in the model as well as highlighting changes in the annual composition of the global violence containment expenditure.

To enable relative comparisons between countries at different levels of economic development, GDP per capita adjusted for relative prices (PPP) has been used to scale the cost of containing violence for each country. Where country data was not available, reliable studies of the cost of various types of violence and crime for a specific country were scaled according to a country's PPP adjusted GDP per capita.

In calculating the total global size of violence containment costs, the GPI has been used as an initial point of reference for specifying the indicators that most accurately capture the level of violence in each of the countries in the study. Financial costs were determined by measuring the level of specific types of violence and multiplying these by estimates of their likely cost. It is important to note that each category is mutually exclusive to ensure double counting is avoided.


This study enables further analysis of the interactions between investments in activities that reduce violence and their potential economic flow-on effects. It also highlights some of the economic benefits that can be gained by actively seeking greater peace.

A useful illustration of how violence and conflict can effect economic growth and income can be seen in the case of the Rwandan genocide. Figure 32 overleaf highlights the effect of the civil war in Rwanda, which ended in 1994. GDP per capita decreased instantaneously in 1990 with the onset of conflict and by the end of the war fell by 63 per cent. Not only was there a sharp decline in economic activity due to the civil war, the return to its pre-conflict level was extremely lagged and only occurred in 2007. This demonstrates how drastically war or conflict can destroy the institutions, capital and frameworks that provide the support for society and the economy to function.

While such examples provide a powerful illustration of the economic and development impacts of violence, the benefits of peace extend beyond the absence of violence. This also includes the creation of institutions and structures that encourage greater resilience and foster human development. Encouraging peace through the development of the appropriate attitudes,

FIGURE 32 GDP PER CAPITA (US\$) RWANDA 1990–2007


During Rwanda’s civil war, GDP per capita decreased dramatically to just US\$130 per capita. GDP per capita did not return to pre-war levels until 2007.



Source: World Bank

“ This demonstrates how drastically war or conflict can destroy the institutions, capital and frameworks that provide the support for society and the economy to function.

FIGURE 33 POSITIVE PEACE: VIRTUOUS CYCLE OF LOWERING VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT SPENDING



Source: IEP

BOX 4 THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT

The multiplier effect is a commonly used concept in economics that describes the extent to which redirected expenditure has positive flow-on impacts on the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into an economy this will lead to more spending which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is why one dollar of expenditure can create more than one dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of violence containment expenditure, as individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence and contribute more to the wider economy as a consequence of lower levels of injury and death. Because of this decrease in violence, there are likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, education and infrastructure. For this reason, IEP uses the concept of a 'peace multiplier' which, in addition to the economic multiplier, incorporates the more productive use of resources. For instance, when a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral could be spent elsewhere. Furthermore, in avoiding a death

the economy also stands to gain the lost lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Marlin (2009) who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some activity not occurring at all, thereby stunting economic activity.⁶⁰

For example, a study looking at the effect of terrorism in Spain estimated that each transnational terrorism incident from the years 1970-91 was estimated to dissuade 140,000 tourists.⁶¹ This had the effect of decreasing large amounts of revenue from tourist expenditure and flow-on effects within the local economy. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we would expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.⁶²

This study assumes that the peace multiplier approaches two, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with the established literature.

institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies both reduces violence containment expenditure and supports the optimum environment for human potential to flourish. This is known as Positive Peace.

By understanding the social and economic drivers of violence, policymakers and business leaders can better understand the costs and benefits of particular social and economic investment programs. Furthermore, by directing resources towards addressing the root causes of violence, society can begin to make long-term investments in the creation of a virtuous cycle of peace and economic prosperity.

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
Furthermore, by directing resources towards addressing the root causes of violence, society can begin to make long-term investments in the creation of a virtuous cycle of peace and economic prosperity.

GLOBAL VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT RESULTS & TRENDS

From 2013 to 2014, global violence containment expenditure increased marginally to its highest point since 2008. Currently, total violence containment expenditure, without taking into account the multiplier, totals US\$7.16 trillion. This represents both direct and indirect costs, which without increasing violence could be transferred to other more productive areas of economic activity. While a range of indicators have deteriorated since 2008, reflecting the deterioration in peace, the most marked increase has been in the costs associated with conflict.

FIGURE 34 DIRECT AND INDIRECT VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT BY CATEGORY 2014

Military spending accounts for almost 43.2 per cent of total violence containment expenditure, followed by crime and interpersonal violence at 28 per cent.



Source: IEP

Military expenditure is the largest single expense item, totalling 43.2 per cent of total violence containment expenditure. The United States is by far the major contributor of military expenditure, accounting for over US\$1.3 trillion alone, while China is the second largest contributor with US\$370 billion. Note the United States military expenditure mentioned here includes the full accounting of the consequences of US military spending, which not only encompasses the US Department of Defense, but also the maintenance of the nuclear arsenal, veteran affairs, and debt repayments on prior military-related borrowing. This amounts to the US spending US\$4,158 per capita on military expenditure while China spends US\$273. It should be noted that China's expenditure on the military is likely to be underestimated while the US figure is more comprehensively accounted for.

Homicide, the second largest component of violence containment expenditure, accounts for 14.4 per cent of total expenditure. The United States has the highest cost accounting for 15 per cent of global homicide costs. This is due to the high per capita income of the US combined with its large population. Other countries with higher homicide rates have a combination of lower per capita income and are less populous.

South America is the largest contributor to homicide costs by region and accounts for US\$250 billion. The majority of costs in South America are from Colombia and Brazil. While in recent years economic development has progressed significantly in both countries, crime rates have not experienced a corresponding decrease (which would normally

be seen with such increases in wealth and development). One of the main observations of these two countries is that while the overall size of their respective economies has increased, the level of progress in Positive Peace has not been commensurate. In particular, both Colombia and Brazil still hold high levels of inequities and corruption.

According to Colombia's Positive Peace factors, it has seen a slight deterioration in the indicators *equitable distribution of resources* and *low levels of corruption*. Levels of inequality represented by the Gini coefficient have increased while the perception of corruption has also increased since 2005. Secondary school attainment is also lower than its 2010 level, according to Colombia's national department of statistics (DANE). This highlights that priorities and resources which would normally have been devoted to development have been used to fight the civil war.


Costs associated with terrorism have increased by 89 per cent over the past year. The majority of these costs occurred in the MENA region, which accounts for 73 per cent of all terrorism-related costs. Iraq, the worst performing country in the 2014 Global Terrorism Index, had US\$19.6 billion worth of terrorism-related costs. Global terrorism costs are relatively low at only US\$32 billion. While they take into account the total cost of loss of life and direct damage to infrastructure, they do not take into account the indirect effect terrorist acts have on the economy. If they included the indirect costs associated with the economy the costs of terrorism would be substantially higher. Examples are decreased FDI, trade, tourism and growth. Due to the large variation in findings IEP, has not included this within the current model.

Internal security expenditure includes the costs of internal and private security, measuring the total value of government and private resources that are dedicated to the national police and private security presence. The accumulated internal security costs amount to one-fifth of total expenditure, totalling US\$1.2 trillion globally. The largest category is police forces, where China and the United States are the largest contributors to internal security expenditure. Their internal police forces cost approximately US\$127 and US\$93 billion respectively. Private security spending, which includes security guards, is also a large global expense, at US\$376 billion, and national security agency costs are very notable, at US\$117 billion.

Conflict related costs of deaths from internal and external conflict, costs relating to IDPs and refugees and GDP losses from conflict accumulate to US\$802 billion globally. The MENA region ranks as the largest contributor to conflict related losses, much of which is a result of the Syrian civil war and the broader spread of ISIL throughout the region.

“ Military expenditure is the largest single expense item, totalling 43.2 per cent of total violence containment expenditure. UN peacekeeping is one of the smallest, at only 0.17% of total violence containment.

FIGURE 35 COMPOSITION OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT, 2014 (\$US BILLION PPP 2014)




Source: IEP

TRENDS IN GLOBAL VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT EXPENDITURE 2008-2014

Since 2008, the total cost of violence containment expenditure has increased by 15.4 per cent, from US\$6.2 to over US\$7.16 trillion PPP. Large increases in violence costs have occurred in deaths from internal conflict, IDP and refugee related costs, UN peacekeeping costs and GDP losses from conflict. The only category which saw an improvement was deaths from external conflict, which reflects the drawing down of the US and Coalition partner involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

FIGURE 36 TREND IN VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF VIOLENCE

While all groups have shown a slight increase, costs associated with conflict have seen the largest increase of more than US\$500 billion PPP. While crime related costs have increased, this has mainly come from homicides, increasing US\$160 billion since 2008. Costs associated with violent crime have been fairly stagnant, increasing by US\$8 billion over the same time period.



Source: IEP

The largest area of increase in violence containment expenditure is GDP losses from conflict, which reflects the huge losses from conflict in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria. As a consequence, the number of refugees and IDPs is the highest since World War II. Related costs increased by 267 per cent to US\$92 billion since 2008. Deaths from internal

conflict have had the highest relative increase, at 387 per cent over 2008 levels. This has been triggered mainly by the sub-Saharan African and MENA regions, with large spikes seen in Yemen, Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Turkey. Syria accounted for 40 per cent of internal battle related costs in 2014.

TABLE 22 TREND IN VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT INDICATORS — PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL US\$ BILLIONS PPP, 2008–2014

GDP losses from conflict accounted for the largest increase in violence costs at 38 per cent of the total increase. The largest changes in violence containment expenses have been in deaths from internal conflict and losses from IDPs and refugees.

CATEGORY	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT INDICATOR	CHANGE 2008–2014	US\$ (BILLIONS) CHANGE 2014–2008
Conflict	Deaths from internal conflict	378%	\$31.89
Conflict	Losses from IDPs and refugees	267%	\$92.9
Conflict	UN peacekeeping	166%	\$7.67
Conflict	GDP losses from conflict	149%	\$360.97
Crime and interpersonal violence	Homicide	19%	\$161.28
Conflict	Terrorism	56%	\$11.40
Crime and interpersonal violence	Incarceration	9%	\$20.78
Internal security	Police services	9%	\$61.05
Internal security	Private security services	6%	\$22.07
Military	Global military expenditure	6%	\$176.34
Crime and interpersonal violence	Violent and sexual crime	1%	\$8.25
Crime and interpersonal violence	Fear from violence	0.4%	-\$0.10
Conflict	Deaths from external conflict	-69%	-\$1.61
TOTAL		15.4% INCREASE	\$954.85


Further, costs associated with homicide have increased by over US\$160 billion over the same time period.

Large decreases in homicides have occurred in European countries with the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Denmark recording decreases of over 30 per cent since 2008. These improvements have been countered by large increases in Latin America, Africa and Asia, reflecting a concerning trend of increased homicide costs in developing countries. Somewhat contrary to the increases in homicide costs are the costs associated with violent and sexual crime which have slightly increased globally. While data availability is limited, this model does account for underreporting rates in various sexual and violent crimes.

Violence containment costs by the state and the private sector to protect against violence have also risen and show a very similar trend to homicides and violent crime. This suggests a relationship where increases in violence not only result in increased direct and indirect costs associated with crime, but also increased expenditure on security to combat rising violence. This potentially means that funds are diverted away from more productive areas such as business development, infrastructure, health and education. As can be seen in figure 37, there is a positive relationship between the global homicide rate and total spending on police services expenditure.

FIGURE 37 POLICE SERVICES EXPENDITURE AND COST OF HOMICIDE, 2008 – 2014 (US\$ BILLION PPP)


The global economic cost of homicide has moved closely to the spending on police services. As violence increases, governments respond by increasing government spending on the police in order to combat increased crime levels in society.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 38 SYRIA'S GDP LOSSES DUE TO CONFLICT AND ESTIMATED GROWTH PATH IN THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT (IN US\$ BILLIONS PPP)

Estimates of Syria's losses due to conflict have been as much as 30 per cent of GDP. Prior to the onset of civil war Syria's GDP PPP averaged a growth rate of 6.6 per cent per annum since 2000. The estimated flow-on effects on GDP output has cost the economy US\$80 billion.



Source: IEP calculations based on IMF data

FIGURE 39 INCREASES IN HOMICIDE-RELATED COSTS COMPARED TO INCREASES IN GDP PPP, 2008-2014

Lower income countries have experienced a much higher percentage increase in the costs associated with homicide than the GDP growth rate. In contrast, OECD countries have had a decrease in homicide related costs relative to GDP growth.



Source: IEP

The countries that have seen the biggest proportional change in violence containment expenditure have had high levels of internal conflict. Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Iran, Syria, North Korea and Zimbabwe all have seen significant increases in violence containment expenditure as a per cent of their GDP between 2008 and 2014.

The two countries with the biggest change are Central African Republic and Syria. Their increased costs have been derived from four main areas: increased IDPs and refugees, deaths from internal conflict and GDP losses due to conflict and terrorism. If Syria had not experienced conflict and continued the same level of economic growth every year that it had seen

from 2003 to 2010, its economy would be at least US\$80 billion PPP larger than it is today.

Lower income countries have seen a much larger percentage increase in the costs associated with violence than they have shown in their GDP growth rate. For example, low income countries GDP grew 54 per cent since 2008 while costs associated with homicide more than doubled. Lower middle income countries also experienced an increase in homicide costs relative to GDP growth of 13 per cent. However, in contrast, upper middle and high income countries saw a reduction in homicide costs relative to GDP growth.

COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST COST OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT AS A PER CENT OF GDP

Excluding North Korea, the ten countries with the largest violence containment expenditure as a percentage of GDP are in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA. Seven of these countries are involved in some form of civil conflict, which has become a major driver of violence containment expenditure in recent years.

In Syria the major costs have stemmed from the civil war, which is now in its fifth year and has devastated the local economy. Large amounts of government expenditure are centered on military spending, and GDP losses from conflict and refugees and IDPs have all accumulated to extinguish a massive portion of Syria's output. UNHCR estimates that over 9.5 million people have been internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries as refugees and up to 30 per cent of Syria's physical capital has been destroyed as a result of the conflict, with international trade virtually halted. A recent paper published by the World Bank estimated that the cost of the war in Syria has totaled to over 38.3 per cent of per capita welfare⁶³, an economic valuation of living standards and prosperity of an individual or a group. This includes not only income but items such as health and education.

“ UNHCR estimates that over 9.5 million people have been internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries as refugees and up to 30 per cent of Syria's physical capital has been destroyed as a result of the conflict, with international trade virtually halted.

The majority of Central African Republic and Somalia's costs stem from IDPs and refugees and homicides. Refugee and IDP populations alone account for 40 per cent of CAR's violence containment expenditure due to almost 750,000 people being either internally displaced or holding refugee status in other countries. The same category represents 54 per cent of Somalia's total costs.

While Afghanistan too incurs large costs from IDPs and refugees and from terrorism, the largest component comes from military expenditure, accounting for 14 per cent of its GDP, totalling more than US\$8.5 billion.

TABLE 23 TEN COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST COST OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

RANK	COUNTRY	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT (% OF GDP)
1	Syria	42%
2	Afghanistan	31%
3	Iraq	30%
4	North Korea	26%
5	Zimbabwe	22%
6	Somalia	22%
7	Honduras	21%
8	Central African Republic	19%
9	Colombia	18%
10	El Salvador	17%

Source: IEP

The three Latin American countries holding the largest level of violence containment expenditure as a percentage of GDP are mainly derived from costs associated with homicide. Homicide-related costs account for 83 and 82 per cent of Honduras and El Salvador's violence containment expenditure, respectively. While homicides account for the greatest portion of Colombia's cost of violence, the ongoing internal conflict also contributes greatly. Costs associated with IDPs and refugees, GDP losses from internal conflict as well as deaths from internal conflict account for 40 per cent of Colombia's losses.

Iraq, like Syria, suffers its greatest losses from war-related costs. Losses to GDP from conflict are estimated to have cost Iraq almost US\$40 billion while military spending cost US\$36 billion.

COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST COST OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT EXPENDITURE

In absolute terms, the countries with the largest violence containment expenditure are the United States, China, Russia, India and Brazil. These countries account for 54 per cent of total violence containment expenditure while also accounting for 45 per cent of world GDP and 46 per cent of the world's population.

The United States is the greatest contributor to military expenditure, accounting for US\$1.3 trillion of the US\$3 trillion global figure by IEP's PPP-based calculations. While this is the greatest component of US costings, the United States also has substantial costs associated with homicides, fear from violence, deaths from external conflict and security agency costs. The high per capita income in the US and the large population combine to boost its absolute expenditure.

China and Russia have higher levels of expenditure on the military, internal security and costs associated with violent crime. China specifically is the world's largest contributor to police expenditure, spending US\$127 billion in 2014.

The highest contribution to violence containment in Brazil and Mexico is homicide, which accounts for 50 per cent of the total. As both countries have gained significant amounts of wealth in recent years, the relative costs associated with violent crime have increased. For Brazil, homicide costs have increased by 21 per cent since 2008 and almost by 50 per cent in Mexico for the same time period. The continuation of the drug war in Mexico has also led to increased GDP losses from conflict, military expenditure and deaths from internal conflict. On the positive side, the past two years have shown a decrease in the growth of violent crime in both countries. Based on the findings from the 2015 Mexico Peace Index, if the current trend of increasing peacefulness continues in Mexico then there is likely to be a decrease in the costs associated with homicides.

The major shifts in Europe have been in the United Kingdom and Germany, which have both shown a trend of decreasing violence containment expenditure in recent years. Germany has shown decreases in its level of military expenditure, while the

UK has shown large decreases in interpersonal violence and homicide-related costs.

Over 90 per cent of Saudi Arabia's costs stem from military expenditure and security related costs, while losses due to violence such as homicides, IDPs and refugees and deaths from conflict are relatively low, especially as Saudi Arabia has one of the highest GDP per capita costs globally. As Saudi Arabia is located in a hostile geographical location, their increased military expenditure is a key example of the indirect effects of violence.

TABLE 24 TEN COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST COST OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

RANK	COUNTRY	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT TOTAL (US\$ BILLIONS PPP)
1	United States	\$2,028
2	China	\$898
3	Russia	\$354
4	India	\$342
5	Brazil	\$255
6	Mexico	\$221
7	Germany	\$171
8	Saudi Arabia	\$165
9	Iraq	\$150
10	United Kingdom	\$140
TOTAL		\$4,723

Source: IEP

“Deaths from internal conflict have had the highest relative increase, at 378 per cent over 2008 levels.”

POSITIVE PEACE



WHAT IS POSITIVE PEACE?

NEGATIVE PEACE

... is the absence of violence or fear of violence

POSITIVE PEACE

... is the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies.

- Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. These same factors also lead to many other positive outcomes which society feels are important. Therefore Positive Peace is described as creating the optimum environment for human potential to flourish.
- Positive Peace has been empirically derived by IEP via the statistical analysis of thousands of cross-country measures of economic and social progress to determine what factors are statistically significantly associated with Negative Peace.
- Positive Peace is measured by the Positive Peace Index (PPI) which consists of eight domains, each containing three indicators, totalling 24. This provides a baseline measure of the effectiveness of a country's institutions and attitudes to build and maintain peace. It also provides a measure for policymakers, researchers and corporations to use for monitoring and evaluation efforts.
- Positive Peace factors can be used as the basis for empirically measuring a country's resilience, or ability to absorb and recover from shocks. It can also be used to measure fragility and to help predict the likelihood of conflict, violence and instability.
- There is a close relationship between Positive Peace and violence as measured by Negative Peace.

POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS

IEP's framework for Positive Peace is based on eight factors. The Positive Peace factors not only sustain peace but also support an environment where human potential flourishes. They interact in complex ways, are multidimensional and are generally slow moving.

THE PILLARS OF PEACE



Sound business environment



Good relations with neighbours



High levels of human capital



Acceptance of the rights of others



Low levels of corruption



Well functioning government



Free flow of information



Equitable distribution of resources

WHY POSITIVE PEACE IS TRANSFORMATIONAL

Humanity is facing challenges unparalleled in its history. The most urgent are global in nature, such as climate change, ever decreasing bio-diversity and natural resources, increasing migration and overpopulation. These global challenges call for global solutions and these solutions require cooperation on a scale unprecedented in human history. In a globalised world, the sources of many of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders. For this reason, finding solutions to these unprecedented challenges fundamentally requires new thinking.

Peace is an essential prerequisite; without peace it will not be possible to achieve the levels of cooperation, trust and inclusiveness necessary to solve our challenges, let alone empower the international institutions and organisations necessary to address them.

Without the appropriate measures and understanding of the factors that support peace, it is not possible to know what policies work and what programmes need to be implemented, when, how and where. Practically identifying what resources this effort requires is complex and calls for a shift to new ways of thinking about peace.

Positive Peace lies at the centre of understanding and addressing the multiple and complex challenges the world faces.

Positive Peace is transformational because it is a cross-cutting facilitator of progress, making it easier for individuals to produce, businesses to sell, entrepreneurs and scientists to innovate and governments to effectively regulate. Through better understanding what makes societies peaceful it may be possible to then replicate these attributes.

Understanding what creates sustainable peace cannot just be found in the study of violence.

A parallel can be drawn here with medical science. The study of pathology has led to numerous breakthroughs in our understanding of how to treat and cure disease. However, it was only when medical science turned its focus to the study of healthy human beings that we understood what we need to do to stay healthy: the correct physical exercise, a good mental disposition and a balanced diet. This could only be learnt by studying what was working. In the same way, the study of violence is fundamentally different than the study of peace.

Countries high in Positive Peace also tend to enjoy many other positive social and economic outcomes. Seen in this light, Positive Peace can be used as an overarching framework for understanding and achieving progress in many other areas of economic and social advancement, as demonstrated below.



DEFINING & MEASURING POSITIVE PEACE

Without better understanding how to conceptualise and measure the factors that support peace, it is not possible to know what policies work and what programmes need to be implemented. Practically identifying what resources are needed is complex and requires a new way of thinking about peace.

KEY FINDINGS

- The research presented in this report finds that Positive Peace builds capacity for resilience and the appropriate environment for nonviolent conflict resolution. The higher the level of Positive Peace, the higher the likelihood of compromise and nonviolent reconciliation of grievances.
- Where Positive Peace is stronger, development and other beneficial societal outcomes are more likely to be achieved.
- Positive Peace is statistically associated with many other desirable outcomes: stronger business environments, better performance on well-being measures, gender equality and better performance on ecological measures.
- The analysis finds that in countries with higher levels of Positive Peace, resistance movements are less likely to become violent and are more likely to successfully achieve concessions from the state.
- For countries experiencing major resistance campaigns, 91 per cent of all violent resistance campaigns have been waged in countries with weaker Positive Peace.
- Historically, nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to be successful than violent campaigns in achieving their goals.
- Countries with weaker Positive Peace lack restorative forces and as such are less resilient in the face of civil resistance. Movements tend to be larger, more violent, have more radical aims and continue for longer.
- Case study analysis shows that the post-conflict countries of Rwanda, Myanmar, Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia and Georgia have made notable improvements in Positive Peace scores between 2005 and 2015.

The analysis in this report is based on two simple but useful definitions of peace, both of which have a long history in peace studies – Negative Peace and Positive Peace. These two commonly referred to types of peace were defined by one of the founders of peace studies, Johan Galtung.

Negative Peace is the absence of violence or fear of violence – an intuitive definition that many agree with and that can be more easily measured than other definitions of peace. The definition of Negative Peace is used to construct the GPI, which is the main focus of this report. The 23 GPI indicators are broken into two main domains: external peace and internal peace. External peace measures how a country interacts with other countries beyond its borders while internal peace measures how peaceful it is within its borders.

A more ambitious conceptualisation of peace is Positive Peace, which the IEP defines as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. These same factors also create the underlying conditions to achieve outcomes that many in society find desirable. Positive Peace can therefore be understood as a process which underpins the optimal environment for human potential to flourish. The distinguishing feature of IEP's work on Positive Peace is that it has been empirically derived through statistical analysis. There are few known empirical frameworks available to analyse Positive Peace; historically it has largely been understood qualitatively and largely subject to value judgment.

In order to address this gap, IEP utilised several years of GPI data in combination with existing literature in peace and development studies to statistically analyse what can be learnt from the most peaceful countries in the GPI. The practical starting point for this research is simply, 'what do the most peaceful countries in the GPI have that those at the bottom don't have?' An important aspect of this approach is to derive these factors not through value judgement but by letting the statistical analysis, as best as possible, explain the key drivers of peace.

This section introduces new thinking and evidence about Positive Peace, is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. These same factors also lead to many other positive outcomes that support the optimum environment for human potential to flourish.

Understanding what prevents conflict and violence is one of the key challenges for policymakers and practitioners working in the fields of development and peacebuilding. It is equally critical for business, as the economic cost of violence is enormous. Even the small increases in violence and conflict recorded by the Global Peace Index (GPI) over the last eight years demonstrate how expensive this has been to the global economy. The uptick in violence since 2008 has destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars of economic opportunity and capital and has also come with a huge human and social cost.

The shift in global development circles to understanding fragility, resilience and peace is underscored by the potential inclusion of peace and governance in the Sustainable

Development Goals (SDG). This is especially important as the SDGs will replace the Millennium Development Goals after 2015. This reflects the growing recognition of the importance of identifying the drivers of peace. However, in spite of this, there is little prevailing guidance about how to conceptualise, measure and ultimately support the key factors that develop peace. The research presented in this report is aimed at helping to address this need.

Without better understanding how to conceptualise and measure the factors that support peace, it is not possible to know what policies work and what programmes need to be implemented, when, how and where. In addition, practically identifying what resources are needed is complex and requires a shift to a new way of thinking about what creates peace.

Positive Peace provides a framework for addressing many of these conceptual and empirical challenges. It can advance understanding about whether countries are moving towards peace and away from violent conflict and whether they are building resilience against future shocks or becoming resistant to societal change.

The attitudes, institutions, and structures, or Positive Peace factors, which build peace are complex, multidimensional, non-linear in their progress, hard to observe and multi-causal depending on their context.

This report identifies how systems thinking can be applied to Positive Peace, what other indicators of progress are empirically related to Positive Peace and how non-violence is closely related to the factors of Positive Peace.

Both Negative and Positive Peace can be seen as the producer and product of forms of societal trust and cohesion that are a pre-requisite for well-functioning and prosperous societies. Countries higher in Positive Peace also tend to have many other fundamentally positive social and economic outcomes. Seen in this light, Positive Peace can be used as an overarching framework for understanding and measuring progress in many other areas of economic and social advancement.

Furthermore, the Positive Peace framework presented here can be used to measure other development frameworks adopted by various multilateral organisations. Positive Peace can be used to better understand:

- **Resilience**
- **Fragility**
- **Institutional capacity and political economy**
- **Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals**
- **Other developmental outcomes**
- **Country risk**

POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS



Well-Functioning Government

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.



Sound Business Environment

The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector determine the soundness of the business environment. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries, as is the presence of regulatory systems which are conducive to business operation.



Equitable Distribution of Resources

Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources like education and health, as well as, although to a lesser extent, equity in income distribution.



Acceptance of the Rights of Others

A country's formal laws that guarantee basic human rights and freedoms and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens serve as proxies for the level of tolerance between different ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-economic groups within the country. Similarly, gender equality, worker's rights and freedom of speech are important components of societies that uphold acceptance of the rights of others.



Good Relations with Neighbours

Having peaceful relations with other countries is as important as good relations between groups inside a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have low levels of organised internal conflict. This is also beneficial for business and supports foreign direct investment, tourism and human capital inflows.



Free Flow of Information

Peaceful countries tend to have free and independent media that disseminates information in a way that leads to greater openness and helps individuals and civil society work together. This is reflected in the extent to which citizens can gain access to information, whether the media is free and independent and how well-informed citizens are. This leads to better decision-making and more rational responses in times of crisis.



High Levels of Human Capital

A skilled human capital base – reflected in the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge – improves economic productivity, care for the young, enables political participation and increases social capital. Education is a fundamental building block through which societies can build resilience and develop mechanisms to learn and adapt.



Low Levels of Corruption

In societies with high corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services. The resulting inequities can lead to civil unrest and in extreme situations can be the catalyst for more serious violence. Low corruption, by contrast, can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.

From this framework IEP has developed a composite measurement of Positive Peace, the Positive Peace Index (PPI), covering the same countries as the GPI. The methodology and indicators informing the PPI are detailed on page 89 and 90.

CHARACTERISTICS OF POSITIVE PEACE

IEP's framework for Positive Peace is based on eight factors, or pillars. The Positive Peace factors not only sustain peace but also support an environment where human potential flourishes. They interact in complex ways, are multidimensional and are generally slow moving. They can be best understood within the framework of systems thinking to understand the process of how people and institutions interact.

Change and influence occurs within this framework, with multiple factors evolving and moving dynamically and simultaneously. The outcome of these interactions is dependent on both the state of the system and the types of interactions. The same interactions can have very different outcomes depending on the state of the system.


These eight pillars were found to be associated with peaceful environments and are both interdependent and mutually reinforcing, such that improvements in one factor would tend to strengthen others and vice versa. Therefore, the relative strength of any one pillar has the potential to positively or negatively influence the others, thereby influencing overall levels of peacefulness.

Due to the interdependent nature of these factors, the weakening or strengthening of any one pillar will also weaken or strengthen the other pillars. A peaceful environment is therefore dependent on the strength of all pillars. This is analogous to a brick wall: take out one brick and the strength of the entire wall is materially impacted.

The Positive Peace framework described in this report does not aim to isolate causality, but rather to describe the optimal environment for peace to flourish. This means that long-term peacebuilding efforts should aim to enhance and build these pillars as much as possible, in addition to dealing with tactical issues such as containing or dealing with the consequences of violence.

FIGURE 40 THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

A visual representation of the factors comprising Positive Peace. All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in varied and complex ways.



“ The eight pillars were found to be associated with peaceful environments and are both interdependent and mutually reinforcing, such that improvements in one factor would tend to strengthen others and vice versa.

Positive Peace has the following characteristics:

- **Systemic and Complex**
It is complex; progress occurs in non-linear ways and can be better understood through systems thinking.
- **Preventative**
Though Positive Peace factors tends to move slowly overtime, by focusing on Positive Peace it can be possible to prevent violence and violent conflict.
- **Informal and Formal**
It includes both formal and informal factors. This implies that societal and attitudinal factors are equally important as state institutions.
- **Underpins Resilience and Non-Violence**
Positive Peace builds capacity for resilience and the possibility and incentives for nonviolent conflict resolution. It provides an empirical framework to measure an otherwise amorphous concept, resilience.
- **Virtuous or Vicious**
It can evolve in a cyclical process where negative feedback loops create vicious cycles of violence whereas positive feedback loops create virtuous cycles of peace.

POSITIVE PEACE AND SYSTEMS THINKING

A system at its most simplistic level can be understood as a collection of components which interact together to perform a function. An example of this may be the simple analogy of a forest which is comprised of individual components such as trees, grass, soil and fauna. Each of these individual components interact and share varying degrees of dependence with each other. The collection of the individual components and their interactions form the system and together, the interdependent system is more than the sum of the component parts.

When thinking of complex systems and how this idea pertains to conflict-affected or peaceful environments, it is not possible to simply isolate cause from effect because of the multitudinous ways in which different variables react to each other. Consider the example of an increase in the incidence and perception of corruption. This will undoubtedly have an effect on business, the functioning of government and the free flow of information. But changes in corruption may also be caused in part by negative or positive changes in the very same variables. Alternatively, consider restrictions on the free flow of information and its impact on financial transparency, thereby affecting business, the functioning of government and the ability for individuals to engage in corruption. It is not possible to say that when certain attributes reach a certain level we will see violence, but rather that when one variable deteriorates, others are likely to as well. Together, these dynamics cause community stress and grievances that can lead to violence.

When investigating the levels of violence or peace in a society, understanding society as a system can inform the understanding of interactions in many different ways. Systemic change can best be managed by understanding what are the most relevant actions that can be taken in a given context. All contexts are different; therefore a situational analysis is needed to best understand how to interact with the system. The practical goal is to use this information to define an action or set of actions and to then focus on key factors which can create a positive feedback loop to stimulate the whole system.

In the context of peace, the relationship between Positive and Negative Peace within a country is dependent on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each at any given time. If all eight Positive Peace factors are strong, they all become good predictors of levels of peace. The interaction between grievances and positive peace can be best understood at the micro, meso and macro levels.

For instance, a high Positive Peace environment would lower the potential for violence at the micro, meso and macro levels by:

- **High Positive Peace at the Micro Level**
Reduced potential for grievances to occur. Higher levels of equity, justice and fairness as well as trust.
- **High Positive Peace at the Meso Level**
More viable pathways for trusted non-violent resolution of grievances when and if they occur.
- **High Positive Peace at the Macro Level**
Resilient and adaptive system of social institutions that can address grievances and avoid escalation of large scale violence.

Conversely, violence can occur if Positive Peace is low within a country:

- **Low Positive Peace at the Micro Level**
Increased potential for grievances to occur. Lower levels of equity, justice, fairness and trust.
- **Low Positive Peace at the Meso Level**
Fewer viable alternatives to using violence to deal with grievances and conflict resolution.
- **Low Positive Peace at the Macro Level**
Weak social institutions unable to adapt and deal with sudden rise in grievances and difficulty avoiding escalation to large scale violence.

An example of this framework can be seen in the case of Tunisia in the lead up to the Arab Spring. The perceived unfairness of the treatment of Mohammed Bouazizi by officials created a serious number of micro-level grievances. Despite his

best efforts, Bouazizi could not address his numerous micro-level grievances at the meso level through institutions of the day, leading to his act of self-immolation.⁶⁴ This violent statement quickly resulted in broader instability and violence and subsequently spread across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where the macro-level structures were in many cases unable to deal with grievances and prevent violent escalations among the movements.

HOW QUICKLY DOES POSITIVE PEACE DEVELOP OR CHANGE?

Over the last decade Positive Peace has changed slowly within nearly all countries measured. There are however cases where the levels of Positive Peace can improve greatly in a relatively short period of time. For example, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia improved Positive Peace by between 17 and 25 per cent in the second half of the decade after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Furthermore, the global average for seven out of the eight Positive Peace factors have changed by at least 15 per cent within a five year timeframe, showing that notable change is possible.


Figure 41 highlights the largest changes in scores in the GPI and PPI since 2008. What is apparent from this graph is that there are far more countries that have experienced large deteriorations in Negative Peace than have had large improvements. Of all countries that had a change in GPI of greater than 10 per cent, approximately 80 per cent were deteriorations. This suggests that to be resilient and avoid deteriorations in peace a country must strengthen all of its Positive Peace factors, thereby creating the best way of successfully influencing the system.

The directions of the arrows are mostly left to right, showing changes in violence, whereas changes up or down, indicating movement in Positive Peace, are far less apparent.

Positive Peace indicators do not change at the same rate, with some changing much faster than others. *Acceptance of the rights of others* can deteriorate or improve up to 50 per cent within a five year period compared to *high levels of human capital* which sees only a maximum of 10 per cent improvement or deterioration in a five year period.

FIGURE 41 POSITIVE PEACE COMPARED TO NEGATIVE PEACE, 2008-2015; CHANGES IN PEACE OF GREATER THAN 10 PER CENT SINCE 2008 SHOWN BY ARROW

Negative Peace can deteriorate much faster than Positive Peace. It is also much easier for a country to deteriorate suddenly in its levels of violence whereas changes in positive peace are much slower.



Source: IEP

HOW IMPORTANT ARE INFORMAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS TO POSITIVE PEACE?

Having stable state institutions is clearly important to maintaining peace, with improvements in these institutions advancing Positive Peace. However, societal views and attitudes of how well these institutions function is also highly important for maintaining and supporting peace. Similarly, socially organised forms of cooperation and production can play an important role in supplanting formal institutions where they do not exist or are not properly functioning.

For example, having a police force that violently maintains the rule of law which results in low levels of crime does not mean that the community will trust or utilise the police force to assist with solving crimes. For a society to be peaceful, the community's perception of the police must also be positive. Trust within a community and of the police and judiciary are an important part of proper functioning governance and rule of law. Similarly, institutions may function well for a majority of a population but exclude different religious or ethnic minority groups and thus be the source of grievances which could be the source of future violent conflict.

In countries where capacity is lacking in formal institutions, informal processes may also fill the void. For instance, tribal justice and tribal courts are often more trusted by communities than what are seen as corrupt or insufficient national judicial systems. Many such informal institutions are ongoing or done in partnership with formal institutions.

Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the judicial system acknowledged the lack of capacity to deal with the large number of cases related to the genocide because of both the magnitude of cases and the deterioration of the system and loss of ranked officials. As such the government agreed to the setting up of traditional community Gacaca courts, or grassroots courts. While there are both positive and negative stories attached to these courts, they tackled as many as two million cases and are often heralded as one of the reasons Rwanda has not fallen into even deeper entrenched violence⁶⁵.

“ Positive Peace is a concept that not only involves how a society sustains peace within its own sphere of influence but also how it can deal with unforeseen shocks, such as economic crises, natural disasters or disease epidemics.

POSITIVE PEACE AND RESILIENCE

Positive Peace is a concept that not only involves how a society sustains peace within its own sphere of influence but also how it can deal with unforeseen shocks, such as economic crises, natural disasters or disease epidemics. In 2011, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) defined resilience as the ability of a country to quickly recover from or withstand and absorb the impact of a shock.⁶⁶

Resilient social systems have three broad characteristics:⁶⁷

1. Coping capacities

The ability of the system to cope with and overcome adversities or shocks.

2. Adaptive capacities

The ability to learn from past experiences and adjust for the future accordingly.

3. Transformative capacities

The ability to build institutions to foster individual and societal robustness.

IEP's Positive Peace framework explicitly includes factors that measure countries' adaptive and transformative capacities. For example, a country's adaptive capability is dependent on its ability to foster *high levels of human capital*, as measured through education levels and number of scientific publications. As countries and the world become more interconnected, *acceptance of the rights of others* also assists in this adaptive dimension. *Equitable distribution of resources* helps foster individual and societal robustness, which in turn enables a society to transform and improve with time.

VICIOUS AND VIRTUOUS CYCLES OF PEACE

The link between positive and negative peace is cyclical in that changes to one variable can result in knock-on effects to other variables which in turn interact with other variables thereby creating the cyclical effect. In a societal system there can be self-destructive phenomena termed “vicious cycles” and positive reinforcing cycles called “virtuous cycles”.

The relationship between Positive and Negative Peace can also be thought of in these terms. Figure 42 shows the stages of a virtuous peace cycle. Increasing investment in Positive Peace will lead to an improvement in one or more Positive Peace factors. Improvements in Positive Peace will also improve a country's resilience to external shocks. Stronger Positive Peace will decrease the level of violence within a society in two ways, firstly by removing the source of grievances that could generate violence and secondly by offering legitimate and effective nonviolent resolution avenues. This decrease in violence will lead to less capital being spent on violence containment, allowing for further investment in Positive Peace.

FIGURE 42 VIRTUOUS CYCLE OF POSITIVE PEACE

Example of positive feedback loop and transition to peace.





FIGURE 43 VICIOUS CYCLE OF POSITIVE PEACE

Example of negative feedback loop and transition to violence.



MEASURING POSITIVE PEACE THE POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The Positive Peace Index (PPI) measures the Positive Peace of 162 countries covering over 99 per cent of the world's population. Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies and provides the optimal environment for human potential to flourish. Positive Peace is conceptually similar to Negative Peace in that it is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be measured simply by one or two indicators. Hence, similar to the GPI, the PPI is composed of 24 indicators and can be disaggregated into eight domains.

The PPI is the only known globally based quantitative approach to defining and measuring Positive Peace. This work provides a foundation for researchers to deepen their understanding of the empirical relationships between peace, cultural factors, governance and economic development. It stands as one of the few holistic and quantitative based studies to isolate the positive factors which create and sustain peaceful societies.

In order to construct the PPI, 8,500 different indices, datasets and attitudinal surveys were analysed in conjunction with current thinking about the drivers of violent conflict, resilience and peacefulness. IEP takes a systems approach to peace, drawing on a range of recent research, in order to develop a holistic framework. IEP measures Positive Peace in eight domains by looking 24 indicators.

TABLE 25 DOMAINS AND INDICATORS OF POSITIVE PEACE

The 24 indicators used to construct the Positive Peace Index.

POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS	INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
Well functioning government	Government Effectiveness	Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies	World Bank
	Rule of Law	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence	World Bank
	Political Culture	Measures electoral process, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation and culture	EIU
Sound business environment	Ease of Doing Business	Measures of business regulations for local firms in 189 economies and selected cities at the subnational level	World Bank
	Economic Freedom	Measures individual's freedom to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by the state and unconstrained by the state	Heritage Foundation
	GDP per capita	GDP per capita	World Bank
Equitable distribution of resources	Life Expectancy Index Loss	The HDI Life Expectancy Index adjusted for inequality in distribution of expected length of life	UNDP
	Gini coefficient	Measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution	EIU
	Population living below \$2/day	Percentage of the population living on less than \$2.00 a day at 2005 international prices	World Bank
Acceptance of the rights of others	Intergroup Cohesion	Measures cooperation of identity groups within a society	ISS
	Empowerment Index	An additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators	CIRI
	Gender Inequality Index	Measures women's disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market	UNDP
Good relations with neighbours	Number of visitors	Number of visitors as % of domestic population	EIU
	Regional Integration	Extent of a nation's integration with other states	EIU
	Hostility to Foreigners	Measures social attitudes towards foreigners	EIU
Free flow of information	Freedom of the Press Index	Measures the level of freedom the press	Freedom House
	World Press Freedom Index	Measures the level of safety of foreign reporters	Reporters without borders
	Mobile phone subscriptions	Number of mobile phone subscriptions per 1,000 people	ITU
High levels of human capital	School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	Total enrolment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age	World Bank
	Youth Development Index	Measures the status of 15-29 year-olds across five key domains: Education, Health and Well-being, Employment, Civic Participation and Political Participation	IEP
	Scientific publications	Number of scientific publications per 100,000 people	World Bank, IEP calculation
Low levels of corruption	Control of Corruption	Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption	World Bank
	Factionalised Elites	Measures fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	Fund for Peace
	Perceptions of Corruption	Measures how corrupt public sectors are seen to be	Transparency International

POSITIVE PEACE & RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

One way in which Positive Peace provides the optimal environment for human potential to flourish is to help build resilience and to create an environment conducive for nonviolent alternatives for conflict resolution. This section explores the link between Positive Peace and whether civil resistance movements are violent or non-violent in attempting to address their grievances.

IEP found that countries with high levels of Positive Peace have the following characteristics of resilience and nonviolent conflict resolution:

- Countries with higher Positive Peace have historically had fewer civil resistance movements, whether violent or non-violent.
- Countries with weaker Positive Peace lack restorative forces and as such are less resilient in the face of civil resistance. Movements tend to be larger, more violent, have more radical aims and continue for longer.
- In comparing major resistance campaigns, 91 per cent of all primarily violent resistance campaigns have been waged in countries with weaker Positive Peace.
- In countries with high levels of Positive Peace, 51 per cent of campaigns have been primarily non-violent in nature. This compares to only 30 per cent of campaigns being non-violent in countries with weaker Positive Peace. In countries with weaker Positive Peace, violence is more intense.
- Positive Peace determines other characteristics of violent resistance campaigns. In high Positive Peace countries violent resistance campaigns tend to be smaller in size and scope, their propensity for violence is lower and they tend to be more successful.

TABLE 26 CHARACTERISTICS OF VIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS BY LEVELS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Violent civil resistance movements only occur in extreme circumstances in countries with stronger Positive Peace.

	WEAKER POSITIVE PEACE	STRONGER POSITIVE PEACE
GOAL OF THE CAMPAIGN	Goals are typically major structural or regime change	Goals are typically aimed at policy or in some circumstances territorial independence
SIZE	Weaker Positive Peace countries tend to have larger violent campaigns but smaller non-violent campaigns	Stronger Positive Peace countries tend to have smaller violent but larger non-violent campaigns
PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE	Tend to use violence more	More of a tendency for non-violence
PROGRESS	On average, violent and non-violent campaigns can achieve some gains but fall short of major concessions without regime change	Violent campaigns are less successful. Non-violent campaigns tend to achieve concessions
STATE RESPONSE	Repression occurs. In non-violent cases state repression aims to demobilise the movement	Repression of violent and non-violent campaigns tends to be condemned by domestic actors
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	State repression of non-violent campaigns is more likely to result in international condemnation and sanctions	There is generally stronger overt international support for the state. Diasporas living overseas tend to be more supportive to the campaign

Positive Peace translates into more opportunities for non-violent conflict resolution. Highly peaceful countries have strong institutions with low levels of corruption that offer such nonviolent alternatives. However, when governments are unresponsive, change may only be possible through campaigns and civil protests exerting political pressure.

The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project is a multi-level data collection effort that catalogues major violent and non-violent resistance campaigns around the world and has been compared to Positive Peace to determine the breakdown of conflicts by their Positive Peace profile.⁶⁸ The database only includes movements of more than 1,000 participants.⁶⁹ It should be noted that the majority of these resistance movements have been violent.

The nature of a resistance campaign is also influenced by the strength of Positive Peace. Table 26 lists the statistically significant differences between campaigns in countries with high and low levels of Positive Peace.⁷¹ Evidently, strong Positive Peace offers a number of coping mechanisms in times of crises. When Positive Peace is strong, civil resistance tends to be less violent. Violence, when it does occur in high Positive Peace contexts, tends to be carried out by smaller groups. Furthermore, civil movements in high Positive Peace countries tend to seek more incremental change and are more likely to be


supported by diasporas living abroad. In weaker Positive Peace countries, movements are more likely to seek significant structural or regime change. Where Positive Peace is strong, violence is far less effective at achieving concessions from the state than nonviolence. While the same is true in low Positive Peace countries, the difference is not as pronounced.

“ Where Positive Peace is strong, violence is far less effective at achieving concessions from the state than nonviolence.

Therefore when Positive Peace in a country is strong, the social and structural system itself is less likely to generate large violent movements, which in turn increases stability. The system rewards and therefore incentivises non-violence more than is the case when Positive Peace is low, evidenced by the relative success of non-violent campaigns. In addition, other coping mechanisms come into play as well when Positive Peace is strong. The state itself is more likely to have the support of the international community in times of civil resistance.

FIGURE 44 PREVALENCE AND NATURE OF RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

Between 1945 and 2006, 91 per cent of violent resistance campaigns have occurred in countries with weaker Positive Peace. The proportion of resistance movements that are non-violent is higher in countries with stronger Positive Peace.⁷⁰



Source: University of Denver, IEP

This comparison demonstrates that strong Positive Peace brings with it incentives for both the state and movements to use non-violent strategies. These incentives are not present in low Positive Peace countries. However, an element of resilience is the ability to overcome adversities when they do occur. To highlight this, figure 45 shows the distribution of violent movements in countries of high and low Positive Peace. From this it can be seen that violent movements last three years less on average in countries with strong Positive Peace.

FIGURE 45 DURATION OF VIOLENT CIVIL MOVEMENTS AND POSITIVE PEACE

For countries high in Positive Peace resistance movements which are violent last three to four years less than in countries with Low Positive Peace. In low Positive Peace environments many violent campaigns last more than 10 years.



Source: IEP

POSITIVE PEACE & THE CLOSE LINK TO OTHER DEVELOPMENT GOALS

To determine how Positive Peace is associated with developmental outcomes other than peace, the PPI was compared to a large range of developmental variables. It was found that many developmental factors, as demonstrated in the figure below, are closely correlated and empirically linked to Positive Peace.



TABLE 27 CORRELATION WITH COMMON DEVELOPMENT GOALS

There are many strong correlations between global measurements of development and the PPI or subsets of the PPI.⁷²

SOURCE	INDEX	INDICATOR	PPI CORRELATION	SUBSET CORRELATION
Economist Intelligence Unit	Global Food Security Index	Overall score	-0.93	—
The Social Progress Imperative	Social Progress Index	Foundations of wellbeing	-0.83	-0.81
World Economic Forum	Global Competitiveness Report	Business sophistication	-0.79	-0.76
World Economic Forum	Global Competitiveness Report	Business impact of tuberculosis	-0.79	—
International Institute of Social Sciences	Indices of Social Development	Gender equality	-0.7	-0.69
Yale	Environmental Performance Index	Overall score	-0.7	—
Sustainable Development Solutions Network	World Happiness Index	Overall score	-0.67	—
The Social Progress Imperative	Social Progress Index	Rural versus urban access to improved water source	-0.64	—

Table 28 continued.


Millennium Development Goals	—	Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities, urban	-0.62	—
Millennium Development Goals	—	Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, urban	-0.58	—
Millennium Development Goals	—	Employment-to-population ratio, women, percentage	-0.57	-0.57
World Gallup Poll	—	Business will do well (% responding Yes)	0.53	0.53
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor	—	Total entrepreneurial activity	0.57	0.57
OECD	Better Life Index	Overall score	0.88	—

Positive Peace is also associated with many aspects that are priorities for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as a strong economic growth and employment, environmental sustainability, greater food security, gender empowerment and development objectives such as improving access to water and energy resources. Simply, Positive Peace, as measured by the Positive Peace Index, correlates with many other measures of progress. Figure 46 shows that countries with stronger Positive Peace have progressed further in their achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, Table 28 maps the eight Positive Peace factors to the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), highlighting the ongoing importance of Positive Peace in the post 2015 debate.

FIGURE 46

POSITIVE PEACE AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Higher levels of Positive Peace correlates with the achievement of a country's Millennium Development Goals.



Source: Centre for Global Development, IEP

TABLE 28 POSITIVE PEACE AND POST 2015 DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Positive Peace factors measured by IEP cover all of the proposed Sustainable Development Goals as well the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals.

GOALS	ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS	EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES	FREEFLOW OF INFORMATION	GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS	HIGH LEVEL OF HUMAN CAPITAL	LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION	SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT
End poverty in all its forms everywhere		✓						
End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture		✓			✓		✓	
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	✓	✓			✓			✓
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	✓	✓			✓			✓
Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	✓				✓			✓
Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all		✓			✓			✓
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all				✓	✓		✓	
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation					✓		✓	
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development					✓			✓
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns					✓			✓
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt					✓			✓
Reduce inequality within and among countries	✓	✓						✓
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts					✓			✓
Economic foundations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Justice	✓				✓	✓		✓
Legitimate politics	✓		✓			✓		✓
Revenues and services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Security	✓			✓				✓

SDGs

PSGs


FIVE POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

WITH LARGEST POSITIVE PEACE IMPROVEMENTS 2005-2015

As countries progress through and out of conflict, their institutions can either strengthen or impede their successful transition to a peaceful society. Five countries that have recently experienced conflict — Rwanda, Myanmar, Cote d’Ivoire, Georgia and Indonesia — have all made notable improvements in their Positive Peace scores. The Positive Peace factors for each of these countries is set out below, highlighting how each of the countries has performed for all of the factors compared to the global averages. For all factors other than acceptance of the rights of others, the majority of these five countries have shown improvements at a faster rate than the global average.

FIGURE 47 CHANGE IN POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS: RWANDA COMPARED TO THE GLOBAL AVERAGE, 2005-2015



Rwanda has shown significant progress at faster rates than global average improvement in six of the Positive Peace factors between 2005 and 2015 and has not recorded a deterioration in any factors.



Source: IEP



FIGURE 48 CHANGE IN POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS: GEORGIA, MYANMAR, COMPARED TO THE GLOBAL AVERAGE, 2005–2015

- 1 Low levels of corruption
- 2 High levels of human capital
- 3 Free flow of information
- 4 Good relations with neighbours
- 5 Acceptance of the rights of others
- 6 Equitable distribution of resources
- 7 Sound business environment
- 8 Well-functioning government



Georgia has experienced faster rates of improvement than the global average in four of the eight Positive Peace factors.

Myanmar has shown significant progress with four of the eight Positive Peace factors increasing faster than the global average.



Indonesia has made more improvement than the global average in seven of the eight the Positive Peace factors.

Cote d'Ivoire has shown significant progress at faster rates than global average improvement in four of the Positive Peace factors.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A

GPI METHODOLOGY

MEASURING THE STATE OF PEACE Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony achieved by the absence of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative Peace. Negative Peace is a compliment to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. The Global Peace Index measures a country's level of Negative Peace using three domains of peacefulness.

The first domain, ongoing domestic and international conflict, investigates the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and duration of involvement in conflicts.

The second domain evaluates the level of harmony or discord within a nation; ten indicators broadly assess what might be described as societal safety and security. The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a stable political scene and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or made refugees can be equated with peacefulness.

Seven further indicators are related to a country's militarisation –reflecting the link between a country's level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per head are gauged, as are financial contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

THE RESEARCH TEAM

The GPI was founded by Steve Killelea, an Australian technology entrepreneur and philanthropist. It is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, a global think tank dedicated to building a greater understanding of the relationship between economics, business and peace. The GPI is collated and calculated by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which has also contributed to some sections of this report, including the regional analysis and the risers and fallers. An international panel of independent experts played a key role in establishing the GPI in 2007—in selecting the indicators that best assess a nation's level of peace and in assigning their weightings. The panel has overseen each edition of the GPI; this year, it included:

Professor Kevin P. Clements, chairperson

Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and director, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

Dr Sabina Alkire

Director, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Dr Ian Anthony

Director a.i., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden

Mr Vasu Gounden

Founder and Executive Director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban, South Africa

Mr Nick Grono

CEO, Freedom Fund, London, United Kingdom

Dr Manuela Mesa

Director, Centre for Education and Peace Research (CEIPAZ) and president, Spanish Association for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Madrid, Spain

Dr Ekaterina Stepanova

Head, Unit on Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

THE INDICATORS

The GPI comprises 23 indicators of the existence of violence or fear of violence. The indicators were originally selected with the assistance of an international panel of independent experts in 2007 and have been reviewed by the expert panel on an annual basis. In the 2015 edition of the index two new indicators have been introduced: number and duration of internal conflicts and number, duration and role in external conflicts (which replace number of external and internal conflicts fought). These indicators, produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, improve the methodological structure of the index by distinguishing between domestic and international conflict and adding a degree of complexity to the scoring (see full explanation in Annex B). All scores for each indicator are normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones are either banded into ten groupings or rounded to the first decimal point. The Economist Intelligence Unit's team of country analysts has scored seven of the eight qualitative indicators and also provided estimates where there have been gaps in the quantitative data. A detailed explanation of the scoring criteria used for each indicator is supplied in Annex B.

Political instability

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Political Terror Scale

Qualitative assessment of Amnesty International and US State Department yearly reports

Impact of terrorism

IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)

Number of homicides per 100,000 people

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates

Level of violent crime

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Likelihood of violent demonstrations

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Number of jailed population per 100,000 people

World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex

Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people

UNODC; EIU estimates



ONGOING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Number and duration of internal conflicts

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)

Number of deaths from organised conflict (external)

UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset

Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD)

Number, duration and role in external conflicts

UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP

Intensity of organised internal conflict

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Relations with neighbouring countries

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts



SOCIETAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

Level of perceived criminality in society

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population

Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)



MILITARISATION

Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP

The Military Balance, IISS

Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people

The Military Balance, IISS

Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database

Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions

United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP

Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities

The Military Balance, IISS; SIPRI; UN Register of Conventional Arms; IEP

Ease of access to small arms and light weapons

Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

WEIGHTING THE INDEX

When the GPI was launched in 2007 the advisory panel of independent experts apportioned scores based on the relative importance of each of the indicators on a scale 1-5. Two sub-component weighted indices were then calculated from the GPI group of indicators:

- 1) A measure of how at peace internally a country is;
- 2) A measure of how at peace externally a country is (its state of peace beyond its borders).

The overall composite score and index was then formulated by applying a weight of 60 percent to the measure of internal peace and 40 percent for external peace. The heavier weight applied to internal peace was agreed upon by the advisory panel, following robust debate. The decision was based on the innovative notion that a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict. The weights have been reviewed by the advisory panel prior to the compilation of each edition of the GPI.

QUALITATIVE SCORING: THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPROACH

The EIU's Country Analysis team plays an important role in producing the GPI by scoring seven qualitative indicators and filling in data gaps on quantitative indicators when official data is missing. The EIU employs more than 100 full-time country experts and economists, supported by 650 in-country contributors. Analysts generally focus on two or three countries and, in conjunction with local contributors, develop a deep knowledge of a nation's political scene, the performance of its economy and the society in general. Scoring follows a strict process to ensure reliability, consistency and comparability:

- 1) Individual country analysts score qualitative indicators based on a scoring methodology and using a digital platform;
- 2) Regional directors use the digital platform to check scores across the region; through the platform they can see how individual countries fare against each other and evaluate qualitative assessments behind proposed score revisions;
- 3) Indicator scores are checked by the EIU's Custom Research team (which has responsibility for the GPI) to ensure global comparability;
- 4) If an indicator score is found to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a judgment on the score;

- 5) Scores are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalising the GPI;

- 6) If the advisory panel finds an indicator score to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a final judgment on the score, which is then discussed in turn with the advisory panel.

Because of the large scope of the GPI, occasionally data for quantitative indicators do not extend to all nations. In this case, country analysts are asked to suggest an alternative data source or provide an estimate to fill any gap. This score is checked by Regional Directors to ensure reliability and consistency within the region, and by the Custom Research team to ensure global comparability. Again, indicators are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalisation.

TABLE 29 INDICATOR WEIGHTS
Internal Peace 60% / External Peace 40%

INTERNAL PEACE (WEIGHT 1 TO 5)

Perceptions of criminality	3
Security officers and police rate	3
Homicide rate	4
Incarceration rate	3
Access to small arms	3
Intensity of internal conflict	5
Violent demonstrations	3
Violent crime	4
Political instability	4
Political Terror	4
Weapons imports	2
Terrorism impact	2
Deaths from internal conflict	5
Internal conflicts fought	2.56

EXTERNAL PEACE (WEIGHT 1 TO 5)

Military expenditure (% GDP)	2
Armed services personnel rate	2
UN peacekeeping funding	2
Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	3
Weapons exports	3
Refugees and IDPs	4
Neighbouring countries relations	5
Number, duration and role in external conflicts	2.28
Deaths from external conflict	5
Weapons imports	2
Terrorism impact	2
Deaths from internal conflict	5
Internal conflicts fought	2.56

ANNEX B

GPI INDICATOR SOURCES, DEFINITIONS AND SCORING CRITERIA

The information below details the sources, definitions, and scoring criteria of the 23 indicators that form the Global Peace Index. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised either on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones are either banded into ten groupings or rounded to the first decimal point. The Economist Intelligence Unit has provided imputed estimates in the rare event there are gaps in the quantitative data.

INTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

LEVEL OF PERCEIVED CRIMINALITY IN SOCIETY

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	4%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = **Very low:** The majority of other citizens can be trusted; very low levels of domestic security.
- 2 = **Low:** An overall positive climate of trust with other citizens.
- 3 = **Moderate:** Reasonable degree of trust in other citizens.
- 4 = **High:** High levels of distrust in other citizens; high levels of domestic security.
- 5 = **Very high:** Very high levels of distrust in other citizens; people are extremely cautious in their dealings with others; large number of gated communities, high prevalence of security guards.

NUMBER OF INTERNAL SECURITY OFFICERS AND POLICE PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	4%
Data Source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 2013
Measurement period	2012

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

Definition: This indicator is sourced from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and refers to the civil police force. Police means personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. It is distinct from national guards or local militia.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-199.8	199.9-399.8	399.9-599.8	599.9-799.8	> 799.9

NUMBER OF HOMICIDES PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	4
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	5.3%
Data Source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 2013
Measurement period	2012

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

- Afghanistan
- Djibouti
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Iraq
- Kenya
- Liberia
- Malawi
- Mauritania
- Mozambique
- Niger
- North Korea
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Turkmenistan

Definition: This indicator comes from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide. The figures refer to the total number of penal code offences or their equivalent, but exclude minor road traffic and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-1.99	2-5.99	6-9.99	10-19.99	> 20

Additional Notes: The scores for the listed countries have been smoothed following an update of UNODC data:

NUMBER OF JAILED POPULATION PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	4.0%
Data Source	International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex, World Prison Brief
Measurement period	2004-14, depending upon data availability

Definition: Figures are from the International Centre for Prison Studies, and are compiled from a variety of sources. In almost all cases the original source is the national prison administration of the country concerned, or else the Ministry responsible for the prison administration. Prison population rates per 100,000 people are based on estimates of the national population. In order to compare prison population rates, and to estimate the number of persons held in prison in the countries for which information is not available, median rates have been used by the International Centre for Prison Studies to minimise the effect of countries with rates that are untypically high or low. Indeed, comparability can be compromised by different practice in different countries, for example with regard to pre-trial detainees and juveniles, but also psychiatrically ill offenders and offenders being detained for treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.

Scoring Bands

1/5	1.5/5	2/5	2.5/5	3/5
0-109.74	109.75-199.4	199.5-289.24	289.25-378.9	379.0-468.74
3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5	
468.75-558.4	558.5- 648.24	648.25-737.9	> 738	

Additional Notes: The data provided by World Prison Briefs are not annual averages but indicate the number of jailed population per 100,000 inhabitants in a particular month during the year. The year and month may differ from country to country.

EASE OF ACCESS TO SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	4.0%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the accessibility of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ranked from 1-5 (very limited access to very easy access) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period from March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Very limited access:** The country has developed policy instruments and best practices, such as firearm licences, strengthening of export controls, codes of conduct, firearms or ammunition marking.

2 = Limited access: The regulation implies that it is difficult, time-consuming and costly to obtain firearms; domestic firearms regulation also reduces the ease with which legal arms are diverted to illicit markets.

3 = Moderate access: There are regulations and commitment to ensure controls on civilian possession of firearms, although inadequate controls are not sufficient to stem the flow of illegal weapons.

4 = Easy access: There are basic regulations, but they are not effectively enforced; obtaining firearms is straightforward.

5 = Very easy access: There is no regulation of civilian possession, ownership, storage, carriage and use of firearms.

INTENSITY OF ORGANISED INTERNAL CONFLICT

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	5
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	6.7%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of conflicts within the country, ranked from 1-5 (no conflict to severe crisis) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

1 = No conflict.

2 = Latent conflict: Positional differences over definable values of national importance.

3 = Manifest conflict: Explicit threats of violence; imposition of economic sanctions by other countries.

4 = Crisis: A tense situation across most of the country; at least one group uses violent force in sporadic incidents.

5 = Severe crisis: Civil war; violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organised and systematic way throughout the country.

LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	3

Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	4.0%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the likelihood of violent demonstrations ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on the question, "Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for March 2014 - March 2015 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Scoring Criteria

"Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?"

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

LEVEL OF VIOLENT CRIME

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	4
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	5.3%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the likelihood of violent crime ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team based on the question, "Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for March 2014 - March 2015 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Scoring Criteria

"Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?"

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	4
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	5.3%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for March 2014–March 2015 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Specific Questions:

- What is the risk of significant social unrest during the next two years?
- How clear, established and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?
- How likely is it that an opposition party or group will come to power and cause a significant deterioration in business operating conditions?
- Is excessive power concentrated or likely to be concentrated in the executive so that executive authority lacks accountability and possesses excessive discretion?
- Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively affect the economy and/or polity?

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–20.4	20.5–40.4	40.5–60.4	60.5–80.4	80.5–100

POLITICAL TERROR SCALE

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	4
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	5.3%
Data Source	Gibney, M., Cornett, L. & Wood, R. (2011): Political Terror Scale 1976-2013
Measurement period	2013

Definition: The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a

given year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- 3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- 5 = Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

VOLUME OF TRANSFERS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AS RECIPIENT (IMPORTS) PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	2.7%
Data Source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; EIU
Measurement period	2009-2013

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons imported by a country between 2009 and 2013, divided by the average population in this time period at the 100,000 people level (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for their production. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, engines.

Scoring Bands

1/5	1.5/5	2/5	2.5/5	3/5
0-7.596	7.597 – 15.192	15.193 – 22.788	22.789 – 30.384	30.385 – 37.980

3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5
37.981 – 45.576	45.577 – 53.172	53.173 – 60.768	> 60.769

IMPACT OF TERRORISM

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	2.7%
Data Source	IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
Measurement period	1 Jan 2004 to 31 Dec 2014

Definition: Terrorist incidents are defined as “intentional acts of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

- A** The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- B** The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence, including property violence as well as violence against people.
- C** The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

For all incidents listed, at least two of the following three criteria must be present:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Methodology: Using the comprehensive, event-based Global Terrorism Database, the GTI combines four variables to develop a composite score: the number of terrorist incidents in a given year, the total number of fatalities in a given year, the total number of injuries caused in a given year and the approximate level of property damage in a given year. The composite score captures the direct effects of terrorist-related violence, in terms of its physical effect, but also attempts to reflect the residual effects of terrorism in terms of emotional wounds and fear by attributing a

weighted average to the damage inflicted in previous years. As of the date of publication, the Global Terrorism Database only logs events up to 31 Dec 2013. To assess the impact of terrorism between this date and 15 March 2015 GPI cutoff, IEP uses data from publicly available third party sources to impute terrorist activity in that period.

Scoring Bands

1/5	1.5/5	2/5	2.5/5	3/5
0-3.39	3.37-11.36	11.36-38.30	38.30-129.1	129.11 – 435.21

3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5
435.21 – 1,467.03	1,467.03 – 4,945.15	4,945.15 – 16,669.41	>16,669.41

NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM ORGANISED CONFLICT (INTERNAL)

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	5
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	6.7%
Data Source	International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD)
Measurement period	2013-2014

Alternative Source: EIU. When no data was provided by the IISS ACD, then EIU analysts have scored the figures available for 2013 and 2014 according to the set bands of the actual data.

Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP’s definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” Statistics are compiled from the most recent edition of the IISS ACD, which has the following definition of armed conflict-related fatalities: ‘Fatality statistics relate to military and civilian lives lost as a direct result of an armed conflict’.

The figures relate to the country which is the main area of conflict. For some conflicts no reliable statistics are available. Estimates of war fatalities vary according to source, sometimes by a wide margin. In compiling data on fatalities, the IISS has used its best estimates and takes full responsibility for these figures. Some overall fatality figures have been revised in light of new information. Changes in fatality figures may therefore occur as a result of such revisions as well as because of increased fatalities. Fatality figures for terrorism may include deaths inflicted by the government forces in counter-terrorism operations.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–23 deaths	24–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

NUMBER AND DURATION OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2.56
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	3.2%
Data Sources	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset
Measurement period	2009–2013

Definition: This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts which have occurred within that country's legal boundaries over the last five years.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:

Number:

- Number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed conflict (civil conflicts), internationalised internal armed conflicts, one-sided conflict and non-state conflict located within a country's legal boundaries.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25–999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

The cumulative conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score. This indicator is two years lagging due to when the UCDP data is released.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No internal conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 4.75	Combined conflict score of up to 9.5	Combined conflict score of up to 14.25	A combined conflict score of 19 or above. This shows very high levels of internal conflict

EXTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	2.6%
Data Source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015
Measurement period	2013–2014

Alternative Source: When no data was provided, several alternative sources were used: National Public Expenditure Accounts, SIPRI information and the Military Balance 2013. Alternative data are from 2007 to 2013, depending upon data availability.

Definition: Cash outlays of central or federal government to meet the costs of national armed forces—including strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces as well as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force. Published EIU data on nominal GDP (or the World Bank when unavailable) was used to arrive at the value of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

Scoring Criteria: This indicator is scored using a min-max normalisation. Applying this method, a country's score is based on the distance of its military expenditure as a share of GDP from the benchmarks of 0% (for a score of 1) and 12.97% or above (for a score of 5). The bands, while linear, approximately conform as follows:

1/5	Between 0–3.11 %
2/5	Between 3.12–6.39 %
3/5	Between 6.4–9.67 %
4/5	Between 9.68–12.96 %
5/5	>12.97 %

NUMBER OF ARMED SERVICES PERSONNEL PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	2.6%
Data Source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015
Measurement period	2014

Alternative Source: World Bank population data used if unavailable from the EIU.

Definition: Active armed services personnel comprise all service men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy, air force and joint forces (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves). Population data provided by the EIU.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-660.94	660.95 - 1,311.90	1,311.91 - 1,962.85	1,962.86 - 2,613.81	2,613.82 - 3,264.76
3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5	
3,264.77 - 3,915.72	3,915.73 - 4,566.67	4,566.68 - 5,217.63	>5,217.64	

Additional Notes: The Israeli reservist force is used to calculate Israel's number of armed services personnel.

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	2.6%
Data Source	IEP; United Nations Committee on Contributions
Measurement period	2011-2013

Methodology: The UNFU indicator measures whether UN member countries meet their UN peacekeeping funding commitments. Although countries may fund other programs in development or peacebuilding, the records on peacekeeping are easy to obtain and understand and provide an instructive measure of a country's commitment to peace. The indicator calculates the percentage of countries' "outstanding payments versus their annual assessment to the budget of the current peacekeeping missions" over an average of three years. This ratio is derived from data provided by the United Nations Committee on Contributions Status reports. The indicator is compiled as follows:

1. The status of contributions by UN Member States is obtained.
2. For the relevant peacekeeping missions, the assessments (for that year only) and the collections (for that year only) are recorded. From this, the outstanding amount is calculated for that year.
3. The ratio of outstanding payments to assessments is calculated. By doing so a score between 0 and 1 is obtained. Zero indicates no money is owed; a country has met their funding commitments. A score of 1 indicates

that a country has not paid any of their assessed contributions. Given that the scores already fall between 0 and 1, they are easily banded into a score between 1 and 5. The final banded score is a weighted sum of the current year and the previous two years. The weightings are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 for the previous year and 0.2 for two years prior. Hence it is a three year weighted average.

5. Outstanding payments from previous years and credits are not included. The scoring is linear to one decimal place.

Scoring Criteria

1/5	0-25% of stated contributions owed
2/5	26-50% of stated contributions owed
3/5	51-75% of stated contributions owed
4/5	75-99% of stated contributions owed
5/5	100% of stated contributions owed (no contributions made in past three years)

Additional Notes: All United Nations Member States share the costs of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Due to delays in the release of new data, the 2013 indicator scores take into account a 2008, 2009, and 2010 weighted average.

NUCLEAR AND HEAVY WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	3.9%
Data Source	IEP; SIPRI; IISS The Military Balance; United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Measurement period	2013

Methodology: This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

There are five categories of weapons, each of which receive a certain number of weighted points. The five weapons categories are weighted as follows:

1. Armoured vehicle and artillery pieces = 1 point
2. Tank = 5 points
3. Combat aircraft and combat helicopter = 20 points
4. Warship = 100 points
5. Aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine = 1000 points

Countries with nuclear capabilities automatically receive the maximum score of five. Other scores are expressed to the second decimal point, adopting a min-max normalisation that sets the max at two standard deviations above the average raw score. Nuclear-weapon equipped states are determined by the SIPRI World Nuclear Forces chapter in the SIPRI Yearbook, as follows:

1/5	Nil-18,185
2/5	18,185-36,368
3/5	36,368-54,553
4/5	54,553-72,737
5/5	States with nuclear capability receive a 5, or states with heavy weapons capability of 72,738 or in the top 2% of heavy weapons receive a 5.

Additional Notes: This indicator methodology was changed in 2013 to remove the population denominator and include nuclear weapon equipped states.

VOLUME OF TRANSFERS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AS SUPPLIER (EXPORTS) PER 100,000 PEOPLE

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	3
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	3.9%
Data Source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2009-2013

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons exported by a country between 2009 and 2013 divided by the average population during this time period (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for the production of them. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships and engines.

Scoring Bands

1/5	1.5/5	2/5	2.5/5	3/5
0-2.972	2.973 - 5.944	5.945 - 8.917	8.918 - 11.890	11.891 - 14.863
3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5	
14.864 - 17.835	17.836 - 20.808	20.809 - 23.781	> 23.782	

NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	4
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	5.2%
Data Source	UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2014
Measurement period	2014

Definition: Refugee population by country or territory of origin plus the number of a country's internally displaced people (IDPs), as a percentage of the country's total population.

Scoring Bands

1/5	1.5/5	2/5	2.5/5	3/5
0-1.50	1.51-3.02	3.03-4.54	4.55-6.06	6.07-7.58
3.5/5	4/5	4.5/5	5/5	
7.59-9.10	9.11-10.62	10.63-12.14	> 12.15	

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Indicator Type	Qualitative
Indicator Weight	5
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	6.5%
Data Source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2014 to 15 March 2015

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of contentiousness of neighbours, ranked from 1-5 (peaceful to very aggressive) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria

- 1 = **Peaceful:** None of the neighbours has attacked the country since 1950.

- 2 = **Low:** The relationship with neighbours is generally good, but aggressiveness is manifest in politicians' speeches or in protectionist measures.

- 3 = **Moderate:** There are serious tensions and consequent economic and diplomatic restrictions from other countries.

- 4 = **Aggressive:** Open conflicts with violence and protests.

- 5 = **Very aggressive:** Frequent invasions by neighbouring countries.

NUMBER, DURATION AND ROLE IN EXTERNAL CONFLICTS

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	2.28
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	3.2%
Data Source	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2009-2013

Definition: This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:

Number:

- Number of internationalised internal armed conflicts and interstate armed conflicts.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999 battle related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

Role:

- If the country is a primary party to the conflict, that conflict receives a score of one; if it is a secondary party (supporting the primary party), that conflict receives a score of 0.25.

- If a country is a party to a force covered by a relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution, then the entire conflict score is multiplied by a quarter; if not, it receives a full score.

The different conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score. This indicator is two years lagging due to when the UCDP data is released.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No external conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 1.5	Combined conflict score of up to 3	Combined conflict score of up to 4.5	A combined conflict score of 6 or above. This shows very high levels of external conflict

NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM ORGANISED CONFLICT (EXTERNAL)

Indicator Type	Quantitative
Indicator Weight	5
Indicator Weight (% of total Index)	6.5%
Data Source	UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset
Measurement period	2013-2014

Alternate Source: When no data was provided, several alternative sources have been used: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database; the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, and the EIU.

Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year".

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-23 deaths	24-998 deaths	999-4,998 deaths	4,999-9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

ANNEX C

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT COSTS BY COUNTRY

TABLE 30 DIRECT VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT COSTS / TOTAL US\$ PER COUNTRY, PER PERSON AND PERCENTAGE OF GDP / ALL COUNTRIES IN THE GPI (US\$, 2014 PPP)

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	TOTAL COSTS IN US\$ 2013 (MILLIONS PPP)	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT COSTS PER PERSON (US\$ 2014 PPP)	% OF GDP
1	Syria	\$57,331	\$2,509	42%
2	Afghanistan	\$19,016	\$622	31%
3	Iraq	\$149,631	\$4,478	30%
4	North Korea	\$10,536	\$423	26%
5	Zimbabwe	\$5,972	\$422	22%
6	Somalia	\$1,240	\$118	22%
7	Honduras	\$8,358	\$1,032	21%
8	Central African Republic	\$540	\$117	19%
9	Colombia	\$113,715	\$2,353	18%
10	El Salvador	\$8,497	\$1,340	17%
11	Cote d'Ivoire	\$11,988	\$590	17%
12	Sudan	\$24,714	\$651	15%
13	South Sudan	\$3,585	\$317	15%
14	Libya	\$15,021	\$2,422	15%
15	Oman	\$22,719	\$6,254	14%
16	Jamaica	\$2,941	\$1,083	12%
17	Israel	\$32,212	\$3,997	12%
18	Venezuela	\$63,990	\$2,105	12%
19	United States	\$2,028,741	\$6,417	12%
20	Ukraine	\$42,845	\$942	11%
21	Eritrea	\$875	\$138	11%
22	Lesotho	\$622	\$300	11%
23	DRC	\$6,172	\$91	11%
24	Cyprus	\$2,691	\$2,358	11%
25	Bahrain	\$6,576	\$4,937	11%
26	Republic of Congo	\$3,000	\$674	11%
27	Namibia	\$2,450	\$1,064	10%
28	Mexico	\$221,435	\$1,810	10%
29	Angola	\$17,804	\$829	10%
30	Saudi Arabia	\$165,234	\$5,732	10%
31	Russia	\$354,394	\$2,470	10%
32	Myanmar	\$24,319	\$457	10%
33	South Africa	\$66,654	\$1,258	10%
34	Guatemala	\$11,561	\$747	10%
35	Guyana	\$534	\$668	10%
36	Guinea-Bissau	\$242	\$142	10%
37	Mauritania	\$1,239	\$319	10%
38	Botswana	\$3,223	\$1,595	10%
39	Timor-Leste	\$798	\$677	10%
40	Equatorial Guinea	\$2,414	\$3,189	10%
41	Trinidad and Tobago	\$3,852	\$2,872	9%
42	Yemen	\$9,337	\$383	9%
43	Bhutan	\$509	\$675	9%
44	Panama	\$6,553	\$1,696	9%
45	Malawi	\$1,170	\$72	9%
46	Lebanon	\$6,713	\$1,503	8%
47	Brazil	\$254,884	\$1,272	8%
48	Algeria	\$45,642	\$1,164	8%
49	Ethiopia	\$11,025	\$117	8%
50	Gabon	\$2,684	\$1,606	8%
51	Pakistan	\$67,503	\$371	8%
52	Mali	\$1,980	\$129	7%
53	Kenya	\$9,820	\$221	7%
54	Montenegro	\$691	\$1,112	7%
55	Swaziland	\$627	\$502	7%
56	Rwanda	\$1,350	\$115	7%
57	Djibouti	\$206	\$236	7%
58	Dominican Republic	\$9,689	\$931	7%
59	Tanzania	\$6,515	\$132	7%
60	Ecuador	\$12,193	\$775	7%
61	Iran	\$85,913	\$1,109	7%
62	Nigeria	\$70,551	\$406	7%
63	Chad	\$1,976	\$154	7%
64	Egypt	\$62,531	\$762	7%
65	Cameroon	\$4,389	\$197	7%
66	Burkina Faso	\$1,949	\$115	6%
67	Kyrgyzstan	\$1,244	\$218	6%
68	Peru	\$23,944	\$788	6%
69	Turkey	\$94,008	\$1,255	6%
70	Sweden	\$26,524	\$2,765	6%
71	Georgia	\$2,090	\$467	6%
72	Benin	\$1,202	\$116	6%
73	Armenia	\$1,449	\$487	6%
74	Azerbaijan	\$10,042	\$1,066	6%

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	TOTAL COSTS IN US\$ 2013 (MILLIONS PPP)	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT COSTS PER PERSON (US\$ 2014 PPP)	% OF GDP
75	Jordan	\$4,729	\$732	6%
76	Burundi	\$489	\$48	6%
77	United Kingdom	\$139,883	\$2,182	6%
78	Gambia	\$190	\$103	6%
79	Sri Lanka	\$12,289	\$600	6%
80	Liberia	\$213	\$49	6%
81	Singapore	\$24,984	\$4,627	6%
82	Kuwait	\$15,619	\$4,637	6%
83	Costa Rica	\$3,918	\$804	6%
84	Nicaragua	\$1,641	\$270	5%
85	Guinea	\$825	\$70	5%
86	Togo	\$539	\$79	5%
87	Sierra Leone	\$682	\$112	5%
88	Kazakhstan	\$21,920	\$1,287	5%
89	Finland	\$11,482	\$2,111	5%
90	China	\$897,486	\$661	5%
91	Thailand	\$50,146	\$748	5%
92	Ghana	\$5,512	\$213	5%
93	Belgium	\$23,063	\$2,060	5%
94	Morocco	\$12,546	\$380	5%
95	Uzbekistan	\$8,335	\$276	5%
96	Mongolia	\$1,449	\$510	5%
97	Paraguay	\$2,811	\$413	5%
98	Niger	\$851	\$48	5%
99	Germany	\$171,144	\$2,123	5%
100	India	\$341,733	\$273	5%
101	Greece	\$13,323	\$1,208	5%
102	Uruguay	\$3,249	\$954	5%
103	Cambodia	\$2,335	\$154	5%
104	Kosovo	\$651	\$357	5%
105	Vietnam	\$23,299	\$260	5%
106	Tajikistan	\$1,010	\$123	5%
107	Estonia	\$1,608	\$1,214	5%
108	Chile	\$18,506	\$1,050	5%
109	Haiti	\$833	\$81	4%
110	South Korea	\$80,395	\$1,601	4%
111	United Arab Emirates	\$26,842	\$2,872	4%
112	Australia	\$48,744	\$2,107	4%
113	Uganda	\$2,952	\$79	4%
114	Bolivia	\$3,087	\$289	4%
115	Turkmenistan	\$3,619	\$691	4%
116	Senegal	\$1,477	\$105	4%
117	France	\$112,960	\$1,711	4%
118	Papua New Guinea	\$766	\$105	4%
119	Taiwan	\$43,025	\$1,842	4%
120	Portugal	\$11,428	\$1,093	4%
121	Mauritius	\$962	\$742	4%
122	Croatia	\$3,557	\$836	4%
123	Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$1,535	\$401	4%
124	Cuba	\$4,823	\$428	4%

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	TOTAL COSTS IN US\$ 2013 (MILLIONS PPP)	VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT COSTS PER PERSON (US\$ 2014 PPP)	% OF GDP
125	Argentina	\$36,867	\$890	4%
126	Zambia	\$2,435	\$167	4%
127	Latvia	\$1,816	\$902	4%
128	Philippines	\$25,387	\$258	4%
129	Albania	\$1,113	\$401	4%
130	Belarus	\$6,141	\$649	4%
131	Bulgaria	\$4,412	\$607	4%
132	New Zealand	\$5,656	\$1,265	4%
133	Tunisia	\$4,408	\$405	4%
134	Netherlands	\$28,045	\$1,669	4%
135	Lithuania	\$2,735	\$925	3%
136	Ireland	\$7,750	\$1,687	3%
137	Czech Republic	\$10,272	\$976	3%
138	Qatar	\$11,076	\$5,107	3%
139	Poland	\$32,205	\$836	3%
140	Indonesia	\$84,241	\$337	3%
141	Malaysia	\$24,482	\$824	3%
142	Serbia	\$2,958	\$413	3%
143	Italy	\$67,269	\$1,124	3%
144	Romania	\$12,404	\$621	3%
145	Macedonia (FYR)	\$869	\$413	3%
146	Moldova	\$542	\$152	3%
147	Madagascar	\$1,058	\$46	3%
148	Slovenia	\$1,868	\$907	3%
149	Denmark	\$7,639	\$1,361	3%
150	Slovakia	\$4,480	\$827	3%
151	Canada	\$45,229	\$1,286	3%
152	Nepal	\$1,890	\$68	3%
153	Norway	\$9,518	\$1,872	3%
154	Laos	\$962	\$142	3%
155	Switzerland	\$11,973	\$1,482	3%
156	Spain	\$39,052	\$837	3%
157	Bangladesh	\$13,583	\$87	3%
158	Japan	\$114,182	\$897	2%
159	Austria	\$9,196	\$1,085	2%
160	Hungary	\$5,547	\$560	2%
161	Mozambique	\$611	\$24	2%
162	Iceland	\$242	\$750	2%

ANNEX D

2015 GPI DOMAIN SCORES

TABLE 31 ONGOING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT DOMAIN, MOST PEACEFUL TO LEAST



COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Botswana	1.00	United Arab Emirates	1.33	Togo	1.39	Cote d'Ivoire	1.65	Iran	2.09
Switzerland	1.00	Croatia	1.33	Cambodia	1.40	Greece	1.66	Niger	2.10
Chile	1.00	Poland	1.33	Ghana	1.43	Macedonia (FYR)	1.66	Kenya	2.11
Mauritius	1.00	Argentina	1.33	Sierra Leone	1.43	Jordan	1.66	Chad	2.11
Uruguay	1.00	Bolivia	1.33	France	1.44	Morocco	1.67	Uganda	2.12
Brazil	1.04	Bhutan	1.33	Guinea	1.44	Belarus	1.67	Mali	2.13
Austria	1.13	Dominican Republic	1.33	Montenegro	1.46	Cuba	1.67	Colombia	2.17
Malaysia	1.14	Equatorial Guinea	1.33	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.49	Eritrea	1.67	Azerbaijan	2.18
Bulgaria	1.16	Guyana	1.33	Hungary	1.49	Gambia	1.67	Ethiopia	2.22
Denmark	1.16	Jamaica	1.33	Lithuania	1.49	Kosovo	1.67	Myanmar	2.24
Spain	1.16	Japan	1.33	Latvia	1.49	Moldova	1.67	Russia	2.32
Iceland	1.16	Kuwait	1.33	Slovakia	1.49	Saudi Arabia	1.67	North Korea	2.33
New Zealand	1.16	Laos	1.33	Slovenia	1.49	Uzbekistan	1.67	Lebanon	2.41
Portugal	1.16	Lesotho	1.33	Republic of the Congo	1.50	South Africa	1.67	Mexico	2.45
Singapore	1.16	Malawi	1.33	Cyprus	1.50	Zimbabwe	1.67	Israel	2.46
Costa Rica	1.17	Nicaragua	1.33	Ecuador	1.50	Bahrain	1.71	Philippines	2.50
Namibia	1.17	Oman	1.33	Gabon	1.50	Sri Lanka	1.71	Yemen	2.52
Panama	1.17	Qatar	1.33	Haiti	1.50	Senegal	1.74	Libya	2.59
Trinidad and Tobago	1.17	Swaziland	1.33	Indonesia	1.50	United States	1.74	Ukraine	2.83
Zambia	1.17	Timor-Leste	1.33	Kazakhstan	1.50	Mauritania	1.78	India	2.83
Canada	1.20	Tanzania	1.33	Paraguay	1.50	Korea	1.79	Nigeria	2.93
Romania	1.20	Vietnam	1.33	Serbia	1.50	Georgia	1.83	Iraq	3.03
Belgium	1.21	Czech Republic	1.34	Turkmenistan	1.50	Kyrgyzstan	1.85	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.04
German	1.21	Angola	1.35	Tunisia	1.50	Cameroon	1.86	Somalia	3.11
Finland	1.21	Papua New Guinea	1.35	Taiwan	1.50	Burundi	1.93	Afghanistan	3.23
Italy	1.21	Netherlands	1.36	Venezuela	1.50	Egypt	1.94	Central African Republic	3.25
Norway	1.21	Honduras	1.37	El Salvador	1.51	Tajikistan	1.94	South Sudan	3.26
Sweden	1.21	Madagascar	1.37	Guatemala	1.52	Armenia	1.98	Sudan	3.33
Australia	1.25	Peru	1.37	Mozambique	1.52	Algeria	2.00	Syria	3.36
Ireland	1.29	Benin	1.39	Djibouti	1.54	Thailand	2.06	Pakistan	3.38
Mongolia	1.29	Burkina Faso	1.39	Guinea-Bissau	1.55	Rwanda	2.07		
United Kingdom	1.30	Liberia	1.39	Bangladesh	1.57	Turkey	2.09		
Albania	1.33	Nepal	1.39	Estonia	1.63	China	2.09		

TABLE 32 SOCIETAL SAFETY & SECURITY DOMAIN, MOST PEACEFUL TO LEAST


COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Japan	1.20	Bulgaria	2.17	Ecuador	2.60	Egypt	2.98
Iceland	1.21	Chile	2.19	Tanzania	2.60	Thailand	2.98
Denmark	1.26	Armenia	2.21	Liberia	2.61	Guinea	3.01
Sweden	1.30	Mongolia	2.22	Tunisia	2.62	Philippines	3.02
Switzerland	1.37	Italy	2.23	Mozambique	2.62	Cameroon	3.02
Finland	1.38	United States	2.23	Nicaragua	2.62	Trinidad and Tobago	3.04
Slovenia	1.38	Vietnam	2.25	India	2.63	Kenya	3.05
Austria	1.39	Costa Rica	2.26	Angola	2.63	Rwanda	3.05
New Zealand	1.39	Morocco	2.26	Bangladesh	2.63	Zimbabwe	3.06
Norway	1.47	Jordan	2.28	Ethiopia	2.63	Guatemala	3.07
Netherlands	1.51	Greece	2.28	Israel	2.63	North Korea	3.09
Canada	1.52	Cyprus	2.32	Uzbekistan	2.66	Lebanon	3.11
Australia	1.52	Oman	2.33	Panama	2.67	Brazil	3.14
German	1.54	Timor-Leste	2.33	Bolivia	2.67	Honduras	3.15
Czech Republic	1.54	Ghana	2.34	Myanmar	2.68	El Salvador	3.17
Bhutan	1.59	Sierra Leone	2.35	Paraguay	2.68	Ukraine	3.19
Portugal	1.60	Saudi Arabia	2.35	Kazakhstan	2.71	Pakistan	3.29
Korea	1.60	Moldova	2.35	Djibouti	2.71	Mexico	3.30
Qatar	1.61	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.35	Kyrgyzstan	2.72	South Africa	3.30
Ireland	1.63	Malawi	2.38	Mali	2.74	Russia	3.37
Hungary	1.63	Georgia	2.39	Burkina Faso	2.74	Yemen	3.37
Poland	1.64	Gabon	2.40	Belarus	2.74	Venezuela	3.38
Belgium	1.64	Namibia	2.41	Haiti	2.76	Libya	3.40
Singapore	1.66	Zambia	2.41	Peru	2.76	Colombia	3.60
Slovakia	1.68	Albania	2.42	Papua New Guinea	2.76	Nigeria	3.68
Spain	1.78	Argentina	2.44	Sri Lanka	2.76	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.78
Taiwan	1.80	Macedonia (FYR)	2.44	Bahrain	2.79	Sudan	3.87
France	1.90	Cuba	2.45	Guyana	2.79	Central African Republic	3.95
Croatia	1.91	Montenegro	2.46	Dominican Republic	2.81	South Sudan	4.03
United Kingdom	1.95	Kosovo	2.46	Iran	2.83	Somalia	4.07
Kuwait	1.95	Uruguay	2.46	Mauritania	2.83	Afghanistan	4.23
Romania	1.98	China	2.49	Cote d'Ivoire	2.85	Syria	4.25
Estonia	2.00	Lesotho	2.50	Cambodia	2.86	Iraq	4.40
Mauritius	2.03	Madagascar	2.50	Republic of the Congo	2.87		
Lithuania	2.05	Togo	2.51	Turkey	2.87		
Malaysia	2.05	Algeria	2.51	Niger	2.88		
Senegal	2.08	Nepal	2.52	Guinea-Bissau	2.88		
Botswana	2.10	Gambia	2.54	Eritrea	2.89		
Indonesia	2.12	Uganda	2.54	Swaziland	2.89		
United Arab Emirates	2.12	Benin	2.56	Burundi	2.90		
Laos	2.13	Azerbaijan	2.56	Turkmenistan	2.91		
Serbia	2.13	Tajikistan	2.57	Chad	2.92		
Latvia	2.15	Equatorial Guinea	2.58	Jamaica	2.94		

TABLE 33 MILITARISATION DOMAIN, MOST PEACEFUL TO LEAST


COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Kosovo	1.00	Trinidad and Tobago	1.23	German	1.42	Uganda	1.70
Ireland	1.03	Serbia	1.23	Japan	1.43	Korea	1.70
Bhutan	1.04	Lesotho	1.24	Peru	1.43	South Sudan	1.70
Hungary	1.05	Nepal	1.24	Papua New Guinea	1.43	Guinea-Bissau	1.70
Latvia	1.05	Laos	1.24	Netherlands	1.44	Djibouti	1.71
Costa Rica	1.05	Ecuador	1.25	Togo	1.44	Eritrea	1.71
Mexico	1.07	Croatia	1.25	Cyprus	1.45	Morocco	1.72
Slovakia	1.07	Portugal	1.25	Brazil	1.49	Chad	1.72
Austria	1.07	Honduras	1.25	Timor-Leste	1.49	Uzbekistan	1.73
Philippines	1.08	Gambia	1.28	Cameroon	1.49	Yemen	1.74
Tanzania	1.09	Cuba	1.28	Burundi	1.50	Afghanistan	1.75
Malawi	1.09	Malaysia	1.28	Benin	1.50	Mauritania	1.76
New Zealand	1.09	Namibia	1.29	Bahrain	1.51	Norway	1.77
Denmark	1.10	Bulgaria	1.29	Switzerland	1.51	Lebanon	1.77
Lithuania	1.10	Sierra Leone	1.30	Guinea	1.52	Sweden	1.78
Czech Republic	1.10	Panama	1.30	Egypt	1.52	India	1.81
South Africa	1.11	El Salvador	1.30	Angola	1.53	Cambodia	1.82
Tunisia	1.11	Madagascar	1.31	Jamaica	1.53	Iran	1.82
Kazakhstan	1.11	Swaziland	1.31	Kyrgyzstan	1.53	China	1.82
Nicaragua	1.14	Zimbabwe	1.31	Armenia	1.54	Venezuela	1.85
Mongolia	1.14	Ghana	1.31	Zambia	1.54	Pakistan	1.86
Mozambique	1.14	Slovenia	1.32	Jordan	1.55	Sudan	1.88
Guyana	1.16	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.32	Republic of the Congo	1.55	Qatar	1.91
Georgia	1.16	Gabon	1.32	Algeria	1.56	United Kingdom	2.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1.16	Macedonia (FYR)	1.32	Turkey	1.56	France	2.02
Haiti	1.17	Paraguay	1.32	Belarus	1.56	Saudi Arabia	2.02
Estonia	1.18	Kuwait	1.32	Dominican Republic	1.57	Singapore	2.10
Iceland	1.18	Spain	1.33	Libya	1.57	United Arab Emirates	2.17
Mauritius	1.19	Albania	1.33	Bolivia	1.57	Oman	2.17
Kenya	1.19	Italy	1.33	Central African Republic	1.57	United States	2.19
Canada	1.19	Indonesia	1.33	Greece	1.59	Syria	2.22
Burkina Faso	1.19	Tajikistan	1.34	Equatorial Guinea	1.60	Russia	2.58
Montenegro	1.19	Argentina	1.35	Vietnam	1.60	Israel	3.18
Moldova	1.19	Romania	1.36	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.61	North Korea	3.29
Turkmenistan	1.20	Ethiopia	1.36	Somalia	1.64		
Guatemala	1.21	Liberia	1.36	Mali	1.64		
Thailand	1.21	Finland	1.36	Sri Lanka	1.65		
Poland	1.21	Nigeria	1.36	Myanmar	1.66		
Colombia	1.22	Niger	1.38	Rwanda	1.66		
Senegal	1.22	Australia	1.40	Ukraine	1.67		
Chile	1.23	Botswana	1.41	Iraq	1.67		
Bangladesh	1.23	Uruguay	1.41	Azerbaijan	1.68		
Belgium	1.23	Taiwan	1.41				

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- 72 Where indices contain similar variables, e.g. fertility in health, further correlations were performed on subsets of the PPIs without the domain containing the similar variable to avoid collinearity. Tests found that the indicators still correlated with the subset PPIs.

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

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