Facilitation, Imposition, or Impairment?

The Role of Bridging Networks on Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders in the Deep South of Thailand

Ajirapa Pienkhuntod

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

At the University of Otago, New Zealand,

July 2017

Abstract

The peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders in conflict is well established within the peacebuilding literature. To date, most studies have focused on the impact of religious factors on the peacebuilding of religious leaders, while factors other than religion remain under-researched. The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of inter-group ties or bridging networks on the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders. This represents the first attempt to examine how the varying behaviour of members of bridging networks impacts the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders during conflict. In an effort to highlight the importance of non-religious mechanisms, the central research question of this thesis is: *How do bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting?*

This study examines a single case of the Deep South of Thailand (the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, and some parts of Songkhla). Based on thirty-one in-depth interviews conducted in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, I investigate the impact of three 'types' of bridging networks, those with civil society, governmental, and military actors. I trace a causal chain between the behaviours of members of theses bridging networks and the peacebuilding practices of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders in the context of the Southern Thailand conflict. Some local religious leaders engaged in socio-economic development, e.g. drug rehabilitation for youth and the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum; community justice, e.g. legal training for Islamic leaders and torture prevention; religious dialogues, e.g. inter-religious camps for students; and community mediation between Buddhist-Muslim communities.

I find that local religious leaders were pragmatic and likely to engage in a peacebuilding collaboration with other actors only when other actors facilitated the development of their approaches and initiatives to match local needs, or in other words, supporting the bottom-up peacebuilding. In this case, civil society actors could to an extent play a facilitative role by increasing local religious leaders' socialisation with other like-minded actors and/or peacebuilders, and promote the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders. In contrast, civilian governmental and military actors could do so only in a limited fashion as they used top-down and security approaches respectively, which limit and impair the development of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders.

A safe operational space was also identified as an essential non-material resource enabling engagement in peacebuilding in the ongoing conflict environment. Local religious leaders were unlikely to access financial and/or material resources for peacebuilding available in a bridging network if doing so could generate the risk of being harmed. In this case, the risk was determined by the perceived neutrality or bias of local religious leaders' contacts who provided resources for peacebuilding. Interestingly, the perceived neutrality or bias of these actors was influenced by their distance to the fighting. I have found that civil society actors were, to some extent, able to provide safe spaces for local religious leaders. Civil society actors were perceived to be more neutral than civilian governmental and military actors, who were associated with the Thai state, the conflict party to the Malay insurgents.

As a result, the behaviours of civil society, civilian governmental and military actors (facilitation via socialisation/top-down approach/impairment due to security concerns) created different immediate outcomes (a sense of safety/limited space for participation/fear), which affected varying degrees of access (access, restricted, and no access) to peacebuilding resources

in civil society, civilian government and military networks, and consequently resulted in promoting, restricting, or hindering the engagement of local religious leaders in peacebuilding, respectively.

I therefore argue that local religious leaders' contribution to peacebuilding during conflict was significantly influenced by the behaviour of their contacts. In a conflict environment such as the Deep South of Thailand, the more a bridging network facilitated the development of bottom-up peacebuilding approaches and created a safe operational space, the more local religious leaders engaged in peacebuilding. By identifying this enabling condition for peacebuilding, this thesis deepens our understanding of the drivers of local peacebuilding and sheds light on how to improve the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders through bridging networks in a time of conflict.

Acknowledgements

My PhD journey is about learning, not only in the academic arena but also on a personal level. It is more challenging than I ever thought it would be. Most things I have learnt related to the fact that ‘it can take so long to write a good paragraph’ and ‘things can often go wrong’. Completion of my PhD thesis thus gives a great sense of achievement. I will always remember this period of my life, which would not be memorable and meaningful without a small group of kind and talented people.

Firstly, I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional love and support. You have taught me to be strong, determined, and hardworking and have always believed in me. I was lucky to be born into this family.

My heartfelt thanks also go to my excellent supervisory team. I could not have asked for a better supervisory team. Karen Brounéus, you are an outstanding supervisor. I have learnt so much from you and will try my best to be a supervisor like you. I also would like to thank Sung Yong Lee for being so supportive and attentive. I am grateful for the generous time you have given me. Charles Butcher, what an intelligent and kind supervisor you have been! You have always provided helpful feedback on my work and helped me clarify many critical points throughout the thesis. John Gray-Smith and Liesel Mitchell, you are the PhD mates who have made my PhD journey full of fantastic academic experiences and fun stories. You two have also given me incredible emotional support.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank Darren Hight for your support, patience, and understanding throughout, helping me to ‘toughen up’ and ‘chill out’ when needed. You have always been there for me through the ups and downs. You’re the best!

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

CICOT	Central Islamic Committee of Thailand
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command
KPYW	Kam Pong Tak Wa (Faith Community)
MAC	Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation
NOB	National Office of Buddhism
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission
RTR	Royal Thai Rangers (*Thahan Prahan*)
RKK	Runda Kumpulan Kecil
SBPAC	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center
4th Army	Royal Thai Army's Southern 4th Army Command
VDC	Volunteer Defence Corps (*Or Sor*)

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research Focus

This study investigates the determinants of local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding in an intra-state conflict. It highlights the importance of *local* peacebuilding, which is widely emphasised by academics, policy makers, and peace practitioners to be important to peace processes and to contributing to the sustainability of peace (Carl, 2003; Forster & Mattner, 2007; Francis, 2002; Francis & Ropers, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1999; Reich, 2006; Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001; Richmond, 2005, 2011; Theros, 2012; UN, October 2010; van Leeuwen, 2009). However, a review of the current state of research related to the involvement of local actors in peacebuilding reveals few empirical and rigorous studies. In particular, research on the role of local religious leaders in peacebuilding is limited, unlike the role of local religious leaders in conflict, which is well documented (De Juan, 2008; Gurr, 1993; Huntington, 1993; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Varshney, 1993).

This study is among the first attempts to take a non-traditional research direction by offering an alternative theoretical framework in order to understand the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders. It adopts an approach different from the mainstream research, which mainly

focuses on how religious factors (e.g. religious teachings, values and norms) promotes the peacebuilding roles of religious leaders (Abu-Nimer, 2004; Appleby, 2000; Bartoli, 2004; Bouta, Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, & Abu-Nimer, 2005; Denny, 2004; Gandhi, 2004; Grant, 2004; D. M. Johnston & Eastvold, 2004; Morris, 2004; Neumaier, 2004; Palm-Dalupan, 2005). This study highlights the centrality of non-religious mechanisms, namely social relations or networks, which appear to affect the peacebuilding behaviour of religious leaders (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Sisk, 2011a). I particularly focus on bridging or inter-group networks, which have been identified as having the capacity to improve the peacebuilding capacity of religious peace practitioners (Appleby, 2000; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004). I ask the research question: *How do social networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting?* By answering this research question, this study furthers an understanding of how to promote local religious leaders' peacebuilding. It also contributed to development of the concept of peacebuilding, which scholars widely agree is too broadly defined and needs more empirical research in order to develop a clearer concept.

1.2 Research Gap

Two main research gaps are addressed in this study - the limited empirical research on causal mechanisms other than religious factors linking local religious leaders to peacebuilding, and the lack of research designs that embed a clear definition of 'religious leader' and 'peacebuilding' in the specific context of study (during/post conflict). By starting to fill these research gaps, this study contributes to the development of a clearer concept of the peacebuilding of religious leaders, which is still underdeveloped.

First, this study identifies that previous studies have not yet paid enough attention to non-religious factors. A great deal of the literature focuses on the impact of religious principles as a way to understand the peacebuilding roles of religious leaders (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000; Haar, 2005; Hertog, 2010; Little, 2007; Sampson, 1997; Smock, 2006; Svensson, 2013), while factors other than religion, such as social relations or networks, have not yet been widely examined, despite being acknowledged as vital mechanisms enhancing the peacebuilding capacity of religious peace practitioners. Scholars have demonstrated the positive impacts of some of the teachings of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism on peacebuilding (Abu-Nimer, 2004; Appleby, 2000; Bartoli, 2004; Bouta et al., 2005; Denny, 2004; Gandhi, 2004; Grant, 2004; Johnston & Eastvold, 2004; Morris, 2004; Neumaier, 2004; Palm-Dalupan, 2005). They argue that religion provides the moral values for peace, such as compromise, tolerance, compassion, love, empathy, forgiveness, and non-violence, which motivate peacebuilding behaviour.

Although recognising the potential of religion as a source of moral values to inspire peace activities and orientations, I argue that further exploration of other, non-religious, factors that may affect religious leaders' peacebuilding is needed. Religious principles for peace cannot fully explain the varying behaviours of religious leaders in a conflict situation despite coming from the same religious traditions, for example, why only some (not all) religious leaders involve themselves in peacebuilding, as was the case in Northern Ireland (Little, 2007b) and Sri Lanka (Hayward, 2011). As a response to this research puzzle, this study explores the effect of non-religious mechanisms, i.e., bridging networks, which the current research lacks.

Second, this study points out a serious lack of systematic and robust research designs in previous case studies on the determinants of peacebuilding behaviour by religious leaders

involved in peacebuilding. As demonstrated in more detail in Chapter Two, case studies presented in the edited volume of *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (Sisk, 2011) suggest the importance of social networks as influential mechanisms determining the behaviour of religious leaders. These case studies, however, lack consistency in their definitions of 'religious leaders' and, therefore, their conceptualisation of social networks. 'Religious leaders' refer to *religiously oriented politicians* or *religious scholars and spiritual leaders*, who operate at the national or the local levels. The unclear definition of 'religious leaders' significantly reduces the validity and generalisation of various study results on the destructive/constructive behaviour of religious leaders, as these religiously oriented politicians and religious scholars or spiritual leaders are likely to operate in different conditions and fulfil different social expectations.

Other existing research (Bouta et al., 2005; Little, 2007c) has also illustrated the peacebuilding potential of religious leaders without identifying clearly the differences between the environment faced by peacebuilders in conflict[1] and post-conflict[2] settings. In addition, they have not yet specifically identified the differences between international and local religious leaders, who are likely to operate under different conditions.

To address the importance of devising a systematic research design for an empirical investigation, this study indicates a specific research direction – examining the peacebuilding of religious scholar leaders, who *are recognised by a local religious body or community as a*

[1] In this thesis, conflict refers to "an armed conflict" which "is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (UCDP, 2017).
[2] Post-conflict denotes a situation in which an armed conflict has come to an end or a situation after the signing of a peace agreement.

spiritual leader and/or teacher providing guidance and who inspires others based on religious principles and knowledge. It also specifies the context of the study to be *a conflict environment*.

1.3 Research Approach

This study employs a qualitative case study approach (see more details in Chapter Two), as mentioned in the research gap section above. The case study method is used to identify the conditions – that impact the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. I conducted thirty-one semi-structured interviews between 22 May and 5 September 2014 in the conflict areas in the southernmost provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and some parts of Songkhla) where most of the thirty-one interviewees were based. The following are brief overviews of the research method, research scope, and theoretical framework.

1.3.1 Case Study

I adopted the qualitative case study to assess aspects of complex causality (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 9-10) as the research focuses on the dynamics of a single setting of the Deep South of Thailand[3]. The case study method is an in-depth investigation and provides intensive empirical analysis of the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict, which has previously been underreported and lacking in substantial analysis of historical patterns (Achen & Snidal, 1989; Yin, 2009).

To briefly illustrate the background of the case, the southernmost provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and some parts of Songkhla), often referred to as the Deep South,

[3] The term the Deep South of Thailand is used interchangeably in this thesis.

are where the conflict between the Malay insurgents and the Thai government is concentrated. This region was once an independent kingdom called Patani[4] or Patani Raya (Greater Patani) (Funston, 2008; Syukri, 1985). The vast majority (about 95 percent) of the local population in this region are ethnic Malays with Islamic beliefs. The Deep South is a unique case for investigation. It is a setting in which local Buddhist and Islamic leaders are in a challenging position as regards engaging in peacebuilding. Local Buddhist and Islamic leaders are the symbols of the different identities, such as the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Islamic, that predominantly symbolise the ethno-nationalist divide which is thought to be the fundamental cause of conflict (Abuza, 2009; Thanet Aphornsuvan, 2006; D. Brown, 2008; Chalk, 2008; McCargo, 2008; Melvin, 2007; NRC, 2006; Pitsuwan, 1982; Storey, 2007, 2008; Yusuf, 2006). In this intra-state conflict, local religious leaders are therefore likely to be perceived as biased actors whose capacity and/or appropriateness to build peace is potentially limited (Harpviken & Røislien, 2008). However, even in these challenging contexts, religious leaders still engage in peacebuilding activities. The contributions of local religious leaders to local peacebuilding in such an environment is the focus of this thesis in order to improve scholarly knowledge on the peacebuilding phenomenon in the Deep South, which is currently limited, as discussed in Chapter Five. It is the intention of this study to shed light on the peacebuilding potential without suggesting that local religious leaders only engage in peacebuilding. This study acknowledges the duality of potential role (building/obstructing peace), which a religious leader could play in a conflict situation.

[4] The term *Patani* is often confused with *Pattani* due to the spelling. *Patani,* pronounced as "pa-ta-ni", is the original Malay word. When written in Thai, it becomes *Pattani* and is pronounced differently as "pat-ta-ni". While *Pattani* refers to a province located in the southernmost region or the Deep South of Thailand, *Patani* is the historical name of the southernmost region located in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula, before coming under the control of Thailand or Siam at the time. The term Patani is often associated with the Malay insurgency and struggles for self-determination.

1.3.2 Research Scope

This study confines its analysis to *local religious leaders*' peacebuilding behaviour and to *bridging networks* in a context of *intra-state conflict*. The research scope is reflected through the conceptualisation of 'the peacebuilding of local religious leader' and the 'bridging' type of network.

In this thesis, the term 'peacebuilding of local religious leader' is defined as *the engagement in (re)establishing tolerance and peaceful coexistence between two or among multiple conflicting parties in a conflict setting.* The concept differs from the existing concept of religious peacebuilding, which involves promoting the role of religious principles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding by individual religious peace practitioners or faith-based organisations in both during-conflict and post-conflict contexts (Appleby, 2000; Bouta et al., 2005; Gopin, 2000; Hertog, 2010). Rather than focusing on religion itself, central to the concept is the involvement of a *local religious leader*, who is recognised by a local religious body or community as a spiritual leader and/or teacher providing guidance and inspiring others based on religious principles and knowledge. More importantly, it highlights the possibility of religious peacebuilders' engagement in non-religious activities or the use of non-religious strategies to promote peace (Bouta et al., 2005).

The term 'bridging network' is conceptualised as *a set of relationships between a local religious leader and other actors who are outside his/her religious congregation.* Considering the conflict environment, I argue that local religious leaders may not have the power to choose whom they establish (or not) a relationship with. They may be forced to form ties with certain people outside their immediate religious congregations to survive in a divided and distrustful environment. With this in mind, I categorise bridging networks into three broad types based on

the behaviours of *other actors* or local religious leaders' contacts, who could support, enforce or hinder the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders. In this respect, the analysis of bridging networks in this study is limited to these three broad characterizations, which are likely to appear in a conflict setting. It is worth noting that this study is aware of the possibility of incomplete identification of an actor's behavior that is complex and could vary across time and places. This categorization of behaviours could, however, provide a preliminary framework for analysis of bridging networks at a certain point in time and at a certain place in the conflict.

1.3.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study connects the types of bridging networks and the varying peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders (See Table 1). It lays out the predicted effect that each network type is likely to create regarding local religious leaders' behaviour. As shown in Chapter Three, I propose three theoretical propositions based on the behaviours of other actors:

Theoretical Proposition 1: A bridging network is likely to promote the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member facilitates a bottom-up peacebuilding approach.

Theoretical Proposition 2: A bridging network is likely to restrict the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member imposes unshared peacebuilding norms and practices on the local religious leader.

Theoretical Proposition 3: A bridging network is likely to hinder the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member impairs the political conditions for peacebuilding by enhancing the local religious leader's risk of facing punishment.

These propositions also serve as the thematic structure for the analysis of local religious leaders' peacebuilding practices in the Deep South of Thailand, which are demonstrated in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

Table 1: Theoretical Propositions - The Effects of Bridging Networks on the Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

Network Types	**Network Effects**
Facilitation (Assisting local religious leaders in bottom-up peacebuilding)	*Active Peacebuilding* Accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach)
Imposition (Enforcing unshared peacebuilding norms and practices)	*Restricted Peacebuilding* Restricted accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to unshared norms and practices)
Impairment (Spoiling local religious leaders' peacebuilding potential)	*No Peacebuilding* No accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to the risk of facing punishment)

1.3.4 Methodology

In-depth interviews are used as the research instrument in this thesis to obtain rich and in-depth empirical information that assisted in answering the research question for a certain moment in time (Brounéus, 2011, p. 131). As outlined in more detail in Chapter Four, empirical data was collected through thirty-one semi-structured interviews conducted during fieldwork in the Deep South of Thailand between 22 May and 5 September 2014. Of thirty-one interviewees, eighteen were local religious leaders (twelve Islamic religious leaders and six Buddhist religious leaders), six were local activists, four were local academics, and three were

government officials. Those interviewees were recruited via a snowball sampling strategy. Interviewees were not necessarily involved in peacebuilding but associated with local religious leaders or were aware of local religious leaders' relationships with other actors to ensure relevant knowledge and information related to the research interests.

In the process of data analysis, findings were drawn from the interviews and organised into themes that were combined into a coherent narrative. Thematic analysis is driven by the prior hypotheses or theoretical propositions, which are formulated into the expected patterns that should be found in the case that the theoretical propositions are correct (Campbell, 1966, 1975; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009). Nevertheless, thematic analysis is flexible enough to allow for unpredicted themes to emerge from the data, rendering possible an inductive analytical approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 1990). The flexibility of the analysis method facilitates the discovery of other variables - local religious leaders' sense of safety, limited space for participation, and fear, which are caused by the behaviour of other actors determining the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders. These immediate outcomes are the themes that emerged from the data collected in the Deep South of Thailand, where the peacebuilding of local religious leaders has not yet been systematically examined through the lens of social networks. The combination of theory-testing and newly-found themes helps maximise the understanding of the phenomenon in question.

1.4 Research Findings

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight demonstrate how the behaviours of other actors (civil society, governmental, and military actors) affects the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders. These actors were identified in the interviews as local religious leaders' key contacts, whose

behaviours appeared to shape the peacebuilding practices of those local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict.

Table 2: The Effects of Bridging Networks on the Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

Network Types	*Facilitation via Socialisation* - shared preference for a bottom-up approach	*Top-Down Approach* - domination of government officials	*Impairment via Security Concerns* - suspicion over Islamic leaders - militarising Buddhist monks
Immediate Outcomes	*Sense of Safety*	*Limited Space for Participation*	*Fear*
Network Effects	*Promoting Peacebuilding* - accessibility to resources for socio-economic development activities	*Restricting Peacebuilding* - restricted accessibility to resources only for education-related activities	*Hindering Peacebuilding* - negative attitudes towards the other ethnoreligious group - risk from accessing the military's resources

As shown in Table 2, the chapters show three themes outlined in the theoretical propositions, each of which explains how the behaviour of the given actor influenced the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders in the Deep South. In addition, they reveal unexpected themes that emerged from empirical data, which are presented as the immediate outcomes of the other actors' behaviours, as detailed in the chapters. These immediate outcomes help clarify the mechanisms that link different bridging networks to peacebuilding behaviour.

Overall, civil society actors promoted the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand by providing platforms for socialisation between local religious leaders and other actors, including activists, academics, religious actors and leaders from other religious congregations, who otherwise would not be in contact with the local religious leaders. The socialisation approach of civil society actors helped local religious leaders develop a sense of safety, which I argue to be a critical condition for encouraging local religious leaders to

mobilise resources from civil society actors for peacebuilding initiatives, such as the development of the integrated Islamic curriculum for private Islamic schools, legal training, and a drug rehabilitation programme for local youth.

In contrast, I have found that military actors, as the direct conflicting party to the Malay insurgents, impaired the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders by, for example, using aggressive military approaches in dealing with locals during house searches, and more serious human right violations such as torture and ill-treatment in detention. These military approaches were utilised in the name of national security. This priority on the security front appeared to reinforce the military's suspicion over local Islamic leaders' involvement in the insurgency and the military's strategy of militarising local Buddhist monks, which created fear among local religious leaders. In addition, local religious leaders had fear of targeting by the Malay insurgents. They therefore kept their distance from the military. They avoided access to the military's resources since taking resources from the military might suggest a close connection to the military, which was likely to engender the risk of being targeted by the insurgents. I argue that fear is an important condition disabling engagement in peacebuilding. However, Chapter Seven demonstrates that civilian government officials can to some degree support the peacebuilding of local Islamic leaders, although they are considered as part of the Thai state (the conflicting party to the Malay insurgents). Despite the limited scale, local religious leaders collaborated with civilian-government officials and were willing to mobilise government resources when the government created a space for their initiatives, such as educational-related peacebuilding activities. In a sense, it seems that local religious leaders were pragmatic actors. It is also important to recognise the constructive potential of a conflicting party in improving the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders, who may be perceived to be on the opposite side in the conflict. In other word, the more space for

participation the government provides for religious leaders, the greater the possibility of local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding.

1.5 Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured in the following way. After this first introductory chapter, **Chapter Two** explores the existing research on religious leaders' contributions to peacebuilding. It then identifies research puzzles and gaps. In particular, this chapter highlights that the existing studies pay too much attention to the impact of religious components (religious faiths, interpretation of cannons, and spirituality) on the behaviour of religious actors and/or leaders and marginalise the non-religious factors relevant to their peacebuilding activities (social networks, knowledge of local culture, and social kudos). At the same time, it will point out a few methodological issues such as unclear contexts of studies that the previous research presents.

Chapter Three discusses the concepts of the peacebuilding activities of local religious leaders and bridging networks. It also articulates the predicted effects of bridging networks on the peacebuilding of local religious leaders, based on the varying behaviours (facilitation, imposition, and impairment of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders) of other actors in contact with local religious leaders.

Chapter Four outlines the methods used for conducting this study; how I tested the predicted outcome of bridging networks in Southern Thailand. It identifies the case study as the research method, the research instrument of in-depth interviews, the data collection techniques, and the thematic analysis strategy.

Chapter Five describes the background to the Southern Thailand case. The nature of, and a brief history of the conflict, are provided. The chapter then details the development of the peacebuilding efforts taking place in Southern Thailand.

The empirical findings drawn from the qualitative materials collected from the fieldwork are provided in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. Each chapter focuses on one network type. **Chapter Six** articulates the interview information related to the 'facilitation' approach of civil society actors and its outcomes in creating local religious leaders' sense of safety and providing accessibility to resources used for socio-economic development (e.g. drug rehabilitation for youth and the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum), community justice (e.g. legal trainings for Islamic leaders and torture prevention), and religious dialogue (e.g. inter-religious camps for students).

Chapter Seven examines the top-down nature of civilian government officials and demonstrates that the centralised power of government officials limited spaces for local religious leaders' participation in peacebuilding, which leads to restricted access to government resources. Nevertheless, the chapter highlights education as the area that religious leaders seemed to enjoy government officials provided a wider space for participation.

Chapter Eight presents the military's impairment of the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders by focusing only on national security and on its negative impacts in creating and reinforcing fear among local religious leaders. The chapter suggests that local religious leaders' fear of insurgent attacks is generated from being perceived to be close allies of the military, who is the direct conflict party to the Malay insurgents. Fear of insurgent attacks is

an important condition discouraging local religious leaders from engaging in peacebuilding despite the availability of the military's resources.

Chapter Nine contains a summary of this study's main findings and highlights the original contributions this study makes to the fields of peace and conflict studies and to Thai studies. The original contributions include (1) a theoretical framework other than the religion-driven framework for analysis of the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders, (2) a rigorous research design, (3) further understanding about opportunities and challenges that local religious leaders faced in intra-state conflicts, (4) a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationships between local religious leaders and the Thai state, and (5) a policy implication of this study on a partnership between state and civil society actors, which potentially helps widen the operational space for local religious leaders . Limitation of research design and recommendations for further research, are also provided.

Chapter 2

Literature Review:

Local Religious Leaders and Their Contributions to Peacebuilding

2.1 Introduction

Peacebuilding is a complex arena involving multiple actors and issues. While the intervention of international agents and organisations in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is well documented, an understanding of the involvement of local actors is far less comprehensive. However, it has increasingly gained research momentum. This chapter reviews existing research on the peacebuilding roles of religious leaders, who are believed to be crucial actors in peacebuilding as they are the link between the elite and grassroots (Lederach, 1997). It aims to identify shortcomings and research gaps in the literature. The following sections begin with a brief overview of the contemporary academic discourse of local peacebuilding. It then illustrates religious leaders' constructive and destructive potential. The next part describes the primary focus of the literature, which is the impact of religion on peacebuilding by local religious leaders, followed by a potentially powerful mechanism to explain peacebuilding behaviour: a social relationship or network, which has been overlooked.

2.2 Local Peacebuilding

As will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three, peacebuilding is defined in this thesis as the engagement in (re)establishing tolerance and peaceful coexistence between two or among multiple conflicting parties in a conflict setting. Local peacebuilding then refers to a

peacebuilding effort by a local actor. The importance of local actors has been increasingly recognised as the peacebuilding paradigm has shifted from the international to the local. Including and empowering local actors has become a widely agreed principle in peacebuilding theory and practice, as well as in policy discourse (Carl, 2003; Forster & Mattner, 2007; Francis, 2002; Francis & Ropers, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Miall et al., 1999; Reich, 2006; Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001; Richmond, 2005, 2011; Theros, 2012; UN, October 2010; van Leeuwen, 2009). According to Lederach (1997), the local can be a source of positive mechanisms, and conflict transformation and peacebuilding must actively consider and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting for the sustainability of peace. Local peacebuilding initiatives can produce successful outcomes that scale up to national peace (Hancock & Mitchell, 2012). In many cases, for example, the local population turns to traditional mechanisms and community institutions as well as respected individuals, such as tribal elders, to resolve community problems and disputes (Anderson, 1999a; Waldman, 2008). Local peacebuilders can help improve the operational success of international peacebuilding initiatives in local settings by offering their contextual knowledge and specific understandings of local complexities, and by identifying the needs of the locals (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Anderson, 1999a; Anderson, Brown, & Jean, 2012; Burke, 2012a; Dibley, 2014). More importantly, local peacebuilders play a pivotal role in intrastate armed conflict where international intervention is restricted, for example in settings such as in the Deep South of Thailand and Sri Lanka (Burke, 2012b). However, it is worth noting that local peacebuilding is very complex. Local mechanisms and actors can bring positive outcomes, or can also prevent and obstruct peace initiatives from successfully transforming conflict into sustainable peace, as well as sustain the conflict (Hancock & Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Vervisch & Titeca, 2010).

Local peacebuilding issues have been increasingly discussed in the literature. The literature argues that there are multiple actors and organisations involved in local peacebuilding but the analyses mainly focus on the contributions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Anderson, 1999a; Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; C. Barnes, 2006; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009; Orjuela, 2008; Paffenholz, 2009; Thiessen, Byrne, Skarlato, & Tennent, 2010).

Although the peacebuilding roles of *individual* actors are recognised (Dibley, 2014), they are yet to be adequately investigated (Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000; Sampson, 1997). The role of local religious leaders, who often have longstanding and frequent involvements in intrastate conflicts (Little & Appleby, 2004), are particularly under-researched. Although scholars acknowledge the importance of religious leaders, systematic research on their role in building tolerance and peaceful coexistence between divided groups is still limited, unlike their destructive influences that have been well documented as a powerful force for generating intergroup conflict and war (De Juan, 2008; Gurr, 1993; Huntington, 1993; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Varshney, 1993). However, studies on constructive contributions from religious leaders have recently begun emerging in the literature. The next section will show the current development of research on the peacebuilding roles of religious leaders, which are often suggested to be driven by the religious principles attached to peace.

2.3 Religion and Peacebuilding of Religious Leaders

A great deal of the literature focuses on the impact of religion as a way to understand the peacebuiding roles of religious leaders (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000; Haar, 2005; Hertog, 2010; Little, 2007; Sampson, 1997; Smock, 2006; Svensson, 2013), while factors other than religion such as social relations or networks are not yet widely examined. Scholars argue that religious peacebuilding is an alternative approach to help secular policymakers

understand and deal with the narrative of ethnoreligious violence (Appleby, 2000; M. E. Brown, 1993; D. Johnston & Sampson, 1995; Reychler, 1997). The positive impacts of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism on peacebuilding have been demonstrated in the literature (Abu-Nimer, 2004; Bartoli, 2004; Bouta et al., 2005; Denny, 2004; Gandhi, 2004; Grant, 2004; Johnston & Eastvold, 2004; Morris, 2004; Neumaier, 2004; Palm-Dalupan, 2005). Scholars generally indicate the potential of religion as a source of moral values to inspire peace activities and orientations of faith-based actors and organisations even though simultaneously recognising the possible destructive effects of religious beliefs. The moral values for peace include compromise, tolerance, compassion, love, empathy, forgiveness, and non-violence, which are inherent in all religious traditions. Inserting the spiritual dimension into peace processes can also open access to a more deep-seated basis of people's conflicting behaviour, which is negative for peace and often based on emotional considerations that may not be changed by rational negotiation and agreements (Assefa, 1996).

Furthermore, scholars emphasise the importance of religious leaders as highly respected agents of faith. Moral values and authority can put religious actors in a unique position if they possess pervasive moral leverage and legitimacy to restore relationships between conflicting parties and mobilise support for peacebuilding (Bouta et al., 2005; Little, 2007; Sampson, 1997, p. 276). In turn, religious leaders can also influence norm-setting more effectively than average believers because of their elite status (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010). Those religious leaders who live in the communities, especially, often support the long term interests of the people since they are part of the same communities (Hertog, 2010, p. 102; Little, 2007a). Their actions have significant potential to direct divided societies away from terror and toward tolerance and peaceful co-existence (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Johnston & Cox, 2003; Sisk, 2011b).

A number of scholars argue that local religious leaders, in particular, have transcendent authority to undertake peacebuilding initiatives, especially those involved critical issues, due to their proximity to the communities they serve. Local religious leaders tend to have long term interest in and regular contact with local people via charity works, which give them normative authority (Hertog, 2010, p. 102; Little & Appleby, 2004). Ntale (2012) argues that religious leaders in Northern Uganda appeared to play a leadership role for local political reform and productive social relations as they remained the only agents of credibility during the state's declining power, and the military's abuse of power. Haynes (2009) similarly illustrates the leadership role of a prominent Buddhist monk in Cambodia, Somdet Maha Ghosananda. For instance, Somdet Maha Ghosananda assisted Cambodian refugees, who needed physical, moral, and spiritual help after Vietnamese troops brought the Khmer Roug regime to an end in 1978 (Haynes, p. 69). Being based in their communities, local religious leaders can also accurately identify local needs and offer understandings of local constraints and the possibilities of peacebuilding initiatives (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Bartoli, 2004). Their intimate knowledge of the local language and culture, as well as access to on the ground information about the conflict, helps religious mediators succeed in closing the hermeneutical gap of religious interpretation (Bartoli, 2004).

The literature shows different perspectives about the religious context as a suitable operational environment for religious peacebuilders. For many scholars, involvement of religious leaders seems the most relevant and effective where religion is central to the lives of individuals. Religious leaders who gain high leverage and legitimacy have a major impact on the success or failure of mediation in conflicts in which cultural, ethnic and religious components define the social life and identities of conflicting parties, such as in Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Bartoli, 2004; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Faith-

based diplomacy appears to be functional and powerful where faith cannot be separated from politics, such as in the Middle East (Appleby, 2003, Johnston, 2003).

Nonetheless, scholars also address shortcomings arguing that local religious peace activists are often unskilled, untrained or ill-equipped (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Sisk, 2011b). For example, local Muslim peacebuilders in Africa and the Balkan regions need more financial and educational resources to improve their credibility and capacity (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008). Furthermore, Harpviken and Røislien (2008) raise a question about the neutral status of religious actors and the possible success of any peace activities under their influence in interreligious conflicts. They argue that the potentiality to establish peace is likely to fall short where religious identity is at stake. They question the effectiveness of religious actors in conflict settings that are heavily charged by religion. In such environments, working conditions for religious peacemakers are difficult. Their credibility is at risk when religious peace brokers are identified with one of the conflicting parties who often emphasise the peace brokers' religious identity even when the brokers do not intentionally choose a side. "The broker is thus caught in a dangerous situation: on one hand, the broker faces the risk of being viewed as a traitor among his or her group and, consequently, losing credibility; on the other hand, he or she may also have problems in gaining the necessary confidence of the opposing conflicting party" (Harpviken & Røislien, 2008, p. 370). Harpviken and Røislien (2008) note, however, that peace brokers who are identified with the weaker party may face fewer credibility problems in a highly asymmetrical conflict as seen in the case of Abdul Ghaffar Khan who represented the local population in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan in mediation with the British colonists.

Religious leaders' favour of one side of the conflict may not necessarily halt their potential in conflict resolution. Svensson (2009) argues that impartiality is not a required condition for mediation in internal armed conflicts. In his quantitative research on types of mediators and successful negotiated settlement between 1989 and 2004, Svensson (2009) finds that biased mediators are in fact more effective than neutral mediators in generating institutional peace agreements. Although neutral mediators may convince the parties to peacefully end the conflict, biased mediators appear to be associated with arrangements of higher quality, such as political and territorial power sharing, international guarantees, repatriation, and provisions for amnesty. Interestingly, "biased mediators for the side that gained a favourable deal were actually less effective, compared to other types of mediators" in a situation of exorbitant concessions such as territorial power-sharing (Svensson, 2009, p. 463). However, when the concessions are less costly, "biased mediators tend to bring deals that are beneficial for their side" (Svensson, 2009, p. 465). Svensson (2013) indicates in a separate study on religious civil wars that, although religious incompatibility continues to exist, parties and third-party mediators can overcome religious obstacles and negotiate settlements through de-sacralising the conflict. In this respect, it is understandable that sharing religious identities with one of the conflicting parties does not necessarily undermine the constructive potential of religious intervention. Biased religious leaders may rather have a high possibility of success.

Despite emphasising the peacebuilding potential of religious actors and organisations, there are knowledge gaps in conceptualisation of religiuos actors' peacebuidling to which I hope to contribute in this thesis. Scholars widely agree that religious peacebuilding as a concept is still under-developed due to limited empirical knowledge of the role of religion in peacebuilding. The concept remains fragile and needs more empirical and systematic research (Appleby, 2000, p. 7; Gopin, 2000, pp. 16-17; Sampson, 1997, p. 280). The existing research demonstrates the

engagement of religious actors and organisations in peacebuilding in many countries via various categories of activities such as advocacy, mediation, observation, education, intra-faith and inter-faith dialogue, and transitional justice (Appleby, 2000; Bouta et al., 2005; Sampson, 1997). Bouta et al. (2005) find that these activities involve single-religious and multi-religious initiatives as well as complementary secular peacebuilding work and that these initiatives result in varying levels of success. The categorisation of peacebuilding activities, however, is still unclear. It appears that these activities are highly interrelated and take place at every phase of the conflict and at various levels of society in both religious and non-religious conflict and post-conflict contexts. More importantly, existing research does not indicate what peacebuilding activities religious actors are more likely to be involved in during conflict or post-conflict settings, and why this is the case. In other words, existing research does not yet explain how the different contexts of conflict or post-conflict influence the peacebuilding behaviour of religious peacebuilders. Besides, the existing research has not generally looked at variation among religious peacebuilders, both in terms of whether or not they engage in peacebuilding, and the types of peacebuilding activities in which they participate. To work toward conceptual clarity, this thesis focuses on peacebuilding in conflict settings and provides a categorisation of peacebuilding activities in which local religious leaders engage based on the principle of sustainable peace, which will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

In addition to the operational context of peacebuilding, the literature lacks a rigorous and systematic examination of peacebuilding at the individual level. Bouta et al. (2005) suggest in their comparative study of 27 Christian, Muslim and multi-faith peacebuilding organisations (international, regional and local) that the peace work of individual actors is often invisible and less accessible (to outsiders). Muslim peacebuilders especially, such as imams and sheikhs, work mostly through informal channels in their personal capacity without associating with

formal organisations.[5] Such peacebuilding work is difficult to measure and evaluate, thus constraining the ability to identify relevance and effectiveness or even the existence of religious peacebuilding practices. Indeed, the authors note that their research methods, which rely on email surveys and phone interviews, may be insufficient to identify non-institutionalised peacebuilders and their work. They call for a follow-up study that would include field research and interviews of faith-based peacebuilders to gather more information from less visible groups and individuals who may do important peace work in their communities. To fill this methodological gap, this thesis reports the results of fieldwork and interviews to gather first-hand information from *local individuals including Muslim leaders* who are based in the conflict areas in the Deep South of Thailand. Identifying relationships between non-governmental organisations and individual actors, and the possible influence of the former on the latter, may also improve understanding about the peacebuilding behaviour of individual actors.

Another area my study pays attention to is the influence of mechanisms other than religion. Many conventional studies not only ignore factors other than religion but also lack systematic and rigorous research design and methods. One can question whether religious values can at all imply inherent capacity to build peace or fully explain an engagement in peacebuilding, let alone effectiveness of such engagement. For example, case studies done by the Tanenbaum Centre for Interreligious Understanding (Little, 2007) are part of an initial step to demonstrate the peacebuilding efforts of individual religious leaders. These studies highlight the unrecognised peacebuilding efforts of international and local individuals, who have contributed to building peace in a wide range of conflict-torn countries such as Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The focus of these cases, however, is limited to

[5] In a separate paper, Abu-Nimer and Kadayifci-Orellana (2008) observing Muslim peacebuilders in Africa and the Balkan region, contend that, despite less visible peacebuilding works, Muslim peace-building NGOs in the modern sense are evolving due to increasing contacts with Western institutions.

personal stories of individual religious actors' peacebuilding as the outcome of the use of religion. Further exploration of other factors or mechanisms that may be as important as or more important than religion in motivating peacebuilding in these countries, may offer a more nuanced explanation of the peacebuilding of these individual religious actors.

Several other case studies also show that faith does not necessarily inspire religious leaders to engage in peacebuilding. They illustrate contextually the varying behaviour of religious leaders who make only a limited contribution to peacebuilding, or have unclear impacts, or even intensify the conflict and propel violence (Al Qurtuby, 2013; Fitzduff, 2011; Fluehr-Lobban, 2011; Ganguly & Swami, 2011; Hashemi, 2011; Hayward, 2011; Hibbard, 2011; Ishay, 2011; Khadiagala, 2001; Korostelina, 2011; Ntale, 2012). For instance, Hashemi (2011) argues that national, regional and global contexts significantly affect the behaviour of Sunni and Shi'a religious leaders in conflict settings mainly in the Middle East because these contexts shape the political environment in which religious leaders operate. Political agendas also critically shape the role of Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka. Hayward (2011) shows that prominent Buddhist monk elites at a national level in Sri Lanka are often so concerned with their own privileges and authority as clergy that they will not support peace processes if they are not included as stakeholders in the process, or if their interests are not addressed. Similarly, Korostelina (2011) finds that Tajik Muslim leaders only seek conflict settlement when they fear losing political power and popularity among the Tajik population. In the case of Kashmir, Ganguly and Swami (2011) also demonstrate the unclear impact of religious authority and leaders, who sometimes show involvement in the conflict but sometimes have limited participation in intensifying or reducing religious tensions despite the fact that political actors (both religious and secular) exploit and manipulate religious issues for their political agendas. In essence, these case studies

suggest the heterogeneity of religious leaders' behaviour – even amongst those from the same religious traditions.

As mentioned, there has been a serious lack of robust research designs in previous case studies on religious leaders in peacebuilding. For example, in the edited volume of *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (Sisk, 2011a), there is inconsistency between chapters as to how the term 'religious leaders' is defined. This significantly reduces the validity and generalisation of the study's results on the destructive/constructive behaviour of religious leaders especially the tendency for exercising religious leadership in a certain way – i.e. publicly/actively engaging or not with peacebuilding or conflict as presented in the cases above. In the Israel/Palestine, Tajikistan, Egypt and Sri Lanka cases, for instance, the term 'religious leader' refers to *religiously oriented politicians* (Hayward, 2011; Hibbard, 2011; Ishay, 2011; Korostelina, 2011), whereas it means *religious scholars and spiritual leaders* in other cases, such as Nigeria, Sudan and Northern Ireland (Fitzduff, 2011; Fluehr-Lobban, 2011; Hackett, 2011). Nevertheless, it is understandable that it may be difficult to completely separate religious leaders from political leaders in Islamic societies where religious and political systems closely intertwine.

Also, the unit of analysis of these case studies is unclear as the positions of the religious leaders studied in these case studies varies from religious leaders who are national figures to those who are active at a local level. For example, the Sri Lanka and Tajikistan cases (Hayward, 2011; Korostelina, 2011) show the contradictory behaviour of religious leaders. While religiously-oriented politicians at a national level manifest destructive behaviour, local religious leaders may not necessarily share such behaviour. Rigorous research design and further examination of the behaviour of religious leaders at the same level such as the local and the elite, may help

identify what roles are possible or suitable for religious leaders in different levels of leadership to play.

Given that most of the research is on the contribution of religious leaders from various levels of leadership, there is limited comparative knowledge of the peacebuilding work of local religious leaders. To date, a rigorous comparative analysis of local religious leaders who are in similar positions and in the same faith system is still missing. The existing case studies often compare contributions of religious leaders from different religious communities such as those in Northern Ireland (Little, 2007b), Nigeria (Little, 2007d; Hackett, 2011), and Lebanon (Irani, 2011). These case studies have been carried out within the same conflict settings to show similarities between different religious traditions - how they can positively motivate individual leaders to promote peace between warring communities. They however do not explain a possibility that an involvement in peacebuilding may not only be motivated by religious principles for peace. Other factors may also motivate (or demotivate) individual leaders in similar positions within the same religious traditions to engage in peacebuilding.

In conclusion, this section demonstrates the primary focus of the literature, which is the impact of religion on religious leaders' peacebuilding. It emphasises the importance of religious leaders as the normative authority, but also indicates the lack of a well-developed definition of 'religious leader'. More importantly, this section addresses the need for further exploration of other factors (non-religious) that may affect religious leaders' peacebuilding since religious values of peace are, at best, likely to only offer an inspiring context for peacebuilding but cannot fully explain the varying behaviour of religious leaders from the same faith tradition in the same countries. Examining the impact of other factors will enrich an understanding of religious leaders' peacebuilding. It is indeed the main question driving this thesis. The next

section will illustrate existing research on social networks, which also appear to be a potentially important mechanism influencing the peacebuilding work of religious leaders.

2.4 Social Networks and Peacebuilding of Religious Leaders

This research focuses on social relations or networks as possible mechanisms that promote or hinder peacebuilding. Notwithstanding the general lack of systematic research on factors other than religion, scholars widely agree that social networks within and across groups, as well as across levels of the conflict, are important mechanisms affecting religious actors' rational decision to undertake peacebuilding initiatives, and the effectiveness of their initatives (Appleby, 2000; Cilliers, 2002; De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004; Sisk, 2011a). They find that intra- and inter-group networks influence the peacebuilding practices and capacity of individual religious actors by generating and enhancing communication and collaboration as well as shared norms and resources. The following sections present existing studies on two types of social networks; intra-group or bonding and inter-group or bridging networks.

2.4.1 Intra-group or bonding networks

In the literature, intra-group or bonding networks refer to intra-religious networks, which are formed based on shared religious (and ethnic) identity. Scholars find that intra-group relationships can both promote and hinder inter-group cooperation and peacebuilding efforts. It appears that followers have the power to pressure their religious leaders to abandon or mobilise violence since religious leaders may lose their influence and legitimacy if they continue mobilising violence or passively allow violence to occur when their followers

condemn and distance themselves from prolonged violent movements and instead urge for peace (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010, p. 13).

Scholars illustrate an intra-group bond as a powerful force behind peacebuilding efforts in the case of Northern Ireland. With well-established internal relationships with group members, the Protestant Reverend Roy Magee gained leverage to criticise and condemn fellow Protestants, and helped Catholic Father Alex Reid successfully convince John Hume[6] and Gerry Adams[7] (representatives of internal factions within the Catholic community) to meet secretly for the first time, which later led to the Good Friday Agreement (Appleby, 2000; Jafari, 2007). As constant and trusted intermediaries, their intra-group dialogue significantly eased internal tension and influenced public theological transformation and Christian interdenominational reconciliation in Northern Island (Little, 2007b; Sandal, 2011).

Scholars also highlight that the ability to mobilise people for peace may decline when the degree of internal connection is low, as seen in Afghanistan for example. Wardak, Zaman, and Nawabi (2007) examine the involvement of Afghan religious leaders in post-2001 efforts to build a new state and fortify development, and conclude that Afghan religious leaders overstate their power. A number of Islamic leaders do not have much influence because they lack control of their members within their religious networks, which are very scattered. The authors note that the older religious leaders have limited impact but the young mullahs (teachers) more actively and effectively involved and control developments in the political arena by reaching out to the local population. With their self-awareness of the potential of participation and courage to achieve peace, the young mullahs provide education and persuade people to be more

[6] John Hume is the leader of the Nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) which advocates Irish reunification.
[7] Gerry Adams is the leader of Sinn Féin, the nationalist party, which has links with the IRA.

involved in religious processes. It is, however, important to note here that the authors fail to provide a clear definition of an *internal* religious network as these Islamic leaders may have tight control over their local or regional territories while their authority falls short on a national scale. In essence, one could consider national religious networks as inter-group rather than intra-group networks.

Showing a double-edge sword effect, scholars also suggest that intra-group bonds can create difficulties for inter-group collaboration. A few case studies affirm that, rather than having power over their constituents, religious leaders' actions can be restricted by pressure and expectation from group members who reject peaceful coexistence with others and discourage moderate religious leaders from participating in intergroup collaboration. Although having sympathy for the causes of peace movements, scholars demonstrate that religious leaders in Northern Ireland (Fitzduff, 2011), Tajikistan (Korostelina, 2011), Egypt (Hibbard, 2011) and Sri Lanka (Hayward, 2011) usually hesitate to engage in interreligious dialogue and cooperative activities as long as sectarian tendencies continue and support from their followers cannot be mobilised. These scholars suggest this is because religious leaders fear losing their privileged positions and authority in their own communities. In this respect, Sisk (2011b, p. 235) as the editor of *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* concludes that the religious leaders presented in these cases are more likely to follow and reflect existing social demands rather than set a new norm that their members will reject.

In summary, the literature demonstrates that religious leaders' decisions and actions are possibly determined by internal pressures and the expectations of their group members. If religious leaders fail to do what their constituents expect, they may face social punishment,

which in these cases is to lose their leadership and mandate and ultimately their power. Intra-group bonds can therefore potentially override moral obligations to other groups and may prevent individual leaders from taking a radical role in peace processes.

2.4.2 Inter-group or bridging networks

In the literature, inter-group or bridging networks suggest relationships with other religious actors and leaders from other faith systems, and that with secular state and non-state actors. Scholars argue that inter-group relationships can facilitate peacebuilding since these relationships open access to more resources. In the case of Sierra Leone, Fitzduff (2011) finds that longstanding trusting relationships across different religious groups encouraged inter-religious cooperation, which is an essential element to gain access to conflicting parties and to gain insight into the conflict's dynamics.[8] As demonstrated in the study, Alimamy Koroma, a Christian leader conversed in Islam, who is considered a fair and trustworthy person among the opposite side of the conflict, along with fellow leaders from the Interreligion Council of Sierra Leone, was able to gain access to and mediate between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and government leaders. Because of these inter-religious relationships, Little (2007d) suggests that the inter-religious cooperation by religious leaders that took place in Sierra Leone was based on a strong foundation of religious tolerance, acceptance and respect. It is also important to mention that in Sierra Leone religion neither caused nor nurtured the civil war and that in trusting their religious leaders, the people granted them a legitimate power to (re)generate trust across groups and to persuade the two sides to participate in peace processes (Little, 2007d).

[8] Religious communities in Sierra Leone have coexisted for generations. The majority of the population are Muslims (60%). While Christians are about 10 percent of the total population, indigenous beliefs comprise 30 percent.

Little (2007d, p.290) illustrates further the benefits of inter-religious networks with the increasing engagement between religious leaders of the Catholic Church (the Anglican Church of Uganda) and Muslims in Gulu and Kitgum under the formal interfaith collaboration, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). This engagement allowed religious leaders to reach the minority Acholi people and advocate for a peaceful solution to the ethnic-based civil war in Northern Uganda. The ARLPI have been able to promote dialogue between the Government and the rebels of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), and pressure for comprehensive measures to address socioeconomic problems in Northern Uganda, which have direct implications for the national peace and reconciliation process.

An interreligious institution appears to have produced a similar outcome in Sri Lanka where religious differences fuelled the civil war and Buddhist leaders achieved limited success in building inter-group trust. Khadiagala (2001) suggests that Buddhist elites, members of the interfaith Congress of Religions in Colombo, were more actively supportive of peace processes when they were involved in unofficial dialogue and interaction with peers from other religious groups.

Unofficial bridging networks are also examined in a case study of Peace Provocateurs (*Provokator Perdamaian*) in Indonesia (Al Qurtuby, 2013). Al Qurtuby (2013, p. 358) suggests that Peace Provocateurs, an informal interreligious alliance, serves as a friendship network or "a web of peacemakers" in which the Reverend Jacklevyn Manuputta, co-founder of this group, along with other Christian and Muslim peace activists have created a "public culture" of tolerance and spaces for interfaith dialogue for Christian-Muslim reconciliation in Ambon Island, Indonesia. Peace Provocateurs not only works with religious actors but also with multiple secular counterparts and peace advocates, especially from the media, to provide

accurate information about inter-religious violence. It should be noted, however, that their collaboration and output has not been systematically analysed and measured. One cannot be sure which collaboration is more effective than others. While Al Qurtuby (2013) suggests that Peace Provocateurs certainly contributes to current social stability and mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims, he also admits that inter-religious collaboration is less likely to establish durable peace in Ambon. Due to almost an equal population of Muslims (48%) and Christians (50%) and past experiences of inter-religious wars, Ambon remains prone to conflict as long as inter-group competition for political power and economic and cultural resources exists and can potentially spark tensions. In this regard, further research on the impact of inter-group networks in Ambon and similar contexts may help identify the conditions which will sustain the peacebuilding efforts of religious leaders.

Going beyond national boundaries, the literature also captures participation in transnational non-governmental networks, which can stimulate de-radicalisation of extreme local religious actors and improve local peacebuilding potential through sharing resources and motivations. According to Sandal (2011, p. 942), transnational connection and interaction with religious actors at an international level established shared norms and practices, which to some extent de-radicalised South African church leaders who represented exclusive public theologies forcing them to create more inclusive theological orientation. Not only were local religious leaders moderated, Appleby (2008) argues that engaging and interacting with international counterparts engendered learning about peacebuilding, which helped increase self-awareness among local religious leaders of their potential peacebuilding roles. He illustrates the potential of success for religious peacebuilders by providing the example of the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio, who became effective mediators of conflicts in Africa by using a strategy of alliance building. They sought potential personal and organisational partnerships by extending

relationships as far as possible with religious and secular people on every side in the different conflicts. In fact, the ability to find potential Catholic allies, or what Appleby calls ‘natural allies', who also were committed to the principle of justice and peace across the globe, significantly generates the Catholic Church’s pervasive worldwide presence and involvement in peacebuilding in general. In this regard, Appleby (2008) suggests that collaboration through transnational networks across geographical and cultural settings will help local Buddhist activists, who often fail to realise their strategic capacity to understand and/or enact their potential peacebuilding roles within their local communities, to support human rights in Cambodia. As transnational actors, Cambodian Buddhist monks would benefit from various resources, including technologies and specialised expertise that their possible global networks could offer. Transnational partnerships would help compensate for the limited resources with which the monks are struggling. Similar roles of transnational non-governmental organisations that support local religious peace practitioners are demonstrated in other settings such as the Vatican (links to the Maronites) in Lebanon (Irani, 2011) and the Mennonites in Uganda and Kenya (Welty, 2014).

Relationships with the state are also investigated. Scholars find that the state plays a crucial role in creating the conditions or environment that enable or disable the peacebuilding behaviour of religious leaders. Hashemi (2011), for example, argues that to stay in power the authoritarian nature of most of the regimes in the Muslim Middle East largely manipulates political ideologies and the behaviour of the Sunni and Shi’a religious leaders by promoting religious sectarianism. Similarly highlighting the role of the state, Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney (2011) investigate the church-state relations in Northern Ireland and identify that the state shapes opportunities and constraints in the peacebuilding of religious actors through

maximising or minimising the intellectual, institutional, market, and political space in which religious actors can operate.

Moreover, De Juan and Vüllers (2010) suggest that a rational decision of religious leaders to become involved in peace activism, such as in Southern Thailand and Indonesia, is not only influenced by rewards (available resources) but also by punishment from the government. Their argument however forms based on only few examples without a systematic research design. One needs to further investigate these cases to be able to provide a concrete explanation behind the influences of the government, whose resources or punishment may not produce the same effect or be applicable at all to some religious leaders. The relationship with the government will be examined in this thesis to help clarify its effect on religious leaders' behaviour in Southern Thailand.

In short, the literature shows that inter-group relationships, religious and non-religious, as well as domestic and international relationships, can potentially encourage peacebuilding behaviour in individual religious leaders. Inter-group networks appear to moderate ideologies in individual religious leaders and improve access to opportunities and resources, which are important in enabling religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding. Unlike inter-religious and non-governmental networks, the existing research demonstrates that relationships with the state may both positively and negatively impact religious leaders' peacebuilding behaviour. Therefore, further empirical research on linkages with the state and its impact on the behaviour of individual leaders is essential to create a comprehensive understanding of the conditions or mechanisms through which the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders can be strengthened (or weakened). This thesis will start filling this research gap by examining the relationship between the Thai state and local religious leaders in Southern Thailand.

2.5 Conclusion

Previous literature has recognised the importance and potential of various peacebuilding roles, both religious and non-religious, that are or could be played by local religious leaders, and also the importance of biased religious leaders who lean towards one of the conflicting parties. The potential of these leaders to build peace has primarily been described as the product of religious values for peace. However, such values are constant and cannot fully explain varying behaviour among leaders from the same tradition. Therefore, one must search for other causal factors.

The literature has suggested that the behaviour of religious leaders is likely to be determined by the social relationships or networks they establish with other actors. These networks appear to hold both constructive and destructive potential, which has to date been illustrated in case studies with limited comparability. Most existing studies do not examine the comparative impact of both intra- and inter-religious networks. Religious elites, who are group leaders, are likely to be constrained in supporting and engaging with peace processes when group members disallow inter-group cooperative activities. In contrast, inter-group or bridging networks, such as an inter-religious organisation or a religious-secular alliance, may be more likely to facilitate peacebuilding as they improve the ability to communicate, collaborate, spread norms of peace, and gain access to resources. However, the existing research lacks robust research design and methods, for instance, in clearly defining religious leaders. Moreover, the existing research lacks a comparative analysis showing a tendency of examining peacebuilders without investigating non-peacebuilders. This thesis will further contribute to empirical research by systematically examining the likelihood of engagement in peacebuilding and possibly other consequences that bridging networks have on local religious leaders in a conflict environment.

The theory of bridging networks and their impacts will be articulated in the next chapter. It will serve as the foundation of this thesis and as the theoretical framework for investigating bridging networks and peacebuilding practices of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders[9] in the Southern Thailand conflict. The next chapter will also provide the conceptualisation of 'peacebuilding of local religious leaders' including identifying disaggregation of types of peacebuilding activities, and 'bridging networks' including defining a clear group boundary that is missing in the current concept of social network.

The thesis will examine the links between networks with other actors in the conflict, who have different behaviours (facilitation, imposition, impairment of peacebuilding roles), and the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders. It will also conduct a within-case comparative analysis comparing the effects of three different types of bridging networks (based on the three varying behaviours of other actors) on the behaviour of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders.

[9] To clarify, this thesis looks at local scholarly religious and spiritual authorities/elites, not religious politicians.

Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 2, religious leaders have both constructive and destructive potential. During ethnoreligious conflict, they can mobilise violence against the opposition group or support inter-group cooperation. Many of them engage in neither conflict nor peacebuilding, and remain in a position of non-involvement. Although recognising the possibility or existence of normative guidance, religious actors' involvement in peace activism also appears to be determined by the social relations or networks they have within and across conflicting groups (Appleby, 2000; Cilliers, 2002; De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004). This thesis focuses on inter-group or bridging networks as a possible mechanism to promote peacebuilding. Intra-group or bonding networks may be less closely related to peacebuilding, as demonstrated in the previous chapter and this is left for future research.

This thesis adopts a combination between positivism and constructivism as the philosophy of how to acquire knowledge (epistemology) and the nature of the world (ontology) (Druckman, 2005, pp. 5-7). I first use a positivist approach in developing a theoretical framework, which is created based on the existing knowledge or observed facts in other research settings. As the below discussions will demonstrate, the theoretical framework suggests a set of predicted effects of bridging network on local religious leaders' peacebuilding. However, the research

findings gathered from the field research not only follow the positivist stance but also generate knowledge based on how interviewees perceived and their subjective experiences about a given subject at the certain point in time in the context of the Deep South.

This chapter will articulate the theoretical foundation of this thesis arguing that during conflict bridging networks are likely to encourage local religious leaders to engage in peacebuilding. The theory concentrates on analysing the way in which access to resources available in bridging networks determines the varying levels of support or opportunity for local religious leaders to engage in a peacebuilding activity. In the following sections, the conceptualisation of peacebuilding of local religious leaders and bridging networks will be presented, followed by a discussion of the predicted effect – varying peacebuilding behaviour.

3.2 Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

3.2.1 Conceptualisation

In this thesis, 'local religious leader' is defined as a person, who is recognised by a local religious body or community as a spiritual leader and/or teacher providing guidance and inspiration to others based on religious principles and knowledge. Generally speaking, a religious leader is a respected individual, who gains prestige from people within (and maybe outside) his/her areas (Lederach, 1997). He/she possesses unique leverage and legitimacy to set religious norms and practices for the public through his/her doctrinal and ethical interpretations (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; D. Johnston & Cox, 2003; Sisk, 2011c). Especially, a religious leader at the local level seems to have power to "develop, form [his/her] own tradition and with understanding of the specificities of the conflict situation, effective and appropriate concepts and practices" (Hertog, 2010, p. 96). The term 'religious leader' is used

when referring to a religious political leader or a spiritual leader (Sisk, 2011a), who may be similarly influenced by religion but differently hold social positions, incentives and expectations.

Religious leaders' peacebuilding is also broadly defined in the literature with 'religion' as the key component of the concept. Using religion as an instrument of peace contributes particularly to the "soft aspects" of sustainable peacebuilding that Hertog (2010, p. 47) defines as psychological, such as emotions, attitudes and perceptions. It has been suggested that religion inspires peacebuilding and prevents future conflict and violence through its normative values of compromise, tolerance, compassion, love, empathy, forgiveness, and non-violence (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Appleby, 2000, 2003b; Gopin, 1997, 2000, 2001; Hertog, 2010; D. Johnston & Cox, 2003). Scholars acknowledge, however, that the conceptualisation of religious peacebuilding is underdeveloped because of limited empirical and systematic research into religion's role in peacebuilding (Appleby, 2000, p. 7; Gopin, 2000, pp. 16-17; Sampson, 1997, p. 280).

Appleby (2000, pp. 211-212) suggests a broad definition of religious peacebuilding that captures three dimensions: conflict management, conflict resolution, and structural reform. These definitions encompass "the various phases, levels, and types of activity, by religious actors and others, that strengthen religion's role in creating tolerant and nonviolent societies". According to Gopin (2000, 2002a), religious peacebuilding can also be seen as "myth matters" that use religious symbols and deeds to address deep human problems and to unite the population. Scholars demonstrate that in many countries religious leaders utilise religion to promote non-violent approaches to conflict-solving. For example, Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo advocated for non-violent change via the mobilisation of non-violent resistance

to the Indonesian government's occupation of East Timor during which the indigenous East Timorese were oppressed and killed (Appleby, 2000, p. 215). With Catholicism popular among Bolivian peasants and miners, the Catholic Church became a mediator in resolving clashes between miners and the national government in the 1970s and the 1980s (Appleby, 2000, p. 217).

Despite recognising the important role of religion, I argue that peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by religious leaders can be religious (involving single or multiple religions) and non-religious as illustrated in the previous study by Bouta et al. (2005). For example, the peace programme of the Mennonite Central Committees (MCC) started in 2001 in Nigeria actively involved both Muslims and Christians in inter-faith and joint practical activities such as trauma healing sessions and workshops for pastors, Muslim leaders, and other community stakeholders to increase their resilience and to reduce tension. Religious actors are also devoted to single-religious peace work as seen in the case of the Catholic Peace-building Network (CNP), which focuses on expanding the Church's peacebuilding capacity in areas of conflict and strengthening a theology of just peace[10].

Showing an involvement in secular peacebuilding, a spiritually-based group - the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) branch in Northern Ireland - acted as an intermediary at the community level between civilians and the police and civilians and the IRA (Bouta et al., 2005). More importantly, the involvement of the Catholic movement of Sant'Egidio in mediation in Guatemala in 1996 showed the importance of complementary work in secular peacebuilding. Sant'Egidio created informal and direct contacts between the Guatemalan

[10] There is an ongoing debate about the definition of 'just peace'. Just peace often refers peace with justice, which can be defined differently depending on the context. See more details about 'just peace' in Allan, P., & Keller, A.(Eds.) (2006). *What is a Just Peace?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

government and the guerrilla movement, which helped overcome the lack of trust and led to meetings between the two sides (Bouta et al., 2005).

Based on the study of Bouta et al. (2005) that demonstrates religious leaders' involvement in both religious and non-religious peacebuilding initiatives, this thesis therefore uses the term 'peacebuilding of local religious leaders' rather than 'religious peacebuilding' to also accommodate non-religious peacebuilding work.

Given the importance of recognising that the peacebuilding of religious leaders in conflict and post-conflict situations can be very different, the broad concept of religious peacebuilding proposed by Appleby (2000, pp. 211-212) that tries to capture both during-conflict and post-conflict contexts may also be problematic. One can imagine peace formation while violence exists to be more challenging and constrained than in the absence of violence. A complex peacebuilding strategy is often required for peace practitioners who work in conflict situations. This is especially the case for religious leaders whose leader status can be harmed when they are identified with one conflicting group and expected to represent interests of that group, and to advocate peace and reconciliation with other conflicting groups (Sisk, 2011b). Defining a clearer concept of religious leaders' peacebuilding during conflict is therefore of interest to this research. This thesis defines peacebuilding as *the engagement in (re)establishing tolerance and peaceful coexistence between two or among multiple conflicting parties in a conflict setting.*

Local religious leaders may pursue two main peacebuilding goals during conflict: the formation of *tolerance* and *coexistence* as the basis of sustainable peace. Tolerance of differences is a core principle of peacebuilding (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Appleby, 2000; Sisk, 2011a). It means acceptance of others, which importantly reinforces living in harmony and the pursuit of a larger

goal of social cooperation (Gülen, 2004). It is the minimalist form of interaction that fosters 'negative peace'[11] or the absence of direct violence[12] (Sisk, 2011a). In a conflict where religion and ethnicity are prominent forces in shaping the dynamics of nationalism, intolerance and tolerance towards other ethnicities and religions (what might be called the other's theology) each become extremely important in the occurrence or mitigation of violence (Little, 2011). In many cases of illiberal democracy, ethnic and religious intolerance is permitted during the conceptualisation of the nation. The potential outcome is a high incidence of violence as seen in the case of Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka where an illiberal form of democracy has existed since independence in 1948 (Little, 1994, 2011). In contrast, a combination of a high degree of national tolerance and effective constitutional democracy can lead to a very low incidence of violence where social and political rules were based on ethnic and religious inclusiveness and the equal freedom of all citizens (Little, 2011). To ensure 'negative peace', inclusive ethnic and religious identities as national identities should be enforced with the goal of peacebuilders "to bring people to the realization that they are different and that such differences should not constitute a basis for discrimination or bias" (Abu-Nimer, 2003, p. 82).

Going beyond tolerance, peacebuilding of local religious leaders may ultimately aim at establishing a peaceful coexistence between different ethnicities and religions. Coexistence is generally seen as a more extensive form of interaction that manifests 'positive peace' or the presence of cooperation (Sisk, 2011a). It is not only about allowing the other to live without

[11] See more details about definitions of 'negative peace' and 'positive peace' in Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), pp. 167-191; Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. London: Sage; Galtung, J. (2012). Positive and Negative Peace. In C. P. Webel & J. Johansen (Eds.), *Peace and conflict studies: a reader*. New York: Routledge.

[12] Violence can be categorised into 'direct violence' meaning "intended harming, hurting", 'structural violence' meaning "unintended harming, hurting", and 'cultural violence' meaning "intended or unintended justifying violence" (Galtung, 2012, p. 75). See more details about definitions of 'violence' in Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), pp. 167-191; Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. London: Sage; Galtung, J. (2012). Positive and Negative Peace. In C. P. Webel & J. Johansen (Eds.), *Peace and conflict studies: a reader*. New York: Routledge.

harm but also about accommodating differences and developing inclusive and cooperative modes of interaction between the minority and the majority (Abu-Nimer, 2001b; Kriesberg, 1998, 2001; Weiner, 1998). Importantly, Kriesberg (2001, p. 48) argues that forms of accommodation tend to change over time depending on contextual, relational, and internal factors. One example that demonstrates this kind of flexibility is the tremendously diverse activities organised under an education project of the Encounter Programme to support Arab-Jewish coexistence in Israel between the 1950s to the 1980s, suitable to fit the conditions at the time (Abu-Nimer, 2001b). Considering the 'negative' and 'positive' dimensions of peace discussed above, peace can be defined as the presence of tolerance and/or peaceful coexistence. To re-establish tolerance and peaceful coexistence, local religious leaders engage in peacebuilding activities that are concerned with mutual benefits to all conflicting parties or at least not endangering others while advocating primarily for the interests of one party. This is because activities concerned with mutual benefits are likely to encourage peaceful relationships in a deeply divided society. Lederach (1997) argues that sustainable peacebuilding is a comprehensive process that is not only about ending physical violence or materially rebuilding the country, but rather a process of societal transformation from conflict toward more peaceful relationships. Numerous activities in a variety of domains are combined to build bridges between polarised groups or warring parties and re-integrate the affected populations, including conflicting parties, war victims, civilians and security personnel, in order to establish a stable society and prevent the escalation of tensions or future disputes (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Francis & Ropers, 1999, p. 537; Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1997; van Leeuwen, 2009). In conflicts where religious and ethnic differences cause division and hostility, peacebuilding activities often focus on the reconstruction or the restoration of sustainably peaceful relationships between conflicting parties and bridging differences with rapprochement and mutual understanding (Francis & Ropers, 1999, p. 529; Lederach, 1997).

3.2.2 Peacebuilding Activities

In the religious peacebuilding literature, scholars demonstrate that local religious leaders engage in a broad range of activities in varying operational contexts (Appleby, 2000; Bouta et al., 2005; Sampson, 1997; Sisk, 2011a). Peacebuilding activities are categorised into several functions: advocacy, observation or monitoring, education, religious dialogue, mediation or intermediation, and transitional justice (Bouta et al., 2005; Sampson, 1997). These categorisations are however ambiguous and do not offer clear definitions of some activities in practice. For instance, 'advocacy' for human rights is difficult to separate from the 'observation/monitoring' category that prevents the violation of human rights. More importantly, if advocacy is defined as activities that "are primarily concerned with empowering the weaker party(ies) in a conflict situation, reconstructing relationships, and transforming unjust social structures" (Sampson, 1997, p. 280), it may not result in mutual benefits or lead to tolerance and peaceful coexistence between conflicting parties. When advocates emphasise the interests of only one side of the conflict (despite being perceived as the weaker side), they may (intentionally or unintentionally) exclude others and sustain division.

A more comprehensive categorisation is found in the Joint Utstein Study of Peace Building by Smith (2004, p. 20), which proposes a strategic framework for sustainable peacebuilding that reflects 'negative peace' (tolerance) and 'positive peace' (peaceful coexistence) through four fundamental objectives: "(1) to provide security; (2) to establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace; (3) to establish the political framework of long-term peace; and (4) to generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war and justice". These four goals are transformed into four primary domains of peacebuilding practices: reform of justice and security institutions; socio-economic development; good governance; and a culture of truth, justice and reconciliation (OECD, 2008). Although these categorisations are broad and were

originally applied to international peacebuilding intervention in a post-conflict situation, they can provide a similar framework for local peacebuilding in a conflict setting due to the inseparable link between international and local peacebuilding. Peacebuilding initiatives of local religious leaders are often directly or indirectly influenced by international donors and transnational counterparts, for example via funding applications and training. This influence is evident in the substantial impact of Sant'Egidio's engagement in local peacebuilding in many African countries (Appleby, 2008).

To practically capture all the possible activities of local religious leaders that nurture tolerance and peaceful coexistence in a conflict setting, this thesis has combined the categorisations drawn from both religious and sustainable peacebuilding literature and subsequently categorises peacebuilding activities into five domains: community mediation; community security and justice; socio-economic development; inclusive governance; and reconciliation via religious dialogue.

Community mediation concentrates on peacemaking efforts that seek to mediate between opposing sides and neutralise differences to reach a settlement at the community level (Sampson, 1997, p. 280). This thesis also includes mediation between ethnoreligious communities and facilitation, such as providing safe spaces for mediation (Bouta et al., 2005, pp. 7-8). For instance, under the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI)[13] in northern Uganda, religious leaders from the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church of Uganda, and Muslim communities mediated conflict between feuding clans and neighbouring communities between the Acholi and their Jie neighbours, Teso and Karimojong rural

[13] The ARLPI was an interfaith collaborative peace group that gained massive support because it was formed within the conflict society, which offered a strong local foundation and trust even though it later embraced external partnership (Khadiagala, 2001).

communities (Bouta et al., 2005; Khadiagala, 2001; Ntale, 2012). Local Catholic and Islamic leaders in Uganda were also involved in mediation at a national level between rebels and the government (Bouta et al., 2005; Khadiagala, 2001; Ntale, 2012).

Community security and justice refer to the protection of and justice for community members regardless his/her ethnic and religious differences. Community policing is an increasingly important role for religious leaders where interreligious tensions and conflict are escalating. In Victoria, Australia, as a part of creating inclusive counterterrorism networks, the police and security agencies conducted community policing with positive community relations, especially working in partnership and consultation with Islamic leaders to foster mutual confidence and to lessen the risk of alienating the Islamic population (Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009, p. 929). As a result, Islamic communities could express their dissent and grievances non-violently through multi-faith communities that were created for safe communication channels. Collaborating with Islamic leaders and communities also sent an important message that community policing was for the entire state rather than an action against a particular segment of Victoria.

In addition to community policing, nonviolent observations in judicial procedures and security policies and practices (police and military) are also important to guarantee the safety of community members, particularly those who are seen as suspicious. In a community with a high level of mistrust and prejudice, the rule of law and judicial practices may be distorted in dealing with civilian suspects or insurgents held captive by the authorities. For example, Church organizations took part in observing and monitoring the 1991 elections in Zambia, while Mennonite peacemakers play an important observer role in Central America (Sampson, 1997).

Socio-economic development is a key mechanism of peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Collier et al., 2003; Paffenholz, 2010) in line with rapidly growing research on the relationship between development and conflict (Mac Ginty, 2011; Uvin, 2002). In a statement, the former United Nations Secretary, General Kofi Annan, said "there can be no development without peace, and no peace without development" (cited in McCandless, 2014, p. 505). Development assistance or international aid accommodates the disadvantaged (minority) population and brings to a war-torn society positive changes via a reduction in the socio-economic inequalities that are the source of grievances (Kriesberg, 1998), and economic growth and modernisation (Jantzi & Jantzi, 2009). Development initiatives involve material and non-material development such as the physical (re)construction of infrastructure, equitable distribution of development benefits, equitable access to services and natural resources, awareness of gender equality, and civic engagement for social inclusion (Huda, Abu-Nimer, Qader, & McCandless, 2011; OECD, 2008). The effectiveness of development initiatives rests heavily on the involvement of local actors who have local knowledge and legitimacy in operational contexts (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Anderson, 1999a; Anderson et al., 2012). Although the roles of local religious actors in development are rarely articulated due to the traditional tendency of separating religion from the state or the public sphere, scholars argue that engaging them can provide crucial development alternatives by incorporating the normative ideals embedded in religion and ability to mobilise adherents (Clarke, 2006; McDuie-Ra & Rees, 2010). The success of local Islamic actors' development projects were manifested in Somalia where they coordinated and provided social services such as healthcare, education, and water during the absence of effective government (Anderson, 1999b; Bouta et al., 2005; Clarke, 2006).

Inclusive governance is reflected in freedom of expression, participatory processes, anti-corruption and good governance, transparency and accountability, rule of law, democratisation, electoral processes, civil society development, and media development (OECD, 2008). It is to replace 'poor governance' that is often a root cause of conflict and a major obstacle to peace formation. When the society is primarily organised along ethnic, religious and tribal lines, setting up inclusive local governance often requires a combination of existing local systems and various institutions introduced by external actors. As the traditional authority, religious leaders - along with other traditional institutions like councils of elders, warlords and tribal chiefs representing the different needs of various groups including militias - must inevitably be included in reformation to ensure equal participation of all parties, and transparency and accountability of the new regulations and procedures as seen in Afghanistan (Nixon & Ponzio, 2007; Ponzio, 2007) and Southern Sudan (Unger & Wils, 2007).

Religious dialogue is the main approach to reconciliation. Religious dialogue is a conversation of people from different faiths that facilitates learning and understanding of each other (Smock, 2002). It creates tolerance, or the acceptance of differences, and cooperation through reconciling identity differences (Korostelina, 2010, p. 105). It emphasises the importance of spirituality, morality and religious identity in encountering dialogue participants and changing their negative attitudes to more positive ones (Abu-Nimer, 2002). It is effectively utilised in the promotion of (national and international) tolerance and mutual understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim groups (Korostelina, 2010). In this thesis, religious dialogue refers to teaching, preaching, and discussing and the exchanging of religious texts and principles. It is not only initiated with the aim of contributing to local and national peace processes (Bouta et al., 2005, p. 8), but also to de-radicalisation and the reinforcement of religious values for peace

(Sandal, 2011, p. 942), as well as to spiritual healing of trauma, frustration, and anger after an encounter with violence and loss in conflict settings (Little, 2007a) .

There are two kinds of religious dialogue: intra- and interreligious dialogue.[14] Intra-religious dialogue occurs among members of the same religious group to generate a deep understanding of their own religious traditions, especially the fundamentals of peace. Inter-religious dialogue develops between members of conflicting religious groups to share religious convictions with each other (Cilliers, 2002, p. 48). The two are closely linked. Cilliers (2002, p. 49) suggests that "interfaith dialogue is constructive only when people become firmly grounded in their own religious traditions and through that process gain the willingness to listen and respect the beliefs of other religions". It is therefore crucial to internally discuss peace elements, which are inherent in one's own religious tradition to urge engagement in interfaith dialogue. For that reason, intra- and interreligious dialogue often takes place in combination and is labelled as interfaith or interreligious dialogue that usually "requires not only mutual sharing and exchange, but also mutual listening and consideration of the others' view" (Abu-Nimer, Khoury, & Welty, 2007, pp. 8-9). At interreligious dialogue workshops between Christians and Muslims held by Pastor James Movel Wuye and Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa in Nigeria, intra-religious sessions were separate discussions of Christian and Muslim participants (religious youth leaders). Although the workshops aimed to incorporate religious peace values, such as forgiveness and respect, into their perception and behaviour toward others, both groups could freely express their fear, concerns and expectations about meeting people from the other faith group (Smock, 2006, pp. 21-24). Both groups then joined an interreligious dialogue session where they (1) disclosed positive and negative sentiments about the other faith group,

[14] Intra- and inter-religious dialogues are interchangeable with intra- and inter-faith dialogues in the literature.

(2) discussed misconceptions and stereotypes, and (3) identified steps to establish a productive interreligious dialogue (Smock, 2006, pp. 21-24).

In this section, I have conceptualised the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in a conflict setting. To construct the existing theoretical propositions, I have used case studies/examples that best demonstrate the local religious leaders' peacebuilding behaviour and factors influencing the peacebuilding behaviour in a conflict context. Due to the paucity of Southeast Asian cases, I could unfortunately not draw upon this region for the theoretical conceptualization. I have argued that tolerance and peaceful coexistence are the two main goals components of peacebuilding as they foster sustainable peace. To define peacebuilding in a practical way, I have also discussed the categorisation of peacebuilding activities undertaken by local religious leaders into five domains: community mediation; community security and justice; socio-economic development; inclusive governance; and reconciliation via religious dialogue. This thesis will include the religious leaders as research target only when they engage in at least one of these five types of peacebuilding activities (See more details below). The following sections will conceptualise inter-group or bridging networks, which are suggested in the literature to be important factors influencing the behaviour of individual religious leaders (Appleby, 2008; De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Harpviken & Røislien, 2008; Sisk, 2011a).

3.3 Bridging Networks

3.3.1 Conceptualisation

Despite an ongoing debate relating to its conceptual clarity and methodological strength, social networks are used as an analytical framework in various research fields such as anthropology (Barnes, 1954, 1972; Mitchell, 1969; Nadel, 1957), sociology (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1987,

1988; Flap, 2002; Flap & Völker, 2003; Lin, 2001; Portes, 1998; Wellman, 1983), economics and development (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001; Isham, Kelly, & Ramaswamy, 2002; Woolcock, 1998), and political science (Nannestad, Lind Haase Svendsen, & Tinggaard Svendsen, 2008; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Varshney, 2002). Social networks are also employed in Peace and Conflict studies when peace and conflict are viewed as a form of social relations. Scholars highlight the importance of the role of civic engagement and trust in constructing peace and conflict in diverse communities (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Cox, 2009; Pickering, 2006; Varshney, 2002; Vervisch & Titeca, 2010).

There appears to be strong agreement on the definition of the term 'social network' as a two-dimensional concept showing two broad patterns of ties: intra-group/bonding and inter-group/bridging networks. The pattern of ties shows the links between individuals or the way in which individuals are connected. To understand individuals' behaviour and change in a social context, scholars analyse these patterns in a network that provides significant opportunities and constraints on people's actions or decision-making by determining their access to resources. As described by Wellman (1983, p. 157), social systems are "networks of dependency relationships resulting from the differential possession of scarce resources at the nodes and the structured allocation of these resources at the ties".

Scholars acknowledge that an individual has autonomy to reach out to others beyond his/her immediate group, including distant acquaintances, colleagues, neighbours, and voluntary association membership of sport clubs (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Varshney, 2002; Woolcock, 1998). In an ethnically and religiously diverse, and deeply divided society, relationships with others reflect "inclusiveness" and "looking outwards" that "encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (Putnam, 2000, p.22). Such inclusive

relationships are likely to hold diverse membership, which is likely to nurture tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Relationships with others can also be described as 'weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1360) among people from different groups, in which resources or social capital can be found despite less proximity than 'strong ties' (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988) among peoples from the same group, which "reinforce exclusive identities" (Putnam, 2000, p.22). In this context, strong ties are inherent in the religious leaders' immediate group, which is his/her religious congregation, primarily consisting of religious actors/leaders who are close (in relations or proximity) to and share similar religious leadership positions and social status such as monks, imams and *uluma*[15].

In this thesis, only the bridging pattern of ties is central to the analysis of peacebuilding behaviour of *individual* local religious leaders. This is because scholars identify that bridging networks are more likely than bonding networks[16] to support the creation of peace in deeply divided societies, by fostering inclusiveness with the different (ethnic and religious) groups. Bridging networks are thus conceptualised in this thesis from the standpoint of focal individuals as *a set of relationships between a local religious leader and others who are outside his/her religious congregation.*

In peacebuilding, religious leaders are likely to extend their relationships beyond the boundary of their own religious congregation and associate with a number of other actors. The relationships with others may be optional in a peaceful context in which religious leaders are

[15] 'Uluma' is the plural form of 'ulama' (Islamic scholar).

[16] Scholars suggest that bonding networks potentially cause inter-group conflict as they may reinforce the exclusion of others and constrain inter-group cooperation in a deeply divided society. However, bonding links can facilitate peace by providing leaders with the capacity to implement reforms, but that role of bonding networks is probably conditioned by other factors, especially the motivations of the leader and the preferences of the congregation. In some contexts, this may enhance the demand for and efficacy of peacebuilding, but in others, it may not.

able to isolate themselves and focus only on their spiritual journey. However, Lederach (1997) argues that religious leaders that are involved in peacebuilding often serve as a vital link to other actors. These can be actors at the 'top' (i.e. political and military leaders), middle-range (i.e. religious leaders from other religious congregations, civil society and non-governmental organisations), and grassroots (i.e. community leaders, indigenous civil society and non-governmental organisations).

Notwithstanding the recognition of external linkages to other actors, Lederach (1997) largely focuses on peaceful approaches to building peace undertaken by actors at different levels of leadership. As a result, the varying behaviours or approaches, particularly of those who may use aggression and violence, are excluded from the current discussion even though the peacebuilding behaviour of religious leaders may be determined by both pacifism (Appleby, 2000, 2003a, 2008; Bouta et al., 2005; Brewer et al., 2011) and violence (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Sisk, 2011a) in conflict settings. For that reason, this study will explore ties to out-group actors, and categorises them into three broad types of bridging networks based on the approaches of other actors: facilitate, impose, and impair.

3.3.2 Network Types: The Behaviours of the Others

In conflict settings, local religious leaders possibly encounter both peacebuilders and peace spoilers. I therefore propose that local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding during conflict is likely to be influenced by the behaviours or approaches of their contacts, which can (1) facilitate the bottom-up development of the peacebuilding roles of local religious leaders, (2) impose peacebuilding norms and practices on local religious leaders, or (3) impair the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders. However, it is possible that one could be

facilitative of the peacebuilding role of a local religious leader in one instance, and be detrimental in another.

Facilitation or the act of assisting local actors in the bottom-up peacebuilding is a widely-promoted strategy for building sustainable peace in local settings (Carl, 2003; Forster & Mattner, 2007; Francis, 2002; Francis & Ropers, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Miall et al., 1999; Reich, 2006; Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001; Richmond, 2005, 2011; Theros, 2012; UN, October 2010; van Leeuwen, 2009). External actors are encouraged to help foster locally-driven peacebuilding processes by including local actors and knowledge.[17] Scholars demonstrate that international faith-based actors and organisations strengthen the peacebuilding roles of local religious actors and leaders, who are highly respected and can shape the conflict dynamics and peacebuilding process, such as in Nigeria (Hackett, 2011; Haynes, 2009; Little, 2007e), Northern Uganda (Khadiagala, 2001; Ntale, 2012), Kenya (Lynch, 2011; Welty, 2014), and Sierra Leone (Little, 2007d). In these countries, the international faith-based actors and organisations facilitate training programs and workshops, in which socialisation with other actors takes place. Socialisation is about associating with individuals who are outside the immediate religious congregation, and learning of social patterns and norms, which are constructive conflict resolution mechanisms and peaceful norms in this context.

Scholars show that the peaceful approaches and norms derived from religious myths and principles, are used to create distance from the conflictual psychology of the community, and to construct a new narrative of non-violence and re-humanisation (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-

[17] It is worth noting that I am aware of an on-going debate about identifying who the local is, and which elements in 'the local' (i.e. culture/knowledge/people) that should be included in a peacebuilding process as the conflict is probably caused by the local in the first place. However, the issue of defining a clear definition of 'the local' is not a concern in this thesis as this thesis particularly focuses on 'the local religious leader' and has provided a specific definition of local religious leaders earlier in this chapter.

Orellana, 2009, pp. 196-197). Constructing mutual norms for peace and transforming (religious) identities to more sustainably peaceful ones, can be done through religious rituals that are symbolic interpretations of identity and how a person constructs 'the other', which is often the underlying cause of the conflict (Schirch, 2001).

Transforming radicalism and creating an awareness of mutual peaceful principles can also be done through more general forms of interaction. Sandal (2011, p. 942) found that in South Africa, meeting with leaders and peace practitioners from other religious groups, who have inclusive theological orientations, helped de-radicalise and inspire church leaders through shared religious norms for peace such as nonviolence, tolerance and compassion.

External actors can help facilitate the development of the peacebuilding roles of local religious leaders from the bottom-up perspective, and they can also take a top-down approach by imposing certain peacebuilding norms and practices on local religious leaders.

Imposition or the act of enforcing international peacebuilding norms and practices occurs when external actors hinder the contributions of local peace practitioners through enforcing certain initiatives based on western/liberal ideologies and standards, as opposed to strengthening local ones. International actors are often criticised for being domineering and lacking a clear understanding of local needs, which in turn can result in the exclusion of local knowledge in externally-driven peacebuilding projects (Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Richmond, 2005, 2011).

International actors have power to pursue certain goals and objectives, and to direct the resource-recipient's practices in order to complete their goals. International non-governmental organisations can influence local partners' ideologies and practices via funding application

processes and project assessments, even though their direct involvement is restricted (Anderson, 1999a; Appleby, 2003a, 2008; Wardak et al., 2007). On the one hand, local actors can construct themselves to align with donor interests, such as equitable distribution of development benefits, equitable access to services, and social inclusion (OECD, 2008, p. 18), to increase the possibility of receiving funding and support. On the other hand, local actors can adopt donor's policies and agendas after successfully securing the funding and to survive evaluation at the end of the project, which does not necessarily fit the local needs.

Furthermore, local religious leaders may have contact with actors who restrict and spoil their peacebuilding potential in a conflict setting.

Impairment or the act of spoiling local actors' peacebuilding potential is also illustrated in the peacebuilding literature. The literature demonstrates that some states control religious leaders. This is done via governmental policies, which set and enforce certain expectations. Governmental policies, especially those pertaining to the construction of a national identity driven by religious nationalism, can strongly influence inter-religious war/peace narratives and political environments for peacebuilding, such as in Northern Ireland (Fitzduff, 2011) and Sri Lanka (Hayward, 2011). In addition to state-controlled institutions, civil society organisations such as the Orange Order and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) in Northern Ireland construct beliefs and war narratives based on religious nationalism, which influences the behaviour of religious leaders (Belloni, 2009). This type of control can be more effectively done when these religious leaders have ties with political institutions.

Other actors can also control local religious leaders through force and other coercive methods. For example, in Sudan during the 1990s, repression and violence were used by state to

institutionalise the Muslim identity as the new public order when the al-Bashir Inqaz regime enforced the Islamist Civilisation Project (Fluehr-Lobban, 2011). Similarly, the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East use coercion in shaping the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian relations, which affects the political environment in which Sunni and Shi'a religious leaders operate (Hashemi, 2011).

In this section, I have defined bridging networks of local religious leaders and categorised them into three broad network types based on the behaviours of the actors on the other side of the bridge. The other actors (governmental and non-governmental actors) can *facilitate, impose*, or *impair* the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders during conflict. This categorisation of network types will be the central analytical framework for examining the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict. The next sections will draw plausible causal links between the behaviour of the other actors and the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders. They will show that the varying behaviour of other actors affects the accessibility to resources, which can impact local religious leaders' means and motives for peacebuilding.

3.4 The Predicted Outcomes

This section presents the thesis' primary theoretical prediction of the effect of a bridging network, which is that the bridging network is likely to be supportive of local religious leaders' peacebuilding efforts in a conflict setting when members of the bridging network share local religious leaders' goals. This predicted outcome aligns to the literature, which suggests that extensive networks that cut across diverse groups are important for enhancing the peacebuilding capacity of local religious leaders (Appleby, 2000; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004). The theory is grounded

on the assumption that the resources available to bridging networks enhance the conditions for peacebuilding by increasing the access to resources that religious leaders have for undertaking peacebuilding activities. However, one not only considers the benefit from the flow of resources, but also the cost. I argue that the *transaction cost*, which is an expected repayment incurred once taking the resources, can be estimated from the behaviour of the other actors or their approach to engaging with local religious leaders. I propose three theoretical propositions based on the behaviours of other actors, which affect religious leaders' accessibility to resources and their subsequent ability to engage in peacebuilding activities.

Accessibility to Resources: Scholars widely agree that participating in social networks or having relationships with other people increases (or hinders) an individual's access to resources, or their 'social capital' (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 1999, 2001; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 1995). Resources, "material or symbolic goods" that are assigned value and significance by individual members and their groups (Lin, 2001, pp. 29-33), may be helpful in achieving the goals of individual network members (Bourdieu, 1986; Flap, 1999, 2002; Flap & Völker, 2003; Lin, 1999, 2001; Portes, 1998). Resources that are valuable and significant in one circumstance, however, may become useless or even harmful in another (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Harriss & De Renzio, 1997). In peacebuilding, the valuable resources that may help a local religious leader promote tolerance and peaceful coexistence include monetary and other material support such as physical facilities, as well as non-material assets including peacebuilding knowledge, skills, experience, opportunities, ideologies and norms (Appleby, 2000, 2008; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Cilliers, 2002; De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004).

According to Lin (1999, p. 36), bridging networks increase the likelihood of reaching out to "added resources, resources not yet possessed", which are outside everyday social circles. He says that bridging networks are different from bonding networks, which are likely to mobilise only actors with similar resources in order to protect and maintain resources existing within the networks. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, local religious actors draw various kinds of valuable resources from out-group actors in all levels of conflict, such as local and international actors and organisations including the conflicting parties, whom they have established networks with (Appleby, 2000, 2008; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Bouta et al., 2005; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004; Lynch, 2011).

It is however worth noting that the flow of resources possessed by other actors is likely to be determined by the transaction costs, which a local religious leader is expected to repay in the future once taking the resources. The transaction cost depends on the expected return or underlying motivation of the actors who provide access to the resources (Flap, 2002; Flap & Völker, 2003; Gaag, 2005; Portes, 1998). It could be tangible benefits such as money (Portes, 1998), or intangibles such as the granting of approval (Portes, 1998), the sharing of information (Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 1993), or conversely, the risk of losing popularity and legitimacy within their religious congregations (Sisk, 2011a) and facing punishment or negative political repercussion (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010). It is therefore understandable that if there are many available sources of resources, a local religious leader is more likely to choose the source that requires the least costly expected return. In this connection, I argue that the expected return can be projected from the behaviour of the other actor, who is the source of resources. In other words, *the accessibility to resources depends on the behaviour of the other members of the bridging network.* The possibility of peacebuilding therefore lies on a gradual scale ranging from (1) facilitating the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach with local

religious leaders, (2) imposing unshared peacebuilding norms and practices on local religious leaders, and (3) impairing the peacebuilding potential by increasing local religious leaders' risk of being harmed.

3.4.1 Theoretical Proposition 1: Facilitation and Active Peacebuilding

Scholars argue that because local religious leaders are highly respected, they can make meaningful contributions in conflict settings, and that they have the potential to transform the conflict and cause positive change (Lederach, 1997; Schneier, 2002). Local religious leaders however could be hesitant to engage in peacebuilding activities in situations where local peacebuilders lack resources (Appleby, 2008) and the incentives to engage in peacebuilding, as the close proximity of religious leaders to the conflict intensifies the risks and (physical) dangers (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Sisk, 2011a). Under this condition, scholars suggest that other peace practitioners can help improve local religious leaders' peacebuilding roles through cooperation and partnership, which help widen the pool of resources for peacebuilding (Appleby, 2000; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004).

However, these resources are likely to be supportive of peacebuilding only when the other actors share a preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach with local religious leaders. A local religious leader could have links to a foreign state, which would be seen as part of their bridging network. However, if resources from foreign states (Staniland, 2012, 2014) or political elites (De Juan, 2008) are used to fuel ethnic conflict, such as in Kashmir and Sri Lanka, it may make the conflict worse.

When sharing the peacebuilding approach with local religious leaders, the other actors are likely to facilitate the development of the peacebulding roles of local religious leaders. Scholars show that international actors, who were well-established in peacebuilding and sought to strengthen the peacebuilding role of like-minded local religious leaders, provided motive and means to peacebuilding in countries in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Appleby, 2008; Bouta et al., 2005; Hertog, 2010; Lederach, 1997; Little, 2007). For instance, African priests gained material and non-material resources such as funding, peacebuilding knowledge, practical skills and experience, as well as religious norms for peace via training and workshops, from international mediators working under the umbrella of the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio (Appleby, 2008) and the Mennonite Central Committee (Welty, 2014). An expectation held by the other actor is likely to be that the given resources are used to create opportunities for the local religious leaders to develop their peacebuilding capacity, while also becoming part of a global networks of like-minded faith-based actors (Appleby, 2008; Bouta et al., 2005).

Although international actors may possess greater financial and material resources, like-minded local actors are vital sources of infrastructural facilities, which are peacebuilding tools in local areas. For example, the facilities of media counterparts of Peace Provocateurs (the Christian-Muslim organisation) helped Christian and Islamic leaders to widely and quickly spread accurate information to kill rumours about inter-religious violence, which otherwise could have furthered inter-religious tension in Ambon Island, Indonesia (Al Qurtuby, 2013).

In addition to material resources, religious norms and principles for peace are fundamental motives for peacebuilding, which can help promote local religious leaders' awareness of their peacebuilding potential. Little (2007d) demonstrates that the shared religious norms and

principles for peace, which were reinforced within the Interreligion Council of Sierra Leone, were sources of mutual trust and cooperation between Islamic and Christian leaders who were members of the Council. These shared religious norms and principles inspired the Islamic and Christian religious leaders to advocate mutuality, even though some network members may have identified with the conflicting party. The established trust opened communication channels allowed the Islamic and Christian religious leaders access to hostile parties and provided insight into the conflict dynamics, which helped lead to mediation between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and government leaders.[18]

Similar to the religious leaders in Sierra Leone, once accessed to mutual religious norms for peace, religious leaders in Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine and Sudan exercised their moral and spiritual leverage to re-frame the conflict and participate in faith-based diplomacy despite the ongoing conflict between religious groups (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Johnston, 2003b).

Consequently, I therefore hold the first theoretical prediction that *a bridging network is likely to promote the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member facilitates the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach.*

Nevertheless, when the other network member plays a dominant role by imposing an unshared peacebuilding norm and/or practice, the local religious leader is likely to be marginalised, even though he/she may maintain involvement in the peacebulding initiative.

[18] Religious communities in Sierra Leone have coexisted for generations. The majority of the population are Muslims (60%). Christians are about 10 percent of the total population, and indigenous belief comprises 30 percent.

3.4.2 Theoretical Proposition 2: Imposition and Restricted Peacebuilding

Although the imposition of unshared peacebuilding norms and practices may not physically harm or alienate local actors from a peacebuilding process (Bouta et al., 2005; Hertog, 2010), it can marginalise their role. Local actors are unlikely to stand on equal footing with external actors in peacebuilding partnerships, as seen in the case of Afghanistan (Reich, 2006; Theros, 2012). Resources are given to support peacebuilding inititatives that fit the expectations and ideologies of the international donors that control the resources. Under this environment, local religious leaders may discard their urgent needs or lose the power to choose the peacebuilding activities to carry out with the given resources. The trade-off for taking resources is thus likely to be accepting a limited role and/or be constrained on the types of activities that will be supported by external actors.

Therefore, I propose that local religious leaders are likely to have limited access to resources for peacebuilding possessed by actors who assert domination and control over peacebuilding policies and have objectives that are not shared by local religious leaders. Therefore, my second theoretical prediction is that *a bridging network is likely to restrict the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member imposes an unshared peacebuilding norm and/or practice on the local religious leader.*

In addition to enforcing an unshared norm and/or practice, the other actor can impair the peacebuilding of local religious leaders by increasing the risk of being punished for accepting these resources.

3.4.3 Theoretical Proposition 3: Impairment and No Peacebuilding

Local religious leaders may lack access to resources for peacebuilding when religious nationalist policies are enforced by the state. Scholars argue that illiberal or non-democratic state policies, particularly with regards to religious nationalism and/or sectarianism, undermine the political conditions for peacebuilding by religious leaders (Little, 2011; Sisk, 2011a). In Egypt for example, Islamic and Christian religious leaders were reluctant to maintain inter-religious cooperation when Islamic nationalism was endorsed by the Sadat government, which was hoping to boost political support from the traditional elites (Hibbard, 2011). The policy had a deleterious effect on inter-religious relations, and it increased religious intolerance and tension between Muslim majorities and Christian minorities. Hashemi (2011) similarly demonstrates that the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East serve as the contextual factors determining political repercussion, which explains why Islamic leaders hardly ever mobilise support for reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a groups without risks, unless led by the state.

More importantly, the literature also shows that local religious leaders risk punishment by the state when they engage in peacebuilding activities, if the state is either a conflict party or stakeholder in the conflict. De Juan and Vüllers (2010) argue that the Mozambique Government exercised power via punishment – cutting political and financial support – to stop Catholic clerics from joining the independence movement, and undertaking peacebuilding activities that would challenge or weaken the stability of the government.

As a result, peacebuilding is likely to be impaired when the other actors remove or alter the political conditions for peacebuilding by increasing the risk of being punished. People's lives are often at risk in a conflict environment regardless their political stance. Local religious leaders to some extent can face a higher risk as they symbolically represent 'religion', which

is a key factor fuelling an ethnoreligious conflict. My third theoretical prediction therefore is that *a bridging network is likely to hinder the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member impairs a political condition for peacebuilding by enhancing a local religious leader's risk of facing punishment.*

Table 1: Theoretical Propositions - The Effects of Bridging Networks on Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

Network Types	**Network Effects**
Facilitation (Assisting local religious leaders in the bottom-up peacebuilding)	*Active Peacebuilding* Accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach)
Imposition (Enforcing unshared peacebuilding norms and practices)	*Restricted Peacebuilding* Restricted accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to unshared norms and/or practices)
Impairment (Spoiling local religious leaders' peacebuilding potential)	*No Peacebuilding* No accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to the risk of facing punishment)

This section has outlined the three theoretical predictions regarding the effects of bridging networks on the peacebuilding activities of local religious leaders (See Table 1). It is argued that the behaviour of the other actors involved (facilitation/imposition/impairment) determines local religious leaders' accessibility to material and non-material resources possessed by the other actors. These resources could potentially improve local religious leaders' capacity to engage in peacebuilding activities in conflict environments. Local religious leaders' ability to engage in peacebuilding therefore seems to vary according to the behaviour of other actors. The more other actors have a shared preference for a peacebuilding objective, the more likely it will be that local religious leaders will have access to resources for peacebuilding. In contrast, the more harm (mentally and physically) that other actors could cause, the less likely it will be that local religious leaders are willing to access resources for peacebuilding.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has defined the key concepts used in this thesis: peacebuilding of local religious leaders and bridging networks. It has highlighted that local religious leaders not only engage in religious but also secular peacebuilding activities as long as those activities contribute to re-establishing tolerance and peaceful coexistence between two or among multiple conflicting parties in a conflict setting. It also argues that bridging networks, which consist of relationships with actors outside the congregations of local religious leaders, tend to be associated with accessibility to a wider pool of resources for peacebuilding. Bridging networks are likely to create an enabling condition for peacebuilding by allowing local religious leaders, as network members, access to resources possessed by other network members. These resources can be material and non-material, and can be used to improve the means and motives for peacebuilding.

However, I argue that behaviours of the other network members or actors, who are on the other side of the bridge, are likely to affect the accessibility to resources for peacebuilding. The behaviour of the other actors determines the transaction cost or expected return, such as the risk of being dominated or harmed, that may occur once taking resources from the other actor. The difference in the transaction cost then affects the accessibility or willingness to draw resources from the other actor. Therefore, this thesis holds three theoretical propositions:

1. A bridging network is likely to promote the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member facilitates the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach.
2. A bridging network is likely to restrict the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member imposes an unshared peacebuilding norm and/or practice on the local religious leader.

3. A bridging network is likely to hinder the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member impairs a political condition for peacebuilding by increasing the local religious leader's risk of facing punishment.

These theoretical predictions will be tested in the case study of Southern Thailand.

The next chapter will show the research design and methods, or to put it more simply, how I will go about testing the predicted effects of bridging networks on the peacebuilding practice of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders in the context of the conflict in Southern Thailand.

Chapter 4

Research Design and Methods

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter Two, I identified the puzzle guiding this thesis; although they share religious principles of peace, why do some religious leaders choose to engage in peacebuilding in a conflict situation while some choose to back away from it? Bridging networks appear in the literature to be important factors influencing the behaviour of religious leaders. I have therefore asked this research question: *how do bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting?* In Chapter Three, an overarching theory has been laid out as the theoretical framework of my investigation arguing that bridging networks are likely to facilitate peacebuilding in religious leaders. I suggest that the bridging pattern of ties between local religious leaders and others is likely to create an enabling condition for peacebuilding by allowing access to resources that can be utilised for peacebuilding. Three types of bridging network will be examined: facilitation, imposition, and impairment. My theoretical expectation is that, under a non-democratic regime, a facilitative bridging network, such as a civil society organisation, is more likely to create higher accessibility to resources than imposition/impairment bridging network such as a governmental agency, which is unlikely to provide a suitable environment for peacebuilding. This hypothesis will be tested in the context of the conflict in Southern Thailand where Islamic and Buddhist leaders are involved in and/or affected by the ethnoreligious conflict between the Thai state and Malay insurgents fighting for the right to self-determination.

The next sections will outline the research design – a case study for in-depth investigation of the outcome in question (peacebuilding of local religious leaders) and for assessing the usefulness of the theory I articulated in the previous chapter to explain the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. The section then covers the operationalisation of key variables (peacebuilding and bridging networks), case selection, the research instrument of an in-depth interview, the semi-structured interview questionnaire, research participants, the sampling strategy, data collection, ethical considerations, data analysis, and the research method's limitations.

4.2 The Case Study Method

This thesis adopts the qualitative case study as its fundamental method for inquiry in order to assess aspects of complex causality - the nature of bridging networks that affect the dynamics of local religious leaders' peacebuilding in a single setting (the Deep South of Thailand) (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 9-10). The case study method is an in-depth investigation and provides intensive empirical analysis of a phenomenon, which has been previously inaccessible or lacking in historical patterns (Achen & Snidal, 1989; Yin, 2009). It is used for both theory description and testing deductive hypotheses (Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009) as well as theory induction (Eisenhardt, 1989; George & Bennett, 2005). It helps researchers to confirm or challenge existing generalisations or to develop a new theoretically-oriented narrative by discovering an unidentified hypothesis, thus leading the research in a new direction. A common application of the case study method is "to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies" or to "describe an intervention and the real-life context in which it occurs" (Yin, 2009, pp. 19-20). For that reason, the case study method is employed to test the theory-driven logic connecting bridging networks and peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South

of Thailand, in which the relationship between bridging networks and peacebuilding of local religious leaders has never been studied.

To test the validity of the theoretical predictions articulated in Chapter Three, the process tracing method is used as a tool to study causal mechanisms or causal links between observed variables – bridging networks (independent variables) and peacebuilding of local religious leaders (the outcome/dependent variable) in Southern Thailand in a single case research design (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2; George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). It is the method that makes "a strong within-case causal inference" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2) as it "combines preexisting generalizations with specific observations from within a single case to make a causal inference about the case" (Mahoney, 2012, p. 570). In other words, process tracing is the process to investigate the presence or the absence of a causal mechanism in order to "increase our confidence about the validity of the theory" in a single case study (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 84).

Put specifically in the context of this research, process tracing identifies a process of how peacebuilding of local religious leaders is brought into being by testing the predicted effect of bridging networks – whether bridging networks as potential causal variables "can or cannot be ruled out as having causal significance" in the context of Southern Thailand (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 214). Process tracing examines how bridging networks create a series of conditions that in some way do (or do not) produce the peacebuilding of local religious leaders (George & Bennett, 2005). Specifically, this thesis presents the research findings by following (1) the nature of network, (2) its immediate outcome, and (3) the impact on peacebuilding. By investigating and gaining insight into the causal mechanisms, process tracing can help validate or falsify the theory and produce a causal explanation of how bridging networks do (or do not)

facilitate peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict, the phenomenon under study. More importantly, process tracing can help link differences of network types to variation in outcomes.

In addition to examining the prior explanatory hypotheses, process tracing may also discover new hypotheses or identify omitted causal variables that are necessary or sufficient for the outcome, which is a social phenomenon that often has multiple causes (D. Collier, 2011, p. 824; George & Bennett, 2005, p. 215). Moreover, it offers "the possibility of identifying different causal paths that lead to a similar outcome in different cases" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 215). In this respect, process tracing allows me as the researcher to take equifinality into account and consider alternative causal processes of how the peacebuilding of local religious leaders (the outcome) could have come into existence.

4.3 Operationalising Key Variables

4.3.1 Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

As discussed in Chapter Three, local religious leaders' peacebuilding work can be practically carried out via several types of activities (Appleby, 2000; Bouta et al., 2005; Sampson, 1997; Sisk, 2011a), which in this thesis are categorised into five types: community mediation; community security and justice; socio-economic development; inclusive governance; and reconciliation via religious dialogue. In this study, the presence of local religious leaders' peacebuilding is verified by interviewees' responses if they indicate that local religious leaders *undertook at least one of the five types of activities*. Otherwise it is considered as 'no peacebuilding'. When local religious leaders undertake an activity under other actors' control or domination, the undertaking of that activity is defined as 'restricted peacebuilding'.

In this study, the term 'local religious leaders' refers to local Buddhist and Islamic leaders based in the Deep South of Thailand. According to Thailand's Sangha Act B.E.2505, local Buddhist leaders are ordained or non-ordained members of the Buddhist Theravada and the Mahayana monastic orders respectively. Local Islamic leaders can be categorised into two groups: formal and informal. According to Thailand's Islamic organization Administration Act B. E. 2540, formal Islamic leaders hold official leadership positions in the formal structures of the provincial Islamic councils and mosques, such as provincial Islamic committees, imams, bilals, and kotebs. They perform religious and social ceremonies, which allow them to interact with Muslim followers on a daily basis. Informal Islamic leaders refer to a wider range of Muslims who earn spiritual and social leadership and respect with their religious principles and knowledge, such as prominent Islamic philosophers and teachers (*ustaz*) (Little, 2007; Sisk, 2011). Both formal and informal Islamic leaders possess normative power and authority at the grassroots level since they provide law-like guidance on norms and practice for the Malay-Muslim population (Liow, 2009, 2010; Yusuf, 2007a).

4.3.2 Bridging Networks

The common sources of information to indicate bridging networks are "self-reports of the presence (or absence) of social ties" (Marsden, 1990, p. 441). Research respondents are asked to list or name individuals (both religious leaders and other actors from the out-group) with which local religious leaders have direct contact.[19] Those ties or relationships of local religious leaders with the other individuals must however show the meaningful or quality transaction, such as discussing "important matters" (Campbell & Lee, 1991, p. 204) or matter important [to local religious leaders] (Burt, 1984, 1987). The meaningful attribute of relationship is an

[19] Name Generator survey questions identify the respondent's alters (what does this mean?) or people he/she knows.

essential inclusion rule to set the specification of a network to distinguish the relationship as a bridging network from the act of simply knowing someone. Although interpretation of 'important matters' is subjective and can pose difficulties in some research contexts (Marsden, 2005), it will not be problematic in this thesis since the focus is on local religious leaders' action of sharing or discussing matters that are important to them rather than the matters being shared or discussed by them. Bridging networks in this study are thus operationalised as *participation in conflict/peace-related activities such as dialogues, development projects, workshops, and training sessions hosted by other actors.* Moreover, this thesis uses interviewees' responses to indicate the behaviours of the other actors on the other end of the bridge that determine the types of bridging network (facilitation, imposition, and impairment) presented in the previous chapter.

4.4 Case Selection

This thesis has chosen Southern Thailand as it is a conflict setting where local peacebuilding has recently gained momentum on the ground but still lacks rigorous research and academic knowledge. An in-depth study of peacebuilding of local Islamic leaders and Buddhist monks, in particular, will shed light on what drives local religious leaders' peaceful behaviour and peacebuilding potential. This behaviour and peacebuilding potential goes largely underreported in the environment of division and distrust in the southernmost parts of Thailand. The research findings have the potential to show how peaceful behaviour and peacebuilding potential can be reinforced and translated into a governmental policy recommendation.

Moreover, Southern Thailand offers a similar context to other countries such as the Philippines and Myanmar, where there are conflicts between the central government and Muslim minorities. For instance, in both Southern Thailand and Phillippines (Mindanao), local

religious leaders have engaged in peacebuilding activities despite the on-going violence (Sandal, 2017, pp. 145-147). Research findings from this thesis on how bridging networks either do or do not facilitate peacebuilding may also yield a similar application in these other cases. Given that local peacebuilding in Southern Thailand has not been researched thoroughly and the case is potentially applicable to other cases, this research output is likely to make empirical and theoretical contributions to studies on Southern Thailand and peacebuilding literature in general. Additional details on Southern Thailand, including the background of the protracted conflict and the recent development of peacebuilding, are described in Chapter Five.

4.5 In-depth Interview Method[20]

The interview method was employed as the research instrument in this study to gather rich and in-depth information that helped me answer the research question. According to Brounéus (2011, p. 131), "in-depth interviewing offers a unique method and source of information since it provides research with depth, detail and perspective on a certain research question, and at a certain moment in time". It helps researchers gain a comprehensive understanding about the phenomenon being studied, particularly the micro-processes of armed conflict or peace and, in this case, the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict. More importantly, the in-depth interview often unfolds "a first-hand account of the research question at hand" (Brounéus, 2011, p. 131).

I carried out thirty-one in-depth interviews in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. The key characteristics of the in-depth interviews included semi-structured and open-ended questions, reflective listening, and recording responses (Brounéus, 2011; Guion, Diehl, & McDonald,

[20] The words 'in-depth interview' and 'interview' are used interchangeably in this thesis.

2011). Prior to the interviews, a set of nine key questions was prepared and formulated to be simple as possible. These key questions were retained across all interviews to ensure relevant contents to the research interests and to allow me to probe the nuanced responses of interviewees. In addition to the prepared key questions, follow-up questions were constructed during the interview in a 'conversational' style and linked to the previous responses to create a smooth flow. More importantly, they were formed in a way to establish trust with the interviewees, which is the primary aim of an interview (Brounéus, 2011, p. 139). During the interview, I therefore remained flexible and was prepared to revise the key questions and formulate unplanned but relevant and appropriate follow-up questions.

In addition, the interview questions were open-ended and sought to give interviewees freedom to explain and answer 'how' and 'why' questions rather than looking only for 'yes-no' answers. Using open-ended questions helped expand the depth of data gathering and increase the number of sources of information (Yin, 2009). They particularly helped identify local sources of information and other potential interviewees that would not have been located without suggestions and referrals from the initial interviewees.

Throughout the interviews, I also applied reflective listening skills to clarify what interviewees said and for understanding the interviewee's perspective. According to Brounéus (2011, p. 137), reflective listening is listening actively to what is said both explicitly and implicitly and then reflecting back to the speaker for confirmation of the correct meaning of what has been said. With permission from the interviewees, the interviews were recorded through audio recording and written notes, which collected the interviewees' verbal and non-verbal responses. I also advised the interviewees that they could stop the interviews at any time. However, none of the interviewees requested a stop.

The language used in the interviews was the interviewees' choice – either Thai or *Yawi* (a Malay language; Thai was not the first language of the majority of interviewees). Providing the possibility to use the language with which interviewees felt most comfortable aimed to enable them to speak more confidently and in turn widen the opportunity for me to access deeper information. However, Thai was the language of choice of most interviewees, and used in all interviews for the most part. *Yawi* and Arabic were sometimes used as Islamic leaders referred to teachings/quotations from the Quran. An interpreter (a native *Yawi* speaker) therefore participated in the interviews with permission from the interviewees to help me understand the meanings of the teachings/quotations.

In addition, the interpreter (a male Muslim) also served the role of gatekeeper as he accompanied me when interviewing and travelling in the southernmost provinces. Due to the Islamic tradition that Islamic leaders (male) cannot be alone with a woman in an interview room/venue, I, as a woman, had to be accompanied by a male relative or colleague at all times during the interviews. Similarly, it is also seen as inappropriate if a Buddhist monk is close to a female follower or me in this case. In this regard, I had the gatekeeper present in all of the interviews with Islamic and Buddhist leader interviewees to prevent hesitation and animosity. The gatekeeper, a young male Muslim, was however asked to leave the interview room[21] in some interviews with Buddhist monks. Buddhist monks, who were being increasingly attacked by insurgents, often took a necessary precaution to avoid interaction with Muslims especially young male Muslims, who were potentially militants/insurgents. Given the high level of distrust of young male Muslims, excluding the gatekeeper from the interview room allowed the monks to speak freely.

[21] The rooms or spaces used for interviews were transparent or not a closed-door through which others could see the interviewee and the interviewer from the outside even though unable to hear the conversations.

4.6 Semi-structured Interview Questionnaire

To help answer the research question, the semi-structured interview questionnaire was designed to include background questions and more specific questions, which were guided by the theoretical propositions of the thesis to ensure relevant data was gathered for analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 130). This data included the characteristics or patterns of ties which local religious leaders had built with other actors, and whether and how these ties supported local religious leaders' peacebuilding. The background questions were simple and aimed at obtaining the interviewees' demographic details, such as where they were born, studied, lived and worked. Often these background questions were asked both at the beginning and during the interview as follow-up questions to maintain a smooth conversation.

As the conversation gradually moved, interviewees were asked more specific questions, which covered three overarching themes. The first theme mainly aimed at obtaining a contextual definition of 'local religious leaders', which for the most part is not clearly defined in the literature (Sisk, 2011a). A general perception about the local religious leader's status in the community was included in the first set of specific questions to help indicate the position of respect and the normative authority of the local religious leaders, which the literature often romanticises (Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000; Hertog, 2010; Little, 2007b).

The second set of specific questions pertained to the development of the peacebuilding roles of local religious leaders in conflict environments in the southernmost parts of Thailand. Its objective was to identify feasible peacebuilding activities commonly engaged in by local religious leaders.

Lastly, the third set of specific questions focused on local religious leaders' bridging networks and the perceived effects on the peacebuilding of local religious leaders. Interviewees were asked to describe local religious leaders' relationships with key contacts, namely civil society, governmental and military actors, to reveal the main characteristics of these relationships. Then interviewees were asked for their opinions on how the relationships with these actors supported (or constrained) their peacebuilding by improved access to resources, as is suggested in the literature (Appleby, 2000; Cilliers, 2002; De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004; Sisk, 2011a).

4.7 Research Participants

Categorised into four groups, there were 31 interviewees[22], who were mostly based in the conflict areas in southernmost provinces of Thailand: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and some parts of Songkhla. These 31 interviewees were not necessarily involved in peacebuilding but associate with local religious leaders or were aware of local religious leaders' relationships with other actors. Among 31 interviewees, there were only two women (from local civil society and academic groups) as most religious leaders' contacts are male. Traditionally, religious leaders can have direct contact with men but usually cannot do so with women. Moreover, the majority of interviewees were Islamic and Buddhist religious leaders, who are male.

The first group of interviewees was eighteen *local religious leaders* (twelve Islamic leaders and six Buddhist leaders/monks) from local congregations and religious schools at the district and village levels. All of these religious leaders are the main interviewees of my field study, who shared their experience and perspectives relevant to local level peacebuilding activities. In selecting the religious peacebuilders, I utilised the 'five categories of peacebuilding' that I

[22] All interviewees' names appeared in this thesis are pseudonyms.

conceptualised in Chapter Three (see pp. 46-51 for more details) as the key selction criteria. In other words, I included religious leaders in my project only when they had been engaged and/or known other religious leaders who had been engaged in at least one of these types of work. The number of Islamic leaders was higher than Buddhist monks because the number of Islamic leaders, who were involved in peacebuilding, was higher than that of Buddhist leaders. This group of local religious leaders was asked to provide information about their peacebuilding activities (if any) and their relationships with civil society/governmental/military actors.

Table 3: Local Religious Leader Interviewees

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview Date
1. Abdulla	Islamic scholar	A local university, Pattani	3 July 2014
2. Ahmad	Islamic committee, owner of a private Islamic school	A provincial Islamic Council	30 June 2014
3. Ali	Islamic committee, Muslim Attorney Centre (MAC))	A provincial Islamic Council	10 June 2014
4. Faris	Islamic teacher	A private Islamic school, Pattani	25 June 2014
5. Haziq	Imam	A local mosque, *tadika*, private Islamic school, Pattani	9 August 2014
6. Mohamed	Islamic scholar	A local university, Pattani	2 June 2014
7. Rayyan	Islamic teacher	A private Islamic school, Songkhla	2 July 2014, 27 June 2015 (via skype)
8. Syed	Imam	A local mosque, Pattani	19 August 2014

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview Date
9. Umar	Islamic scholar	A local university, Pattani	1 August 2014
10. Yasin	Islamic scholar	A local university, Yala	25 June 2014
11. Youssef	Islamic teacher	A private Islamic school, Pattani	25 June 2014
12. Zikri	Islamic scholar	A local university, Pattani	3 June 2014
13. Phra[23] Manit	Monk abbot	A Buddhist temple, Pattani	10 June 2014
14. Phra Thepsatit	Monk abbot, the monk dean of Narathiwat Province	A Buddhist temple, Narathiwat	30 June 2014
15. Phra Surasit	Monk abbot	A Buddhist temple, Pattani	2 June 2014
16. Phra Wikom	Monk abbot	A Buddhist temple, Narathiwat	30 June 2014
17. Phra Supon	Monk abbot	A Buddhist temple, Pattani	19 August 2014
18. Prasert	Mahayana leader	A Mahayana Buddhist temple, Pattani	5 June 2014

The second group of interviewees consisted of six *activists* from local civil society[24] groups and non-governmental organisations. As local activists were the key driving force of peacebuilding and operated in collaboration with multiple actors in Southern Thailand (Burke,

[23] "Phra" means "monk" which is used to address a Buddhist monk.

[24] According to Paffenholz (2010, pp. 8-9), civil society is "a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and economic spheres, keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors are complex and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations – competing with each other and oriented to specific interests – that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere. Thus, civil society is independent from the state and the political sphere, but it is oriented toward and interacts closely with them."

2012a, 2012b), this group provided insight into local religious leaders' involvement in peacebuilding and their connections with non-governmental and governmental actors.

Table 4: Civil Society Interviewees

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview Date
1. Aamir	Activist	A civil society group, Pattani	18 June 2014, 17 June 2015 (via skype)
2. Aqil	Activist / journalist	A media outlet, Pattani	30 May 2014
3. Danish	Coordinator	A research centre, Narathiwat	2 June 2014
4. Hamza	Activist	A civil society group, Narathiwat	11 June 2014
5. Mostafa	Senior activist	Civil society organisations, Pattani	29 May 2014
6. Sophia (female)	Activist	Civil society organisations, Pattani	30 May 2014

The third group consisted of four *academic scholars* from local educational institutions. The education sector offered a neutral or non-political space (physical and intellectual) in which local religious leaders and other actors could be actively engaged in conflicted-related issues in Southern Thailand. The group provided details on public debates and movements as they often interacted with a number of public figures, particularly Islamic leaders who were also academics within the same institutions.

Table 5: Academic Interviewees

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview Date
1. Imran	Lecturer	A local university, Pattani	2 June 2014
2. Piyawan (female)	Asst. Prof.	A research centre, Bangkok (hosting several interfaith dialogues between local Islamic and Buddhist leaders, and among religious leaders from multiple religions in the Deep South)	7 July 2014
3. Sarin	Lecturer	A local university, Pattani	14 August 2014
4. Somchai	Asst. Prof.	A local university, Pattani	28 May 2014

Lastly, the fourth group consisted of three *governmental officials* from government departments. These governmental actors were vital sources of information as they influenced the decision-making process and were involved in the implementation of government policies that affected the local population, including its religious leaders.

Table 6: Government Official Interviewees

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview Date
1. Panumas	A former director	SBPAC, Yala	11 August 2014
2. Tera	A senior official (and a well-respected scholar at a local university)	SBPAC, Yala	24 June 2014
3. Weerachai	A former director	SBPAC, Yala	9 July 2014

Information obtained from interviewees from the last three groups represented different perspectives on the peacebuilding roles of local religious leaders. Their views were used to counterbalance or verify information obtained from the local religious leaders. In essence, information drawn from the four groups of interviewees enabled me to diversify the data sources, thus minimising the risk of bias in the findings.

4.8 Sampling Strategy

Snowball sampling was the most appropriate method to recruit research participants for this study. This sampling technique offers an important benefit for this study, which aims to collect data from a small number of research participants from difficult to reach or hidden populations. In this case, the research participants were local religious leaders, activists, academic scholars and governmental officials located in the conflict zones to whom I had limited access (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Cohen & Arieli, 2011). This was especially the case since most of the potential interviewees cancelled the pre-arranged interviews due to political uncertainty following the military coup in Bangkok three days before the interviews were to begin. As a result, the recruitment of new interviewees relied heavily on personal referrals, which took place while I was in Southern Thailand.

As per the inclusion criteria, research participants needed to be aware of local religious leaders' roles and relationships with civil society and/or governmental and/or military actors to ensure relevant information about the influence of bridging networks on the behaviour of local religious leaders. Demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, and level of education, were not used as sampling criteria, as interviewees could be politically active and played (or had played) a role in peace processes and peacebuilding initiatives regardless of these factors. However, none of interviewees was from a vulnerable group such as children, prisoners, the

mentally disabled, or other people whose ability to give informed consent was questionable. This research recruited only healthy adults aged over 21, which is the legal threshold of adulthood in Thailand. All these adult interviewees gave consent to participate in this research by signing a consent form (see Appendix B).

To start the recruiting process, I first conducted a preliminary examination of profiles of potential interviewees gathered from secondary sources including news articles, and most importantly from consultations with local gatekeepers who were from different sectors of the local communities and had ties with key actors in the Deep South. Once a list of potential interviewees was identified, I made initial contact through local gatekeepers who knew the potential interviewees well. In this way, I developed trust with the potential interviewees, via local gatekeepers prior to the interview. The preliminary research from secondary sources and suggestions from local gatekeepers could not identify a significant number of potential interviewees, especially hard-to-track religious leaders, whose names and peacebuilding activities were not widely published in the mainstream media and were known only among locals.

To further expand the sample size, snowball sampling was employed; that is, each research participant was asked to provide the name of another potential inteviewee, who in turn was asked to provide the name of a third, and so on (Vogt & Johnson, 2011). I created chain referrals by asking for referrals from readily locatable interviewees (Berg & Lune, 2004). The referrals continued until considerable overlap occurred in the names of potential interviewees suggested (Tranter, 2005). As a major advantage, this technique provided relatively easy access into the hidden population of especially local Islamic leaders, whom it would otherwise have been very time-consuming and labour intensive to contact had I attempted direct access (Atkinson &

Flint, 2001; Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Groger, Mayberry, & Straker, 1999). These referrals were highly valuable as they showed other potential interviewees the trust and credibility I had established with the previous interviewees/referrers. In many cases, the referrers contacted other potential interviewees on behalf of me as these other potential interviewees were often reluctant or refused to speak to me with whom they were unacquainted and during a time of high suspicion and distrust.

4.9 Data Collection

I gathered information via local materials and publications such as local news agencies and newspapers (i.e. The Nation and Prachathai), government documents (i.e. SBPAC, NRC), and a local database (Deep South Incident Database) of the Deep South Watch, which is a leading non-governmental agency reporting the current situations and development on conflict and peacebuilding in the Deep South of Thailand. Nevertheless, the information collected from the secondary sources were not sufficient to answer the research question and particularly to understand the relations between religious leaders and key actors in the conflict.

To carry out research on the Southern Thailand conflict, physical presence and personal relationships were crucial to facilitating access to information. Face-to-face interactions and contacts were considered appropriate and necessary in this cultural context. It ensured the willingness to participate and build trust with research participants especially Malay Muslims, who might be suspicious of the intentions of me – a Thai Buddhist (further discussion on this issue can be found in the next section: Ethical Consideration). Most interviews were conducted face-to-face during the field research, which was conducted between 22 May and 5 September 2014. I did not, however, stay in the conflict areas throughout the whole period of field

research. I stayed in the southernmost provinces for only two or three weeks during each visit due to the security situation. I made 3 visits in total during the time period of field research.

The time and location of each interview were set accordingly to the availability, convenience, and safety of the interviewee. Interviews took place at the safest or the most comfortable venue, such as the office or the house of the interviewee, or an educational institute/school, which was usually seen as a neutral ground for research in the southernmost provinces. The interviews took place in 19 locations, 17 of which were in the southernmost provinces where the conflict was concentrated. As indicated by the red dots in Figure 1 (Map of Interview Locations), the interviews were conducted at one location in Songkhla, one in Yala, three in Narathiwat, and 12 in Pattani. The other two locations were in Bangkok where the interviewees lived at the time of interviews. Each interview lasted about one hour. One was only 20 minutes long and one lasted approximately three hours.

I acknowledged a time gap between data collection and thesis completion and I mitigated this issue by conducting two Skype interviews in 2015 (as shown in the Table 3 and 4) in addition to the interviews I conducted during the field visits in 2014. These skype interviews were to confirm and/or clarify information obtained from the interviewees as well as to update recent development of the situation on the ground. I also maintained contact with some of interviewees and followed the local news agencies such as Prachathai and the Nation, which serve as platforms for maintaining connections with the field to ensure that the information presented in this thesis remained relevant until the completion of the thesis in 2017.

Figure 1: Map of Interview Locations



4.10 Ethical Consideration

Similar to other peace research, seeking approval from the University ethics committee and other relevant authorities was a requirement as this research project involved interviewing people in a sensitive and risky context (Höglund & Öberg, 2011). The field research was approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. It was also important for me to keep in mind that "the ethical golden rule is to do no harm" (Brounéus, 2011, p. 141). For the in-depth interviews, I strictly considered the ethical dimensions of every step of the research design and planning for data gathering, such as case selection, sampling of interviewees, the venue and time of interviews, as well as possible consequences and dangers (physical and emotional) that may have been experienced by the interviewees because of the interviews (Brounéus, 2011). I therefore ensured that participation was voluntary and interviewees were comfortable with the interview arrangement.

To follow the objective of 'do no harm', consent and confidentiality were the key ethical considerations. All interviewees "freely consent[ed] to participation, without being coerced or unfairly pressurised" (Patton & Cochran, 2002, p. 5). They were provided with information about the research before giving consent, informed that they were under no obligation to participate in the interview, and that they could discontinue the interview at any time. No one discontinued the interview. Two interviewees asked to see the list of interview questions before agreeing to participate, and these were provided as requested. Written consent from all interviewees was obtained. All interviewees signed consent forms and were aware that their identities, personal data, and interview materials would be protected at all times and not revealed without their consent in order to maintain confidentiality (Brounéus, 2011; Patton & Cochran, 2002). The interviewees' information is stored and protected by encrypted passwords on the computer drive and electronic storage. Due to the sensitivity of the ongoing conflict, and the risks participation may entail for participants, this personal information will be kept in this way under strictest confidentiality until destroyed after 5 years, in accordance with Otago Ethics Committee regulations. Although interviewees indicated in the consent form that they allowed the disclosure of their identities and information for publication, publishing will be carefully handled and only be done by using pseudonyms. All interviewees' names appeared in this thesis are therefore *pseudonyms* to ensure safety of interviewees.

An additional ethical issue was the emotional stress of the researcher, which is important but rarely mentioned in field research (Brounéus, 2011). During the five-month period of field visits, I faced emotional stress from being seen as a suspicious outsider (if not the enemy) in the Malay-Muslim dominant areas. Unable to speak or understand *Yawi*, I was often seen by the Malay locals as someone who shared the ethnic-Thai and Buddhist identities of the conflict party (the Thai state).

I, as a woman, also had to deal with physical limitations and difficulties in accessing or being present in different places or in closely engaging with male Muslim researchers and interviewees. For that reason, I could not be independent and relied heavily on help from gatekeepers, who were interpreters during the interviews and for daily activities.

To mitigate these constraints, I emphasized my identity as a PhD student representing a University in New Zealand as well as the non-partisan stance of my research. My perception is that this helped create a positive environment in which interviewees felt free to speak with me. I ensured that the interviews were guided by the semi-structured interview questions in order to keep the conversation relevant to the research interests and prevent bias that might be caused by my personal stance (Thai/Buddhist/woman).

I also had great help from the gatekeepers. The trust that they had established with local stakeholders and research participants enabled me to reduce the communication barriers during my field study. Moreover, the gatekeepers had excellent language skills and provided tips to avoid limitations/difficulties, as well as were willing to accompany me whenever needed; hence, I was able to cross-check the accuracy of my analysis of the collected data whenever necessary. Regarding the impact on myself, moreover, I ensured that each visit was not too long (no more than three weeks) to reduce the emotional stress.

4.11 Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of transforming "raw interviews to evidence-based interpretations" of interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 201). Thematic analysis is a suitable method for this study because it organises data into themes that are combined into a coherent narrative. A process of thematic analysis is the most fundamental data analysis strategy in qualitative

research. It is a process of identifying, classifying, and comparing data from the interviews to extract patterns, meanings or themes expressed across the interviews (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Joffe, 2012; Rubin & Rubin, 2011). As well fitting the purpose of this case study, thematic analysis emphasises a rich description of a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). More importantly, it is the most suitable analytic strategy for this deductive or theory-based single case study (Yin, 2009). Thematic analysis is often driven by the prior hypotheses or theoretical propositions, which are formulated into the expected patterns that should be found in the case if the theoretical propositions are correct (Campbell, 1966, 1975; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009). This analysis technique of pattern matching between theoretical patterns and observed patterns helps strengthen internal validity of inference regarding the causal relationships between bridging networks and the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the case of Southern Thailand (Trochim, 1989).

In addition to the pattern matching strategy, the flexibility of thematic analysis also allows the emergence of unpredicted themes that strongly link to the data itself, rendering an inductive analytical approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 1990). The flexibility of the analysis method is particularly central to my research interest – to discover or extract themes from the data (if any) collected in Southern Thailand where the peacebuilding of local religious leaders has not yet been systematically examined through the lens of social networks. This is to ultimately gain as much as possible understanding of the phenomenon in question.

As a first step in data analysis, I prepared transcripts. All interviews were transcribed during and after the field visit. Although the transcripts were completed, I am aware that it is impossible for transcripts to be "perfect" or provide "complete" data (Ellis et al., 2003, p. 355). Indications of interviewees' emotions and feelings during the interviews, such as stalling words

like "umms" and "ahhs" as well as laughter, pauses and physical gestures, were noted during the interviews as a personal note and included in some interview transcripts. Others were not depending on the meanings and implications of such indications. I read through the entire transcripts to get a sense of possible overarching themes/meanings and wrote down thoughts that occurred to her in memos, which helped identify possible themes and patterns emerging across the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Rubin & Rubin, 2011).

A process of coding then took place as the next step of analysis. As the analytical rationale, a set of codes was created to reflect patterned responses or themes, or the meaning of words and phrases, which demonstrated the evidence that helped answer or connect to the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82; Yin, 2009, p. 128). The codes were guided by the process of reading the interview transcripts and the expected patterns/themes derived from the theoretical propositions. The codes were categorised into: (1) the behaviours of the other actors or local religious leaders' contacts (facilitation/imposition/impairment); (2) the immediate result of the behaviours of other actors (sense of safety/limited space for participation/fear)[25]; and (3) the network effects (peacebuilding/restricted peacebuilding/no peacebuilding). Each of the findings chapters is organised to present the three components of each network type (civil society/governmental/military), which was identified in the interviews as the key networks affecting local religious leaders' behaviour.

4.12 Limitations of the Research Method

As the interviews took place immediately after the military seized power in a coup on 22 May 2014, I only had access to a small pool of potential candidates willing to participate in the

[25] The concepts of the sense of safety and fear have not yet introduced but will be articulated in the finding chapters.

research due to fear of severe repercussions during a period of political uncertainty. For that reason, the findings and conclusions may not represent a comprehensive perspective shared among the local population at large or, in other words, they may have limited generalizability outside the sample population (Yin, 2009). The findings and conclusions from this study however can be applied in a similar context of ethnoreligious conflict in which local religious leaders engage in peacebuilding by providing a hypothesis or theory, which is a potentially valid descriptive or casual inference.

Moreover, there is a possibility that the findings are not free from bias. The extensive power of the military and the loss of power of some key stakeholders in the Deep South at the time might have affected how the interviewees, especially those who had a connection with the previous power holders, articulated their views when asked about the role of the military – possibly holding a political bias toward the military. More importantly, the findings may hold male-bias since the vast majority of interviewees were male. There were only two women among the total of 31 interviewees. However, this is the nature of a Muslim community where men play a leading and more active role in the public sphere, especially since the position of Islamic leader or Buddhist monk in Thailand is only held by the male. All 18 local religious leader interviewees were therefore male, which accounted for more than half of the total number of interviewees. Nevertheless, I ensured that these 31 interviewees had relevant information as they were chosen because they were embedded in the conflict and were aware of the role of local religious leaders in the Deep South.

Given that the interviews were conducted mostly with Malay interviewees who spoke *Yawi* as the mother tongue and some a limited Thai which is my native language, I might not always have understood or extracted the deep meanings of words used by the Malay interviewees.

However, the language barrier became less detrimental as I had help from the Muslim gatekeeper, who was fluent in both *Yawi* and Thai, in translating and contextualising the interview information.

4.13 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how I tested the theoretical propositions in the case of Southern Thailand. In doing so, process tracing and the case study method was used to help trace the causal link between bridging networks and the peacebuilding of local religious leaders, which is the research aim of this thesis. Interviewing, which took place in Southern Thailand between May and September 2014, was described as a suitable research instrument for data collection. To work with the rich and complex data gathered from the field research, thematic analysis was employed as the data analytic strategy in order to produce a narrative, which is able to test the theoretical propositions and uncover new aspects and nuances that emerged from the interview material. Obstacles and other practical issues that I faced while conducting the research in a conflict environment have also been discussed, as been the approaches used to deal with them.

To create a general understanding of the case study's context, the next section will lay out the background to the protracted conflict in Southern Thailand, and the recent peacebuilding developments.

Chapter 5

The Context: Conflict and Peacebuilding in the Deep South of Thailand

5.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the background of the protracted conflict between Malay-Muslim insurgents and the Thai government over the southernmost territories of Thailand. It shows the fundamental and immediate causes of the conflict. It argues that ethnoreligious nationalism serves as an underlying cause of the conflict, while violent competition for power, and conspiracies of influential political networks and interest groups, add complexity and fuel to the current violence. It then describes the key insurgent movements from the 1960s until now to illustrate the nature and change of insurgency. Lastly, the recent efforts to build peace in the region are discussed, noting that it is in its initial stages.

5.2 The Protracted Conflict in the Deep South of Thailand

Conflict between the Malay insurgents and the Thai government has been present for more than a hundred years. It is concentrated in the southernmost provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and some parts of Songkhla) often referred to as the Deep South, which was once an independent kingdom called Patani[26] or Patani Raya (Greater Patani) (Funston, 2008; Syukri, 1985). About 95 percent of the total Muslim population in Thailand (around three

[26] Patani pronounced as "pa-ta-ni" is the original Malay word. When written in Thai, it becomes Pattani and pronounced differently as "pat-ta-ni". The term Patani is often associated with the Malay insurgency and struggles for self-determination.

million) is ethnic Malays (Minority Rights Group International, 2013). Although Muslims are minorities in other parts of the country (about 5% of the total population), they are the majority in the Deep South; 86%, 90%, and 89% of the total population in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani respectively.[27] The local traditions and practices are therefore predominately influenced by Malay ethnicity and Islam rather than Thai ethnicity and Buddhism, which are the main identity components of the vast majority of Thailand's population.

The relationship between the Thai and the Malay was first established in 1511 in a tributary form. Siam exercised limited sovereign power and mainly acquired tributes from Patani. From 1785 onward, Bangkok gradually increased its control over the southernmost territories. In 1902 Patani was eventually annexed into Thailand (or Siam[28] as it was at the time) as a result of state-building policy. Local Malay-Muslim leaders loyal to the Thai who were appointed to rule Patani lost a high degree of autonomy (Suhrke, 1970-1971). After annexation, Patani was divided into seven provinces[29], which were assigned to be under control of the Thai governor of Songkhla[30] and the central administration in Bangkok as part of the centralised bureaucratic structuring that aimed to turn Siam into a modern state (Suhrke, 1970-1971). Since then, there have been periodic violent uprisings and insurgencies seeking the political independence or at least autonomy of Patani (Aphornsuvan, 2007; Chalk, 2008; Le Roux, 1998).

[27] These numbers were obtained from the provincial offices during the field research.
[28] Siam was changed to Thailand in 1939 by Field Marshal Luang Phibunsongkhram (the fascist military dictatorship), but officially renamed Thailand on 20th July 1948 with the change coming into effect the following year (Aphornsuvan, 2007; Chalk, 2008).
[29] Seven provinces (in Thai: Khaek Jet Haumuang) included Patani, Nhongchik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala and Yaring (Aphornsuvan, 2007, p. 18).
[30] Songkhla is a main Thai-Buddhist province in the southernmost region.

5.2.1 Causes of Conflict

Several factors contribute to the formation and prolongation of the conflict in the Deep South. While ethnoreligious nationalism serves as the fundamental cause of conflict, the conflict's complexity and the recent escalation of violence are likely to be influenced by power struggles between influential figures at a national level and conspiracy theories involving several interest groups competing for resources and political power in the region.

Ethnoreligious Nationalism: scholars widely agree that grievances from injustices and assimilation that developed from 'Thai-ization' or Thai nationalism are the underlying causes of conflict in the Deep South (Abuza, 2009; Aphornsuvan, 2006; Brown, 2008; Chalk, 2008; McCargo, 2008, 2009; Melvin, 2007; NRC, 2006; Pitsuwan, 1982; Storey, 2007, 2008; Yusuf, 2006). The Thai and the Malay belong to two completely different cultural orientations (Pitsuwan, 1982, pp. 12-13) despite evidence of cross-community marriage and cultural syncretism such as healing practices and beliefs in common ancestors (Horstmann, 2004). For the Malay, it is almost impossible to separate ethnic from religious identity. Loyalty is defined by ethnicity and religion. The Malay identity is not only based on Malay ethnicity but also on Islamic belief because religion historically functions along ethnic lines. The Malay speak a different language (*Yawi*) from the rest of the country and their way of life is largely intermingled with Islam rather than Buddhism, which heavily influences mainstream culture (Che Man, 1990). More importantly, the Malays separate themselves from the Thais and associate Thai with Buddhism. For instance, the *Yawi*[31] word used to designate the Thai, *Orè Siyè* (people of Siam), primarily indicates Buddhist (Le Roux, 1998, p. 242). In other words, 'Malay' and 'Thai' are synonymous with 'Muslim' and 'Buddhist' respectively. This

[31] *Yawi* is a Melayu dialect used only in the Deep South (Le Roux, 1998; Yusuf, 2007a).

significantly shows that identity formation for the Malay and the Thai was based on ethnicity and religion long before the modern state era.

With such an understanding of the terminology, it is not acceptable among the Malay population when the Thai government replaces the term 'Patani Malay' with 'Thai Muslim' to indicate Thai citizens who have faith in Islam. From a Malay perspective, the term 'Thai-Muslim' shares the same meaning as 'Buddhist-Muslim', which cannot be used to identify those who will never be Buddhist (Jory, 2007). In essence, the Malay cannot be assimilated because transforming into Thai entails Malay-Islam cultural disintegration.

Rather than recognising the differences in identity foundation, the national identity of the Thai state is formed on 'Thainess' and Buddhism that are institutionalised in political culture. As shown in the constitution(s), the national identity is conceptualised around the notion of one nation (Thai), one religion (Buddhism), and one king, which naturally contests the identity of the Malay ethnic group (Liow, 2006; Yusuf, 2007a). The government's suppression of minority cultures in its policy of 'Thai-ization' is, in other words, the transformation of multi-ethnic societies into a cohesive Thai nation and collective belongingness. 'Thai-ization' policies originated to survive the periods of colonization and Cold War, helping Thailand escape colonialism, and the communism which affected neighbouring countries. All minorities, not only in the southern region but in every corner of the country, were forced to assimilate and adopt the mainstream Thai-Buddhist character in order to create 'the mono-ethnic character of the state' (Brown, 1994).[32] During the extreme nationalist regimes between the late 1930s and the early 1970s, the semi-military governments of Phibulsongkram, Sarit Thanarat, and

[32] Minorities' dialects in the North, Northeast, Central and South enjoyed slightly more official recognition from governments than Jawi. These dialects often appeared on radio and TV programmes, while Jawi was omitted from the country's main communication channels.

Thanom Kittikajorn, the ultra-nationalist Pan-Thai policy and the Cultural Mandates (*Ratthaniyom*) forced government officials to view any expression of non-Thai identity as threat to national security (ICG, 2005).

In the Deep South, promoting the use of the Thai language and the introduction of secular curricula to Islamic studies in private Islamic schools (*pondoks*) escalated the sense of discrimination, antagonism and fear among the Malay-Muslim population that they would ultimately lose their language and culture (Aphornsuvan, 2006; Boonlong, 2007; Nguyen, 2008). *Pondoks*, as part of a traditional Islamist education that served as a central agent in reproducing Islamic identity, were suppressed. Malay children were taught a secular curriculum in Thai language and Buddhist ethics and values, and *Yawi* was not allowed in classrooms. Students were also taught to identify themselves as 'Thai Muslim' rather than 'Malay Muslim'(Anurugsa, 1984). People's names, as well as the names of streets and villages, were forced to change to reflect Thainess. Islamist practices were restricted as a consequence of the state's promotion of Buddhism (Melvin, 2007). The linguistic and education policies resulted in massive protest shown by a very high opt-out rate of Malay schoolchildren. Equally important, education reform contributed to the rise of a new generation of foreign-educated Muslim intellectuals, who did not see themselves as constituents of the Thai state (Aphornsuvan, 2006).

Even though aggressive nationalist policies toward the Malay minorities were eased in the 1980s, the promotion of Thai consciousness to ensure loyalty continued. A policy of *Tai Rom Yen* (Peaceful Thailand) launched during the General Prem administration (1980-1988) was to strategically avoid intense repression that might lead to unrest and political uprisings, and to increasingly support Muslim cultural rights and religious freedoms (Le Roux, 1998, p. 238;

Tan, 2002). For instance, the central government sought to enhance public participation, economic development and a broad amnesty for communist and separatist fighters ((ICG), 2008, p. 57). The open political environment led to the formation in 1986 of a moderate political group, Al-Wahdah, to represent Malay-Muslim people at the national level. Despite the increasing level of political participation, the Malays rarely held high ranking positions in the bureaucracy (Jha, 1997). The Malays were still encouraged to identify themselves as 'Thai Muslim' to continue marginalising a Malay consciousness (Anurugsa, 1984).

In 2004, the Thaksin Government re-emphasised strong nationalist ideals and adopted harsh security policies to deal with the re-emergence of violence. A military approach was the main strategy. Martial law was imposed across the region. Many special squads were deployed, while a large number of policemen received training on military tactics and long-range reconnaissance (Chalk, 2008; McCargo, 2008). Notoriously, the government was engaged in human rights abuses – arbitrary repression, targeted killings and abductions, which increased the sense of fear and revenge among the Malay Muslim population (Chalk, 2008; McCargo, 2007b; Melvin, 2007).

The resurgent violence in 2004 involved religion. Scholars argue that the character of the conflict has recently shifted from primarily ethnic to predominately ethnoreligious strife (Croissant, 2005; Harish, 2006; Joll, 2010; Melvin, 2007; Peow, 2009; Yusuf, 2007a, 2007b). For instance, religious elements - such as a report on mystical religious prayer services including the drinking of holy water before the incident and a book titled "*Berjihad di Pattani*" with jihadist inspiration - were found on the body of a dead militant in the 2004 Krue Se incident (Yusuf, 2007a, p.14) . Soon after the Krue Se incident, the population was horrified by the decapitation of Buddhist monks by the Malay insurgents leading to the Thai Buddhist

mobilisation due to the increase in fear for safety (Ehrlich, 2006). Local Muslim and Buddhist communities were further divided when a number of Buddhist monasteries were turned into compounds by the Thai military to protect Buddhist communities from insurgent attacks (Jerryson, 2009, 2011).

Despite the rise of radical Islamist ideology and religious division in Southern Thailand, the conflict is not a religious conflict in the sense of a dispute between competing religious beliefs but a fight for territory and the self-determination of an ethnic minority. Liow and Pathan (2006, pp. 43-44) argue that the insurgent movements are not based in theology or stem from Islamic jurisprudence but rather on the 'oral instruction' of local religious teachers with reference to narratives of religious oppression and colonisation by the Buddhist Siam. The Malay insurgencies mainly focus on the idea of Patani Malay-Muslim nationalism and the liberation of Patani (Liow & Pathan, 2006, pp. 41-46). Islam is only utilised for indoctrinating and recruiting insurgents, which are believed to take place mostly in religious schools (*pondoks*) (ICG, 2009; Liow & Pathan, 2006; Pitsuwan, 1982). Religious teachers played a prominent role in the formation of insurgent groups such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), which did not hold religious goals but rather the secular aim of separatism (Chalk, 2008; Liow, 2006). These days, they serve as recruitment agents selecting youths "who display three key characteristics: piety, impressionability, agility" and "recruit these youths into small groups, initially by befriending and inviting them to join discussion or prayer groups" (ICG, 2005, p. 26). Only those sympathetic toward liberationist ideology are invited to join the movement.

Power Struggle and Criminality: In addition to ethnoreligious nationalism it appears that power politics and criminality have recently fuelled the conflict. McCargo (2005) suggests that

the escalation of violence in 2004 was a consequence of the competition for political power between Thaksin and 'the network monarchy' or the Thai king and his proxies who intervened in the political process. Thaksin aimed to replace the existing power structure of 'network monarchy' sustained through the Privy Council[33], the military, and the bureaucratic system with his political economy network of insider connections and private enterprises (McCargo, 2007a; McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). For instance, Thaksin's abolition of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) in 2002 was a challenge to the existing local patronage network in the southern border provinces. He claimed that the centre was no longer required since the problems in the Deep South did not rise from political grievances but from conflicts among interest groups (McCargo, 2007a). The SBPAC was established under the *Tai Rom Yen* policy in the 1980s and masterminded by Prem and the palace. It was responsible for development projects and public relations initiatives including training for non-Malay officials in cultural awareness and the local language (*Yawi*). Without the SBPAC, the communication channels between the government and the Muslim leadership were removed, thus providing an opportunity for an upsurge of insurgent movements.

In addition to the power struggle between Thaksin and the monarchy, the complex interrelation between politics and criminality in the region is an integral part of insurgency that crucially exacerbates the violence. Askew (2007) describes the character and the causes of the current violence in the Deep South through conspiracy theories, arguing that crime and militancy is highly connected and persistent due to the lawless nature of the borderland. Some violent incidents are caused by interest groups/networks, such as criminal networks, influential figures and politicians/government officials, rather than ideologically inspired separatists. Personal and political agendas often contribute to violence or what the locals call 'creating a situation

[33] The President of the Privy Council was Prem Tinsulanond at the time of power struggle.

(*srang sathanakan*)' to reduce trust in the authorities and destroy political rivals. Conflicts over economic and political resources are also waged by different powerful groups, each citing separatism as a cover. In these circumstances, government reports and intelligence are also politicised and it is often unclear who is responsible for attacks and raids. Pervasive corruption and political contestation in this lawless borderland became a foundation of the region's instability and vulnerability, which are easily exploited by insurgents.

In summary, this section discusses as the underlying cause of conflict (ethnoreligious nationalism) and the more immediate causes (power struggle and conspiracy) of the current waves of violence. These causes have generated and sustained insurgency and the fight for self-determination of Patani since the 1960s. The next section will illustrate the three phases of insurgent movements in the Deep South.

5.2.2 The Insurgent Movements

There are several insurgent movements in the Deep South. However, only the key movements will be described in this section. All the insurgent movements uphold Malay nationalism but express it with different strategies. After they emerged in the 1960s, some of the insurgent movements became inactive, while others split and sprang into other factions. The insurgent movements can be divided into three main phases: the 1960s to the 1990s; the late 1990s to 2004; and 2004 to the present. These categories are based on the active capacity of the insurgent movements.

The 1960s to the 1990s: Three main insurgent groups operated between the 1960s and the 1990s: Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN); Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO); and

New PULO.[34] They were all rurally based. Each had different ideologies for armed struggle and usually did not coordinate their operational activities (Chalk, 2008).

The BRN was formed among religious schools (*pondoks*) originally to protest against the secular curriculum introduced by the Thai government. It proved to be a significant threat to the government with its ability to operate throughout the region. It split due to leaders' different focuses on the spectrums of nationalism, religion and socialism during the 1980s and the 1990s (ICG, 2005, p. 12).

The PULO was the largest and the most effective movement during the 1970s and the 1980s (ICG, 2005; Pitsuwan, 1982). It was formed by a religious scholar and had strong connections with the Middle East through military training and financial support (ICG, 2005, p. 8). Its two strategies included non-violently promoting political consciousness and Malay national identity at home, and intensifying international publicity through armed action. The border security cooperation between the Thai and Malaysian governments that drove PULO operatives out of their sanctuary in the northern Malaysian state of Kalantan to flee aboard significantly weakened the group, leaving a dissident faction of New PULO.

New PULO was established in 1995 with the aim to pursue Patani autonomy only through military action. In contrast to PULO, New PULO only operated in some parts of Yala and Narathiwat carrying out low-level attacks and missions to limit the loss of innocent lives and enhance its legitimacy (ICG, 2005, p. 13). The group was however crippled when key leaders were captured in 1998.

[34] They operated along with other smaller groups such as Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), Sabilillah, Barisan Nasional Baru (BNB), Tantra Jihad Islam (TIJ), and Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) (Chalk, 2008).

Nevertheless, they briefly formed an alliance under the name '*Bersatu'* (solidarity or unity) and carried out bombing, incendiary and shooting strikes in mid-1997 under a campaign called 'falling leaf' – the most serious rise of insurgency in the 1990s (Chalk, 2008; ICG, 2005). Despite their differences, they all aimed to create an independent Muslim state.

The late 1990s to 2004: The insurgent movements in the late 1990s seemed to be severely weakened and the scale of unrest dropped dramatically mainly due to the dissolution of PULO and New PULO coinciding with the Thai government's non-military approach (*Tai Rom Yen*) introduced in the 1980s (Chalk, 2008; Yegar, 2002). With the *Tai Rom Yen* policy, the region enjoyed increasing economic and administrative development as well as political participation as part of a winning hearts-and-minds campaign. The national security policy for the southern border provinces was established based on a "development as security" approach in the 1990s (Croissant, 2005, p. 23; Rahimmula, 2003, p. 275). Confrontation was changed to negotiation efforts. Infrastructure budgets for the Deep South, such as electricity and running water projects, increased. State programmes aimed to create better understanding and tolerance between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims. To build Muslim Malay cultural awareness, training schemes for non-Muslim officials were held. In other words, the government tried to solve problems of "poor coordination among agencies and corruption and prejudice among officials" to improve its ability to handle issues in the Deep South ((ICG), 2008, p. 57). By the late 1990s, insurgence had become "relatively quiet" (Tan, 2002, p. 109).

Insurgency resurfaced in early 2000 when the Thaksin Administration implemented a policy change to dismantling arrangements and mechanisms for cooperation between the Malay elites and central government, such as the SBPAC which was mentioned in the previous section. This policy change was part of Thaksin's attempts to replace the old power networks with his

political allies (McCargo, 2005, 2007a; Pathmanand, 2007). Violent incidents escalated from 75 in 2002 to 119 in 2003 to more than 1000 in 2004 (ICG, 2005, p. 16).

2004 to the present: From the reactivation of violence in 2004 onwards, a significant change is demonstrated in the nature and dynamics of local militant movements. Unlike the earlier generations of insurgency, the current movement is loose, or "a network without a core" called by Satha-Anand, a Thai scholar (cited in McCargo, 2008, p. 174), rather than a tangible or hierarchical organization as it appeared in the past (Askew, 2007; ICG, 2009; Liow & Pathan, 2006; McCargo, 2008, 2007b; Melvin, 2007; Satha-Anand, Daigaku, & Kenkyūjō, 2009). An amalgam of militants operating on the ground is drawn from New PULO, BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (the only active faction of BRN)), Pemuda (a separatist youth movement part of which is controlled by BRN-C) as well as ad-hoc groups such as Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GIMP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP) (Chalk, 2008; ICG, 2005). The militants are believed to mix in the community and base themselves in towns and villages rather than rural areas. Most violent incidents are conducted by a small cell of militant franchises (district-level) that lack formal leadership. They also show a lack of coherence and strategic direction (Chalk, 2008). Not only are armed forces including the military and police the usual targets of attacks, civilians (both Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists, including monks) are also increasingly targeted. The attacks are mostly concentrated in the Deep South. The current waves of violence since 2004 have so far caused more than 6,200 deaths and about 11,300 injuries (Deep South Incident Database: DSID, 2017). Despite a concern raised by some scholars about the possible link to regional or international jihadist networks[35], there is no evidence of such a connection apart from the fact

[35] Although there is no direct connection with the transnational terrorist groups or sharing the global jihadist aim, the Malay insurgents are influenced by radical Islamic websites and copy some of the tactics used in Iraq and Afghanistan (Storey, 2007).

that some ustaz (teachers/trainers) have been trained aboard (McCargo, 2008; Melvin, 2007). The conflict remains largely domestic with an increased intensity of violence and level of sophistication in the insurgents' operations (Liow & Pathan, 2006).

This section has explained the development of insurgent movements in the Deep South from the 1960s until now. Although all insurgent movements aim at the independence of Patani, they seem to operate separately. Unlike the past, the current movements are based in the cities and are loosely formed without organisation. Insurgent attacks are, however, still carried out mainly on local targets in the Deep South.[36] Nevertheless, there are increasing numbers of indiscriminate attacks including deliberate attacks against civilians. Despite the ongoing insurgency, peace processes and peacebuilding attempts have been initiated at the top and local levels. There have been a few rounds of peace talks between the Thai government and Malay-Muslim insurgents since they were initiated in February 2013. The next section will discuss the development of peacebuilding in the Southern Thailand conflict.

5.3 The Recent Efforts to Build Peace

Peace processes and peacebuilding are relatively new in the Deep South. Unlike scholarly knowledge about the conflict, research on peace processes and peacebuilding is limited. The peace process at the top-level shows slow progress and has not yet gained momentum. In contrast, peacebuilding work at the local level is growing and driven by provincial governmental officials and non-governmental actors.

[36] Recently a few incidents have occurred outside the region (in Hua Hin, Surat Thai and on Phuket island), which are suspected to have been carried out by insurgents from the Deep South.

Although the Malay culture and identity have been increasingly aware by government officials in the Deep South, there have been no peace agreements signed specifically to settle the conflict between the Thai government and Malay insurgency, nor have there been changes to the political structures in the Deep South. Scholars suggest that the only long-term solution to the ongoing conflict is substantive decentralisation such as autonomy (Jitpiromsri & Lhungpetae, 2008; McCargo, 2008) or an official recognition of the ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of the Muslim population (Yusuf, 2007a) . The Thai government has neither engaged officially with ideas of substantive decentralisation nor an intention to offer the southern provinces substantial control over their own affairs (ICG, 2016; McCargo, 2008, p. 10). It has offered only a limited degree of political space to Malay minorities since the Thai government's legitimacy to rule was believed to be maintained through the allegiances of local elites, and not the general Malay population. Discussions around enlarging political space or granting substantive decentralisation to the region still create controversy (McCargo, 2008, 2010, 2012), even though the majority of Malay population in the conflict areas do not support separatism as a way to end the current violence. Only about 20 percent of the Malay population in the South believes that separatism is the only way to end the conflict (Klein, 2010, pp. 117-118).

Furthermore, the Thai government is still reluctant to commit to fundamental policy changes regarding cultural differences such as language use and religious educational arrangements although these were recommended by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) as ways to bring about reconciliation in the region. The NRC is an independent body established in March 2005 by the Thai government to address the violence afflicting the country's southernmost provinces. In 2006, it launched a report (Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation), which addresses both security concerns and issues of injustice. Against the recommendation of the NRC, the Thai government refuses to officially recognize

Yawi as "an additional working language" in the region (NRC, 2006, p. 100), let alone education reform to bring the Islamic and state school systems closer together, or the introduction of bilingual education (NRC, 2006, pp. 93-94). In response to the NRC's recommendations, President of the Privy Council General Prem Tinsulanonda (a former Prime Minister, who enforced the *Tai Rom Yen* policy in the 1980s) stated: "we cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai…We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language" (The Nation, 2006a).

Despite the absence of substantial decentralisation or structural changes, the Thai government was recently engaged in a series of peace talks with Malay insurgents, which took place in 2013 with Malaysia as a facilitator (Puengnetr & Thiosanangwan, 2013). This peace dialogue, however, lacked substantial effectiveness and was marred by distrust, inconsistency, and poor management.[37] There was controversy and criticism on the benefits of these talks especially around the issue of the representatives of the insurgent groups who might not hold authority over several active separatist groups (Puengnetr & Pathan, 2013; The Nation, 2013a, 2013b). The term 'liaison' was often used instead of 'representative' to describe Hasan Taib, the self-proclaimed head of the negotiating team of the insurgent movements. The peace talks eventually stalled in 2014 without achieving a meaningful agreement.

Nevertheless, peace dialogue between the current military government under the command of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha and the insurgent groups officially resumed on 25 October 2016 after closed-door negotiations (The Nation, 2016). In this new round of talks, the Thai officials met a new group of Malay insurgent representatives: MARA Patani. The MARA Patani or the Patani Consultative Council is a separatist umbrella group formed in March 2015. It consists

[37] Interviews in 2014.

of BRN[38] and two factions of PULO, GMIP and BIPP.[39] However, key actors from the MARA Patani, have been criticised as to whether they have the actual power to control militants and truly represent all the insurgent groups operating on the ground. This is because some members of the BRN, whose combat unit – known as Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) and the main group behind the current violence – made it clear that they rejected peace talks between the government and the MARA Patani (Prachathai, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Notwithstanding, the new policy guideline for conflict management and development in the Southern border provinces (Year 2017 – 2019) launched in November 2016 by the Office of Internal Security Council, elevates the commitment of the government by putting peace talks on the national agenda.[40]

In addition to top-level peace negotiation attempts, governmental development programmes at a local level have been initiated as the main tools to mitigate conflict and improve the relationship between the Thai government and the Malay minorities in the Deep South.[41] Massive government spending was poured into in the region through provincial governmental departments, especially the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), which is the main governmental agency in charge of development issues. Unlike the past when Malay minorities were managed as part of the economic advancement and political development of the country (Suhrke, 1970-1971), more specific approaches are now being implemented. The SBPAC not only funds economic development projects but also initiatives

[38] Members of the BRN are divided. Some support and become representatives of MARA Patani, whereas some oppose formal peace talks with the Thai government.
[39] When first introduced in August 2016, there were three factions of PULO. However, the third PULO faction, PULO P4, withdrew from MARA Patani after participating in earlier secret negotiations with Thai officials (Wahari, 14 October 2016).
[40] The new policy guideline (Year 2017-2019) indicates the government's main goals of building safe southern border provinces, eliminating causes of violence, protecting the way of life of everyone, fostering development based on multiculturalism, and encouraging participation in sustainable peacebuilding.
[41] Interviews with Tera, Panumas, and Weerachai, who were senior governmental officials, on 24 June 2014 (in Pattani), 11 August 2014 (in Pattani), and 9 July 2014 (in Bangkok) respectively.

that allow the expression of ethnic, linguistic and religious identity of the Malay-Muslims. For example, the SBPAC has given financial support of 175 million baht (about 5.6 million USD) to *tadika* (Islamic schools for young children) for constructing new buildings as well as other grants for small development projects (ICG, 2012). To facilitate the undertaking of religious-related activities, Imams and mosques are also receiving increased salaries and allowances from the SBPAC.[42]

However, the government has not yet given a genuine apology for wrongdoing and heavy-handed policies. Partly due to this issue, supports from the government are often seen as insincere efforts to improve the government's approaches. A study conducted by Saniwa (2009) from Yala Islamic University in Pattani shows that any development projects and peace initiatives by the Thai government have had little effect on terminating the conflict. The current 'stick and carrot' strategy often does not reduce violence in the areas because the Malays do not believe that government development projects will bring "the freedom to practice a Muslim way of life and culture", which is seen as their ultimate goal (Saniwa, 2009, p. 12). Although several development projects aimed at improving the living standard of locals have been established throughout the region, according to Saniwa (2009, p. 12), they cannot compensate for the loss of lives, misery, frustration and suspicion caused by military practices over the years.

In addition to the government's peacebuilding efforts via development projects, peacebuilding by non-governmental actors at the local level has increasingly gained momentum. Local civil society and non-governmental organisations are the main drivers. International agencies can

[42] Interviews with Panumas, who was working for the SBPAC at the time of interview, in Yala on 11 August 2014.

have only limited involvement since the Thai government wants the conflict to remain a domestic matter and strictly monitors aid and support from overseas (Burke, 2012a). Despite the lack of direct intervention, international organisations' funding to local agencies can expand a local peacebuilding coalition of civil society and non-governmental organisations in the Deep South. For instance, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand significantly engenders civil society cooperation and helps pave the way for a formal peace process (Iglesias, 2013; Pathan, 2012). Because it is a form of network that consists of multiple civil society and non-governmental organisations, it can coordinate and make a deal with different stakeholders at the local level through dialogue to help build confidence in peace processes (Iglesias, 2013). It also drafted a proposal of political decentralisation models (Iglesias, 2013). Other roles include oversight of the rule of law and capacity-building for local peacebuilders (Pathan, 2012). It is worth noting, however, that the civil society coalition is still fragmented and lacks effective mechanisms to ensure integrated expansion (O-In, 2012).

It is an objective of this thesis to study local religious leaders' peacebuilding efforts in the Deep South of Thailand. As an overview of the research findings, I have found that local religious leaders are increasingly engaged in peacebuilding activities via collaboration with civil society and governmental actors. Among the five main domains of peacebuilding activities[43], local religious leaders engaged in socio-economic development (e.g. drug rehabilitation for youth and the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum), community justice (e.g. legal trainings for Islamic leaders and torture prevention), religious dialogue (e.g. inter-religious camps for students), and community mediation between Buddhist-Muslim communities.

[43] As articulated in Chapter Three, the five domains of peacebuilding activities are community mediation, community security and justice, socio-economic development, inclusive governance, and reconciliation via religious dialogue.

I have found that socio-economic development is the peacebuilding domain in which local religious leaders' contribution is particularly significant. A type of such activities is the effort for tackling major social issues in the Deep South. For example, Imam Syed,[44] a local imam in Pattani, initiated a drug rehabilitation programme for youth, which took place at his mosque. He used 'faith' or Islamic principles as a tool to deal with the drug addiction in youth. At the mosque, the young addicts studied and practiced Islam, which helped them remain disciplined. Through this programme, Imam Syed addressed the addiction problem at the family level by not only educating the young addicts but also their parents of how to fulfil the duties of a good son to the parents and vice versa. He believed this programme helped reduce the likelihood of youth's involvement in insurgency since the drug addicts were the targets of insurgent recruitments and other illegal business such as drug cartels and smuggling, which also inflicted violence in the Deep South of Thailand.

Another main domain of socio-economic development is education, especially the development of the Islamic integrated curriculum. The development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum is an important activity to strengthen and improve social acceptance of the Malay Muslim identity, which has been under marginalisation by state – the underlying cause of conflict. For example, Rayyan, an Islamic teacher in Songkhla, engaged in the development of the Integrated-Islamic Curriculum with an objective to improve the Malay-Muslim minority's access to education and enhance trust between the government and the Malay-Muslim minority, especially religious students and scholars. According to Rayyan, by creating quality Islamic education in private religious schools, the government encouraged Malay-Muslim students to stay in the system rather than enrolling in pondoks, a traditional form of Islamic education, which could provide a ground for Muslim insurgents/extremists. In this sense, the

[44] Names of interviewees appeared in this thesis are pseudonym.

development of the Integrated-Islamic Curriculum help alleviate suspicion that religious scholars/students may involve in insurgency.

Local Islamic leaders have also been involved in legal trainings for the Muslim population as a way to improve justice and prevent human rights violations by increasing legal knowledge and skills. Abdulla, an Islamic scholar at a local university, and Ali, a member of the Pattani Islamic committee, received resources and supports for their legal trainings from governmental and civil society sources respectively. Abdulla collaborated with government officials from the Ministry of Justice in organising workshops to educate local Muslims about laws and legal rights. Ali worked with the Asia Foundation and the Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) to hold workshops for local Islamic leaders from Muslim villages, who could often be the targets of abuse and human right violations as they were often seen as insurgents or insurgent sympathizers by the Thai military forces and police. Ali, as a lawyer, also provide local consultations for local Muslims, who were arrested and accused of involvement in insurgency. More details on peacebuilding activities undertaken by local religious leaders will be articulated in Chapter Six (Civil society: Facilitative Network and Peacebuilding) and Seven (Government: Top-Down Network and Restricted Peacebuilding).

It however seems that community mediation between Buddhist-Muslim villages and torture prevention via monitoring places of detention were not emphasised although identified by Phra Thepsatit and Rayyan respectively. That could be because of the small scale of the works or the limited interview time, which did not allow them to further articulate their involvement in these activities. These activities require further research.

This section has demonstrated the recent peacebuilding efforts in the Deep South. While the top-level peace process has recently taken shape and not yet made a significant impact on the situation, peacebuilding at a local level has been expanding with the peace work of provincial governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations.

5.4 Conclusion

To create an understanding about the environment in which local religious leaders operate in the Deep South, this chapter has described the nature of the conflict as well as recent developments in peacebuilding in Southern Thailand. It argues that the conflict is caused by ethnoreligious nationalism, which has generated several insurgent movements over the years. More importantly, the close link between ethnic and religious identities and the conflict makes the position of religious leaders on peacebuilding deeply ambivalent. In addition to ethnoreligious nationalism, power struggles and criminality also account for the complexity of the violence since 2004.

Peacebuilding efforts at the elite levels are discussed showing the increasing commitment of the Thai government and the Malay insurgents to peace talks and other government-led development projects, which aim to improve relationships with the local population. Furthermore, local civil society is recognized as the main driving force of peacebuilding on the ground. Peacebuilding by civil society organisations however remains disintegrated in strategy and direction of their expansion.

The next section will present research findings on the effect of variations in other bridging actors (state and civil society) on peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders that are

drawn from interviews conducted in Southern Thailand between 22 May and 5 September 2014.

Chapter 6

Civil Society: Facilitative Network Promoting Peacebuilding

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings related to civil society actors, and how their involvement promoted the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict. It sheds light on the research question: *how do bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting?* Overall, the interviewees[45] suggested that civil society actors facilitated the peacebuilding of local religious leaders by offering platforms for socialisation with other like-minded actors. Socialisation helped identify a shared preference for peace, and allowed local religious leaders to learn about their peacebuilding potential. As a result, local religious leaders appeared to voluntarily join peacebuilding alliances with civil society actors and develop a sense of safety from being part of 'like-minded' peacebuilding networks. The sense of safety was suggested to be a vital condition for determining local religious leaders' access to civil society actors' resources, such as funding and knowledge of laws, development as a peacebuilding strategy, and integrated-Islamic education. The findings seem to support theoretical proposition 1, that a bridging network is likely to promote peacebuilding of local religious leaders when the other network members facilitate the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach.

[45] Names of all interviewees appeared in this thesis are pseudonymous.

The chapter proceeds in three main sections. The first section shows how civil society actors facilitated the development of local religious leaders' peacebuilding efforts through *socialisation*. The second section examines the effects of socialisation with civil society actors, namely the sense of safety derived from collective action, and the connectivity of civil peacebuilding networks (*phak pouk*) and shared preferences for peace. The third section illustrates the effect of having ties to civil society actors, namely how it increases the accessibility to funding and peacebuilding knowledge and norms, which subsequently enables local religious leaders to undertake peacebuilding activities.

Table 7: Findings - Civil Society Networks and Promoting Peacebuilding

Behaviour of Civil Society Actors	Immediate Outcome	Network Effect
Facilitation via Socialisation - the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach	Sense of safety	Promoting Peacebuilding - accessibility to resources for socio-economic development activities

6.2 The Behaviour of Civil Society Actors: Facilitation via Socialisation

This section focuses on the facilitative behavior of civil society actors that was identified in the interviews. Based on the responses provided, it appears that civil society actors, as the key driving force of peacebuilding in the Deep South (Burke, 2012a; O-In, 2012), provided opportunities for local religious leaders to socialise with actors outside of their religious congregations, such as peacebuilders from civil society.[46] It was suggested that the facilitation by civil society actors was motivated by a preference for peace, shared between them and local

[46] Religious leaders and civil society actors were separate entities even though they collaborated with each other. Despite working with a civil society organisation, religious leaders still maintained their religious titles and functions on the religious front. Besides, civil society actors would never perform religious rituals.

religious leaders. All eleven of the local religious leader interviewees that engaged in peacebuilding activities reported that they had ties with at least one civil society peacebuilder, whereas all six local religious leader interviewees, who did not engage in peacebuilding activities, lacked ties with civil society peacebuilders.

6.2.1 Socialisation

Several interviewees suggested that civil society actors facilitated the development of the peacebuilding role and the restoration of the leadership of local religious leaders via socialisation with other actors such as members of non-governmental groups and organisations. The term socialisation in this chapter denotes a process through which local religious leaders learnt patterns and norms of practice from other actors (inside and outside the immediate religious congregations) whom local religious leaders established ties with. In a sense, socialisation was more meaningful than a simple engagement. Such socialisation process in the Southern Thailand, which was nurtured by continuing engagement, gradually developed a common preference for the bottom-up peacebuilding.

The non-governmental groups and organizations in which socialisation occurred include the Deep South Watch, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand, the Inter-religious Council of Thailand (IRC-Thailand)[47], the Platform of Insider Peacebuilders (IPP),[48] the

[47] The IRC-Thailand is interreligious cooperation among representatives of five religions that are officially recognised in Thailand namely Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikh. The current co-presidents of IRC-Thailand are Phra Rajvaracharn, provincial head abbot of the Dhammayutikanikaya, and Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, president of Yala Islamic University, Pattani and so-called head of the "new" Islamic sect in the Deep South ("Establishment of Inter-religions Council for Peace in Southern Thailand," 2011; "The Inter-religious Council for Peace – Thailand (IRC-Thailand)," 2011).

[48] The Platform of Insider Peacebuilders is a joint initiative of several academic institutions working in the field of peace and conflict studies, one civil society organisation, a think tank established by the Thai Parliament and the Berghof Foundation: The Center for the Study of Conflict and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) at the Pattani Campus and the Institute of Peace Studies (IPS) at the Hat Yai campus, both of the Prince of Songkla University (PSU), The Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) at the Chulalongkorn University, the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) at the Mahidol University, and the Peace Information Center (PIC) at the

People's College,[49] the Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC),[50] the Kam Pong Tak Wa (KPTW)[51] and the Curriculum Reform for Pondok in Southeast Asia (CRP-Project)[52].

Mostafa, a senior activist, indicated that the main task of civil society actors in the Deep South was to increase local religious leaders' socialisation [53] with other actors, especially peacebuilders. In accordance with research by Paffenholz (2010), Mostafa suggested that socialisation helped promote inter-group cohesion and a culture of peace, by building constructive attitudes and norms of conflict resolution, as well as helping to consolidate the identity of the minority that was oppressed and marginalised.

Mostafa also said that civil society organisations such as the IPP, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand, and the Deep South Watch, provided "platforms" or opportunities for local religious leaders to "socialise (*pob pa*)" and "participate (*kao ruom/mee soun ruom*)" in activities with actors whom they usually would not mingle with such as activists, academics, and local political leaders (government officials).[54] He suggested that

Thammasat University, The Office of Peace and Governance of the King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) in Bangkok, a think tank under the Thai National Assembly. For more information, see http://www.berghof-foundation.org/programmes/southeast-asia/insider-peacebuilders-platform/.

[49] The People's College is a local civil society organisation offering training for other civil society organisations and individual actors about democratic, political, peace processes, and peace/conflict-related issues in the Deep South of Thailand ("The Challenge of People's College with the Opening Common Space for Permanently Peace Resolution in Patani," 2015).

[50] MAC is a non-profit organization providing legal aid to Thai people and promoting access to justice and the rule of law particularly in the Deep South where cases of human rights abuses are common.

[51] The Kam Pong Tak Wa is a Islamic-faith based civil society network. More details will be provided later in the chapter.

[52] The CPR-Project was funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), a Japanese non-profit organisation.

[53] Paffenholz (2010) however defines socialisation and social cohesion in slightly different ways. She defines socialisation as the in-group association taking place within the same (religious) group, while social cohesion occurs in an inter-group fashion between two or among multiple conflicting (religious) groups. However, this thesis uses the term socialisation when referring to association taking place outside the immediate religious congregation, which is the smaller group unit than the religious group as a whole (the Buddhist or the Islamic group) which Paffenholz would do. Therefore, the term socialisation in this thesis suggests the combined meanings of socialisation and social cohesion proposed by Paffenholz (2010). For more details, please see Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework.

[54] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

civil society platforms brought together local religious leaders, who were closed to the people on the ground, and other influential actors to discuss and propose peaceful solutions to the current problems, and pave the way for peace processes. He said that

> civil society organisations have been trying to increase their work with religious leaders… I believe religious leaders are important. Their work is in Track 3, which links to civil society, [and] to the people at the grassroots level. This [collaboration between religious leaders and civil society actors] is therefore very important to peacebuilding.[55]

Mostafa also believed that local religious leaders could effectively learn conflict resolution from experienced peacebuilders saying that

> it had to be [local] civil society, and not the state and or armed actors, who supported the role of religious leaders. International organisations were also important because they could share peacebuilding experiences, such as in Ache, Mindanao - the Philippines, [and] Ireland. Islamic leaders learnt from external actors that there was still the [peaceful] way-out.[56]

Rayyan, a member of the Islamic Private Schools Association in Songkhla, was one of the local religious leaders who discussed the opportunity received from a regional Islamic educational network or the Curriculum Reform for Pondok in Southeast Asia (CRP-Project) to visit Islamic

[55] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.
[56] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

schools in other Southeast Asian countries. During the visits, he learnt about Islamic education management, which was used as a model for his project of the integrated-Islamic curriculum at his school. The details of his project will be discussed later in the chapter.

In addition, both Aamir and Imam Syed spoke about the Faith Community (*Kam Pong Tak Wa*: KPTW)[57] as a civil society platform that facilitated the peacebuilding role of religious leaders. The KPTW provided a platform through which local Islamic leaders learnt about sustainable development. Aamir, the founder of the KPTW, said that the KPTW was a civic network in which local Islamic leaders learnt to improve their leadership role within their community. The KPTW used "the Islamic faith" shared by all villagers, as a strategic tool for development in Muslim villages. Aamir believed using 'faith' not only helped mobilise public participation in development projects, but also helped return the leadership back to Islamic religious leaders. He said that "imams did not only lead daily prayers" but traditionally held the highest authority in the Islamic community.

More importantly, Aamir emphasised that use of "faith" and the significance of improving the leadership of religious leaders. As a member of the KPTW, Imam Syed indicated that 'faith' motivated him to join the KPTW, and that it provided him the opportunity to "visit and learn" from other members of the KPTW who ran successful development projects in other villages including Yaha district, Yala province, and Yanai sub-district.[58]

[57] The KPTW was a project established in 2008 by a small group of local civil society actors. Members of the KPTW at the village level emphasised the use of local knowledge, culture, and religious values as the tools for community development. That was because the KPTW aimed to reinforce local capacity for peacebuilding as a way to achieve sustainable peace (Hayeemasalae & Duerumae, 2013).
[58] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

Besides, Aamir said that by emphasising 'faith' and the role of religious leaders, community leaders helped "send out a message to the Malay-Muslim population that their identities were recognised and welcomed to prosper further in Thailand".[59] Aamir believed that the KPTW helped consolidate the Islamic identity that the Thai state marginalised through raising awareness of the importance of Islam as the primary component of the Malay identity, as well as the Islamic way of living.

Piyawan, a Buddhist facilitator of inter-religious dialogue working under the Inter-Religious Council of Thailand (IRC-Thailand), also indicated that local religious leaders were exposed to the culture of peace and constructive conflict resolution in her inter-religious dialogues. She said that it was "her job to transform local religious leaders". She proudly shared with me that

> local religious leaders who joined inter-religious dialogues slowly developed their peacebuilding knowledge [and] changed their negative attitudes [about the other religious group]…and realised that they could contribute to peacebuilding.[60]

In particular, she said that some local Buddhist monks, who were "told not to get involved in peacebuilding" and that "they did not have knowledge about the conflict and peaceful resolution", had changed and "were inspired to further their involvement in peace work after joining only one seminar [inter-religious dialogue] with [her]".[61]

[59] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[60] Interview with Piyawan on 7 July 2014 in Bangkok.
[61] Interview with Piyawan on 7 July 2014 in Bangkok.

She also emphasised that

> if we put [Buddhist monks] in an environment where they could learn how to help others, they would do more [peace work],…otherwise they would only do their usual religious duties and study religion.[62]

More to the point, Piyawan indicated that inter-religious dialogue was a key platform for bridging the division between Islamic and Buddhist leaders (who often have "hatred or mistrusted" for each other), and for building relationships among the religious communities affected by violence. Similar to findings by Paffenholz (2010, p. 72), Piyawan, a civil society peacebuilder, "brought together" local religious actors and leaders from different faith systems (Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikh) into the inter-religious dialogue sessions to foster relationships aimed at "educating them about peacebuilding [and] creating positive attitude toward the others".[63]

Piyawan described how to conduct interfaith dialogue sessions. First, religious leaders of Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism were divided into small groups for discussion. Then they were given an opportunity to openly engage in dialogue. She said the session empowered the participants by allowing the exchange of ideas on challenges and suggestions for peacebuilding processes in the Deep South. The exchange improved the mutual understanding and trust-building among religious actors of different faiths. She said that

> [the inter-religious dialogue] built trusting relationships…changed hateful relations to more positive ones…we showed them [participants] that

[62] Interview with Piyawan on 7 July 2014 in Bangkok.
[63] Interview with Piyawan on 7 July 2014 in Bangkok.

> interfaith dialogue was not beneficial to Muslims only, but mutually beneficial to both Muslims and Buddhists... It was much more effective once explained and it gave them [participants] time come to an understanding [of our interfaith dialogue]… Although they did not really want to join [interfaith dialogue at first], they did anyway because they wanted the project to succeed. Even if they only joined out of duty[64], they still learnt something and could later use that knowledge.[65]

Ahmad, an Islamic leader from Narathiwat who participated in the interfaith dialogue sessions, indicated that socialisation through inter-religious dialogue by the IRC-Thailand brought about the realisation of possible peaceful coexistence among different religious traditions. He stated that

> when people socialised with other people [from different religions and ethnic backgrounds], they realised that they all could live together. But if they did not spend time together, they would have likely been suspicious of others.[66]

This pattern of socialisation, which promoted the development of a common preference for the bottom-up peacebuilding, occurred to various extents in most bridging engagements between local religious leaders and civil society actors in the Deep South. The finding above highlighted

[64] Buddhist monks will traditionally not refuse an invitation from a Buddhist to perform rituals and religious services (i.e. funerals or blessing a place/person) outside their temples unless prohibited by the monk-regulation.
[65] Interview with Piyawan on 7 July 2014 in Bangkok.
[66] Interview with Ahmad on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.

the possibility of local religious leaders having facilitative relationships with other actors during conflict.

6.2.2 The Shared Preference for a Bottom-Up Peacebuilding Approach

Interviewees suggested that invitation or an official letter of invitation was the most common protocol that enabled religious leaders to step outside their religious and spiritual duties and participate in non-religious affairs. For instance, Rayyan, an Islamic teacher from a private Islamic school, said that

> if [civil society actors] invite me. I'll go. If they don't, I won't go.[67]

Similarly, Phra Surasit, the abbot of a Buddhist temple in Patani, mentioned that his interactions with civil society actors took place

> because I was invited and I accepted the invitation. If I was not invited, I could not do it myself [join a civil society network].[68]

Interviewees indicated that a shared ideology or objective motivated local religious leaders to voluntarily join civil society networks. Rayyan said that he utilised the civil society platforms, to which he was invited to participate, to socialise with civil society actors in order to examine whether the civil society actors shared his objectives. He said that these platforms allowed him to "talk with the civil society actors, to see whether they were open

[67] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.
[68] Interview with Phra Surasit on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.

[about their objectives], whether they were friendly, we can see their thoughts" before deciding to collaborate with them on peacebuilding.[69]

In the interview, Rayyan gave an example of sustainable peacebuilding as a shared goal, which influenced his involvement in the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand. He said that

> sustainable peacebuilding means improvements in people's quality of life, such as in education, economic and social development and so on… after several meetings and by establishing [separate] several organisations, we eventually set up the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand.[70]

Rayyan also talked about the shared objective with the Curriculum Reform for Pondok Project in Southeast Asia: Thailand (CRP- Project), a transnational Islamic education network. He indicated that his participation was influenced by his interest and expertise in education as a school teacher who sought to improve Islamic private education in Southern Thailand.

Zikri, an Islamic scholar of Islamic College, PSU, stated clearly in the interview that he only accepted invitations from civil society actors who agreed upon, or at least were willing to allow him to express his beliefs.

> When [a civil society actor] invites me, it shows that they want to know how I think, what my principles are. Without an invitation, I won't join

[69] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.
[70] Interview with Rayyan in Songkhla on 2 July 2014.

> [a civil society network], I just continue my teaching, my way of living.[71]

Youssef, a teacher at a private Islamic school, similarly suggested that

> Islamic leaders, especially progressive leaders that cooperate with NGOs because they share similar goals [with NGOs]… for example, if they want to restore justice…they participate in civil society seminar groups and other activities.[72]

Moreover, Ali, a lawyer who held an Islamic committee position in Pattani, identified that his relationships with "NGOs, like the CrCF [the Cross Cultural Foundation] and their networks" and "the Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC)" were driven by his passion and legal work on providing legal assistance to Muslims who were abused and/or accused of being involved in the insurgency.

Furthermore, Umar, an Islamic scholar, spoke about the shared desire to build peace with a non-violent approach as the primary factor driving local religious leaders' ties with civil society actors.

> From an Islamic perspective, it is the duty of the leaders to peacefully build a society. Although it is not specified in the Act [the Administrative Law on Islamic Organization Act B. E. 2540], it is the commitment to Allah that it is the duty. When the

[71] Interview with Zikri on 3 June 2014in Pattani.
[72] Interview with Youssef on 25 June 2014in Pattani.

> conflict occurs, religious leaders must take on this [duty] to mobilise peaceful means. Everyone [in the civil society sector] agrees on the need to build peace. No one denies it. Religious leaders may not be the main actors but they are part of the [civil society] alliance.[73]

Mostafa, a prominent Muslim activist, similarly described the desire to use non-violence as an alternative means of ending the conflict, as being important for "increasing the participation" of local religious leaders in the peacebuilding activities of civil society actors.

> [Local religious leaders] are fed up with the violence. [They realised that] violence is not the way-out. They do not have other options, except [participating in] peace processes. There weren't many religious leaders [involved in peacebuilding activities] before but recently more religious leaders are participating in our sessions and workshops. For example, in our People's College project, we got religious leaders to talk about peace and discuss peace processes with me on the stage. We got the deputy head of the Islamic Committees from Yala, for example. This [the participation of religious leaders] never happened in the past. Now the number [of religious leaders] is rising, which can be seen from the increasing number of

[73] Interview with Umar in Pattani on 1 August 2014.

> participants in IPP [Insider Peacebuilders Platform]. Religious leaders showed a huge interest to come and listen to what we had to say.[74]

This section has demonstrated that socialisation was a mechanism through which civil society actors facilitated the development of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders. Socialisation appeared to allow local religious leaders to exchange ideas and learn about positive attitudes, constructive conflict resolution, and their peacebuilding potential. Moreover, this section has shown that the shared desire for the bottom-up peacebuilding approach between local religious leaders and civil society actors motivated local religious leaders to join civil society networks to increase collaborative resources for peacebuilding.

The next section will illustrate the immediate result of facilitation via socialisation and the shared preference of the bottom-up peacebuilding approach: the sense of safety.

6.3 The Immediate Outcome: The Sense of Safety

In the interviews, the sense of safety or risk reduction, was discussed as a vital condition ties to civil society actors generated, and that enabled local religious leaders to conduct peacebuilding activities. Socialising within civil society networks and being parts of the collective voice of like-minded locals seemed to help local religious leaders develop the sense of safety. That was because such collaboration with the civil society based on socialisation and the shared preference for the bottom-up peacebuilding approach suggested a neutral position of religious leaders. And that neutrality prevented religious leaders from being seen as a threat to neither the government nor the insurgents, the two main conflict parties.

[74] Interview with Mostafa in Pattani on 29 May 2014.

Interviewees commonly said that "fear[*gour*]" of danger or attack, possibly from the conflict parties, was the biggest obstacle to local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding (the findings on fear as a hindrance to peacebuilding practice is articulated in Chapter 8). Mostafa, Aqil, and Ali suggested that the sense of safety could be reinforced by collaboration with civil society actors, or through being part of a civil society network. Mostafa and Aqil considered a civil society network as "a safety net" that could protect local religious leaders who became active in peacebuilding.

Rayyan, an Islamic teacher, spoke about the sense of safety derived from the membership in a civil society organisation. He said that aligning "[he was] with civil society, and not the Malay insurgents or the Thai state" would increase his sense of safety as the civil society was viewed as being neutral. Moreover, to be able to conduct peacebuilding activities, he said that he must maintain his neutral position, or at least not be seen as choosing a side.

Similarly, Hamza, a young Muslim activist, believed that working within the civil society sector reduced local religious leaders' risk of being seen as biased against the state. He said that

> [in a governmental platform], religious leaders cannot speak up about peacebuilding or conflict because, when they do, the government accuses them of provoking public outcry… If there is not a safe platform set up for them, they cannot speak up [their ideas]…[In contrast] when religious leaders become

> part of an NGO, people give them support [to publicly speak out].[75]

Hamza further emphasised that local Islamic leaders were usually "comfortable speaking in an academic-like platform" because academic discussions were generally well received in the Deep South. This was because academic discussions were considered to be for education purposes and as such, they were not viewed as tools for political gain by a particular group.

Phra Manit also discussed the advantage of civil society actors having a neutral position. He said that local religious leaders were probably most effective at working with civil society because it (civil society) represented local people, and more importantly, "they could tell the real needs of the [local] people". He also suggested that working as a civil society actor was perceived as being neither for the Thai state, or the Malay insurgents (the main conflict parties), but rather for the benefit of the people in the Deep South.[76] In other words, local religious leaders' collaboration with civil society actors would not be seen as being biased in favour of one side over the other when undertaking peacebuilding initiatives.

However, this did not suggest that all civil society actors were actually neutral. It is plausible that civil society actors could provide sanctuary for insurgent sympathizers. However, civil society actors were at least *perceived* to be relatively neutral in comparison to the other actors in the conflict, such as the Thai government, the Thai military forces and police, and the Malay insurgents.

[75] Interview with Hamza on 11 June 2014 in Pattani.
[76] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

This section demonstrated that the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding, illustrated via socialisation with civil society networks, seemed to help local religious leaders develop the sense of safety in times of high risk. The next section shows how local religious leaders' accessibility to civil society actors' resources enabled them to undertake peacebuilding activities.

6.4 The Network Effect: Promoting Peacebuilding

This section examines how access to civil society actors' resources helped promote the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. Once the membership of like-minded peacebuilding coalitions created a sense of safety, local religious leaders appeared to draw resources from civil society actors. These resources were used for activities in socio-economic development, community justice, religious dialogue such as drug rehabilitation for youth, the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum, legal training for Islamic leaders, and inter-religious camps for students.

Mostafa, a senior civil society actor, suggested that local religious leaders adopted peacebuilding strategies and "how to" do peace works from civil society actors with whom they shared similar peacebuilding objectives. He also said that "local religious leaders' skills improved" through the "increased participation" of civil society actors.

Rayyan also indicated that

> [he] would not do what he has been doing without knowledge received from civil society actors.

He added that

> working with civil society actors…helps expand his pool of knowledge.[77]

However, Umar, an Islamic scholar at Islamic College, PSU in Pattani, suggested that local Islamic leaders had a preference for Islamic sources of support. He said "there were two types of NGOs in the Deep South - NGOs from [the West] and those from the Muslim world". While "local Islamic leaders did not fear NGOs from the West" or try to restrict their ties with donors from the West, he suggested that "Islamic leaders would be happy if the funding comes from the Muslim world because the funding is the real donation". He also believed that they shared Islamic identity, as well as awareness of the global war on Islamic terrorism led by the West, and its negative effects on Muslim fellows.

> Local Islamic leaders preferred to receive support from the Middle East....For those [NGOs] from the West, [local Islamic leaders] will check whether the given money [from the Western NGOs] had any hidden agendas [of the war on Islamic terrorism]… There are only a small number of mosques [that receive money from the Western NGOs] because the mosques are small. Most mosques mobilise money from within their villages [for their projects]. Islamic leaders feel more comfortable that way.[78]

[77] Interview with Rayyan on 27 June 2015 via Skype.
[78] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

Umar added that

> if the money comes from Europe or America, Islamic leaders may be apprehensive given that their followers [Muslim villagers] may not like [western] NGOs. Although the money from the NGOs does not have any implications, it can create a bad image [of allying with the West]. People may criticise [the Islamic leaders]. Islamic leaders want to ensure that they do not upset Muslim villagers.[79]

Nevertheless, Umar suggested that funding from the West flown through local education institutions was likely to create less tension than that which was sent directly to local religious leaders. He suggested that local Islamic leaders who held positions in education institutions therefore had more flexibility to choose partnerships with foreign civil society actors.

> [Islamic leaders] who work under an organisation, like me being a university employee, can undertake initiatives from wherever without having problems. Although Islamic leaders are Muslims, they can still say the funding [from Europe or America] is received in the name of the organisation. For example, a mosque would be questioned immediately if it receives money from a Western NGO. In contrast, it would be alright if the university does. People consider universities as independent organisations that can do that. In other words, it is more flexible when organisations such as

[79] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

> universities receive money from NGOs. Unlike the mosques where Islamic leaders are very concerned.[80]

The flexibility to choose partnerships with other actors via state education institutions will be further discussed in the following chapter.

Aamir also stated that the funding from the European Union could reach local religious leaders via the *Kam Pong Tak Wa* (KPTW) or the Faith Community project. Aamir said financial support from the European Union allowed local religious leaders to initiate and maintain their development projects during 2009 – 2011.[81] This finding is in accordance with research by Burke (2012a), who suggests that while foreign actors cannot have direct involvement, their aid can reach Southern Thailand through local civil society channels.

'Faith' as a Peacebuilding Tool

Imam Syed, as a member of the *Kam Pong Tak Wa* (KPTW) or Faith Community, indicated that, after joining the Islam-based civil society network of the KPTW, he adopted the KPTW's peacebuilding strategy of using 'faith' or Islamic principles as a peacebuilding tool for his drug rehabilitation programme for youth in his village.[82] Similarly, both Aamir (the founder of the KPTW) and Imam Syed emphasised the importance of the role of religion, and "the duty" of imams as "community leaders" for "build(ing) sustainable peace"[83] and in

[80] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.
[81] According Aamir, with an approximately nineteen million Thai baht budget from the Thai government, the KPWT began locally-led development projects in 37 villages throughout Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkha in 2008. After that, the project received funding from the EU and other Thai universities/sponsors.
[82] The mosque of Imam Syed was the only mosque among 9 mosques in Khok Poh district, Pattani province that undertook a drug rehabilitation programme. Imam Syed also preached about the duty of Muslims and religious leaders in other occasions such as in community meetings, the Friday Prayer and religious teachings.
[83] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

"play(ing) a role in development, governance, and other related issues".[84]

Imam Syed stated that

> have you [the researcher] heard about what Aamir [the founder of the KPTW] had said? – transforming schools into faith-based schools, mosques into faith-based mosques, health centres into faith-based health centres. Making everything faith-based.[85]

Imam Syed indicated that this KPTW's Islamic strategy replaced the hard-line approach that he used prior to joining the KPTW. He said that

> I have been mitigating this [drug] problem since I was the village headman - for 13 years, and then the district headman – for 9 years, and now imam for 7 years. I am sure this time [mitigating the drug problem] will be successful because I use the religious [approach].[86]

At the time of the interview, Imam Syed revealed that there were about 20 young Muslim addicts from local villages residing at his mosque, where he ran the rehabilitation programme. He said that he taught them "the Malay language, both the Yawi and Romanised versions, and the Quran", which helped them remain disciplined. He believed the programme also contributed to the reduction of violence in the Deep South as it tackled

[84] Skype interview with Aamir on 17 June 2015.
[85] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.
[86] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

violence at the family level, where "the problem [the ongoing unrests in the Deep South] started".[87]

He believed that the conflict remained when the family was weak and their duty of parents "were not emphasised". He said that faith must be established at the familial level before the conflict could be solved. He further suggested that practicing religion at the family level would decrease the likelihood of youths getting involved with drugs or in violence or criminal activity. This was suggested to be significant for the escalation of violence in the Deep South (Askew, 2007).

> First, families must be faith-based and then the rest will be fine...The parents must not only be parents, but also friends, and the teachers to their children... when the family [the parents] is good...and aware of Islamic principles... the kids will be good too.[88]

In addition to adopting Islam as the peacebuilding tool in his village, Imam Syed also followed the KPTW's steps to peacebuilding (that have been illustrated earlier). He indicated that he used every opportunity to build a mutual understanding about using 'faith' as the tool for community development, and for building coalitions with other local leaders.

> I sought to improve relations with other leaders, especially other imams, in official meetings at the district office. I asked for permission from the district headman to speak half an hour before he

[87] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.
[88] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

> started the meeting. Sometimes I took 45 minutes or so. I want to make koteb [and] bilal [Islamic religious leaders] understand first.[89]

This effort of Imam Syed matched with the first two steps of peacebuilding of the KPTW, which Aamir, the founder of the KPTW, described in the interview,

> (1) building a peacebuilding coalition between main leaders of a community: natural leaders (activists), members of local councils, district headmen, and religious leaders. The leadership coalition was likely to generate a cooperative community, which would then;
>
> (2) encourage community members to engage in development initiatives that improve the quality of life. These development initiatives at the village level were 'tools for learning', which had important elements of peacebuilding such as harmony and peaceful means to conflict resolution. They also created an understanding that community development was the duty of community members rather than that of external actors. When community members, especially young ones who might take up arms as a solution to inequality and marginalisation, adopted the development approach instead of violent means;

[89] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

> (3) violence was likely to be mitigated and eventually eliminated as community members did not let the violence spoil their peaceful villages.;
> (4) Support for peace processes could then take place, not only in one village but also in numerous villages within the KPTW network, with the shared goal of sustainable development and peacebuilding.[90]

Imam Syed however indicated that creating and maintaining cooperation between four leaders in the village was challenging, as each of them appeared to have different interests. [91] The four leaders also existed and functioned in different facets of the community, and were not necessarily concerned with religious norms for peace.

> Imams exercised power through religion. Village headmen's power was centred on the implantation of laws. Council men drew power from money [government budgets] they had. The natural leaders had the brains.[92]

Despite the current fractions of community leadership, Imam Syed highlighted his determination to promote a strong collaboration among local leaders. He said that

> Islam teaches people to be like 'hands' not 'eyes'. If an insect flies into an eye, the other eye cannot help. Unlike hands, if one hand is bitten by an insect, the other hand can help wave the insect away.

[90] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[91] In his evaluation report for the KPTW, Bualuong (2014) argued that Imam Syed was the only active leader among four main leaders when the KPTW was first introduced in the village in 2008.
[92] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

> Particularly, Allah created five uneven fingers, just like humans with five different characters. First, the forefinger by itself cannot lift things comfortably. Second, the middle finger is the tallest; just like people who are famous and prestigious but may hardly accomplish a task by themselves. The ring finger is only good for beauty. The last one is the thumb. It is the lowest, often forgotten, but important. Without it, eating would not be possible. It is just like a leader who must continually work hard despite the lack of recognition.[93]

The Integrated-Islamic Curriculum

Rayyan's development of the Integrated-Islamic Curriculum was influenced by knowledge learnt from a transnational educational network of the Curriculum Reform for Pondok Project in Southeast Asia: Thailand (CRP- Project).

Rayyan explained that the development of Islamic-integrated education was beneficial to the Malay-Muslim minority as it improved their access to education. It could also potentially improve trust between the government and the Malay-Muslim minority, especially religious students and scholars. The availability of quality Islamic education in private religious schools would encourage Malay-Muslim students to stay in the system rather than enrolling in pondoks, a traditional form of Islamic education, which mainly focuses on Islamic studies without adequate learning of secular subjects. The move away from pondoks would also help alleviate

[93] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

suspicion that religious scholars/students that have graduated from pondoks have been recruited to act as agents of Muslim insurgents/extremists. According to Rayyan, "distrust is likely to be reduced when the government can oversee the curriculum and what are taught at religious schools".[94]

He identified that the poor implementation of the integrated-curriculum had to do with the workload required by students. Under the current education bill, Rayyan said that the integrated-curriculum was not widely used even though "private Islamic schools could adopt the integrated-Islamic curriculum". He said that

> there was difficulty. Currently, the private Islamic schools used the national curriculum, which was the normal practice in Thailand. If adding one more curriculum, students would be overwhelmed with work. Very difficult.[95]

Legal Training for Local Islamic Leaders

Ali, a member of an Islamic council, indicated that the legal training programs he provided for local Islamic leaders received support from the Asia Foundation and the CrCF. He said that his legal works were related to these NGOs and "needed to use [these NGOs'] mechanisms" in order to enhance the legal knowledge and human rights in the Deep South. He described the works of MAC that

> MAC's work is done to ensure that locals are equipped with knowledge of basic civil and political rights, which help them protect their villages from

[94] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.
[95] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.

> injustice, and enable them to seek legal recompense if injustice occurs. MAC's work focuses on the Muslim-majority southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla.[96]

Inter-religious Camps for Students

Phra Wikom, a Buddhist monk in Narathiwat, discussed his inter-religious camps where he taught 'Buddhism and peace' to primary school students (both Buddhist and Muslims). These students stayed at the camps and learnt about Buddhist and Islamic principles and practices for 3 days. He said the programme focused on teaching students about "peaceful coexistence in religious diversity".

> In the inter-religious camps, I teach students about how to live together with other religions peacefully, by using what religious principles. The coexistence [between Buddhists and Muslims] must occur without prejudice and discrimination. We must help each other and maintain generosity.[97]

Phra Wikom also emphasised that this programme would not be possible without supports and collaboration between local Buddhists and Muslims, especially Ahmad, a member of the Narathiwat Islamic committee (an Islamic leader interviewee) who provided lessons on 'Islam and peace' at the camps. Ahmad also promoted the programme in Muslim communities, which could have misunderstood the objective of the programme and raised suspicion about Phra Wikom's attempt to impose Buddhist beliefs and practices on Muslim students. Phra Wikom

[96] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[97] Interview with Phra Wikom on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.

articulated his strategy used to initiate these inter-religious camps - that was "finding friends [local Muslims and Buddhists] who shared the same peaceful ideology" to join the initiative. He argued that this strategy was a tool to conflict resolution as the shared peaceful ideology would be strengthened and replace distrust and intolerance, which had been largely driven the conflict and divided society in the Deep South. He believed the problems in the Deep South would be solved as soon as we could find "this common [peaceful] ideology".

This section has outlined that local religious leaders accessed the resources of civil society networks for peacebuilding. These resources include funding, peacebuilding strategies, faith and religious principles, and knowledge in integrated-Islamic education and legal systems. These resources enabled local religious leaders to participate in, for example, drug rehabilitation programs for youth, the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum, legal training for local Islamic leaders, and inter-religious camps for students.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the role of civil society actors, and how their relationships with local religious leaders have helped promote peacebuilding practices. It has highlighted the importance of socialisation as an approach used by civil society actors to increase the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders during conflict. Interviewees identified that civil society actors facilitated the development of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders by providing platforms for socialisation. Local religious leaders' socialisation with others actors, especially civil society peace practitioners, provided them with a means of learning the culture of peace, and to more fully understand their peacebuilding potential. Socialisation seemed to also help local religious leaders unpack a preference for a bottom-up

peacebuilding approach they shared with civil society actors, before becoming members of a civil society peacebuilding network.

Moreover, interviewees identified that local religious leaders developed a sense of safety through being part of a like-minded network. This sense of safety appeared to be an important condition for influencing local religious leaders to draw resources from civil society actors. These resources included financial supports, faith and religious principles as peacebuilding tools, legal knowledge, and knowledge in integrated-Islamic education, which enabled local religious leaders to engage in activities such as drug rehabilitation for youth, the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum, legal training for local Islamic leaders, and inter-religious camps for students.

More importantly, this chapter addressed the importance of the perceived neutrality of civil society actors in effecting local religious leaders' willingness to form peacebuilding collaboration. It seemed that the religious leaders had to judge how different actors are perceived by both sides of the conflict. In this context, civil society actors allowed a 'way out' of this conundrum to an extent as their perceived neutrality helped maintain the (perceived) neutral position of local religious leaders once engaging in the civil society network.

The next chapter will present the findings relating to government networks, which was identified in the interviews as a key bridging network restricting the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders.

Chapter 7

Civilian Government: Top-Down Network Restricting Peacebuilding

7.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the findings relating to the top-down approach of civilian government actors[98] and its impact on the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict, compared to bridging networks with civil society actors (Chapter Six) and military actors (Chapter Eight). Most interviewees did not see the Thai state as a unified entity. They seemed to categorise the Thai state into two types of actors: civilian government officials, and military forces, which will be further articulated in Chapter Eight. This was because the interviews took place right after the military junta seized power on 22 May 2014 and there have been political struggles between the military and the civilian-led governments since 2001 (McCargo, 2005, 2007, 2008).

Most interviewees suggested that, government officials remained dominant over local religious leaders despite recognising the importance of local religious leaders in mobilising local support for peacebuilding. The government's ties to local religious leaders were seen as a strategy to restore the government's legitimacy and relationships with the Muslim population rather than to empower local religious leaders.

[98] The term 'civilian governmental actors' is used interchangeably with 'government officials', 'governmental actors', 'the government' and 'civil administrators' in this thesis.

As a result, the top-down approach created only a limited space or opportunity for local religious leaders to play a leading role in government-sponsored peacebuilding initiatives. Under the condition of the top-down approach and the limited operative space, the possibility that local religious leaders would undertake a peacebuilding activity was restricted. However, when the government increased the operational space for local religious leaders, for example in education, local religious leaders could play a proactive role and were willing to draw government resources for education-related activities.

The findings partly support Theoretical Proposition 2 - *a bridging network is likely to restrict the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member imposes an unshared peacebuilding norm and/or practice on the local religious leader* - in the sense that the unshared peacebuilding norms and practices (the top-down approach) restricted the peacebuilding of local religious leaders. While local religious leaders wanted to be supported via the bottom-up approach especially in enhancing the role of religion in peacebuilding, government officials used the top-down approach allowing them to remain dominant over local religious leaders.

The chapter consists of three main sections. First, I show the top-down approach of government officials, who were at the other end of the bridge and identified as dominant and lacking the will to empower local religious leaders in the Deep South. In the second section, I articulate how the government's top-down approach limited a space or opportunity for local religious leaders to participate in the government peacebuilding collaboration. Lastly, I examine the restricted peacebuilding that resulted from the involvement of government networks, which provided local religious leaders' limited space to engage in the government peacebuilding collaboration. I however point out the potential of a positive impact educational governmental networks had on local religious leaders.

Table 8: Findings - Governmental Networks and Restricting Peacebuilding

Behaviour of Government Officials	Immediate Outcome	Network Effect
Top Down Approach - the domination of government officials	Limited Space for Participation	Restricting Peacebuilding - restricted accessibility to resources only for education-related activities

7.2 The Behaviour of Governmental Actors: The Top-Down Approach

This section looks at the top-down approach of government officials, whom local religious leaders established relationships with. The top-down approach was expressed through local government officials' domination over local religious leaders. Most interviewees indicated that, although the government sought to establish ties with local religious leaders and might recognise the influence of religion and religious leaders on the local population, the power was centralised in the hands of local government officials. They discussed about government officials, who did not fully appreciate their roles as partners and their voice was often ignored in the goverentmet-led peacebuilding initiatives. A lack of an equal partnership influenced local religious leaders to became more passive with the collaboration with the government.

All interviewees from the four groups of research participants (local religious leaders, activists, academics, and government officials) indicated the existence of networks between local religious leaders and civilian government officials in the Deep South. Three government official interviewees in particular considered the existing governmental networks as in the venues of collaboration with local religious leaders. Governmental networks encompassed relationships between local religious leaders and civilian-government officials, elected and/or

non-elected persons in the public sector employed for a government department. The interviewees suggested that local religious leaders often formed and maintained links to the government via their positions in state-funded religious bodies and educational institutions, which they worked for and/or were administered by. As Ali,[99] a committee of the Pattani Islamic Council, said that

> Islamic leaders, who held positions in the governmental system, usually developed a tie with the government…, not spiritual ones who are outsiders to the official [network].[100]

State-funded religious bodies referred to as provincial Islamic councils (PICs) and provincial offices of Buddhism (POBs), were under the supervision of the Central Islamic Council of Thailand and the National office of Buddhism respectively. PICs looked after their committees, as well as imams, kotebs, and bilals, who worked for local mosques.[101] Similar to PICs, POBs administered local Buddhist monks of the Theravada tradition, the main Buddhist tradition in Thailand.[102]

State-funded educational institutions[103] where local religious leaders associated with government officials included private Islamic schools, university departments (i.e. the Center

[99] All interviewee names in this thesis are pseudonyms.
[100] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[101] All seventeen local religious leader interviewees (eleven Islamic leaders and six Buddhist leaders) reported their ties to the government. Among eleven local Islamic leader interviewees, three of them held a position of Islamic committee in PICs and two were imams of local mosques.
[102] Five out of six Buddhist leader interviewees were ordained as Buddhist monks in the Theravada-Buddhist tradition and administered by POBs. There was only one Buddhist leader interviewee, who was not ordained and did not enter the monkhood. This Buddhist leader belonged to the Mahayana tradition, which is often worshipped among the Chinese-Thai population. Nevertheless, he had a tie to a governmental educational network.
[103] For the Islamic leader side, there were 9 local Islamic leader interviewees in total reporting that they worked in Islamic education; four of which were teachers (ustaz) or school owners (babo) in private Islamic schools, and five were university scholars. There was one Islamic leader interviewee (Zikri) holding a position of lecturer in College of Islamic Studies (PSU) and Islamic committee of Pattani Islamic council. For the Buddhist leader side, there were only two Buddhist leader interviewees forming a tie to educational institutions. One Buddhist monk

for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity and College of Islamic Studies (Prince Songkla University (PSU)), and the Research Center for Peacebuilding of Mahidol University), and the governmental research institution the King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI)[104].

These governmental educational and religious networks also bridged local religious leaders to other governmental agencies such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), local councils in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla provinces, administrative offices (i.e. Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Social Development, and Ministry of Justice). For instance, as a prominent Islamic scholar on Islamic law at College of Islamic Studies, PSU, Mohamed was invited to be a deputy chief for religion at the SBPAC. Ahmad said, because he was a long-term committee member (18 years) of the Narathiwat Islamic council, he was chosen to be a member of the advisory council of the SBPAC, along with other local community leaders from administrative and religious sectors. Phra Thepsatit and Phra Surasit also stated that, as the abbots from Narathiwat and Pattani respectively, they were invited to participate in interfaith dialogue and inter-cultural activities organised by the SBPAC and various administrative offices.

It was unsurprising that all three government official interviewees highlighted the importance of local Islamic leaders, who have affected and been affected by the religious dynamics of the conflict (S. P. Harish, 2006; Joll, 2010; Yusuf, 2006; Yusuf, 2007a). These government official interviewees worked for the SBPAC, which is the government agency administering-political and development policies to win hearts and minds of the locals, especially the Muslim population. However, most interviewees from other groups considered the government's

indicated his network with the KPI, while another Buddhist leader from the Mahayana Buddhist tradition was a part-time lecturer at PSU as mentioned earlier.

[104] The KPI is a state academic and research centre which is established to promote democratic development in Thailand offering courses and research on democracy and related-issues.

cooperation with local Islamic leaders as part of the government's efforts to restore its legitimacy and top-down relationships with the Muslim population, rather than to strengthen the leadership of local religious leaders in peacebuilding.

The three government officials addressed the advantage of collaboration with local Islamic leaders, who had a wide base of followers and could mobilise local support for the government-led peacebuilding activities. In contrast, they rarely commented on the role of local Buddhist religious leaders. This suggests that the government did not consider Buddhist religious leaders as being as important as Islamic leaders.

Tera, a former senior public servant working for the SBPAC, said that was why "the government was trying to be closer to [Islamic] religious leaders".[105] Similarly, Weerachai, a former director of the SBPAC, emphasised the government's need to "cooperate" with Islamic leaders in order to restore local support for government-led peacebuilding initiatives.[106]

Weerachai also said that, during his administration, "I supported cooperation between the government [the SBPAC] and [Islamic] religious leaders, whom I considered as the true leaders in the people's perspective". He believed that "creating an understanding with one [Islamic] religious leader leading to that with hundreds of other people". He added that

> these days, if you ask people who they trust the most to do development work [the area of responsibility of the SBPAC], they will tell you religious leaders…

[105] Interview with Tera on 24 June 2014 in Pattani.
[106] Interview with Weerachai on 9 July 2014 in Bangkok.

> meaning Islamic committees, imams, kotebs, bilals… not district headmen, not police [law enforcement officers]…Therefore we must check whether we have looked after [these religious leaders], [and] how much we incorporate them into our peacebuilding collaboration.[107]

Sharing Weerachai's view, Panumas, another former director of the SBPAC, indicated that governmental actors "must get Islamic leaders to work with the government and other actors" and "employ the leadership of [Islamic] religious leaders" in solving the conflict in the Deep South as "many people are willing to follow them".[108]

Although the three government official interviewees highlighted the importance of cooperation with local Islamic leaders, it seemed that the cooperation did not occur on the basis of equal partnership. The top-down relationship was reflected in the interview with Weearachai. Weerachai emphasised the need to maintain the existing dominant role of local government officials despite claiming to understand the strong influence and leadership of local Islamic leaders. He said that

> in the Deep South, we [the SBPAC] focus a lot on *gamnan* [sub-district headmen] and *puyaiban* [village headmen], which we need to, but, we must also give

[107] Weerachai was just relocated from Yala to Bangkok at the time of interview. Interview with Weerachai on 9 July 2014 in Bangkok.
[108] Interview with Panumas on 11 August 2014 in Yala.

> priority to local religious leaders, who lead and affect people with religious practices.[109]

The government' top-down approach was also identified in the interviews with most local religious leader and civil society interviewees. For example, Yasin, who was one of the most respected Islamic leaders, and an advisor of the SBPAC for a number of years, suggested that there was only a small number of government officials, who truly promoted the role of local religious leaders in peacebuilding. He said that Pol Col. Thawee Sodsong, who was the former secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (2011-2014), was a rare case of government officials that had a clear understanding about the impact of religion and helped enhance the role of local religious leaders during his administration. Yasin said that after years of working with the government, he "never met any officials as good as Thawee, [who] was 100% good". Not only Yasin but also other religious leaders "admired him", as "never before that so many local people cried when the director [of the SBPAC] was leaving".[110]

Yasin also added that most government officials did not yet recognise Islam as more influential than the state in terms of dictating the locals' way of life. He said that

> governmental actors, especially high-ranking ones, must understand the role of religion and its influence on people, especially Muslims, whose lives are greatly influenced by Islam…If government actors instruct Muslim people to do something that contradicts what Islamic leaders do, Muslim people

[109] Interview with Weerachai on 9 July 2014 in Bangkok.
[110] Interview with Yasin on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.

> will not follow the government's instruction. Muslims people will follow Islamic leaders because the influence of Islam is stronger than that of the government.[111]

Showing an opinion similar to the Yasin's, Ali, a member of an Islamic committee in Pattani, indicated that local religious leaders were not given a leading role to play even though local religious leaders were considered "more trustworthy" than local governmental officials in the Deep South. He clearly spoke of the higher level of respect given to Islamic leaders than that to local government officials.

> Although some local imams involve in dirty politics which is also problematic…, most people in general respect religious leaders more than sub-district and village headmen because it is their life that always involves religious leaders.[112]

Sophia, a female activist working closely with local Islamic leaders, implied the unequal power of local religious leaders by saying that

> local religious leaders often do [peace] work that [governmental officials] ask them to...I hope to see local religious leaders become more courageous and initiate activities themselves.[113]

[111] Interview with Yasin on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.
[112] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[113] Interview with Sophia on 30 May 2014 in Pattani.

Youssef, a head teacher in a private Islamic school in Pattani, similarly highlighted the inferior status of local religious leaders.

> Normally local religious leaders are not able to initiate peacebuilding activities. [They] can give their opinions but the government is the initiator [of peacebuilding activities].[114]

Aamir, the founder of a civil society peacebuilding network - the Kam Pong Tak Wa, also indicated the domination of sub-district headmen, such as village headmen over Islamic religious leaders, that "never played the community leader role" in the Deep South. He said, for years, "the community leaders" referred exclusively to sub-district headmen (*gamnan*) and village headmen (*puyaiban*), rather than actual community leaders such as imams and other "natural leaders" (*phunam tam tammachat*), who were influential and respected leaders in the community. He suggested that was because the government aimed to maintain power within the governmental circle. The power was then given to sub-district and village headmen, who were "the representatives of the government".[115]

Mostafa, a prominent activist, similarly indicated that the government's cooperation with local Islamic leaders often occurred as the government's strategic tool to improve public relations, rather than truly empowering local religious leaders. [116]

Ali believed that the power of local government elites was a product of the patron-client system or patronage network, which shaped the relationships between the central government and the

[114] Interview with Youssef on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.
[115] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[116] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

Malay Muslims in the Deep South, as suggested by Beach and Pedersen (2013); McCargo (2007a). He said that the central government "let [district and sub-district headmen] behave in that [aggressively dominant] way" partly because of the hope that these local government actors could control the Malay Muslim population and suppress insurgents and empathizers. He strongly disagreed with this approach, saying that aggression carried out by government officials still "cannot really suppress insurgents and insurgent sympathizers". He urged the government to "change the strategy [of letting local governmental actors use aggression]" to avoid damage to the government's legitimacy to rule the local Islamic leaders and the Malay Muslims in general. Ali's view was supportive of McCargo (2008), who argues that the loss of legitimacy of the Thai state has contributed to the on-going insurgency in the Deep South.

Government officials appeared to prefer the unilateral approach to peacebuilding even though they invited local religious leaders to the state-led peacebuilding and development projects. They often expected local religious leaders to play more or less nominal roles. It was quite difficult to identify examples where the government took proactive action to get local religious leaders' perspectives in planning, implementing, and evaluating the government peacebuilding projects. For example, Phra Manit indicated that government administrators were unwilling to consider his opinion on how to improve the relationship between Islamic and Buddhist leaders. He said, for several times, he suggested the SBPAC to be "the middle man", who invite Islamic religious leaders and Buddhist monks to meet up in a casual environment such as "having a cup of tea together". He said doing so would help the Islamic and Buddhist religious leaders, who "usually would not meet" or have a chance to interact formed a connection. However, his suggestion had never been implemented by the SBPAC. [117]

[117] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

Phra Manit added that his opinion on how to improve a class organised by the King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) as platforms for an intra-religious interaction was also ignored.

> On the last day at the class, the [KPI] officials asked participants to evaluate the class. I, a participant of the 3rd class, suggested them to use religious principles for peace shared by both religions [Islam and Buddhism]. Let Islamic and Buddhist religious experts to work together to tease out the shared religious principles for peace, which are then taught to local religious leaders…however the KPI officials said they could not do that. [Rather than taking my suggestion into consideration], they just said they were not capable of fixing the conflict in the Deep South anyway.[118]

This section has illustrated that, although the ties had been established, local religious leaders stood on an unequal footing with government officials. It is clear that some government officials were well aware of the influence and the potential contributions of local religious leaders to peacebuilding. However, they lacked the will to empower local religious leaders. Rather, they maintained the dominant position to ensure its control over local religious leaders in the conflict situation. Some interviewees believed that the ties to local religious leaders was the government's attempt to restore its legitimacy and top-down relationships with the local Muslims because government officials maintained their domination. The next section will show the immediate effect of the governments' top-down approach in limiting an operational space for local religious leaders.

[118] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

7.3 Immediate Outcome: The limited Space for Participation

Although all three government official interviewees indicated the government's recognition of the importance of local Islamic leaders in the Deep South, most interviewees from other interviewee groups suggested that this government's recognition was not sufficient to strengthen the role of religion and local religious leaders in peacebuilding. When the leadership and power were retained in the hands of civil administrators, local religious leaders only had a limited space for participation in government-led peacebuilding initiatives even though religion and religious leaders play a major role in the construction of national identity (nation, religion, king), and fuels the current waves of violence in the Deep South (McCargo, 2008).

While Sophia suggested that the top-down approach of the government accounted for local religious leaders' lacking opportunities to play a leading role in peacebuilding, Mostafa indicated that government officials did not truly incorporate local religious leaders into government-supported initiatives as these initiatives were the products of top-down policy that often did not conform to the needs and expectations of local religious leaders. Mostafa explained that government officials did not accurately understand the role of religion and did not "know how to cooperate with religious leaders…and could not think of how to incorporate religion into politics".[119] He suggested that the inability of the state to include religion and religious leaders into the peacebuilding policies contradicted the expectations of the local people, who wanted to see religion incorporated into the political solutions.

[119] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

Aamir, the founder of the well-established civil society network of Kam Pong Tak Wa, similarly addressed the government's limited collaboration with local Islamic leaders in the Deep South, saying that when the state was not Islamic,

> it was not easy [for the state] to understand [the Islamic context in the Deep South]. The state must be open-minded and learn how [a Muslim community operates].[120]

Yasin, a prominent Islamic scholar, also suggested that

> governmental actors must improve their understanding [of local beliefs]. I generally think [government actors] don't have sufficient knowledge in many fields. Particularly not enough knowledge about religion. They also don't have effective mechanisms to build peace even though I am sure most government officials want to build peace.[121]

Ahmad, a member of an Islamic committee in Narathiwat, also said that the roles of religion and local religious leaders were not yet sufficiently strengthened, and they would benefit from increased support from the government via religious and interreligious activities. Because "religion is the key" to improving the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders, Ahmad suggested, for example, "on a special Islamic occasion or Buddhist day, the government could have spent their budget and hosted a massive event at a mosque or a temple".[122]

[120] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[121] Interview with Yasin on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.
[122] Interview with Ahmad on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.

In accordance with findings from Ntale (2012), Ahmad believed the more frequently a religious leader interacted with individuals from different religions, the more likely the religious leader would adopt a peaceful and moderate orientation. He said that interreligious activities "allowed both Muslim and Buddhist [leaders] to not only socialise but also deal with problems together" and that it would help "raise an awareness of religious practice - what Nabi would practice, what Buddha would practice", which were peaceful and supportive of inter-religious cooperation. He suggested that "once people accept religious principles, they would realise their duties to others and the country". Ahmad's opinion on interreligious activities between Buddhism and Islam is supported by an argument made by Yusuf (2013, p. 371), that "paradigms drawn from religious phenomena can serve as mediums for understanding and dialogue between these two religion and their societies".

Mohamed shared a similar view. As an advisor on religion-related issues for the SBPAC[123] which is the main governmental agency responsible for political and development approaches of conflict management, Mohamed acknowledged the SBPAC's insufficient knowledge about religion and a limited space for local religious leaders to participate in the SBPAC-led programmes despite increasingly recognising the importance of religion and local cultures. He also proposed that knowledge about religion would be improved if the SBPAC widened the official space for religion in order to attract more religious experts and to increase cooperation

[123] Mohamad is considered a well-respected Islamic leader, who has worked with governmental agencies to ensure benefits of Muslims. Recently, a mediation centre for Muslims to deal with family and heritage based on Islam Act was successfully established in January 2016. It is an important achievement because it provides mechanisms for justice in the Muslim community. It is a product of a long-term collaborative work between Mohamad and College of Islamic Studies, PSU, Justice Department, and provincial Islamic councils (Muhammad, 2016).

among them. Consequently, the religious space at the institutional level would also increase the quality of local religious leaders, who could engage in peacebuilding.

> If we had a [government] department focused only on religion, we would have more experts on religion, especially on Islam. If the government officially opens up a space for [religion] and allows cooperation [among religious actors] at the institutional level, I think the ability of religious actors [for example] in development projects will improve.[124]

In addition, Aamir, Imam Syed, Ali, and Abdulla commonly spoke about local government officials' lack of deep understanding of religious norms and practices, which reduced the possibility of collaboration between local religious leaders and local government officials. They reported how the mafia-like (*phu mee ittipon*) attitudes of sub-district and village headmen created tension with religious leaders. Aamir suggested that sub-district and village headmen did not necessarily hold religious principles or "know about Islamic practices" despite being Muslims.[125] Supporting Aamir's view, Imam Syed gave an example of the involvement of some sub-district and village headmen in gambling, which certainly upset him and other Muslim villagers.[126] He said that local imams, as the traditional leaders of Muslim communities, were opposed to these sub-district and village headmen, which lead to a fraction of leadership in the community, and undermined imams' incentives to participate in peacebuilding projects. Aamir similarly explained that

[124] Interview with Mohamed on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.
[125] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[126] Interview with Imam Syed on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

> if sub-district and village headmen do not [follow Islamic principles], they don't even set their foot in a mosque, let alone discussing details on budgeting and collaboration with imams.[127]

Moreover, Ali and Abdulla revealed that there were conflicts between local government officials and 'ordinary' locals including religious leaders, which discouraged collaboration with the government. They suggested that the conflicts were often caused by "the abuse of power and influence of district and sub-district headmen", who did not represent the local needs, but their own interests. In local elections, including those for Islamic councils, which often created fierce competition and political rivalry (McCargo, 2012), local Islamic leaders were forced to choose a side or ally with one party. As result, Ali said that

> the state-bureaucratic system caused conflicts in the areas [southernmost provinces]…the problems in communities are often caused by sub-district and village headmen, who represent the government.[128]

Similarly, Abdulla stated that "governmental administrative officers, not all of them, maybe one in a hundred" exacerbated the conflict between the Malay minorities and the state at the local level. "Rather than by the secessionist ideology, the conflict at the village level is caused by personal troubles of *gaman* [sub-district headmen] or *puyaiban* [village headmen]", who sought and maintained their own political dominance by using aggression against the opposition. He said "there are conflicts in all villages, just not

[127] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.
[128] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

extremely violent". He stressed that, in this conflictual environment, local Islamic leaders were unlikely to collaborate with local governmental administrative officials to build peace since they saw governmental administrative officials as trouble-makers rather than peacebuilders.[129]

In the above section, I have demonstrated that the government did not sufficiently facilitate the role of religion and local religious leaders in peacebuilding by the top-down approach. The top-down approach only generated a limited space or opportunity for local religious leaders to engage in the government peacebuilding collaboration. A wide range of opportunity that could be utilised for facilitating more consolidate role of religious leaders were missed. For example, a few interviewees suggested that religious rituals and related social activities might have been great opportunities for the civilian governmental actors to demonstrate their commitment to incorporating religious elements into government practices. The following section will present the effects of the top-down approach and the limited space for participation, which restricted local religious leaders' peacebuilding. I will also show education-related activities in which local religious leaders were more engaged than other activities.

7.4 Network Effect: Restricted Peacebuilding

This section describes local religious leaders' restricted peacebuilding as a result of the top-down approach and the limited space for participation in the government peacebuilding collaboration. Interviewees addressed the importance of the government as a source of peacebuilding resources. However, interviewees suggested that local religious leaders were pragmatic with the engagement with the civilian government. In other words, they tended to

[129] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.

engage with government officials and mobilise government resources when the government increased the operational space and government resources were beneficial to local religious leaders' peacebuilding such as education-related activities.

In accordance with the findings of Brewer et al. (2011); De Juan and Vüllers (2010); Little (2011), most interviewees identified the importance of state policies or the top-down approach of governmental actors in affecting opportunities and constraints for religious leaders' peacebuilding activities. Ali, a member of an Islamic committee in Pattani, said the role of local religious leaders depends on the government. Moreover, Ahmad, a member of an Islamic committee from Narathiwat, stressed, "the government is the catalyst of local religious leaders' peacebuilding role".[130] The importance of the government was further emphasised when Youssef, a head teacher in a private Islamic school in Pattani, said local religious leaders "must work together with the government" to find effective solutions to the conflict.[131] Similarly, Imam Haziq identified the need to incorporate government support, saying that "we can use the combination of two power(s), which are the power(s) of the government and religion" in order to have effective peacebuilding.[132]

Despite addressing the importance of the government, most interviewees suggested that local religious leaders were not motivated to engage in peacebuilding by the government's top-down policy and the limited space for participation even though the government was willing to provide financial supports to local religious leaders. Ali said that "formal Islamic leaders", who held official membership in state-funded religious institutions, "usually

[130] Interview with Ahmad on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.
[131] Interview with Youssef on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.
[132] Interview with Imam Haziq on 9 August 2014 in Pattani.

receive money from the government". Ali also added that local Islamic leaders not only had access to government budgets in the form of a salary via provincial Islamic councils, as well as extra funding from the SBPAC, the main governmental agency in charge of political and economic solutions to the conflict in the Deep South.

> Islamic leaders who hold government positions [in the Provincial Islamic Councils] normally received the financial budget from the government. The government can also allocate additional funding depending on the policy at the time, for example, [the SBPAC] during the Tawee's term [in which substantial funding was provided].[133]

Ahmad also indicated that he received support from a provincial administrative office and the SBPAC. Similarly, Imam Haziq said that he received "budgets" from "the district administrative office, police, military". He said "they [the local governmental actors] always give us money every time we ask".[134]

Nevertheless, Panumas, a former director of the SBPAC, spoke about the support given to local Islamic leaders, saying "money [from the SBPAC]… [given to local Islamic leaders] to help them out [for example] their travelling for religious activities" could not yet encourage a larger number of local Islamic leaders to engage in government-led peacebuilding projects.[135] He pointed out ineffectiveness of the money approach as giving away a large budget could not gain trust from local Islamic leaders. He

[133] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[134] Interview with Imam Haziq on 9 August 2014 in Pattani.
[135] Interview with Panamas on 11 Aug 2014 in Yala.

compared the relationships between the Thai military/the Thai government and Islamic leaders to a romantic relationship.

> I think the Islamic leader was a woman who we [the government and the military] wanted to win her heart. We often visit her, buy her gifts, take care of her, and please her. But, she does not love us. It does not matter how much we give her.[136]

Mostafa also suggested that government money would not promote local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding as long as the government was unwilling to empower local Islamic leaders and limited the opportunity for local Islamic leaders to make a more significant contribution to peacebuilding.

> I think [local religious leaders] want to do [peacebuilding] but the issue is that the government must change their view. [The government] cannot think of local Islamic leaders in a negative way. I think the reason behind the negative thinking was partly because the government did not trust Islamic leaders. I think trusting each other is really important. A peace process must start with trusting each other to share a peacebuilding space. Giving Islamic leaders a space to do things they are good at. They have their own way. Recently, it seems that everyone increasingly understands this but still not enough to encourage Islamic leaders, for example, to

[136] Interview with Panumas on 11 August 2014 in Yala.

> make a religious verdict [against violence by the Malay insurgents].[137]

Mostafa believed that a religious verdict could have led to a significant impact on conflict resolution and peacebuilding since "a religious verdict is powerful as it was based on the Quran or Hadith". However, he said "a religious verdict become possible" only when the government's "trust [in Islamic leaders] is high". Moreover, Ali suggested that the peacebuilding role of Islamic leaders could be boosted when the government provided more operational space for local Islamic leaders and incorporated local religious leaders into the government's peacebuilding programmes. Ali suggested that

> as you have seen during the Tawee[138] era [the SBPAC], if the government shows sincerity and confidence in Islamic leaders, I think especially Islamic leaders who have positions in state-funded religious institutions can lead local people to engage in the government peacebuilding collaboration. But that won't happen if Islamic leaders are still discriminated.[139]

Education was one example showing how the positive collaboration between religious leaders and the local government can bring about significant changes to the local societies. Most interviewees indicated that local religious leaders were more comfortable having links to state-funded educational and research institutions as these networks were perceived as being more independent from the state than other governmental agencies. They said government resources

[137] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.
[138] Tawee was a former director of the SBPAC.
[139] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

were well received when they were for education and training aimed at improving skills and knowledge, which would enable local religious leaders to engage more effectively in peacebuilding. That was because ties to these educational institutions did not suggest a biased position - neither the supporter/sympathizer of the state nor the insurgents, which could affect the safety of local religious leaders. Local Islamic leaders, in particular, felt more comfortable in undertaking Islamic educational activities than other activities sponsored by the government, Hamza argued. Panumas and Weerachai, former directors of the SBPAC, also clearly pointed out in the interviews that education was the area that the government could work closely with local Islamic leaders. That was because local Islamic leaders had more freedom to view their opinions and implement their religious beliefs in the education field.

Ali also talked about the preferable form of support from the government. He suggested that "religious leaders are willing to receive financial support from the government" via "the SBPAC's projects" when the support was "to improve the capacity or work skills of imams, [and] other religious leaders".[140] The government's training to improve local religious leaders' skills and activism were considered by Mostafa to be "the main achievement" of the government.[141] Perhaps that was because academically engaging in a debate or "ideological battles" on public issues were allowed by the government and welcomed by local religious leaders. As Rayyan indicated, improved education was "necessary to building an intellectual community" in order to create a sustainable peaceful society.[142]

[140] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[141] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.
[142] Interview with Rayyan on 27 June 2015 via skype.

Ali, Imam Syed, and Aamir identified that most local religious leaders lacked awareness of their potential and knowledge to engage in non-religious activities, which was a common problem of the grassroots religious peace practitioners (Appleby, 2008). They said local religious leaders were only equipped with religious knowledge, which was insufficient. For example, Ali emphasised the need of further education and training for local Islamic leaders. He said in the interview that local religious leaders could no longer rely on religious knowledge only, and that they needed "`non-religious knowledge and skills`", such as in laws and legal procedures in order to increase their peacebuilding capacity. He suggested that legal knowledge and skills could be obtained from governmental and civil society actors.[143]

Local universities were identified as the governmental networks in which non-religious knowledge and skills could be obtained. As a scholar member of the College of Islamic Studies, PSU, a state-funded university, Abdulla said that he had funding from the government through his university to initiate education-related activities. He cooperated with the Justice Department to create a legal training class for local Muslims aiming to improve their legal knowledge and skills to deal with human rights violations if occurred. He also indicated that he used government funding via the university to undertake training workshops to help improve employability of Malay Muslim graduates, who often could not find employment in the competitive job market because they could not very well use the Thai language, the main language use in Thailand. He said that the workshops for young graduates reduced the possibility of growing insurgency as these young Malay Muslims were targets of insurgent recruitment. He added that, by funding these activities, the government sent out a message that Malay Muslims could practice Islam and simultaneously live in a multicultural Thailand.[144]

[143] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[144] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.

Moreover, Abdulla said that he secured scholarships from the government for Muslim students to study Islam abroad, mainly in Middle Eastern countries. Contributing to the advancement of Islamic education in the Deep South, the students, who were granted the scholarships, could "transfer their knowledge learnt overseas to other kids when they come back". These students also help expand "the international Islamic studies network established nine years ago". He said that these scholarships show that "the government sees the importance of Islamic education", which is vital to the Muslim identity.[145]

Another well-received project conducted by Abdulla was the government-supported educational project 'moderate Islam'. The project also relied on the government support given via the College of Islamic Studies. With funding from the government, Abdulla invited internationally respected Islamic leaders/scholars from the Middle East to join a seminar aimed at building knowledge on Islam and peace for local Islamic leaders. He explained that these world-famous Islamic leaders/scholars could help guide the Muslim population toward a more peaceful direction with moderate Islamic practices and integrated-Islamic knowledge.[146]

Furthermore, Umar, another religious scholar at the College of Islamic Studies, also said that formal education institutions were also a bridge to non-governmental actors and organisations, which were sources of resources. Through his position in the College of Islamic Studies, Umar suggested that he could cooperate with and apply for funding from international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) especially Western ones. Because of the war on Islamic

[145] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.
[146] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.

terrorism, Umar said that local Islamic leaders had limitations on sources of funding as the Muslim fellows often distrusted the West.

> If a mosque received funding [from the West], people [Muslim villagers] may raise concerns. But at the university level, it is more flexible because universities are viewed as more independent… Religious scholars [working] under universities can receive funding from any NGOs, but people become concerned if a mosque [local imam] does.[147]

A government educational network also appeared to provide a bridge to other religions. As Buddhist monks and Islamic leaders could not join each other religious ceremonies, Phra Manit pointed out that joining a training course of the KPI allowed him to interact with other local Islamic leaders whom he would otherwise not have a relationship with.

> My point is that I did not have any Muslim friends because I was ordained when I was really young. I only started to know Muslims when I was enrolled in the KPI class for two months.[148]

More importantly, Phra Manit said that interaction with local Islamic leaders mitigated the demonization of the other religion, which deepened his distrust in Malay Muslims. He suggested that

> if Buddhist and Islamic leaders socialised just by having a cup of tea together, or by having small talk about anything, exchanging phone numbers, becoming

[147] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.
[148] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

> closer to each other, I don't think Buddhist and Islamic leaders would teach people to hate each other.[149]

It seemed that, although there was evidence of positive collaboration in education, such positive collaboration was hardly seen in other areas of peacebuilding. In this sense, the above example demonstrates that opportunities for further improvement of local peacebuilding are being missed due to the Thai government's top-down approaches toward the engagement with local religious leaders.

This section has shown pragmatic collaborations with civilian governmental agents that occasionally played an important role in developing local peacebuilding initiatives. Overall, the level of collaboration between local religious leader and the government was however limited. Only when given a space to implement their ideas and preferences, for example in education, local religious leaders engaged in peacebuilding collaboration with the government. In this respect, the supports from the government achieved only partial success in promoting the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that the government's top-down approach allowed government officials to maintain dominant over local religious leaders, especially Islamic leaders in a Muslim majority region of the Deep South. Although the high-ranking government official interviewees highlighted the appreciation of the peacebuilding potential of local Islamic

[149] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

leaders, most interviewees from other groups suggested that the top-down approach of government officials failed to empower local Islamic leaders to engage in peacebuilding.

As an immediate result, the top-down approach limited a space for local religious leaders to participate in the government peacebuilding collaboration. In other words, the top-down approach prevented government officials from developing sufficient knowledge about the role of religion and local religious leaders and missed the opportunity to show the commitment to religious leaders. Most interviewees believed that without a clear understanding about the role of religion and religious leaders, the government could not fully grasp local needs, especially the religious authority and the capacity of local Buddhist and Islamic leaders, who could have been valuable partners in peacebuilding. Particularly local Islamic leaders, who were influential and often more respected than government officials at the grassroots level, could have increasingly engaged in peacebuilding if they were trusted to have a more opportunity to implement their ideas.

However, it appears that it seemed that local religious leaders were pragmatic and willing to maintain collaboration with the government when they saw benefits and a space to initiate peacebuilding activities. The interviewees provided examples of local religious leaders utilising financial support and knowledge from the government in their education-related peacebuilding.

The next chapter will present the finding related to the military networks of local religious leaders and their effects in discouraging local religious leaders from engagement in peacebuilding.

Chapter 8

Military: Fearful Network Hindering Peacebuilding

8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings relating to the relationships between local religious leaders and military forces and police[150] that appeared to generate fear – a condition de-motivating local religious leaders from undertaking peacebuilding activities in Southern Thailand. As previously discussed (Chapter Three), this chapter sheds light on the research question: *how do bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting?* Overall, the findings of this chapter partly support Theoretical Proposition 3, that *a bridging network is likely to hinder the peacebuilding of a local religious leader when the other network member impairs a political condition for peacebuilding by enhancing the local religious leader's risk of facing punishment.* The findings however highlight the different source of risk. They revealed the risk of being attacked by insurgents incurred from accepting the resources from the military rather than the risk of facing punishment the military generated directly against local religious leaders to stop local religious leaders from engaging in peacebuilding – which is suggested by Theoretical Proposition 3. Although local religious leaders could access the resources provided by military actors, which could in theory be used for peacebuilding activities, the findings suggest that local religious leaders were not willing

[150] The term 'military forces and police' is used interchangeably with 'military actor', 'military personnel' and 'the military' in this thesis.

to access military resources as they feared that doing so might indicate a close alliance to the military (the direct conflicting party to the Malay insurgents), increasing a chance of being attacked by the Malay insurgent.

The chapter consists of three main sections. The first section focuses on the behaviour of the military actors: impairment of the peacebuilding environment via security concerns, which was driven by the military's suspicion over local Islamic leaders and the military's militarising of Buddhist monks. The second section examines the immediate effect of the behaviour of military actors: fear amongst local religious leaders. Finally, the third section looks at the impact of fear on local religious leaders' peacebuilding practices, namely the *negative attitudes towards the other ethnoreligious group* and *wasted resources* that produced low motivation for peacebuilding.

Table 9: Findings - Military Networks and Hindering Peacebuilding

Behaviour of Military Actors	Immediate Outcome	Network Effect
Impairment due to Security Concerns - suspicion over Islamic leaders - militarising Buddhist monks	Fear	Hindering Peacebuilding - negative attitudes towards the other ethnoreligious group - wasted resources

8.2 The Behaviour of Military Actors: Impairment due to Security Concerns

This section looks at the military's impairment of the peacebuilding environment, which was driven by security concerns. Interviewees commonly suggested that military actors had a different behaviour from the civilian governmental actors even though both were considered

part of the Thai state. Unlike civilian governmental actors, who increasingly engaged local religious leaders in peacebuilding, the military distrusted local Islamic leaders and considered them as a threat to national security. Another finding is that turning local Buddhist temples into military camps was the military's way to protect local Buddhist monks.

Most interviewees from all groups of interviewees identified the key military networks through which local religious leaders established relationships with military actors: the Royal Thai Army's Southern 4th Army Command (the 4th Army or *Gong Tup Pak Tee See*), the Internal Security Operations Command (*Gor Or Ror Mor Nor*), the Royal Thai Rangers or paramilitary forces (RTR or *Thahan Phran*), the Thai police, and civilian militias schemes such as the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) or the paramilitary volunteers (*Or Sor*) and the community security volunteer programme (*Chor Ror Bor*) (McCargo, 2008, pp.88-126). The interviewees suggested that these military networks were state agencies that primarily dealt with security issues and operated in the Deep South. They were seen as 'the direct conflicting part(ies) (*ku kad yang doi tong/ku koranee*)' to the Malay-Muslim insurgents.

8.2.1 Suspicion of Local Islamic Leaders

Although military personnel sought to establish ties with local leaders including the imams and monks in the areas under their responsibility, it appeared that their relationships were largely driven by the military's desire to monitor the behaviour of local Islamic leaders. All interviewees from the three groups (local religious leaders, activists, and academics, except those from the governmental officials group) suggested that military forces and police in the Deep South were highly suspicious of local Islamic leaders, as their religious principles and

cultural practices were seen as potential threats to the Thai nation.[151] As scholars argue, when nationalism or 'the national identity' is constructed along a foundation of ethnic and/or religious homogeneity (the Thai nation, Buddhism, the King – the main component of the Thai nationalism) (McCargo, 2008, 2012), state could seek to control or in some cases discriminate against ethnic and religious minorities' expression of other ethnic and religious identities which are seen as the threat to the nation (Connor, 1994; Fox, 2000, 2003; Gurr, 1993; Horowitz, 1985).

Zikri, a well-respected Islamic scholar, suggested that the military' suspicion of local Islamic leaders was largely based on the religious and cultural differences. He argued that the military did not consider Malay Muslims as Thai citizens. He said that the military "doesn't think the Malay Muslims, who do not think and act like the [Buddhist] Thais, are Thais". He added that when the military already had a pre-existing belief that Malay Muslims were not Thai citizens, Islamic leaders were likely to alienate the military in return.

> [The military] had cloudy eyes seeing wherever that had a sign in Yawi as [an area of] insurgents or insurgent sympathisers… Any sub-districts that had Yawi names, [or] Yawi characters were residence of insurgents or insurgent sympathizers. Politicians from the Deep South, regardless of their levels [of administration], were seen as insurgent sympathizers. You can find books and articles written by high-ranking military officers in Matichon Newspaper, for example, that accuse these politicians, who now are in Parliament, of being

[151] The suspicion was to some degree extended to Muslims as a whole.

> secessionists. If you look back in many articles in the past years, you will see how they [the military] see [us] here. What shall we think when they [the military] see us like this.[152]

Ali, an Islamic committee member of the Islamic Council in Pattani, argued similarly, saying that

> the security forces are concerned about the issue of secession, and they think religion [Islam] can cause it. They adhere to the idea that the Thai state must be uniform. However, the three southernmost provinces are different. When people do things their own way [i.e. Islamic practices], they are seen as suspicious – they are different, they are not Thai, something like that.[153]

An Islamic scholar, Abdulla, added that

> [Islamic leaders] are directly affected by the conflict. They are feeling unease over the suspicion of the other group [the Thai military]. Overall, more than 50 percent of religious teachers, imams, and other religious actors are in the blacklist of the military since the violence re-emerged 10 years ago.[154]

[152] Interview with Zikri on 3 June 2014 in Pattani.
[153] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[154] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.

Somchai, a well-known scholar in Pattani, similarly said that

> because some Islamic leaders play an important role [in the insurgency], the military tends to use a controlling or preventive strategy with them. Islamic leaders are heavily affected. They are requested to report to [the military], and to receive military visits at home or at school. As reported on the news, there are searching operations that trespass on Islamic schools and *Tadika* [Islamic pre-schools held often at mosques] which have caused a lot of resentment...The military often visits Islamic schools to keep an eye on school activities.[155]

Suspicion was also brought up in the interview with Danish, an activist who worked closely with religious leaders on interreligious dialogue.

> Islamic leaders, who are strict [and] hold principles that may be similar to that of the insurgents [judged by fading away from the mainstream practice], become a target even though that [strict principles] may only be their personal beliefs….[thus] local Islamic leaders may have a negative view on the military…[and] don't seem to like the military very much.[156]

[155] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.
[156] Interview with Danish on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.

In another interview, Rayyan, an Islamic religious teacher from a private Islamic school in Jana, Songkhla, said that the military not only targeted Islamic school teachers but also Muslim students graduated from Islamic countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who might bring home radical ideologies.[157] However, it is worth noting that the military's suspicions of the involvement of Islamic schools and teachers are not unfounded – for example, Thamma Wittaya school is known to be a bastion of insurgency (Liow, 2009, pp. 38-39). Rayyan mentioned that

> in the past, Thai teachers sent to private religious schools had two jobs – being teachers and spies. Thamma Wittaya Foundation School [in Yala], where I graduated from, was an example...Some Muslim students from central provinces who went to Egypt for study were also spies [to spy on Muslim students from the Deep South].[158]

Moreover, Umar talked about his experience in trying to maintain goodwill, and preventing misunderstandings with the Thai security agencies (DSI), who suspected his involvement with Muslim youth groups in the university (where he worked as a lecturer) as "a mentor who might brainwash and establish extremist ideology in Muslim youths".[159]

Abdulla and Imam Syed also argued that the military's increasing contacts with local Islamic leaders was part of an operative strategy to gain intelligence within the Malay-Muslim community. Both believed that the regular meetings with local Islamic leaders were driven by

[157] Rayyan received religious education from a university in Egypt (a popular destination for religious scholars), and Thamma Wittaya Foundation School (a private religious school which was believed to be a recruitment agent for insurgent groups).
[158] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.
[159] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

the military's attempts to monitor and assess the behaviour of Islamic leaders, especially their potential links to insurgents. While Imam Syed spoke about his personal experience of being accused of "supporting insurgents" *(liang jone),* Abdulla made a general comment about the common experience of local Islamic leaders, saying that "the military has invited local Islamic leaders to join seminars and attend courses as a way to keep an eye on them and gain insight into their behaviour".[160]

Imam Syed also mentioned during the interview that, as a highly respected figure, (along with his childhood friend Phra Supon, who lived in the same sub-district in Pattani) he was at the time of the interviews scheduled to meet with Lt-General Walit Rojjana-phakdee, the newly appointed Army Chief of the 4th Army. He said this was a standard of practice for a newly appointed military officers and commanders to meet with prominent local leaders in order to establish a relationship and to gain insight into a given area.

Interviewees also spoke of the military's aggressive and violent approaches (often indiscriminately) towards local Islamic leaders. They said the military's aggressive and violent approaches were driven by suspicion, and the perception that local Islamic leaders may be involved in recruiting and indoctrinating potential insurgents (Liow & Pathan, 2006), as discussed in Chapter Five. Once local Islamic leaders were considered potential security threats to the territorial integrity of the Thai state, the military was able to use "whatever means are necessary" to block them (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). Specifically, the military implemented emergency laws such as the Martial Law, the Emergency Decree, the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in State of Emergency, and the Serious State of Emergency Order, as well as other coercive measures including indiscriminate violence in the name of national

[160] Interview with Abdulla on 3 July 2014 in Pattani.

survival (Kularb, 2016). According to Kalyvas (2006, p. 149), indiscriminate violence is used in military operations known as "mopping up", "comb", "cordon and search", "search and destroy", or "scorched earth" that "seek to encircle and liquidate insurgents and undercut the insurgency's civilian basis". Umar, an Islamic scholar, shared his experiences about indiscriminate violence, saying that the military often used an overly aggressive approach in dealing with locals, which created the feeling that "the military and people [the Malay Muslims] are incompatible" He gave an example of an aggressive approach used by the military during a house search.

> When the military does a search [on a local's house], the whole brigade comes. This just happened to one of my family members living in Yaha a few days ago. This family member of mine is a good citizen but someone reported [suspicion to the military] them, and then the military brigade showed up for a search. The same [house search approach] happens to other people, even old people and pregnant women.[161]

Ali also argued that the military and law enforcement agencies often abused the emergency law.

> The rule of law is hard to find here. The law can be used for different interests. A case arrives at the court and the local police who conduct an investigation close the case and release the suspects if the suspects are close with the police guys [have a connection with the Thai police]. But the police

[161] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

> choose to work on cases of suspects who are with the other side [perceived to have a connection with the Malay insurgent]… [in the investigation] the police obtain most of information from people who already have political agendas and conflicts with the given suspects. The cases of the given suspects are then turned into the cases under the Emergency Law. … If this inability to uphold the law continued, the Thai security agencies will not be able solve the conflict in the Deep South.[162]

Zikri talked about coercion by the military, which is used to terrorise religious leaders and other key actors including media and activists in the Deep South.

> The military has power to demand a meeting with anyone. I have friends in the media, whom the Thai army dislikes and demanded a meeting with. The military offered them two options. One, according to their [the military's] evidence, [my friends] will be arrested on 13 charges and sentenced for two years in prison as well as paying a fine of 40,000 Thai bahts. Or second, my friends will agree with what the military says. This is what happens here. It happens to everyone – media agents, NGOs, and religious leaders.[163]

[162] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[163] Interview with Zikri on 3 June 2014 in Pattani.

Zikri also said the military in particular, indiscriminately targets young Muslim men. In the interview, Zikri gave an example of how the indiscriminate implementation of the emergency laws caused resentment in Malay Muslim villages, as it interrupted the Islamic way of life. Young Muslim men who were suspected of being insurgents/insurgent sympathisers were often forced to join an overly long and extensive seminar in a military camp.

> Because of the suspicion, the military invited the youths to join a seminar in a military camp, a very long seminar lasting several months. I asked the youths how they managed their responsibilities at home - they had to work and look after their parents. They said every man in the sub-district had to go [to the seminar]. Not enough men left to perform the Friday prayer. The Friday prayer requires at least 40 male adults. Because the seminar was compulsory, if they did not participate, they would be in trouble.[164]

More importantly, more serious human right violations such as torture and ill-treatment by the military were reported. In accordance with reports by Amnesty International (Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency, January 2009)[165], the Cross Cultural Foundation, the Duay Jai Group, and the Patani Human Rights Network (January 2016),[166] Rayyan discussed about Islamic teachers frequently tortured by the military. The discussion showed a similar argument to McCargo (2012, p. 9), who describes torture of suspects as "a standard of operating

[164] Interview with Zikri on 3 June 2014 in Pattani.
[165] Amnesty International had testimonies indicating tortures and ill-treatments during detention of at least 34 cases between March 2007 and May 2008.
[166] The report documents 54 cases of allegedly tortured or ill-treated Malay-Muslim insurgent suspects by the Thai security officers between 2004 and 2015.

procedure, routinely practiced by army Rangers and other military and police units". Rayyan, as a representative of the Private Islamic School Association (PISA) of Songkhla Province, was involved in an investigation regarding the military's torture of an Islamic teacher from Rungroj Wittaya School that took place a few years ago at the Natawee military camp. He said that

> the military had a right to arrest the suspect...The military promised not to harm the suspect when arrested. Only one day after arrested, we however found that the suspect was tortured. The PISA's complaint to the military camp failed. The military denied [the torture]. We then involved a hospital to do a medical check on the suspect proving the torture. We complained and made several requests to the Prime Minister Samak Sunthonnivet at the time. As a result, the government sent a military commander to negotiate with us. It was a very smart decision [of the government] considering the intensified situation. Eventually both parties reconciled. There are so many cases like this [tortures of Islamic teachers] in the Deep South.[167]

The next section will show the military's approach to form ties with local Buddhist leaders that was different from the approach taken in the case of local Islamic leaders.

[167] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.

8.2.2 Militarising Buddhist Monks

This section will present the military's attempts to protect local Buddhist monks by militarising Buddhist temples and monks. The militarisation in this context meant that military forces resided in the Buddhist temples, turned the Buddhist temples into the military camps, and kept Buddhist monks under the military protection. This section will demonstrate how the militarisation drew local Buddhist monks into the centre of the conflict rather than distancing them from the conflict.[168] The militarisation turned local Buddhist monks into an ally of the military, who was the direct conflict party. Somchai, a leading local scholar studying the conflict and peace process in the Deep South, said the military did not directly threaten Buddhist monks. The military was instead used "to protect Buddhist monks [and] to destroy the criminals", who harmed civilians, as part of state security measures. Somchai described the deteriorating security situation as a reason behind this security policy to protect Buddhist monks, since they had been increasingly targeted by insurgents in recent years. He said that

> many monks moved out. Several temples particularly in remote areas were abandoned. This is a reason why the military set up their camps in temples - to protect monks and Buddhist Thais in those areas.[169]

All Buddhist monk interviewees indicated the relationship between Buddhist monks and the military was established when the temples were militarised. Phra Manit, a Buddhist monk in Pattani, indicated that Buddhist monks were seen as the ally to the military "as soon as the

[168] The number of monks I could access to as peacebuilders was small due the sensitive political circumstance at the time. There potentially maybe more Buddhist monks involved in peacebuilding. However, according to the Buddhist monk interviewees, data presented in this section widely represented the ideas shared among monks in the areas.
[169] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.

military live in the temples".[170] Buddhist monks appeared to have no choice but to embrace the military when the military took up residence in temples. Phra Supon said Buddhist monks and military personnel shared facilities - the military used the temple across the road from his temple as the residence, and used his temple "as a resting place for lunch breaks, finding food to eat [such as food left from the morning alms or other donations to the temple], having a shower, and using the toilet", because his temple did not have enough rooms for the military to stay.[171] Phra Wikom also reported the military's presence and guards his temple in Narathiwat.

In addition to the general and everyday interaction that occurred from sharing the premises, all of the Buddhist monks interviewed said that Buddhist monks' morning alms and religious rites were carried out with military escorts. Phra Supon indicated that this military practice was a common practice of Buddhist monks in the Deep South. Similar to other local monks, he was "escorted by military officers when travelling outside the temple, such as during the morning alms" in Pattani.[172] Phra Wikom also shared similar insight, saying that there were "nine military officers to look after the monks [at his temple] and escort the monks when going out during the morning alms".[173]

Furthermore, in accordance with the study of Jerryson (2010, 2011), Somchai suggested that sharing the premises with the military opened access to weaponry and militarised the role of Buddhist monks.

[170] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[171] Interview with Phra Supon on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.
[172] Interview with Phra Supon on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.
[173] Interview with Phra Wikom on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.

> Monks carry guns. I am not sure how many of them hide guns in their robes. I at least know one monk who has admitted that he carries a gun to protect himself...He also has a group of military guards. I cannot imagine how he manages to pull out the gun [from the robe where the gun is hidden]. It is ridiculous. He is a monk fighter.[174]

In this section, I have demonstrated that the relationship between local religious leaders and the military was influenced by the military's security concerns. On the one hand, the military' perception that local Islamic leaders were a threat to the Thai state, brought about mistrust in local Islamic leaders and the use of military measures to mitigate that threat. On the other hand, Buddhist monks' links to the military was formed based on the military's mission to protect Buddhist monks from insurgent attacks. The military protection led to militarising of Buddhist monks. The next section will illustrate how the military's suspicion of local Islamic leaders and of militarising local Buddhist monks resulted in a creation of fear among local religious leaders.

8.3 Immediate Outcome: Fear

This section identifies fear (*gour*) as a consequence of the behaviour of the military. Most interviewees (except three government official interviewees) suggested that, due to fear, local religious leaders appeared to avoid contact with military actors even though military actors sought to meet 'regularly' with local leaders. Local Islamic leaders feared the military as they were directly targeted by the military as potential threats to the national security. While

[174] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.

Buddhist monks did not face the same threat from military actors (they were meant to be protected by them), they appeared to be frightened by the consequences of military protection, which they believed increased the possibility of being attacked by Malay insurgents. In other words, for both Muslim and Buddhist leaders, it appeared that closer connections to the military led to more fear.

Most interviewees (except three government official interviewees) commonly indicated that local Islamic leaders could not deny military personnel's demands to meet because they feared the military. Although the military used a so-called "invitation(*chearn*)", they said local religious leaders were obliged to accept the invitation from the military. Mostafa suggested that while "[Islamic leaders] don't want to interact with the military, they will join the military's activities if invited… they don't turn down the invitation but want to keep a distance".[175]

Sophia similarly said that Islamic leaders interacted with the military even though "for sure, Islamic leaders are not comfortable, [and are] not willing to do what the military orders them to do".[176] Religious activities were examples of initiatives hosted by the military that local Islamic leaders reluctantly accepted the military's invitation to join since .

Ali, an Islamic committee member of the provincial Islamic council of Pattani, also commented that Islamic religious leaders "unwillingly *(fuen jai)* participate" in meetings with the military but did anyway. Ali explained that local Islamic leaders still have to maintain contact with military actors, as they fear that denying contact with the military could raise

[175] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.
[176] Interview with Sophia on 20 May 2014 in Pattani.

suspicion of involvement in the insurgency, and that it may increase the possibility of being targeted by the military. He said "if Islamic leaders refuse to participate [in activities organized by the military], there would be problems in their areas; [the military] would be suspicious whether they are insurgents or insurgent sympathisers".[177]

Umar, an Islamic scholar, similarly suggested that local religious leaders keep a distance from military personnel because they fear (*gour*) them, saying "people here [the Malay Muslims], including Islamic religious leaders, definitely fear the military because of their behaviour".[178] He added that

> [Islamic leaders] don't want to build a link to the Thai military because they will be perceived negatively... In fact, not only religious leaders, we as Islamic scholars working for the university [the Islamic College, PSU] also avoid a connection with the Thai military if possible.[179]

Similarly yet contrastingly, military *protection* raised fear in Buddhist monks. Rather than bringing safety, Somchai argued that protecting Buddhist monks by militarising the Buddhist temples exacerbated fear. Under military protection, Buddhist monks appeared to be more frightened of being attacked by Malay insurgents. Somchai said that establishing military camps in the Buddhist temples "worsened the tension between Muslims and nearby Muslim communities, which now think of Buddhists as being the

[177] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[178] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.
[179] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

same as the Thai state, as the Thai military was sent here to protect Buddhists".[180]

To demonstrate an example of intensified fear among Buddhist monks, Somchai described an experience during a visit to a Buddhist temple in Panarae, which was used as a military residence and was located in the middle of a Thai community. He said that

> I met the abbot. He had a character of a boxer or a gangster. He had bodyguards. He mistrusted anyone especially when I first arrived. He did not know whether I was Buddhist or Muslim. He was more relaxed when he saw me prostrate to worship (*wai*)[181] a Buddha [statute]. But he still felt unease about who we were, [and] why we were there...I am a Buddhist myself. I wonder how Buddhism, which is supposed to be peaceful, can become quite hateful or distrustful or the combination between the two.[182]

Buddhist monk interviewees also expressed their fear. Phra Manit argued that Buddhist monks felt insecure from the presence of military officers even though their main task was to protect the Thai-Buddhist population, especially monks. He said that since the military was the main target of the Malay insurgents, being close to them increased the possibility of being attacked.

> After the [re]emergence of violence [2004], the military have taken up residence in temples. Only

[180] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.
[181] *Wai* is a prayer-like gesture consisting of a slight bow and palms pressured together to show respect or greeting in the Thai culture. A Muslim cannot worship gods or god-like objects other than Allah. Therefore, when a person *wai* a Buddha statue or image, it is certain that person is not Muslim.
[182] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.

> small numbers [of the military] set up their bases elsewhere. When the majority of the military had bases in temples, temples then become a target of insurgents as the insurgents wish for even though the temples have nothing to do with this conflict.[183]

Phra Supon also spoke about fear generated from the risk of being attacked when escorted by the military. He said that Buddhist monks in his temple "don't go out to receive alms in the morning because [Buddhist monks] were attacked by the insurgents so often, every year".[184]

Phra Wikom was also unconvinced that having a military escort would ensure his safety during the morning routine of alms-receiving. He was critically injured in a bomb explosion during an alms-receiving in 2006, in spite of being escorted by military guards. After the incident he had chosen not to be seen with the military when travelling out of the temple. He stated that

> I do not allow the military officers [who look after the temples and monks] to go with us while wearing the uniform and carrying weapons. That is because my [peacebuilding] works have already made me a target of an insurgent attack. If I travel with a military officer who is also a target, it is more likely that we become a significant target…I therefore travel with a civilian driver. If a military officer wants

[183] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[184] Interview with Phra Supon on 19 August 2014 in Pattani.

to come, he can, only without the [military] uniform though.[185]

To summarise, this section demonstrates that the military created a fearful environment due to its suspicion of local Islamic leaders and by militarising Buddhist monks. Fear of danger appeared to be drawn possibly from both military actors and the Malay insurgents. Religious leaders were concerned the potentially negative consequence of not accepting the military 'protection' from the military authorities; at the same time, they fear that such military arrangement might attract more attacks from the insurgent groups. Local religious leaders therefore appeared to maintain a reasonable distance from military personnel in order to minimise the risk of being attacked. The next section will lay out how fear caused by the military's behaviour reduced local religious leaders' motives for undertaking peacebuilding activities during conflict.

8.4 Network Effect: Hindering Peacebuilding

This section looks at how fear caused by military actors has impacted local religious leaders' motivation to do peace works by creating negative attitudes towards the other group and high personal risk if mobilising resources from the military. In accordance with Brewer et al. (2011) and Little (2011), Mostafa argued that the military "plays a critical role", influencing peacebuilding dynamics and opportunities/constraints for peacebuilding, and that "we [peacebuilders] cannot rule out the military from the peace process [and] the military must be included to end the situation in the Deep South".[186] Similarly, Hamza said that military actors were powerful players in the conflict,

[185] Interview with Phra Wikom on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.
[186] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

and that they play a role in the conflict situation and conditions for peacebuilding. He stated that he usually "thought of the military before other civilian governmental officials when asked to identify the Thai state because the military was the direct conflict party [to the Malay Muslim insurgents]".[187]

Two constraints on the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders were identified as being the result of the military's impairment of the peacebuilding environment due to security concerns. First, the military's security approach generated negative attitudes toward the other ethnoreligious group (the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Muslim), and diminished the willingness of local religious leaders to engage in peacebuilding activities. Second, the material resources given by military produced a limited effect in boosting the peacebuilding capability of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders because the resources did not necessarily fit the needs of local Islamic and Buddhist leaders. Moreover, most interviewees suggested that the behaviour of military personnel discouraged local religious leaders from drawing resources from the military, as receiving support from military actors could suggest a close connection with military actors that increased the risk of being attacked by the Malay insurgents.

8.4.1 Negative Attitudes towards the Other Ethnoreligious Group

Several of the interviewees indicated that the behaviour of military personnel hindered local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding, as it reinforced negative attitudes toward the other ethnoreligious group. For instance, Hamza, a Muslim activist, said that "local Islamic leaders play a limited role [in peacebuilding collaboration with military actors in comparison to that with civil society actors] because they fear and distrust the Thai security forces", who threatened

[187] Interview with Hamza on 11 June 2014 in Pattani.

them and their Muslim followers, but largely seem to protect the Thai Buddhists. In his work promoting human rights and justice, Hamza mentioned that the military only looked after the Thai Buddhists, while "Malay Muslims including Islamic leaders barely received help [from the military]" such as compensations.[188]

Zikri similarly identified that in a highly suspicious environment, local Islamic leaders "could not teach reconciliation [to Malay Muslims]". He suggested that military actors needed to first trust local religious leaders and to accept the Islamic-oriented way of life before local Islamic leaders could be more actively involved in peacebuilding. He said that

> reconciliation is about an understanding of the way of life here. If [the Thai military] don't understand it, …it is not possible that we [local religious leaders] teach reconciliation.[189]

Yasin also suggested that the oppression and violence carried out by the military against Islamic religious leaders affected their willingness to engage in peacebuilding, and to begin reconciling with the Thai state.

> It will take time to change the negative attitude of Islamic leaders who were for a very long time suppressed by the Thai state. Violence that the Thai state brought to this area since the war between Siam and Patani very badly affected people's feelings. The wound is still not yet healed. I have told the

[188] Interview with Hamza on 11 June 2014 in Pattani.
[189] Interview with Zikri on 3 June 2014in Pattani.

> military that it is the product of their violent acts to the Malayu Patani people.[190]

A negative effect on local Buddhist monks' attitudes was also reported. Somchai expressed his concern over the military's approach of militarising Buddhist monks as it discouraged them from playing a peacebuilding role. Specifically, he suggested that the military presence in Buddhist temples deepened local monks' fear and distrust of Malay Muslims. When local Buddhist monks were symbolically linked with the Thai state and were militarised in the name of national security, "it is hard [for Buddhist monks] to build peace [with Malay-Muslims]".

> The major issue is that religion is mixed with the state. Buddhism and the Thai state are stuck together. Although the constitution does not say that the state is Buddhist, in practice people know that all the state ceremonies are Buddhist-related. Buddhists [monks] therefore often feel threatened when the state is harmed.[191]

Three out of the six Buddhist leaders interviewed also indicated that they are suspicious of Malay Muslims, especially Islamic religious leaders. Phra Manit, Phra Surasit and Prasert believed that Malay-Muslims could be trusted. For example, Phra Manit said he preferred being escorted by military actors when travelling out of his temple as "travelling by himself is not safe...especially in Muslim villages, definitely not safe". He also added that

[190] Interview with Yasin on 25 June 2014 in Pattani.
[191] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.

> Malay Muslims already think monks or Buddhists choose the [Thai] military side. That is why we [monks] are attacked when travelling with the military. At least, we [monks] would have a chance to fight back when being attacked, if we are with the military, who prepare to fight.[192]

In addition to the negative attitudes toward the other ethnoreligious group, it also appeared that the resources given to local religious leaders by military personnel was likely to increase the risk of being attacked by insurgents. Local religious leaders' peacebuilding practices therefore could not be promoted by military actors' resources.

8.4.2 Risk from Accessing the Military's Resources

Although military actors were willing to offer support to local religious leaders as Tera and Panumas, the senior governmental officials, pointed out, local religious leaders especially Islamic leaders did not seek access to the military's resources. Phra Thepsatit and Phra Wikom (two out of four of Buddhist monk interviewees involved in peacebuilding) stated that they never requested money from the military. Instead, both relied on support from the civil society sector, most notably from the village level, as articulated in Chapter Six. Phra Wikom said that

> I did not hope for any funding [from the military and the government]. I always say to my followers that we must be determined to do our job first. If we do it well enough, others will then help us. If we only hope for help from the government funding,

[192] Interview with Phra Manit on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.

> we will achieve nothing...[After starting the project with the donation from people in the areas] we have now got help from the Pitak Prachachat Foundation, a group of retired public servants, giving us 160,000 [Thai baths] every year for the project of interreligious camp for youths.[193]

While the local Buddhist monks did not seek support from the military, local Islamic leaders seemed reluctant to draw resources from military personnel. Umar indicated that local Islamic leaders were very concerned about potential consequences of receiving support from the military because they generally feared a high-cost repayment. He said that "funding from the SBPAC or the National Islamic Council was more preferable than that from the military". He suggested it was because if Islamic leaders mobilised support from and were perceived to be an ally of the military, they might consequently be faced with a high-cost repayment or having to return the favour by "providing intelligence" or "releasing secrets" of the Muslim Malay community to the military.[194] As Coleman (1988) argued, after giving support, the network associates can request favours as a quid pro quo. However, such repayment would likely put them in conflict with the Malay insurgents. In this respect, it is understandable that concerns about safety influenced the decision of local Islamic leaders not to mobilise resources from the military.

Similarly to Umar's view, Haziq, Rayyan, and Phra Wikom suggested that local religious leaders' fear insurgent attacks by being perceived as an ally or informant of the military.[195] The

[193] Interview with Pra Wikom on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.
[194] Interview with Umar in Pattani on 1 August 2014.
[195] Interviews with Umar (on 1 August 2014), Haziq (on 9 August 2014) in Pattani, Rayyan (on 2 July 2014) in Songkha, and Phra Wikom (on 30 June 2014) in Narathiwat.

suggestion is in accordance with the report of Human Right Watch (*No one is safe: Insurgent attacks on civilians in Thailand's southern border provinces*, 2007), which indicates that a significant number of insurgent attacks on civilians was used as a strategy of insurgents to spread terror among the civilian population.

Phra Surasit, a Buddhist monk from Pattani, stated in the interview that the behaviour of Islamic leaders was likely to be determined by their fear of Malay insurgents. He said that

> Muslims and Islamic leaders, who cooperated with the police and the military, were soon enough killed [by the insurgents]. So Muslims don't dare to associate with Thai Buddhists because they have fear. They really consider whom they can build a relationship with.[196]

Danish also spoke about fear of the insurgents as a factor that discourages religious leaders from forming peacebuilding collaborations with military actors.

> That is because if they have a lot of exchanges with the military, they fear that the other conflict party [the Malay insurgents] will give them particular attention.[197]

Similarly, and although he uses the broadcasting facilities of the military for his religious teaching on local radio stations, Umar mentioned his reluctance to work with military actors;

[196] Interview with Phra Surasit on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.
[197] Interview with Danish on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.

> not only religious leaders, we, Islamic scholars, who are at the university level, will avoid collaborating with the military if we can. That is because we don't know whether we will be pushed into one side [of the conflict parties]. This is what people worry about.[198]

Umar also explained that his work with military actors could backfire on him if a Muslim fellow, who might have a connection with or sympathy for the Malay insurgents, reported to the Malay insurgents. He said that

> to prevent misunderstanding, I had to confirm [not choosing the Thai side] with Muslim fellows that I did not release any secrets [of the Muslim Malay community to the Thai military] even though I worked for the state-funded university and used broadcasting facilities of the Thai military.[199]

Furthermore, Somchai described in the interview that local Islamic leaders were unwilling to have a close cooperation with the military due to fear of being seen as '*munafik*', or "traitors to religion subjected to even worse punishment than a non-believer… [and]… often prosecuted at a mosque on Friday after the Friday Prayer". *Munafik* were believed to be among the Muslim victims killed by militants, as argued by McCargo (2012). Somchai said "[the Malay insurgents] see the conflict as a religious conflict" and the fight against the Thai state as "a religious duty". He

[198] Interview with Umar in Pattani on 1 August 2014.
[199] Interview with Umar on 1 August 2014 in Pattani.

believed the Malay insurgents expected that "if [Islamic leaders] don't fight [militarily], [they] must not hinder [the fight against the Thai state]". For that reason, "they have a right to kill [munafik] who work for the enemy, [and] assist the enemy - the Thai state, which is called *Siyae* or Siam – a non-believer who occupied the land". Such "fear of death [and] punishment for munafik" crucially prevented Islamic leaders from engaging with state agents and "made Islamic leaders reduce their activism [and] do not dare to speak anything…or do anything that resists [the insurgents]… even though [they] disagree [with the insurgents]".[200]

According to Rayyan, if an Islamic leader was perceived to be a close ally to the Thai state, especially the military, the insurgents would send him a warning to reduce interaction with the military, for example by sending someone to warn him in person, or through the use of a symbolic warning of rice hung outside his front door.[201] If the close relationship continued, an assassination of the Islamic leader might then be carried out.

In the interview with Danish, the risk of being killed as a repercussion of ties with the military was also discussed. Danish suspected that the death of Imam Yakob, which was a notorious murder case in the Deep South in 2013, could be explained by his close relationship to the Thai side. He said that

> Imam Yakob, the imam of the central mosque in Pattani, publicly announced his wish to build peace [via working closely with the military]. He eventually was shot during Ramadan last year. This

[200] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.
[201] Interview with Rayyan on 2 July 2014 in Songkhla.

> is an example of Islamic teachers and imams who were shot.[202]

However, it seemed that religious principles could help reduce fear of the military allowing local religious leader to accept support from the military when offered. For instance, Imam Haziq said he accepted money from the military when they visited his school, although he had made no request for it. The money was meant as a contribution to his project of religious teaching for youths at his school, which operated mainly through donations from community members. He explained in the interview that he accepted support from the military not only because he could not turn down the offer without causing tension, but also because "Islam allows the acceptance of the money".

> Religion [Islam] says if [the money] is for a good deed that is beneficial to people, it does not matter who it is from. We should receive it.[203]

This suggests a complex relation between the risk from 'accepting' resources from the military and religious principles that allowed acceptance of resources, especially what kinds of resources from the military. However, this study does not have enough data to explain this complexity. Further research is needed to identify factors determining a decision to accept or not accept support from the military.

Other interviewees also indicated that local religious leaders did not turn down the military's resources when given, even though the support was not beneficial to peacebuilding or to help improve their peacebuilding capacity. Ahmad expressed concern over meaningless spending

[202] Interview with Danish on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.
[203] Interview with Imam Haziq on 9 August 2014 in Pattani.

and support by the military in some development projects, which were irrelevant and failed to inspire local Islamic leaders to increase their engagement in peacebuilding. As an example of wasted resources from the military he said that rather than improving the skills needed for economic development, free distribution of livestock to Islamic leaders caused difficulties and created excessive work for them, as they did not know how to look after farm animals.

> Local religious leaders tried all [development] approaches. They didn't work. They were not beneficial. In the lived stocks project, all goats, cows, and chickens distributed to us died because we didn't know how to raise them. We also had to buy food for them on our own. This project should have done with people who were professional such as those already in the farm animal industry. Also the persons have to like the job to be able to do it well. The government should have done a survey [on who should have participated in the project], not distributing the animals to every household.[204]

Reflecting a similar view to Ahmad, Danish said that the military still lacked an accurate understanding of local Islamic leaders' needs and skills for peacebuilding and development that local imam needed.

> I talked to an imam who complained that he already had so much work [i.e. religious teachings]. He could not look after fish and ducks [livestock distributed to improve the economic condition], which was not

[204] Interview with Ahmad on 30 June 2014 in Narathiwat.

> his job. So, he had such a negative feeling toward the military that lacked an understanding [of the role of imams]. Another imam also reflected with me that he participated in a seminar on self-sufficient economy only because he was invited by the military [and needed to accept the invitation].[205]

Interviewees emphasised the military's failure in improving activism in religious activities. All of the Muslim interviewees said that they preferred religious activities to be sponsored by religious experts who were well respected, as opposed to the military. Ali, as a member of the Islamic committee in Pattani, who worked closely with the civil society sector, in particular the Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC), suggested that resources from military actors could not build a commitment to religious peacebuilding, even though local Islamic leaders might participate in religious activities funded by military actors. Local Islamic leaders' participation was only to ensure that they would not be accused of being insurgents or insurgent empathizers.

> The Thai military has involved in a dawah project and Islamic leaders feel obliged to participate even though Islamic leaders think that religious events should be done by religious leaders rather than the state [and the military in particular]. It causes discontentment and reluctance among Islamic leader to participate. They however cannot refuse to participate without causing a problem of being

[205] Interview with Danish on 2 June 2014 in Pattani.

> accused as an insurgent or a supporter of insurgency.[206]

Mostafa, a senior civil society actor, thought that the military resources pouring into interreligious dialogues were useless in term of encouraging meaningful engagement of local religious leaders because "no [religious leader] would be willing to participate if the Thai military or the government hosted". He believed the interreligious dialogue should be led by civil society actors, who represented the people from all ethnic and religious groups.[207]

Somchai shared Mostafa's view. He spoke of the lack of interest and limited contributions that local religious leaders made at an interfaith dialogue that was run under military supervision. This was hardly an environment that could facilitate open information exchange and peacebuilding.

> Hundreds of Islamic leaders joined an inter-religious meeting organised by the Thai military but they only sat together in their own group. They listened to what the officials had to say but they did not contribute anything [to the dialogue]. Only listening and then whispering in Yawi language among themselves that the officials could not understand. If they did not agree with the officials, they only discuss that issue in their own group. After the event dismissed, Islamic leaders went home without having any major impacts on their thoughts and

[206] Interview with Ali on 10 June 2014 in Pattani.
[207] Interview with Mostafa on 29 May 2014 in Pattani.

> behaviour. The Buddhist monks also sat in a group when participating in inter-religious and inter-cultural meetings. They always make excuses not to participate though.[208]

Aamir, who was the founder of the *Kam Pong Tak Wa* (the Faith Community), a civil society group, pointed out the lack of credibility and religious knowledge of the military as the reason behind local religious leaders' limited engagement in religious peacebuilding activities. He said that

> the Internal Security Operations Command took our idea [utilising faith as a tool to peacebuilding]. But I predict that it will not work because they [the military] have so many limitations. For example, it is hard for the military to talk about religion. They preach this and that but they fail to practice what they preach. It is also hard to find military officers who are Muslims to do the job. Unlike us [the Faith Community working in collaboration with local religious leaders], they [the military] also cannot find sub-district headmen or village headmen, who are good [Islamic] followers and understand Islamic principles...Although they [the military] can give them [sub-district headmen or village headmen] training with an expert in Islam, which they have never done... if they do, I think there would be many problems emerged since it [a secular and

[208] Interview with Somchai on 28 May 2014 in Pattani.

> conflicting party undertaking a religious role] is such a sensitive issue.[209]

In conclusion, I have shown in this section that, although military actors seemed to seek to be supportive of local religious leaders' peacebuilding practice, local religious leaders were reluctant to mobilise resources from the military because of the potential risk of being seen as ally to the military. Nevertheless, local Islamic leaders appeared to accept the military's resources when given (even though the resources did not improve the peacebuilding practice) because they did not want to risk being seen as the opposition to the military.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how the behaviour of military actors reduced local religious leaders' motivation to undertake peacebuilding activities. I have found that military actors generated fear. Interviewees suggested that local Islamic leaders were terrified by the military's use of aggression against them or potential insurgent recruiters and empathizers. Although Buddhist monks may not have been directly threatened by the military, it also became clear that they were frightened of the consequence of having a close relationship to the military. For example, all interviewees believed that having a military escort during the morning alms-receiving increased the risk of being attacked by Malay insurgents. As an immediate outcome, local religious leaders maintained distance from the military in order to ensure their safety. They only formed involuntary relationships when necessary; otherwise they tried to avoid contact with the military as much as possible.

[209] Interview with Aamir on 18 August 2014 in Pattani.

Interviewees suggested that the military's approach created and reinforced fear among local religious leaders. The fear of insurgent attacks influenced the reluctance to cooperate and utilise resources of military actors in peacebuilding activities as doing so might suggest a close alliance to the military, which could increase the risk of being targeted by the Malay insurgents.

The next chapter will discuss the significance and implications of the key findings presented in Chapter Six, Seven, and Eight. It will also highlight the contributions this study makes to existing knowledge on the potential role of religious leaders in a conflict situation, the limitations of this study, as well as suggestions for further research.

Chapter 9

Discussion and Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This thesis has examined the influence of social networks on the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders in a conflict setting. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, previous literature has highlighted religious factors as the potential factors influencing religious leaders' peacebuilding potential and roles (Appleby, 2000; Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana, & Abu-Nimer, 2005; Hertog, 2010; Little, 2007). Factors other than religion have been under-researched. Moreover, clear definitions of 'religious leader' and 'peacebuilding' embedded in the specific context of study have been lacking. This study therefore contributes to filling these gaps by specifically examining the impact of *social networks* on *local religious leaders' peacebuilding in conflict*.

Scholars have suggested that social relations or networks are important mechanisms influencing peaceful or violent behaviour in religious leaders (Cox, 2009; Sisk, 2011a; Varshney, 2002). In this study, I only focus on the inter-group or bridging network as previous research suggests that a bridging network is likely to promote inter-group peace (Cox, 2009; Varshney, 2002) and improve the peacebuilding capacity of faith-based peace practitioners (Appleby, 2000; Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004). To address the importance of bridging networks, I therefore ask the research question: *How do bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious*

leaders in a conflict setting? To shed light on this research question, I have examined local Buddhist and Islamic leaders' bridging networks and how these networks have affected their peacebuilding in the Southern Thailand conflict.

As articulated in Chapter Three, scholars have suggested that bridging networks across diverse groups are means of successful peacebuilding in both post-conflict and conflict settings because such networks generate access to material and non-material resources for peacebuilding (Appleby, 2000; Cilliers, 2002; Hertog, 2010; Little & Appleby, 2004). However, they have largely ignored variation in the approaches or behaviours of other actors or network members of a given bridging network and their potentially different effects on accessibility to resources. Especially in a conflict setting, local religious leaders might establish not only peaceful but also hostile relationships with other actors (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Fitzduff, 2011; Hashemi, 2011; Hayward, 2011; Hibbard, 2011; Little, 2011). For that reason, I have proposed three types of bridging network based on the behaviours or approaches of other actors: *facilitation, imposition, and impairment*. These aspects of other actors plausibly influence the expected return or transaction cost associated with accepting their resources for local religious leaders. The expected return is likely to increase local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding when other actors adopt the shared preference for a peacebuilding approach with local religious leaders and seek to facilitate the development of the peacebuilding roles of local religious leaders. In contrast, the role of local religious leaders may be reduced when the other actors impose unshared peacebuilding norms and practices on local religious leaders. Furthermore, taking resources for peacebuilding from other actors who seek to impair the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders may produce more severe consequences, such as a risk of facing punishment. In the theoretical framework, I therefore hypothesised that these three behaviours led to three different levels of engagement in

peacebuilding: *active*, *restricted* and *no peacebuilding*, respectively, since these behaviours are likely to generate varying accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (accessibility, restricted accessibility, no accessibility).

Table 1: Theoretical Propositions - The Effects of Bridging Networks on the Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders

Network Types	**Network Effects**
Facilitation (Assisting local religious leaders in bottom-up peacebuilding)	*Active Peacebuilding* Accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach)
Imposition (Enforcing unshared peacebuilding norms and practices)	*Restricted Peacebuilding* Restricted accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to unshared norms and practices)
Impairment (Spoiling local religious leaders' peacebuilding potential)	*No Peacebuilding* No accessibility to resources for peacebuilding (due to risk of facing punishment)

As outlined in Chapter Four, this research employed a case study method to help trace a causal chain between the different network types and the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the context of the Southern Thailand conflict. Qualitative data was gathered through in-depth interviews with thirty-one interviewees, who were drawn from the four groups of a) local religious leaders (18), b) local activists/NGOs (6), c) local academics (4), and d) local government officials (3). The interviews were conducted in the conflict areas in the southernmost provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and some parts of Songkhla), and additional information was also gathered from Skype interviews with two of the original interviewees.

A thematic analysis approach was used to analyse the empirical data obtained. It identified three main themes, explaining that the behaviours of civil society actors (facilitation), civilian government officials (imposition), and military personnel (impairment) were mechanisms through which the peacebuilding behaviour of local religious leaders was promoted, restricted, and impaired, respectively.

Outlining the contents of this chapter, first, I will present summaries and a discussion of the main findings in relation to the existing literature. The summaries and discussion will be articulated in a within-case comparative style of analysis, which has not yet been applied in other research on the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in Southern Thailand. Second, I will articulate the contributions this thesis makes to the field of peacebuilding and to studies of the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. Third, I will illustrate the policy implications drawn from this study and the implications of the research design, as well as recommendations for further research.

9.2 Main Findings

This study has found that a bridging network could *promote*, *restrict*, and *hinder* the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict, depending on the behaviours of other actors who were members of the given bridging network. It has highlighted the importance of the other actors' behaviours, rather than the diverse membership on which the existing research focuses as the key variable determining the effect of bridging networks on peacebuilding (Cox, 2009; Paffenholz, 2010; Pickering, 2006). As individual religious leaders tend to be reluctant to engage in any type of peace works in an ongoing violent conflict or where the risk of being targeted/killed is very high (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010; Sisk, 2011a),

other actors therefore could play a significant role in boosting religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding by facilitating the development of the peacebuilding role of religious leaders.

Figure 2: Results - The Relationship Between the Behaviours of Other Actors and the Peacebuilding of Local Religious Leaders



In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, I have shown three themes, drawn from the qualitative materials, which were related to the behaviour of the other actors: facilitation via socialisation by civil society actors, the top-down approach of governmental actors, and impairment via security concerns by military actors, respectively (See Figure 2). In the Southern Thailand conflict, these behaviours on the part of the key contacts of local religious leaders appeared to create in local religious leaders' a sense of safety, or cause limited space for participation, or introduce a risk of being harmed, respectively. These outcomes could be considered as the transaction costs or 'repayment' determining local religious leaders' access to resources for peacebuilding possessed by the other actors.

9.2.1 Civil Society: Facilitative Network Promoting Peacebuilding

In Chapter Six, I demonstrated that the facilitative behaviour (via *socialisation*) of civil society actors supported the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. As can be seen in Figure 2, this study has shown that civil society actors, who were the driving forces behind bottom-up peacebuilding (Burke, 2012a; O-In, 2012), facilitated the development of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders by providing platforms for *socialisation* between local religious leaders and other actors, including activists, academics, religious actors and leaders from other religious congregations, who otherwise would not be in contact with local religious leaders. Accepting resources from civil society actors carried relatively few risks of being targeted by the military or insurgents which increased the attractiveness of accepting these resources. As suggested by Paffenholz (2010), socialisation was the main mechanism used by civil society actors through which local religious leaders learnt about constructive conflict resolutions and the culture of peace as well as recognised their own peacebuilding potential. In addition, socialisation helped identify the shared

preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach, which motivated local religious leaders to join a civil society peacebuilding coalition.

This study has unexpectedly identified that the immediate result of ties with civil society actors who had a shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach, actually helped local religious leaders develop *a sense of safety* or the reduction of fear, which appeared to promote engagement in peacebuilding. In other words, the sense of safety suggested a lower cost attached to the given resources, which could be accessed via these civil society bridges. As Paffenholz, Spurk, Belloni, Kurtenbach and Orjuela (2010) argue, insecurity is a key variable affecting the space to act (the higher the level of insecurity), the more space for peacebuilding is reduced. In this case, it appeared that a like-minded civil society network (*pak puak*) increased the sense of safety by creating a collective voice, which served as a 'safety net' for local religious leaders when actively engaging in peacebuilding.

As members of like-minded civil society networks for peace, local religious leaders could access resources for peacebuilding available in the networks, such as funding, legal knowledge, norms for peace, and a peacebuilding strategy of development, without fear of danger. In accordance with previous research (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008; Appleby, 2008; Bouta et al., 2005; Hertog, 2010; Lederach, 1997; Little, 2007), these resources, obtained through ties with civil society actors, helped increase local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding activities, such as the development of an integrated-Islamic curriculum for private Islamic schools, legal training, and a drug rehabilitation programme for local youth.

9.2.2 Civilian Government: Top-Down Network Restricting Peacebuilding

In Chapter Seven, I have demonstrated that the *top-down approach* of government officials restricted the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. As shown in Figure 2, this study has found that government officials seemed to maintain a powerful and superior position even though some of them might recognise the importance of cooperation with local religious leaders. Particularly, local government officials were often dominant over local Islamic leaders, who were, however, often more respected and trusted by villagers.

Consequently, as a key actor determining the operative environment of peacebuilding (Brewer et al., 2011), the government's top-down approach generated limited space for local religious leaders' participation and leadership in the government peacebuilding collaboration. In this environment, government officials were identified as lacking a clear understanding about the potential role of religion and local religious leaders in peacebuilding. They therefore could not fully incorporate local religious leaders into government-led peacebuilding initiatives.

However, I have found that local religious leaders were pragmatic. They were willing to cooperate with government officials and be actively involved in peacebuilding when their ideas were allowed to be implemented, such as in the area of education. Local religious leaders mobilised government resources via state-educational institutions for education-related activities such as seminars in moderate Islam, legal training, and classes in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

9.2.3 Military: Fearful Network Hindering Peacebuilding

In Chapter Eight, I have shown that the military's primary concern with security and its negative effect on the peacebuilding activities of local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand. As illustrated in Figure 2, this study has found that the military impaired the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders by focusing only on national security, which seemed to be largely defined based on ethnic and religious homogeneity (the Thai Buddhist) (Croissant, 2005; Harish, 2006; McCargo, 2008; Pitsuwan, 1982). On the one hand, the military was highly suspicious of local Islamic leaders' activism and in general about local Islamic leaders' involvement in insurgency. On the other hand, the military militarised local temples and local Buddhist monks as part of security policy, under the auspices of military protection of the Buddhist population from insurgent attacks.

As a result, the military's sole priority on containing threats created and reinforced local religious leaders' fear, which I argued to be an important disabling condition for peacebuilding. Such fear de-motivated local religious leaders from establishing ties to the military, let alone mobilising the military's resources. Doing so might suggest that a local religious leader was a close ally of the military, which potentially increased the risk of being attacked by Malay insurgents. In other words, the risk of being attacked reflected the high expected cost that might occur when obtaining resources from the military, which was higher than mobilising resources from other bridging networks such as civil society and governmental networks.

Moreover, fear created and sustained a negative attitude toward the other religious group (Islam or Buddhism), which discouraged engagement in peacebuilding activities. In this respect, the security-driven behaviour of the military appeared to hinder the peacebuilding of local religious leaders.

9.2.4 The Behaviours of Other Actors and Distance to the Fighting

In addition to examining the behaviour of local religious leaders, this study has also identified the significance of the behaviour of local religious leaders' key contacts, namely civil society, civilian governmental and military actors. The behaviours of these actors seemed to be shaped by their distance to the fighting itself, which in turn affected their (perceived) neutrality. Perceptions of neutrality were central to the calculation of local religious leaders before mobilising resources for peacebuilding.

The priority on security was driven by the military's position in the conflict. When the military personnel were the direct fighting party opposed to the Malay insurgents, they were *the least neutral*. Collaborating with and mobilising resources from the military was therefore likely to place a local religious leader (regardless of their religious identity) on the opposite side to the Malay insurgents, increasing their risk of being seen as a close ally to the military and of being harmed by the Malay insurgents.

Although being agents of the Thai state, civilian government officials were not at the core of the fighting. Ties with civilian government officials therefore tended to be perceived as *less sensitive* in comparison to those with the military. Civilian government officials, as public servants, appeared to be able to form collaborations with the local constituents, both Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims, in the southernmost provinces, even though only in certain areas, such as education.

Civil society actors appeared to be perceived as *the most neutral* of the three types of actors. Their perceived neutral position derived from being at the farthest distance from the fighting and, more importantly, the closest proximity to the people. Civil society actors were identified

as actors representing the interests of the people rather than of the conflicting parties. Therefore, they were more likely than the military and the civilian government officials to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives by the people, including local religious leaders. Drawing resources for peacebuilding from a civil society actor was then *the least dangerous* in the sense that doing so suggested a (perceived) neutral position of the local religious leader rather than indicating its support for one side of the direct conflicting parties (the military or the insurgents).

The (perceived) neutral or biased position of local religious leaders found in this thesis differed from the neutrality or bias of religious leaders in the study by Harpviken and Røislien (2008), which was determined by their religious identities and affected their ability to build peace. In this case, the (perceived) neutrality or bias of local religious leaders was defined by the identity of the people, i.e., conflict parties or not, whom local religious leaders established ties with. In a sense, the (perceived) neutrality or bias of local religious leaders was not directly associated with their religious identities. Therefore, it is possible, in some cases, to identify the neutrality or bias of religious leaders by looking at the identities of religious leaders' allies or where local religious leaders sat in relation to the conflict - whether they participate in conflict or choose sides in the conflict.

This section has summarised and discussed the key findings of this research as related to civil society, governmental, and military networks and their effects in promoting, restricting and hindering the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict. The next section will lay out this thesis's original contributions to the literature.

9.3 Contributions to the Literature

This study addresses research gaps in the literature, which predominantly focuses on the influence of religious principles for peace and lacks clear conceptualisations of 'religious leader' and 'peacebuilding' that are integrated with a theoretical framework taking into account the specific contexts of study (during or post-conflict). It started filling these research gaps by examining social relations, or networks, which are likely to increase access to material and non-material resources with the potential to improve the peacebuilding capacity of religious leaders (Appleby, 2008; Sisk, 2011a), and by creating a rigorous research design for an empirical study to test the predicted outcome in the single case of the Deep South of Thailand. This thesis offers a specific research focus on *the peacebuilding of local religious scholars and/or spiritual leaders in conflict*. The following are the original contributions this thesis makes to the peace and conflict literature and to Thai studies.

Peace and Conflict Studies

9.3.1. Alternative Theoretical Framework

This thesis provides an alternative theoretical framework for examining the peacebuilding role of religious leaders. It has highlighted bridging networks and systematically traced how bridging networks affect the peacebuilding behaviour of religious leaders in a conflict environment. In the literature, the mainstream explanation for religious leaders' contributions to peacebuilding focuses on the role of religious principles for peace (Abu-Nimer, 2001a, 2003; Appleby, 2000, 2001; Bouta et al., 2005; Gopin, 2000, 2002b; Hertog, 2010), while other factors have not yet been systematically examined. As Harpviken and Røislien (2008, p. 370) suggest, "religion alone is unlikely to create peace, just as it is unlikely to be the main cause of any armed conflict". Aligning with this argument, it is therefore misleading to believe that

religious actors will necessarily build peace. Especially in conflicts heavily influenced by religion, religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding may be difficult, as their religious identities are shared by one of the conflicting parties.

To my knowledge, this is the first empirical case study that uses the behaviour of network members as the analytical framework to examine the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders in a conflict environment. The existing research on bridging networks only focuses on diverse membership as an indication of bridging networks (Cox, 2009; Putnam, 2000). It has not yet examined variation in the behaviour of network members. I have argued in this thesis that the behaviours of network members are critical variables in understanding the impact of bridging networks on the peacebuilding activities of local religious leaders. When examining the behaviours of network members, the analysis has rendered a more nuanced explanation of the effect of bridging networks in a conflict setting, where local religious leaders often may not have the power or flexibility to choose whom they form a relationship with. In the Southern Thailand conflict, local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding appeared to be largely influenced by the relationships with both peaceful and coercive types of actors.

9.3.2 A Rigorous Research Method

To avoid the vague analysis caused by unclear definitions, this study set a definition of 'local religious leader' - a person, who is recognised by a local religious body or community as a spiritual leader and/or teacher providing guidance and inspiration to others based on religious principles and knowledge -, and specified the study context: 'intra-state conflict'. This is an effort to address and take a step further to develop a stronger conceptualisation of peacebuilding by local religious leaders and social networks in a conflict setting, and avoid a conceptual issue that appeared in many conventional studies: unclear definition of religious

leaders. For example, in the volume edited by Sisk (2011a), which contains several case studies on the peacebuilding or conflictive behaviour of religious leaders, the term 'religious leader' variously refers to religiously oriented politicians (Hayward, 2011; Hibbard, 2011; Ishay, 2011; Korostelina, 2011) and religious scholars and/or spiritual leaders (Fitzduff, 2011; Fluehr-Lobban, 2011; Hackett, 2011), who are active in varying levels in conflict (national or local). Therefore, the varying definitions and operative levels of religious leaders reduced the comparability of findings relating to religious leaders' peacebuilding or conflictive behaviour across this volume. In contrast, the findings of this study apply specifically to 'local' religious leaders who are 'religious scholars and/or spiritual leaders' in an intra-state conflict.

I used semi-structured interview questions, which were guided by the theoretical propositions of the thesis, to ensure relevant data was gathered for analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 130). The selection of research participants was also conducted according to clear sampling criteria. Moreover, the data analysis was systematically carried out through a process of thematic analysis driven by the theoretical propositions, which is capable of testing for the presence of expected patterns (Campbell, 1966, 1975; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009) found in the case of the Deep South of Thailand. The flexibility of thematic analysis also allowed me to discover unpredicted themes or other variables (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 1990). These included a sense of safety, limited space for participation, and fear, which are caused by the behaviour of other actors. These variables paint a more complex picture than the expected patterns of the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict.

9.3.3 Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding in Intra-State Conflicts

By using the research framework explained above, I have furthered an understanding of both the opportunities and challenges for peacebuilding which local religious leaders experience in

an intra-state conflict. This study has illustrated the opportunities and challenges presented by key actors in the conflict with whom local religious leaders have established contacts. It has emphasised the importance of a facilitative role of civil society actors in creating opportunities for peacebuilding through the socialisation of local religious leaders and other actors. Some local religious leaders were identified as trustworthy leaders who could guide the locals in a peaceful direction as they were highly-respected and proximate to the local population (Hertog, 2010; Little, 2007). However, they often lacked resources for peacebuilding and awareness of their own peacebuilding potential. Civil society networks were identified as sources of material and non-material resources for peacebuilding, such as financial support, legal knowledge, development strategies, and peacebuilding norms, and more importantly safe operational spaces. It appeared that local religious leaders sought collective partnerships with civil society actors to be able to engage in peacebuilding and civil society actors helped develop their peacebuilding roles and had a shared preference for the bottom-up peacebuilding approach. As Appleby (2008) suggests, the peacebuilding capacity of local religious leaders could be improved by forming partnerships with civil society organisations as partnerships allow local religious leaders to access civil society resources. Particularly in this context, civil society networks generated safe spaces, which were important non-material resources, for local religious leaders to reveal their preferences for peace. Such an ability to reveal the preferences for peace hardly developed in the absence of these safe spaces due to endemic uncertainty and incentives to conceal preferences.

A coalition with the state could potentially also create an opportunity for peacebuilding. I have demonstrated in Chapter Seven that local religious leaders engaged in education-related activities when governmental actors increased the operational space for religious leaders. Nevertheless, I have addressed challenges related to the behaviour of the state. Little (2011)

and Brewer et al. (2011) argue that the state plays a critical role in creating a political environment in which local religious leaders operate. In the Deep South of Thailand, the government's top-down system seems to marginalise and restrict the operational space of local religious leaders.

Moreover, local religious leaders were affected by fear of danger, which was an important challenge, as demonstrated in Chapter Eight. Paffenholz (2010) suggests that the lack of a safe operative environment, which is largely determined by the state, is likely to discourage non-governmental actors from engaging in peacebuilding. As long as the military continues its suspicion of local Islamic leaders and the militarising of local Buddhist monks, fear will remain as the key factor challenging the peacebuilding potential of local Islamic leaders.

Thai Studies

9.3.4 The Relationship between Local Religious Leaders and the Thai State

As of the contribution of my research to the ongoing academic debates in Thai studies, I have shown the complexity of the 'state' structure in Thailand, which is comprised of civilian government officials and military forces that demonstrated varying behaviours, as articulated in Chapters Seven and Eight, respectively. It is therefore misleading to assume that the Thai state is a unified actor, especially in terms of relationships with locals (Saleh, 2009), and particularly as regards their influence on local religious leaders. This study offers separate examinations of local religious leaders' relationships with civilian government officials and security forces (i.e. soldiers and police), which are lumped into the broad term of 'state officials' in the study by Saleh (2009).

I argue that the relationship with the Thai state does not lead to only negative outcomes such as destroying trust among community members regardless of their religious identities. Islamic villagers becoming suspicious of other villagers, whether Buddhist or Islamic, who have established ties with government officials, as such ties suggest sympathy and/or support for the Thai state (Saleh, 2009). In Chapter 7, I have illustrated some positive outcomes of relationships with civilian government officials. Within a governmental network, local religious leaders have accessed opportunities via seminars and workshops to interact with actors from other religious traditions and engage in education-related peacebuilding activities. Nevertheless, I also addressed the inadequate knowledge government officials had on the role of religion and of religious leaders. This phenomenon may in part have been because the government's manuals for bureaucrats contained inadequate information on local culture and traditions (Tangseefa, 2009).

9.3.5 Policy Implication: State and Civil Society Partnerships for Increasing the Operational Space for Local Religious Leaders

The findings have shown that the operative space for local religious leaders could most optimally be widened by civil society actors, while the state was limited in its ability to do so despite efforts to collaborate with local religious leaders in peacebuilding. In this regard, I argue that civil society actors are key to the improved engagement of local religious leaders in the ongoing conflict environment.

Rather than maintaining the current efforts to establish a direct partnership with local religious leaders, the state may consider forming a partnership with civil society actors to promote local religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding. Considering the limitations related to the narrow focus of the military and the government's top-down nature as well as the biased

position of both actors, generated from their participation in the conflict, the state should consider buying into civil society actors' socialisation approach, which could promote the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders. As suggested in Chapter Six, local religious leaders were willing to form a tie with civil society actors because civil society actors had the shared preference for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach and facilitated the development of the peacebuilding role of local religious leaders via civil society platforms for socialisation. More importantly, embedding in a civil society network manifests a neutral position, which local religious leaders were less likely to encounter in a state network. Because neutrality reduces the risk of being harmed by Malay insurgents, it is likely to increase the operational space for local religious leaders. Nevertheless, there is potentially a challenge for civil society actors to maintain their neutral position when forming a partnership with the state. Further research is therefore needed to identify what kinds of partnership allow civil society actors to maintain their neutral position or prohibit them from doing so.

In the section above, I have articulated the thesis's contributions to the existing pool of knowledge. This thesis has offered (1) a theoretical framework other than the religion-driven framework for the analysis of the peacebuilding practices of local religious leaders, (2) a rigorous research design, (3) a further understanding about the opportunities and challenges that local religious leaders faced in intra-state conflicts, (4) a description of the complex relationships between local religious leaders and the Thai state, which is comprised of two different characteristic actors: the civilian government and military officials, as well as (5) a potential policy implication that may assist with questions of which state actors could improve religious leaders' engagement in peacebuilding in the Deep South of Thailand. I have suggested that a partnership with civil society actors will potentially help state actors widen the operational space for local religious leaders, as they are more likely to form a peacebuilding

collaboration with civil society actors. The next section will present limitation related to research design of this study and suggestions for further research.

9.4 Limitation of the Study and Areas for Further Research

This study has only used the case study method, which has been useful in exploring deeply into, and providing rich and contextualised data on the phenomena of interest. Considering the time limit and budgetary constraints of the PhD project, this method helps answer the research question and follows the purpose of this study, which is to explain how a bridging network affects the peacebuilding behaviour of a local religious leader in the Southern Thailand conflict. However, the single case study method cannot produce a widely generalizable result. It would have been useful to compare the Southern Thailand case to other similar conflict settings in which the peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders is heavily affected by other actors in the conflict and particularly by the religious identities they share with conflict parties. In this case, one would have assessed whether the same types of bridging networks or behaviours of other actors (facilitation/imposition/impairment) would have had similar applicability or outcomes in other cases (George & Bennet, 2005).

It would have also been useful to compare the influence of bridging networks and religious principles for peace, which are traditionally suggested in the previous literature as the important factors inspiring the peacebuilding behaviour of religious leaders (Appleby, 2000; Bouta, et al., 2005; Gopin, 2000, Hertog, 2010, Little, 2007). By doing so, one can potentially identify a similar or different impact of bridging networks and religious principles for peace on the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders, or the relationship between bridging networks and religious principles for peace, in the Deep South of Thailand.

Furthermore, the voice of military forces and police is missing in this thesis. The timing of interviews, which took place immediately after the Thai army seized power in a coup (22 May 2014), created an impediment to recruiting military and/or security force research participants that were willing to participate in this study. Adding the voice of military forces and police could have enabled me to develop more nuanced findings and especially insights into military networks and the approaches military forces and police have used in dealing with local religious leaders in the Deep South.

In this section, I have identified the limitations of my research design and areas for improvement for future research. A comparison between the Southern Thailand case and other other similar conflict settings, or between the influence of bridging networks and religious principles for peace, or interviews with military forces and police would have added beneficial aspects into this study.

9.5 Conclusion

This empirical study has shed light on how social networks influence the peacebuilding of local religious leaders in a conflict setting. Although being aware of the importance of religion in inspiring peaceful behaviour, this study affirms how critical it is to examine the varying behaviour of actors whom local religious leaders have established ties with in order to understand the peacebuilding practice of local religious leaders. It has pointed out that religious leaders are pragmatic actors, who would engage in a peacebuilding activity in a conflict situation only when doing so did not put them in danger. Therefore, ties to other actors, such as the military personnel (the direct conflict party to the Malay insurgents), which might increase the risk of being harmed, cannot promote the peacebuilding of local religious leaders, even though those actors might provide access to resources for peacebuilding. This thesis has

found that local religious leaders in the Deep South of Thailand engaged in socio-economic development (e.g. drug rehabilitation for youth and the development of the Islamic-integrated curriculum), community justice (e.g. legal trainings for Islamic leaders and torture prevention), religious dialogue (e.g. inter-religious camps for students), and community mediation between Buddhist-Muslim communities. Despite the varying scope of these activities, local religious leaders had shown an important step engaging in the important domains of peacebuilding activities,[210] which aim to re-establish tolerance and peaceful coexistence. More importantly, this finding has shed lights on positive contributions and peacebuilding potential of local religious leaders that are often understudied in the existing studies, which mainly focus on local religious leaders' involvement in conflict (McCargo, 2008, 2009; Liow & Pathan, 2006; Jerryson, 2010, 2011; ICG, 2005, 2009, 2012;).

This thesis particularly highlights the importance of non-material resources, especially safe spaces, which are important conditions for enabling engagement in peacebuilding in ongoing conflict environments. It is hard for local people to reveal preferences for peace in the absence of these safe spaces due to endemic uncertainty and incentives to conceal preferences. In particular, local Islamic leaders and Buddhist monks, who were often seen as insurgent sympathizers and or supporters and targets of insurgent attacks, could not play a proactive role in their communities without risk. However, I have found that, in the context of the Deep South of Thailand, civil society actors were to some extent able to provide safe spaces for local religious leaders to reveal their preference for peace and engage in local peacebuilding initiatives. That was because civil society were perceived to be neutral. State actors or combatants will struggle in this sense because they may not be perceived as neutral, either

[210] The five domains of peacebuilding activities are community mediation, community security and justice, socio-economic development, inclusive governance, and reconciliation via religious dialogue. As articulated in Chapter Three, they are created based on the conceptualisation of sustainable peacebuilding.

because they have not been in the Deep South long enough to establish trust or because their participation in the conflict compromises this perception of neutrality. In this respect, allying with civil society actors therefore suggests the (perceived) neutral position of local religious leaders, which largely helps reduce the risk of being attacked by the direct conflict parties, the Thai military and the Malay insurgents.

Bibliography

Abu-Nimer, M. (2001a). Conflict resolution, culture, and religion: Toward a training model of interreligious peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research, 38*(6), 685-704.

Abu-Nimer, M. (2001b). Education for Coexistence in Israel: Potential and Challenges. In M. Abu-Nimer (Ed.), *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice* (pp. 235-254). Maryland: Lexington Books.

Abu-Nimer, M. (2002). The miracles of transformation through interfaith dialogue: Are you a believer? In D. R. Smock (Ed.), *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Abu-Nimer, M. (2003). *Nonviolence and peace building in Islam: Theory and practice*: University Press of Florida.

Abu-Nimer, M. (2004). Religion, Dialogue, and Non-Violent Actions in Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17*(3), 491-511.

Abu-Nimer, M., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace & Change, 33*(4), 549-581.

Abu-Nimer, M., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace and Change, 13*(4), 549-581.

Abu-Nimer, M., Khoury, A., & Welty, E. (2007). *Unity in diversity: interfaith dialogue in the Middle East*: US Institute of Peace Press.

Abuza, Z. (2009). *Conspiracy of Silence* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Achen, C. H., & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. *World Politics, 41*(02), 143-169.

Al Qurtuby, S. (2013). Peacebuilding in Indonesia: Christian–Muslim Alliances in Ambon Island. *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 24*(3), 349-367.

Alger, C. F. (2002). Religion as a peace tool. *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1*(4), 94-109.

Allan, P., & Keller, A.(Eds.) (2006). *What is a Just Peace?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, M. B. (1999a). *Do No Harm: how aid can support peace or war*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Anderson, M. B. (1999b). Village Rehabitation: Supporting Local Rebuilding in Somalia. In M. B. Anderson (Ed.), *Do No Harm: how aid can support peace or war* (pp. 131-142). Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Anderson, M. B., Brown, D., & Jean, I. (2012). *Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid*. Massachusetts: Cambridge.

Anderson, M. B., & Woodrow, P. J. (1989). *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster* Colorado: Westview Press.

Anurugsa, P. (1984). *Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of the Malay Muslim Minority* (PhD), University of Texas at Austin.

Aphornsuvan, T. (2006). Nation-state and the Muslim identity in the southern unrest and violence. In I. Yusuf & L. P. Schmidt (Eds.), *Understanding conflict and approaching peace in Southern Thailand* (pp. 92-127). Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Aphornsuvan, T. (2006). Nation-State and the Muslim Identity in the Southern Unrest and Violence In I. Yusuf & L. P. Schmidt (Eds.), *Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand* Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Aphornsuvan, T. (2007). *Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories*. Washington: East-West Center Washington.

Appleby, R. S. (2000). *The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation*: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Incorporated.

Appleby, R. S. (2001). Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (pp. 821-840). Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Appleby, R. S. (2003a). Catholic Peacebuilding. *America, 189,* 12-15.

Appleby, R. S. (2003b). Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding. In D. Johnston (Ed.), *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (pp. 231-258). New York: Oxford University Press.

Appleby, R. S. (2008). Building Sustainable Peace: The Roles of Local and Transnational Religious Actors In T. Banchoff (Ed.), Religious Pluralism, Globalisation, and the World Politics. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press.

Askew, M. (2007). *Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand's Deep South* Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Assefa, H. (1996). Peace and reconciliation as a paradigm: A philosophy of peace and its implications for conflict, governance and economic growth in Africa. *Peacemaking and democratisation in Africa: theoretical perspectives and church initiatives. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers*, 42-71.

Atkinson, R., & Flint, J. (2001). Social Research Update. *Department of Sociology, University of Surrey*.

Barnes, C. (2006). Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War and Building Peace. *European Centre for Conflict Prevention*(2).

Barnes, J. A. (1954). *Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish*: Plenum New York.

Barnes, J. A. (1972). *Social Networks* (Vol. 26): Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Bartoli, A. (2004). Christianity and Peacebuilding. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 147-166). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines*: University of Michigan Press.

Belloni, R. (2009). Shades of orange and green: Civil society and the peace process in Northern Ireland. In M. Cox (Ed.), *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks* (pp. 5-21). New York: Routledge.

Bercovitch, J., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2009). Religion and mediation: The role of faith-based actors in international conflict resolution. *International Negotiation, 14*(1), 175-204.

Berg, B. L., & Lune, H. (2004). *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences* (Vol. 5): Pearson Boston.

Boonlong, F. R. (2007). The Language Rights of The Malay Minority in Thailand. *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, 1*, 47-63.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital (R. Nice, Trans.). In J. E. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-258): Greenward Press.

Bouta, T., Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, S., & Abu-Nimer, M. (2005). *Faith-Based Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim, and Multi-Faith Actors*. Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*: UN.

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*: Sage.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3*(2), 77-101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Brewer, J., Higgins, G., & Teeney, F. (2011). *Religion, Civil Society, and Peace in Northern Ireland*: Oxford University Press.

Brounéus, K. (2011). In-depth Interviewing: The process, skill and ethics of interviews in peace research. In K. Höglund & M. Öberg (Eds.), *Understanding peace research: methods and challenges*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Brown, D. (1994). *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Brown, D. (2008). The Ethnic Majority: Benign or Malign? *Nation and Nationalism, 14*(4), 768-788.

Brown, M. E. (Ed.) (1993). *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* Princeton: Princeton University.

Bualuong, A. (2014). *Evaluation report: Promoting the role of civil society in poverty reduction (Faith Community, Kam Pong Tak Wa, Southern border provinces)*. Retrieved from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/sites/default/files/report_kampungtaqwa_ahmadsomboon_0.pdf.

Burke, A. (2012a). *Foreign aid and peripheral conflict: a case study of the far south of Thailand.* University of London.

Burke, A. (2012b). Hollow Words: Foreign Aid and Peacebuilding in Peripheral Conflicts. *Asian Affairs: An American Review, 39*(4), 181-201. doi:10.1080/00927678.2012.705154.

Burt, R. S. (1984). Network items and the general social survey. *Social Networks, 6*(4), 293-339.

Burt, R. S. (1987). A note on missing network data in the general social survey. *Social Networks, 9*(1), 63-73.

Burt, R. S. (1992). The social structure of competition. *Networks and organizations: Structure, form, and action*, 57-91.

Campbell, D. T. (1966). Pattern matching as an essential in distal knowing. *The psychology of Egon Brunswik*, 81-106.

Campbell, D. T. (1975). Degrees of freedom and the case study. *Comparative Political Studies, 8*(2), 178.

Campbell, K. E., & Lee, B. A. (1991). Name generators in surveys of personal networks. *Social Networks, 13*(3), 203-221.

Carl, A. (2003). Supporting local capacities for handling violent conflict: A role for international NGOs. *Occasional Paper, Conciliation Resources, London*.

Chalk, P. (2008). *The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute.

The Challenge of People's College with the Opening Common Space for Permanently Peace Resolution in Patani. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/7627.

Che Man, W. K. (1990). *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Cilliers, J. (2002). Building Bridges for Interfaith Dialogue. In D. R. Smock (Ed.), *Interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Clarke, G. (2006). Faith matters: faith-based organisations, civil society and international development. *Journal of international development, 18*(6), 835-848.

Cohen, N., & Arieli, T. (2011). Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling. *Journal of Peace Research, 48*(4), 423-435.

Coleman, J. S. (1987). Norms as social capital. *Economic imperialism*, 133-155.

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology, 94*, S95-S120.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Colletta, N. J., & Cullen, M. L. (2000). *Violent conflict and the transformation of social capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia* (Vol. 795): World Bank Publications.
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 44*(04), 823-830.
Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap : civil war and development policy*. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13938/567930PUB0brea10Box353739B01PUBLIC1.pdf;sequence=1.
Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cox, M. (2009). *Social capital and peace-building: creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks*: Taylor & Francis US.
Croissant, A. (2005). Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001. *Comtemporary Southeast Asia, 27*(1), 21-43.
De Juan, A. (2008). A Pact with the Devil? Elite Alliances as Bases of Violent Religious Conflicts. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31*(12), 1120-1135.
De Juan, A., & Vüllers, J. (2010). *Religious Peace Activism-The Rational Element of Religious Elites' Decision-Making Processes*. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp130_juan-vuellers.pdf.
Denny, F. M. (2004). Islam and Peacebuilding. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 129-146). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Dibley, T. (2014). *Partnerships, Power and Peacebuilding: NGOs as Agents of Peace in Aceh and Timor-Leste*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Druckman, D. (2005). *Doing research: Methods of inquiry for conflict analysis*. London: Sage.
Ehrlich, R. (2006, December 29). Thai insurgency targets Buddhists. *The Washington Times*, Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/29/20061229120148-2009r/.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of management review, 14*(4), 532-550.
Establishment of Inter-religions Council for Peace in Southern Thailand. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.peace.mahidol.ac.th/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=70.
Fitzduff, M. (2011). Just Enough to Hate - Not Enough to Love: Religious Leaders in Northern Ireland. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 145-168). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Flap, H. (1999). Creation and returns of social capital. A new research program. *Tocqueville Review, 20*, 5-26.
Flap, H. (2002). No man is an island: the research programme of a social capital theory. *Favereau O. and Lazega E.(a cura di), Conventions and Structures. Markets, Networks and Hierarchies, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar*, 29-59.
Flap, H., & Völker, B. (Eds.). (2003). *Creation and returns of social capital*: Routledge.

Fluehr-Lobban, C. (2011). Religion, War, and Peacemaking in Sudan: Shari'a, Identity Politics, and Human Rights. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 105-122). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Forster, R., & Mattner, M. (2007). *Civil society and peacebuilding: Potential, limitations and critical factors*: Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, World Bank.

Fox, J. (2000). Religious Causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities. *International Studies Quarterly, 44*(3), 423-450. doi:10.2307/3014006.

Fox, J. (2003). Ethnoreligious conflict in the Third World: the role of religion as a cause of conflict. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 9*(1), 101-125.

Francis, D. (2002). *People, peace, and power*. London: Pluto.

Francis, D., & Ropers, N. (1999). Peace Work by Civil Actors in Post-Communist Societies. *International Negotiation, 4*(3), 529-547.

Funston, J. (2008). *Southern Thailand: the dynamics of conflict*. Washington: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Gaag, M. P. J. v. d. (2005). *Measurement of individual social capital.*

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), pp. 167-191.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. London: Sage.

Galtung, J. (2012). Positive and Negative Peace. In C. P. Webel & J. Johansen (Eds.), *Peace and conflict studies: a reader*. New York: Routledge.

Gandhi, R. (2004). Hinduism and Peacebuilding. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 45-68). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Ganguly, S., & Swami, P. (2011). Piety and Politics: Religious Leadership and the Conflict in Kashmir. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 201-225). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gopin, M. (1997). Religion, violence, and conflict resolution. *Peace & Change, 22*(1), 1.

Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: the future of world religions, violence, and peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gopin, M. (2001). Forgiveness as an Element of Conflict Resolution in Religious Cuntures: Walking the Tightrope of Reconciliation and Justice. In M. Abu-Nimer (Ed.), *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice* (pp. 87-100). Oxford: Lexington Books.

Gopin, M. (2002a). *Holy war, holy peace: How religion can bring peace to the Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gopin, M. (2002b). *The Interaction Between Religion and Culture in Peace and Conflict*: Oxford University Press.

Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. *American Journal of Sociology, 78*(6), 1360-1380.

Grant, P. (2004). Northern Ireland: Religion and the Peace Process. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 261-278). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Groger, L., Mayberry, P. S., & Straker, J. K. (1999). What we didn't learn because of who would not talk to us. *Qualitative Health Research, 9*(6), 829-835.

Grootaert, C., & van Bastelaer, T. (2001). *Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiatives* Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-24.pdf.

Guion, L. A., Diehl, D. C., & McDonald, D. (2011). Conducting an In-depth Interview. Retrieved from http://greenmedicine.ie/school/images/Library/Conducting%20An%20In%20Depth%20Interview.pdf.

Gülen, F. (2004). Tolerance in the Life of the Individual and Society. *Toward a Global Civilization of Love & Tolerance*, 37-46.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitics Conflict* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Haar, G. t. (2005). Religion: source of conflict or resource for peace? In G. t. Haar & J. J. Busuttil (Eds.), *Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence, and Visions for Peace* (pp. 3-34). Leiden: Brill.

Hackett, R. I. J. (2011). Nigeria's Religious Leaders in an Age of Radicalism and Neoliberalism. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 123-144). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Halafoff, A., & Wright-Neville, D. (2009). A missing peace? The role of religious actors in countering terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32*(11), 921-932.

Hancock, L. E., & Mitchell, C. (2012). Between Local and National Peace: Complementarity or Conflict? In L. E. Hancock & C. Mitchell (Eds.), *Local Peacebuilding and National Peace: Interaction Between Grassroots and Elite Processes*. New York: Continuum.

Harish, S. P. (2006). *Changing Conflict Identities: The Case of the Southern Thailand Discord.* Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.

Harish, S. P. (2006). Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the Nature of the Conflict in Southern Thailand. *Contemporary Southest Asia, 28*(1), 48-69.

Harpviken, K. B., & Røislien, H. E. (2008). Faithful brokers? Potentials and pitfalls of religion in peacemaking. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25*(3), 351-373.

Harriss, J., & De Renzio, P. (1997). Policy Arena: 'Missing link'or analytically missing?: The concept of social capital. *Journal of international development, 9*(7), 919-937.

Hashemi, N. (2011). Religious Leaders, Sectarianism, and the Sunni-Shi'a Divide in Islam. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 29-48). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Hayeemasalae, S., & Duerumae, M. (2013). SIx Years Kam Pong Tuk Wa Reducing Conflict in Villages (6 ปี'ชุมชนศรัทธา'สิ่งละอันลดความขัดแย้ง จับต้องได้ที่หมู่บ้าน). *Deep South Journalism School*. Retrieved from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/th/4957 - sthash.oFxvghcP.dpuf.

Haynes, J. (2009). Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47*(1), 52-75.

Hayward, S. (2011). The Spoiler and the Reconciler: Buddhism and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 183-199). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Hertog, K. (2010). *The Complex Reality of Religious Peacebuilding: Conceptual Contributions and Critical Analysis*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Hibbard, S. W. (2011). Egypt and the Legacy of Sectarianism. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 85-104). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Höglund, K., & Öberg, M. (2011). *Understanding peace research: methods and challenges*. New York: Taylor & Francis.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* California University of California Press.
Horstmann, A. (2004). Ethnohistorical Perspectives on Buddhist-Muslim Relations and Coexistence in Southern Thailand: From Shared Cosmos to the Emergence of Hatred? *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 19*(1), 76-99. doi:10.2307/41308025.
Huda, Q.-U., Abu-Nimer, M., Qader, A., & McCandless, E. (2011). Islam, Peacebuilding and Development. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 6*(1), 1-5.
Human Right Watch. (2007). *No one is safe: Insurgent attacks on civilians in Thailand's southern border provinces*. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/08/27/no-one-safe/insurgent-attacks-civilians-thailands-southern-border-provinces.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign affairs, 72*(3), 22-49.
ICG. (2005, May 18). *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/southern-thailand-insurgency-not-jihad.
ICG. (2009, June 20). *Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand.* Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/recruiting-militants-southern-thailand.
ICG. (2012, December 11). *Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South.* Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/thailand-evolving-conflict-south.
ICG. (2016, September 21). *Southern Thailand's Peace Dialogue: No Traction.* Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/southern-thailand-speace-dialogue-no-traction.
Iglesias, S. (2013). *The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Southeast Asia in Focus*. Retrieved from http://eplo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EPLO_CSDN_Background-paper_Role-Civil-Society-Peacebuilding.pdf.
The Inter-religious Council for Peace – Thailand (IRC-Thailand). (2011). Retrieved from http://www.peace.mahidol.ac.th/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=82&Itemid=76.
Irani, G. E. (2011). Between Intolerance and Coexistence: The Vatican, Maronites, and the war in Lebanon *Between Terror and Tolerance* (pp. 49-68): Georgetown University Press.
Isham, J., Kelly, T., & Ramaswamy, S. (2002). *Social capital and economic development: well-being in developing countries*: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Ishay, M. (2011). Globalisation, Religion, and Nationalism in Israel and Palestine. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 69-84). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Jafari, S. (2007). Local religious peacemakers: An untapped resource in US foreign policy. *Journal of International Affairs, 61*(1), 111-XI.
Jantzi, T. L., & Jantzi, V. E. (2009). Development paradigms and peacebuilding theories of change: analysing embedded assumptions in development and peacebuilding. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 5*(1), 65-80.
Jerryson, M. (2009). Appropriating a space for violence: State Buddhism in southern Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40*(01), 33-57.
Jerryson, M. (2010). Militarizing Buddhism: Violence in Southern Thailand. In M. Jerryson & M. Juergensmeyer (Eds.), *Buddhist Warfare* (pp. 181--209): Oup Usa.
Jerryson, M. (2011). *Buddhist fury: religion and violence in southern Thailand* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jha, G. (1997). Patani Muslims in Thailand *Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia and Quest for Identity* (pp. 102-122). New Delhi: National Book Organisation.
Joffe, H. (2012). Thematic Analysis. *Qualitative research methods in mental health and psychotherapy: A guide for students and practitioners, 1*, 210-223.
Johnston, D. (2003a). Introduction: Realpolitik Expanded. In D. Johnston (Ed.), *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (pp. 3-10). New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, D. (Ed.) (2003b). *Faith-based diplomacy: Trumping realpolitik*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, D., & Cox, B. (2003). Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement. In D. Johnston (Ed.), *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (pp. 11-29). New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, D., & Sampson, C. (1995). *Religion: The missing dimension of statecraft*: Oxford University Press, USA.
Johnston, D. M., & Eastvold, J. (2004). History Unrequited: Religion as Provocateur and Pacemaker in the Bosnian Conflict. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 213-242). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Joll, C. M. (2010). Religion and Conflict in Southern Thailand: Beyond Rounding Up the Usual Suspects. *Contemporary Southest Asia, 32*(2), 258-279.
Jory, P. (2007). From "Melayu Patani" to "Thai Muslim": The Spectre of Ethnic Identity in Southern Thailand *Working Paper No. 84*. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1317162.
Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence*: University of California Press.
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Khadiagala, G. (2001). The role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in peace building in northern Uganda. *Report appendix to USAID report, The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace, Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project*.
Klein, J. (2010). *Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand: A Survey of the Thai Electorate in Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani*. Retrieved from https://asiafoundation.org/ publication/democracy-and-conflict-in-southern-thailand-a-survey-of-the-thai-electorate-in-yala-narathiwas-and-pattani/.
Korostelina, K. (2010). Dialogue as a Source of Peaceful Coexistence. In J. L. Esposito & I. Yilmaz (Eds.), *Islam and Peacebuilding: The Gülen Movement* (pp. 103-122). New York: Blue Dome Press.
Korostelina, K. (2011). Religion, War, and Peace in Tajikistan In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 169-182). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Kriesberg, L. (1998). Coexistence and the reconciliation of communal conflicts. In E. Weiner (Ed.), *The handbook of interethnic coexistence* (pp. 182-198). New York: Continuum.
Kriesberg, L. (2001). Changing forms of coexistence. In M. Abu-Nimer (Ed.), *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice* (pp. 47-64). Maryland: Lexington Books.
Kularb, P. (2016). *Reporting Thailand's Southern Conflict: Mediating political dissent*: Routledge.
Le Roux, P. (1998). To Be or Not to Be...: The Cultural Identity of the Jawi (Thailand). *Asian Folklore Studies, 57*(2), 223-255.
Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social capital. *Connections, 22*(1), 28-51.
Lin, N. (2001). *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Liow, J. C. (2006). *Muslim resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, ideology, and politics.* Retrieved from https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/muslim-resistance-southern-thailand-and-southern-philippines-religion-ideology-and-poli.
Liow, J. C. (2009). *Islam, education, and reform in Southern Thailand: tradition and transformation.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Liow, J. C. (2010). Religious Education and Reformist Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces: The Roles of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lutfi Japakiya. *Journal of Islamic Studies, 21*(1), 29-58.
Liow, J. C., & Pathan, D. (2006). *Confronting ghosts: Thailand's shapeless southern insurgency/Joseph Chinyong*. New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
Little, D. (1994). *Sri Lanka: the invention of enmity*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
Little, D. (2007a). Introduction: The Peacemakers in Action by The Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding Program on Religion and Conflict Resolution. In D. Little (Ed.), *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of religion in conflict resolution* (pp. 3-21). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (2007b). Men Who Walked the Street: Father Alex Reid and the Rev. Dr. Roy Magee, Northern Ireland. In D. Little (Ed.), *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution* (pp. 53-96). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (2007c). *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of religion in conflict resolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (2007d). The Power of Organization, Alimamy Koroma, Sierra Leone. In D. Little (Ed.), *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution* (pp. 278-301). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (2007e). Warriors and Brothers: Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye, Nigeria. In D. Little (Ed.), *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of religion in conflict resolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (2011). Religion, Nationalism and Intolerance. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking* (pp. 9-27). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Little, D. (Ed.) (2007). *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of religion in conflict resolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D., & Appleby, R. S. (2004). A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 1-23). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Lynch, C. (2011). Local and global influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 6*(1), 21-34.
Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. *Third World Quarterly, 34*(5), 763-783.
Mahoney, J. (2012). The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences. *Sociological Methods & Research, 41*(4), 570-597.

Marchetti, R., & Tocci, N. (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict. *Global Change, Peace & Security, 21*(2), 201-217.
Marsden, P. V. (1990). Network Data and Measurement. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 435-463.
Marsden, P. V. (2005). Recent developments in network measurement. In P. J. Carrington, M. Granovetter, J. Scott, & S. Wasserman (Eds.), *Models and methods in social network analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCandless, E. (2014). Journal of Peacebuilding and Development. *Peace Review*, *26*(4), 505-509.
McCargo, D. (2005). Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand. *The Pacific Review, 18*(4), 499-519.
McCargo, D. (2007a). Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South. In D. McCargo (Ed.), *Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
McCargo, D. (2008). *Tearing apart the land: Islam and legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
McCargo, D. (2009). Mapping national anxiety *the RUSI, 154*(3), 54-60.
McCargo, D. (2009). The politics of Buddhist identity in Thailand's Deep South: The demise of civil religion? *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40*, 11-32.
McCargo, D. (2010). Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thinking the unthinkable?. *Pacific Affairs, 83*(2), 261-281.
McCargo, D. (2012). *Mapping national anxieties: Thailand's southern conflict*: NIAS Press.
McCargo, D. (2012). Southern Thailand: The trouble with autonomy. In M. A. Miller (Ed.), *Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia* (pp. 217-234). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
McCargo, D. (Ed.) (2007b). *Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
McCargo, D., & Pathmanand, U. (2005). *The Thaksinization of Thailand*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
McDuie-Ra, D., & Rees, J. A. (2010). Religious actors, civil society and the development agenda: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. *Journal of international development, 22*(1), 20-36.
Melvin, N. J. (2007). *Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., & Woodhouse, T. (1999). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflict* Oxford: Blackwell.
Mitchell, J. C. (1969). *Social Networks in Urban Situations: Analyses of Personal Relationships in Central African towns.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Morris, C. (2004). Case Studies in Religion and Peacebuilding: Cambodia. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 191-211). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Muhammad, A. B. (2016). Opened! The Mediation Centre for Muslim Familiy Matters in the Southern Border region (เปิดแล้ว! ศูนย์ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทครอบครัวมุสลิมชายแดนใต้ หลังขับเคลื่อนมานานข้ามปี). *Fatonionline*. Retrieved from http://www.fatonionline.com/1665.
Nadel, S. F. (1957). *The Theory of Social Structure.* Oxon: Routledge.
Nannestad, P., Lind Haase Svendsen, G., & Tinggaard Svendsen, G. (2008). Bridge Over Troubled Water? Migration and Social Capital. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34*(4), 607-631.

National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). (2006). *Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation*. Retrieved from http://thailand.ahrchk.net/docs/nrc_report_en.pdf.

Neumaier, E. K. (2004). Miss Opportunities: Buddhism and the Ethnic Strife in Sri Lanka and Tibet. In H. Coward & G. S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (pp. 69-92). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Nguyen, T. D. (Ed.) (2008). *The Thai Challenge: Unity, Stability and Democracy in Times of Uncertainty*. New York: Nova Science.

Nixon, H., & Ponzio, R. (2007). Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The Statebuilding Agenda and International Engagement. *International Peacekeeping, 14*(1), 26-40.

Ntale, F. K. (2012). Religious Actors and the Agenda for Peace in Northern Uganda,The Journal of social, political, and economic studies. *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 37*(3), 322-346.

O-In, A. (2012). *Partnership of International Funding Agencies and Civil Society Organizations in Peace Building Process in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.* Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

OECD. (2008). *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Working Draft for Application Period*. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39774573.pdf.

Orjuela, C. (2008). What Can Civil Society Do for Peace? Theoretical Debates and Dilemmas *The identity politics of peacebuilding: Civil society in war-torn Sri Lanka*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited.

Paffenholz, T. (2003). *Community-based Bottom-up Peacebuilding: The Development of the Life and Peace Institute's Approach to Peacebuilding and Lessons Learned from the Somalia Experience (1990-2000)*: Life & Peace Institute.

Paffenholz, T. (2009). *Civil Society and Peacebuilding*. Retrieved from https://www.sfcg.org/events/pdf/CCDP_Working_Paper_4-1%20a.pdf.

Paffenholz, T. (2010). Civil Society and Peacebuilding. In T. Paffenholz (Ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (pp. 43-64). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Paffenholz, T. (Ed.) (2010). *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Paffenholz, T., Spurk, C., Belloni, R., Kurtenbach, S., & Orjuela, C. (2010). Enabling and Disenabling Factors for Civil Society Peacebuilding In T. Paffenholz (Ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (pp. 405-424). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Palm-Dalupan, M. L. (2005). The Religious Sector Building Peace: Some Examples from the Philippines In G. t. Haar & J. J. Busuttil (Eds.), *Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence, and Visions for Peace* (pp. 225-274). Leiden: Brill.

Pathan, D. (2012, October 18). *Conflict Management and Resolution in Asia: The Role of Civil Societies in Thailand's Deep South*. Retrieved from https://asiafoundation.org/publication/conflict-management-and-resolution-in-asia-the-role-of-civil-societies-in-thailands-deep-south/.

Pathmanand, U. (2007). Thaksin's achilles' heel: The failure of hawkish approaches in the Thai South. In D. McCargo (Ed.), *Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence* Singapore: National University of Singapore.

Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods 3ed.* Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.

Patton, M. Q., & Cochran, M. (2002). A guide to using qualitative research methodology Retrieved from https://evaluation.msf.org/sites/evaluation/files/a_guide_to_using_qualitative_research_methodology.pdf.

Peow, S. H. (2009). Politics of Religious and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines. *Journal of International Social Research, 2*(9).
Pickering, P. M. (2006). Generating social capital for bridging ethnic divisions in the Balkans: Case studies of two Bosniak cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29*(1), 79-103.
Pitsuwan, S. (1982). *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand.* (PhD), Harvard University, Massachusettes.
Ponzio, R. J. (2007). Transforming political authority: UN democratic peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 13*(2), 255-275.
Portes, A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology, 24*, 1-24.
Prachathai. (7 September 2016). BRN Claims Responsibility for Recent Bombings, Including Mother's Day Attack.
Puengnetr, P., & Pathan, D. (2013, April 29). NSC rebuts BRN demand. *The Nation*, Retrieved from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/NSC-rebuts-BRN-demands-30205006.html.
Puengnetr, P., & Thiosanangwan, P. (2013). M'sia to facilitate negotiations with south insurgents. *the Nation*.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *Journal of Democracy, 6*(1), 65-78.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rahimmula, C. (2003). Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and Terrorist Movement in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand. *Songklanakarin Journal of Social Science and Humanities, 10*(1), 98-112.
Reich, H. (2006). *"Local Ownership" in Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation Or Patronage?* Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CDDB393F195EC54EC125727A005937C3-Berghof-peace%20building-Sep2006.pdf.
Reuters. (1 September 2016). Thai Government to Resume Peace Talks with Muslim Insurgents.
Reychler, L. (1997). Religion and conflict. *International Journal of Peace Studies, 2*(1), 19-38.
Reychler, L., & Paffenholz, T. (2001). *Peacebuilding : a field guide*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner.
Richmond, O. P. (2005). *The transformation of peace.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke.
Richmond, O. P. (2011). *A post-liberal peace.* Oxon: Routledge.
Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2011). *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data*: Sage.
Saleh, R. (2009). "New" relations: Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost provinces. In C. Satha-Anand (Ed.), *Imagined Land?: State and Southern Violence in Thailand* (pp. 145-164): Research Institute for Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa.
Sampson, C. (1997). Religion and Peacebuilding. In I. W. Zartman (Ed.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (pp. 273-323). Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Sandal, N. (2011). Religious actors as epistemic communities in conflict transformation: the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland. *Review of International Studies, 37*, 929-949.

Sandal, N. (2017). The Philippines: Interfaith Religious Epistemic Communities in Conflict Mediation. In *Religious Leaders and Conflict Transformation: Northern Ireland and Beyond* (pp. 145-147). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Saniwa, S. (2009). Ethnic Minority Movements in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective of the Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand and the Thai Buddhists in Northern Malaysia, 1999-2009.

Satha-Anand, C., Daigaku, T. G., & Kenkyūjō, A. A. G. B. (2009). *Imagined Land?: The state and southern violence in Thailand*: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Afrika, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Schirch, L. (2001). Ritual reconciliation: Transforming identity/reframing conflict. In M. Abu-Nimer (Ed.), *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice* (pp. 145-161). Maryland: Lexington Books.

Schneier, A. (2002). Religion and interfaith conflict: Appeal of conscience foundation. In D. R. Smock (Ed.), *Interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding*: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Sisk, T. D. (2011a). *Between terror and tolerance: Religious leaders, conflict, and peacemaking*. Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press.

Sisk, T. D. (2011b). Conclusion: from terror to tolerance to coexistence in deeply divided societies In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between terror and tolerance: religious leaders, conflict, and peacemaking* (pp. 227-239). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Sisk, T. D. (2011c). Introduction: Religious leaders, conflict, and peacemaking. In T. D. Sisk (Ed.), *Between terror and tolerance: Religious leaders, conflict, and peacemaking* (pp. 1-8). Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press.

Smith, D. (2004). *Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: Getting their act together, Evaluation report, 1.* Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf.

Smock, D. R. (2002). Introduction. In D. R. Smock (Ed.), *Interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding* (pp. 3-11). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Smock, D. R. (Ed.) (2006). *Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Staniland, P. (2012). Between a rock and a hard place: Insurgent fratricide, ethnic defection, and the rise of pro-state paramilitaries. *Journal of conflict resolution, 56*(1), 16-40.

Staniland, P. (2014). *Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Storey, I. (2007). Ethnic Separatism in Southern Thailand: Kingdom Fraying at the Edge?. Retrieved from http://apcss.org/ethnic-separatism-in-southern-thailand/.

Storey, I. (2008). Southern Discomfort: Separatist Conflict in the Kingdom of Thailand *Asian Affairs, an American Review, 35*(1), 31-51.

Suhrke, A. (1970-1971). The Thai Muslims: Some Aspects of Minority Integration. *Pacific Affairs, 43*(4), 531-547.

Svensson, I. (2009). Who brings which peace? Neutral versus biased mediation and institutional peace arrangements in civil wars. *Journal of conflict resolution, 53*(3), 446-469.

Svensson, I. (2013). *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars.* Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Syukri, I. (1985). *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani* (C. Bailey & J. N. Miksic, Trans.). Ohio: Ohio University.

Tan, A. (2002). The New Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It. In U. Johannen, A. Smith, & J. Gomez (Eds.), *Post September 11: Political Freedoms in Asia*. Singapore: Select Publishing.

Tangseefa, D. (2009). Reading "Bureaucrat Manuals", writing cultural space: The Thai state's cultural discources and the Thai-Malay in-between spaces. In C. Satha-Anand (Ed.), *Imagined Land?: State and Southern Violence in Thailand*: Research Institute for Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa.

The Nation. (2006a, June 25). Prem disagrees with proposed use of Malay as official language. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/06/25/headlines/headlines_30007268.

The Nation. (2006b, June 26). Govt backs Prem against use of Malay by Officials. *The Nation*.

The Nation. (2013a, May 3). 'Peace process' will unravel as truth emerges. *The Nation*.

The Nation. (2013b, March 3). Violent response suggests peace deal was too hasty: Senior govt officials should have known the insurgents are spilt into many groups. *The Nation*.

Theros, M. (2012). *Understanding Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Operations in Afghanistan*. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/09522.pdf.

Thiessen, C., Byrne, S., Skarlato, O., & Tennent, P. (2010). Civil society leaders and Northern Ireland's peace process: Hopes and fears for the future. *Humanity & Society, 34*(1), 39-63.

Trochim, W. M. K. (1989). Outcome Pattern Matching and Program Theory. *Evaluation and program planning, 12*(4), 355-366.

UCDP. (2017). *The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)*: *Definitions*. Retrieved from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

UN. (2010, October). *Peacebuilding Review*. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/pb_review_20101022.pdf.

Unger, B., & Wils, O. (2007). Systemic conflict transformation and inclusive governance in Southern Sudan. *Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, Berlin*.

Uvin, P. (2002). The development/peacebuilding nexus: a typology and history of changing paradigms. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 1*(1), 5-24.

van Leeuwen, M. (2009). *Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-Society Peacebuilding*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Varshney, A. (1993). Contested Meaning: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety. *Daedulus, 122*(3), 227-261.

Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Vervisch, T., & Titeca, K. (2010). Bridging community associations in post-conflict Burundi: the difficult merging of social capital endowments and new 'institutional settings'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 48*(3), 485-511.

Vogt, W. P., & Johnson, R. B. (2011). *Dictionary of Statistics & Methodology: A Nontechnical Guide for the Social Sciences: A Nontechnical Guide for the Social Sciences.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wahari, H. (14 October 2016). Southern Thailand: Rebels Commit to Peace Talks Despite BRN Rift.

Waldman, M. (2008). Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *Oxfam International*.

Wardak, M., Zaman, I., & Nawabi, K. (2007). *The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan: Case Studies From Sayedabad & Kunduz*: Cooperation for Peace and Unity.

Weiner, E. (1998). Coexistence work: A new profession. In E. Weiner (Ed.), *The handbook of interethnic coexistence* (pp. 13-24). New York: Continuum.

Wellman, B. (1983). Network Analysis: Some Basic Principles. *Sociological theory*, 155-200.

Welty, E. (2014). Faith-based Peacebuilding and Development: An Analysis of the Mennonite Central Committee in Uganda and Kenya. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9*(2), 65-70.

Woolcock, M. (1998). Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework. *Theory and Society, 27*(2), 151-208. doi:10.2307/657866.

Yegar, M. (2002). Part Two: The Patani Muslims *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar* (pp. 73-181). Maryland: Lexington Books.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (Fourth ed.). Califonia: Sage publications.

Yusuf, I. (2006). The ethno-religious dimension of the conflict in Southern Thailand In I. Yusuf & L. P. Schmidt (Eds.), *Understanding conflict and approaching peace in southern Thailand* (pp. 169-190). Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Yusuf, I. (2007a). *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*. Washington: East-West Center.

Yusuf, I. (2007b). The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 27*(2), 319-339.

Yusuf, I. (2013). Islam and Buddhism. In C. Cornille (Ed.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Inter-Religious Dialogue* (pp. 360-375). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Appendix A – Information Sheet for Research Participants



Contributions of religious leaders to peacebuilding in conflict settings: Investigating the importance of social networks in Southern Thailand

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.

What is the Aim of the Project?

This is a research project undertaken for the completion of a doctoral degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago, New Zealand. This research project focuses on the impact of social networks on peacebuilding activities of Buddhist and Islamist leaders in the Southern Thailand conflict. It aims to identify a characteristic profile of local religious leaders who are more likely to play supportive roles in restoration of peace. It also seeks to indicate beneficial or harmful social networks in which religious leaders are embedded in order to further build or alter such networks to support and improve their peacebuilding initiatives.

What Types of Participants are being sought?

This research project involves individual interviews of at least 12 Buddhist and Islamist leaders. All participants must be aged over 21, and mainly based and involved in peace activism in the southernmost provinces of Thailand; Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Songkla.

Participation to this research project is completely volunteer. You will not receive any tangible benefits or rewards from participating in the research. However, your contributions to the project will likely to be acknowledged in the PhD dissertation of the researcher, and possibly in journal publications and at conferences. If you wish, you may ask for a copy of the said publications. You are also welcome to suggest ways in which the collaboration in this project could be most beneficial for your local community.

What will Participants be Asked to Do?

Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in the interviews. The researcher, Ajirapa Pienkhuntod, and an interpreter/translator will be present during the interviews. The interview will take one or two hours of time. The researcher and you will negotiate together the time and the venue of the interview, and you may ask a person of your choice to be present if this may make you comfortable.

The interview will take the form of a conversation between you and the researcher. You are welcome to not answer questions that could make you uncomfortable for any reason, and no disadvantage will come to you if you choose to do so.

Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it?

During the interview, we will discuss different topics such as peacebuilding activities/initiatives, their positive and negative outcomes, actors involved the peacebuilding activities/initiatives, relationships between different actors, and how the relationships influence peacebuilding activities/initiatives. Different perspectives and opinions of participants will be accounted and compared.

With your consent, our interview will be audio recorded (if not the researcher will take notes). It then will be analysed and discussed mainly in the doctoral dissertation of the researcher. No commercial use will be made with the data collected. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) and may be also published in journal articles and presented at conferences. Every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity unless you require otherwise.

On the Consent Form you will be given options regarding your anonymity. Please be aware that should you wish we will make every attempt to preserve your anonymity. However, with your consent, there are some cases where it would be preferable to attribute contributions made to individual participants. It is absolutely up to you which of these options you prefer. If you wish to not remain anonymous, please indicate so in the Consent Form.

Only the researcher, Ajirapa Pienkhuntod, and the translator/interpreter who will be present at the time of the interview will have access to personal information such as names and contact details. The supervisors of the researcher, Dr. SungYong Lee, will have access to the audio recordings of the interviews, but not to the names and contact details. You can find his details at the bottom of this information sheet.

The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned below will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for 5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants such as contact details, audio recordings, transcriptions and notes, may be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely.

You will have the opportunity to correct or withdraw the data that you have provided until the completion of the project. You will be provided with a copy of the published results if you wish so.

This project involves an open-questioning technique. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics

Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be used.

In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project?

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

What if Participants have any Questions?

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either:

Ajirapa Pienkhuntod (researcher)

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago

University telephone number: +64 3 479 4546

Email: pieaj574@student.otago.ac.nz

And;

Dr. SungYong Lee (supervisor)

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago

University Telephone Number: +64 3 479 4547

Email: sungyong.lee@otago.ac.nz

This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.

(Thai Language)



บทบาทผู้นำศาสนาในการสร้างสันติภาพในสามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้: ผลกระทบจากความสัมพันธ์และเครือข่ายทางสังคมระหว่างผู้นำศาสนาและตัวแสดงต่างๆ

ข้อมูลสำหรับผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์

ขอขอบพระคุณทุกคนที่ให้ความร่วมมือในโครงการวิจัยนี้ กรุณาอ่านข้อความข้างล่างนี้ก่อนให้สัมภาษณ์ ภายหลังจากการอ่านข้อความนี้ หากท่านต้องการถอนตัวจากการให้สัมภาษณ์ ท่านจะไม่สูญเสียประโยชน์ใดๆทั้งสิ้น

วัตถุประสงค์ของโครงการวิจัย

โครงการวิจัยนี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาปริญญาเอก สาขาสันติภาพและความความขัดแย้ง มหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก เมืองดูนีดิน ประเทศนิวซีแลนด์ โดยมุ่งเน้นศึกษาผลกระทบของความสัมพันธ์หรือเครือข่ายสังคม (social relations/networks) ต่อบทบาทผู้นำศาสนาท้องถิ่นในการสร้างสันติภาพในสามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ เพื่อค้นหาและเสนอแนะว่าผู้นำศาสนาและเครือข่ายสังคมแบบใดที่จะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่ความรุนแรง

คุณลักษณะของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์

โครงการวิจัยนี้มีความประสงค์ที่จะสัมภาษณ์ผู้นำศาสนาท้องถิ่น จำนวนอย่างน้อย 12 ท่าน รวมถึงตัวแสดงอื่นๆ ที่ทำงานด้านสันติภาพในพื้นที่ เช่น นักวิชาการ นักพัฒนา (activists/NGOs/CSOs) และเจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่ายการเมืองการ

ปกครองท้องถิ่น จำนวนอย่างน้อย 9 ท่าน โดยผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์จะต้องมีอายุอย่างน้อย 21 ปี และพำนักอยู่ในพื้นที่เขตจังหวัดปัตตานี นราธิวาส ยะลา และสงขลา ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ต้องเข้าร่วมโดยสมัครใจเท่านั้น และจะไม่ได้รับค่าตอบแทนใดๆ จากการเข้าร่วมสัมภาษณ์ แต่อย่างไรก็ตาม การให้ความอนุเคราะห์และความร่วมมือของท่านเหล่านี้จะได้รับการอ้างถึงในวิทยานิพนธ์ของผู้วิจัย รวมถึงในเอกสารตีพิมพ์และการประชุมทางวิชาการที่ผู้วิจัยอาจจะมีส่วนร่วมในอนาคต หากท่านมีข้อแนะนำต่างๆ ที่จะทำให้งานวิจัยนี้เป็นประโยชน์กับชุมชนของท่านได้ กรุณาแจ้งผู้วิจัย

หน้าที่ของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์

1. หากท่านยินดีเข้าร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ ท่านจะถูกถามคำถามและขอให้ข้อมูลแก่ผู้วิจัย โดยบางครั้งอาจผ่านผู้แปลภาษาหรือล่าม ทั้งนี้ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์และผู้วิจัยจะตกลงร่วมกัน เกี่ยวกับวันเวลาและสถานที่ของการสัมภาษณ์ และหากผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ต้องการ สามารถให้มีบุคคลหนึ่งอยู่ด้วยระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์ ซึ่งช่วยสร้างความอุ่นใจให้แก่ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ได้

2. การสัมภาษณ์นี้จะเป็นไปในลักษณะการพูดคุยหระหว่างผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์และผู้วิจัย โดยผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์อาจปฏิเสธที่จะตอบคำถามใดๆที่สร้างความอึดอัดใจให้แก่ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์

3. หากผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ตัดสินใจถอนตัวจากการสัมภาษณ์ จะไม่มีความเสียหายใดๆเกิดขึ้นต่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์

ข้อมูลการสัมภาษณ์และการใช้ประโยชน์ของข้อมูล

1. ในระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์ ผู้วิจัยจะถามคำถามและพูดคุยในหลากหลายหัวข้อ เช่น กิจกรรมการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่ฯ ผลกระทบด้านบวกและด้านลบ ตัวแสดงต่างๆ ที่เกี่ยวข้อง และผลกระทบของเครือข่ายทางสังคมของตัวแสดงเหล่านั้นต่อกิจกรรมการสร้างสันติภาพ โดยคำตอบและข้อมูลเหล่านี้จะถูกรวบรวมไว้ทั้งหมด

2. หากผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ยินยอม บทสนทนาเหล่านี้จะถูกบันถึงในรูปแบบการอัดเสียงและจดบันทึก และจะนำไปวิเคราะห์ต่อไปในวิทยานิพนธ์ของผู้วิจัย ซึ่งจะถูกตีพิมพ์และเผยแพร่ โดยมหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก ประเทศนิวซีแลนด์ รวมถึงบทความและการประชุมทางวิชาการด้วย อย่างไรก็ตามจะไม่มีการนำข้อมูลเหล่านี้ไปใช้เพื่อผลประโยชน์ทางการค้าอื่นๆ การตีพิมพ์และเผยแพร่จะเป็นไปโดยสงวนนามของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ หากผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ต้องการให้แสดงนามของตน กรุณาแจ้งผู้วิจัย

3. ท่านสามารถระบุว่าต้องการสงวนนามหรือไม่ ในแบบฟอร์มการให้ความยินยอมร่วมือในการให้สัมภาษณ์อีกฉบับหนึ่ง

4. ข้อมูลส่วนตัวของท่านจะถูกเผยแพร่ระหว่างผู้วิจัยและล่ามเท่านั้น โดยอาจารย์ผู้ดูแลของผู้วิจัย (supervisors) จะสามารถเข้าถึงเฉพาะบทสนทนาระหว่างผู้วิจัยและผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์เท่านั้น ท่านสามารถอ่านรายละเอียดของอาจารย์ผู้ดูแลฯได้ที่ท้ายเอกสารนี้

5. บันทึกข้อมูลจากการสัมภาษณ์จะถูกเก็บไว้อย่างมิดชิด มีระบบคุ้มกันอย่างแน่นหนา เป็นเวลา 5 ปี ส่วนข้อมูลส่วนตัว เช่น ชื่อ เบอร์ติดต่อ และบทสนทนาของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ จะถูกทำลายเมื่อโครงการวิจัยปริญญาเอกนี้เสร็จสิ้น

6. ท่านสามารถแก้ไขหรือยกเลิกข้อมูลของท่านได้ทุกเมื่อ ก่อนที่โครงการวิจัยปริญญาเอกนี้จะเสร็จสิ้น และท่านสามารถขอสำเนาผลการวิจัยได้หากท่านต้องการ

7. การสัมภาษณ์จะใช้คำถามปลายเปิด ฉะนั้นจึงไม่สามารถแสดงรายละเอียดของคำถามได้ล่วงหน้า และมหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโกไม่สามารถพิจารณาตรวจสอบคำถามได้ทั้งหมด หากท่านรู้สึกอึดอัดที่จะตอบคำถามใดๆ ท่านสามารถหลีกเลี่ยงการตอบคำถามนั้นๆ ได้โดยจะไม่มีความสูญเสียใดๆเกิดขึ้นแก่ท่าน

การถอนตัวจากการสัมภาษณ์

ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์สามารถถอนตัวจากการให้สัมภาษณ์ได้ทุกเมื่อ โดยจะไม่มีความสูญเสียใดๆเกิดขึ้นแก่ท่าน

ผู้วิจัยและอาจารย์ผู้ดูแล

หากท่านมีคำถามเพิ่มเติม ท่านสามารถติดต่อได้ที่

นางสาวอจิรภาส์ เพียรขุนทด (ผู้วิจัย)

สถาบันศึกษาด้านสันติภาพและความขัดแย้ง

มหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก ประเทศนิวซีแลนด์

เบอร์ติดต่อ +64 3 479 4546

อีเมล์ pieaj574@student.otago.ac.nz

และ

นายซองยอง ลี (อาจารย์ผู้ดูแล)

สถาบันศึกษาด้านสันติภาพและความขัดแย้ง

มหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก ประเทศนิวซีแลนด์

เบอร์ติดต่อ +64 3 479 4547

อีเมล์ sungyong.lee@otago.ac.nz

โครงการวิจัยนี้ได้รับการอนุมัติจากมหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก หากท่านมีข้อกังวลใดๆ กรุณาโทรติดต่อ +64 3 479 8256 หรืออีเมล์ gary.witte@otago.ac.nz ข้อกังวลของท่านจะถูกตรวจสอบอย่างเป็นความลับ และจะแจ้งผลให้ท่านทราบต่อไป

Appendix B – Consent Form



Contributions of religious leaders to peacebuilding in conflict settings: Investigating the importance of social bonding and bridging in Southern Thailand

CONSENT FORM FOR
PARTICIPANTS

I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.

I know that:

1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary;

2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;

3. Personal identifying information such as names and contact details will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years;

4. This project involves an open-questioning technique. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. In the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind.

5. I will immediately inform the researcher if I find myself in a state of distress or anxiety during the interview.

6. I have been informed that this project has been partially funded by a contribution of the National Centre of Peace and Conflict Studies and that there will no commercial use of the data. I understand that there will be no payment or reward for my participation in this project.

7. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity should I choose to remain anonymous.

8. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research, ☐ OR;

b) would rather remain anonymous ☐

I agree to take part in this project.

....

(Signature of participant) (Date)

.....

(Printed Name)

This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.

(Thai Language)



บทบาทผู้นำศาสนาในการสร้างสันติภาพในสามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้: ผลกระทบจากความสัมพันธ์และเครือข่ายทางสังคมระหว่างผู้นำศาสนาและตัวแสดงต่างๆ

แบบฟอร์มยินยอมการให้สัมภาษณ์

ข้าพเจ้าได้อ่านและทำความเข้าใจรายละเอียดของโครงการวิจัยนี้ การตอบคำถามข้างล่างนี้เป็นไปด้วยความพอใจของข้าพเจ้า และข้าพเจ้าทราบว่าสามารถขอข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับโครงการวิจัยนี้ได้ทุกเมื่อ

ข้าพเจ้าทราบว่า;

1. ข้าพเจ้าเข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัยนี้โดยความสมัครใจ

2. ข้าพเจ้าสามารถถอนตัวจาการสัมภาษณ์ได้ทุกเมื่อโดยไม่ต้องแจ้งเหตุผล

3. ข้อมูลส่วนตัวของข้าพเจ้า เช่น ชื่อและเบอร์ติดต่อ จะถูกทำลายเมื่อโครงการวิจัยปริญญาเอกนี้เสร็จสิ้น แต่ข้อมูลจากการสัมภาษณ์จะถูกเก็บไว้อย่างมิดชิด มีระบบคุ้มกันอย่างแน่นหนา เป็นเวลาอย่างน้อย 5 ปี

4. การสัมภาษณ์ใช้คำถามปลายเปิด ฉะนั้นรายละเอียดของคำถามจึงไม่สามารถแจ้งล่วงหน้าได้ หากรู้สึกอึดอัดข้าพเจ้าสามารถหลีกเลี่ยงการตอบคำถามนั้น ๆ หรือยกเลิกการให้สัมภาษณ์ได้ โดยจะไม่มีความสูญเสียใดๆ เกิดขึ้น

5. ข้าพเจ้าจะแจ้งผู้วิจัยโดยทันที หากรู้สึกเครียดหรือเกิดข้อกังวลใดๆ ระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์

6. การทำวิจัยนี้ได้รับการสนับสนุนโดยสถาบันศึกษาสันติภาพและความขัดแย้ง มหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก และจะไม่มีการนำข้อมูลวิจัยไปใช้เพื่อผลประโยชน์ทางการค้าอื่นๆ ข้าพเจ้าทราบด้วยว่าจะไม่มีเงินค่าจ้างและของรางวัลเป็นการตอบแทนหรือเป็นการชดเชยจากการเข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัยนี้

7. ผลการวิจัยจะถูกตีพิมพ์และเผยแพร่โดยมหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก ประเทศนิวซีแลนด์ อย่างไรก็ตาม การตีพิมพ์และเผยแพร่จะเป็นไปโดยสงวนนามของข้าพเจ้า หากข้าพเจ้าต้องการ

8. ในฐานะผู้เข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัยนี้

- ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมให้ระบุชื่อในงานตีพิมพ์ต่าง ๆ ที่เกี่ยวข้องกับงานวิจัย ☐ หรือ
- ข้าพเจ้าไม่ยินยอมให้มีการระบุชื่อในรายงานหรือสิ่งพิมพ์ใด ๆ ☐

ข้าพเจ้ายินยอมเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของงานวิจัยนี้

....

(ลายมือชื่อของผู้เข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัย) (วันเดือนปี)

.....

(ชื่อตัวบรรจงผู้เข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัย)

โครงการวิจัยนี้ได้รับการอนุมัติจากมหาวิทยาลัยโอทาโก หากท่านมีข้อกังวลใดๆ กรุณาโทรติดต่อ +64 3 479 8256 หรืออีเมล์ gary.witte@otago.ac.nz ข้อกังวลของท่านจะถูกตรวจสอบอย่างเป็นความลับ และจะแจ้งผลให้ท่านทราบต่อไป

Appendix C – Interview Questions

Interview Questions for Religious Leaders

1. Who are religious leaders?

ผู้นำศาสนา ในความเห็นของท่าน คือใครบ้าง

ท่านคิดว่า ผู้นำศาสนามีบทบาทใดในการลดความรุนแรงและสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่

2. What peacebuilding activities/initiatives are you involved with?

ท่านริเริ่มหรือมีส่วนร่วมในกิจกรรม/โครงการใดเพื่อการลดความรุนแรงและการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่หรือไม่ กิจกรรมหรือโครงการดังกล่าวมีอะไรบ้าง

3. How and why do you initiate/engage in the peacebuilding activities/initiatives?

เพราะเหตุใดท่านถึงริเริ่มหรือมีส่วนร่วมในกิจจกรรมหรือโครงการดังกล่าว

4. What resources do you use/need in your peacebuilding activities/initiatives? Where are they from?

ท่านใช้ทรัพยากรใดหรือคิดว่าสิ่งใดมีความสำคัญ (เช่น กำลังเงิน กำลังวัตถุ แนวคิด คำสอนทางศาสนา หรือเครื่องมืออื่นๆ) ในการดำเนินกิจกรรมหรือโครงการนั้นๆ และท่านได้รับหรือแสวงหาสิ่งนั้นมาจากใคร

5. How do you think (the followers/other religious leaders/the government/the military/international partners/or other actors - depending on who the interviewee is) influence the peacebuilding activities/initiatives?

คุณคิดว่าตัวแสดงใด (เช่น ลูกศิษย์ ผู้นำศาสนาท่านอื่นๆ กลุ่มขบวนการ รัฐ เจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่านความมั่นคง ทหาร ตำรวจ ประชาสังคม องค์กรต่างประเทศ) มีอิทธิพลกระทบหรือชี้นำการกระทำหรือกิจกรรมการสร้างสันติภาพของผู้นำศาสนา

6. How do your followers/other religious leaders/the government/the military/ international partners/etc influence/impact and respond to the peacebuilding activities/initiatives? i.e. support or oppose (overwhelming/massive, moderate, just enough, or none)

กิจกรรม/โครงการของท่านได้รับความสนับสนุน และต่อต้านจากตัวแสดงใด (เช่น ลูกศิษย์ ผู้นำศาสนาท่านอื่นๆ กลุ่มขบวนการ รัฐ เจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่านความมั่นคง ทหาร ตำรวจ ประชาสังคม องค์กรต่างประเทศ) และการสนับสนุน และต่อต้านจากตัวแสดงดังกล่าวมากน้อยแค่ไหน

7. How do you handle/deal with such responses?

ท่านจัดการกับการต่อต้านอย่างไรคะ

8. Who do you think is/would be the most important/useful in your peacebuilding activities/initiatives? Why?

ท่านคิดว่าตัวแสดงใดมีความสำคัญที่สุดในกิจกรรม/โครงการ/ความพยายามของท่านในการลดความรุนแรงและสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่ และเพราะเหตุใดจึงคิดเช่นนั้น

9. On a scale of 1 – 10 with 10 being the most positive, how would you describe the peacebuilding role of religious leaders?

หากขอให้ท่านให้คะแนน บทบาทของผู้นำศาสนาในการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่ในขณะนี้ จากเต็มสิบ ท่านคิดว่า ท่านให้กี่แต้มคะ

10. Do you have any suggestions or other comments on the roles of religious leaders in peacebuilding in the Deep South?

คุณมีความคิดเห็นอื่นๆเกี่ยวกับบทบาทของผู้นำศาสนาในการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่สามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้หรือไม่

Interview Questions for Activists, Scholars, and Government Officials

1. Who are religious leaders?

ผู้นำศาสนา สำหรับคุณ คือใครบ้าง

2. Do you know any examples that religious leaders play significant roles in peace-promoting activities (such as education or community reconciliation programmes) in your province (district)? If yes, what are they?

คุณรู้จักผู้นำศาสนาคนไหน (ในเขตพื้นที่ของคุณ) ที่มีส่วนสำคัญในการสร้างสันติภาพหรือเกี่ยวข้องกับกิจกรรมสนับสนุนการสร้างสันติภาพหรือไม่ ถ้าใช่ มีความสำคัญอย่างไร และเกี่ยวข้องในกิจกรรมอะไรบ้าง

3. Compared to your village leaders do you think you trust (religious leaders) more? If yes, why? If not, why not?

หากเปรียบเทียบกับผู้นำฝ่ายปกครอง เช่น กำนันผู้ใหญ่บ้าน, อบต., อบจ., ผู้ว่าฯ, นายอำเภอ ท่านเชื่อใจผู้นำศาสนามากกว่าหรือไม่ เพราะอะไร

4. Do you think religious leaders in your province (district) are in good position to initiate peace-supporting activities? If yes, why? If not, why not?

คุณคิดว่าผู้นำศาสนาในเขตพื้นที่ของคุณอยู่ในสถานะที่ดีหรือเหมาะสมในการสร้างสันติภาพหรือไม่ ทำไมท่านจึงคิดเช่นนั้น

5. Why do you think religious leaders can initiate/engage in the peacebuilding activities/initiatives?

คุณคิดว่า เหตุใดผู้นำศาสนา จึงสามารถริเริ่ม หรือมีส่วนร่วมในกิจกรรมเกี่ยวกับการสร้างสันติภาพ หรือเป็นตัวแปรสำคัญในการสร้างสันติภาพ

6. What resources do you think religious leaders use/need in their peacebuilding activities/initiatives? Where are they from?

ทรัพยากรอะไรที่คุณคิดว่าผู้นำศาสนา ใช้ (หรือต้องการใช้) ในกิจกรรมการสร้างและส่งเสริมสันติภาพ (เช่น กำลังเงิน กำลังวัตถุ หรือเครื่องมืออื่นๆ) แล้วสิ่งเหล่านี้ผู้นำศาสนาหาได้จากที่ไหน

7. How do you think (the followers/other religious leaders/the government/the military/international partners/or other actors - depending on who the interviewee is) influence the peacebuilding activities/initiatives?

คุณคิดว่าตัวแสดงใด (เช่น ลูกศิษย์ ผู้นำศาสนาท่านอื่นๆ กลุ่มขบวนการ รัฐ เจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่านความมั่นคง ทหาร ตำรวจ ประชาสังคม องค์กรต่างประเทศ) มีอิทธิพลกระทบหรือชี้นำการกระทำหรือกิจกรรมการสร้างสันติภาพของผู้นำศาสนา

8. If you have a problem or need help with your peacebuilding projects, who (a religious leader) you will talk to and ask for advice/help? Why do you think it is useful to see him/her?

หากคุณมีปัญหาหรือต้องการความช่วยเหลือเกี่ยวกับงาน/โครงการเพื่อการสร้างสันติภาพของคุณ คุณจะขอความช่วยเหลือหรือคำปรึกษาจากผู้นำศาสนาไหม ผู้นำศาสนาคนใด และทำไมคุณถึงคิดว่าผู้นำศาสนาคนนั้นจะช่วยคุณได้

9. Do you have any suggestions or other comments on the roles of religious leaders in peacebuilding in the Deep South?

คุณมีความคิดเห็นอื่นๆเกี่ยวกับบทบาทของผู้นำศาสนาในการสร้างสันติภาพในพื้นที่สามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้หรือไม่